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“LA INTERPRETACIÓN DE KRIPKE SOBRE WITTGENSTEIN: PARADOJA Y COMUNIDAD”

POR COLIN MCGUINN

"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad" (Kripke's Interpretation of Wittgenstein: Paradox and Community) en: Wittgenstein on Meaning. An Interpretation and Evaluation, McGINN, Colin, Inglaterra, Basil Blackwell Publisher L t d, 1984, pp. 59-92 (Aristotelian Society Series, Volume 1)

Traducción: Profesor Joel Tucídides Madrigal Bailón, Licenciado en Filosofía, México Distrito Federal. Egresado de la Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana Unidad Iztapalapa (tucidides2000@yahoo.com.mx). Para educar y sin fines de lucro. Se permite la reproducción total o parcial citando al autor original.

"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

Sin mis seres amados, esta traducción jamás hubiera visto la luz:

A MARÍA IMELDA SOTO LÓPEZ

Porque su Náhuatl me enseñó a hablar el Castellano y aún me guía para entender el Inglés.
Licenciada en Letras Hispanas por la Normal Superior de México. Mujer culta dedicada a la educación de la niñez mexicana…. guía de muchas decenas de generaciones. Excelente maestra y magnífico ejemplo.

A INÉS BAILÓN SOTO

A mi querida Angélica, amante de los libros.

A CARMINA ITZEL RUÍZ MADRIGAL… PORQUE SU EXISTENCIA ME ENORGULLECE Y ME DA FUERZA PARA INTERPRETAR LOS SIGNOS DEL FUTURO.

"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

Porque la palabra es una…y la realidad es otra:

A los jubilados de México y Latinoamérica...Titanes humillados y olvidados.

Colin McGinn

Wittgenstein on Meaning
An Interpretation and Evaluation

Aristotelian Society Series Volume 1

Basil Blackwell • Oxford

© Colin M c G i n n 1984 First published 1984 in cooperation with The Aristotelian Society King's College, London W C 2 Basil Blackwell Publisher L t d 108 Cowley Road, Oxford 0 X 4 1JF, England Basil Blackwell Inc. 432 Park Avenue South, Suite 1505 New Y o r k , NY 10016, U S A A l l rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purposes of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.
British Library Cataloguing in Publishing Data

Contents

Preface N o t e on References Introduction 1 Wittgenstein's V i e w s : M e a n i n g , U n d e r s t a n d i n g , Rules 2 K r i p k c ' s Interpretation of Wittgenstein: Paradox and C o m m u n i t y 3 4 C r i t i c a l E v a l u a t i o n of Wittgenstein's Views Assessment of K r i p k e ' s A r g u m e n t s

vii ix xi

M c G i n n , Colin Wittgenstein on meaning. 1. Wittgenstein, Ludwig I. Title 192 B3376.W564 ISBN 0-631-13764-5

1

59 93 139 201

Index

Photoset and printed in Great Britain by Photobooks (Bristol) Ltd

Vili

PREFACE

more substantial; in the end it turned out to be a b o o k . My m a i n a i m in this b o o k is to give a clear and accurate account of what Wittgenstein actually thought, w i t h a view to critically evaluating his ideas. In pursuance of this a i m , I have perforce included a g o o d deal of quoted material and commented closely on Wittgenstein's actual words; I invite the reader to check for himself whether Wittgenstein is really saying what I say he is. I hope the b o o k w i l l be useful to students, as well as to their teachers; indeed, I have tried to write in a way that does not presuppose any prior knowledge of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. My greatest debt in the c o m p o s i t i o n of this w o r k is to M a l c o l m B u d d . We discussed Wittgenstein protractedly, and I was constantly reassured by the happy convergence of our views. H i s extensive knowledge of Wittgenstein's corpus and his sure grasp of its contents were a great help to me. He directed me to certain important passages in Wittgenstein, and saved me from more than one error of interpretation. He also read and commented upon the first draft and made several very helpful comments. It is seldom that one has the benefit of such disinterested and agreeable cooperation from a fellow philosopher. Other people also helped me to w o r k out my ideas. Audiences of seminars I gave at University College L o n d o n , the University of Southern C a l i f o r n i a , Bielefeld University and Stanford University made helpful comments which led to various improvements. Conversations w i t h Rogers A l b r i t t o n , A n i t a A v r a m i d e s , J i m H o p k i n s , Ian M c F e t r i d g c , M a r i e M c G i n n , D a v i d Pears, R i c h a r d Warner and C r i s p i n Wright (who commented in writing on my first draft) were also m u c h appreciated. Peter H a c k e r generously made detailed critical comments on my penultimate draft; I am very grateful to h i m for undertaking this labour and for the correspondence which ensued. I am also grateful to M a r t i n D a v i c s for his encouragement and his efficient editorial work. Lastly, I am again grateful to Katherine Backhouse for typing the w o r k and for he good h u m o u r in d o i n g it.
A

Note on References

References to Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (Blackwell: O x f o r d , 1974) are given simply by citing section numbers, or page numbers where appropriate. Other works of Wittgenstein are cited by using initial letters of their titles followed by section or page numbers, according to the f o l l o w i n g system: TLP : Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus K e g a n P a u l : L o n d o n , 1961) (Routledge and

Z
RFM OC PG RPP WLFM

:
:

Zcttel(mi)

Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (1978) : On Certainty (1979) : Philosophical Grammar (1974) : Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (1980) : Wittgenstein s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, ed. C. D i a m o n d (Harvester Press: Sussex, 1976)

A l l of these books (except for the first and last) are published by Basil B l a c k w e l l , O x f o r d .

Colin M c G i n n 10 June 1984

"La interpretación de KripKe sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

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2 2 Kripke's Interpretation of Wittgenstein: Paradox La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: and Community paradoja y comunidad POR COLIN McGUINN
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TRADUCCIÓN: JOEL TUCÍDIDES MADRIGAL BAILÓN In this chapter I shall contrast Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein with the interpretation I put forward in Chapter 1; we shall see that these interpretations are very different. Kripke's expository procedure differs somewhat from that adopted in the previous chapter: he does not expound Wittgenstein by paying close attention to the text, supporting each attribution with an apposite citation; rather, he develops a systematic argument which he hopes will make sense of, and occasional contact with, Wittgenstein's text. Kripke's assumption is that this argument is what underlies Wittgenstein's actual text, and that we shall understand Wittgenstein better if we see his text as the surfacing of this systematic argument in different ways and contexts: it is not that Wittgenstein is to be found explicitly propounding this argument, but we can illuminatingly treat his text as if he were. And it is this feature of Kripke's exposition which causes him to qualify his attributions to Wittgenstein from time to time - to admit that his way of presenting Wittgenstein is somewhat alien to Wittgenstein's own conception of his views. (1) We should therefore take seriously Kripke's prefatory caveat: “the present paper should be thought of as expounding neither "Wittgenstein's" argument nor "Kripke's" : rather Wittgenstein's argument as it struck Kripke, as it presented a problem for him”. (p. 5). En este capítulo yo compararé esta interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein, con aquella interpretación que bosquejé en el capítulo I. Tendremos que ver que estas interpretaciones son muy diferentes. El proceso expositivo de Kripke difiere de aquellos adoptados en el capítulo previo. Kripke no expone a Wittgenstein prestando mucha atención al texto, apoyando cada suposición con la cita correspondiente. Más bien él desarrolla un argumento sistemático el cual espera, mantenga sentido con el texto de Wittgenstein y haga contacto ocasional con aquel. El supuesto de Kripke es que este argumento es lo que subyace realmente en el texto de Wittgenstein y lo entenderemos mejor si vemos al texto como el revestimiento de cierto argumento sistemático en diferentes maneras y contextos. No es que Wittgenstein deba de ser hallado completamente explícito proponiendo este argumento, pero es posible iluminar su texto como si pudiéramos proceder así. Y es este rasgo de la exposición de Kripke, lo que le lleva a identificar sus argumentos con los de Wittgenstein, y de cuando en cuando, a admitir que su forma de presentar a Wittgenstein es en realidad una extraña manera de presentar su propia concepción del trabajo de Wittgenstein. (1). Sin embargo, debemos tomar en serio la advertencia preliminar de Kripke: "Este documento no debe ser tomado como "la exposición de Wittgenstein" ni tampoco como "el argumento de Kripke", sino más bien como "el argumento de Wittgenstein como lo descubrió Kripke", como la manera en que el problema se le presentó a él " (p.5).

α

Tema: Kripke's Interpretation of Wittgenstein: Paradox and Community. La versión castellana puede descargarse de la página: http://es.scribd.com/ Por favor, para mejor opinión visite la página Web del profesor Colin McGuinn en: http://mcginn.philospot.com/ . Extraído del libro original. Referencia bibliografía: "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"( Kripke's Interpretation of Wittgenstein: Paradox and Community) en: Wittgenstein on Meaning. An Interpretation and Evaluation, McGINN, Colin, Inglaterra, Basil Blackwell Publisher L t d, 1984, pp. 59-92 (Aristotelian Society Series, Volume 1). Las notas originales (1) se han colocado a final de texto y se han reservado los pies de página para algunas notas adicionales. Esto pretende facilitar al estudiante la lectura. El acomodo de palabras ha variado ligeramente la paginación: algunos párrafos se han recorrido “al siguiente inicio de página” respecto a la versión original (vgr. Las líneas últimas de p. 63, se trasladaron a inicio de la 64). La paginación se maneja así: Arriba en un recuadro negro se pone el número aproximado en el formato original, y abajo la paginación particular de este documento. Traducido por el profesor Joel Tucídides Madrigal Bailón, Licenciado en Filosofía, México Distrito Federal. Egresado de la Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana- Unidad Iztapalapa. (tucidides2000@yahoo.com.mx) Para educar y sin fines de lucro. Se permite la reproducción total o parcial citando al autor original.

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Kripke is here disarmingly aware that he is foisting onto Wittgenstein's text what is not to be found inscribed on its surface; and this is why he adopts the method of exposition he does adopt. My own procedure has been quite different: I have assumed that Wittgenstein can be satisfactorily interpreted without seeing his text as the occasional surfacing of an underlying systematic argument but rather by paying close (and perhaps somewhat pedantic) attention to what he actually says. I would not therefore think it appropriate to issue the sort of caveat Kripke does. This observation is not intended as a piece of self-congratulation on my part, but as a recognition of the procedural difference between Kripke and me. In fact I believe that the more substantive differences stem fundamentally from this difference in respect of exegetical method. For what Kripke has done is to produce an impressive and challenging argument which bears little affinity with Wittgenstein's own problems and claims: in an important sense Kripke and the real Wittgenstein are not even dealing with the same issues (they have a different 'problematic'). I shall begin by summarising Kripke's interpretation, assuming some familiarity with its outline, and then I shall explain why I think it goes wrong as an interpretation. This task should be facilitated by what has already been argued in Chapter 1; since I believe I there gave ample textual evidence for my interpretation, it will be necessary only to spell out the points of disagreement and give some diagnosis of how Kripke came to the wrong interpretation. The general structure of Wittgenstein's argument, according to Kripke, is as follows. Wittgenstein focuses attention upon the normative notion of an application of a sign being (linguistically) correct, i.e. in accordance with its meaning. (This is not the notion offactual correctness, i.e. stating a truth about the world; it concerns the question which word is linguistically appropriate to the facts. Thus, for example, suppose I believe truly that this object is red; the question of linguistic correctness is then which word expresses this belief: is 'red' the word I ought to use to state the fact in which I believe?)

Kripke está sereno y consciente de que en realidad está parafraseando en el texto de Wittgenstein, escudriñando lo que no puede hallarse en su superficie... y precisamente esta es la razón por la que él adopta este método de exposición. Pero mi procedimiento ha sido muy diferente: He asumido que Wittgenstein puede ser interpretado satisfactoriamente sin contemplar su texto como el recubrimiento ocasional de un argumento sistemático subyacente, sino más bien, prestando mucha atención (y de alguna manera "pedante atención") a lo que realmente dice. Sin embargo no pensaría apropiado cuestionar la clase de elucidación que Kripke hace. Esta observación no es una clase de auto-complacencia de mi parte, sino que es un auto-reconocimiento de la diferencia metodológica entre Kripke y Yo. En realidad creo que las diferencias más substanciales descansan fundamentalmente en este desacuerdo respecto al método exegético. La razón por la que Kripke ha hecho esto es para producir un argumento impresionante y cambiante el cual mantenga una pequeña afinidad con los problemas y afirmaciones propias de Wittgenstein. En un sentido importante, Kripke y el Wittgenstein real no siempre están lidiando con las mismas cuestiones (ellos tienen una "problemática" diferente). Debo comenzar resumiendo la interpretación de Kripke. Asumiré alguna familiaridad con su trabajo y después explicaré el por qué opino que no es viable su interpretación. Esta tarea será facilitada por lo argumentado en el capítulo I, pues creo haber presentado evidencia textual para mi interpretación. Será necesario, sólo para subrayar los puntos de desacuerdo y dar un diagnóstico del cómo Kripke llegó a una interpretación equivocada. La estructura general del argumento de Wittgenstein, según Kripke, es como sigue. Wittgenstein enfoca su atención sobre la noción normativa de una aplicación de un signo que es lingüísticamente correcto, por ejemplo, de acuerdo con su significado. [ Esta no es la noción de exactitud factual-o precisión objetiva (factual correctness)- por ejemplo al establecer una verdad sobre el mundo. Esto concierne a la cuestión de qué palabra es lingüísticamente apropiada a los hechos. Así por ejemplo, suponga que yo creo verdadero el que este objeto sea rojo. El caso del buen uso lingüístico será aquel donde la palabra refleje esta cuestión: ¿ Es "roja" la palabra que debo usar para expresar el hecho que considero? ]

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Nosotros pensamos ordinariamente que algunos usos de las palabras son correctos y otros son incorrectos. Algunos usos expresan correctamente el uso que deseamos declarar y otros no. El dilema de Wittgenstein consiste en imaginar en que consiste esta distinción ¿Qué es lo que hace correcto el uso de las palabras, más de una forma que de otra? Es claro que esta propiedad normativa de las palabras depende de que tengan un significado determinado. La noción de uso correcto esta bien definida si las palabras significan algo de una forma mejor que otra. Eso es lo que hace correcto el uso de una palabra en lugar de otra al expresar un hecho dado. Entonces debemos dar sentido a la idea de que una palabra signifique una cosa en lugar de otra, si es que queremos dar contenido a la noción de corrección (o incorrección) en el uso del lenguaje. Poniéndolo de otra forma: cualquier posible candidato para el significado de una palabra debe ser tal que logre sustentar una normatividad lingüística. Debemos ser capaces de entender por completo cuál es el uso correcto de una palabra a partir de cualquier pretendida propiedad constitutiva de la palabra. De esta forma, la normatividad del significado funciona como una condición de suficiencia sobre cualquier recuento de lo que es el significado (2). Ahora la afirmación de Kripke es que Wittgenstein encuentra esta noción de normatividad profundamente confusa, y por eso encuentra la noción de significado, correspondientemente confusa. Nada es generado de forma tal que implique el necesario vínculo con el requisito de la normatividad. No existe propiedad de una palabra desde la cual podamos determinar completamente su uso correcto, y así no hay nada que apoye la existencia de cierto significado. Esto es lo que Kripke llama "la paradoja escéptica" de Wittgenstein: la tesis de que no hay nada, ningún hecho, que pudiera dar la pauta para constituir un significado a favor de otro. Pero Wittgenstein (según Kripke) no desea dejarnos indefensos en las fauces de esta paradoja. El propone una "solución escéptica" a la paradoja, en la cual mientras se conceda al escéptico que ningún hecho constituye el significado, se conservará nuestra habla ordinaria con sus significados y reglas. La solución escéptica procede convenciéndonos de que nosotros no necesitamos generar la clase de recuentos del significado que el escéptico nos muestra que ya están agotados. Podemos tomar una posición totalmente radical del sentido de las afirmaciones acerca del significado, a saber, que tales afirmaciones no proponen para nada establecer hechos. Puesto que las adscripciones de

We ordinarily think that some uses of words are correct and some are incorrect, some uses correctly express the fact we want to state and some do not: Wittgenstein's question is supposed to be what this distinction consists in. What makes it right to use words in one way rather than another? It is clear that this normative property of words depends upon their having a determinate meaning: for the notion of' a correct use is well-defined only if words mean one thing rather than another - that is what makes it right to use one word rather than another to state a given fact. Therefore we need to make sense of the idea of a word meaning one thing rather than another if we are to give content to the notion of correct (or incorrect) use of language. To put it differently: any proposed candidate for the meaning of a word must be such as to sustain linguistic normativeness; we must be able to read off from any alleged meaning-constituting property of a word what is the correct use of that word. The normativeness of meaning thus functions as a condition of adequacy upon any account of what meaning is. (2)

Now Kripke's claim is that Wittgenstein finds this notion of normativeness deeply problematic, and hence finds the whole notion of meaning correspondingly problematic. For nothing can be produced to constitute meaning that meets the normativeness requirement: there is no property of a word from which we can read off its correct use, and so there is nothing for meaning to be. This is what Kripke calls Wittgenstein's 'sceptical paradox' - the thesis that there is nothing, no fact, that could constitute meaning one thing rather than another. But Wittgenstein does not (according to Kripke) want to leave us helpless in the jaws of this paradox; he proposes a 'sceptical solution' to the paradox which, while conceding to the sceptic that no fact constitutes meaning, nevertheless preserves our ordinary talk of meaning and rules. The sceptical solution does this by persuading us that we do not need to supply the kind of account of meaning the sceptic shows to be unavailable; we can take a radically different view of the significance of statements about meaning, namely that such statements do not purport to state facts at all. Since ascriptions of meaning and rule-following do

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not set out to state facts, it is no disaster for them that we can discover no facts for them to state; we can provide a quite different account of their function. This, then, is the general shape of Wittgenstein's argument, as Kripke sees it; let us now fill the argument in a bit.

significado y reglas de seguimiento no encaminan a establecer hechos, no es tan malo que no podamos descubrir hechos que puedan ser declarados. Podemos establecer un recuento completamente diferente de sus funciones. Esta es pues la forma general del argumento de Wittgenstein como Kripke lo ve. Permítasenos agregarle una pieza al argumento. La paradoja escéptica se presenta inicialmente a través de la consideración de un significado que yo ligo a signos usados en el pasado. Acrítica y normalmente, yo asumo que mi presente uso de (por decir) "+" concuerda con mi significado pasado. Así, al dar ahora la suma de 67 y 58, en respuesta a la pregunta "¿Cuánto es 67+58?", yo estoy interpretando "+" como lo hice en el pasado. Esto es, asumo que en el pasado yo quise significar adición a través de "+", y así me adapto a mi significado pasado (yo uso "+" correctamente) si se tomar las preguntas que contengan "+" como la exigencia de hacer alguna suma. La pregunta escéptica de Kripke radica en si esta suposición se basa en una reflexión legítima. Quizás en el pasado yo quise decir por "+" no adición sino “meta-adición” ó "suma cuarta" (Quaddition), una función matemática cuyo valor es 5 para el par de argumentos: "67 y 58" ¿Qué es eso acerca de mi historia pasada que me hace estar tan seguro de que quiero significar "suma" y no "suma cuarta", y que por ende me hace tan confiado de que mi respuesta lingüística presente deba responder conforme a mi significado previo (a saber: que 125 es la respuesta requerida para "67+58")? La pregunta escéptica es en efecto ¿Qué justifica mi confianza de que "+" tenga un significado constante para mi a través del tiempo?, ¿qué es lo que constituye esta presumible constante? Para contestar debemos ser capaces de señalar algún rasgo o punto de mi uso pasado, a partir del cual se comienza a significar "adición". La semántica escéptica afirma que esto no puede ser posible. [ En realidad la paradoja escéptica tiene dos aspectos: uno epistemológico y otro constitutivo o metafísico. Epistemológicamente la tesis es que ahora nada puede ser invocado para justificar mi supuesto de constancia semántica. Constitutivamente la tesis es que no hay ningún hecho relacionado conmigo, el cual pudiera constituir mejor el significado de adición en vez del de "suma cuarta". Este es el segundo aspecto más importante en la exposición de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein. El cambio epistemológico está supuesto principalmente, como un camino dentro del cambio constitutivo ] (3)

The sceptical paradox is initially presented by considering' the meaning I attach to signs I used in the past. I normally and uncritically assume that my present use of (say) accords with my past meaning, so that when I now give the sum of 67 and 58 in answer to the question '67+58? I am interpreting *+* as I did in the past: that is, I assume that in the past I meant addition by *+' and so I conform with my past meaning (I use'+1 correctly) if I now take questions containing '+' to require doing some addition. Kripke's sceptic questions whether this assumption is on reflection legitimate: perhaps in the past I meant by k+\ not addition, but quaddition, a mathematical function whose value is 5 for the pair of arguments 67 and 58. What is it about my past history that makes me so sure that I meant addition and not quaddition, and hence so confident that my present linguistic response conforms with my previous meaning (the response of giving 125 in answer to '67 + 58?')? The sceptic's question is, in effect, what justifies my confidence that'+' has a constant meaning for me over time: what is it that constitutes this presumed constancy? To answer this question we need to be able to point to some feature of my past usage that establishes that I then meant addition; and the semantic sceptic claims that this cannot be done. (In fact, the sceptical paradox has two aspects, an epistemological aspect and a constitutive or metaphysical aspect: epistemologically, the claim is that nothing can now be cited to justify my assumption of semantic constancy; constitutively, the claim is that there is no fact about me which could constitute my meaning addition rather than quaddition. It is the second aspect which is the more important in Kripke's exposition of Wittgenstein; the epistemological challenge is regarded chiefly as a way into the constitutive challenge.) [ 3 ]

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El caso de la paradoja escéptica procede eliminando candidatos. Primero, los cálculos actuales que envuelvan a "+" no serán suficientes para determinar lo que yo quise significar por suma ya que estos son lógicamente compatibles con otros significados mentales, relativos a funciones que concuerdan con mi adición. Mi cálculo es exclusivo de los números que realizan las operaciones que presentaron a "+". El caso puede cambiar en lo sucesivo. El uso actual de "+", ya sea externo o en mi cabeza, es el que subdetermina cuál es la función denotada. Hay muchas funciones indefinidas y distintas de la adición que son compatibles con aplicaciones finitas de "+", parecidas a la que yo realicé. En cualquier secuencia finita de aplicaciones de un signo, podemos planear siempre distintas formas de trabajo con el signo. De esta forma el signo se adapta a distintos usos del significado. Segundo, mis anteriores estados inherentes de conciencia, no pueden determinar lo que quiero significar, porque ellos admiten varias aplicaciones e interpretaciones. Ninguna experiencia que haya tenido puede dictaminar cuál es la manera correcta de usar un signo y cualquier significado debe tener prevista tal normatividad. Tampoco hay algún "estado mágico" de conciencia que sea capaz de hacer lo que los estados mundanos no puedan hacer. Así que, no hay hechos relativos a la conciencia que puedan otorgar una respuesta al escéptico. Tercero, Kripke considera la sugerencia de que mi significado pasado consiste en que yo tenía cierta clase de disposición lingüística. Por ejemplo, en lugar de observar mi uso actual del signo "+" respecto al pasado, hay que cambiar a la idea sobre el cómo estuve dispuesto a usar "+" y el cómo pude deducir aquel significado pasado de todo ello. El sentido de esta sugerencia es que ofrece la esperanza de que el problema de la indeterminación sea evadido. Ahora podemos citar el hecho de que en el pasado yo estuve dispuesto a decir "125" y no "5" en la respuesta a "67+58", aunque en realidad esta pregunta nunca surgiera. Entonces, las disposiciones de uso están supuestas o pensadas para reflejar la productividad del significado. Sus consecuencias se extienden más allá de la historia actual en que la persona usa el signo. La respuesta de Kripke a esta sugerencia

The case for the sceptical paradox proceeds by exhausting the candidates. First, my actual computations involving "+" do not suffice to determine that I meant addition, since these are logically compatible with my having meant some other function which agrees with addition for just the numbers on which I have performed computations with '+' but diverges thereafter. Actual use of "+" either externally or in my head. underdetermines which function is denoted; for there are indefinitely many functions distinct from addition which are compatible with the finitely many applications of '+' I have made. For any finite sequence of applications of a sign we can always envisage different ways of continuing to apply the sign which conform to different assignments of meaning.

Second, my past inner states of consciousness cannot determine what I meant because they admit of various interpretations or applications: no experience I have can dictate what is the right way to use a sign, and whatever meaning is it must provide for such normativeness. Nor are there any 'magical states of consciousness which are capable of doing what the mundane states cannot do. So there are no facts about consciousness which can furnish a reply to the sceptic.

Third, Kripke considers the suggestion that my past meaning consisted in my having a certain sort of linguistic disposition: instead of looking to my actual use of '+' in the past, let us turn to how I was disposed to use '+1 and read my past meaning off from that. The appeal of this suggestion is that it offers the hope that the underdetermination problem will be got round: for we can now cite the fact that in the past I was disposed to say 4125* and not 45' in answer to 467 + 58?\ even though this question never actually came up. Dispositions to use are thus supposed to mirror the productivity of meaning; their consequences extend beyond the actual history of a person's use of a sign. Kripke's reply to this dispositional suggestion consists in two observations: in the first place, dispositions to use arc finite, since human beings are finite objects existing for a finite

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time, whereas addition is a function with infinitely main arithmetical consequences; in the second place, speakers are disposed to make mistakes in their use of signs, and so dispositions by themselves cannot properly account for normativeness. The dispositional suggestion just equates, Kripke says, competence with performance: but performance by itself cannot capture the infinity of meaning nor its normativeness. So meaning addition by '+' cannot consist in being disposed to give the sum of arbitrary pairs of numbers on demand: some numbers are simply too big, and we may have systematic tendencies to give something other than the sum because of errors of calculation.

disposicional consiste en dos observaciones: en primer lugar, las disposiciones de uso son finitas ya que los seres humanos son objetos finitos existiendo por un tiempo finito, mientras la adición es una función con muchas e infinitas consecuencias aritméticas. En segundo lugar, los hablantes están dispuestos a cometer errores en su uso de los signos. Así las disposiciones por sí mismas no pueden propiamente dar cuenta de la normatividad. La sugerencia disposicional, dice Kripke, sólo iguala competencia con desempeño eficiente. Pero el desempeño eficiente por sí mismo no puede capturar la infinidad del significado ni su normatividad. Así, significar adición a través de "+" no puede consistir en "estar dispuestos a dar la suma" de un par de números arbitrarios dados. Algunos números simplemente son muy grandes y podríamos tener una tendencia sistemática a dar como resultado algo distinto a la suma natural, debido a errores de cálculo.

Kripke claims (on Wittgenstein's behalf) that these three replies to the semantic sceptic exhaust the possibilities, and so we must concede that there is nothing for my having meant addition to consist in. But once we concede this we admit that the same scepticism applies to my present use of “+”: for the same sceptical question could be asked about my present meaning at some future time, and the same range of possible answers will be shown to be inadequate then. Indeed, if we ask directly what constitutes my presently meaning addition and not quaddition we shall be faced with the same difficulty: actual use, present states of consciousness and present dispositions to use will all fail to fix a unique meaning for my words. So there is likewise nothing about my present use of signs that makes that use right or wrong: the whole notion of meaning appears to collapse. (4) This, then, is the first, negative phase of Wittgenstein's discussion of meaning, as Kripke interprets him.

Kripke afirma (según su interpretación de Wittgenstein) que estas tres respuestas al semántico escéptico agotan las posibilidades, y por eso debemos conceder que no hay nada que apoye el significado o idea que tengo de "suma". Pero una vez que admitimos esto, también admitimos que el mismo escepticismo aplica a mi uso presente de "+". En un futuro cercano, la misma pregunta escéptica podría aplicarse a mi significado en uso y entonces el mismo rango de respuestas posibles se mostrarán también como inadecuadas. En efecto, si preguntamos directamente qué es lo que constituye o apoya mi significado actual de "adición" y "suma cuarta", habremos de encarar la misma dificultad. El uso actual, los estados presentes de conciencia y las disposiciones presentes de uso fallarán en acordar un significado único para mis palabras. Del mismo modo, no hay nada en lo que respecta a mi uso presente, que señale que este sea correcto o equivocado. La noción entera de significado parece colapsarse. (4) Esto es el primer rostro negativo de Wittgenstein en la discusión sobre el significado, como Kripke la interpreta.

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The second, positive phase consists in an effort to draw the sting from the sceptical paradox while not questioning its substance. The strategy, as I remarked, is to reject the sceptic's presupposition that ascriptions of meaning are in the business of stating facts; rather, we are to conceive of their significance in terms of (a) their assertibility conditions and (b) their role or utility or point in discourse. The effect of this move is to undercut the key assumption of the sceptic: we are to see that all along he was attacking a straw man, though a straw man with whom we naturally and naively identify. According to Kripke, the change of perspective needed to fend off the sceptic reflects Wittgenstein's shift from the philosophy of language espoused in the Tractatus to that put forward in the Investigations: the sceptic is presupposing the kind of fact-stating model of meaning advocated in the Tractatus, and the cure for this scepticism is to adopt the different conception of meaning we find in the Investigations - with its emphasis upon the role of criteria and the place of language in our lives. The sceptic seems to us to be striking at the very notion of meaning only because we are powerfully attracted to the conception of language articulated in the Tractatus: if we can free ourselves from that conception we shall no longer feel ourselves threatened by the sceptic's arguments; but it is hard to tree ourselves from it, so the threat feels real. (5)

Lo segundo es un rostro positivo que consiste en un esfuerzo por bosquejar el corazón de la paradoja escéptica sin cuestionar su substancia. Su estrategia, como ya subrayé, es rechazar el supuesto escéptico de que las atribuciones de un significado están bajo negociación de hechos establecidos, en lugar de ello, debemos considerar esos significados en términos de (a) sus condiciones de asertabilidad o precisión y (b) su rol, utilidad o punto específico en el discurso. El resultado de este proceder es debilitar el supuesto clave del escéptico. Debemos ver que en todo este tiempo se ha estado atacando a un espantapájaros, el cual se ha identificado con naturalidad e ingenuidad. De acuerdo con Kripke, el cambio de perspectiva necesaria para evadir la reflexión escéptica de Wittgenstein oscila desde la filosofía del lenguaje expuesta en el Tractatus, hasta aquella puesta más adelante en las Investigaciones. El escéptico está presuponiendo el modelo de significado propio del "hecho establecido" presente en el Tractatus y la cura para este escepticismo está en adoptar la otra concepción del significado que encontramos en las Investigaciones (con un énfasis especial en el rol de los criterios y el lugar que tiene el lenguaje en nuestras vidas). El escéptico nos parece estar apuntando a la noción propia de significado, sólo porque nosotros mismos estamos poderosamente atraídos a la concepción del lenguaje articulada en el Tractatus. Si podemos liberarnos de tal concepción no tendremos que sentirnos amenazados por los argumentos escépticos, pero es difícil hacerlo así que sentimos que la amenaza es real. (5) Aunque Kripke no lo exprese por sí mismo de esta forma, hay según creo yo, otras áreas de la filosofía en las cuáles la misma estrategia ha sido aplicada y sería útil mantener esto en mente cuando nos preguntemos si Wittgenstein realmente procede como Kripke sugiere. Tres casos paralelos pueden mencionarse. Primero cierta clase de ética no-cognitivista (non-cognitivist) puede ser visualizada de forma análoga. El no-cognitivista tiene problemas para encontrar hechos capaces de corresponderse con afirmaciones éticas. Así se llega a sugerir que las expresiones éticas han sido concebidas de una manera "no establecida de hecho" (igual que las prescripciones a la acción o expresiones de emoción). Este tipo de visión podría ser motivada por la incapacidad de poder agregar hechos apropiados y "no-extraños" ("non queer facts") a lo que una verdad ética nos demanda intuitivamente, o tal vez también, por la convicción de que lo que agregamos a esa verdad es en cierto sentido metafísicamente "raro" . (6) En lugar de abandonar las expresiones éticas como simples sin sentidos en la ausencia de hechos éticos, el no-cognitivista

Although Kripke does not himself say so, there are, I think, other areas of philosophy in which much the same strategy has been tried, and it will be useful to have these in mind when we enquire whether Wittgenstein really proceeds as Kripke suggests. Three parallels may be mentioned. First, certain sons of noncognitivism in ethics can be viewed in an analogous way: the noncognitivist cannot find facts suitable for correspondence with ethical statements, and so he suggests that ethical utterances be conceived in a non-fact-stating way instead - as prescriptions to action or expressions of emotion, say. This type of view might be motivated by the incapacity of nonqueer facts to add up to what we intuitively demand of ethical truth or by a conviction that what would add up to that is in some way metaphysically rebarbative. (6) Instead of abandoning ethical utterances as meaningless in the absence of ethical facts the noncognitivist reinterprets their purport - he proposes a different conception of meaning for such sentences.

