"La

interpretación
de Kripke sobre
Wittgenstein:
paradoja y
comunidad"
(Kripke's
Interpretation
of
Wittgenstein:
Paradox and
Community)
en:
Wittgenstein
on Meaning.
An
Interpretation
and
Evaluation,
McGINN, Colin,
“LA Inglaterra, Basil
Blackwell
INTERPRETACIÓN Publisher L t d,
DE KRIPKE SOBRE 1984, pp. 59-92
WITTGENSTEIN: (Aristotelian
PARADOJA Y Society Series,
Volume 1)
COMUNIDAD”
POR COLIN
MCGUINN

Traducción: Profesor Joel Tucídides Madrigal Bailón,

Licenciado en Filosofía, México Distrito Federal. Egresado
de la Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana Unidad
Iztapalapa (tucidides2000@yahoo.com.mx).

Para educar y sin fines de lucro. Se permite la reproducción

total o parcial citando al autor original.
 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

Sin mis seres amados, esta traducción jamás hubiera visto la luz:

Porque su Náhuatl
me enseñó a hablar
A MARÍA IMELDA SOTO el Castellano y aún
LÓPEZ me guía para
entender el Inglés.

Licenciada en Letras
Hispanas por la Normal
Superior de México.
Mujer culta dedicada a la
educación de la niñez
mexicana…. guía de muchas
A INÉS BAILÓN SOTO
decenas de generaciones.

Excelente maestra y
magnífico ejemplo.

A mi querida Angélica, amante de los libros.

A CARMINA ITZEL RUÍZ MADRIGAL…

PORQUE SU EXISTENCIA ME
ENORGULLECE Y ME DA FUERZA PARA
INTERPRETAR LOS SIGNOS DEL
FUTURO.
"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

Porque la palabra es una…y la realidad es otra:

A los jubilados de
México y
Latinoamérica...Titanes
humillados y olvidados.
 Colin McGinn

Wittgenstein on Meaning

An Interpretation and Evaluation

Aristotelian Society Series

Volume 1

Basil Blackwell • Oxford

 © Colin M c G i n n 1984

First published 1984

in cooperation with The Aristotelian Society
King's College, London W C 2

Basil Blackwell Publisher L t d

108 Cowley Road, Oxford 0 X 4 1JF, England
Contents
Basil Blackwell Inc.
432 Park Avenue South, Suite 1505
New Y o r k , NY 10016, U S A

A l l rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages

for the purposes of criticism and review, no part of this publication
may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted,
in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the
prior permission of the publisher. Preface vii

British Library Cataloguing in Publishing Data N o t e on References ix

Introduction xi
M c G i n n , Colin
Wittgenstein on meaning. 1 Wittgenstein's V i e w s : M e a n i n g , U n d e r s t a n d i n g ,
1. Wittgenstein, Ludwig I. Title
Rules 1
192 B3376.W564 2 K r i p k c ' s Interpretation of Wittgenstein: Paradox
ISBN 0-631-13764-5
and C o m m u n i t y 59

3 C r i t i c a l E v a l u a t i o n of Wittgenstein's Views 93

4 Assessment of K r i p k e ' s A r g u m e n t s 139

Index 201

Photoset and printed in Great Britain by

Photobooks (Bristol) Ltd
Vili PREFACE

more substantial; in the end it turned out to be a b o o k .

My m a i n a i m in this b o o k is to give a clear and accurate
account of what Wittgenstein actually thought, w i t h a view to
critically evaluating his ideas. In pursuance of this a i m , I have
perforce included a g o o d deal of quoted material and
commented closely on Wittgenstein's actual words; I invite the
reader to check for himself whether Wittgenstein is really Note on References
saying what I say he is. I hope the b o o k w i l l be useful to
students, as well as to their teachers; indeed, I have tried to
write in a way that does not presuppose any prior knowledge of
Wittgenstein's later philosophy.
My greatest debt in the c o m p o s i t i o n of this w o r k is to
M a l c o l m B u d d . We discussed Wittgenstein protractedly, and I
was constantly reassured by the happy convergence of our
views. H i s extensive knowledge of Wittgenstein's corpus and
his sure grasp of its contents were a great help to me. He References to Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (Black-
directed me to certain important passages in Wittgenstein, and well: O x f o r d , 1974) are given simply by citing section numbers,
saved me from more than one error of interpretation. He also or page numbers where appropriate. Other works of Wittgenstein
read and commented upon the first draft and made several very are cited by using initial letters of their titles followed by
helpful comments. It is seldom that one has the benefit of section or page numbers, according to the f o l l o w i n g system:
such disinterested and agreeable cooperation from a fellow TLP : Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Routledge and
philosopher. K e g a n P a u l : L o n d o n , 1961)
Other people also helped me to w o r k out my ideas. Z : Zcttel(mi)
Audiences of seminars I gave at University College L o n d o n , RFM :
Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (1978)
the University of Southern C a l i f o r n i a , Bielefeld University and OC : On Certainty (1979)
Stanford University made helpful comments which led to PG : Philosophical Grammar (1974)
various improvements. Conversations w i t h Rogers A l b r i t t o n , RPP : Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (1980)
A n i t a A v r a m i d e s , J i m H o p k i n s , Ian M c F e t r i d g c , M a r i e WLFM : Wittgenstein s Lectures on the Foundations of
M c G i n n , D a v i d Pears, R i c h a r d Warner and C r i s p i n Wright Mathematics, ed. C. D i a m o n d (Harvester Press:
(who commented in writing on my first draft) were also m u c h Sussex, 1976)
appreciated. Peter H a c k e r generously made detailed critical
comments on my penultimate draft; I am very grateful to h i m A l l of these books (except for the first and last) are published
for undertaking this labour and for the correspondence which by Basil B l a c k w e l l , O x f o r d .
ensued. I am also grateful to M a r t i n D a v i c s for his encourage-
ment and his efficient editorial work. Lastly, I am again
grateful to Katherine Backhouse for typing the w o r k and for
he good h u m o u r in d o i n g it.
A

Colin M c G i n n
10 June 1984
"La
interpretación
de Kripke sobre
Wittgenstein:
paradoja y
comunidad"
 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
59
COLIN MCGINN
2 2
Kripke's Interpretation of Wittgenstein: Paradox La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein:
and Community paradoja y comunidad
α
POR COLIN McGUINN

TRADUCCIÓN:
JOEL TUCÍDIDES MADRIGAL BAILÓN

In this chapter I shall contrast Kripke's interpretation
of Wittgenstein with the interpretation I put forward in
Chapter 1; we shall see that these interpretations are
very different. Kripke's expository procedure differs
somewhat from that adopted in the previous chapter:
he does not expound Wittgenstein by paying close
attention to the text, supporting each attribution with
an apposite citation; rather, he develops a systematic
argument which he hopes will make sense of, and
occasional contact with, Wittgenstein's text. Kripke's
assumption is that this argument is what underlies
Wittgenstein's actual text, and that we shall understand
Wittgenstein better if we see his text as the surfacing
of this systematic argument in different ways and
contexts: it is not that Wittgenstein is to be found
explicitly propounding this argument, but we can
illuminatingly treat his text as if he were. And it is this
feature of Kripke's exposition which causes him to
qualify his attributions to Wittgenstein from time to
time - to admit that his way of presenting Wittgenstein
is somewhat alien to Wittgenstein's own conception of
his views. (1) We should therefore take seriously
Kripke's prefatory caveat: “the present paper should
be thought of as expounding neither "Wittgenstein's"
argument nor "Kripke's" : rather Wittgenstein's
argument as it struck Kripke, as it presented a problem
for him”. (p. 5).
En este capítulo yo compararé esta interpretación de Kripke
sobre Wittgenstein, con aquella interpretación que bosquejé
en el capítulo I. Tendremos que ver que estas
interpretaciones son muy diferentes. El proceso expositivo
de Kripke difiere de aquellos adoptados en el capítulo
previo. Kripke no expone a Wittgenstein prestando mucha
atención al texto, apoyando cada suposición con la cita
correspondiente. Más bien él desarrolla un argumento
sistemático el cual espera, mantenga sentido con el texto
de Wittgenstein y haga contacto ocasional con aquel. El
supuesto de Kripke es que este argumento es lo que
subyace realmente en el texto de Wittgenstein y lo
entenderemos mejor si vemos al texto como el
revestimiento de cierto argumento sistemático en diferentes
maneras y contextos. No es que Wittgenstein deba de ser
hallado completamente explícito proponiendo este
argumento, pero es posible iluminar su texto como si
pudiéramos proceder así. Y es este rasgo de la exposición
de Kripke, lo que le lleva a identificar sus argumentos con
los de Wittgenstein, y de cuando en cuando, a admitir que
su forma de presentar a Wittgenstein es en realidad una
extraña manera de presentar su propia concepción del
trabajo de Wittgenstein. (1). Sin embargo, debemos tomar
en serio la advertencia preliminar de Kripke: "Este
documento no debe ser tomado como "la exposición de
Wittgenstein" ni tampoco como "el argumento de Kripke",
sino más bien como "el argumento de Wittgenstein como lo
descubrió Kripke", como la manera en que el problema se le
presentó a él " (p.5).

α
Tema: Kripke's Interpretation of Wittgenstein: Paradox and Community. La versión castellana puede descargarse de la página:
http://es.scribd.com/ Por favor, para mejor opinión visite la página Web del profesor Colin McGuinn en: http://mcginn.philospot.com/ .
Extraído del libro original. Referencia bibliografía: "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"( Kripke's
Interpretation of Wittgenstein: Paradox and Community) en: Wittgenstein on Meaning. An Interpretation and Evaluation, McGINN,
Colin, Inglaterra, Basil Blackwell Publisher L t d, 1984, pp. 59-92 (Aristotelian Society Series, Volume 1).
Las notas originales (1) se han colocado a final de texto y se han reservado los pies de página para algunas notas adicionales.
Esto pretende facilitar al estudiante la lectura. El acomodo de palabras ha variado ligeramente la paginación: algunos párrafos se han
recorrido “al siguiente inicio de página” respecto a la versión original (vgr. Las líneas últimas de p. 63, se trasladaron a inicio de la 64).
La paginación se maneja así: Arriba en un recuadro negro se pone el número aproximado en el formato original, y abajo la paginación
particular de este documento.
Traducido por el profesor Joel Tucídides Madrigal Bailón, Licenciado en Filosofía, México Distrito Federal. Egresado de la
Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana- Unidad Iztapalapa. (tucidides2000@yahoo.com.mx) Para educar y sin fines de lucro. Se permite
la reproducción total o parcial citando al autor original.
Página 1 de 34 COLIN MCGINN