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Thus emotivism (say) can be seen as a sceptical solution to a sceptical paradox - the paradox, namely, that there is nothing in the world that could constitute the value-fact we naively take ethical assertions to require; and the sceptical solution is that these 'assertions1 serve rather to express the emotions of the speaker or some such thing. (7)

reinterpreta su objetivo. Él propone una concepción diferente de "significado" para tales afirmaciones. De esta manera, el "emotivismo" (por llamarlo así) puede ser contemplado como una solución escéptica a la "paradoja escéptica" . Esta paradoja, a saber, la que afirma que no existe nada en el mundo que pueda llegar a constituir un "hecho de valor". Tomamos ingenuamente las expresiones éticas como exigencias, y la solución escéptica es que estas "expresiones" sirven más bien para expresar las emociones del hablante o cosas parecidas. (7) Segundo, existe la doctrina del instrumentalismo en lo que respecta a los enunciados teoréticos de la ciencia. El instrumentalista no puede (según piensa) encontrar hechos genuinos que se correspondan con tales enunciados, pero preserva su rol en el discurso, interpretandolos de una manera distinta (como mecanismos útiles para organizar hechos auténticos). En vez de reaccionar a la falta de hechos apropiados evidenciando un habla llena de inadvertidos vacíos de significado, se renuncia al modelo de hechos establecidos y se opta por un balance diferente del significado (quizás en términos de condiciones de asertabilidad y utilidad organizacional). Tercero, ciertas orientaciones de los enunciados matemáticos despliegan esta forma dialéctica: buscando hechos que se correspondan con enunciados matemáticos, nos encontramos desanimados por la incapacidad de los actos mundanos para realizar este trabajo o por la aparente necesidad de postular hechos "extraños" (Platonismo). Así, abandonamos el modelo de hechos establecidos y ponemos en su lugar una explicación diferente del significado. Por ejemplo, que los enunciados matemáticos consiguen su significado de sus aplicaciones empíricas. De nuevo, esto puede ser apropiadamente caracterizado como una solución escéptica para una paradoja escéptica. Uno acuerda con el escéptico que ningún hecho matemático puede ser encontrado, pero uno evita esta conclusión tan radical (las matemáticas son un absurdo sin sentido) proponiendo un explicación o recuento alternativo del significado que haga de la paradoja escéptica algo irrelevante. (8) Creo que estos tres cuestionamientos ejemplifican la estructura general del argumento que Kripke atribuye a Wittgenstein. Podemos ver la dialéctica de Kripke como una que todavía agrega algún tipo de "anticogniscitivismo" a la lista de las doctrinas más familiares que nos han ocupado en estos tres ejemplos.

Second, there is the doctrine of instrumentalism with respect to the theoretical sentences of science: the instrumentalist cannot (he thinks) find any genuine facts to correspond to such sentences, but he preserves their role in discourse by interpreting them in a different way - as useful devices for organising the real facts. Instead of reacting to the lack of suitable facts by declaring talk of unobservables void of significance, he gives up the fact-stating model and opts for a different account of meaning - in terms, perhaps, of assertibility conditions and organisational utility. Third, certain views of mathematical statements display this dialectical form: seeking facts to correspond to mathematical sentences we find ourselves discouraged either by the incapacity of mundane facts to do the job or by the seeming necessity to postulate 'queer' facts (platonism); so we abandon the factstating referential model altogether and put in its place a different account 0f meaning e.g., that mathematical sentences get their significance from their empirical applications. This again would be aptly characterised as a sceptical solution to a sceptical paradox: one agrees with the sceptic that no mathematical facts can be found, but one averts his radical conclusion (mathematics is meaningless) by proposing an alternative account of meaning that makes the sceptical paradox irrelevant. (8) I think that these three issues exemplify the general pattern of argument Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein; we can see Kripke's dialectic as adding yet another kind of 'noncognitivism' to the list of more familiar doctrines of which I have given three examples.

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Hasta aquí, sólo he explicado el sentido en el que la visión positiva de Kripke sobre los enunciados semánticos, se transforma en solución escéptica. No he dicho nada sobre la forma que toma aquella visión positiva. La idea central, atribuida a Wittgenstein, es que las condiciones de asertabilidad y el punto de la adscripción del significado, envuelven esencialmente la noción de una comunidad. Entonces, decir que una persona significa adición con el signo "+" está justificado sólo si: (a) la persona converge en sus respuestas con "+", con las respuestas de alguna comunidad que use "+"; y (b) La persona puede confiar en que sus interacciones con los miembros de la comunidad dentro de situaciones que envuelvan que envuelvan al signo "+". Esto nos dice que: la noción de una regla es esencialmente la de una regla social. Envuelve relaciones interpersonales y así, no podemos dar recuentos de reglas seguidas en términos individuales. (9) No podemos, afirma Kripke, concederle sentido a alguien que sigue una regla "pensada en soledad". Kripke compara el resultado de esto con la explicación positiva de Hume acerca de la causación. La relación de causación entre un par de eventos no puede ser explicada solamente haciendo referencia a aquellos eventos, como suponemos ingenuamente. Más bien, cuando hablamos de relaciones causales, estamos (tácitamente) subsumiendo el par de eventos en cuestión, bajo una generalización que envuelve otros eventos. De esta forma, las condiciones de asertabilidad de la expresión: " e causó f " son inherentemente sociales. Los eventos pueden descansar en relaciones causales sólo en virtud de su filiación en una "Comunidad" de eventos. Kripke expone esto diciendo que no puede existir, según Hume, "causación privada", por ejemplo, una "regla de seguimiento individualista" a la manera de Wittgenstein. En suma, La solución escéptica consiste en dos movimientos: primero, el reemplazo de las condiciones de verdad (correspondientes con los actos) por las condiciones de asertabilidad. Segundo, la introducción del concepto de comunidad dentro de las noción de regla de seguimiento. Estos dos movimientos son lógicamente independientes pero lo que Kripke afirma es que ambos son necesarios si la paradoja escéptica se quiere resolver. (10)

So far I have only explained the sense in which Kripke's positive view of semantic statements is a sceptical solution; I have not said what form that positive view takes. The central idea, attributed to Wittgenstein, is that the assertibility conditions and point of ascriptions of meaning essentially involve the notion of a community. Thus to say that someone means addition by "+" is warranted just if (a) he agrees in his responses with the responses of some community who use and (b) he can be trusted in his interactions with members of a community in situations involving "+" . That is to say, the notion of a rule is an essentially social one, involving interpersonal relations; solve cannot give an account of rule following in individualistic terms. (9)

We cannot, Kripke says, make sense of someone following a rule “considered in isolation”. Kripke compares this result with Hume's positive account of causation: the relation of causation between a pair of events cannot be explicated solely by reference to those events, as we naively suppose; rather, when we speak of causal relations we are (tacitly) subsuming the pair of events in question under a generalisation involving other events. Thus the assertibility conditions of "e caused f" are inherently 'social': events can stand in causal relations only in virtue of their membership in a 'community1 of events. Kripke puts this by saying that there cannot, on Hume's view, be 'private causation'; as there cannot be 'private', i.e. individualistic, rule-following, according to Wittgenstein. In sum, then, the 'sceptical solution' consists in two moves: first the replacement of truth conditions (correspondence to facts) by assertibility conditions, and second the introduction of the community into the notion of rule-following. These two moves are, of course, logically independent, but Kripke's claim is that both are necessary if the sceptical paradox is to be answered. (10)

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What I have just given is a swift summary of a rich and detailed course of argument, intended to remind the reader of the salient points of Kripke's interpretation rather than substitute for.it. Let us now ask whether this interpretation accords with what Wittgenstein says, beginning with the question whether Wittgenstein really advocates a sceptical paradox about meaning and rules. The central passages to consider here are 198 and 201 in which Kripke takes Wittgenstein to be stating his sceptical thesis that there are no facts for meaning to consist in. Kripke quotes the beginning of 201: This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here. (201)

Lo que acabo de dar es un resumen ligero de un rico y detallado argumento. Intenta recordarle al lector los puntos principales de la interpretación de Kripke más que sustituir aquel. Permítasenos ahora preguntar si esta interpretación esta de acuerdo con lo que Wittgenstein dice, comenzando con la pregunta de si Wittgenstein realmente aboga por una paradoja escéptica acerca del significado y las reglas. Los pasajes centrales para considerar esto son el 198 y el 201 en los cuales Kripke interpreta a un Wittgenstein que recién toma la tesis escéptica de que no hay hechos que puedan denotar en qué consiste un significado. Kripke cita el comienzo del 201 Esta fue nuestra paradoja: ningún curso de la acción podría ser determinada por una regla, porque todo curso de acción puede ser elaborado para coincidir con la regla. La respuesta fue: Si todo puede ser elaborado para estar de acuerdo con la regla, en ese entonces también puede ser elaborado para estar en conflicto con ella. y de esta forma, no tendríamos conflicto o coincidencia aquí. (201)

But he signally fails to quote, or even to heed, what Pero él, señaladamente se olvida de citar, o aun de prestar atención, a lo que inmediatamente sigue de esto: immediately follows this: It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it. What this shews is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases. Puede verse que existe un malentendido aquí por el solo hecho de que en el transcurso de nuestro argumento, nosotros damos una interpretación después de otra; Como si cada uno se contentara al menos por un momento, hasta que se nos ocurriera quizás alguna idea detrás de ella. Lo que esto muestra es que hay una forma de captar la regla que no es una interpretación, pero que es exhibida en lo que nosotros llamamos el "obedecer la regla" e "ir en contra de ella" en los casos reales. Por lo tanto hay una inclinación para decir: Cada acción según la regla es una interpretación. Pero debemos restringir el término "interpretación" a la sustitución de una expresión de la regla por otra. (201)

Hence there is an inclination to say: every action according to the rule is an interpretation. But we ought to restrict the term "interpretation" to the substitution of one expression of the rule for another. (201)

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Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2

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Hay dos cosas a notar sobre este pasaje que desmienten la primera parte de la interpretación de Kripke (11) , Primero, Wittgenstein aclara inmediatamente que la paradoja indicada proviene de un malentendido, o sea una presuposición falsa. Así es que él no puede realmente estar respaldando a la paradoja, así como Hume no acepta los reclamos escépticos acerca de la causación. En segundo lugar, cuando nos preguntamos en qué consiste el malentendido, se nos dice que es el error de asumir que: seguir la regla significa establecer una interpretación sobre algún signo, es decir, asociándola con otra señal - una suposición que Wittgenstein piensa, estamos acostumbrados a seguir, pero no obligados a realizar. En otras palabras, Wittgenstein propone la paradoja como una reducción al absurdo de la concepción interpretacional; porque es el resultado inevitable de este malentendiendo sobre la naturaleza de seguir una regla. Wittgenstein no respalda más a la paradoja indicada, de lo que lo haría cualquier filósofo que da un Reductio a la posición de su adversario. Wittgenstein no dice que la paradoja surja del malentendido de las atribuciones a los "estados de hechos" en las reglas o a sus condiciones de verdad, ni sugiere que el error subyacente sea considerar al seguidor de la regla en alguna clase de aislamiento social; lo que él desaprueba es la concepción específica de entender todo esto como una operación mental de traducción. Si Kripke estuviera en lo correcto, Wittgenstein debe ser encontrado diciendo, después de su declaración de la paradoja: " Lo que esto muestra es que seguir una regla no es un hecho acerca de un individuo considerado en el aislamiento social "; pero esto es ni de lejos lo que él en realidad dice. Si hay un descuido crucial en la exposición de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein, es el de pasar por alto lo que Wittgenstein dice en 201 enseguida de decir la paradoja, pues Wittgenstein da aquí su diagnóstico más explícito de la paradoja… y lo que él dice está alejado de la imputación de Kripke. Esto se hace también muy claro en 198: La lección de la paradoja es que las interpretaciones no determinan el significado; No es que el significado no consista en hechos individuales. Lo que Wittgenstein dice es que ciertos tipos de hechos se fallan al determinar el significado, por ejemplo al sustituir un signo por otro, más no dice que no exista hecho alguno. (12)

There are two things to notice about this passage which give the lie to Kripke's interpretation. (11) First, Wittgenstein makes it clear immediately that the stated paradox arises from a 'misunderstanding', i.e. a false presupposition; so he cannot really be endorsing the paradox, as Hume embraces his own sceptical claims about causation. Second, when we ask what the misunderstanding is we are told that it is the mistake of assuming that grasping a rule is placing an interpretation upon a sign, i.e. associating it with another sign - an assumption which Wittgenstein thinks we are by no means compelled to make. In other words, Wittgenstein is putting forward the paradox as a reductio ad absurdum of the interpretational conception; it is the inevitable result of that particular misunderstanding about the nature of grasp of a rule. Wittgenstein no more endorses the stated paradox than does any philosopher who gives a reductio of his opponent's position. Wittgenstein does not say that the paradox arises from the misunderstanding that ascriptions of rules state facts or have truth conditions, nor does he suggest that the underlying mistake is to consider the rule-follower in social isolation; what he is objecting to is the specific conception of understanding as a mental operation of translation. If Kripke were right, Wittgenstein ought to be found saying, after his statement of the paradox: “What this shows is that grasping a rule is not a fact about an individual considered in social isolation” ; but this is nothing like what he actually does say. If there is one key oversight in Kripke's exposition of Wittgenstein, it is that of ignoring what Wittgenstein says in 201 straight after stating the paradox: for Wittgenstein here gives his most explicit diagnosis of the paradox and what he says is remote from Kripke's attribution. This is also made very clear in 198: the lesson of the paradox is said to be that interpretations do not determine meaning; it is not that meaning does not consist in individualistic facts. What Wittgenstein is saying is that certain sorts of facts fail to determine meaning, viz. substituting one sign for another, not that no facts do . (12)

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La mala interpretación de Kripke se vuelve evidente en sus comentarios acerca del tratamiento de Wittgenstein sobre el ' leer '. La lectura es un tipo de seguimiento de la regla, y de esta manera es que Kripke supone que Wittgenstein propone su paradoja para "leer", lo que consiste en un proceso interior - esto significa que la lectura no es un hecho individual sino que debe ser comprendido en términos de unas condiciones de asertibilidad social (13) . Pero cuando consultamos el texto encontramos que lo que Wittgenstein está oponiendo es una familia particular de puntos de vista acerca de la clase de hecho que supone el acto de leer: sea esto algo consciente, subconsciente o físico - y nos aconseja a mirar hacia lo que el lector hace: Pero en el caso de la máquina-lectora viviente, "leyendo" significó reaccionar a las señales escritas de tal o cual forma. Este concepto fue por consiguiente, muy independiente al de un mecanismo mental u otro parecido. - Ni el maestro puede decir aquí del alumno: "Quizás él ya estaba leyendo cuando dijo aquella palabra". En este caso no hay duda acerca de lo que él hizo.- El cambio cuando el pupilo comenzó a leer fue un cambio en su comportamiento, y tiene poco sentido aquí el hablar de una "primera palabra en su nuevo estado" . (157) No hay evidencia en estas secciones de que estemos bajo la amenaza de que la paradoja sobre la lectura nunca ocurra, de que no exista algún elemento en la lectura que de origen a esta; más bien, recibimos instrucciones de redireccionar nuestra atención de supuestos procesos interiores hacia los criterios exteriores que usamos al juzgar a alguien como un lector. De hecho estas secciones no contienen una declaración de la paradoja en absoluto, si no que más bien Wittgenstein está considerando un caso de seguir-la-regla; así es que a duras penas puede afirmarse que la paradoja sea el tema central y recurrente de Wittgenstein. (14) Pienso que la paradoja es mejor vista como simplemente una batalla en una guerra general en contra del modelo del proceso interno, no como el foco primario de la discusión entera de Wittgenstein. Kripke dice que la paradoja es en realidad el problema principal de las Investigaciones, pero su aparición aislada desmiente esta sugerencia; Y cuando esta aparece se nos figura más bien "como un clavo más en el ataúd del modelo del proceso interior, que termina clavado junto con algún número de otros clavos."

Kripke's misinterpretation comes out clearly in his remarks about Wittgenstein's treatment of 'reading'. Reading is a kind of rule-following, and so Kripke takes Wittgenstein to be propounding his paradox for reading - reading is not an individualistic fact but is to be understood in terms of social assertibility conditions. (13) But when we consult the text we find that what Wittgenstein is opposing is a particular family of views about the sort of fact reading is - that it consists in an inner process: conscious, queer, or physical - and advising us to look to what the reader does:

But in the case of the living reading-machine "reading" meant reacting to written signs in suchand-such ways. This concept was therefore quite independent of that of a mental or other mechanism.—Nor can the teacher here say of the pupil: "Perhaps he was already reading when he said that word". For there is no doubt about what he did.—The change when the pupil began to read was a change in his behaviour; and it makes no sense here to speak of la first word in his new state'. (157)

There is no suggestion in these sections that we are under threat of the paradox that reading never occurs, that there is nothing for reading to consist in; rather, we are told to redirect our attention from supposed inner processes to the outer criteria we use forjudging someone to be a reader. In fact these sections do not contain a statement of the paradox at all, yet Wittgenstein is considering a case of rule-following; so it can hardly be maintained that the paradox is Wittgenstein's central and recurrent theme. (14) I think the paradox is best seen as just one battle in a general campaign against the inner process model, not as the primary focus of Wittgenstein's whole discussion. Kripke says that the paradox is really the main problem of the Investigations, but its infrequent appearance belies this suggestion; and when it does appear it figures as one more nail in the coffin of the inner process model, to be hammered in along with a number of other nails.

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So the passages upon which Kripke bases his interpretation fail to support it and suggest instead a quite different view of Wittgenstein's intentions; but can Kripke's interpretation find sustenance in more general considerations? This question has two parts, corresponding to the constitutive and epistemological versions of semantic scepticism. That Wittgenstein is advocating a constitutive scepticism certainly seems hard to square with the fact that he does offer an account of the sort of thing understanding is: it is mastery of a technique, possession of a capacity, participation in a custom. And it is notable that Kripke nowhere registers Wittgenstein's concern to connect understanding with the concept of ability, as an alternative to the conception of understanding as a condition of consciousness. Nor does Wittgenstein show any tendency to contest the factuality of ascriptions of ability; he merely protests against what he takes to be misunderstandings about the sort of thing an ability is (e.g. a configuration of one's 'mental apparatus'). [15] De esta manera los pasajes sobre los cuales Kripke basa su interpretación fracasan en darle sostén y sugieren en lugar de eso, un panorama muy diferente de las intenciones originales de Wittgenstein; ¿Pero la interpretación de Kripke puede encontrar sustento en consideraciones más generales? Esta cuestión tiene dos partes, que se corresponden con las versiones constitutivas y las epistemológicas del escepticismo semántico. Que Wittgenstein "abogue por un escepticismo constitutivo" ciertamente parece no cuadrar con el hecho que él ofrece un argumento sobre la clase de cosa que es el entendimiento: Es maestría de una técnica, posesión de una capacidad, participación en una costumbre. Y es notable que Kripke en ninguna parte registre la preocupación de Wittgenstein por conectar el concepto de entendimiento con el concepto de habilidad, como una alternativa a la concepción del entendimiento como una condición de la conciencia. Ni tampoco nos muestra en Wittgenstein, alguna tendencia a objetar la factibilidad que tienen las "adscripciones de habilidad": Él solamente protesta en contra de aquello que nos confunde y nos lleva a malentendidos acerca de la clase de cosa que es una habilidad (por ejemplo la configuración de un ' aparato mental'). (15) Sería más preciso, creo yo, decir que Wittgenstein sitúa al entendimiento en una clase de hecho más que en otra tipo de figura; Pero si queremos capturar el espíritu verdadero de la discusión de Wittgenstein haremos mejor todavía en descartar todo juego con la noción de hecho y simplemente digamos que Wittgenstein ofrece una descripción de la ' gramática ' de la noción de entendimiento en términos de las nociones de habilidad, técnica, etcétera. No creo que Wittgenstein esté pensando aquí en términos de "hechos" y "no-hechos"; Ciertamente no hay evidencia textual contundente para sustentar este tipo de interpretación. Cualquier resistencia por parte de Wittgenstein para decir que el entendimiento consiste en, o es constituido por una capacidad, se arraiga en la desconfianza general sobre la empresa del análisis filosófico, y no de alguna convicción de que el entendimiento sea alguna clase de hecho. (16) Ciertamente, pienso que Wittgenstein habría estimado tal aseveración, y tal debate, como muy vacío, ya que no existe el recorrido filosófico sustancial para salirse de las nociones de: hechos, condiciones de verdad y correspondencia con las condiciones-en-el-mundo. Kripke mismo muestra alguna conciencia de esta situación, pero él

It would be more accurate I think to say that Wittgenstein locates understanding in one kind of fact rather than another kind; but if we want to capture the true spirit of Wittgenstein's discussion we do better still to drop all play with the notion of fact and simply say that Wittgenstein is offering a description of the 'grammar' of the notion of understanding in terms of the notions of ability, technique, etc. I do not believe that Wittgenstein is thinking in terms of facts and nonfacts at all here; certainly there is no hard textual evidence to support this sort of interpretation. Any resistance on Wittgenstein's part to saying that understanding consists in, or is constituted by, a capacity stems from a general distrust of the enterprise of philosophical analysis, not from a conviction that understanding is somehow not a fact. (16) Indeed, I think Wittgenstein would have regarded such an assertion, and such a debate, as quite empty, since there is no substantial philosophical mileage to be got out of the notions of fact, truth conditions and correspondence to conditions-in-the-world. Kripke himself shows some awareness of this kind of point,

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but he boldly brushes it aside in the expectation that he is conforming to the real spirit of Wittgenstein's position; but I think he should take more seriously Wittgenstein's deflationary remarks about truth and facts. (17) At any rate, if we want to talk in terms of facts it seems that Wittgenstein does suggest that understanding consists in a fact, the fact of having an ability to use signs.

atrevidamente disuelve la cuestión con la actitud de tan sólo "llegarse a asemejar" al espíritu real de la posición de Wittgenstein; Pero pienso que él debería tomar más seriamente los comentarios negativos de Wittgenstein acerca de la verdad y los hechos. (17) En cualquier caso, si es que deseamos hablar en términos de los hechos, tal parece ser que Wittgenstein sugiere que la comprensión consiste en un hecho, el hecho de tener una habilidad para usar signos. También estaría mal el interpretar a Wittgenstein como un escéptico epistemológico. Como enfaticé en el Capítulo 1, la negación de Wittgenstein respecto a que nuestro uso de palabras se funda en razones, no es aplicable escépticamente: El escéptico tradicional establece una demanda inadecuada e imposible sobre nuestros conceptos epistémicos, y la respuesta correcta para él, es cuestionar la necesidad de lo que a su decir: "no existe allí" . Andar escaso de razones, no significa estar en un apuro en el cual la duda sea la respuesta correcta; pues la duda puede ser eliminada por vía de nuestras reacciones habituales naturales. (18) Esta posición epistemológica instigaría a Wittgenstein a concederle al escéptico de Kripke, el comentario de que por supuesto que nuestras razones se acaban, pero esto no quiere decir que estemos en alguna clase de problema epistemológico (o mejor dicho de " pre vaciado " ): Que no pueda probar a un escéptico decidido que mi uso actual de ' + ' es correcto, no demuestra que no sepa cómo aplicarlo correctamente o que tengo menos derecho a proceder como me sienta inclinado. El autor de Sobre la Certeza seguramente no propondría la clase de argumento escéptico que Kripke desarrolla, deteniéndose sobre una concepción de conocimiento y derecho epistémico que él con tenacidad contrarresta. La epistemología de Wittgenstein detendría al escéptico de Kripke antes de que él emprendiera el camino; Así es que no podemos interpretar a Wittgenstein como concediendo victoria al escéptico epistemológico de Kripke y entonces ofreciendo lo que es en el mejor de los casos, una operación de salvamento. Una parte crucial de la paradoja constitutiva de Kripke es su rechazo de una concepción disposicional del entendimiento; Así es que deberíamos esperar, si Kripke comprende a Wittgenstein correctamente, que el mismo tipo de argumento sea encontrado en Wittgenstein, en vista de su importancia para el éxito de la tesis escéptica. Lo que encontramos, sin embargo, cuando nosotros buscamos por todos los sitios del texto de Wittgenstein es una falta total de cualquier cosa remotamente semejante a los tipos de

It would also be wrong to interpret Wittgenstein as an epistemological sceptic. As I emphasised in Chapter 1, Wittgenstein's denial that our use of words is founded on reasons is not intended sceptically: the traditional sceptic makes an inappropriate and impossible demand on our epistemic concepts, and the right response to him is to question the need for what he says there isn't. To lack reasons is not to be in a predicament to which doubt is the proper response; for doubt can be removed (better pre-empted) by our natural and habitual reactions. (18) This epistemoiogical position would prompt Wittgenstein to dismiss Kripke's sceptic with the remark that of course our reasons come to an end but this does not mean we are in any sort of epistemological trouble: that I cannot prove to a determined sceptic that my present use of "+" is correct does not show that I do not know how to apply it correctly or that I have anything less than a perfect right to proceed as I feel inclined. The author of On Certainty would surely not propound the kind of sceptical argument Kripke develops, resting as it does upon a conception of knowledge and epistemic right that he steadfastly resists. Wittgenstein's epistemology would stop Kripke's sceptic before he got going; so we cannot interpret Wittgenstein as conceding victory to Kripke's epistemoiogical sceptic and then offering what is at best a salvage operation.

A crucial part of Kripke's constitutive paradox is his rejection of a dispositional conception of understanding; so we should expect, if Kripke has Wittgenstein right, that the same sort of argument be found in Wittgenstein, in view of its importance to the success of the sceptical thesis. What we find, however, when we scour Wittgenstein's text is a total lack of anything remotely resembling the sorts of considerations about dispositions advanced by Kripke.

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consideraciones hechas por Kripke respecto de las disposiciones. Todo lo que Kripke puede decir para explicar esta disparidad es que Wittgenstein asume la respuesta disposicional del escéptico como algo poco atractivo para la audiencia de su libro al momento de escribir - mientras que la respuesta del estado consciente sea tomada como la respuesta natural para el escéptico, por parte de la audiencia. Es el cambio en el clima filosófico lo que explica el aparente desacuerdo entre lo que Wittgenstein dice y lo que Kripke argumenta. (19) Yo encuentro esta explicación poco convincente - por tres razones. Primero. me parece inconcebible que Wittgenstein se negara totalmente a considerar lo que es probablemente la reacción más natural del escéptico constitutivo; Seguramente la demolición de esta idea es esencial si la paradoja debe ser llevada a su término. Y la forma de la demolición de Kripke - las discusiones de finitud y errores - no encuentra eco en el texto de Wittgenstein: En particular, en los lugares donde Wittgenstein enuncia su paradoja uno esperaría que él indicara que la paradoja muestra (entre otras cosas) que la comprensión no es una disposición y no es explicada en términos de "recuentos de hechos" acerca del uso, en lugar de decir que (como él hace) que la paradoja refuta la concepción del interpretacional. En ningún sitio Wittgenstein dice, en el paralelo con su reclamo que las interpretaciones no determinan el significado, que las disposiciones fracasan al determinar el significado y que lo que esto demuestra es "que estemos lejos de captar una regla que no sea una disposición". Nosotros simplemente no encontramos las clases de comentario acerca de las disposiciones que la interpretación de Kripke nos conduce a esperar. En segundo lugar, y más probablemente, en aquellos raros casos en los cuales la noción de disposición es invocada por Wittgenstein, se construye una gran diferencia de enfoque respecto a Kripke. Así considere 149, el único pasaje en las secciones pertinentes de las investigaciones en las cuales la noción de disposición es explícitamente invocada: Si uno dice que conocer el abecedario es un estado de la mente, uno piensa en un estado de un aparato mental (quizá del cerebro) por medio de lo cual explicamos las manifestaciones de ese conocimiento. Tal estado es llamado una disposición. Pero hay objeciones, para hablar de un estado de la mente aquí, en tal medida que

All Kripke can say to explain this disparity is that Wittgenstein is assuming the dispositional reply to the sceptic to be unattractive to the audience of his book at the time of writing - whereas the conscious state reply is taken to be the natural response to the sceptic for that audience.

It is the change in the philosophical climate that explains the apparent difference between what Wittgenstein says and what Kripke argues. (19) I find this explanation unconvincing - for three reasons. First, it seems to me inconceivable that Wittgenstein would wholly neglect to consider what is probably the most natural reaction lo the constitutive sceptic; surely the demolition of this idea is essential if the paradox is to be carried through. And the form of Kripke's demolition - the arguments from finiteness and mistakes - finds no echo in Wittgenstein's text: in particular, at the places where Wittgenstein states his paradox one would expect him to indicate that the paradox shows {inter alia) that understanding is not a disposition and is not to be explicated in terms of counterfactuals about use, instead of saying (as he does) that the paradox refutes the interpretational conception. Nowhere does Wittgenstein say, in parallel with his claim that interpretations do not determine meaning, that 'dispositions fail to determine meaning' and that 'what this shows is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not a disposition'. We just do not find the kinds of remark about dispositions which Kripke's interpretation leads us to expect.

Second, and more privatively, in those rare places in which the notion of disposition is invoked Wittgenstein is clearly making a quite different point from Kripke. Thus consider 149, the only passage in the relevant sections of the Investigations in which the notion of disposition is explicitly invoked:

If one says that knowing the ABC is a state of the mind, one is thinking of a state of a mental apparatus (perhaps of the brain) by means of which we explain the manifestations of that knowledge. Such a state is called a disposition. But there are objections to speaking of a state of the

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mind here, inasmuch as there ought to be two deben haber dos criterios diferentes para tal estado: Un different criteria for such a state: a knowledge of conocimiento de construcción del aparato, muy aparte the construction of the apparatus, quite apart from de lo que hace. what it does. (Nothing would be more confusing here than to use the words "conscious" and "unconscious" for the contrast between states of consciousness and dispositions. For this pair of terms covers up a grammatical difference.) (149) Here Wittgenstein's objection seems to be that talk of dispositions is likely to be accompanied by the idea that knowledge is a state of mind; and he thinks that this way of conceiving of knowledge leads to the mistaken idea that there are two independent ways of telling whether someone (e.g.) knows the ABC - by examining his mental apparatus or by seeing what he does. Wittgenstein's purpose is, as usual, to discourage the inner state model of concepts such as knowledge, and he is warning us that talk of dispositions is apt to go along with this model; instead we should attend to what the person does. If Kripke's interpretation were correct Wittgenstein would have to be saying that what a person it disposed to do does not fix what he knows when he knows the ABC, but this is not what Wittgenstein says and indeed he seems to be suggesting just the contrary. (20) (Nada sería más confuso aquí que destinar las palabras: "consciencia" e "inconsciencia" para el contraste entre estados de conciencia y las disposiciones. (Pues este par de términos encubren una diferencia gramatical.) (149) La objeción de Wittgenstein parece hablar aquí, sobre aquellas disposiciones que tienen probabilidad de estar acompañadas por la idea de que el conocimiento es un estado mental; Y él piensa que esta forma de imaginar el conocimiento conduce a la idea equivocada de que hay dos formas independientes de decir si alguien (por ejemplo) sabe el abecedario - examinando su aparato mental o viendo lo que él hace. El propósito de Wittgenstein es, como siempre, desalentar el modelo del "estado interior" de conceptos, como conocimiento, y él nos advierte que hablar de disposiciones es algo muy propenso a estar de acuerdo con este modelo; en lugar de eso deberíamos ocuparnos de lo que la persona hace. Si la interpretación de Kripke estuviera en lo correcto Wittgenstein tendría que decir que lo que una persona se disponga a hacer, no altera lo que ella sabe sobre el abecedario, pero esto no es lo que Wittgenstein dice y es un hecho que él parece sugerir simplemente lo contrario. (20) En tercer lugar, Wittgenstein hace comentarios que en realidad sustentan la clase de sugerencia disposicional contra las que Kripke mismo compite: Es decir, Wittgenstein puede ser encontrado justificando, el significado en términos de un uso condicional más objetivo, de ese modo considere este pasaje: Lo que es esencial es observar que la misma cosa puede llegar con antelación a nuestras mentes cuando oímos la palabra, y sin embargo la aplicación todavía puede ser diferente. ¿Tiene el mismo significado ambas veces? Pienso que debemos decir con firmeza que no. (140) Es decir, si dos oradores difieren en su aplicación de un signo en ese entonces deberíamos decir que quieren decir algo diferente, a pesar de la identidad de sus estados conscientes: El uso determina el significado, no lo que subyace dentro de él. Este pensamiento de Wittgenstein no se ajusta bien al comentario de Kripke respecto a que las

Third, Wittgenstein makes remarks that actually support the kind of dispositional suggestion Kripke pits himself against: that is, Wittgenstein can be found explaining, meaning in terms of counterfactuals about use, thus consider this passage:

What is essential is to see that the same thing can come before our minds when we hear the word and the application still be different. Has it the same meaning both times? I think we shall say not. (140)

That is, if two speakers differ in their application of a sign then we should say that they mean something different, despite the identity of their conscious states: use determines meaning, not what transpires within. This thought of Wittgenstein's hardly fits with Kripke's claim that differences of dispositions to use

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do not suffice to establish differences of meaning, on account of the possibility of systematic mistake Wittgenstein remark from 140 shows no sign of acknowledgment of this kind of point, which would be amazing if he were really arguing in the way Kripke suggests.

diferencias entre disposiciones de uso, no son suficientes para establecer diferencias de significado, pues existe la posibilidad de errores semánticos, por eso Wittgenstein no muestra desde el 140 ningún signo de simpatía respecto a esta clase de punto, lo cuál sería realmente sorprendente si realmente estuviéramos argumentando todo esto en la forma que sugiere Kripke. Lo que Wittgenstein está haciendo aquí es dibujar el contraste entre la aplicación y lo que se presenta a la mente, estableciendo que la identidad de significado entre personas depende de una identidad con relación "a lo anterior" no "a lo más reciente"; Pero la interpretación de Kripke tendría a Wittgenstein insistiendo en la paridad de los dos tipos de circunstancia, no en el contraste entre ellos. En la perspectiva de Kripke, los estados conscientes y la aplicación se rehúsan a anclar el significado, y entonces por esto no se logra progresar en contra del escéptico; Pero Wittgenstein mismo evidentemente cree que hay una diferencia importante entre éstos con relación a la determinación del significado. (Esto es para no decir que Wittgenstein tenga alguna respuesta para el punto de Kripke acerca de los errores; Es simplemente que Wittgenstein se muestra despreocupado acerca de tales cuestiones en el pasaje citado - así que no podría ser que tuviera en mente lo que Kripke dice de él.) Un segundo pasaje sobre el significado de la presente cuestión, es éste: "Pero en aquel momento ya sabía (cuando di la orden), que él tenía que escribir 1002 después de 1000 - En efecto, y así usted puede decir que : "quiso decir aquello". La única condición es que no debe permitirse a si mismo el ser confundido por las gramáticas de las palabras "conocer" y "querer decir". Pues resulta claro que usted no quiso decir que "había pensado" o "conocido" el paso del 1000 al 1002 en aquel mismísimo instante -- y aún si hubiera "pensado" en este paso, todavía no habría "pensado" en otros más. Cuando usted dice cosas como: "Yo ya lo sabía en ese instante"... en realidad usted quiere decir algo así como: "Si me hubieran preguntado qué número era el que debía escribir después de 1000, entonces yo hubiera respondido: 1002"... y afirma que no tiene ninguna duda acerca de eso. Esta suposición es también de la misma clase que: "Si él se hubiera caído al agua, entonces mi deber hubiera sido saltar después de él.” - Ahora dígame: ¿Cuál es el error en su idea? (187)

What Wittgenstein is doing here is drawing contrast between application and what presents itself to the mind holding that identity of meaning between people depends upon identity in respect of the former not the latter; but Kripke's interpretation would have Wittgenstein insisting upon the parity of the two sorts of circumstance, not upon the contrast between them. On Kripke's view, both conscious states and application fail to fix meaning, and so equally make no progress against the sceptic; but Wittgenstein himself evidently believes that there is an important difference between these with respect to the determination of meaning. (This is not to say that Wittgenstein has some answer to Kripke's point about mistakes; it is just that Wittgenstein shows himself to be unconcerned about such issues in the passage quoted - so it cannot be that he has on his mind what Kripke has on his.) A second passage of so me significance for the present issue is this: "But I already knew at the time when I gave the order, that he ought write 1002 after 1000 Certainly; and you can also say you meant it then; only yon should not let yourself be mislead by the grammar of the words "know" and "mean". For you don't want to say that you thought of the step from 1000 to 1002 at that time - and even if you did think of this step, still you did not think of other ones. When you said "1 already knew at the time . . ." that meant something like: "If I had then been asked what number should he written after 1000. I should have replied 1002." And that I don't doubt. This assumption is rather of the same kind as: "If he had fallen into the water then, 1 should have jumped in after him". - Now, what was wrong with your idea? (187)

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What is notable about this passage is Wittgenstein's willingness to employ a counterfactual about what someone would have said in explanation of that person's having meant something. Applied to Kripke's favorite example. Wittgenstein's suggestion would run as follows: for me to have meant by '+' that '125' is the right answer to '67+58?' (assuming that this is a computation I had not come across or thought about) is for it to be true of me that had I been faced with that question in the past I would have given that answer. Wittgenstein is comparing the case of meaning (or knowing) paring the case of meaning (or knowing) with the case of trait of character such as bravery: to say I was brave yesterday is to assume that there are true counterfactuals such as 'If he had fallen into the water, I would have jumped in'; it is not to assume that I had somehow mentally rehearsed the brave action of saving a potential drowner.

Lo que es notable acerca de este pasaje es la tendencia de Wittgenstein para utilizar cierto condicional material sobre lo que alguien dice al intentar explicar lo que otra persona hubiera querido significar. Aplicado esto al ejemplo preferido de Kripke, la sugerencia de Wittgenstein sería como sigue: Para mi, ¿Es correcto decir con el signo "+" que "125" era la respuesta correcta a la suma "67+58"? (Suponiendo que éste es un cálculo al que no me había enfrentado o que hubiera pensado antes)… Esta verdad en mi, depende de haber reflexionado la cuestión en el pasado para entonces dar la respuesta correcta. Así Wittgenstein compara el caso del "significado" (o conocimiento) con un atributo de carácter particular como el de la valentía: Decir que fui valiente ayer es asumir que hay condicionales materiales verdaderos tales como "Si él hubiera caído al agua, yo habría saltado tras él"; aquí no se asume como premisa que de alguna manera yo hubiera "entrenado mentalmente" la acción valiente de salvar un naufrago potencial. Análogamente, querer decir algo en un momento dado es no tenerlo delante de la mente en ese instante. De esta forma, cada paso de la serie ' +2 ' ya ha pasado por el número uno; eso en lugar de estar dispuesto "a dar la respuesta correcta", por ejemplo, para el tipo de condicionales de conducta a los que Wittgenstein se refiere como verdaderos en la persona. (21) Es seguramente increíble que Wittgenstein haya podido escribir esto si su actitud para condicionales materiales relativos al uso fueran como Kripke sugiere; Pues Wittgenstein en efecto dice en 187 exactamente lo que Kripke le supone desechar. Es verdad que Wittgenstein no afirma que los condicionales materiales provean un análisis reduccionista de la noción de significado - él solamente dice que lo "más reciente" significa algo similar a "lo anterior" - pero esto debe verse como una reflexión sobre su sospecha ala idea entera del análisis conceptual; y no es impulsado por algún reconocimiento tácito a las clases de argumento que Kripke da cuando va en contra de explicar el significado en términos de condicionales. Lo que Wittgenstein sugiere es que podemos captar bastante de la gramática de la noción de significado invocando a condicionales que nos dirijan en la dirección filosófica correcta (o lejos de la dirección equivocada); Wittgenstein por consiguiente no puede ser interpretado como dirigiendo una campaña escéptica en la cual el empleo de condicionales sea una maniobra defensiva para cerrarse y aislarse. Lo que Wittgenstein debe estar diciendo, "en la interpretación de Kripke", es que

Similarly, to mean something at a given time is not to have it before one's mind at that time, so that every step of the series '+2' has already occurred to one; it is rather to be disposed to give the right answer, i.e. for the kinds of behavioural counterfactuals Wittgenstein cites to be true of one. (21) It is surely incredible that Wittgenstein could have written this if his atitude to counterfactuals concerning use were as Kripke suggests; for Wittgenstein is in effect saying in 187 exactly what Kripke supposes him to reject. It is true that Wittgenstein does not claim that the counterfactuals provide a reductive analysis of the notion of meaning something - he says only that the latter 'means something like' the former - but this is to be seen as a reflection of his suspicion of the whole idea of conceptual analysis; it is not prompted by an unstated recognition of the kinds of argument Kripke gives against explicating meaning in terms of counterfactuals. What Wittgenstein is suggesting is that we can capture enough of the grammar of the notion of meaning by invoking counterfactuals to point us in the right philosophical direction (or away from the wrong direction); he cannot therefore be taken to be conducting a sceptical campaign in which the employment of counterfactuals is a defensive manoeuvre to be blocked and repulsed. What Wittgenstein ought to be saying, on Kripke's

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interpretation, is that ascriptions of meaning are not tantamount to (mean nothing like) the assertion of counterfactuals about use; but this is the exact opposite of what he does say in 187.

las adscripciones de significado no son equivalentes a la declaración de condicionales acerca del uso (o algo parecido). Pero en la realidad esto es el opuesto exacto de lo que Wittgenstein intenta decirnos en 187. En este pasaje, así como en 140, Wittgenstein contrasta lo que ocurre en la mente de uno cuando algo es dado a entender con lo que es el verdadero de comportamiento de uno, incluyendo los condicionales acerca del comportamiento de uno. Wittgenstein no está entendiendo a estos dos aspectos como incapaces de sustituir la clase de hecho que el escéptico de Kripke está demandando. Por estas razones, entonces, dudo que Kripke esté en lo correcto al interpretar a Wittgenstein como abogando a favor de una paradoja escéptica diseñada para demostrar que no hay "hechos materiales" respecto a lo que queremos significar. Así que nada en la discusión de Wittgenstein sugiere el primer estadio negativo característico de las doctrinas que ya mencioné tiempo atrás. No estamos preparados para la clase de solución escéptica propuesta por los partidarios del emotivismo e instrumentalismo. No hay un distintivo entre condiciones de verdad y condiciones de asertibilidad que den cuenta del significado, Y entonces una supuesta comprobación de que las declaraciones semánticas no tienen condiciones definidas de verdad; expresan más bien, que hay una oposición entre dos concepciones diferentes de la naturaleza a que pertenece el significado - hablando en términos generales, concepciones que localizan el significado en lo interior y en lo exterior. (22) Y si ésta es la interpretación correcta, no estaremos justificados para explicar a Wittgenstein, como proponiendo que cualquier cosa merece ser llamada una "solución escéptica": su optimista punto de vista simplemente tiene el estatus de un recuento correcto de los conceptos en disputa, aunque sea un recuento que por varias razones nos resulta difícil de enfocar para aceptarlo, como algo adecuado y completo. No obstante, todavía podemos preguntar si Kripke tiene la razón de atribuir a Wittgenstein una concepción comunal de seguir-la-regla, independientemente de si esto es tenido en mente como una solución escéptica para una paradoja escéptica. Yo aseguro que esta adscripción es también equivocada.

In this passage, as in 140, Wittgenstein is contrasting what happens in one's mind when something is meant with what is, true of one's behaviour, including counterfactuals about one's behaviour; he is not treating both as sharing as incapacity to supply the sort of fact Kripke's sceptic is demanding.

For these reasons, then, I doubt that Kripke is right to interpret Wittgenstein as advocating a sceptical paradox designed to show that there is no 'fact of the matter' about what we mean. So nothing in Wittgenstein's discussion suggests the sort of negative first stage characteristic of the analogous doctrines I mentioned earlier; we are not being prepared for the kind of sceptical solution proffered by the likes of emotivism and instrumentalism. There is not a distinguishing of truth conditions and assertibility conditions accounts of meaning and then a purported demonstration that semantic statements have no determinate truth conditions; rather, there is an opposition between two different conceptions of the sort of thing meaning is - roughly speaking, conceptions which locate meaning in the inner and in the outer. (22) And if this is the correct interpretation, we will not be able to construe Wittgenstein as proposing anything that deserves to be called a 'sceptical solution': his positive view simply has the status of a correct account of the concepts at issue, though it is an account which for various reasons it is hard to see ourselves clear to accepting as adequate and complete. Nevertheless, we can still ask whether Kripke is right to ascribe to Wittgenstein a community conception of rule following, independently of whether this is intended as a sceptical solution to a sceptical paradox. 1 shall maintain that this ascription is also mistaken.

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La comunidad entra generalmente, según Kripke, por vía de la normatividad del significado y de las reglas: cuando decimos que alguien está usando una palabra equivocadamente, queremos decir que su uso de la palabra no está acorde con el uso hecho por otros miembros de una comunidad lingüística; y que el uso correcto esta sincronizado con cierto uso. Si nosotros consideramos al individuo en soledad, todo lo que podemos decir de él es que está usando las palabras correctamente, pero si ampliamos el panorama hasta su comunidad, podemos darle sentido a la idea indispensable de que esto pareciera ser algo engañoso, de que la persona no está en realidad usando las palabras con corrección. De esta manera, la condición de asertibilidad correcta para la frase <<Él quiere decir adición a través de "+">> está en que él responda con "+" para estar de acuerdo conmigo o con su comunidad, Y estas últimas personas están primitivamente facultadas a tomar dentro de si el significado de "adición" con el signo ' + '. En este tenor, Wittgenstein construye la noción de comunidad insertándola en la noción de "regla", de tal manera que "seguir-la-regla" no pueda ser concebida individualmente --- decir que alguien está siguiendo la regla es reconocer necesariamente la existencia de otros seguidores de la regla. De esta forma la noción de seguimiento de regla llega a ser una noción social, un poco a la manera en que las nociones de: "conformista", "miembro de un club" o "un guardarropa muy de moda" son nociones sociales: ninguna de estas propiedades pueden ser poseídas por individuos "considerados en soledad". Ahora veamos: ¿Existe alguna evidencia en el texto para esta interpretación de Wittgenstein? (23) Permítasenos re-examinar el periodo 198-202 en el cuál Wittgenstein está proponiendo una perspectiva positiva y la opone a la opinión que él rechaza. El elemento sobresaliente de estas secciones respecto a la presente conexión es que las palabras: "costumbre", "práctica" y "uso" nunca son relacionadas o "calificadas" con las expresiones "social" o "comunidad" --- y "costumbre/practica social" no son un pleonasmo (es decir, no son redundantes). Seguramente Wittgenstein hubiera insertado estos adjetivos calificativos si realmente hubiera querido sostener una concepción social de "segur-la-regla", especialmente en vista del hecho de que la introducción a la idea de comunidad está tomada como un resultado sorpresivo de simbólica importancia --- algo así Como estar en conflicto tajante con aquello que prevemos. Y si

The community enters, according to Kripke, by way of the normativeness of meaning and of rules generally: when we say that someone is using a word wrongly we mean that his use of that word disagrees with the use made of it by members of a linguistic community; and right use is agreement of use.

If we consider the individual in isolation all we can say is that it seems to him that he is using words correctly; but if we broaden our gaze to take in his community we can make sense of the indispensable idea that this seeming may be delusive, that he is not really using words correctly at all. Thus the correct assertibility condition for "he means addition by '+'" is that his responses with "+" agree with mine or those of his community, and these latter persons are primitively entitled to take themselves to mean addition by '+'. On this interpretation, Wittgenstein builds the notion of community right into the notion of rule, in such a way that rule-following cannot be individualistically conceived - to say someone is following a rule is necessarily to advert to other rulefollowers. Thus the notion of rule-following turns out to be a social notion in somewhat the way the notions of a conformist or a club member or a fashionable dresser are social notions: none of these properties can be possessed by individuals 'considered in isolation'. Now is there any textual support for this interpretation of Wittgenstein? (23)

Let us re-examine 198-202 in which Wittgenstein is putting forward his positive view and opposing it to the view he rejects. The most glaring feature of these sections in the present connection is that the words 'custom', 'practice' and 'use' are never qualified with 'social' or 'community' - and 'social custom/practice' is not pleonastic. Surely Wittgenstein would have inserted these qualifying adjectives if he really meant to maintain a social conception of rule-following, especially in view of the fact that the introduction of the community is taken to be a surprising result of signal importance - as sharply conflicting with what we antecedently expect. And if we look for a gloss on the use of 'custom' etc. we find, as 1 stressed in Chapter 1, the insistence that rules must be followed

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on more than one occasion - i.e. the existence of rules depends upon 'regular use'. Wittgenstein does use 'custom' and 'practice' to suggest the idea of a multiplicity, but it is a multiplicity of instances of rule following not of persons who follow the rules.

buscamos un comentario en el uso de "costumbre", etcétera, encontraremos (como señalé en el capítulo 1) la insistencia de que las reglas deben de seguirse en más de una ocasión --- por ejemplo, la existencia de reglas depende de un "uso regular". Wittgenstein usa "costumbre" y "práctica" para sugerir la idea de "multiplicidad", pero se refiere a la multiplicidad de instancias al "seguri-la-regla" y no a las personas que siguen las reglas. Y este es el detalle de la tesis general de Wittgenstein de que el significado es uso: Un signo tiene significado sólo en virtud de ser usado (repetidamente) de cierto modo. Esta tesis en sí no transmite ninguna sugerencia que el significado sea inconcebible en el aislamiento social. ¿Pero habrá algo más en estas secciones que pudieran estar supuestas para promover la interpretación comunal? Dos puntos pueden ser mencionados aquí. El primero tiene que ver con el uso de "privacidad" en 202. Kripke toma esta palabra como un intento de contrastar la expresión "social" a fin de que tenga aproximadamente el sentido de "privado" contenido en "propiedad privada". Por ejemplo, yo sugerí en el capítulo 1 que <<se contrastaba mejor con las palabras "público" o "abierto">>, al pensar por ejemplo, lo que se relaciona con lo acontecido secretamente dentro de la conciencia. En la comprensión de Kripke sobre la pretendida noción de privacidad respecto a la conducta abierta de una persona cuando dice estar siguiendo un "signo-establecido", debe ser considerado "privado", al menos si es descrito individualmente; así que muy bien podríamos afirmar que el comportamiento no-gobernado por una regla (por ejemplo el comportamiento de dolor) puede y de hecho toma su lugar "privadamente", ya que su descripción no requiere de una referencia a las otras personas.

And this is part and parcel of Wittgenstein's general thesis that meaning is use: a sign has meaning only in virtue of bemg (repeatedly) used in a certain way. This thesis does not in itself carry any suggestion that meaning is inconceivable in social isolation. But is there anything else in these sections which might be supposed to encourage the community interpretation? Two points may be mentioned here. The first concerns the use of 'privately' in 202. Kripke takes this word to be intended to contrast with 'social', so that it has roughly the sense 'private' has in 'private property', i.e. relating to a single individual; I suggested in Chapter 1 that it contrasts rather with 'public' or 'overt', i.e. relates to what transpires covertly within consciousness.

On Kripke's understanding of the intended notion of privacy a person's overt behavior say in following a sign-post, is to be considered 'private', at least if it is described individualistically; and so we could quite properly claim that all non-rule-governed behaviour (e.g. pain behaviour) can and does take place 'privately', since its description does not require reference to other people.

It is thus possible to wave your arm 'privately' but not Es entonces posible agitar su brazo "privadamente" pero no possible to follow the addition rule 'privately', posible el seguir la regla de adición "privadamente", según el constructo de Kripke respecto a lo que se sigue according to Kripke's construal of 'privately' in 202. "privadamente" en 202. What is public can be 'private' in this sense knowability by others is therefore not sufficient for non-privacy. We can even say that (non-relational) properties of material objects,, e.g. being cubical or weighing a stone, are possessed 'privately' in Kripke's sense, since their ascription does not make essential reference to other objects and their condition. Lo que es público puede ser privado, en este sentido, la cognoscibilidad a través de otros no es por consiguiente suficiente para no la privacidad. Nosotros siempre podemos decir que las propiedades de objetos materiales, por ejemplo el ser cúbicos o pesados como una piedra, son obtenidos "privadamente" en el sentido de Kripke, ya que su adscripción no hace referencia esencial a otros objetos o a su condición (es no-relacional).

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Now it seems to me that this would be a very odd way for Wittgenstein to intend his use of 'privately' in 202: in general he opposes 'private' to 'public' or 'oven', as in "private sensations)" (24) Kripke takes Wittgenstein to be saying in 202 that if rule-following were private in the sense that it involved just the individual rule-follower. then rules could not be nonnative - correct rule-following would collapse into apparently correct rule-following; whereas I take the claim of 202 to be that if rule-following were private in the sense of being a condition or process of consciousness, then self-ascriptions of rule-following would be infallible.

Ahora me parece que ésta sería una forma muy extraña para que Wittgenstein pensara su uso de "privacidad" en 202: aunque en general él opone lo "privado" sobre "público", tal como en el caso de las "sensaciones privadas" (24) . Kripke toma a Wittgenstein como diciendo en 202 que seguir-la- regla es algo privado en el sentido de que ello sólo envuelve a la persona que sigue la regla y así las reglas no pueden ser normativas - pues el seguir bien una regla se colapsaría en una corrección aparente del seguimiento . Así yo tomo la afirmación en 202 sobre la idea de que, si el seguimiento de reglas fuera privado en el sentido de ser una condición o un proceso de la conciencia, entonces nuestras auto-adscripciones al seguir la regla serían infalibles. Además de la plausibilidad global de la interpretación que prefiero, pienso que mi interpretación obtiene un mejor sentido del uso que Wittgenstein da a: "privadamente" en 202 - se ajusta mejor con el uso general de Wittgenstein de la noción de "privacidad". Como mínimo debería estar convenido que el uso de ' privadamente ' en 202 no puede ser citado para establecer la exactitud de la interpretación comunal.

Aside from the overall plausibility of the interpretation I prefer, I think that my interpretation makes better sense of Wittgenstein's use of 'privately' in 202 - it conforms better with Wittgenstein's general use of the notion of privacy. At the very least it should be agreed that the use of 'privately' in 202 cannot be cited to establish the correctness of the community interpretation.

The second point concerns Wittgenstein's mention of El segundo punto concierne a la mención de Wittgenstein de '"un hombre" en 199: 'one man' in 199: Is what we call "obeying a rule" something that it would be possible for only one man to do, and to do only once in his life?-This:, of course a note on the grammar of the expression "to obey a rule". (199) ¿Acaso lo que llamamos "obedecer una regla " es algo que sería posible hacer por solamente un hombre, y además hacerlo solamente una vez en su vida? - Esto es por supuesto una nota sobre la gramática de la expresión "obedecer una regla". (199) Lo que Wittgenstein antepone a esta cuestión es: "No es posible que hubiera debido haber solamente una ocasión en la cual alguien obedeciera una regla". El enigma que surge a primera vista aquí es: ¿por qué Wittgenstein debería plantear la pregunta de si es posible para un hombre "seguir una regla", para después contestarla diciendo que no es posible que exista una ocasión única de seguir una regla? (25) . Su respuesta, permítasenos notarlo, no es que "no sea posible para un hombre obedecer una regla": ¿Por qué parece entonces hacer una pregunta para la cuál no da respuesta (o quizás da media respuesta)? " Ya que Wittgenstein no contesta su pregunta diciendo que "el seguir reglas requiere más que un hombre", entonces el apartado 199 no puede ser citado como prueba de que Wittgenstein respalda una concepción comunal de reglas;

Wittgenstein's reply to this question is: "ít is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which someone obeyed a rule." What is prima facie puzzling here is why Wittgenstein should raise the question whether it is possible for one man to follow a rule and answer it by saying that it is not possible for there to be a single occasion of rule-following. (25)

His reply, let it be noted, is not that it is not possible for one man to obey a rule: Why then does he appear to ask a question to which lie gives no answer (or half an answer)? Since Wittgenstein does not answer his question by saying rule-following requires more than one man, 199 cannot be cited as evidence that Wittgenstein endorses a community conception of rules; but the passage certainly seems to raise the issue

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of whether rule-following is individual or .social. Sin embargo, este pasaje ciertamente parece desarrollar el What is going on here? asunto de si el seguir reglas es algo individual o social ¿Qué está ocurriendo aquí? The explanation that seems to me the most plausible is this: Wittgenstein's central contention in these passages, viz., that rules require many occasions of manifestation. is ambiguous as stated, between (a) the claim that each individual who grasps a rule must obey it on more than one occasion and (b) the weaker claim that there must be many occasions of rulefollowing possible distributed over several individuals. The latter claim would allow as possible the circumstance that each of many people obey a given rule only once, since this would be enough for the rule to be followed on many occasions. Now Wittgenstein's actual words in 199 commit him only to the weaker thesis, and so are compatible with the possibility that each person follows a rule only once; what they are not compatible with is the possibility that one man follows a rule just once - exactly the question he raises. The point being made, then, is that if there is just one man then he must follow his rules more than once, but if there are many men it can be enough to each follows his rules just once (or possibly not at all) I think this reading of 199 is consonant with the gist of other passages in which the question of how many occasions of rule-following are necessary is raised and answered; for example: In the same way it cannot be said either that just once in the history of mankind did someone follow a sign-post. Whereas it can be said that just once in the history of mankind did someone walk parallel with a board. And that first impossibility is again not a psychological one. (RFM p. 346) La explicación que a mi me parece la más plausible es esta: la controversia central de Wittgenstein en estos pasajes, a saber, que las reglas requieren muchas ocasiones de manifestación, es ambigua como se propone entre (a) la afirmación de que cada individuo que sigue la regla debe obedecer la regla en más de una ocasión y (b) la declarativa más débil de que deben haber muchas ocasiones de seguir la regla, posiblemente distribuidas sobre varios individuos. La última afirmación concedería como algo posible la circunstancia de que cada individuo entre la gente obedeciera a una regla dada tan sólo una vez, y esto sería suficiente para que la regla sea seguida en muchos casos. Ahora, las verdaderas palabras de Wittgenstein en 199 lo comprometen a la primera tesis, y de esta forma son compatibles con la posibilidad de que un hombre sigua una regla solamente una vez --- exactamente la cuestión original. El punto expuesto entonces, es que "si existe solamente un hombre", entonces él debe seguir sus reglas más de una vez, pero si existen muchos hombres, podría ser suficiente para cada uno el seguir sus reglas sólo una vez (o posiblemente ninguna) . Pienso que esta lectura de 199 está acorde con la expuesta en otros pasajes en los cuales la cuestión de "cuántas ocasiones de seguir la regla son necesarias", es planteada y respondida; por ejemplo: En el mismo sentido: No se puede decir tampoco que sólo una vez en la historia del género humano alguien halla seguido un signo-establecido, aunque si se puede decir que solamente una vez en la historia del género humano alguien "haya caminado en paralelo con una tabla" Y la primera imposibilidad no es, una vez más, una de corte psicológico. (RFM p. 346) Nada parece sugerir aquí que un solitario seguimiento-dela-regla sea imposible; pues esto no se descarta en la aseveración de que los signos establecidos tienen que obedecerse más de una vez. La razón que Wittgenstein saca a colación sobre la cuestión del "solitario seguimiento de reglas" en el 199 es que el quiere conceder la posibilidad de que estas ocasiones estén diseminadas sobre muchos individuos, cuando se afirma que "muchos casos son requeridos". No es, pienso, que él esté poderosamente atraído por la idea de "que existan muchos casos dispersos sobre los individuos" - cada uno de ellos, por así decirlo pero el siente la necesidad de admitir que esto es

There is no suggestion here that solitary rulefollowing is impossible; for this is not ruled out by the claim that sign-posts have to be obeyed more than once. The reason Wittgenstein broaches the question of solitary rule-following in 199 is that he wants to make allowance for the possibility that the occasions are spread over many individuals when he claims that many occasions are required. It is not, 1 think, that he is greatly attracted to the idea of spreading the many occasions over equally many individuals - one occasion each, so to speak - but he feels the need to acknowledge that this is logically compatible with his

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fundamental contention, viz, the multiple application thesis. As we saw in Chapter 1, he is anxious not to over-state this thesis, requiring only that there be some rules which are multiply obeyed and not that all should be; I surmise that in 199 he is again guarding against exaggerating a thesis which he thinks his readers may find it hard to accept even in its weakest form.

lógicamente compatible con esta argumentación fundamental, a saber, la aplicación múltiple de una tesis. Como vimos en el capitulo 1 el está ansioso no por imponer esta tesis, exigiendo solamente que existan algunas reglas, las cuales sean múltiplemente obedecidas aunque no lo sean todas ellas. Pero yo sospecho que en 199 Wittgenstein otra vez se cuida de exagerar alguna tesis que piense que sus lectores puedan encontrar difícil aceptar aun en su forma más débil. Así que yo concluyo que el apartado 199 no puede ser citado tampoco para establecer la interpretación comunal, una vez que está visto en el contexto y se ha leído cuidadosamente. Y además, ¿no sería asombroso si Wittgenstein hubiera adelantado su "tesis positiva" principal en un comentario tan corto y confuso? (26) Quizás debo aclarar que yo no estoy sugiriendo que en estos pasajes discutidos, Wittgenstein esté optando conscientemente por una concepción individualista, en oposición a otra concepción social del seguimiento de regla: esto es… no es que Wittgenstein halla hecho un análisis central con esta pregunta en mente y halla tomado una posición definitiva en ella. Más bien, mi opinión es que esta cuestión por entero es extraña a sus preocupaciones verdaderas: Sencillamente no es una pregunta contra la cual Wittgenstein estuviera combatiendo. Así que cuando yo digo que su enfoque positivo es "individualistico" yo más bien estoy imponiendo una clasificación sobre su posición, la cual ha sido traída desde el exterior. Si Wittgenstein hubiera sido cuestionado sobre la posición que tenía en este asunto, entonces creo que él habría respondido que estaba del lado individualista, pero no pienso que en verdad hubiera considerado esto de alguna importancia para la clase de problemas con los cuales se ocupaba principalmente. Esta debilidad general tiene que ver con el tipo de cuestionamiento que Kripke parece establecer. Esta debilidad, me parece, indica qué tan básica y profundamente la interpretación de Kripke se equivoca respecto a lo que Wittgenstein realmente tiene en mente. No sólo hace de Wittgenstein un defensor de la concepción comunitaria de la regla; sino que de hecho, lo inscribe fuera de cualquier posición considerada dentro del espacio de las perspectivas filosóficas en las que Wittgenstein opera. Así que el "Individualismo" que yo señalo en las opiniones establecidas por Wittgenstein, no deben verse como una doctrina que él esté "presto a defender"; es más bien una aclaración acerca de lo que encierra su "opinión positiva" del hecho, sin distinción de sus intenciones principales.