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2

 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
COLIN MCGINN
Kripke is here disarmingly aware that he is foisting
onto Wittgenstein's text what is not to be found
inscribed on its surface; and this is why he adopts the
method of exposition he does adopt. My own
procedure has been quite different: I have assumed
that Wittgenstein can be satisfactorily interpreted
without seeing his text as the occasional surfacing of
an underlying systematic argument but rather by
paying close (and perhaps somewhat pedantic)
attention to what he actually says. I would not
therefore think it appropriate to issue the sort of caveat
Kripke does. This observation is not intended as a
piece of self-congratulation on my part, but as a
recognition of the procedural difference between
Kripke and me. In fact I believe that the more
substantive differences stem fundamentally from this
difference in respect of exegetical method. For what
Kripke has done is to produce an impressive and
challenging argument which bears little affinity with
Wittgenstein's own problems and claims: in an
important sense Kripke and the real Wittgenstein are
not even dealing with the same issues (they have a
different 'problematic'). I shall begin by summarising
Kripke's interpretation, assuming some familiarity
with its outline, and then I shall explain why I think it
goes wrong as an interpretation. This task should be
facilitated by what has already been argued in Chapter
1; since I believe I there gave ample textual evidence
for my interpretation, it will be necessary only to spell
out the points of disagreement and give some
diagnosis of how Kripke came to the wrong
interpretation.
The general structure of Wittgenstein's argument,
according to Kripke, is as follows. Wittgenstein
focuses attention upon the normative notion of an
application of a sign being (linguistically) correct, i.e.
in accordance with its meaning. (This is not the notion
offactual correctness, i.e. stating a truth about the
world; it concerns the question which word is
linguistically appropriate to the facts. Thus, for
example, suppose I believe truly that this object is red;
the question of linguistic correctness is then which
word expresses this belief: is 'red' the word I ought to
use to state the fact in which I believe?)
Página 2 de 34 COLIN MCGINN
Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2
60
Kripke está sereno y consciente de que en realidad está
parafraseando en el texto de Wittgenstein, escudriñando lo
que no puede hallarse en su superficie... y precisamente
esta es la razón por la que él adopta este método de
exposición. Pero mi procedimiento ha sido muy diferente:
He asumido que Wittgenstein puede ser interpretado
satisfactoriamente sin contemplar su texto como el
recubrimiento ocasional de un argumento sistemático
subyacente, sino más bien, prestando mucha atención (y de
alguna manera "pedante atención") a lo que realmente dice.
Sin embargo no pensaría apropiado cuestionar la clase de
elucidación que Kripke hace. Esta observación no es una
clase de auto-complacencia de mi parte, sino que es un
auto-reconocimiento de la diferencia metodológica entre
Kripke y Yo. En realidad creo que las diferencias más
substanciales descansan fundamentalmente en este
desacuerdo respecto al método exegético. La razón por la
que Kripke ha hecho esto es para producir un argumento
impresionante y cambiante el cual mantenga una pequeña
afinidad con los problemas y afirmaciones propias de
Wittgenstein. En un sentido importante, Kripke y el
Wittgenstein real no siempre están lidiando con las mismas
cuestiones (ellos tienen una "problemática" diferente). Debo
comenzar resumiendo la interpretación de Kripke. Asumiré
alguna familiaridad con su trabajo y después explicaré el
por qué opino que no es viable su interpretación. Esta tarea
será facilitada por lo argumentado en el capítulo I, pues
creo haber presentado evidencia textual para mi
interpretación. Será necesario, sólo para subrayar los
puntos de desacuerdo y dar un diagnóstico del cómo Kripke
llegó a una interpretación equivocada.
La estructura general del argumento de Wittgenstein, según
Kripke, es como sigue. Wittgenstein enfoca su atención
sobre la noción normativa de una aplicación de un signo
que es lingüísticamente correcto, por ejemplo, de acuerdo
con su significado. [ Esta no es la noción de exactitud
factual-o precisión objetiva (factual correctness)- por
ejemplo al establecer una verdad sobre el mundo. Esto
concierne a la cuestión de qué palabra es lingüísticamente
apropiada a los hechos. Así por ejemplo, suponga que yo
creo verdadero el que este objeto sea rojo. El caso del buen
uso lingüístico será aquel donde la palabra refleje esta
cuestión: ¿ Es "roja" la palabra que debo usar para
expresar el hecho que considero? ]
 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
COLIN MCGINN
We ordinarily think that some uses of words are
correct and some are incorrect, some uses correctly
express the fact we want to state and some do not:
Wittgenstein's question is supposed to be what this
distinction consists in. What makes it right to use
words in one way rather than another? It is clear that
this normative property of words depends upon their
having a determinate meaning: for the notion of' a
correct use is well-defined only if words mean one
thing rather than another - that is what makes it right
to use one word rather than another to state a given
fact. Therefore we need to make sense of the idea of a
word meaning one thing rather than another if we are
to give content to the notion of correct (or incorrect)
use of language. To put it differently: any proposed
candidate for the meaning of a word must be such as
to sustain linguistic normativeness; we must be able to
read off from any alleged meaning-constituting
property of a word what is the correct use of that
word. The normativeness of meaning thus functions as
a condition of adequacy upon any account of what
meaning is. (2)
Now Kripke's claim is that Wittgenstein finds this
notion of normativeness deeply problematic, and
hence finds the whole notion of meaning
correspondingly problematic. For nothing can be
produced to constitute meaning that meets the
normativeness requirement: there is no property of a
word from which we can read off its correct use, and
so there is nothing for meaning to be. This is what
Kripke calls Wittgenstein's 'sceptical paradox' - the
thesis that there is nothing, no fact, that could
constitute meaning one thing rather than another. But
Wittgenstein does not (according to Kripke) want to
leave us helpless in the jaws of this paradox; he
proposes a 'sceptical solution' to the paradox which,
while conceding to the sceptic that no fact constitutes
meaning, nevertheless preserves our ordinary talk of
meaning and rules. The sceptical solution does this by
persuading us that we do not need to supply the kind
of account of meaning the sceptic shows to be
unavailable; we can take a radically different view of
the significance of statements about meaning, namely
that such statements do not purport to state facts at all.
Since ascriptions of meaning and rule-following do
Página 3 de 34 COLIN MCGINN
Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2
61
Nosotros pensamos ordinariamente que algunos usos de
las palabras son correctos y otros son incorrectos. Algunos
usos expresan correctamente el uso que deseamos
declarar y otros no. El dilema de Wittgenstein consiste en
imaginar en que consiste esta distinción ¿Qué es lo que
hace correcto el uso de las palabras, más de una forma que
de otra? Es claro que esta propiedad normativa de las
palabras depende de que tengan un significado
determinado. La noción de uso correcto esta bien definida si
las palabras significan algo de una forma mejor que otra.
Eso es lo que hace correcto el uso de una palabra en lugar
de otra al expresar un hecho dado. Entonces debemos dar
sentido a la idea de que una palabra signifique una cosa en
lugar de otra, si es que queremos dar contenido a la noción
de corrección (o incorrección) en el uso del lenguaje.
Poniéndolo de otra forma: cualquier posible candidato para
el significado de una palabra debe ser tal que logre
sustentar una normatividad lingüística. Debemos ser
capaces de entender por completo cuál es el uso correcto
de una palabra a partir de cualquier pretendida propiedad
constitutiva de la palabra. De esta forma, la normatividad
del significado funciona como una condición de suficiencia
sobre cualquier recuento de lo que es el significado (2).
Ahora la afirmación de Kripke es que Wittgenstein
encuentra esta noción de normatividad profundamente
confusa, y por eso encuentra la noción de significado,
correspondientemente confusa. Nada es generado de forma
tal que implique el necesario vínculo con el requisito de la
normatividad. No existe propiedad de una palabra desde la
cual podamos determinar completamente su uso correcto, y
así no hay nada que apoye la existencia de cierto
significado. Esto es lo que Kripke llama "la paradoja
escéptica" de Wittgenstein: la tesis de que no hay nada,
ningún hecho, que pudiera dar la pauta para constituir un
significado a favor de otro. Pero Wittgenstein (según Kripke)
no desea dejarnos indefensos en las fauces de esta
paradoja. El propone una "solución escéptica" a la
paradoja, en la cual mientras se conceda al escéptico que
ningún hecho constituye el significado, se conservará
nuestra habla ordinaria con sus significados y reglas. La
solución escéptica procede convenciéndonos de que
nosotros no necesitamos generar la clase de recuentos del
significado que el escéptico nos muestra que ya están
agotados. Podemos tomar una posición totalmente radical
del sentido de las afirmaciones acerca del significado, a
saber, que tales afirmaciones no proponen para nada
establecer hechos. Puesto que las adscripciones de
 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
COLIN MCGINN
not set out to state facts, it is no disaster for them that
we can discover no facts for them to state; we can
provide a quite different account of their function.
This, then, is the general shape of Wittgenstein's
argument, as Kripke sees it; let us now fill the
argument in a bit.
The sceptical paradox is initially presented by
considering' the meaning I attach to signs I used in the
past. I normally and uncritically assume that my
present use of (say) accords with my past meaning, so
that when I now give the sum of 67 and 58 in answer
to the question '67+58? I am interpreting *+* as I did
in the past: that is, I assume that in the past I meant
addition by *+' and so I conform with my past
meaning (I use'+1 correctly) if I now take questions
containing '+' to require doing some addition. Kripke's
sceptic questions whether this assumption is on
reflection legitimate: perhaps in the past I meant by