So I conclude that 199 cannot be cited to establish the community interpretation either, once it is seen in context and read carefully. And besides, would it not be astonishing if Wittgenstein had put forward his major positive thesis in such an oblique and laconic remark? (26) Perhaps I should make it clear that I am not suggesting that in these disputed passages Wittgenstein is consciously opting for an individualistic as opposed to a social conception of rule-following: that is, my interpretation is not that Wittgenstein IS centrally exercised with this question and is taking a definite stand on it. Rather, my view is that this whole issue is foreign to his true concerns: it is simply not a question with which he is wrestling. So when I say that his positive view is individualistic I am imposing a classification upon his position which is imported from outside: if he had been ask where he stood on this issue, he would have said on the individualistic side, but I do not think he would have reckoned this to be especially relevant to the problems with which he was centrally occupied. This general lack of concern with the kind of question Kripke sets up seems to me to indicate how fundamentally Kripke's interpretation misrepresents what Wittgenstein is really up to. Not only does Wittgenstein not advocate a community conception of rules; this is not even a considered position in the space of philosophical views within which he is operating. So the individualism I claim lo discern in Wittgenstein's stated views is not to be seen as a doctrine he is keen to promote; it is rather a claim about what his positive view in fact comes to, irrespective of his own main intentions.

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Hasta aquí me he dirigido a detallar consideraciones textuales, ahora quiero objetar algo a la interpretación Comunitaria bajo un telón de fondo más general, particularmente la relación con la tesis de Wittgenstein respecto a que seguimos reglas "ciegamente". Ya que pienso que el tipo de epistemología del Seguimiento de Reglas de Wittgenstein defendido es inconsistente con la sugerencia de Kripke respecto a que un seguimiento correcto consiste en llegar a un acuerdo con la comunidad. Como vimos en el capítulo 1, la opinión de Wittgenstein es que nuestra inclinación natural a seguir reglas como lo hacemos, no es algo que podamos justificar y tampoco solemos ser cuestionados para hacerlo --- obedecemos a las reglas "ciegamente" sin garantía alguna. Así que si alguien me desafía a justificar la aplicación de algún signo, todo lo que podemos responder al final es: "porque simplemente así lo hago siempre" (217), y nada demuestra en realidad que mi aplicación sea correcta (27) . Pero en la interpretación comunitaria de Kripke esta no sería la situación epistemológica, pues el consenso con otros le proporciona un "tribunal de apelación" en el caso de tal desafío. Suponga que alguien duda, en un ataque, que mi aplicación presente del signo "+" sea correcta, y que de hecho afirme que yo ahora estoy usando el signo "+" equivocadamente; (de acuerdo con sus significados pasados) Luego la solución escéptica de Kripke me ofrece una respuesta, a saber que mi uso actual es correcto, porque está de acuerdo con el uso hecho de ese signo por otras personas. Esto es, la perspectiva comunal me permite llegar más allá (ó a lo que subyace) en mi propensiones naturales de uso en el signo, como algo que puede ser citado para dar una justificación de estas propensiones, ya que la corrección, en la opinión de Kripke, es precisamente un dilema de concordancia comunal sobre el uso: La comunidad, en concreto, provee el tipo de orientación que Wittgenstein explícitamente dice que no existe. (28) La concepción de Kripke trata al seguimiento de reglas como un modelo de este aspecto: Si alguien desafía mi creencia que "estoy a la moda", entonces le puedo refutar señalando que mi modo de vestir está de acuerdo con el de ciertos miembros de mi comunidad - no me reduzco a decir que ésta es una creencia para la cual posiblemente no se requiera justificación.

So far I have been addressing myself to detailed textual considerarons; I now want to object to the community interpretation on a more general or thematic ground, namely its relation to Wittgenstein's thesis that we follow rules 'blindly'. For I think that the kind of epistemology of rulefollowing Wittgenstein advocates is inconsistent with Kripke's suggestion that right rule-following consists in agreement with the community. As we saw in Chapter 1, Wittgenstein's view is that our natural inclination to follow rules as we do is not something we can justify, nor are we required to justify it - we obey rules 'blindly', without guidance. So if someone challenges me to justify an application of a sign, all 1 can ultimately reply is 'This is simply what I do' (217); nothing demostrates that my application is correct. (27) But on Kripke's community interpretation this will not be the epistemoiogical situation: for agreement with others does provide a court of appeal in case of such a challenge. Suppose someone claims that it only strikes me that my present application of "+" is correct (accords with its past meaning) and that in fact I am now using "+" wrongly; then Kripke's sceptical solution offers me an answer, namely that my present use is correct because it agrees with the use made of that sign by others.

That is to say, the community view allows me to get beyond, or beneath, my natural sign-using propensities to something that can be cited to give these propensities a justification, since correctness, on Kripke's view, is precisely a matter of community concordance in use: the community, in short, provides the kind of guidance that Wittgenstein expltcitly says there isn't. (28) Kripke's conception makes rule-following like being in fashíon in this respect: if someone challenges my belief that 1 am in fashion, I can rebut him by pointing out that my mode of dress agrees with that of (certain) members of my cottimunity - I am not reduced to saying that this is a belief for which a justification is neither possible nor required.

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Nótese que Wittgenstein no dice que la comunidad considerada como un todo, siga las reglas ciegamente, pues por ejemplo, procede sobre las bases de una naturaleza humana colectiva, más bien su afirmación es sobre lo que "Yo hago". Así es que no sería factible para las palabras de Wittgenstein, el invertir su afirmación acerca de la ausencia de fundamentos racionales para el nivel de la comunidad, ni tampoco es correcto interpretarlo atenuando a la incomodidad epistemológica que pudiéramos sentir sobre mi falta de razones, dotándome con la prueba de conformidad comunal (29) . En realidad es precisamente la sed por el tipo de bases racionales "que Wittgenstein niega", lo que impulsa a Kripke a introducir a la "comunidad", más por supuesto esto va en contra directa de la posición de Wittgenstein --- Se está tratando de "encontrar las razones" por lo que "no se basa en razones" (pues no es necesario). Para ponerlo en pocas palabras, la interpretación de Kripke se equivoca, o subestima, el naturalismo epistemológico de Wittgenstein. Este punto es crucial para de la interpretación de Kripke, sobre la actitud que mantiene Wittgenstein respecto a la normatividad del significado --- lo que al parecer tomó como su naturaleza y fundamento. Kripke representa al Wittgenstein de la Investigaciones como preocupado con la pregunta: ¿Qué es lo que hace correcto el uso presente de un signo, por ejemplo, con respecto a nuestras intenciones lingüísticas previas? Y la respuesta que se supone da Wittgenstein, es que esto debe ser explicado en términos del acuerdo con la comunidad. Sin embargo yo pienso que un examen menos prejuicioso de los pasajes que nos atañen (138-142) revela que hay muy poco que pueda llegar a apoyar este tema, es decir, nosotros simplemente no encontramos a Wittgenstein preocupándose sobre la pregunta de si mis inclinaciones presentes para aplicar un signo, realmente se alinean con mi significado pasado. Me parece en realidad que la actitud de Wittgenstein sobre este tipo de cuestión raya en lo despectivo. (30) Su opinión es que: lo que subyace (si esta es la palabra) en nuestras prácticas y costumbres de uso de los signos, es nuestra naturaleza humana en interacción con un entrenamiento adquirido: esto es lo que explica nuestra irreflexibilidad al reaccionar. Las diferentes maneras de ser, investidas con una " forma diferente de vida", naturalmente podrían proceder de distintas maneras dado el mismo entrenamiento:

Note that Wittgenstein does not say that the community considered as a whole follows rules blindly, i.e. proceeds upon the basis of a collective human nature; his claim is that I do. So it would not be faithful to Wittgenstein's words to transpose his claim about the absence of rational foundations to the level of the community; and neither is it correct to interpret him as trying to alleviate the epistemological discomfort we may feel about my lack of reasons by equipping me with the test of community conforrnity. (29) In fact, it is precisely the thirst for the kind of rational basis Wittgenstein denies that causes Kripke to introduce the community; but of course this goes right against the thrust of Wittgenstein's position - it is trying to find reasons for what does not (and need not) rest upon reasons. To put it in a nutshell, Kripke's interpretation misses, or underestimates, Wittgenstein epistemological naturalism.

This point leads into the question crucial for Kripke's interpretation, of Wittgenstein's attitude toward the normativeness of meaning - what he took its nature and ground to be. Kripke represents Wittgenstein as preoccupied in the Investigations with the question what makes a present use of a sign correct, i.e. in accordance with our previous linguistic intentions; and Wittgenstein's answer is supposed to be that this is to be explained in terms of agreement with the community. However, I think that an unprejudiced examination of the passages with which we are concerned (138-242) reveals notably little that can be construed as a concern with this question: that is, we just do not find Wittgenstein fretting over the question whether my present inclinations to apply a sign really conform with my past meaning. It seems to me, in fact, that Wittgenstein's attitude towards this kind of question verges on the dismissive. (30) His view is that what underlies (if that is the word) our practices and customs with sings is our human nature in interaction with our training: this is what explains our unreflectively going on as we do, Different kinds of being, endowed with a different "form of life', could naturally go on in different ways given the same training:

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Now we get the pupil to continue a series (say + 2) beyond 1000 - and he writes, 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012. We say to him: "Look what you've done"-He doesn't understand. We say: "You were meant to add two: look how yon began the series!"-He answers: "Yes. isn't it right? I thought that was how I was meant to do it." Or suppose he pointed to the series and said: "But I went on in the same way."-It would now be no use to say: "But can't you see. . . .?"-and repeat the old examples and explanations.-In such a case we might say, perhaps: It comes natural to this person to understand our order with our explanations as we should understand the order: "Add 2 up to 1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to 3000 and so on." Such a case would present similarities with one in which a person naturally reacted to the gesture of pointing with the hand by looking in the direction of the line from finger-tip to wrist, not from wrist to fingertip. (185)

Ahora bien, conseguimos que nuestro alumno continúe una serie más allá de 1000 simbolizando esto con "+2" --- y entonces él escribe: 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012. Nosotros corregiríamos: "Mira lo que hiciste" --- y él podría no entender. Nosotros diremos: "Seguro quisiste decir agregar dos, pero mira cómo empezaste la serie... --- A lo que él diría: "Si, ¿es que no es correcto? Creí que era así como quiso decir que lo hiciera." O bien, suponga que él señala a la serie y dice: "Pero yo procedí como lo hago siempre. "--- En ese caso no sería apropiado reprochar:"¿Pero no lo ves...? --- y repetir los mismos viejos ejemplos y explicaciones. --- En tal situación podríamos reflexionar: quizás vendría a ser natural para esta persona entender "nuestro orden" (según nuestras explicaciones), así como nosotros deberíamos entender: "agregue 2 sobre 1000, 4 sobre 2000, 6 sobre 3000 y así sucesivamente." Tal caso presentaría similitudes con aquel en el que una persona reacciona naturalmente al gesto de dirigir su mirada (cuando apuntamos la mano en una dirección) desde la yema del dedo hacia la muñeca, y no de la muñeca hacia la yema del dedo. (185) Es nuestra naturaleza, que (en parte) se determine lo que queremos decir a través de nuestras palabras y que estas jueguen un rol que no pueda eliminarse de nuestro lenguaje de aprendizaje. Dado que esto es así, Wittgenstein no encuentra algo substancial respecto ala pregunta de si aquello a lo que naturalmente estamos inclinados a hacer realmente se construye con el significado de nuestros signos: Tal pregunta debe ser inútil, ya que lo que estamos inclinados a hacer por naturaleza es lo mismo que constituye aquello que queremos significar. (31) "Qué estamos inclinados a hacer por naturaleza" y "qué queremos significar" no son cuestiones que se puedan llegar a separar de la forma en ques estamos asumiendo el tema. Para Wittgenstein no existe el tipo de brecha que Kripke establece entre el significado y el uso determinado naturalemente.

It is our nature that (partly) determines what we mean by our words and which plays an ineliminable role in our learning language. Given that this is so, Wittgenstein sees no real substance to the question whether what we are naturally inclined to do really conforms with the meaning of our signs: such a question must be futile, since what we are by nature inclined to do is what it is that constitutes what we mean. (31)

What we are inclined to do by nature and what we mean cannot come apart in the way the question assumes. There is, for Wittgenstein, not the sort of gap that Kripke's sceptic trades on between meaning and naturally determined use.

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Leyendo un poco dentro de lo que Wittgenstein dice, creo que su respuesta a la pregunta de Kripke sobre el "qué determina la normatividad", podría establecer que: esta cuestión asume erroneamente que nuestros significados "no están sujetos (al menos en parte) a nuestras propensiones naturales" sino a algo lógicamente independiente de estas propensiones,luego él visualiza la posibilidad de que nosotros debieramos establecer, por naturaleza, un patrón de uso lingüísticamente correcto y todavía así, ese patrón pudiera ser incorrecto; pero el pensamiento sobre esta posibilidad envuelve la suposición equivocada de que una vez que los hechos naturales aecrca de nosotros se han agotado, aún permanezca cierto espacio para buscar qué es lo que determina el significado. Lo que debe reconocerse es que en algún nivel, el significado es re-estructurado por nuestra naturaleza: significar algo no es el logro de una mente trascendente divorciada de nuestra "forma de vida". La base de la normativa está en la naturaleza. (32) Una comparación de Wittgenstein con Hume podría ayudar a clarificar la posición de Wittgenstein. Supóngase que alguien propusiera la pregunta. "¿Qué hace que los juicios causales sean correctos a la vista de Hume? Si se concede que nuestras mentes estan constituidas de forma tal que formamos creencias causales cuando estamos expuestos a constantes eventos conjuntos,pensemos:¿ De qué le serviría a una creencia así formada, el ser verdadera o falsa?, ¿No podría nuestra mente llevarnos a formar una creencia causal en la forma que Hume describe, y aún así, esa creencia ser falsa? Es claro lo que Hume respondería a esta pregunta: no existe "el tipo de vacío" entre creencia y verdad que la cuestión propone, ya que la relación de causalidad no implica nada más allá de conjunciones constantes y la propensión natural de las mentes de formar expectativas - no hay nada en particular, independientemente de nuestras mentes (por ejemplo, algo "objetivo") que constituya una conexión necesaria. En la opinión de Hume entonces, la corrección en un juicio causal descansa, en última instancia, en nuestra naturaleza (mental), así que no puede ser que nosotros nos formemos juicios causales sobre la base de haber observado "conjunciones constantes" los cuales son (objetivamente) falsos, al menos en última instancia.

Reading a little into what Wittgenstein says, I think his response to Kripke's question of what determines normativeness would be that this question erroneously assumes that our meanings are not fixed (in part) by our natural propensities but by something logically independent of these propensities, since it envisages the possibility that we should by nature treat a pattern of use as linguistically correct and yet that pattern be incorrect; but the thought of this possibility involves the mistaken supposition that once the natural facts about us are exhausted there remains somewhere else to look for what determines meaning. What has to be recognized is that at some level meaning is fixed by our nature: meaning something is not an achievement of a transcendent mind divorced from our "form of life", The basis of the normative is the natural. (32)

A comparison of Wittgenstein with Hume may help to clarify Wittgenstein's position. Suppose someone were to put the question 'What makes causal judgements correct on Hume's view?' Granted that our minds are so constituted that we form causal beliefs upon exposure to constantly conjoined events, what is it for a belief so formed to be true or false: might not our minds lead us to form a causal belief in the way Hume describes and yet that belief be false? It is clear what Hume would reply to this question: he would say that there is not the sort of gap between belief and truth that the question presupposes, since causation involves nothing over and above constant conjunctions and the minds natural propensity to form expectations-- there is, in particular, nothing independent of our minds (i.e. objective) to constitute 'necessary connexion'. On Hume's view, then, correctness in a causal judgement ultimately rests upon our (mental) nature; so it cannot be that we naturally form causal judgements on the basis of observed constant conjunctions which are (objectively) false, at least ultimately.

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Solamente si uno rechaza la explicación "proyectivista" de la causación en Hume, podría tocar la cuestión de si nuestras inclinaciones naturales nos encaminan a tener creencias causales verdaderas al estar expuestos a conjunciones (encadenaciones) constantes. El aspecto en el que la posición de Wittgesntein se asemeja con la causación de Hume, es que ambos localizan la "fuente de la corrección" en una naturaleza dada, y no en algún aspecto de la realidad totalmente independiente de nosotros y nuestras inclinaciones naturales (33). La diferencia principal entre ellos (como lo subrayé en el capítulo 1) está que en Hume considera que su opinión es "Escéptica", mientras que Wittgenstein toma a la suya como "noescéptica", una vez que nosotros nos atenemos a la epistemología correcta. Y eso, por supuesto, sería radicalmente opuesto al espíritu entero de la posición de Hume sobre la causación, <<al encontrar una "corrección" acorde a los juicios causales de una persona, y compararlos con los de la propia comunidad>> : esto es, Hume podría no querer decir que la distinción entre creencias aparentemente correctas y las realmente correctas, se explica en términos de si "sus juicios" están de acuerdo con los "juicios de otros". Esto sólo sería un intento forzado por aplazar la conclusión escéptica de que nuestros juicios causales no se corresponden con ningún objeto o elemento externo de la realidad. Yo pienso que la interpetación comunitaria de Kripke cae en un error similar al de esta interpretación comunitaria de Hume respecto al qué constituye la corrección de una creencia causal: Kripke está obstaculizando una de las principales tesis de Wittgenstein --- que no existe un sitio en el que pueda apoyarme de inicio para justificar el cómo pudiera proceder naturalmente en mi aplicación de los signos, ni tampoco en la aplicación de otras personas. Kripke está tratando de localizar "lo que quiero significar" y en consecuencia busca una corrección lingüistica en algo externo a mi naturaleza como usuario del lenguaje, por ejemplo: en mis relaciones con una comunidad. Pero ello sería negarse a aceptar la afirmación de Wittgenstein de que mis juicios de corrección lingüistica no están basados en razones. La posición de Wittgenstein simplemente es esta: Lo que "quiero significar" es determinado por mi uso natural de las palabras, así que no podemos decir sensatamente si mi uso realmente está alineado y conforme a lo que mis palabras quieren significar. (34)

Only if one rejects Hume's 'projectivist' account of causation could one press the question whether our natural propensities lead us to have true causal beliefs upon exposure to constant conjunctions. The respect in which Wittgenstein's position on rules resembles Hume's on causation is that both locate the source of correctness in our given nature, not in some aspect of reality quite independent of us and our natural propensities. (33) The main difference between them (as I remarked in Chapter 1) is that Hume takes his view to be 'sceptical', whereas Wittgenstein takes his to be non-sceptical once we attain a right epistemology. And it would, of course, be radically contrary to the whole spirit of Hume's position on causation to locate correctness in the conformity of one's causal judgements with those of one's community: that is. Hume would not want to say that the distinction between seemingly true causal beliefs and really true ones is to be explained in terms of whether your judgemems agree with others' judgements. This would just be a doomed attempt to postpone the sceptical conclusion that our causal judgements correspond to no objective or external feature of reality. I think that Kripke's community interpretation of Wittgenstein makes a similar mistake as this community interpretation of Hume in respect of what constitutes the correctness of a causal bclief: Kripke is in effect jibbing at one of Wittgenstein's main theses-that there is nowhere 1 can turn to underpin or bolster how 1 naturally proceed in my application of signs, not even to other people Kripke is trying to locate what 1 mean, and hence linguistic correctness, in something external to my nature as a language-user, i.e. in my relations to a community; but this would be to refuse to accept Wittgenstein's claim that my judgements of linguistic correctness are not based upon reasons. Wittgenstein's position is simply this: what I mean is determined by my natural use of words, so that we cannot sensibly ask whether my use really conforms to what my words mean. (34)

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(compara Hume: las verdades causales son determinadas por regularidades que actuan sobre nuestras mentes para producir espectativas, así que no podemos sensatamente pedir que las expectativas consecuentemente producidas sean realmente correctas, es decir, que nos lleven a formar creencias causales verdaderas.) Esto no es, por supuesto, para decir que nuestra aplicación de las palabras jamás está equivocada, o que todo uso es auto-certificadamente correcto, sino que es para decir que los juicios de corrección lingüistica siempre descansan finalmente sobre propensiones a aplicar las palabras de cierta manera; A veces llegamos a hacer juicios de error lingüístico, pero estos juicios tienen su fuente última en nuestro sentido de lo que es correcto --- cosa que no implica prescindir por completo de nuestras inclinaciones naturales para aplicar los signos. Así que en la opinión de Wittgenstein, el error lingüístico es algo necesariamente local; No podemos hacer sentido real de la idea que nuestras formas naturales de uso de los signos están universalmente equivocadas, pues eso debería dar por supuesto que nuestro significado está arreglado por algo externo a nosostros . (35) En Cierto Sentido, entonces, Wittgenstein descarta como incoherente el tipo de escepticismo que yace detrás de la paradoja escéptica de Kripke: Me refiero al escepticismo general que cuestiona si mi uso de los signos alguna vez ha estado alineado con su significado - pues su significado de este modo no puede apartarse del uso que yo tenga de ellos. Es por esta razón que yo digo que Wittgenstein no habría perseguido ni hubiera forzado la cuestión de la normatividad, de la manera en que Kripke lo hizo; Y, como lo comenté, Wittgenstein en realidad no da importancia a la cuestión de la normatividad en estos capítulos de las Investigaciones Filosóficas. Mi replica a la interpretación comunitaria todavía no está completa. Alguien "casado" con esta interpretación podría permitir que los parágrafos 198-202 cayeran por si mismos en la cuenta de que Wittgenstein abraza una concepción social de las reglas, pero insistimos en que estas secciones no deben ser considerados de forma aislada, y cuando las ponemos en el contexto de otros pasajes veremos que deben ser leídos "como envolviendo" a la concepción social; es decir, 198-201 contienen implícitamente lo que otros pasajes hacen explícito.

(Compare Hume: the causal truths are determined by regularities acting upon our minds to produce expectations, so that we cannot sensibly ask whether the expectations thereby produced are really correct, i.e. lead us to form true causal beliefs.)

This is not, of course, to say that our application of words can never be mistaken, that every use is selfcertifyingly correct; but it is to say that judgements of linguistic correctness always rest in the end upon natural propensities to apply words in a certain way: we do sometimes make judgements of linguistic mistake, but these judgements have their ultimate source in our natural sense of what is right- they do not involve prescinding altogether from our natural propensities to apply signs. So, on Wittgenstein's view, linguistic mistake is necessarily local; we cannot make real sense of the idea that our natural ways of using signs are globally mistaken, since that would be to assume that our meaning is fixed by something external to us. (35) In a sense, then, Wittgenstein dismisses as incoherent the kind of scepticism that lies behind Kripke's sceptical paradox: I mean the general scepticism that questions whether my use of signs has ever conformed with their meaning - for their meaning cannot in this way come apart from the use 1 make of them. It is for these reasons that I say that Wittgenstein would not have pursued and pressed the question of normativeness in the way Kripke does; and, as I remarked, he does not in point of fact make a great deal of the question of normativeness in these sections of the Investigations.

My rejection of the community interpretation is not yet complete. Someone wedded to this interpretation might allow that 198-202 fail on their own to establish that Wittgenstein held a social conception of rules but urge that these sections should themselves not be considered in isolation: and when we place them in the context of other passages we will see that they should be read as embodying the social conception; that is, 198-202 have implicit what other passages make explicit.

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1 need, then, to consider what other passages might be thought to lend themselves to a community interpretation and show that they have a different purport. The section 1 have most often heard cited as displaying Wittgenstein's commitment to the social conception is 242:

Yo necesito de esta manera, considerar lo que otros pasajes pudieran haber reflexionado para llegar a prestarse a una "interpretación comunitaria" y después demostrar que tenían diferente propósito. La sección que más a menudo he oído citar como afirmando el compromiso de Wittgenstein con la concepción social es el 242: Si el lenguaje es un medio de comunicación debe haber un acuerdo no sólo en las definiciones, sino también (por raro que pueda parecer) en los juicios. Esto da la impresión de abolir la lógica, pero no es así.- por un lado el caso es describir los métodos de medida, y por el otro, el de obtener y enunciar los resultados de la medida. Pero lo que llamemos "la medida" es en parte determinado a través de una cierta constancia en los resultados de medida.(242) El punto es que Wittgenstein está construyendo aquí la noción de acuerdo, dentro de la noción de significado. Esta interpretación ignora, como lo enfaticé en el capítulo 1, que Wittgenstein hace en este pasaje una afirmación sobre las condiciones necesarias de comunicación: su afirmación es que para dos o más personas, compartir un lenguaje --significar lo mismo con las mismas palabras --- ellos también deben tener un acuerdo sobre sus juicios. Esta afirmación le concierne expresamente a un concepto social, en este caso, el de la comunidad lingüística, y así, naturalmente, está formulado en términos sociales; a saber, los de un acuerdo entre los miembros de una comunidad. Lo que Wittgenstein no dice, es que para que exista significado alguno, tiene que haber también un acuerdo inter-personal. Precisamente, lo que él no dice en esta sección es que la idea de "un dialecto individual" no tiene sentido. Él no descarta la posibilidad de que yo pueda emplear palabras con significados diferentes de los de otras personas, pero su punto es que si vamos a usar las palabras con el mismo significado continuo, entonces debemos estar de acuerdo en su uso. En efecto, a la interpretación que estoy rechazando, Wittgenstein habría contestado que absurdamente, no puedo decir con una palabra lo que "nadie más quiere significar con ella", ya que el sentido requiere un acuerdo inter-personal de uso. En general, la relación entre el acuerdo y las reglas, como Wittgenstein lo ve, se refiere a la noción de dos o más personas siguiendo las mismas reglas; acuerdo que no supone sea una condición necesaria del segumiento individual de la regla --- que requiere más bien, de una multiplicidad de ocasiones para su aplicación.

If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments. This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so.-It is one thing to describe methods of measurement, and another to obtain and state results of measurement. But what we call "measuring" is partly determined by a certain constancy in results of measurement. (242) The claim is that Wittgenstein is here building the notion of agreement into the notion of meaning. This interpretation ignores, what I stressed in Chapter 1, that Wittgenstein is in this passage making a claim about the necessary conditions of communication: his claim is that for two or more people to share a language - to mean the same by their words- they must agree in their judgements. This claim expressly concerns a social concept, viz. that of a linguistic community, and so naturally it is formulated in social terms, vi:, agreement between members of that community. What Wittgenstein does not say, and what fails to follow from what he does say, is that for there to be meaning at all there has to be interpersonal agreement. He is certainly not saying in this section that the idea of an idiolect makes no sense: he is not ruling out the possibility that 1 might employ words with different meanings from those of other people. His point is that if we are to use words with the same meanings then we must agree in their use. Indeed, the interpretation I am rejecting would have Wittgenstein claiming, absurdly, that I cannot mean by a word what no-one else means by it, since meaning requires Ínter-personal agreement of use. In general, the relation between agreement and rules, as Wittgenstein sees it, concerns the notion of two or more people following the same rules; agreement is not supposed to be a necessary condition of an individual's following a rule - that requires, rather, a multiplicity of occasions of application.

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Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2

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Lo que también pudiera confundirnos es que Wittgenstein habla típicamente de lenguajes comunales, por ejemplo el Inglés y el Alemán, y así formula sus afirmaciones en términos de estos lenguajes compartidos, pero no se debe deducir de ello que rechaza la noción misma de un lenguaje limitado a un solo individuo. Ya que muchas de la reglas reales son compartidas, (incluidas las reglas semánticas de los lenguajes naturales) es de esperarse que los ejemplos de Wittgenstein deban ser de este tipo; pero esto no debe tomarse para excluir la gran posibilidad de hallar reglas seguidas por solamente una persona --- y Wittgenstein no dice nada que sugiera que él intenta excluir esta posibilidad. No es que (como lo subrayé más atrás) Wittgenstein se halle especialmente ansioso de insistir en la coherencia un seguimiento solitario de reglas y de contestar a la concepción comunitaria, la verdad es que él simplemente está desinteresado en este tipo de cuestiones. Su cita de los signos comunales, por lo tanto, no significará un compromiso con el empleo esencialmente comunal de los signos; es más bien que para estos propósitos, él se encuentra indiferente a la cuestión. De manera similar, mucho puede ser dicho sobre el énfasis de Wittgenstein sobre la noción de entrenamiento en este recuento del lenguaje y las reglas. El entrenamiento es, por supuesto, un concepto social --- que envuelve una relación inter-personal --- y el entrenamiento en el uso de un signo puede decirse que apunta a un acuerdo entre el comportamiento del aprendiz y el del entrenador ¿Es este un compromiso de Wittgenstein con una concepción comunal de lo que es captar una regla? Evidentemente no, ya que lo dicho hasta ahora, implica que con el objeto de explicar el concepto del cómo un alumno capta la regla, nosotros debamos esencialmente hacer referencia al comportamiento del entrenador --- a menos que se trate de alguna habilidad adquirida por medio del entrenamiento, por ejemplo, patear una pelota. Wittgenstein hace énfasis en el entrenamiento no porque piense que todas las reglas son necesariamente sociales, sino porque ello ayuda a recordarnos sobre lo que realmente sucede cuando se consigue un entendimiento de las cosas: que este actúa como una prevención ( "o profiláctico") contra la creación de mitos. (36) (Debo decir que Wittgenstein mismo no muestra ninguna tendencia a apoyar su interpretación de la comunidad en cualquiera de las dos últimas consideraciones; lo menciono porque yo he escuchado citar estas ideas por otros, para dar soporte a la interpretación de la comunidad)

What may also mislead is that Wittgenstein speaks typically of communal languages, e.g. English and German, and so formulates his claims in terms of these shared languages; but it is not to be inferred from this that he rejects the very notion of a language confined to a single individual. Since most actual rules are in fact shared, including the semantic rules of natural languages, it is only to be expected that Wittgenstein's examples should be of this kind; but this should not be taken to exclude the very possibility of rules followed by only one person - and Wittgenstein says nothing to suggest that he intends lo exclude this possibility. it is not, as I remarked earlier, that he is especially anxious to insist on the coherence of solitary rule-following and to contest a community conception; the truth is that he is simply unconcerned whit this kind of question. His citation of communal signs thus does not betoken a commitment to the essentially communal employment of signs; rather, he is, for his purposes, indifferent to the question.