k+\ not addition, but quaddition, a mathematical
function whose value is 5 for the pair of arguments 67
and 58. What is it about my past history that makes
me so sure that I meant addition and not quaddition,
and hence so confident that my present linguistic
response conforms with my previous meaning (the
response of giving 125 in answer to '67 + 58?')? The
sceptic's question is, in effect, what justifies my
confidence that'+' has a constant meaning for me over
time: what is it that constitutes this presumed
constancy? To answer this question we need to be able
to point to some feature of my past usage that
establishes that I then meant addition; and the
semantic sceptic claims that this cannot be done. (In
fact, the sceptical paradox has two aspects, an
epistemological aspect and a constitutive or
metaphysical aspect: epistemologically, the claim is
that nothing can now be cited to justify my
assumption of semantic constancy; constitutively, the
claim is that there is no fact about me which could
constitute my meaning addition rather than
quaddition. It is the second aspect which is the more
important in Kripke's exposition of Wittgenstein; the
epistemological challenge is regarded chiefly as a way
into the constitutive challenge.) [ 3 ]
Página 4 de 34 COLIN MCGINN
Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2
62
significado y reglas de seguimiento no encaminan a
establecer hechos, no es tan malo que no podamos
descubrir hechos que puedan ser declarados. Podemos
establecer un recuento completamente diferente de sus
funciones. Esta es pues la forma general del argumento de
Wittgenstein como Kripke lo ve. Permítasenos agregarle
una pieza al argumento.
La paradoja escéptica se presenta inicialmente a través de
la consideración de un significado que yo ligo a signos
usados en el pasado. Acrítica y normalmente, yo asumo
que mi presente uso de (por decir) "+" concuerda con mi
significado pasado. Así, al dar ahora la suma de 67 y 58, en
respuesta a la pregunta "¿Cuánto es 67+58?", yo estoy
interpretando "+" como lo hice en el pasado. Esto es,
asumo que en el pasado yo quise significar adición a través
de "+", y así me adapto a mi significado pasado (yo uso "+"
correctamente) si se tomar las preguntas que contengan "+"
como la exigencia de hacer alguna suma. La pregunta
escéptica de Kripke radica en si esta suposición se basa en
una reflexión legítima. Quizás en el pasado yo quise decir
por "+" no adición sino “meta-adición” ó "suma cuarta"
(Quaddition), una función matemática cuyo valor es 5 para
el par de argumentos: "67 y 58" ¿Qué es eso acerca de mi
historia pasada que me hace estar tan seguro de que quiero
significar "suma" y no "suma cuarta", y que por ende me
hace tan confiado de que mi respuesta lingüística presente
deba responder conforme a mi significado previo (a saber:
que 125 es la respuesta requerida para "67+58")? La
pregunta escéptica es en efecto ¿Qué justifica mi confianza
de que "+" tenga un significado constante para mi a través
del tiempo?, ¿qué es lo que constituye esta presumible
constante? Para contestar debemos ser capaces de señalar
algún rasgo o punto de mi uso pasado, a partir del cual se
comienza a significar "adición". La semántica escéptica
afirma que esto no puede ser posible. [ En realidad la
paradoja escéptica tiene dos aspectos: uno epistemológico
y otro constitutivo o metafísico. Epistemológicamente la
tesis es que ahora nada puede ser invocado para justificar
mi supuesto de constancia semántica. Constitutivamente la
tesis es que no hay ningún hecho relacionado conmigo, el
cual pudiera constituir mejor el significado de adición en vez
del de "suma cuarta". Este es el segundo aspecto más
importante en la exposición de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein. El
cambio epistemológico está supuesto principalmente, como
un camino dentro del cambio constitutivo ] (3)
 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
COLIN MCGINN
The case for the sceptical paradox proceeds by
exhausting the candidates. First, my actual
computations involving "+" do not suffice to
determine that I meant addition, since these are
logically compatible with my having meant some
other function which agrees with addition for just the
numbers on which I have performed computations
with '+' but diverges thereafter. Actual use of "+"
either externally or in my head. underdetermines
which function is denoted; for there are indefinitely
many functions distinct from addition which are
compatible with the finitely many applications of '+'
I have made. For any finite sequence of applications
of a sign we can always envisage different ways of
continuing to apply the sign which conform to
different assignments of meaning.
Second, my past inner states of consciousness cannot
determine what I meant because they admit of various
interpretations or applications: no experience I have
can dictate what is the right way to use a sign, and
whatever meaning is it must provide for such
normativeness. Nor are there any 'magical states of
consciousness which are capable of doing what the
mundane states cannot do. So there are no facts about
consciousness which can furnish a reply to the sceptic.
Third, Kripke considers the suggestion that my past
meaning consisted in my having a certain sort of
linguistic disposition: instead of looking to my actual
use of '+' in the past, let us turn to how I was disposed
to use '+1 and read my past meaning off from that.
The appeal of this suggestion is that it offers the hope
that the underdetermination problem will be got
round: for we can now cite the fact that in the past I
was disposed to say 4125* and not 45' in answer to
467 + 58?\ even though this question never actually
came up. Dispositions to use are thus supposed to
mirror the productivity of meaning; their
consequences extend beyond the actual history of a
person's use of a sign. Kripke's reply to this
dispositional suggestion consists in two observations:
in the first place, dispositions to use arc finite, since
human beings are finite objects existing for a finite
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El caso de la paradoja escéptica procede eliminando
candidatos. Primero, los cálculos actuales que
envuelvan a "+" no serán suficientes para determinar
lo que yo quise significar por suma ya que estos son
lógicamente compatibles con otros significados
mentales, relativos a funciones que concuerdan con
mi adición. Mi cálculo es exclusivo de los números
que realizan las operaciones que presentaron a "+".
El caso puede cambiar en lo sucesivo. El uso actual
de "+", ya sea externo o en mi cabeza, es el que sub-
determina cuál es la función denotada. Hay muchas
funciones indefinidas y distintas de la adición que son
compatibles con aplicaciones finitas de "+",
parecidas a la que yo realicé. En cualquier secuencia
finita de aplicaciones de un signo, podemos planear
siempre distintas formas de trabajo con el signo. De
esta forma el signo se adapta a distintos usos del
significado.
Segundo, mis anteriores estados inherentes de
conciencia, no pueden determinar lo que quiero
significar, porque ellos admiten varias aplicaciones e
interpretaciones. Ninguna experiencia que haya
tenido puede dictaminar cuál es la manera correcta
de usar un signo y cualquier significado debe tener
prevista tal normatividad. Tampoco hay algún "estado
mágico" de conciencia que sea capaz de hacer lo que
los estados mundanos no puedan hacer. Así que, no
hay hechos relativos a la conciencia que puedan
otorgar una respuesta al escéptico.
Tercero, Kripke considera la sugerencia de que mi
significado pasado consiste en que yo tenía cierta
clase de disposición lingüística. Por ejemplo, en lugar
de observar mi uso actual del signo "+" respecto al
pasado, hay que cambiar a la idea sobre el cómo
estuve dispuesto a usar "+" y el cómo pude deducir
aquel significado pasado de todo ello. El sentido de
esta sugerencia es que ofrece la esperanza de que el
problema de la indeterminación sea evadido. Ahora
podemos citar el hecho de que en el pasado yo estuve
dispuesto a decir "125" y no "5" en la respuesta a
"67+58", aunque en realidad esta pregunta nunca
surgiera. Entonces, las disposiciones de uso están
supuestas o pensadas para reflejar la productividad
del significado. Sus consecuencias se extienden más
allá de la historia actual en que la persona usa el
signo. La respuesta de Kripke a esta sugerencia
 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
COLIN MCGINN
time, whereas addition is a function with infinitely
main arithmetical consequences; in the second place,
speakers are disposed to make mistakes in their use of
signs, and so dispositions by themselves cannot
properly account for normativeness. The dispositional
suggestion just equates, Kripke says, competence with
performance: but performance by itself cannot capture
the infinity of meaning nor its normativeness. So
meaning addition by '+' cannot consist in being
disposed to give the sum of arbitrary pairs of numbers
on demand: some numbers are simply too big, and we
may have systematic tendencies to give something
other than the sum because of errors of calculation.
Kripke claims (on Wittgenstein's behalf) that these
three replies to the semantic sceptic exhaust the
possibilities, and so we must concede that there is
nothing for my having meant addition to consist in.
But once we concede this we admit that the same
scepticism applies to my present use of “+”: for the
same sceptical question could be asked about my
present meaning at some future time, and the same
range of possible answers will be shown to be
inadequate then. Indeed, if we ask directly what
constitutes my presently meaning addition and not
quaddition we shall be faced with the same difficulty:
actual use, present states of consciousness and present
dispositions to use will all fail to fix a unique meaning
for my words. So there is likewise nothing about my
present use of signs that makes that use right or
wrong: the whole notion of meaning appears to
collapse. (4) This, then, is the first, negative phase of
Wittgenstein's discussion of meaning, as Kripke
interprets him.
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64
disposicional consiste en dos observaciones: en
primer lugar, las disposiciones de uso son finitas ya
que los seres humanos son objetos finitos existiendo
por un tiempo finito, mientras la adición es una
función con muchas e infinitas consecuencias
aritméticas. En segundo lugar, los hablantes están
dispuestos a cometer errores en su uso de los signos.
Así las disposiciones por sí mismas no pueden
propiamente dar cuenta de la normatividad. La
sugerencia disposicional, dice Kripke, sólo iguala
competencia con desempeño eficiente. Pero el
desempeño eficiente por sí mismo no puede capturar
la infinidad del significado ni su normatividad. Así,