Much the same should be said of Wittgenstein's emphasis upon the notion of training in his account of language and rules. Training is, of course, a social concept - it involves an inter-personal relation - and training in the use of a sign may be said to aim at agreement between the trainee's behaviour and that of the trainer. Does this commit Wittgenstein to a community conception of what it is to grasp a rule? Clearly not, since nothing so far said implies that in order to explicate the concept of the learner's grasping a rule we must make essential reference to the behaviour of the trainer - any more so than for any skill acquired by means of training, e.g. kicking a ball. Wittgenstein emphasises training not because he thinks all rules are necessarily social but because it helps to remind us of what really goes on when someone achieves understanding: it acts as a prophylactic against myth-making (36) (I should say that Kripke himself shows no tendency to rest his community interpretation on either of the last two considerations; I mention them because I have heard them cited by others in support of a community interpretation.)

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Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2

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Yo no estoy, en esta réplica de la interpretación comunal, diciendo que Wittgenstein piense que la noción de una comunidad lingüística "no tenga importancia" o que sea totalmente irrelevante para un recuento apropiado del significado; ni tampoco estoy negando que cuando una lengua es común a otros pueda corregirse legítimamente el uso de las palabras: tampoco estoy negando que lo que otros significan con las palabras, pueda llegar a influir en lo que dice un hablante dado. Lo que yo estoy diciendo es que Wittgenstein no afirma que la misma noción de "regla del lenguaje" precise ser explicada en términos sociales --- que nosotros no podamos darle sentido a la regla --- . Wittgenstein continua de parte de un individuo dado a menos que relacionemos ese comportamiento individual con el comportamiento de alguna comunidad de seguidores-de-la-regla. Sin embargo Wittgenstein no apoya esta opinón acerca del entendimiento de una regla, más de lo que apoyaría a una visión paralela acerca del tener algún dolor o del recordar algo. y como lo he argumentado en el capítulo 4, es bueno que Wittgenstein no abrace estas ideas, pues estaría obviamente en un error. La diferencia entre la interpretación de Kripke y la mía se vuelve muy clara respecto a nuestros enfoques sobre la manera en que el parágrafo 202 se relaciona con las secciones posteriores, vinculándose (explícitamente) con el lenguaje privado (243F). La opinión de Kripke es que a través del 202, el argumento contra la posibilidad de un lenguaje privado, está esencialmente completo --- pues Wittgenstein ya demostró que tiene que existir un criterio público para la corrección de un uso lingüístico. Este resultado ya ha sido establecido porque el seguimiento de regla en general depende del acuerdo colectivo de la respuesta que un individuo ha de tener al seguir una regla, pues debe exhibir un comportamiento que otros puedan utilizar para corregir su declaratoria sincera de que está siguiendo cierta regla, ya que en esto consiste la normatividad de la regla. La noción de corregir la regla es explicada en términos de de la asertibilidad de condiciones, las cuales, están disponibles para los miembros de una comunidad lingüística, y así no existe la posibilidad de un seguimiento de reglas en el que otros no puedan saber si uno está siguiendo la regla correcta o incorrectamente (37). Este enfoque de lo que está pasando en el parágrafo 202 obviamente depende de la interpretación comunal que se tenga, por ejemplo, respecto a la construcción de un "acuerdo de respuesta" dentro de la noción del seguimiento de regla.

I am not, in rejecting the community interpretation, saying that Wittgenstein thinks the notion of a linguistic community is 'unimportant' or totally irrelevant to a proper account of meaning; nor am I denying that when a language is communal others may legitimately correct one's use of words: I am not even denying; that what others mean by words can determine their meaning on the lips of a given speaker. I am saying only that Wittgenstein does not hold that the very notion of a rule of language must needs be explicated in social terms - that we cannot make sense of rule-following on the part of a given individual unless we relate that individual's behaviour to the behaviour of some community of rulefollowers. Wittgenstein no more holds this view about understanding a rule than he holds a parallel view about being in pain or remembering something. And, as I shall argue in Chapter 4, it is well that Wittgenstein did not hold such a view, because it is dearly wrong.

The divergence between Kripke's interpretation and mine shows up sharply in our different views of the way 202 relates to the latter sections dealing (explicitly) with private language (243f). Kripke's view is that by 202 the argument against the possibility of a private language is essentially complete - Wittgenstein has already shown that there must always be public criteria for the correctness of linguistic use. This result has already been established because rule-following in general depends upon communal agreement of response for an individual to be following any rule he must exhibit behaviour which others can use to correct his sincere avowal that he is following a rule, since this is what the normativeness of rule comes to. The notion of correct rule-following is explicated in terms of assertibility conditions which are available to members of one's linguistic community, and so there is no possibility of following a rule which others cannot know one is following correctly or incorrectly. (37) This view of what is going on in 202 obviously depends upon the community interpretation interpretation, i.e. upon building agreement of response into the notion of rulefollowing.

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Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2

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En la interpretación que he presentado, no hay enlace directo entre el 202 y el argumento del lenguaje privado: 202 establece el escenario para esta discusión sin realmente completarlo. Mucha más labor argumentativa debe realizarse antes de la posibilidad de que el lenguaje privado pueda ser excluido.Lo que ha sido insinuado por el parágrafo 202 es la posibilidad de una "técnica privada", es decir, una capacidad de aplicar un signo de forma regular, la cuál no es constatada por otros. En el caso de los objetos públicos la técnica de uso será comprobable porque los objetos en sí mismos están accesibles a otros y entonces la regularidad de uso es verificable; pero si los objetos son privados, como se supone que las sensaciones siempre lo son, entonces no existirá explicación si el que habla se refiere a la misma (clase de) sensaciones en ocasiones distintas de uso. Creo que mi interpretación de la relación entre 202 y el material posterior sobre el lenguaje privado se ajusta mejor al procedimiento de Wittgenstein en aquellas secciones posteriores, pues Wittgenstein habla como si nuevas consideraciones hubieran tenido avances y no como si dibujáramos simplemente una consecuencia específica de conclusiones anteriores (38). Kripke, de hecho, afirma que Wittgenstein anticipa su paradoja escéptica con su solución desde antes de la primera sección de las Investigaciones, en cuyo caso la posibilidad de un lenguaje privado hubiera sido excluida desde el principio: pero esto parece ser improbable por sí mismo y una inspección de la sección 1 describe tan sólo un énfasis a favor de los actos y en contra de las "explicaciones" --- no existe ninguna mención especial ahí de la comunidad. Mi conclusión es entonces que el enfoque más tradicional donde el argumento del lenguaje privado surge (después del 243) es preferible a la de Kripke. Tal vez sería aceptable si el criterio de la estructura global de Kripke de las Investigaciones fuera correcto, pero no me da la impresión que así sea. Y la razón de que el libro de Wittgenstein no tenga la estructura que Kripke le atribuye, radica simplemente en que no tiene el contenido que Kripke piensa.

On the interpretation I have put forward, there is not this direct link between 202 and the private language argument: 202 sets the stage for that argument without actually completing it; more argumentative work has to be done before the possibility of a private language can be excluded. What is left open by 202 is the possibility of a 'private technique', i.e. a capacity to apply a sign in a regular way which is not checkable by others. In the case of public objects the technique of use will be checkable by others because the objects themselves are accessible to others and hence regularity of use is verifiable; but if the objects are private, as sensations have often been supposed to be, then there will be no telling whether the speaker is referring to the same (kind of) sensation on different occasions of use. I think my interpretation of the relation between 202 and the later material on private language better fits Wittgenstein's procedure in those latter sections, for he speaks as if new considerations were been advanced and not simply a specific consequence of earlier conclusions being drawn. (38) Kripke, in fact, claims that Wittgenstein anticipates his sceptical paradox and its solution as early as the very first section of the Investigations, in which case the possibility of a private language would have been excluded right at the beginning: this seems implausible in itself, and inspection of section 1 discloses only an emphasis upon acting as against 'explanations' - there is no essential mention there of the community. My conclusion is then that the more traditional view of where the private language argument occurs (after 243) is to be preferred to Kripke's. It would, perhaps, be pleasant if Kripke's view of the overall structure of the Investigations were correct, but it does not seem to me that it is. And the reason Wittgenstein's book does not have the structure Kripke attributes to it is that it does not have the content he attributes to it.

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Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2

"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad" Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2

1. See Kripke, pp. 5, 67-71. These qualifications particularly concern the skeptical thesis Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein. 2. See Kripke, pp. II, 23-4.

NOTAS CAPÍTULO 2

1

1. Véase Kripke, pp. 5, 67-71. Estas caracterizaciones particulares pertenecen a la tesis escéptica que Kripke atribuye a Wittgenstein. 2. véase Kripke, pp. 11, 23-4.

3 Kripke emphasises that his central problem is constitutive on p. 21, though he does initially state the problem more epistemologically (sec p. 8). His use of (he term 'sceptic' must therefore be understood in a slightly nonstandard way: Kripkc's scepticis not (primarily) interested in questions of certainty, knowledge or justification his real interest is 'ontological' or 'metaphysical'.

3 En la página 21 Kripke hace énfasis en que su problema central es constitutivo, aunque inicialmente el hace la declaración de que el problema es más epistemológico (véase p. 8). Sin embargo su uso del término "Escéptico" debe ser ligeramente entendido de una forma no convencional. La Escéptica de Kripke no está (fundamentalmente) interesada en cuestiones de certeza, conocimiento o justificación. Su interés real es "Ontológico" o "Metafísico". 4. "Parece ser que la idea entera de significado se desvanece en un soplo de aire" (Krpke p. 22) Inexplicablemente, esto da a Kripke "un sentimiento extraño y terrorífico" (p. 21) 5. Kripke explota este contraste relacionado con el Tractatus para imponer una estructura a las Investigaciones. Así las primeras secciones (1 - 137) tienen que ver con el derribe de la "verdad condicional", que es una concepción del lenguaje presente en el Tractatus, y además son la preliminar para resolver el problema escéptico (véase Kripke pp. 78 -9). Evidentemente, esta sugerencia arquitectónica podría ser correcta sólo si Kripke está en lo cierto al interpretar que Wittgenstein está resolviendo un problema escéptico, lo que significa una solución escéptica basada en condiciones de asertabilidad. Yo no creo que Kripke esté en lo correcto al interpretar así a Wittgenstein. 6. Pienso aquí en la opinión de J. L. Mackie de que los valores objetivos podrían ser metafísicamente "extraños". Véase su Ética: Inventando lo bueno y lo malo (Penguin Books, 1977) Capítulo I.

4. 'It seems that the entire idea of meaning vanishes into thin air' (Kripke, p. 22); understandably, this gives Kripke 'an eerie feeling' (p. 21). 5. Kripke exploits this alleged contrast with the Tractatus to impose a structure or, the Investigations according to which the early sections (1-137) are concerned to undermine the Tractatus truth-conditional conception of language, as a picliminary to solving the sceptical problem (see Kripke, pp. 78-0). Plainly, this architectonic suggestion can be correct only if Kripke is right to interpret Wittgenstein as solving a sceptical problem by means of a sceptical solution based upon assertibility conditions; and I do not think he is right so to interpret Wittgenstein. 6. I am thinking here of J . L . Mackie's view that objective values would be metaphysically 'queer': sec his Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Penguin Books. 1977), chapter I.

Traducción: Madrigal Bailón Joel Tucídides / UAM-iztapalapa / IN CALLI IXCAHUICOPA

"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad" Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2

2 7. This type of view saves meaningful ethical utterances in the absence of ethical tacts (truth) by rcconstruing such utterances as (logically) nonassertoric: an ethical sentence is meaningful while lacking genuine truth conditions because it is rcail) imperatival or exclamatory or hortatory or some such. And clearly a sentence can be meaningful in these ways without purporting to slate a fact. 7. Este tipo de visión conserva expresiones éticas con sentido aún en la ausencia de hechos éticos (verdades) al reconstruir (lógicamente) tales expresiones como noasertóricas. Un enunciado ético guarda completo significado a la vez que tiene ausencia de condiciones genuinas de verdad porque es en realidad una expresión imperativa, exclamativa o goza del el recurso conativo del lenguaje (por exhortación o fuerte petición: “¡Callad!”, “no matarás”). Evidentemente una oración puede llegar a tener completo sentido con estos medios sin proponerse por ello establecer un hecho. 8. Uno puede revisar a Paul Benacerraf, en su artículo "Verdad Matemática", Gaceta de Filosofía LXX (1973) como poseedor de una clase de problema escéptico, viz. ¿Cómo pueden ser las proposiciones matemáticas verdaderas y conocidas?. También vemos a Harry Field, en Ciencia sin números (Blackwell: Oxford, 1980) ofreciéndonos un tipo de solución escéptica, viz. Los enunciados matemáticos no necesitan estar supuestas como las poseedoras de genuinas condiciones de verdad, y así, no se invocan "extraños" hechos que puedan corresponderse con ellas. 9. Yo estoy usando "individualista" en el sentido en que Tyler Burge lo hace en su artículo: "Lo individualista y lo mental" en Estudios Filosóficos del Oeste Medio. Vol. IV, editado por P. A. French, T. E. Uething y H. K. Wettsein (Impresiones de la Universidad de Minesota , 1979). Esto es, la propiedad de una persona es individualista sólo en la idea de que esa propiedad pueda ser explicada sin referencia a la condición de alguna otra persona. Una propiedad es social en el caso contrario. 10. Es especialmente importante ver que la introducción a la comunidad se corresponde con las condiciones de asertabilidad y no con las condiciones de verdad. Esencialmente los mismos problemas afectarían un intento de encontrar un hecho social que quisiera dar razón de los fundamentos del significado. 11. Resulta significativo que en otros pasajes en los que la concepción interpretacional es rechazada, por ejemplo en BB p. 33-35 no se mencione a ninguna paradoja en la cuál nos encontremos en peligro inminente de caer, el punto de Wittgenstein respecto a estos pasajes estriba solamente en que nosotros no deberíamos pensar sobre el significado y el entendimiento en términos de interpretaciones internas (por ejemplo, símbolos) - él no está diciendo que esta sea la única manera en que podamos pensar si nos apegamos a una concepción "objetiva" de estos conceptos.

8. One might see Paul Benacerraf, in 'Mathematical Truth', Journal of Philosophy LXX (1973), as posing a kind of sceptical problem, viz. how can mathematical propositions be true and known; and Hartry Field, in Science Without Numbers (Blackwcll: Oxford, 1980), as offering a kind of sceptical solution, viz. mathematical sentences need not be regarded as possessing genuine truth conditions and so do not call for 'queer' facts to correspond to them.

9. I am using 'individualistic1 roughly in the sense Tyler Burge does in 'Individualism and the Mental', Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. IV, ed. P.A. French, T . E . Uehling and H . K . Wettstein (University of Minnesota Press, 1979): that is, a property of a person is individualistic just if the instantiation of that property can be explained without reference to the condition of any other person; a property is social just if this is not so. 10. It is especially important to see that the introduction of the community pertains to assertibility conditions and not truth conditions; for essentially the same difficulties would afflict the attempt to find a social fact for meaning to consist in. 11. It is significant that in other passages in which the interpretational conception is rejected, e.g. BB pp. 33—35, there is no mention of a paradox into which we arc in imminent danger of falling; Wittgenstein's point in these passages is just that we should not think of meaning and understanding in terms of inner interpretations (i.e. symbols) - he is not saying that this is the only way we can think if we cleave to a Tactual1conception of these concepts.

Traducción: Madrigal Bailón Joel Tucídides / UAM-iztapalapa / IN CALLI IXCAHUICOPA

"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad" Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2

3 12. More specifically, Wittgenstein is asking what it is about a person that determines his future use of a sign, and hts answer is that this is a matter of the technique of use of which he is master, not of what comes before his mind. If you like: the fact that gives signs life is a fact about use, not a fact about inner states. 12. Más específicamente Wittgenstein está preguntándose qué sucedería con una persona que determina sus usos futuros de un signo, y su respuesta es que este es un problema en la técnica de uso que él domina, y no en lo que viene desde antes a su mente. Si usted gusta: el hecho que da vida al signo es un hecho que tiene que ver con el uso, no es un hecho relacionado con ningún estado interno. 13. Véase Kripke, pp. 45 - 49. 14. Kripke dice: la paradoja escéptica es el problema fundamental de <<Investigaciones Filosóficas>> (p. 78) Parece ser muy clara la actitud de Wittgenstein hacia esta paradoja, lo que contrasta con la actitud de Russell con respecto a su paradoja clásica. Wittgenstein parece ver a su paradoja como un problema para todo aquel que asuma que el significado es una cuestión de interpretación, aunque no obstante él piensa que esa suposición no es del todo "compulsiva" e ineludible; mientras que la paradoja de Russell parte de suposiciones que parecen ser ineludibles - no hay sencillamente error en las premisas que generan contradicción. En una palabra, la paradoja de Wittgenstein no es un problema para Wittgenstein, pero la paradoja de Russell es un problema para Russell. 15. En particular el apartado BB pp. 113-17, que se ocupó de aclarar que la noción de habilidad no sugiere que aquellas sentencias que contengan el verbo << poder >> o alguno de sus cognados, no correspondan a ciertas "condiciones-en-el-mundo", sino que más bien deberíamos interpretar a las habilidades como una clase especial de proceso interno o estado que subyace "detrás" de lo que consideramos el ejercicio de habilidad. 16. Recuérdese que la forma que adopta la exposición de Wittgenstein es la de tener una perspicaz conexión de conceptos (véase 122): Él dice que la "gramática" del verbo "poder" y "ser capaz de" están "íntimamente ligadas" al verbo "entender·" (150) y no que nosotros podamos analizar verdaderamente lo posterior en términos de lo anterior. En realidad creo que la falla de enunciar condiciones suficientes y necesarias para la aplicación de un concepto, podría no tener sentido alguno para Wittgenstein, no importando la cuestión de si ese concepto pudiera ser interpretado en forma de un "hecho declarado".

13. See Kripke, pp. 45-49. 14. Kripke says: 'The sceptical paradox is the fundamental problem of Philosophical Investigations (p. 78). It might clarify Wittgenstein's attitude to this paradox to contrast it with Russell's attitude towards his class paradox. Wittgenstein sees hisparadox as a problem for anyone who assumes that meaning is a matter of interpretation, but he thinks that this assumption is not at all compulsory or unavoidable; whereas Russell's paradox arises from assumptions that seem inescapable - there is no straightforward mistake in the premisses that generate the contradiction. In a word, Wittgenstein's paradox is not a problem for Wittgenstein, as Russell's paradox is a problem for Russell. 15. In particular, BB pp. 113-17, which deals at some length with the notion of ability, does not suggest that sentences containing 'can' and its cognates do not correspond to 'conditions-in-theworld'; the point there is rather that we should not construe abilities as special sorts of inner processor state which lie 'behind' what counts as the exercise of the ability. 16. Remember that the form of Wittgenstein's account is to be the perspicuous connecting of concepts (see 122): he says that the 'grammar' of ‘can’ and 'is able to' is 'closely related' to that of 'understands' (150), not that we can actually analyze the latter in terms of the former. In fact, I think that the failure to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of a concept would, for Wittgenstein, have no significance whatever for the question whether that concept could be interpreted in a 'factstating' way.

Traducción: Madrigal Bailón Joel Tucídides / UAM-iztapalapa / IN CALLI IXCAHUICOPA

"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad" Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2

4 17. Kripke notes that Wittgenstein subscribes to a redundancy theory of truth (so called) in 136 (Kripke. p. 86), but he docs not, I think, draw the right lesson from this: given that 'true' adds nothing to the content of an assertion, it cannot be that Wittgenstein really wishes to deny that semantic sentences have truth conditions – on pain of denying that they express propositions. Similarly for 'it is a fact that 'or 'states a fact'. 17. Kripke repara en que Wittgenstein se suscribe a una redundante teoría de la verdad (por así llamarla) en 136 (véase Kripke, p. 86), pero pienso que él no rescata la lección correcta de todo esto: Dado que ' "la verdad" no le añade nada al el contenido de una aseveración, no puede ser que Wittgenstein realmente desee negar que las frases semánticas tengan condiciones de verdad - so pena de negar que ellas expresan proposiciones. Algo semejante sucede con las expresiones: "es un hecho que " y " estado de hecho". 18. Véase este fragmento: << Pero si usted "está seguro", pues no es que usted este "cerrando los ojos" al encarar la duda - lo que pasa es que ya están cerrados>> (p. 224) Él dice que el asunto de la duda, en ciertos tipos de caso estándar, simplemente no surge de nosotros, así es que el escéptico no puede causar impacto en nuestra confianza usual, inventando alguna duda (en tal caso, deberíamos mantener nuestros ojos firmemente cerrados). 19. Véase a Kripke, p.43. En realidad esta explicación de la disparidad no encuadra en los hechos históricos muy adecuadamente, ya que el conductismo disfrutó de una considerable moda en el tiempo que Wittgenstein estaba escribiendo lo que se convertiría en las Investigaciones y en los argumentos disposicionales psicológicos donde fue ampliamente apoyado por Russell, en particular, fue poderosamente influenciado por el conductismo, tal como Kripke mismo lo reconoce [Kripke p . 25 ] véase Russell, Mi Desarrollo Filosófico (George Allen y Uwin: Londres, 1959, especialmente capítulos 11-13). Si la interpretación de Kripke fuera correcta, en vista del predominio de tales doctrinas al momento de la redacción de su obra, uno podría haber pensado que Wittgenstein tomaría entonces ideas y refutaciones con alguna prioridad inicial. 20. Esto es, Wittgenstein desaprueba la noción de disposición si esta noción es comprendida independientemente del comportamiento, o sea como un estado interno que es explicativo de comportamiento; Pero las objeciones de Kripke a la sugerencia disposicional interpretan a las disposiciones precisamente en términos de condicionales materiales acerca del comportamiento: Entonces Wittgenstein y Kripke quieren decir cosas muy diferentes por "disposición" y por lo tanto hacen objeciones muy diferentes a la invocación de esta noción. )Esto explica por qué Wittgenstein desaprueba hablar de disposiciones, pero recomienda el uso de condicionales materiales para distinguir entre "lo que se quiere decir" y "el conocimiento".)

18. Cf. "But if you are certain, isn't it that you are shutting your eyes in lace of doubt - They are shut" (p. 2?4). He is saying that the question of doubt, in certain standard sorts of case, simply does not arise for us; so the sceptic can make no impact on our customary confidence by inventing if doubt (we should keep yur eyes firmly shut).

19. See Kripke, p. 43, In tact, this explanation of the disparity docs not tit the historical tacts very well, since behaviourism was enjoying a considerable vogue at the time Wittgenstein was writing what became the Investigations, and di1 positional accounts ol psychological concepts were widely advocated Russell, in particular, was strongly inttuenceil by behaviourism, as Kripke himself notes (Kripke, p. 1 see Russell's My Philosophical Development (George Allen and Unwin: London, 1959), esp. chapters 11-13. In view of the prevalence of such, doctrines at the time of his writing, imr might have thought Wittgenstein would take thru refutation as an first priority, if Kripke's interpretation were on the tight lines. 20. that is, Wittgenstein is objecting to the notion of disposition if this notion is understood independently of behavior, i.e. as an internal state that is explanatory of behavior; but Kripke's objections to the dispositional suggestion construe dispositions precisely in terms of counterfactuals about behavior: so Wittgenstein and Kripke mean quite different things by "disposition" and hence are making quite different objections to the invocation of this notion. )This explain why Wittgenstein objects to talk of dispositions, but commends the use of counterfactuals to elucidate meaning and knowledge.)

Traducción: Madrigal Bailón Joel Tucídides / UAM-iztapalapa / IN CALLI IXCAHUICOPA

"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad" Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2

5 21 This, then, is Wittgenstein's answer to the question that ends 187, and to the puzzle originally raised in 138: when one suddenly comes to understand a word, or hears it whit understanding, or knows the meaning of a word, what is true of one is that certain counterfactuals hold, which correspond to the possession of an ability; it is not that one performs a remarkable mental act in which the whole of the future and possible use comes before one's mind as a condensed series of thoughts or images or some such (see 188). A man's entire life may flash before his mind when he believes he is about to die but his temporally extended use of a word does not similarly flash before his mind when he means it in certain way. 21. Ésta, entonces, es la respuesta de Wittgenstein para la pregunta que termina 187, y para el acertijo originalmente planteado en 138: Cuando uno repentinamente consigue comprender una palabra, o la escucha con un poco de entendimiento, o sabe el significado de una palabra, sucede que ciertos condicionales abrazan aplicaciones que se corresponden con la posesión de una habilidad. No es que uno represente un acto mental extraordinario en el cual, todo el futuro y todo uso posible vengan desde antes a la mente de uno, como una serie condensada de pensamientos e imágenes o algo semejante (véase 188) . La vida entera de un hombre puede pasar ante de su mente cuando él cree que él está a punto de morir; pero su uso extendido temporal de la palabra no "pasa ante su mente" (análogamente) cuando él quiere decir algo en cierta forma. 22. Como lo observé en el capítulo uno, la relación que Wittgenstein establece del concepto de significado toma lugar a lo largo de ciertos detalles como el tratamiento de una gran variedad de otros conceptos psicológicos y su meta general es la de resistirse a impulsar estos fenómenos psicológicos interiormente. Si Kripke estuviera en lo correcto respecto al argumento de Wittgenstein sobre el significado, entonces el tendría que tomar una línea paralela de estudio acerca del rango completo de los fenómenos psicológicos tratados por Wittgenstein: él tendría que decir que Wittgenstein está abogando por una paradoja escéptica acerca del creer, reconocer, recordar, comparar, desear, etcétera y estaría proponiendo una comunidad fundamentada en la solución escéptica, de no hacerlo, él tendría que explicar por qué Wittgenstein mismo trata todos estos conceptos de una forma similar. 23. Kripke no es por supuesto el primero en proponer una interpretación ampliamente comunal de la discusión de Wittgenstein de seguir una regla; Un exponente antiguo de esta interpretación es Peter Winch, en La Idea De Sociología (Routledge y Kegan Paul: Londres, 1958), parágrafo pp. 24-39. Y esta interpretación general ha sido justificada por una gran cantidad, quizá la mayoría, de comentaristas de allí en adelante.

22 As I observed in chapter one, Wittgenstein's treatment of the concept of meaning takes its place along whit a like treatment of a wide range of other psychological concepts and his general aim is to resist driving these psychological phenomena inward. If Kripke were right about Wittgenstein's treatment of meaning, then he would have to take a parallel line about the whole range of psychological concepts treated by Wittgenstein: he would have to say that Wittgenstein is advocating skeptical paradox about believing, recognizing, remembering, comparing, wiling, etc. , and proposing a community - based skeptical solution. Or he did not, he would have to explain why Wittgenstein himself treat all this concepts in a similar way. 23. Kripke is, of course, not first to propose a broadly community interpretation of Wittgenstein's discussion of following a rule; an early exponent of this interpretation is Peter Winch, in The Idea Of Social Science (Routledge and Kegan Paul: London, 1958), esp. pp. 24-39. And this general interpretation has been endorsed by a great many, perhaps the majority, of commentators since then.

Traducción: Madrigal Bailón Joel Tucídides / UAM-iztapalapa / IN CALLI IXCAHUICOPA

"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad" Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2

6 24 Wittgenstein does not, perhaps, use "private" and "privately" in an entirely uniform way; but its central meaning for him is, I think, twofold: he uses It to suggest a condition of consciousness, and he uses It to suggest unknowability by another ( see 251, 272, 294). When states of consciousness are conceived in an erroneous way their (admitted) "privacy" becomes a kind of unknowability, instead od a harmless truth about them ( The preposition << Sensations are private>> is comparable to <<one place patience by oneself>> (248), i.e. this is a "grammatical remark"). I think both of these connotations are present in Wittgenstein's use of "privately" in 202. I do not know of any passage in which Wittgenstein clearly uses "private" in the sense Kripke gives to it in 202, i.e. as meaning "making no reference to other people". 25 The question is also raised in RFM p. 349: "Could there be only one human been than calculated? Could there be only one that followed a rule? This is not, however, answered negatively. Elsewhere we read: "But what about this consensus - doesn't It mean that one human been by himself could not calculate? Well, one human been could at any rate not calculate just one in his life" (RFM p. 193). These remarks seems best explained as I explain the passage from the Investigations cited in the text: Wittgenstein's underlying point is that we need a plurality of occasions, and it is a question to be raised whether one man provides enough of these. Wittgenstein implication appears to be that he does, so long as calculates more than once. 26 Kripke never so much as mentions what I have argued to be Wittgenstein's main point in these passages about rules and customs, viz. the multiple application thesis. Since It seems, beyond question that is at least one thing Wittgenstein is saying. Kripke must hold that Wittgenstein is making the community claim in the same breath as he is propounding the multiple application thesis. However in view of the toto caelo difference between these two claims, it would seem at best highly confusing for Wittgenstein to be running them together so carelessly. Better to attribute only one of them to him, and there seems no question but that he held the multiple application thesis. 24. Wittgenstein quizá no usa " privado " y " privadamente " en una forma enteramente uniforme; Pero su significado central para él es, pienso, doble: Él lo usa para sugerir una condición de conciencia, y la usa para sugerir la no cognoscibilidad por medio de otro (véase 251, 272, 294). Cuando los estados de conciencia son concebidos en una forma errónea su " privacidad " se convierte en un tipo de no cognoscibilidad, en lugar de ser alguna verdad acerca de ellos (La preposición "Las sensaciones son privadas" es comparable a "uno juega a la paciencia por si mismo" (248) y esto es un ejemplo de un "enunciado gramatical").. Pienso que ambas de estas connotaciones están presentes en el uso de Wittgenstein de " privadamente " en 202. No sé de algún pasaje en el cual Wittgenstein claramente use " privado " en el sentido que Kripke da a 202, esto es, como intentando "no hacer referencia a las otras personas ". 25. Esta cuestión también surge en RFM p. 349: ¿podría haber un solo ser humano que pudiera calcular?¿podría haber uno solo que siguiera una regla? A pesar de todo, esto no se contesta negativamente. En otro lugar leemos:"Pero ¿qué sucede con este consenso? --- ¿no significa que un ser humano por si mismo no pueda calcular? Bueno, un ser humano pudiera no calcular en ningún porcentaje un sólo caso en su vida" (RFM p. 193). Estos señalamientos parecen estar mejor explicados según mi cita del pasaje de Investigaciones expuesto antes: El punto que señala Wittgenstein es que nosotros necesitamos una pluralidad de ocasiones y esta cuestión se hace presente si un hombre proporciona suficiente de ellas. La implicación de Wittgenstein parece ser que es posible a medida que se calcula más de una vez. 26. Kripke no menciona lo que yo argumento que es "el principal punto de Wittgenstein" en estos pasajes acerca de las reglas y las costumbres, a saber, la tesis de la aplicación múltiple. Le parece que Wittgenstein sólo dice una cosa. Kripke tendría que establecer que Wittgenstein construye la afirmación Comunitaria al mismo tiempo que propone la tesis de la aplicación múltiple. Sin embargo en vista de las diferencias evidentes entre estas dos afirmaciones, pareciera en el mejor de los casos, que sería algo extraño para Wittgenstein el aplicar ambas tesis con tanto descuido. debido a esto decide atribuir a Wittgenstein una sola de ellas y no dar lugar a problemas aparentes al cuestionar si aquél sostuvo la tesis de la aplicación múltiple.