significar adición a través de "+" no puede consistir
en "estar dispuestos a dar la suma" de un par de
números arbitrarios dados. Algunos números
simplemente son muy grandes y podríamos tener una
tendencia sistemática a dar como resultado algo
distinto a la suma natural, debido a errores de
cálculo.
Kripke afirma (según su interpretación de
Wittgenstein) que estas tres respuestas al semántico
escéptico agotan las posibilidades, y por eso debemos
conceder que no hay nada que apoye el significado o
idea que tengo de "suma". Pero una vez que
admitimos esto, también admitimos que el mismo
escepticismo aplica a mi uso presente de "+". En un
futuro cercano, la misma pregunta escéptica podría
aplicarse a mi significado en uso y entonces el mismo
rango de respuestas posibles se mostrarán también
como inadecuadas. En efecto, si preguntamos
directamente qué es lo que constituye o apoya mi
significado actual de "adición" y "suma cuarta",
habremos de encarar la misma dificultad. El uso
actual, los estados presentes de conciencia y las
disposiciones presentes de uso fallarán en acordar un
significado único para mis palabras. Del mismo
modo, no hay nada en lo que respecta a mi uso
presente, que señale que este sea correcto o
equivocado. La noción entera de significado parece
colapsarse. (4) Esto es el primer rostro negativo de
Wittgenstein en la discusión sobre el significado,
como Kripke la interpreta.
 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
COLIN MCGINN
The second, positive phase consists in an effort to
draw the sting from the sceptical paradox while not
questioning its substance. The strategy, as I remarked,
is to reject the sceptic's presupposition that ascriptions
of meaning are in the business of stating facts; rather,
we are to conceive of their significance in terms of (a)
their assertibility conditions and (b) their role or utility
or point in discourse. The effect of this move is to
undercut the key assumption of the sceptic: we are to
see that all along he was attacking a straw man,
though a straw man with whom we naturally and
naively identify. According to Kripke, the change of
perspective needed to fend off the sceptic reflects
Wittgenstein's shift from the philosophy of language
espoused in the Tractatus to that put forward in the
Investigations: the sceptic is presupposing the kind of
fact-stating model of meaning advocated in the
Tractatus, and the cure for this scepticism is to adopt
the different conception of meaning we find in the
Investigations - with its emphasis upon the role of
criteria and the place of language in our lives. The
sceptic seems to us to be striking at the very notion of
meaning only because we are powerfully attracted to
the conception of language articulated in the
Tractatus: if we can free ourselves from that
conception we shall no longer feel ourselves
threatened by the sceptic's arguments; but it is hard to
tree ourselves from it, so the threat feels real. (5)
Although Kripke does not himself say so, there are, I
think, other areas of philosophy in which much the
same strategy has been tried, and it will be useful to
have these in mind when we enquire whether
Wittgenstein really proceeds as Kripke suggests.
Three parallels may be mentioned. First, certain sons
of noncognitivism in ethics can be viewed in an
analogous way: the noncognitivist cannot find facts
suitable for correspondence with ethical statements,
and so he suggests that ethical utterances be conceived
in a non-fact-stating way instead - as prescriptions to
action or expressions of emotion, say. This type of
view might be motivated by the incapacity of non-
queer facts to add up to what we intuitively demand of
ethical truth or by a conviction that what would add up
to that is in some way metaphysically rebarbative. (6)
Instead of abandoning ethical utterances as
meaningless in the absence of ethical facts the
noncognitivist reinterprets their purport - he proposes
a different conception of meaning for such sentences.
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Lo segundo es un rostro positivo que consiste en un
esfuerzo por bosquejar el corazón de la paradoja escéptica
sin cuestionar su substancia. Su estrategia, como ya
subrayé, es rechazar el supuesto escéptico de que las
atribuciones de un significado están bajo negociación de
hechos establecidos, en lugar de ello, debemos considerar
esos significados en términos de (a) sus condiciones de
asertabilidad o precisión y (b) su rol, utilidad o punto
específico en el discurso. El resultado de este proceder es
debilitar el supuesto clave del escéptico. Debemos ver que
en todo este tiempo se ha estado atacando a un
espantapájaros, el cual se ha identificado con naturalidad e
ingenuidad. De acuerdo con Kripke, el cambio de
perspectiva necesaria para evadir la reflexión escéptica de
Wittgenstein oscila desde la filosofía del lenguaje expuesta
en el Tractatus, hasta aquella puesta más adelante en las
Investigaciones. El escéptico está presuponiendo el modelo
de significado propio del "hecho establecido" presente en el
Tractatus y la cura para este escepticismo está en adoptar
la otra concepción del significado que encontramos en las
Investigaciones (con un énfasis especial en el rol de los
criterios y el lugar que tiene el lenguaje en nuestras vidas).
El escéptico nos parece estar apuntando a la noción propia
de significado, sólo porque nosotros mismos estamos
poderosamente atraídos a la concepción del lenguaje
articulada en el Tractatus. Si podemos liberarnos de tal
concepción no tendremos que sentirnos amenazados por
los argumentos escépticos, pero es difícil hacerlo así que
sentimos que la amenaza es real. (5)
Aunque Kripke no lo exprese por sí mismo de esta forma,
hay según creo yo, otras áreas de la filosofía en las cuáles
la misma estrategia ha sido aplicada y sería útil mantener
esto en mente cuando nos preguntemos si Wittgenstein
realmente procede como Kripke sugiere. Tres casos
paralelos pueden mencionarse. Primero cierta clase de
ética no-cognitivista (non-cognitivist) puede ser visualizada
de forma análoga. El no-cognitivista tiene problemas para
encontrar hechos capaces de corresponderse con
afirmaciones éticas. Así se llega a sugerir que las
expresiones éticas han sido concebidas de una manera "no
establecida de hecho" (igual que las prescripciones a la
acción o expresiones de emoción). Este tipo de visión
podría ser motivada por la incapacidad de poder agregar
hechos apropiados y "no-extraños" ("non queer facts") a lo
que una verdad ética nos demanda intuitivamente, o tal vez
también, por la convicción de que lo que agregamos a esa
verdad es en cierto sentido metafísicamente "raro" . (6) En
lugar de abandonar las expresiones éticas como simples sin
sentidos en la ausencia de hechos éticos, el no-cognitivista
 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
COLIN MCGINN
Thus emotivism (say) can be seen as a sceptical
solution to a sceptical paradox - the paradox, namely,
that there is nothing in the world that could constitute
the value-fact we naively take ethical assertions to
require; and the sceptical solution is that these
'assertions1 serve rather to express the emotions of the
speaker or some such thing. (7)
Second, there is the doctrine of instrumentalism with
respect to the theoretical sentences of science: the
instrumentalist cannot (he thinks) find any genuine
facts to correspond to such sentences, but he preserves
their role in discourse by interpreting them in a
different way - as useful devices for organising the
real facts. Instead of reacting to the lack of suitable
facts by declaring talk of unobservables void of
significance, he gives up the fact-stating model and
opts for a different account of meaning - in terms,
perhaps, of assertibility conditions and organisational
utility. Third, certain views of mathematical
statements display this dialectical form: seeking facts
to correspond to mathematical sentences we find
ourselves discouraged either by the incapacity of
mundane facts to do the job or by the seeming
necessity to postulate 'queer' facts (platonism); so we
abandon the factstating referential model altogether
and put in its place a different account 0f meaning -
e.g., that mathematical sentences get their significance
from their empirical applications. This again would be
aptly characterised as a sceptical solution to a
sceptical paradox: one agrees with the sceptic that no
mathematical facts can be found, but one averts his
radical conclusion (mathematics is meaningless) by
proposing an alternative account of meaning that
makes the sceptical paradox irrelevant. (8) I think
that these three issues exemplify the general pattern of
argument Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein; we can
see Kripke's dialectic as adding yet another kind of
'noncognitivism' to the list of more familiar doctrines
of which I have given three examples.
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reinterpreta su objetivo. Él propone una concepción
diferente de "significado" para tales afirmaciones. De esta
manera, el "emotivismo" (por llamarlo así) puede ser
contemplado como una solución escéptica a la "paradoja
escéptica" . Esta paradoja, a saber, la que afirma que no
existe nada en el mundo que pueda llegar a constituir un
"hecho de valor". Tomamos ingenuamente las expresiones
éticas como exigencias, y la solución escéptica es que
estas "expresiones" sirven más bien para expresar las
emociones del hablante o cosas parecidas. (7)
Segundo, existe la doctrina del instrumentalismo en lo que
respecta a los enunciados teoréticos de la ciencia. El
instrumentalista no puede (según piensa) encontrar hechos
genuinos que se correspondan con tales enunciados, pero
preserva su rol en el discurso, interpretandolos de una
manera distinta (como mecanismos útiles para organizar
hechos auténticos). En vez de reaccionar a la falta de
hechos apropiados evidenciando un habla llena de
inadvertidos vacíos de significado, se renuncia al modelo de
hechos establecidos y se opta por un balance diferente del
significado (quizás en términos de condiciones de
asertabilidad y utilidad organizacional). Tercero, ciertas
orientaciones de los enunciados matemáticos despliegan
esta forma dialéctica: buscando hechos que se
correspondan con enunciados matemáticos, nos
encontramos desanimados por la incapacidad de los actos
mundanos para realizar este trabajo o por la aparente
necesidad de postular hechos "extraños" (Platonismo). Así,
abandonamos el modelo de hechos establecidos y
ponemos en su lugar una explicación diferente del
significado. Por ejemplo, que los enunciados matemáticos
consiguen su significado de sus aplicaciones empíricas. De
nuevo, esto puede ser apropiadamente caracterizado como
una solución escéptica para una paradoja escéptica. Uno
acuerda con el escéptico que ningún hecho matemático