Traducción: Madrigal Bailón Joel Tucídides / UAM-iztapalapa / IN CALLI IXCAHUICOPA

"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad" Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2

7 27. Cf. "The danger here, I believe, is one of giving a justification of our procedure where there is no such thing as justification and we ought simply to have said : tha's how we do it" (RFM p. 199) But this not imply any episteme defect, since "To use the word withouth a justification does not mean to use it wrongfully" (RFM p. 406). Essencially the same point could be put by saying that I have (and need) no criterion for appliying a word as I do, i.e. , for supposing that I am using it a rule - governed way. 28. Thus "we look to the rule for instruction and do something, whithout appealing to anything else for guidance" (228): that is, when I naturally react in certain way to a rule (expression of a rule) I cannot check that this reaction is rigth by looking to the community for guidence. What prompts this appeal to community guidence is what also prompts the appeal to a voice of intuition, namely the feeling that we must be able to provide some reason for what we do when we follow rules. 29. In Z 319 Wittgenstein says something very relevant to this, which seems to me of considerable significance for community interpretations of Wittgenstein thought about rule following. After saying, "I cannot describe how (in general) to employ rules, except by teaching you, training you to employ rules" (Z 318), he goes on, "I may now, e.g. make a talkie of such instruction. The teacher will sometimes say "That´s right". If the pupil should ask him "Why?" - He will answer nothing, or at any rate nothing relevant not even: "Well, because we all do it like that"; that will not be the reason. It is very hard to see how this passage could be squared with the idea that for Wittgenstein, correctness in following rule is a matter of agreement whit the reactions of the community - either in respect of truth conditions or assertibility condition. 27. Cfr. "El peligro aquí, creo yo, es el dar justificación a nuestro procedimiento ahi donde no la haya para nuestro procedimiento, y que nosotros simplemente tengamos que decir: es lo que hago siempre" (RFM p. 199), pero este no es simplemente un defecto epistémico, ya que "usar una palabra sin justificación no significa usarla incorrectamente" (RFM p. 406) Esencialmente el mismo punto podría ponerse diciendo que yo no tengo (ni necesito) algún criterio para aplicar una palabra como suelo hacerlo, por ejemplo, para suponer que yo la estoy usando como una regla-de-gobierno. 28. De esta forma "nosotros atendemos a la regla para obtener instrucción y hacer algo, sin apelar a nada más para conseguir guía" (228); esto es, cuando yo reacciono con naturalidad a cierta regla (o expresión de la regla) yo no puedo advertir que esta reacción sea correcta sólo observando a la comunidad para guiarme. Lo que implica esta apelación a la guía comunitaria es lo que también se implica al apelar a la voz de la intuición, a saber, el sentimiento que solemos tener para proporcionar alguna razón para lo que hacemos cuando seguimos las reglas. 29. En Z 319 Wittgenstein dice algo muy relevante al respecto, lo cual me parece de considerable importancia para las interpretaciones comunitarias sobre el pensamiento de Wittgesntein cuando habla acerca del seguimiento de reglas. Después de decir: "Yo no puedo describir cómo (en general) emplear las reglas, excepto enseñándolas, entrenándote en el empleo de reglas" (Z 318), él continua: "Yo podría ahora, por ejemplo, "hacer una película hablada" de tal instrucción. El maestro algunas veces dirá: "Eso es correcto", y si el pupilo le debiera preguntar "¿Por qué?" --- El no contestará nada, o en cualquier caso algo poco relevante como: "Bueno, pues porque todos lo hacemos así"; eso no sería ninguna razón. Es muy difícil ver cómo este pasaje puede ser equiparado con la idea de que para Wittgenstein la corrección de seguir la regla sea materia de algún acuerdo con las reacciones de la comunidad --- ya sea en materia de "condiciones de verdad" o condiciones de asertibilidad.

Traducción: Madrigal Bailón Joel Tucídides / UAM-iztapalapa / IN CALLI IXCAHUICOPA

"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad" Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2

30. The question of correctness in the application of a rule is the question what counts as a mistake in applying the rule. Wittgenstein does not in fact make heavy weather of this question, as witness this passage: "But now does the observer distinguish in this case between players" mistakes and correct play? - there are characteristic sings of it in the players' behavior. Think of the behavior characteristic of correcting slip of the tongue. It would be possible to recognize that someone was doing so even without knowing his language" (54); see also 143, in which mistaking the order of a series is said to be simply a matter of "frequency". That is, Wittgenstein takes there to be readily recognizable criteria for making a mistake; he is not supposing there to be a deep and perplexing problem about what the distinction of correct and incorrect application consists in (for the case of language about public objects) Rather he typically assumes a given pattern of possible future use to be correct and is then exercised with the question how this relates to what I now mean. 31. Here we might think of very simple languagegames in which trining produces fairly uniform and mechanical reactions; or even of the 'language' of bees. 32 . On this point I am in agreement with Barry Stroud, 'Wittgenstein and Logical Necessity', Philosophical Review LXXIV (1965) . This interpretation contrast whit the idea that Wittgenstein is some kind of "conventionalist". 33. There is even in Wittgenstein some analogue of Hume's projectivist "error theory" when we reflect philosophically upon our following rules we are irresistibly tempted to suppose that our natural propensities have some foundation on what is "out there" and hence we get the idea of "rails invisibly laid to infinity" (218) and of "something which only needs the addition of "and so on", in order to reach to infinity" (229). These illusions result from a kind of "externalization" of the compulsion we are under when we follow a rule - rather as Hume thought that we "externalize" necessary connexion in our thought about causation. (Of course this analogy should not be pressed too far; there also plenty of differences between Hume and Wittgenstein in this regard.)

30. La cuestión de la corrección en la aplicación de una regla, es la cuestión sobre lo que cuenta como error en la aplicación de la regla. Wittgenstein en realidad no hace mucho caso de este punto, como lo atestigua este pasaje: "Pero ahora ¿podría el observador distinguir en este caso entre dos jugadores...entre los errores y un juego correcto? --- Existen signos característicos de esto en el comportamiento de los jugadores. Piense en el comportamiento característico al corregir un tartamudeo con la lengua. Se lograría reconocer que alguien estuviera desempeñándose al parejo sin saber su idioma" (54); véase también 143, en el cual En el que confundir la orden de una serie - se dice - es simplemente un asunto de " frecuencia ". Esto es, Wittgenstein toma este criterio para localizar criterios fácilmente reconocibles que den cuenta de la equivocación; Él no supone aquí que esté frente a un problema profundo y desconcertante acerca de lo que implica la distinción de una aplicación correcta e incorrecta (para el caso de lenguaje acerca de objetos del públicos) . Más Bien él asume típicamente que un patrón dado de uso futuro posible puede ser correcto y ello es entonces ejercitado con la pregunta del cómo se relaciona esto, con lo que yo ahora significo. 31. Aquí podríamos pensar en juegos muy simples del lenguaje en los cuales un entrenamiento produce reacciones mecánicas y muy uniformes o por así decirlo, un "lenguaje de abejas". 32. En este punto yo estoy de acuerdo con Barry Stroud, "Wittgenstein y la necesidad Lógica", Revista Filosófica LXXIV (1965) . Esta interpretación contrasta con la idea de que Wittgenstein es una clase de "Convencionalista". 33. Todavía existe en Wittgenstein algunas analogías con respecto a la "teoría del error" que tiene el proyectivismo de Hume. Cuando reflexionamos filosóficamente sobre nuestro seguimiento de reglas nos encontramos irresistiblemente tentados a suponer que nuestras inclinaciones naturales tienen algún fundamento sobre lo que está "allá afuera" y en consecuencia nosotros abrazamos la idea de que "existen rieles que nos llevan hasta el infinito" (218) y de que "Cualquier adición tan sólo necesita la premisa <<y así sucesivamente>> para llegar hasta el infinito" (229). Estas ilusiones son el resultado de una "externalización" compulsiva que experimentamos cuando seguimos una regla --- algo como lo que pensaba Hume respecto a que nosotros "externalizamos" una conexión necesaria en nuestro pensamiento acerca de la causación. (Por supuesto, esta analogía no debe llevarse demasiado lejos, hay también un montón de diferencias entre Hume y Wittgenstein en este sentido.)

8

Traducción: Madrigal Bailón Joel Tucídides / UAM-iztapalapa / IN CALLI IXCAHUICOPA

"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad" Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2

9 34. It is important here that my use of language is interwoven with various kinds of non-linguistic activity in such a way as to fix what my words mean; so correctness of use will (partially) consist in how my linguistic actions fit in with my nonlinguistic actions. 35 'Philosophers very often talk about investigating, analysing, the meaning of words. But let's not forget that a word hasn't got a meaning giving to it, as it were, by a power independent of us, so that there could be a kind of scientific investigation into what the word really means. A word has the meaning someone has given to it' (BB pp. 27-8). So it could not turn out that a word has a meaning different from that which 1 (we) give to it by dint of my (our) use of the word. 34. Es importante aquí que mi uso del lenguaje está entretejido con varias clases de actividad no-lingüística, de tal manera que es posible "arreglar" lo que mis palabras quieren decir; así la "corrección" en el uso consistirá (parcialmente) en la manera en que mis acciones lingüísticas se ajusten y correspondan con mis acciones no-lingüísticas. 35. "Los filósofos usualmente hablan acerca de investigar y analizar el significado de las palabras. Pero no se nos olvide que una palabra no adquiere un significado dándoselo, por así decirlo, mediante un poder independiente a nosotros, de tal forma que pudiera haber "algún tipo de investigación científica" sobre lo que una palabra realmente significa. "Una palabra tiene el significado que alguien le ha querido dar" (88 pp. 276-8). Por lo tanto no podría ser que una palabra tuviera un significado diferente de aquel que yo (o nosotros) le hayamos dado valiéndonos de nuestro (o de mi) uso de la palabra. 36. Véase el periodo 208-10 en el cual se enfatiza que al enseñarle a alguien una regla, yo no comunico nada que yo mismo no conozca. Esta afirmación de Wittgenstein tiene ciertas similitudes con la posición de W. V. Quine sobre la traducción radical entre la Palabra y el objeto (MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass, 1960), capítulo 2; y a la insistencia de Michael Dummett sobre la "exhaustiva manifestabilidad" del entendimiento lingüístico, en su artículo "¿Qué es la teoría del significado? (II)" dentro de "Verdad y significado", ed. G. Evans y J. McDowell (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1976). 37 véase Kripke, pp. 3, 98-113 38. Wittgenstein en ningún lado dice o implica que un lenguaje privado ya haya sido excluido por consideraciones anteriores, que ahora sea necesario para él considerar cómo se aplican esas consideraciones para el caso escéptico de palabras en sensaciones. De hecho. Pienso que Wittgenstein escribe (al igual que en la conclusión anterior), dejando siempre en claro la posibilidad de un lenguaje privado - que la comprensión es consecuencia de una práctica -.De aquí la necesidad de mostrar que nosotros tenemos que dictar condiciones adicionales sobre lo que se necesita para que exista una práctica genuina, el criterio de corrección de "la notación de una tercera persona" (la regla) .

36. See esp. 208-10, in which it is ernphasised that in teaching someone a rule I don not communicate lees than 1 myself know. This claim of Wittgenstein's bears certain similarities to W. V. Quine's position on radical translation in Word and Object (MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass, 1960), chap. 2; and to Michael Dummett's insistence upon the exhaustive manifestability of linguistic understanding in 'What is a Theory of Meaning? (II)', in Truth and Meaning, ed. G. Evans and J. McDowell (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1976). 37 See Kripke, pp. 3, 98-113 38. He does not anywhere say or imply that a private language has already been excluded by he earlier considerations, and that it is necessary for him now only to bring out how those considerations apply to the skeptical case of words for sensations. In fact. I think he writes as in the earlier conclusion -that understanding is mastery of a practice- leaves open the possibility of a private language. Hence the need to show that we have to impose further conditions on what it takes for a genuine practice (rule) to exist, notably third-person criteria of correctness.

Traducción: Madrigal Bailón Joel Tucídides / UAM-iztapalapa / IN CALLI IXCAHUICOPA

"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad" Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2

10
Tema: Kripke's Interpretation of Wittgenstein: Paradox and Community. La versión castellana puede descargarse de la página: http://es.scribd.com/ ubicando Colin Mcginn, "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad" y en www.losriosdeheraclito.blogspot.com . Por favor, para mejor opinión visite la página Web del profesor Colin McGuinn en: http://mcginn.philospot.com/ .

Referencia bibliografía: "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"( Kripke's Interpretation of Wittgenstein: Paradox and Community) en: Wittgenstein on Meaning. An Interpretation and Evaluation, McGINN, Colin, Inglaterra, Basil Blackwell Publisher L t d, 1984, pp. 59-92 (Aristotelian Society Series, Volume 1).

Extraído del libro original.

Las notas originales (1) se han colocado a final de texto y se han reservado los pies de página para algunas notas adicionales. Esto pretende facilitar al estudiante la lectura. El acomodo de palabras ha variado ligeramente la paginación: algunos párrafos se han recorrido “al siguiente inicio de página” respecto a la versión original (vgr. Las líneas últimas de p. 63, se trasladaron a inicio de la

64). La paginación se maneja así: Arriba en un recuadro negro se pone el número aproximado en el formato original, y abajo la paginación particular de este documento.

Escaneado y Traduci do y edi tado por el Profesor Joel Tu cí di des Madrigal Bailó n, Li cen ciado en Filosofía, Méx ico Distrito Federal. Univ ersidad Autónoma Metropolitana- Uni dad Iztapalapa. (tuc id ides2000 @yahoo.com.m x) Para educar y sin fin es d e lucro. Se permite la reprodu cc ión total o parcial c itando al autor origi nal.

Invito a mis amigos a que colaboren generosamente con sus escritos traducidos en bien de las generaciones futuras.
Traducción: Madrigal Bailón Joel Tucídides / UAM-iztapalapa / IN CALLI IXCAHUICOPA

"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

Sin mis seres amados, esta traducción jamás hubiera visto la luz:

A MARÍA IMELDA SOTO LÓPEZ

Porque su Náhuatl me enseñó a hablar el Castellano y aún me guía para entender el Inglés.
Licenciada en Letras Hispanas por la Normal Superior de México. Mujer culta dedicada a la educación de la niñez mexicana…. guía de muchas decenas de generaciones. Excelente maestra y magnífico ejemplo.

A INÉS BAILÓN SOTO

A mi querida Angélica, amante de los libros.

A CARMINA ITZEL RUÍZ MADRIGAL… PORQUE SU EXISTENCIA ME ENORGULLECE Y ME DA FUERZA PARA INTERPRETAR LOS SIGNOS DEL FUTURO.

LECTURAS SUGERIDAS SOBRE EL TEMA: Reflexión sobre lenguaje, significado y seguimiento de reglas. (INGLÉS) 1
"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

 Ludwig Wittgenstein in 20th Century Philosophy Meaning in Philosophy of Language Pragmatics in Philosophy of Language Rule-Following in Philosophy of Mind  Alexander Miller (2010). Kripke's Wittgenstein, Factualism and Meaning. In Daniel Whiting (ed.), The Later Wittgenstein on Language. Palgrave Macmillan. Ludwig Wittgenstein in 20th Century Philosophy  Alexander Miller (1999). Horwich, Meaning and Kripke's Wittgenstein. Philosophical Quarterly 49 (199):161-174. Kripkenstein on Meaning in Philosophy of Language Ludwig Wittgenstein in 20th Century Philosophy  Adam M. Croom (2010). Wittgenstein, Kripke, and the Rule Following Paradox. Dialogue 52 (2/3):103-109. o In §201 of Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein puts forward his famous “rule-following paradox.” The paradox is how can one follow in accord with a rule – the applications of which are potentially infinite – when the instances from which one learns the rule and the instances in which one displays that one has learned the rule are only finite? How can one be certain of rule-following at all? In Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke concedes the skeptical position that there are no facts that we follow a rule but that there are still conditions under which we are warranted in asserting of others that they are following a rule. In this paper, I explain why Kripke’s solution to the rule-following paradox fails. I then offer an alternative.  Jakob Hohwy (2003). A Reduction of Kripke-Wittgenstein's Objections to Dispositionalism About Meaning. Minds and Machines 13 (2):257-68. o A central part of Kripke's influential interpretation of Wittgenstein's sceptical argument about meaning is the rejection of dispositional analyses of what it is for a word to mean what it does (Kripke, 1982). In this paper I show that Kripke's arguments prove too much: if they were right, they would preclude not only the idea that dispositional properties can make statements about the meanings of words true, but also the idea that dispositional properties can make true statements about paradigmatic dispositional properties such as a cup's fragility or a person's bravery. However, since dispositional properties can make such statements true, Kripke-Wittgenstein's arguments against dispositionalism about meaning are mistaken.

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Fuente: Wittgenstein on Meaning | PhilPapers http://philpapers.org/rec/MCGWOM

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Joel Tucídides Madrigal Bailón

"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

 Paul A. Boghossian (1989). The Rule-Following Considerations. Mind 98 (392):507-49. o Recent years have witnessed a great resurgence of interest in the writings of the later Wittgenstein, especially with those passages roughly, Philosophical Investigations p)I 38 â⠬â 242 and Remarks on the Foundations of mathematics, section VI that are concerned with the topic of rules. Much of the credit for all this excitement, unparalleled since the heyday of Wittgenstein scholarship in the early IIJ6os, must go to Saul Kripke's I4rittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. It is easy to explain why. To begin with, the dialectic Kripke uncovered from Wittgenstein's.  Paul Horwich (1990). Wittgenstein and Kripke on the Nature of Meaning. Mind and Language 5 (2):105-121.  Collins (1992). On the Paradox Kripke Finds in Wittgenstein. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 18 (1):74-88.  Kai-Yuan Cheng (forthcoming). A New Look at the Problem of Rule-Following: A Generic Perspective. Philosophical Studies. o The purpose of this paper is to look at the problem of rule-following—notably discussed by Kripke (Wittgenstein on rules and private language, 1982 ) and Wittgenstein (Philosophical investigations, 1953 )—from the perspective of the study of generics. Generics are sentences that express generalizations that tolerate exceptions. I first suggest that meaning ascriptions be viewed as habitual sentences, which are a sub-set of generics. I then seek a proper semantic analysis for habitually construed meaning sentences. The quantificational approach is rejected, due to its persistent difficulties. Instead, a cognitive approach is adopted, where psychological considerations of meaning attributors play a crucial role. This account is then compared with the picture of meaning offered by Kripke and Wittgenstein, respectively. I show how this fresh way of conceiving of meaning sentences respects some of their insights while avoiding some of the drawbacks, and serves to improve the framework in which the current debate and inquiry about rule-following are conducted.

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Joel Tucídides Madrigal Bailón

"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

 Daniel Whiting (2010). Particular and General: Wittgenstein, Linguistic Rules, and Context. In Daniel Whiting (ed.), The Later Wittgenstein on Language. Palgrave Macmillan. o Wittgenstein famously remarks that ‘the meaning of a word is its use’ (PI §43). Whether or not one views this as gesturing at a ‘theory’ of meaning, or instead as aiming primarily at dissuading us from certain misconceptions of language that are a source of puzzlement, it is clear that Wittgenstein held that for certain purposes the meaning of an expression could profitably be characterised as its use. Throughout his later writings, however, Wittgenstein’s appeal to the notion of use pulls in two directions. In several places, Wittgenstein seems to connect the notion of an expression’s meaning with that of use in the sense of usage or practice. More specifically, he suggests that for an expression to possess meaning is for there to be a practice of employing it according to certain rules. ‘That’, he tells us, ‘is why there exists a correspondence between the concepts “rule” and “meaning”’ (OC §62; cf. PG 68; PO 51; RFM VI §28; VW 103). Indeed, Wittgenstein goes so far as to say, ‘The rule-governed nature of our languages permeates our life’ (RC §303). Call the view that the meaning of an expression is determined by a general principle governing its use, rulism.  Carl A. Ginet (1992). The Dispositionalist Solutions to Wittgenstein's Problem About Understanding a Rule: Answering Kripke's Objection. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17 (1):53-73.  Kripkenstein on Meaning in Philosophy of Language Ludwig Wittgenstein in 20th Century Philosophy

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Joel Tucídides Madrigal Bailón

"La interpretación de KripKe sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

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WITTGENSTEIN'S VIEWS

discussed his emphasis upon the diversity of meaning, i.e. the important differences between the various language-games there are; but I have, I think, laid out his basic ideas about meaning, understanding and rules. I have done this without entering into exegetical disputes w i t h other expositors of Wittgenstein, in full knowledge that the interpretation I have offered w o u l d be resisted by others; and I have refrained from expressing my o w n views on the claims I have taken Wittgenstein to be m a k i n g . In the next two chapters these restraints w i l l be t h r o w n off, first by c o m p a r i n g my interpretation with K r i p k e ' s and then by critically assessing W i t t g e n stein's views.
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Kripke's Interpretation of Wittgenstein: Paradox and Community

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See 24, 65, p. 224. Despite this emphasis on the variety of language-games and of

words, I know of no passage in which Wittgenstein explicitly asserts that the notions of rule, meaning and understanding arc themselves family-resemblance concepts; and it seems to me not an easy matter to determine what he shouldhave said about this, given his general views.

In this chapter I shall contrast K r i p k e ' s interpretation of Wittgenstein with the interpretation I put forward in Chapter 1; we shall see that these interpretations are very different. K r i p k e ' s expository procedure differs somewhat from that adopted in the previous chapter: he does not expound Wittgenstein by p a y i n g close attention to the text, supporting each attribution w i t h an apposite citation; rather, he develops a systematic argument which he hopes will make sense of, and occasional contact w i t h , Wittgenstein's text. K r i p k e ' s assumption is that this argument is what underlies Wittgenstein's actual text, and that we shall understand Wittgenstein better if we see his text as the surfacing of this systematic argument in different ways and contexts: it is not that Wittgenstein is to be found explicitly p r o p o u n d i n g this argument, but we can i l l u m i n a t i n g l y treat his text as if he were. A n d it is this feature of K r i p k e ' s exposition w h i c h causes h i m to qualify his attributions to Wittgenstein from time to time - to admit that his way of presenting Wittgenstein is somewhat alien to Wittgenstein's o w n conception of his views. We should therefore take seriously K r i p k e ' s prefatory caveat: 'the present paper should be thought of as e x p o u n d i n g neither " W i t t g e n stein's" argument nor " K r i p k e ' s " : rather Wittgenstein's argument as it struck K r i p k e , as it presented a p r o b l e m for h i m . '
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'See K r i p k e , pp. 5, 67-71. These qualifications particularly concern the sceptical thesis Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein.

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(p. 5) K r i p k e is here d i s a r m i n g l y aware that he is foisting onto Wittgenstein's text what is not to be found inscribed on its surface; and this is why he adopts the method of exposition he does adopt. My o w n procedure has been quite different: I have assumed that Wittgenstein can be satisfactorily interpreted without seeing his text as the occasional surfacing of an underlying systematic argument but rather by paying close (and perhaps somewhat pedantic) attention to what he actually says. I w o u l d not therefore think it appropriate to issue the sort of caveat K r i p k e does. This observation is not intended as a piece of self-congratulation on my part, but as a recognition of the procedural difference between K r i p k e and me. In fact I believe that the more substantive differences stem fundamentally from this difference in respect of exegetical method. F o r what K r i p k e has done is to produce an impressive and challenging argument w h i c h bears little affinity with W i t t g e n stein's o w n problems and claims: in an important sense K r i p k e and the real Wittgenstein are not even dealing with the same issues (they have a different ' p r o b l e m a t i c ' ) . I shall begin by summarising K r i p k e ' s interpretation, assuming some familiarity with its outline, and then I shall explain why I think it goes w r o n g as an interpretation. T h i s task s h o u l d be facilitated by what has already been argued in C h a p t e r 1; since I believe I there gave ample textual evidence for my interpretation, it w i l l be necessary only to spell out the points of disagreement and give some diagnosis of how K r i p k e came to the w r o n g interpretation. The general structure of Wittgenstein's argument, a c c o r d i n g to K r i p k e , is as follows. Wittgenstein focuses attention upon the normative n o t i o n of an a p p l i c a t i o n of a sign being (linguistically) correct, i.e. in accordance w i t h its meaning. (This is not the n o t i o n offactual correctness, i.e. stating a truth about the w o r l d ; it concerns the question which word is linguistically appropriate to the facts. T h u s , for example, suppose I believe truly that this object is red; the question of linguistic correctness is then w h i c h w o r d expresses this belief: is 'red' the w o r d I ought to use to state the fact in w h i c h I believe?) We o r d i n a r i l y think that some uses of words are correct and some are incorrect, some uses correctly express the fact we want to state and some do not: Wittgenstein's question is supposed to be what this distinction consists i n . W h a t makes it

right to use words in one way rather than another? It is clear that this normative property of words depends upon their having a determinate meaning: for the notion of'acorrect use is well-defined only if words mean one thing rather than another - that is what makes it right to use one w o r d rather than another to state a given fact. Therefore we need to make sense of the idea of a w o r d meaning one thing rather than another if we are to give content to the n o t i o n of correct (or incorrect) use of language. To put it differently: any proposed candidate for the meaning of a w o r d must be such as to sustain linguistic normativeness; we must be able to read off from any alleged meaning-constituting property of a w o r d what is the correct use of that w o r d . The normativeness of meaning thus functions as a c o n d i t i o n of adequacy upon any account of what meaning is. N o w K r i p k e ' s c l a i m is that Wittgenstein finds this notion of normativeness deeply problematic, and hence finds the whole notion o f meaning correspondingly problematic. F o r nothing can be produced to constitute meaning that meets the normativeness requirement: there is no property of a w o r d from w h i c h we can read off its correct use, and so there is nothing for meaning to be. T h i s is what K r i p k e calls Wittgenstein's 'sceptical p a r a d o x ' - the thesis that there is nothing, no fact, that c o u l d constitute meaning one thing rather than another. But Wittgenstein does not (according to K r i p k e ) want to leave us helpless in the jaws of this paradox; he proposes a 'sceptical s o l u t i o n ' to the paradox w h i c h , while conceding to the sceptic that no fact constitutes meaning, nevertheless preserves our o r d i n a r y talk of meaning and rules. The sceptical solution does this by persuading us that we do not need to supply the k i n d of account of meaning the sceptic shows to be unavailable; we can take a radically different view of the significance of statements about meaning, namely that such statements do not purport to state facts at a l l . Since ascriptions of meaning and rule-following do not set out to state facts, it is no disaster for them that we can discover no facts for them to state; we can provide a quite different account of their function. T h i s , then, is the general shape of Wittgenstein's argument, as K r i p k e sees it; let us now fill the argument in a bit. The sceptical paradox is initially presented by considering'
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*Scc K r i p k e , pp.

II, 23-4.