puede ser encontrado, pero uno evita esta conclusión tan
radical (las matemáticas son un absurdo sin sentido)
proponiendo un explicación o recuento alternativo del
significado que haga de la paradoja escéptica algo
irrelevante. (8) Creo que estos tres cuestionamientos
ejemplifican la estructura general del argumento que Kripke
atribuye a Wittgenstein. Podemos ver la dialéctica de Kripke
como una que todavía agrega algún tipo de "anti-
cogniscitivismo" a la lista de las doctrinas más familiares
que nos han ocupado en estos tres ejemplos.
 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
COLIN MCGINN
So far I have only explained the sense in which
Kripke's positive view of semantic statements is a
sceptical solution; I have not said what form that
positive view takes. The central idea, attributed to
Wittgenstein, is that the assertibility conditions and
point of ascriptions of meaning essentially involve the
notion of a community. Thus to say that someone
means addition by "+" is warranted just if (a) he
agrees in his responses with the responses of some
community who use and (b) he can be trusted in his
interactions with members of a community in
situations involving "+" . That is to say, the notion of
a rule is an essentially social one, involving inter-
personal relations; solve cannot give an account of
rule following in individualistic terms. (9)
We cannot, Kripke says, make sense of someone
following a rule “considered in isolation”. Kripke
compares this result with Hume's positive account of
causation: the relation of causation between a pair of
events cannot be explicated solely by reference to
those events, as we naively suppose; rather, when we
speak of causal relations we are (tacitly) subsuming
the pair of events in question under a generalisation
involving other events. Thus the assertibility
conditions of "e caused f" are inherently 'social':
events can stand in causal relations only in virtue of
their membership in a 'community1 of events. Kripke
puts this by saying that there cannot, on Hume's view,
be 'private causation'; as there cannot be 'private', i.e.
individualistic, rule-following, according to
Wittgenstein. In sum, then, the 'sceptical solution'
consists in two moves: first the replacement of truth
conditions (correspondence to facts) by assertibility
conditions, and second the introduction of the
community into the notion of rule-following. These
two moves are, of course, logically independent, but
Kripke's claim is that both are necessary if the
sceptical paradox is to be answered. (10)
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Hasta aquí, sólo he explicado el sentido en el que la visión
positiva de Kripke sobre los enunciados semánticos, se
transforma en solución escéptica. No he dicho nada sobre
la forma que toma aquella visión positiva. La idea central,
atribuida a Wittgenstein, es que las condiciones de
asertabilidad y el punto de la adscripción del significado,
envuelven esencialmente la noción de una comunidad.
Entonces, decir que una persona significa adición con el
signo "+" está justificado sólo si: (a) la persona converge en
sus respuestas con "+", con las respuestas de alguna
comunidad que use "+"; y (b) La persona puede confiar en
que sus interacciones con los miembros de la comunidad
dentro de situaciones que envuelvan que envuelvan al
signo "+". Esto nos dice que: la noción de una regla es
esencialmente la de una regla social. Envuelve relaciones
interpersonales y así, no podemos dar recuentos de reglas
seguidas en términos individuales. (9)
No podemos, afirma Kripke, concederle sentido a alguien
que sigue una regla "pensada en soledad". Kripke compara
el resultado de esto con la explicación positiva de Hume
acerca de la causación. La relación de causación entre un
par de eventos no puede ser explicada solamente haciendo
referencia a aquellos eventos, como suponemos
ingenuamente. Más bien, cuando hablamos de relaciones
causales, estamos (tácitamente) subsumiendo el par de
eventos en cuestión, bajo una generalización que envuelve
otros eventos. De esta forma, las condiciones de
asertabilidad de la expresión: " e causó f " son
inherentemente sociales. Los eventos pueden descansar en
relaciones causales sólo en virtud de su filiación en una
"Comunidad" de eventos. Kripke expone esto diciendo que
no puede existir, según Hume, "causación privada", por
ejemplo, una "regla de seguimiento individualista" a la
manera de Wittgenstein. En suma, La solución escéptica
consiste en dos movimientos: primero, el reemplazo de las
condiciones de verdad (correspondientes con los actos) por
las condiciones de asertabilidad. Segundo, la introducción
del concepto de comunidad dentro de las noción de regla
de seguimiento. Estos dos movimientos son lógicamente
independientes pero lo que Kripke afirma es que ambos son
necesarios si la paradoja escéptica se quiere resolver. (10)
 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
COLIN MCGINN
What I have just given is a swift summary of a rich
and detailed course of argument, intended to remind
the reader of the salient points of Kripke's
interpretation rather than substitute for.it. Let us now
ask whether this interpretation accords with what
Wittgenstein says, beginning with the question
whether Wittgenstein really advocates a sceptical
paradox about meaning and rules. The central
passages to consider here are 198 and 201 in which
Kripke takes Wittgenstein to be stating his sceptical
thesis that there are no facts for meaning to consist in.
Kripke quotes the beginning of 201:
This was our paradox: no course of action could be
determined by a rule, because every course of action
can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer
was: if everything can be made out to accord with the
rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it.
And so there would be neither accord nor conflict
here. (201)
But he signally fails to quote, or even to heed, what Pero él, señaladamente se olvida de citar, o aun de prestar
immediately follows this: atención, a lo que inmediatamente sigue de esto:
It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here
from the mere fact that in the course of our
argument we give one interpretation after another;
as if each one contented us at least for a moment,
until we thought of yet another standing behind it.
What this shews is that there is a way of grasping a
rule which is not an interpretation, but which is
exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and
"going against it" in actual cases.
Hence there is an inclination to say: every action
according to the rule is an interpretation. But we
ought to restrict the term "interpretation" to the
substitution of one expression of the rule for
another. (201)
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68
Lo que acabo de dar es un resumen ligero de un rico y
detallado argumento. Intenta recordarle al lector los puntos
principales de la interpretación de Kripke más que sustituir
aquel. Permítasenos ahora preguntar si esta interpretación
esta de acuerdo con lo que Wittgenstein dice, comenzando
con la pregunta de si Wittgenstein realmente aboga por una
paradoja escéptica acerca del significado y las reglas. Los
pasajes centrales para considerar esto son el 198 y el 201
en los cuales Kripke interpreta a un Wittgenstein que recién
toma la tesis escéptica de que no hay hechos que puedan
denotar en qué consiste un significado.
Kripke cita el comienzo del 201
Esta fue nuestra paradoja: ningún curso de la acción
podría ser determinada por una regla, porque todo
curso de acción puede ser elaborado para coincidir con
la regla. La respuesta fue: Si todo puede ser elaborado
para estar de acuerdo con la regla, en ese entonces
también puede ser elaborado para estar en conflicto
con ella. y de esta forma, no tendríamos conflicto o
coincidencia aquí. (201)
Puede verse que existe un malentendido aquí por el
solo hecho de que en el transcurso de nuestro
argumento, nosotros damos una interpretación
después de otra; Como si cada uno se contentara al
menos por un momento, hasta que se nos ocurriera
quizás alguna idea detrás de ella. Lo que esto muestra
es que hay una forma de captar la regla que no es una
interpretación, pero que es exhibida en lo que nosotros
llamamos el "obedecer la regla" e "ir en contra de ella"
en los casos reales.
Por lo tanto hay una inclinación para decir: Cada acción
según la regla es una interpretación. Pero debemos
restringir el término "interpretación" a la sustitución de
una expresión de la regla por otra. (201)
 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
COLIN MCGINN
There are two things to notice about this passage
which give the lie to Kripke's interpretation. (11)
First, Wittgenstein makes it clear immediately that the
stated paradox arises from a 'misunderstanding', i.e. a
false presupposition; so he cannot really be endorsing
the paradox, as Hume embraces his own sceptical
claims about causation. Second, when we ask what the
misunderstanding is we are told that it is the mistake
of assuming that grasping a rule is placing an
interpretation upon a sign, i.e. associating it with
another sign - an assumption which Wittgenstein
thinks we are by no means compelled to make. In
other words, Wittgenstein is putting forward the
paradox as a reductio ad absurdum of the
interpretational conception; it is the inevitable result
of that particular misunderstanding about the nature of
grasp of a rule. Wittgenstein no more endorses the
stated paradox than does any philosopher who gives a
reductio of his opponent's position. Wittgenstein does
not say that the paradox arises from the
misunderstanding that ascriptions of rules state facts
or have truth conditions, nor does he suggest that the
underlying mistake is to consider the rule-follower in
social isolation; what he is objecting to is the specific
conception of understanding as a mental operation of
translation.
If Kripke were right, Wittgenstein ought to be found
saying, after his statement of the paradox: “What this
shows is that grasping a rule is not a fact about an
individual considered in social isolation” ; but this is
nothing like what he actually does say. If there is one
key oversight in Kripke's exposition of Wittgenstein,
it is that of ignoring what Wittgenstein says in 201
straight after stating the paradox: for Wittgenstein
here gives his most explicit diagnosis of the paradox
and what he says is remote from Kripke's attribution.
This is also made very clear in 198: the lesson of the
paradox is said to be that interpretations do not
determine meaning; it is not that meaning does not
consist in individualistic facts. What Wittgenstein is
saying is that certain sorts of facts fail to determine
meaning, viz. substituting one sign for another, not
that no facts do . (12)
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Hay dos cosas a notar sobre este pasaje que desmienten la
primera parte de la interpretación de Kripke (11) , Primero,
Wittgenstein aclara inmediatamente que la paradoja
indicada proviene de un malentendido, o sea una
presuposición falsa. Así es que él no puede realmente
estar respaldando a la paradoja, así como Hume no acepta
los reclamos escépticos acerca de la causación. En
segundo lugar, cuando nos preguntamos en qué consiste el
malentendido, se nos dice que es el error de asumir que:
seguir la regla significa establecer una interpretación sobre
algún signo, es decir, asociándola con otra señal - una
suposición que Wittgenstein piensa, estamos
acostumbrados a seguir, pero no obligados a realizar. En
otras palabras, Wittgenstein propone la paradoja como una
reducción al absurdo de la concepción interpretacional;
porque es el resultado inevitable de este malentendiendo
sobre la naturaleza de seguir una regla. Wittgenstein no
respalda más a la paradoja indicada, de lo que lo haría
cualquier filósofo que da un Reductio a la posición de su
adversario. Wittgenstein no dice que la paradoja surja del
malentendido de las atribuciones a los "estados de hechos"
en las reglas o a sus condiciones de verdad, ni sugiere que
el error subyacente sea considerar al seguidor de la regla
en alguna clase de aislamiento social; lo que él desaprueba
es la concepción específica de entender todo esto como
una operación mental de traducción.
Si Kripke estuviera en lo correcto, Wittgenstein debe ser
encontrado diciendo, después de su declaración de la
paradoja: " Lo que esto muestra es que seguir una regla no
es un hecho acerca de un individuo considerado en el
aislamiento social "; pero esto es ni de lejos lo que él en
realidad dice. Si hay un descuido crucial en la exposición de
Kripke sobre Wittgenstein, es el de pasar por alto lo que
Wittgenstein dice en 201 enseguida de decir la paradoja,
pues Wittgenstein da aquí su diagnóstico más explícito de
la paradoja… y lo que él dice está alejado de la imputación
de Kripke. Esto se hace también muy claro en 198: La
lección de la paradoja es que las interpretaciones no
determinan el significado; No es que el significado no
consista en hechos individuales. Lo que Wittgenstein dice
es que ciertos tipos de hechos se fallan al determinar el
significado, por ejemplo al sustituir un signo por otro, más
no dice que no exista hecho alguno. (12)
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Kripke's misinterpretation comes out clearly in his
remarks about Wittgenstein's treatment of 'reading'.
Reading is a kind of rule-following, and so Kripke
takes Wittgenstein to be propounding his paradox for
reading - reading is not an individualistic fact but is to
be understood in terms of social assertibility
conditions. (13) But when we consult the text we find
that what Wittgenstein is opposing is a particular
family of views about the sort of fact reading is - that
it consists in an inner process: conscious, queer, or
physical - and advising us to look to what the reader
does:
But in the case of the living reading-machine
"reading" meant reacting to written signs in such-
and-such ways. This concept was therefore quite
independent of that of a mental or other
mechanism.—Nor can the teacher here say of the
pupil: "Perhaps he was already reading when he
said that word". For there is no doubt about what he
did.—The change when the pupil began to read was
a change in his behaviour; and it makes no sense
here to speak of la first word in his new state'. (157)
There is no suggestion in these sections that we are
under threat of the paradox that reading never occurs,
that there is nothing for reading to consist in; rather,
we are told to redirect our attention from supposed
inner processes to the outer criteria we use forjudging
someone to be a reader. In fact these sections do not
contain a statement of the paradox at all, yet
Wittgenstein is considering a case of rule-following;
so it can hardly be maintained that the paradox is
Wittgenstein's central and recurrent theme. (14) I
think the paradox is best seen as just one battle in a
general campaign against the inner process model, not
as the primary focus of Wittgenstein's whole
discussion. Kripke says that the paradox is really the
main problem of the Investigations, but its infrequent
appearance belies this suggestion; and when it does
appear it figures as one more nail in the coffin of the
inner process model, to be hammered in along with a
number of other nails.
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La mala interpretación de Kripke se vuelve evidente en sus
comentarios acerca del tratamiento de Wittgenstein sobre el
' leer '. La lectura es un tipo de seguimiento de la regla, y de
esta manera es que Kripke supone que Wittgenstein
propone su paradoja para "leer", lo que consiste en un
proceso interior - esto significa que la lectura no es un
hecho individual sino que debe ser comprendido en
términos de unas condiciones de asertibilidad social (13) .
Pero cuando consultamos el texto encontramos que lo que
Wittgenstein está oponiendo es una familia particular de
puntos de vista acerca de la clase de hecho que supone el
acto de leer: sea esto algo consciente, subconsciente o
físico - y nos aconseja a mirar hacia lo que el lector hace:
Pero en el caso de la máquina-lectora viviente,
"leyendo" significó reaccionar a las señales escritas de
tal o cual forma. Este concepto fue por consiguiente,
muy independiente al de un mecanismo mental u otro
parecido. - Ni el maestro puede decir aquí del alumno:
"Quizás él ya estaba leyendo cuando dijo aquella
palabra". En este caso no hay duda acerca de lo que él
hizo.- El cambio cuando el pupilo comenzó a leer fue
un cambio en su comportamiento, y tiene poco sentido
aquí el hablar de una "primera palabra en su nuevo
estado" . (157)
No hay evidencia en estas secciones de que estemos bajo
la amenaza de que la paradoja sobre la lectura nunca
ocurra, de que no exista algún elemento en la lectura que
de origen a esta; más bien, recibimos instrucciones de
redireccionar nuestra atención de supuestos procesos
interiores hacia los criterios exteriores que usamos al juzgar
a alguien como un lector. De hecho estas secciones no
contienen una declaración de la paradoja en absoluto, si no
que más bien Wittgenstein está considerando un caso de
seguir-la-regla; así es que a duras penas puede afirmarse
que la paradoja sea el tema central y recurrente de
Wittgenstein. (14) Pienso que la paradoja es mejor vista
como simplemente una batalla en una guerra general en
contra del modelo del proceso interno, no como el foco
primario de la discusión entera de Wittgenstein. Kripke dice
que la paradoja es en realidad el problema principal de las
Investigaciones, pero su aparición aislada desmiente esta
sugerencia; Y cuando esta aparece se nos figura más bien
"como un clavo más en el ataúd del modelo del proceso
interior, que termina clavado junto con algún número de
otros clavos."
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So the passages upon which Kripke bases his
interpretation fail to support it and suggest instead a
quite different view of Wittgenstein's intentions; but
can Kripke's interpretation find sustenance in more
general considerations? This question has two parts,
corresponding to the constitutive and epistemological
versions of semantic scepticism. That Wittgenstein is
advocating a constitutive scepticism certainly seems
hard to square with the fact that he does offer an
account of the sort of thing understanding is: it is
mastery of a technique, possession of a capacity,
participation in a custom. And it is notable that Kripke
nowhere registers Wittgenstein's concern to connect
understanding with the concept of ability, as an
alternative to the conception of understanding as a
condition of consciousness. Nor does Wittgenstein
show any tendency to contest the factuality of
ascriptions of ability; he merely protests against what
he takes to be misunderstandings about the sort of
thing an ability is (e.g. a configuration of one's 'mental
apparatus'). [15]
It would be more accurate I think to say that
Wittgenstein locates understanding in one kind of fact
rather than another kind; but if we want to capture the
true spirit of Wittgenstein's discussion we do better
still to drop all play with the notion of fact and simply
say that Wittgenstein is offering a description of the
'grammar' of the notion of understanding in terms of
the notions of ability, technique, etc. I do not believe
that Wittgenstein is thinking in terms of facts and non-
facts at all here; certainly there is no hard textual
evidence to support this sort of interpretation. Any
resistance on Wittgenstein's part to saying that
understanding consists in, or is constituted by, a
capacity stems from a general distrust of the enterprise
of philosophical analysis, not from a conviction that
understanding is somehow not a fact. (16) Indeed, I
think Wittgenstein would have regarded such an
assertion, and such a debate, as quite empty, since
there is no substantial philosophical mileage to be got
out of the notions of fact, truth conditions and
correspondence to conditions-in-the-world. Kripke
himself shows some awareness of this kind of point,
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De esta manera los pasajes sobre los cuales Kripke basa
su interpretación fracasan en darle sostén y sugieren en
lugar de eso, un panorama muy diferente de las intenciones
originales de Wittgenstein; ¿Pero la interpretación de Kripke
puede encontrar sustento en consideraciones más
generales? Esta cuestión tiene dos partes, que se
corresponden con las versiones constitutivas y las
epistemológicas del escepticismo semántico. Que
Wittgenstein "abogue por un escepticismo constitutivo"
ciertamente parece no cuadrar con el hecho que él ofrece
un argumento sobre la clase de cosa que es el
entendimiento: Es maestría de una técnica, posesión de
una capacidad, participación en una costumbre. Y es
notable que Kripke en ninguna parte registre la
preocupación de Wittgenstein por conectar el concepto de
entendimiento con el concepto de habilidad, como una
alternativa a la concepción del entendimiento como una
condición de la conciencia. Ni tampoco nos muestra en
Wittgenstein, alguna tendencia a objetar la factibilidad que
tienen las "adscripciones de habilidad": Él solamente
protesta en contra de aquello que nos confunde y nos lleva
a malentendidos acerca de la clase de cosa que es una
habilidad (por ejemplo la configuración de un ' aparato
mental'). (15)
Sería más preciso, creo yo, decir que Wittgenstein sitúa al
entendimiento en una clase de hecho más que en otra tipo
de figura; Pero si queremos capturar el espíritu verdadero
de la discusión de Wittgenstein haremos mejor todavía en
descartar todo juego con la noción de hecho y simplemente