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the meaning I attach to signs I used in the past. I n o r m a l l y and uncritically assume that my present use of (say) accords with my past meaning, so that when I now give the sum of 67 and 58 in answer to the question ' 6 7 + 5 8 ? I am interpreting *+* as I d i d in the past: that is, I assume that in the past I meant addition by *+' and so I conform with my past meaning (I u s e ' + correctly) if I n o w take questions c o n t a i n i n g '+' to require d o i n g some a d d i t i o n . K r i p k e ' s sceptic questions whether this assumption is on reflection legitimate: perhaps in the past I meant by + \ not a d d i t i o n , but q u a d d i t i o n , a mathematical function whose value is 5 for the pair of arguments 67 and 58. W h a t is it about my past history that makes me so sure that I meant addition and not q u a d d i t i o n , and hence so confident that my present linguistic response conforms w i t h my previous meaning (the response of giving 125 in answer to '67 + 58?')? The sceptic's question is, in effect, what justifies my confidence t h a t ' + ' has a constant meaning for me over time: what is it that constitutes this presumed constancy? To answer this question we need to be able to point to some feature of my past usage that establishes that I then meant a d d i t i o n ; and the semantic sceptic claims that this cannot be done. (In fact, the sceptical paradox has two aspects, an epistemological aspect and a constitutive or metaphysical aspect: epistemologically, the c l a i m is that nothing can now be cited to justify my assumption of semantic constancy; constitutively, the c l a i m is that there is no fact about me which could constitute my meaning addition rather than quaddition. It is the second aspect which is the more important in K r i p k e ' s exposition of Wittgenstein; the epistemological challenge is regarded chiefly as a way into the constitutive challenge. )
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The case for the sceptical paradox proceeds by exhausting the candidates. First, my actual computations i n v o l v i n g '+ do not suffice to determine that I meant a d d i t i o n , since these are logically compatible with my having meant some other function w h i c h agrees with a d d i t i o n for just the numbers on which I have performed computations w i t h '+' but diverges
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' K r i p k e emphasises that his central problem is constitutive on p. 21, though he does initially state the problem more epistemologically (sec p. 8). His use of (he term 'sceptic' must therefore be understood in a slightly nonstandard way: Kripkc's scepticis not (primarily) interested in questions of certainty, knowledge or justification - his real interest is 'ontological' or 'metaphysical'.

il

thereafter. A c t u a l use of + \ either externally or in my head. underdetennines w h i c h function is denoted; for there arc indefinitely many functions distinct from addition which are compatible with the finitely many applications of '+' I have made. F o r any finite sequence of applications of a sign we can always envisage different ways of c o n t i n u i n g to apply the sign w h i c h c o n f o r m to different assignments of meaning.|Second, my past inner states of consciousness cannot determine what I meant because they admit of various interpretations or applications: no experience I have can dictate what is the right way to use a sign, and whatever meaning is it must provide for such normativeness. N o r are there any 'magical states of consciousness w h i c h are capable of d o i n g what the mundane states cannot d o . So there are no facts about consciousness which can furnish a reply to the sceptic. T h i r d , K r i p k e considers the suggestion that my past meaning consisted in my having a certain sort of linguistic disposition: instead of l o o k i n g to my actual use of '+' in the past, let us turn to how I was disposed to use '+ and read my past meaning off from that. The appeal of this suggestion is that it offers the hope that the underdetermination problem w i l l be got round: for we can now cite the fact that in the past I was disposed to say 125* and not 5 ' in answer to 67 + 58?\ even though this question never actually came up. Dispositions to use are thus supposed to m i r r o r the productivTTyljT meaning; their consequences extend beyond the actual history of a person's use of a sign. K r i p k e ' s reply to this dispositional suggestion consists in two observations: in the first place, dispositions to use arc finite, since h u m a n beings are finite objects existing for a finite time, whereas addition is a function with infinitely m a i n arithmetical consequences; in the second place, speakers are disposed to make mistakes in their use of signs, and so dispositions by themselves cannot properly account for normativeness. The dispositional suggestion just equates, K r i p k e says, competence with performance: but performance by itself cannot capture the infinity of meaning nor its normativeness. So meaning a d d i t i o n by '+' cannot consist in being disposed to give the sum of arbitrary pairs of numbers on demand: some numbers are simply too b i g , and we may have systematic tendencies to give something other than the sum because of errors of c a l c u l a t i o n . K r i p k e claims (on Wittgenstein's behalf) that these three
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replies to the semantic sceptic exhaust the possibilities, and so we must concede that there is n o t h i n g for my having meant addition to consist i n . But once we concede this we admit that the same scepticism applies to my present use of '+*: for the same sceptical question c o u l d be asked about my present meaning at some future time, and the same range of possible answers w i l l be shown to be inadequate then. Indeed, i f we ask directly what constitutes my presently meaning a d d i t i o n and not q u a d d i t i o n we shall be faced w i t h the same difficulty: actual use, present states of consciousness and present dispositions to use will all fail to fix a unique meaning for my words. So there is likewise n o t h i n g about my present use of signs that makes that use right or w r o n g : the whole n o t i o n of meaning appears to collapse. T h i s , then, is the first, negative phase of Wittgenstein's discussion of meaning, as K r i p k e interprets h i m .
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The second, positive phase consists in an effort to d r a w the sting from the sceptical paradox while not questioning its substance. The strategy, as I r e m a r k e d , is to reject the sceptic's presupposition that ascriptions of meaning are in the business of stating facts; rather, we are to conceive of their significance in terms of (a) their assertibility conditions and (b) their role or utility or point in discourse. The effect of this move is to undercut the key assumption of the sceptic: we are to see that all a l o n g he was attacking a straw m a n , though a straw m a n with w h o m we naturally and naively identify. A c c o r d i n g to K r i p k e , the change of perspective needed to fend off the sceptic reflects Wittgenstein's shift f r o m the p h i l o s o p h y of language espoused in the Tractatus to that put f o r w a r d in the Investigations: the sceptic is presupposing the k i n d of fact-stating model of meaning advocated in the Tractatus, and the cure for this scepticism is to adopt the different conception of meaning we find in the Investigations - with its emphasis upon the role of criteria and the place of language in our lives. The sceptic seems to us to be striking at the very n o t i o n of meaning o n l y because we are powerfully attracted to the conception of language articulated in the Tractatus: if we can free ourselves from that conception we shall no longer feel ourselves threatened by the
'It seems that the entire idea of meaning vanishes into thin air' ( K r i p k e , p. 22); understandably, this gives Kripke 'an eerie feeling' (p. 21).
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sceptic's arguments; but it is hard to tree ourselves from it, so the threat feels real. A l t h o u g h K r i p k e does not himself say so, there are, I think, other areas of p h i l o s o p h y in w h i c h much the same strategy has been tried, and it will be useful to have these in m i n d when v c enquire whether Wittgenstein really proceeds as K r i p k e suggests. Three parallels may be mentioned. First, certain sons of n o n c o g n i t i v i s m in ethics can be viewed in an analogous way: the noncognitivist cannot find facts suitable for correspondence with ethical statements, and so he suggests that ethical utterances be conceived in a non-fact-stating way instead - as prescriptions to action or expressions of e m o t i o n , say. This type of view might be motivated by the incapacity of non-queer facts to add up to what we intuitively demand of ethical truth or by a c o n v i c t i o n that what w o u l d add up to that is in some way metaphysically rebarbative. Instead of abandoning ethical utterances as meaningless in the absence of ethical facts the noncognitivist reinterprets their purport - he proposes a different conception of meaning for such sentences. Thus emotivism (say) can be seen as a sceptical solution to a sceptical paradox - the paradox, namely, that there is nothing in the w o r l d that c o u l d constitute the value-fact we naively take ethical assertions to require; and the sceptical solution is that these 'assertions serve rather to express the emotions of the speaker or some such t h i n g . Second, there is the doctrine of instrumentalism w i t h respect to the theoretical sentences of science: the instrumentalist cannot (he thinks) find any genuine facts to correspond to such sentences, but he preserves their
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* Kripke exploits this alleged contrast with the Tractatus to impose a structure or, the Investigations according to which the early sections (1-137) are concerned to undermine the Tractatus truth-conditional conception of language, as a picliminary to solving the sceptical problem (see K r i p k e , pp. 78-0). Plainly, this architectonic suggestion can be correct only if Kripke is right to interpret Wittgenstein as solving a sceptical problem by means of a sceptical solution based upon assertibility conditions; and I do not think he is right so to interpret Wittgenstein. M am thinking here of J . L . 1977), chapter I. This type of view saves meaningful ethical utterances in the absence of ethical tacts (truth) by rcconstruing such utterances as (logically) non-asscrtoric: an ethical sentence is meaningful while lacking genuine truth conditions because :t is rcail) imperatival or exclamatory or hortatory or some such. A n d clearly a sentence can be meaningful in these ways without purporting to slate a fact.
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Mackie's view that objective values would be

metaphysically 'queer': sec his Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Penguin Books.

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role in discourse by interpreting them in a different way - as useful devices for organising the real facts. Instead of reacting to the lack of suitable facts by declaring talk of unobservables v o i d of significance, he gives up the fact-stating model and opts for a different account of meaning - in terms, perhaps, of assertibility conditions and organisational utility. T h i r d , certain views of mathematical statements display this dialectical form: seeking facts to correspond to mathematical sentences we find ourselves discouraged either by the incapacity of mundane facts to do the j o b or by the seeming necessity to postulate 'queer' facts (platonism); so we abandon the factstating referential model altogether and put in its place a different account 01 meaning - e.g., that mathematical sentences get their significance from their empirical a p p l i cations. This again w o u l d be aptly characterised as a sceptical solution to a sceptical paradox: one agrees with the sceptic that no mathematical facts can be found, but one averts his radical conclusion (mathematics is meaningless) by proposing an alternative account of meaning that makes the sceptical paradox irrelevant. I think that these three issues exemplify the general pattern of argument K r i p k e attributes to Wittgenstein; we can see K r i p k e ' s dialectic as adding yet another k i n d of ' n o n c o g n i t i v i s m ' to the list of more familiar doctrines of which I have given three examples. So far I have only explained the sense in which K r i p k e ' s positive view of semantic statements is a sceptical s o l u t i o n ; I have not said what form that positive view takes. The central idea, attributed to Wittgenstein, is that the assertibility conditions and point of ascriptions of meaning essentially involve the notion of a community. Thus to say that someone means addition by +' is warranted just if (a) he agrees in his responses with with the responses of some c o m m u n i t y who use and (b) he can be trusted in his interactions with members of a c o m m u n i t y in situations i n v o l v i n g H - \ That is to say, the n o t i o n of a rule is an essentially social one, i n v o l v i n g
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inter-personal relations; so \vc cannot give an a c c o u n t ol ttlk f o l l o w i n g in individualistic terms.* We cannot, K r i p k e says, make sense of someone f o l l o w i n g a rule 'considered in i s o l a t i o n . K r i p k e compares this result with H u m e ' s positive account of causation: the relation of causation between a p a i r of events cannot be explicated solely by reference to those events, as we naively suppose; rather, when we speak of causal relations we are (tacitly) subsuming the pair of events in question under a generalisation i n v o l v i n g other events. Thus the assertibility conditions of "c c a u s e d / ' are inherently 'social': events can stand in causal relations only in virtue of their membership in a 'community of events. K r i p k e puts this by saying that there cannot, on H u m e ' s view, be 'private causation'; as there cannot be 'private', i.e. individualistic, rule-following, according to Wittgenstein. In s u m , then, the 'sceptical s o l u t i o n ' consists in two moves: first the replacement of truth conditions (correspondence to facts) by assertibility conditions, and second the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the c o m m u n i t y into the notion of rule-following. These two moves are, of course, logically independent, but K r i p k e ' s c l a i m is that both are necessary if the sceptical paradox is to be answered. What I have just given is a swift summary of a rich and detailed course of argument, intended to remind the reader of the salient points of K r i p k e ' s interpretation rather than substitute for.it. Let us now ask whether this interpretation accords with what Wittgenstein says, beginning w i t h the question whether Wittgenstein really advocates a sceptical paradox about meaning and rules. The central passages to consider here are 198 and 201 in w h i c h K r i p k e takes W i t t genstein to be stating his sceptical thesis that there are no facts for meaning to consist i n . K r i p k e quotes the beginning of 201:
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This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be
g

I am using 'individualistic roughly in the sense Tyler Burge does in 'Individualism
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and the Mental', Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. IV, ed. P . A . French, T . E . Uehling and H . K . Wettstein (University of Minnesota Press, 1979): that is, a property of a person is individualistic just if the instantiation of that property can be explained without reference to the condition of any other person; a property is social just if this is not so.
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"One might see Paul Benacerraf, in 'Mathematical T r u t h ' , Journal of Philosophy L X X (1973), as posing a kind of sceptical problem, viz. how can mathematical propositions be true and known; and Hartry Field, in Science Without Numbers (Blackwcll: O x f o r d , 1980), as offering a kind of sceptical solution, viz. mathematical sentences need not be regarded as possessing genuine truth conditions and so do not call for 'queer' facts to correspond to them.

It is especially important to see that the introduction of the community pertains t<;

assertibility conditions and not truth conditions; for essentially the same difficulties A'ould afflict the attempt to find a social fact for meaning to consist in

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made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. A n d so there would be neither accord nor conflict here. (201) But he signally fails to quote, or even immediately follows this: to heed, what

It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it. What this shews is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going against i t " in actual cases. Hence there is an inclination to say: every action according to the rule is an interpretation. But we ought to restrict the term "interpretation" to the substitution of one expression of the rule for another. (201) There are two things to notice about this passage w h i c h give the lie to K r i p k e ' s interpretation. F i r s t , Wittgenstein makes it clear immediately that the stated paradox arises from a 'misunderstanding', i.e. a false presupposition; so he cannot really be endorsing the paradox, as H u m e embraces his o w n sceptical claims about causation. Second, when we ask what the misunderstanding is we are t o l d that it is the mistake of assuming that grasping a rule is placing an interpretation u p o n a sign, i.e. associating it w i t h another sign - an assumption which Wittgenstein thinks we are by no means c o m p e l l e d to make. In other words, Wittgenstein is putting f o r w a r d the paradox as a reductio ad absurdum of the interpretational conception; it is the inevitable result of that particular misunderstanding about the nature of grasp of a rule. Wittgenstein no more endorses the stated paradox than does any philosopher who gives a reductio of his opponent's p o s i t i o n . Wittgenstein does not say that the paradox arises from the misunderstanding that ascriptions of rules state facts
11

or have truth c o n d i t i o n s , nor does he suggest that the u n d e r l y i n g mistake is to consider the rule-follower in social i s o l a t i o n ; what he is objecting to is the specific conception of understanding as a mental operation of translation. If K r i p k e were right, Wittgenstein ought to be f o u n d saying, after his statement of the paradox: ' W h a t this shows is that grasping a rule is not a fact about an i n d i v i d u a l considered in social i s o l a t i o n ; but this is nothing like what he actually does say. If there is one key oversight in K r i p k e ' s exposition of W i t t g e n stein, it is that of i g n o r i n g what Wittgenstein says in 201 straight after stating the paradox: for Wittgenstein here gives his most explicit diagnosis of the paradox and what he says is remote from K r i p k e ' s a t t r i b u t i o n . T h i s is also made very clear in 198: the lesson of the paradox is said to be that interpretations do not determine meaning; it is not that meaning does not consist in individualistic facts. W h a t Wittgenstein is saying is that certain sorts of facts fail to determine meaning, viz. substituting one sign for another, not that no facts d o .
1 1 2

K r i p k e ' s misinterpretation comes out clearly in his remarks about Wittgenstein's treatment of 'reading'. R e a d i n g is a k i n d of r u l e - f o l l o w i n g , and so K r i p k e takes Wittgenstein to be p r o p o u n d i n g his paradox for reading - reading is not an individualistic fact but is to be understood in terms of social assertibility c o n d i t i o n s . But when we consult the text we find that what Wittgenstein is opposing is a particular family of views about the sort of fact reading is - that it consists in an inner process: conscious, queer, or physical - and advising us to l o o k to what the reader does:
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But in the case of the living reading-machine "reading" meant reacting to written signs in such-and-such ways. This concept was therefore quite independent of that of a mental or other mechanism.—Nor can the teacher here say of the pupil: "Perhaps he was already reading when he said that word". For there is no doubt about what he did.—The change when the pupil began to read was a change in his behaviour; and it makes no sense here to speak of a first word in his new state'. (157)
l
12

It is significant that in other passages in which the interpretational conception is rejected, e.g. BR pp. 33—35, there is no mention of a paradox into which we arc in imminent danger of falling; Wittgenstein's point in these passages isjust that we should not think of meaning and understanding in terms of inner interpretations (i.e. symbols) - he is not saying that this is the only way we can think if we cleave to a Tactual conception of these concepts.
11 1

M o r e specifically, Wittgenstein is asking what it is about a person that determines

his future use of a sign, and hts answer is that this is a matter of the technique of use of which he is master, not of what comes before his mind. If you like: the fact that gives signs life is a fact about use, not a fact about inner states.
11

See K r i p k e , pp. 45~4 ).
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15

There is no suggestion in these sections that we are under threat of the paradox that reading never occurs, that there is nothing for reading to consist i n ; rather, we are t o l d to redirect our attention from supposed inner processes to the outer criteria we use f o r j u d g i n g someone to be a reader. In fact these sections do not contain a statement of the paradox at a l l , yet Wittgenstein is considering a case of rule-following; so it can hardly be maintained that the paradox is Wittgenstein's central and recurrent theme. I think the paradox is best seen as just one battle in a general campaign against the inner process model, not as the primary focus of Wittgenstein's whole discussion. K r i p k e says that the paradox is really the main p r o b l e m of the Investigations, but its infrequent appearance belies this suggestion; and when it does appear it figures as one more nail in the coffin of the inner process m o d e l , to be hammered in along with a number of other nails. So the passages upon which K r i p k e bases his interpretation fail to support it and suggest instead a quite different view of Wittgenstein's intentions; but can K r i p k e ' s interpretation find sustenance in more general considerations? This question has two parts, corresponding to the constitutive and epistemological versions of semantic scepticism. That Wittgenstein is advocating a constitutive scepticism certainly seems hard to square with the fact that he does offer an account of the sort of thing understanding is: it is mastery of a technique, possession of a capacity, participation in a custom. A n d it is notable that K r i p k e nowhere registers Wittgenstein's concern to connect understanding with the concept of ability, as an alternative to the conception of understanding as a c o n d i t i o n of consciousness. N o r does Wittgenstein show any tendency to contest the /actuality of ascriptions of ability; he merely protests against what he takes to be misunderstandings about the sort of thing
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an ability is (e.g. a configuration of one's 'mental apparatus'). It w o u l d be more accurate I think to say that Wittgenstein locates understanding in one k i n d of fact rather than another k i n d ; but if we want to capture the true spirit of Wittgenstein's discussion we do better still to d r o p all play with the notion of fact and simply say that Wittgenstein is offering a description of the ' g r a m m a r ' of the n o t i o n of understanding in terms of the notions of ability, technique, etc. I do not believe that Wittgenstein is t h i n k i n g in terms of facts and non-facts at all here; certainly there is no hard textual evidence to support this sort of interpretation. A n y resistance on Wittgenstein's part to saying that understanding consists in, or is constituted by, a capacity stems from a general distrust of the enterprise of p h i l o s o p h i c a l analysis, not from a conviction that understanding is somehow not a fact. Indeed, I think Wittgenstein w o u l d have regarded such an assertion, and such a debate, as quite empty, since there is no substantial philosophical mileage to be got out of the notions of fact, truth conditions and correspondence to conditions-in-the-world. K r i p k e himself shows some awareness of this k i n d of point, but he boldly brushes it aside in the expectation that he is c o n f o r m i n g to the real spirit of Wittgenstein's position; but I think he should take more seriously Wittgenstein's deflationary remarks about truth and facts. At any rate, if we want to talk in terms of facts it seems that Wittgenstein does suggest that understanding consists in a fact, the fact of having an ability to use signs.
16 17
1 5

In particular, IUipp. 113-17, which deals at some length with the notion of ability,

does not suggest that sentences containing 'can' and its cognates do not correspond to 'conditions-in-the-world'; the point there is rather that we should not construe abilities as special sorts of inner processor state which lie 'behind' what counts as the exercise of the ability.
1 6

Remember that the form of Wittgenstein's account is to be the perspicuous

connecting of concepts (see 122): he says that the 'grammar' o f ' c a n ' and 'is able to' i< 'closely related' to that of 'understands' (150), not that we can actually analyse the Kripke says: 'The sceptical paradox is the fundamental problem of Philosophical Investigations (p. 78). It might clarify Wittgenstein's attitude to this paradox to contrast it with Russell's attitude towards his class paradox. Wittgenstein sees his paradox as a problem for anyone who assumes that meaning is a matter of interpretation, but he thinks that this assumption is not at all compulsory or unavoidable; whereas Russell's paradox arises from assumptions that seem inescapable - there is no straightforward mistake in the premisses that generate the contradiction. In a word, Wittgenstein's paradox is not a problem for Wittgenstein, as Russell's paradox is a problem for Russell.
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latter in terms of the former. In fact, I think that the failure to provide necessars and sufficient conditions for the application of a concept would, for Wittgenstein, have no significance whatever for the question whether that concept could be interpreted in a 'fact-stating' way.
17

K ipke notes that Wittgenstein subscribes to a redundancy theory of truth (so-

called) in 136 (Kripke. p. 86), but he docs not, I think, draw the right lesson from this: given that 'true' adds nothing to the content of an assertion, it cannot be that Wittgenstein really wishes to deny that semantic sentences have truth conditions - on pain of denying that they express propositions. Similarly f o r 'it is a fact that'or 'states a fact'.

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It w o u l d also be w r o n g to interpret Wittgenstein as an epistemoiogical sceptic. As I emphasised in Chapter 1, Wittgenstein's denial that our use of words is founded on reasons is not intended sceptically: the traditional sceptic makes an inappropriate and impossible demand on our epistemic concepts, and the right response to h i m is to question the need for what he says there isn't. To lack reasons is not to be in a predicament to w h i c h doubt is the proper response; for doubt can be removed (better pre-empted) by our natural and habitual reactions. T h i s epistemoiogical position w o u l d prompt Wittgenstein to dismiss K r i p k e ' s sceptic with the remark that of course o u r reasons come to an end but this does not mean we are in any sort of epistemoiogical trouble: that I cannot prove to a determined sceptic that my present use of +' is correct does not show that I do not k n o w h o w to a p p l y it correctly or that I have anything less than a perfect right to proceed as I feel i n c l i n e d . The author of On Certainty w o u l d surely not p r o p o u n d the k i n d of sceptical argument K r i p k e develops, resting as it does u p o n a conception of knowledge and epistemic right that he steadfastly resists. Wittgenstein's epistemology w o u l d stop K r i p k e ' s sceptic before he got going; so we cannot interpret Wittgenstein as conceding victory to K r i p k e ' s epistemoiogical sceptic and then offering what is at best a salvage operation.
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sceptic for that audience. It is the change in the p h i l o s o p h i c a l climate that explains the apparent difference between whai Wittgenstein says and what K r i p k e argues. I find this explanation u n c o n v i n c i n g - for three reasons. F i r s t , it seems to me inconceivable that Wittgenstein w o u l d w h o l l y neglect to consider what is probably the most natural reaction lo the constitutive sceptic; surely the d e m o l i t i o n of this idea is essential if the paradox is to be carried through. A n d the form of K r i p k e ' s d e m o l i t i o n - the arguments f r o m finiteness and mistakes - finds no echo in Wittgenstein's text: in particular, at the places where Wittgenstein states his paradox one w o u l d expect h i m to indicate that the paradox shows {inter alia) that understanding is not a disposition and is not to be explicated in terms of counterfactuals about use, instead of saying (as he does) that the paradox refutes the interpretational conception. N o w h e r e does Wittgenstein say, in parallel with his c l a i m that interpretations do not determine meaning, that 'dispositions fail to determine m e a n i n g ' and that 'what this shows is that there is a way of grasping a rule w h i c h is not a d i s p o s i t i o n ' . We just do not find the kinds of remark about dispositions which K r i p k e ' s interpretation leads us to expect.
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A crucial part of K r i p k e ' s constitutive paradox is his rejection of a dispositional conception of understanding; so we should expect, if K r i p k e has Wittgenstein right, that the same sort of argument be found in Wittgenstein, in view of its importance to the success of the sceptical thesis. W h a t we f i n d , however, when we scour Wittgenstein's text is a total lack of anything remotely resembling the sorts of considerations about dispositions advanced by K r i p k e . A l l K r i p k e can say to explain this disparity is that Wittgenstein is assuming the dispositional reply to the sceptic to be unattractive to the audience of his book at the time of writing - whereas the conscious state reply is taken to be the natural response to the
" C / . "'Hut, il you arc certain, isn't it thai von an: shutting your eyes in lace ol doubt'" - They are shut' (p. 2?4). He is saying that the question of doubt, in certain standard sorts of case, simply does not arise Cor us; so the sceptic can make no impact on oil! customary confidence by in vent n ig ;i doubt (we should k e e p < >ur eyes firmly shut).

Second, and more probatively, in those rare places in which the n o t i o n of disposition is i n v o k e d Wittgenstein is clearly m a k i n g a quite different point from K r i p k e . T h u s consider 149, the o n l y passage in the relevant sections of the Investigations in w h i c h the n o t i o n of disposition is explicitly i n v o k e d :
If one says that k n o w i n g the A B C is a state of the mind, one is t h i n k i n g of a state of a mental apparatus (perhaps of the brain) by means of w h i c h we explain the manifestations of that knowledge. Such a state is called a d i s p o s i t i o n . But there are objections to speaking of a state of the m i n d here, i n a s m u c h as there ought to be two different criteria l o r such a state: a knowledge of the c o n s t r u c t i o n of the apparatus, quite apart
'"Sec K r i p k e , p. 43, In tact, this explanation of the disparity docs not tit the historical tacts very well, since behaviourism was enjoying a considerable vogue at the time Wittgenstein was writing what became the Investigations, and d i positional accounts ol psychological concepts were widely advocated R u s s e l l , in particular, was strongly inttuenceil by behaviourism, as Kripke hunsetl notes (Rtipke, p. 1» >ee Russell's My Philosophical Development (George Allen and Unwin: L o n d o n , 1959), esp. chapters 11-13. In view of the prevalence of such, doctrines at the time of his writing, imr might have thought Wittgenstein would take thru refutation ,i> .i fiivt priority, il Kripke's interpretation were on the tight lines.
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from what it does. (Nothing would be more confusing here than to use the w ords "conscious " and "u ncons cious " for the contrast between states of consciousness and dispositions. For t h i s p a i r o f t e r m s c o v e r s u p a g r a m m a t i c a l d i f f e r e n c e . ) (149)

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Here Wittgenstein's objection seems to be that talk of dispositions is likely to be accompanied by the idea that knowledge is a state of mind; and he thinks that this way of conceiving of knowledge leads to the mistaken idea that there are two independent ways of telling whether someone (e.g.) knows the ABC - by examining his mental apparatus or by seeing what he does. Wittgenstein's purpose is, as usual, to discourage the inner state model of concepts such as knowledge, and he is warning us that talk of dispositions is apt to go along with this model; instead we should attend to what the person does. If Kripke's interpretation were correct Wittgenstein would have to be saying that what a person it disposed to do does not fix what he knows when he knows the ABC, but this is not what Wittgenstein says and indeed he seems to be suggesting just the contrary. 20 Third, Wittgenstein makes remarks that actually support the kind of dispositional suggestion Kripke pits himself against: that is, Wittgenstein can be found explaining, meaning in terms of counterfactuals about use, thus consider t h i s passage: What is essential is to see that the same thing can come before our minds when we hear the word and the application still be different. Has it the same meaning both times? I think we shall say not. (140) That is, if two speakers differ in their application of a sign then we should say that they mean something different, despite the identity of their conscious states: use determines meaning, not what transpires within. This thought of Wittgenstein's hardly fits with Kripke's claim that differences of dispositions to use do not suffice to establish differences of meaning, on account of
2 0 t h at i s , Wittgenstein is objecting to the notion of disposition if this notion is understood independently of behavior, i.e. as an internal state that is explanatory of behavior; but Kripke’s objections to the dispositional suggestion construe dispositions precisely in terms of counterfactuals about behavior: so Wittgenstein and Kripke mean quite different things by “disposition” and hence are making quite different objections to the invocation of this notion. )This explain why Wittgenstein objects to talk of dispositions, but commends the use of counterfactuals to elucidate meaning and knowledge.)

the possibility of systematic mistake Wittgenstein remark from 140 shows no sign of acknowledgment of this kind of point, which would be amazing if he were really arguing in the way Kripke suggests. What Wittgenstein is doing here is drawing contrast between application and what presents i t s e l f to the mind holding that identity of meaning between people depends upon identity in respect of the former not t h e latter; but Kripke's interpretation would have Wittgenstein insisting upon the parity of the two sorts of circumstance, not upon the contrast between them. On Kripke's view, both conscious states and application fail to fix meaning, and so equally make no progress against the sceptic; but Wittgenstein himself evidently believes that there is an important difference between these with respect to the determination of meaning. (This is not to say that Wittgenstein has some answer to Kripke's point about mistakes; it is just that Wittgenstein shows himself to be unconcerned about such issues in the passage quoted - so it cannot be that he has on his mind what Kripke has on his.) A second passage of so me significance for the present issue is this:
"But I already knew at the time when I gave the order, that he ought write 1002 after 1000 — Certainly; and you can also say you meant it then; only yon should not let yourself be mislead by the grammar of the words "know" and "mean". For you don't want to say that you thought of the step from 1000 to 1002 at that time — and even if you did think of this step, st il l you did not think of other ones. When you said "1 already knew at the time . . ." that meant something like: "If I had then been asked what number should he written after 1000. I should have replied 1002." And that I don't doubt. This assumption is rather of the same kind as: "If he had fallen into the water then, 1 should have jumped in after him". — Now, what was wrong with your idea? (187)

What is notable about t h i s passage is Wittgenstein’s willingness to employ a counterfactual about what someone would have said in explanation of that person's having meant something. Applied to Kripke's favorite example. Wittgenstein’s suggestion would run as follows: for me to have meant by '+' that '125' is the right answer to '67+58?' (assuming that this is a computation I had not come across or thought about) is for it to be true of me that had I been faced with that question in the past I would have given that answer. Wittgenstein is comparing the case of meaning (or knowing)

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paring the case of meaning (or knowing) with the case of trait of character such as bravery: to say I was brave yesterday is to assume that there are true counterfactuals such as ' I f he had fallen into the water, I would have jumped in'; it is not to assume that I had somehow mentally rehearsed the brave action of saving a potential drowner. Similarly, to mean something at a given time is not to have it before one's mind at that time, so that every step of the series '+2' has already occurred to one; it is rather to be disposed to give the right answer, i.e. for the kinds of behavioural counterfactuals Wittgenstein cites to be true of one.21 It is surely incredible that Wittgenstein could have written t h i s if his atitude to counterfactuals concerning use were as Kripke suggests; for Wittgenstein is in effect saying in 187 exactly what Kripke supposes him to reject. It is true that Wittgenstein does not claim that the counterfactuals provide a reductive analysis of the notion of meaning something - he says only that the latter 'means something like' the former – but this is to be seen as a reflection of his suspicion of the whole idea of conceptual analysis; it is not prompted by an unstated recognition of the kinds of argument Kripke gives against explicating meaning in terms of counterfactuals. What Wittgenstein is suggesting is that we can capture enough of the grammar of the notion of meaning by invoking counterfactuals to point us in the right philosophical direction (or away from the wrong direction); he cannot therefore be taken to be conducting a sceptical campaign in which the employment of counterfactuals is a defensive manoeuvre to be blocked and repulsed. What Wittgenstein ought to be saying, on Kripke's interpretation, is that ascriptions of meaning are not tantamount to (mean nothing l i k e ) the assertion of counterfactuals about use; but this is the exact opposite of what he does say in 187. In this passage, as in 140, Wittgenstein is contrasting what happens in one's
This, then, is Wittgenstein’s answer to the question that ends 187, and to the puzzle originally raised in 138: when one suddenly comes to understand a word, or hears it whit understanding, or knows the meaning of a word, what is true of one is that certain counterfactuals hold, which correspond to the possession of an ability; it is not that one performs a remarkable mental act in which the whole of the future and possible use comes before one’s mind as a condensed series of thoughts or images or some such (see 188). A man’s entire life may flash before his mind when he believes he is about to die but his temporally extended use of a word does not similarly flash before his mind when he means it in certain way.
21

mind when something is meant with what is, true of one's behaviour, including counterfactuals about one's behaviour; he is not treating both as sharing as incapacity to supply the sort of fact Kripke's sceptic is demanding.

For these reasons, then, I doubt that Kripke is right to interpret Wittgenstein as advocating a sceptical paradox
designed to show that there is no 'fact of the matter' about what we mean. So nothing in Wittgenstein's discussion suggests the sort of negative first stage characteristic of the analogous

doctrines I mentioned earlier; we are not being prepared for the kind of sceptical solution proffered by the likes of emotivism and instrumentalism. There is not a distinguishing of truth
conditions and assertibility conditions accounts of meaning and then a purported demonstration that semantic statements

have no determinate truth conditions; rather, there is an opposition between two different conceptions of the sort of thing meaning is - roughly speaking, conceptions which locate
meaning in the inner and in the outer. (22) And if this is the correct interpretation, we will not be able to construe Wittgenstein as proposing anything that deserves to be called a 'sceptical solution': his positive view simply has the

status of a correct account of the concepts at issue, though it is an account which for various reasons it is hard to see ourselves
clear to accepting as adequate and complete. Nevertheless, we can still ask whether Kripke is right to ascribe to Wittgenstein a community conception of rule-following, independently of whether this is intended as a sceptical

solution to a sceptical paradox. 1 shall maintain that this ascription is also mistaken.
The community enters, according to Kripke, by way of the normativeness of meaning and of rules generally: when we say that someone is using a word wrongly we mean that his use of that word disagrees with the use made of it by members of a linguistic community; and right use is agreement of use. If we
22 As I observed in chapter one, Wittgenstein’s treatment of the concept of meaning takes its place along whit a like treatment of a wide range of other psychological concepts and his general aim is to resist driving these psychological phenomena inward. If Kripke were right about Wittgenstein’s treatment of meaning, then he would have to take a parallel line about the whole range of psychological concepts treated by Wittgenstein: he would have to say that Wittgenstein is advocating skeptical paradox about believing, recognizing, remembering, comparing, wiling, etc. , and proposing a community – based skeptical solution. Or he did not, he would have to explain why Wittgenstein himself treat all this concepts in a similar way.

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consider the individual in isolation all we can say is that it seems to hi m that he is using words correctly; but if we broaden our gaze to take in his community we can make sense of the indispensable idea that this seeming may be delusive, that he is not really using words correctly at all. Thus the correct assertibility condition for "he means addition by '+'" is that his responses with “+” agree with mine or those of his community, and these latter persons are primitively entitled to take themselves to mean addition by '+'. On this interpretation, Wittgenstein builds the notion of community right into the notion of rule, in such a way that rule-following cannot be individualistically conceived - to say someone is following a rule is necessarily to advert to other rule-followers. Thus the notion of rule-following turns out to be a social notion in somewhat the way the notions of a conformist or a club member or a fashionable dresser are social notions: none of these properties can be possessed by individuals 'considered in isolation'. Now is there any textual support for this interpretation of Wittgenstein?23 Let us re-examine 198-202 in which Wittgenstein is putting forward his positive view and opposing it to the view he rejects. The most glaring feature of these sections in the present connection is that the words 'custom', 'practice' and 'use' are never qualified with 'social' or 'community' - and 'social custom/practice' is not pleonastic. Surely Wittgenstein would have inserted these qualifying adjectives if he really meant to maintain a social conception of rule-following, especially in view of the fact that the introduction of the community is taken to be a surprising result of signal importance - as sharply conflicting with what we antecedently expect. And if we look for a gloss on the use of 'custom' etc. we find, as 1 stressed in Chapter 1, the insistence that rules must be followed on more than one occasion - i.e. the existence of rules depends upon 'regular use'. Wittgenstein does use 'custom' and 'practice' to suggest the idea of a multiplicity, but it is a multiplicity of instances of rule following not of persons who follow the rules.
23 Kripke is, of course, not first to propose a broadly community interpretation of Wittgenstein’s discussion of following a rule; an early exponent of this interpretation is Peter Winch, in The Idea Of Social Science (Routledge and Kegan Paul: London, 1958), esp. pp. 24-39. And this general interpretation has been endorsed by a great many, perhaps the majority, of commentators since then.

And this is part and parcel of Wittgenstein's general thesis that meaning is use: a sign has meaning only in virtue of bemg (repeatedly) used in a certain way. This thesis does not in itself carry any suggestion that meaning is inconceivable in social isolation. But is there anything else in these sections which might be supposed to encourage the community interpretation? Two points may be mentioned here. The first concerns the use of 'privately' in 202. Kripke takes this word to be intended to contrast with 'social', so that it has roughly the sense 'private' has in 'private property', i.e. relating to a single individual; I suggested in Chapter 1 that it contrasts rather with 'public' or 'overt', i.e. relates to what transpires covertly within consciousness. On Kripke's understanding of the intended notion of privacy a person’s overt behavior say in following a sign-post, is to be considered 'private', at least if it is described individualistically; and so we could quite properly claim that all non-rule-governed behaviour (e.g. pain behaviour) can and does take place 'privately', since its description does not require reference to other people. It is thus possible to wave your arm 'privately' but not possible to follow the addition rule 'privately', according to Kripke's construal of 'privately' in 202. What is public can be 'private' in this sense knowability by others is therefore not sufficient for nonprivacy. We can even say that (non-relational) properties of material objects,, e.g. being cubical or weighing a stone, are possessed 'privately' in Kripke's sense, since their ascription does not make essential reference to other objects and their condition. Now it seems to me that this would be a very odd way for Wittgenstein to intend his use of 'privately' in 202: in general he opposes 'private' to 'public' or 'oven', as in “private sensations)” (24) Kripke takes Wittgenstein to be saying in 202 that if rule-following were private in the sense that it involved
24 Wittgenstein does not, perhaps, use “private” and “privately” in an entirely uniform way; but its central meaning for him is, I think, twofold: he uses It to suggest a condition of consciousness, and he uses It to suggest unknowability by another ( see 251, 272, 294). When states of consciousness are conceived in an erroneous way their (admitted) “privacy” becomes a kind of unknowability, instead od a harmless truth about them ( The preposition << Sensations are private>> is comparable to <<one place patience by oneself>> (248), i.e. this is a “grammatical remark”). I think both of these connotations are present in Wittgenstein’s use of “privately” in 202. I do not know of any passage in which Wittgenstein clearly uses “private” in the sense Kripke gives to it in 202, i.e. as meaning “making no reference to other people”.

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just the individual rule-follower. then rules could not be nonnative - correct rule-following would collapse into apparently correct rule-following; whereas I take the claim of 202 to be that if rule-following were private in the sense of being a condition or process of consciousness, then self-ascriptions of rule-following would be infallible. Aside from the overall plausibility of the interpretation I prefer, I think that my interpretation makes better sense of Wittgenstein's use of 'privately' in 202 - it conforms better with Wittgenstein's general use of the notion of privacy. At the very least it should be agreed that the use of 'privately' in 202 cannot be cited to establish the correctness of the community interpretation. The second point concerns Wittgenstein's mention of 'one man' in 199:
Is what we call “obeying a rule” something that it would be possible for only one man to do, and to do only once in his life?—This:, of course a note on the grammar of the expression "to obey a rule". (199)

Wittgenstein's reply to this question is: “ ít is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which someone obeyed a rule.” What is prima facie puzzling here is why Wittgenstein should raise the question whether it is possible for one man to follow a rule and answer it by saying that it is not possible for there to be a single occasion of rule-following.25 His reply, let it be noted, is not that it is not possible for one man to obey a rule: Why then does he appear to ask a question to which lie gives no answer (or half an answer)? Since Wittgenstein does not answer his question by saying rule-following requires more than one man, 199 cannot be cited as evidence that Wittgenstein endorses a community conception of rules; but the passage certainly seems to raise the issue of whether rule-following is individual or .social. What is going on here? The
25 The question is also raised in RFM p. 349: “Could there be only one human been than calculated? Could there be only one that followed a rule? This is not, however, answered negatively. Elsewhere we read: “But what about this consensus — doesn’t It mean that one human been by himself could not calculate? Well, one human been could at any rate not calculate just one in his life” (RFM p. 193). These remarks seems best explained as I explain the passage from the Investigations cited in the text: Wittgenstein’s underlying point is that we need a plurality of occasions, and it is a question to be raised whether one man provides enough of these. Wittgenstein implication appears to be that he does, so long as calculates more than once.

explanation that seems to me the most plausible is this: Wittgenstein's central contention in these passages, viz., that rules require many occasions of manifestation. is ambiguous as stated, between (a) the claim that each individual who grasps a rule must obey it on more than one occasion and (b) the weaker claim that there must be many occasions of rule-following possible distributed over several individuals. The latter claim would allow as possible the circumstance that each of many people obey a given rule only once, since t his would be enough for the rule to be followed on many occasions. Now Wittgenstein's actual words in 199 commit h i m only to the weaker thesis, and so are compatible with the possibility that each person follows a rule only once; what they are not compatible with is the possibility that one man follows a rule just once — exactly the question he raises. The point being made, then, is that if there is just one man then he must follow his rules more than once, but if there are many men it can be enough to each follows his rules just once (or possibly not at all) I think this reading of 199 is consonant with the gist of other passages in which the question of how many occasions of rule-following are necessary is raised and answered; for example:
In the same way it cannot be said either that just once in the history of mankind did someone follow a sign-post. Whereas it can be said that just once in the history of mankind did someone walk parallel
with a board. And that fir st impossibility is again not a psychological one. (RFM p. 346)

There is no suggestion here that solitary rule-following is impossible; for this is not ruled out by the claim that sign-posts have to be obeyed more than once. The reason Wittgenstein broaches the question of solitary rule-following in 199 is that he wants to make allowance for the possibility that the occasions are spread over many individuals when he claims that many occasions are required. It is not, 1 think, that he is greatly attracted to the idea of spreading the many occasions over equally many individuals — one occasion each, so to speak — but he feels the need to acknowledge that this is logically compatible with his fundamental contention, viz, the multiple application thesis. As we saw in Chapter 1, he is anxious not to over-state this thesis, requiring only that there be some rules which are multiply obeyed and not that all should be; I surmise

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that in 199 he is again guarding against exaggerating a thesis which he thinks his readers may find it hard to accept even in its weakest form. So I conclude that 199 cannot be cited to establish the community interpretation either, once it is seen in context and read carefully. And besides, would it not be astonishing if Wittgenstein had put forward his major positive thesis in such an oblique and laconic remark? 26 Perhaps I should make it clear that I am not suggesting that in these disputed passages Wittgenstein is consciously opting for an individualistic as opposed to a social conception of rule-following: that is, my interpretation is not that Wittgenstein IS centrally exercised with this question and is taking a definite stand on it. Rather, my view is that this whole issue is foreign to his true concerns: it is simply not a question with which he is wrestling. So when I say that his positive view is individualistic I am imposing a classification upon his position which is imported from outside: if he had been ask where he stood on this issue, he would have said on the individualistic side, but I do not think he would have reckoned this to be especially relevant to the problems with which he was centrally occupied. This general lack of concern with the kind of question Kripke sets up seems to me to indicate how fundamentally Kripke's interpretation misrepresents what Wittgenstein is really up to. Not only does Wittgenstein not advocate a community conception of rules; this is not even a considered position in the space of philosophical views within which he is operating. So the individualism I claim lo discern in Wittgenstein's stated views is not to be seen as a doctrine he is keen to promote; it is rather a claim about what his positive view in fact comes to, irrespective of his own main intentions. So far I have been addressing myself to detailed textual considerarons; I now want to object to the community interpretation on a more general or thematic ground, namely
26 Kripke never so much as mentions what I have argued to be Wittgenstein’s main point in these passages about rules and customs, viz. the multiple application thesis. Since It seems, beyond question that is at least one thing Wittgenstein is saying. Kripke must hold that Wittgenstein is making the community claim in the same breath as he is propounding the multiple application thesis. However in view of the toto caelo difference between these two claims, it would seem at best highly confusing for Wittgenstein to be running them together so carelessly. Better to attribute only one of them to him, and there seems no question but that he held the multiple application thesis.

its relation to Wittgenstein's thesis that we follow rules 'blindly'. For I think that the kind of epistemology of rule-following Wittgenstein advocates is inconsistent with Kripke's suggestion that right rule-following consists in agreement with the community. As we saw in Chapter 1, Wittgenstein's view is that our natural inclination to follow rules as we do is not something we can justify, nor are we required to justify it - we obey rules 'blindly', without guidance. So if someone challenges me to justify an application of a sign, all 1 can ultimately reply is 'This is simply what I do' (217); nothing demostrates that my application is correct. 27 But on Kripke's community interpretation this will not be the epistemoiogical situation: for agreement with others does provide a court of appeal in case of such a challenge. Suppose someone claims that it only strikes me that my present application of “+” is correct (accords with its past meaning) and that in fact I am now using “+” wrongly; then Kripke's sceptical solution offers me an answer, namely that my present use is correct. because it agrees with the use made of that sign by others. That is to say, the community view allows me to get beyond, or beneath, my natural sign-using propensities to something that can be cited to give these propensities a justification, since correctness, on Kripke's view, is precisely a matter of community concordance in use: the community, in short, provides the kind of guidance that Wittgenstein expltcitly says there isn't. 28 Kripke's conception makes rule-following like being in fashíon in this respect: if someone challenges my belief that 1 am in fashion, I can rebut him by pointing out that my mode of dress agrees with that of (certain) members of my cottimunity - I am not reduced to saying that this is a belief for wliich a justification is neither
27 Cf. “The danger here, I believe, is one of giving a justification of our procedure where there is no such thing as justification and we ought simply to have said : tha’s how we do it” (RFM p. 199) But this not imply any episteme defect, since “To use the word withouth a justification does not mean to use it wrongfully” (RFM p. 406). Essencially the same point could be put by saying that I have (and need) no criterion for appliying a word as I do, i.e. , for supposing that I am using it a rule - governed way. 28 Thus “we look to the rule for instruction and do something, whithout appealing to anything else for guidance” (228): that is, when I naturally react in certain way to a rule (expression of a rule) I cannot check that this reaction is rigth by looking to the community for guidence. What prompts this appeal to community guidence is what also prompts the appeal to a voice of intuition, namely the feeling that we must be able to provide some reason for what we do when we follow rules.

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Possible nor required. Note that Wittgenstein does not say that the community considered as a whole follows rules blindly, i.e. proceeds upon the basis of a collective human nature; his claim is that I do. So it would not be faithful to Wittgenstein's words to transpose his claim about the absence of rational foundations to the level of the community; and neither is it correct to interpret him as trying to alleviate the epistemological discomfort we may feel about my lack of reasons by equipping me with the test of community conforrnity.29 In fact, it is precisely the thirst for the kind of rational basis Wittgenstein denies that causes Kripke to introduce the community; but of course this goes right against the thrust of Wittgenstein’s position - it is trying to find reasons for what does not (and need not) rest upon reasons. To put it in a nutshell, Kripke's interpretation misses, or underestimates, Wittgenstein epistemological naturalism. T h i s point leads into the question crucial for Kripke's interpretation, of Wittgenstein's attitude toward the normativeness of meaning - what he took its nature and ground to be. Kripke represents Wittgenstein as preoccupied in the Investigations with the question what makes a present use of a sign correct, i.e. in accordance with our previous linguistic intentions; and Wittgenstein's answer is supposed to be that this is to be explained in terms of agreement with the community. However, I think that an unprejudiced examination of the passages with which we are concerned (138-242) reveals notably little that can be construed as a concern with this question: that is, we just do not find Wittgenstein fretting over the question whether my present inclinations to apply a sign really conform with my past meaning. It seems to me, in fact, that Wittgenstein's attitude towards this kind of question

verges on the dismissive. (30) His view is that what underlies ( i f that is the word) our practices and customs with sings is our human nature in interaction with our training: this is what explains our unreflectively going on as we do, Different kinds of being, endowed with a different “form of l i f e ' , could naturally go on in different ways given the same training:
Now we get the pupil to continue a series (say + 2) beyond 1000 — and he writes, 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012. We say to him: "Look what you've done"—He doesn't understand. We say: "You were meant to add two: look how yon began the series!"—He answers: "Yes. isn't it right? I thought that was how I was meant to do it." ------ Or suppose he pointed to the series and said: "But I went on in the same way."—It would now be no use to say: "But can't you see. . . .?"—and repeat the old examples and explanations.—In such a case we might say, perhaps: It comes natural to this person to understand our order with our explanations as we should understand the order: "Add 2 up to 1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to 3000 and so on." Such a case would present similarities with one in which a person naturally reacted to the gesture of pointing with the hand by looking in the direction of the line from finger-tip to wrist, not from wrist to finger-tip. ( 1 8 5 )

It is our nature that (partly) determines what we mean by our words and which plays an ineliminable role in our learning
language. Given that this is so, Wittgenstein sees no real substance to the question whether what we are naturally inclined to do really conforms with the meaning of our signs: such a question must be futile, since what we are by nature
The question of correctness in the application of a rule is the question what counts as a mistake in applying the rule. Wittgenstein does not in fact make heavy weather o f t h is question, as witness this passage: “But now does the observer distinguish in this case between players” mistakes and correct play? — there are characteristic sings of it in the players' behavior. Think of the behavior characteristic of correcting slip of the tongue. It would be possible to recognize that someone was doing so even without knowing his language” (54); see also 143, in which mistaking the order of a series is said to be simply a matter of “frequency”. That is, Wittgenstein takes there to be readily recognizable criteria for making a mistake; he is not supposing there to be a deep and perplexing problem about what the distinction of correct and incorrect application consists in (for the case of language about public objects) Rather he typically assumes a given pattern of possible future use to be correct and is then exercised with the question how this relates to what I now mean.
30

29 In Z 319 Wittgenstein says something very relevant to this, which seems to me of considerable significance for community interpretations of Wittgenstein thought about rule following. After saying, “I cannot describe how (in general) to employ rules, except by teaching you, training you to employ rules” (Z 318), he goes on, “I may now, e.g. make a talkie of such instruction. The teacher will sometimes say “That´s right”. If the pupil should ask him “Why?” — He will answer nothing, or at any rate nothing relevant not even: “Well, because we all do it like that”; that will not be the reason. It is very hard to see how this passage could be squared with the idea that for Wittgenstein, correctness in following rule is a matter of agreement whit the reactions of the community — either in respect of truth conditions or assertibility condition.

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inclined to do is what it is that constitutes what we mean.31 What we are inclined to do by nature and what we mean cannot come apart in the way the question assumes. There is, for Wittgenstein, not the sort of gap that Kripke's sceptic trades on between meaning and naturally determined use. Reading a l i t t l e into what Wittgenstein says, I think his response to Kripke's question of what determines normativeness would be that this question erroneously assumes that our meanings are not fixed ( in part) by our natural propensities but by something logically independent of these propensities, since it envisages the possibility that we should by nature treat a pattern of use as linguistically correct and yet that pattern be incorrect; but the thought of this possibility involves the mistaken supposition that once the natural facts about us are exhausted there remains somewhere else to look for what determines meaning. What has to be recognized is that at some level meaning is fixed by our nature: meaning something is not an achievement of a transcendent mind divorced from our “form of life”, The basis of the normative is the natural. 32 A comparison of Wittgenstein with Hume may help to clarify Wittgenstein's position. Suppose someone were to put the question 'What makes causal judgements correct on Hume's view?' Granted that our minds are so constituted that we form causal beliefs upon exposure to constantly conjoined events, what is it for a belief so formed to be true or false: might not our minds lead us to form a causal belief in the way Hume describes and yet that belief be false? It is clear what Hume would reply to this question: he would say that there is not the sort of gap between belief and t r u t h that the question presupposes, since causation involves nothing over and above constant conjunctions and the minds natural propensity to form expectations-- there is, in particular, nothing independent of our minds (i.e. objective) to constitute 'necessary connexion'. On Hume’s view, then, correctness in a causal judgement ultimately rests upon our (mental) nature; so it cannot be that we naturally form causal judgements on the basis of observed
31 Here we might think of very simple language-games in which trining produces fairly uniform and mechanical reactions; or even of the 'language' of bees. 32 On t h i s point I am in agreement with Barry Stroud, 'Wittgenstein and Logical Necessity', Philosophical Review LXXIV (1965) . This interpretation contrast whit the idea that Wittgenstein is some kind of “conventionalist”.

constant conjunctions which are (objectively) false, at least ultimately. Only if one rejects Hume's 'projectivist' account of causation could one press the question whether our natural propensities lead us to have true causal beliefs upon exposure to constant conjunctions. The respect in which Wittgenstein's position on rules resembles Hume's on causation is that both locate the source of correctness in our given nature, not in some aspect of reality quite independent of us and our natural propensities.33 The main difference between them (as I remarked in Chapter 1) is that Hume takes his view to be 'sceptical', whereas Wittgenstein takes his to be non-sceptical once we attain a right epistemology. And it would, of course, be radically contrary to the whole spirit of Hume's position on causation to locate correctness in the conformity of one's causal judgements with those of one's community: that is. Hume would not want to say that the distinction between seemingly true causal beliefs and really true ones is to be explained in terms of whether your judgemems agree with others' judgements. This would just be a doomed attempt to postpone the sceptical conclusion that our causal judgements correspond to no objective or external feature of reality. I think that Kripke's community interpretation of Wittgenstein makes a similar mistake as this community interpretation of Hume in respect of what constitutes the correctness of a causal bclief: Kripke is in effect jibbing at one of Wittgenstein's main theses-that there is nowhere 1 can t u r n to underpin or bolster how 1 naturally proceed in my application of signs, not even to other people Kripke is trying to locate what 1 mean, and hence linguistic correctness, in something external to my nature as a language-user, i.e. in my relations to a community; but thi s would be to refuse to accept Wittgenstein's claim that my judgements of linguistic correctness are not based upon reasons. Wittgenstein's position is simply this: what I mean is
33 There is even in Wittgenstein some analogue of Hume’s projectivist “error theory” when we reflect philosophically upon our following rules we are irresistibly tempted to suppose that our natural propensities have some foundation on what is “out there” and hence we get the idea of “rails invisibly laid to infinity” (218) and of “something which only needs the addition of “and so on”, in order to reach to infinity” (229). These illusions result from a kind of “externalization” of the compulsion we are under when we follow a rule — rather as Hume thought that we “externalize” necessary connexion in our thought about causation. (Of course this analogy should not be pressed too far; there also plenty of differences between Hume and Wittgenstein in this regard.)

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determined by my natural use of words, so that we cannot sensibly ask whether my use really conforms to what my words mean.34 (Compare Hume: the causal truths are determined by regularities acting upon our minds to produce expectations, so that we cannot sensibly ask whether the expectations thereby produced are really correct, i.e. lead us to form true causal beliefs.) This is not, of course, to say that our application of words can never be mistaken, that every use is self-certifyingly correct; but it is to say that judgements of linguistic correctness always rest in the end upon natural propensities to apply words in a certain way: we do sometimes make judgements of linguistic mistake, but these judgements have their ultimate source in our natural sense of what is right- they do not involve prescinding altogether from our natural propensities to apply signs. So, on Wittgenstein's view, linguistic mistake is necessarily local; we cannot make real sense of the idea that our natural ways of using signs are globally mistaken, since that would be to assume that our meaning is fixed by something external to us.35 In a sense, then, Wittgenstein dismisses as incoherent the kind of scepticism that lies behind Kripke's sceptical paradox: I mean the general scepticism that questions whether my use of signs has ever conformed with their meaning - for their meaning cannot in this way come apart from the use 1 make of them. It is for these reasons that I say that Wittgenstein would not have pursued and pressed the question of normativeness in the way Kripke does; and, as I remarked, he does not in point of fact make a great deal of the question of normativeness in these sections of the Investigations. My rejection of the community interpretation is not yet complete. Someone wedded to this interpretation might allow that 198-202 fail on their own to establish that Wittgenstein held a social conception of rules but urge that these sections
34 It is important here that my use of language is interwoven with various kinds of non-linguistic activity in such a way as to fix what my words mean; so correctness of use will (partially) consist in how my linguistic actions fit in with my non-linguistic actions. 35 'Philosophers very often talk about investigating, analysing, the meaning of words. But let’s not forget that a word hasn’t got a meaning giving to it, as it were, by a power independent of us, so that there could be a kind of scientific investigation into what the word really means. A word has the meaning someone has given to it' (BB pp. 27-8). So it could not turn out that a word has a meaning different from that which 1 (we) give to it by dint of my (our) use of the word.

should themselves not be considered in isolation: and when we place them in the context of other passages we will see that they should be read as embodying the social conception; that is, 198-202 have implicit what other passages make explicit. 1 need, then, to consider what other passages might be thought to lend themselves to a community interpretation and show that they have a different purport. The section 1 have most often heard cited as displaying Wittgenstein's commitment to the social conception is 242:
If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments. This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so.—It is one thing to describe methods of measurement, and another to obtain and state results of measurement. But what we call "measuring" is partly determined by a certain constancy in results of measurement. (242)

The claim is that Wittgenstein is here building the notion of agreement into the notion of meaning. This interpretation ignores, what I stressed in Chapter 1, that Wittgenstein is in this passage making a claim about the necessary conditions of communication: his claim is that for two or more people to share a language - to mean the same by their words- they must agree in their judgements. This claim expressly concerns a social concept, viz. that of a linguistic community, and so naturally it is formulated in social terms, vi:, agreement between members of that community. What Wittgenstein does not say, and what fails to follow from what he does say, is that for there to be meaning at all there has to be inter-personal agreement. He is certainly not saying in this section that the idea of an idiolect makes no sense: he is not ruling out the possibility that 1 might employ words with different meanings from those of other people. His point is that if we are to use words with the same meanings then we must agree in their use. Indeed, the interpretation I am rejecting would have Wittgenstein claiming, absurdly, that I cannot mean by a word what no-one else means by it, since meaning requires Ínter-personal agreement of use. In general, the relation between agreement and rules, as Wittgenstein sees it, concerns the notion of two or more people following the same rules; agreement is not supposed to be a necessary condition of an individual’s

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following a rule - that requires, rather, a multiplicity of occasions of application. What may also mislead is that Wittgenstein speaks typically of communal languages, e.g. English and German, and so formulates his claims in terms of these shared languages; but it is not to be inferred from this that he rejects the very notion of a language confined to a single individual. Since most actual rules are in fact shared, including the semantic rules of natural languages, it is only to be expected that Wittgenstein's examples should be of this kind; but t h i s should not be taken to exclude the very possibility of rules followed by only one person - and Wittgenstein says nothing to suggest that he intends lo exclude this possibility. it is not, as I remarked earlier, that he is especially anxious to insist on the coherence of solitary rule-following and to contest a community conception; the truth is that he is simply unconcerned whit t h i s kind of question. His citation of communal signs thus does not betoken a commitment to the essentially communal employment of signs; rather, he is, for his purposes, indifferent to the question. Much the same should be said of Wittgenstein's emphasis upon t h e notion of training in his account of language and rules. Training is, of course, a social concept - it involves an inter-personal relation - and training in the use of a sign may be said to aim at agreement between the trainee's behaviour and that of the trainer. Does this commit Wittgenstein to a community conception of what it is to grasp a rule? Clearly not, since nothing so far said implies that in order to explicate the concept of the learner's grasping a rule we must make essential reference to the behaviour of the trainer - any more so than for any skill acquired by means of training, e.g. kicking a ball. Wittgenstein emphasises training not because he thinks all rules are necessarily social but because it helps to remind us of what really goes on when someone achieves understanding: it acts as a prophylactic against myth-making36 (1 should say
36 See esp. 208-10, in which it is ernphasised that in teaching someone a rule I don not communicate lees than 1 myself know. This claim of Wittgenstein’s bears certain similarities to W. V. Quine's position on radical translation in Word and Object (MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass, 1960), chap. 2; and to Michael Dummett's insistence upon th e exhaustive manifestability of linguistic understanding in 'What is a Theory of Meaning? ( I I ) ' , i n Truth and Meaning, ed. G. Evans and J. McDowell (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1976).

that Kripke himself shows no tendency to rest his community interpretation on either of the last two considerations; I mention them because I have heard them cited by others in support of a community interpretation.)
I am not, in rejecting the community interpretation, saying that Wittgenstein thinks the notion of a linguistic community is 'unimportant' or totally irrelevant to a proper account of meaning; nor am I denying that when a language is communal others may legitimately correct one's use of words: I am not even denying; that what others mean by words can determine their meaning on the lips of a given speaker. I am saying only that Wittgenstein does not hold that the very notion of a rule of language must needs be explicated in social terms - that we cannot make sense of rule-following on the part of a given individual unless we relate that individual's behaviour to the behaviour of some community of rule- followers. Wittgenstein no more holds this view about understanding a rule than he holds a parallel view about being in pain or remembering something. And, as I shall argue in Chapter 4, it is well that Wittgenstein did not hold such a view, because it is dearly wrong. The divergence between Kripke's interpretation and mine shows up sharply in our different views of the way 202 relates to the latter sections dealing (explicitly) with private language (243f). Kripke's view is that by 202 the argument against the possibility of a private language is essentially complete Wittgenstein has already shown that there must always be public criteria for the correctness of linguistic use. This result has already been established because rule-following in general depends upon communal agreement of response for an individual to be following any rule he must exhibit behaviour which others can use to correct his sincere avowal that he is following a rule, since this is what the normativeness of rule comes to. The notion of correct rule-following is explicated in terms of assertibility conditions which are available to members of one's linguistic community, and so there is no possibility of following a rule which others cannot know one is following correctly or incorrectly.37 This view of what is going on in 202 obviously depends upon the community interpretation
37 See Kripke, pp. 3, 98-113

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interpretation, i.e. upon building agreement of response into the notion of rule-following. On the interpretation I have put forward, there is not this direct link between 202 and the private language argument: 202 sets the stage for that argument without actually completing it; more argumentative work has to be done before the possibility of a private language can be excluded. What is left open by 202 is the possibility of a 'private technique', i.e. a capacity to apply a sign in a regular way which is not checkable by others. In the case of public objects the technique of use will be checkable by others because the objects themselves are accessible to others and hence regularity of use is verifiable; but if the objects are private, as sensations have often been supposed to be, then there will be no telling whether the speaker is referring to the same (kind of) sensation on different occasions of use. I think my interpretation of the relation between 202 and the later material on private language better fits Wittgenstein’s procedure in those latter sections, for he speaks as if new considerations were been advanced and not simply a specific consequence of earlier conclusions being drawn. (38) Kripke, in fact, claims that Wittgenstein anticipates his sceptical paradox and i t s solution as early as the very first section of the Investigations, in which case the possibility of a private language would have been excluded right at the beginning: this seems implausible in itself, and inspection of section 1 discloses only an emphasis upon acting as against 'explanations' - there is no essential mention there of the community. My conclusion is then that the more traditional view of where the private language argument occurs (after 243) is to be preferred to Kripke's. It would, perhaps, be pleasant if Kripke's view of the overall structure of t he Investigations were correct, but it does not seem to me that it is. And the reason Wittgenstein's book does not have the structure Kripke attributes to it is that it does not have the content he attributes to it.
38 He does not anywhere say or imply that a private language has already been excluded by he earlier considerations, and that it is necessary for him now only to bring out how those considerations apply to the skeptical case of words for sensations. In fact. I think he writes as in the earlier conclusion —that understanding is mastery of a practice— leaves open the possibility of a private language. Hence the need to show that we have to impose further conditions on what it takes for a genuine practice (rule) to exist, notably third-person criteria of correctness.

"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

Porque la palabra es una…y la realidad es otra:

A los jubilados de México y Latinoamérica...Titanes humillados y olvidados.

“LA INTERPRETACIÓN DE KRIPKE SOBRE WITTGENSTEIN: PARADOJA Y COMUNIDAD”
POR COLIN MCGUINN

"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad" (Kripke's Interpretation of Wittgenstein: Paradox and Community) en: Wittgenstein on Meaning. An Interpretation and Evaluation, McGINN, Colin, Inglaterra, Basil Blackwell Publisher L t d, 1984, pp. 59-92 (Aristotelian Society Series, Volume 1)

Traducción: Profesor Joel Tucídides Madrigal Bailón, Licenciado en Filosofía, México Distrito Federal. Egresado de la Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana Unidad Iztapalapa (tucidides2000@yahoo.com.mx). Para educar y sin fines de lucro. Se permite la reproducción total o parcial citando al autor original.

Un humilde tributo a nuestros maestros, porque enseñan a pesar de la adversidad.

A MARÍA IMELDA SOTO LÓPEZ, porque su Náhuatl me enseñó a hablar el Castellano y