digamos que Wittgenstein ofrece una descripción de la '
gramática ' de la noción de entendimiento en términos de
las nociones de habilidad, técnica, etcétera. No creo que
Wittgenstein esté pensando aquí en términos de "hechos" y
"no-hechos"; Ciertamente no hay evidencia textual
contundente para sustentar este tipo de interpretación.
Cualquier resistencia por parte de Wittgenstein para decir
que el entendimiento consiste en, o es constituido por una
capacidad, se arraiga en la desconfianza general sobre la
empresa del análisis filosófico, y no de alguna convicción de
que el entendimiento sea alguna clase de hecho. (16)
Ciertamente, pienso que Wittgenstein habría estimado tal
aseveración, y tal debate, como muy vacío, ya que no
existe el recorrido filosófico sustancial para salirse de las
nociones de: hechos, condiciones de verdad y
correspondencia con las condiciones-en-el-mundo. Kripke
mismo muestra alguna conciencia de esta situación, pero él
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but he boldly brushes it aside in the expectation that
he is conforming to the real spirit of Wittgenstein's
position; but I think he should take more seriously
Wittgenstein's deflationary remarks about truth and
facts. (17) At any rate, if we want to talk in terms of
facts it seems that Wittgenstein does suggest that
understanding consists in a fact, the fact of having an
ability to use signs.
It would also be wrong to interpret Wittgenstein as an
epistemological sceptic. As I emphasised in Chapter 1,
Wittgenstein's denial that our use of words is founded
on reasons is not intended sceptically: the traditional
sceptic makes an inappropriate and impossible
demand on our epistemic concepts, and the right
response to him is to question the need for what he
says there isn't. To lack reasons is not to be in a
predicament to which doubt is the proper response; for
doubt can be removed (better pre-empted) by our
natural and habitual reactions. (18) This
epistemoiogical position would prompt Wittgenstein
to dismiss Kripke's sceptic with the remark that of
course our reasons come to an end but this does not
mean we are in any sort of epistemological trouble:
that I cannot prove to a determined sceptic that my
present use of "+" is correct does not show that I do
not know how to apply it correctly or that I have
anything less than a perfect right to proceed as I feel
inclined. The author of On Certainty would surely not
propound the kind of sceptical argument Kripke
develops, resting as it does upon a conception of
knowledge and epistemic right that he steadfastly
resists. Wittgenstein's epistemology would stop
Kripke's sceptic before he got going; so we cannot
interpret Wittgenstein as conceding victory to Kripke's
epistemoiogical sceptic and then offering what is at
best a salvage operation.
A crucial part of Kripke's constitutive paradox is his
rejection of a dispositional conception of
understanding; so we should expect, if Kripke has
Wittgenstein right, that the same sort of argument be
found in Wittgenstein, in view of its importance to the
success of the sceptical thesis. What we find,
however, when we scour Wittgenstein's text is a total
lack of anything remotely resembling the sorts of
considerations about dispositions advanced by Kripke.
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atrevidamente disuelve la cuestión con la actitud de tan sólo
"llegarse a asemejar" al espíritu real de la posición de
Wittgenstein; Pero pienso que él debería tomar más
seriamente los comentarios negativos de Wittgenstein
acerca de la verdad y los hechos. (17) En cualquier caso,
si es que deseamos hablar en términos de los hechos, tal
parece ser que Wittgenstein sugiere que la comprensión
consiste en un hecho, el hecho de tener una habilidad para
usar signos.
También estaría mal el interpretar a Wittgenstein como un
escéptico epistemológico. Como enfaticé en el Capítulo 1,
la negación de Wittgenstein respecto a que nuestro uso de
palabras se funda en razones, no es aplicable
escépticamente: El escéptico tradicional establece una
demanda inadecuada e imposible sobre nuestros conceptos
epistémicos, y la respuesta correcta para él, es cuestionar
la necesidad de lo que a su decir: "no existe allí" . Andar
escaso de razones, no significa estar en un apuro en el cual
la duda sea la respuesta correcta; pues la duda puede ser
eliminada por vía de nuestras reacciones habituales
naturales. (18) Esta posición epistemológica instigaría a
Wittgenstein a concederle al escéptico de Kripke, el
comentario de que por supuesto que nuestras razones se
acaban, pero esto no quiere decir que estemos en alguna
clase de problema epistemológico (o mejor dicho de " pre -
vaciado " ): Que no pueda probar a un escéptico decidido
que mi uso actual de ' + ' es correcto, no demuestra que no
sepa cómo aplicarlo correctamente o que tengo menos
derecho a proceder como me sienta inclinado. El autor de
Sobre la Certeza seguramente no propondría la clase de
argumento escéptico que Kripke desarrolla, deteniéndose
sobre una concepción de conocimiento y derecho
epistémico que él con tenacidad contrarresta. La
epistemología de Wittgenstein detendría al escéptico de
Kripke antes de que él emprendiera el camino; Así es que
no podemos interpretar a Wittgenstein como concediendo
victoria al escéptico epistemológico de Kripke y entonces
ofreciendo lo que es en el mejor de los casos, una
operación de salvamento.
Una parte crucial de la paradoja constitutiva de Kripke es su
rechazo de una concepción disposicional del entendimiento;
Así es que deberíamos esperar, si Kripke comprende a
Wittgenstein correctamente, que el mismo tipo de
argumento sea encontrado en Wittgenstein, en vista de su
importancia para el éxito de la tesis escéptica. Lo que
encontramos, sin embargo, cuando nosotros buscamos por
todos los sitios del texto de Wittgenstein es una falta total
de cualquier cosa remotamente semejante a los tipos de
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All Kripke can say to explain this disparity is that
Wittgenstein is assuming the dispositional reply to the
sceptic to be unattractive to the audience of his book
at the time of writing - whereas the conscious state
reply is taken to be the natural response to the sceptic
for that audience.
It is the change in the philosophical climate that
explains the apparent difference between what
Wittgenstein says and what Kripke argues. (19) I find
this explanation unconvincing - for three reasons.
First, it seems to me inconceivable that Wittgenstein
would wholly neglect to consider what is probably the
most natural reaction lo the constitutive sceptic; surely
the demolition of this idea is essential if the paradox is
to be carried through. And the form of Kripke's
demolition - the arguments from finiteness and
mistakes - finds no echo in Wittgenstein's text: in
particular, at the places where Wittgenstein states his
paradox one would expect him to indicate that the
paradox shows {inter alia) that understanding is not a
disposition and is not to be explicated in terms of
counterfactuals about use, instead of saying (as he
does) that the paradox refutes the interpretational
conception. Nowhere does Wittgenstein say, in
parallel with his claim that interpretations do not
determine meaning, that 'dispositions fail to determine
meaning' and that 'what this shows is that there is a
way of grasping a rule which is not a disposition'. We
just do not find the kinds of remark about dispositions
which Kripke's interpretation leads us to expect.
Second, and more privatively, in those rare places in
which the notion of disposition is invoked
Wittgenstein is clearly making a quite different point
from Kripke. Thus consider 149, the only passage in
the relevant sections of the Investigations in which the
notion of disposition is explicitly invoked:
If one says that knowing the ABC is a state of the
mind, one is thinking of a state of a mental
apparatus (perhaps of the brain) by means of
which we explain the manifestations of that
knowledge. Such a state is called a disposition. But
there are objections to speaking of a state of the
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consideraciones hechas por Kripke respecto de las
disposiciones. Todo lo que Kripke puede decir para explicar
esta disparidad es que Wittgenstein asume la respuesta
disposicional del escéptico como algo poco atractivo para
la audiencia de su libro al momento de escribir - mientras
que la respuesta del estado consciente sea tomada como la
respuesta natural para el escéptico, por parte de la
audiencia.
Es el cambio en el clima filosófico lo que explica el aparente
desacuerdo entre lo que Wittgenstein dice y lo que Kripke
argumenta. (19) Yo encuentro esta explicación poco
convincente - por tres razones. Primero. me parece
inconcebible que Wittgenstein se negara totalmente a
considerar lo que es probablemente la reacción más natural
del escéptico constitutivo; Seguramente la demolición de
esta idea es esencial si la paradoja debe ser llevada a su
término. Y la forma de la demolición de Kripke - las
discusiones de finitud y errores - no encuentra eco en el
texto de Wittgenstein: En particular, en los lugares donde
Wittgenstein enuncia su paradoja uno esperaría que él
indicara que la paradoja muestra (entre otras cosas) que la
comprensión no es una disposición y no es explicada en
términos de "recuentos de hechos" acerca del uso, en lugar
de decir que (como él hace) que la paradoja refuta la
concepción del interpretacional. En ningún sitio
Wittgenstein dice, en el paralelo con su reclamo que las
interpretaciones no determinan el significado, que las
disposiciones fracasan al determinar el significado y que lo
que esto demuestra es "que estemos lejos de captar una
regla que no sea una disposición". Nosotros simplemente
no encontramos las clases de comentario acerca de las
disposiciones que la interpretación de Kripke nos conduce a
esperar.
En segundo lugar, y más probablemente, en aquellos raros
casos en los cuales la noción de disposición es invocada
por Wittgenstein, se construye una gran diferencia de
enfoque respecto a Kripke. Así considere 149, el único
pasaje en las secciones pertinentes de las investigaciones
en las cuales la noción de disposición es explícitamente
invocada:
Si uno dice que conocer el abecedario es un estado de
la mente, uno piensa en un estado de un aparato mental
(quizá del cerebro) por medio de lo cual explicamos las
manifestaciones de ese conocimiento. Tal estado es
llamado una disposición. Pero hay objeciones, para
hablar de un estado de la mente aquí, en tal medida que
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mind here, inasmuch as there ought to be two deben haber dos criterios diferentes para tal estado: Un
different criteria for such a state: a knowledge of conocimiento de construcción del aparato, muy aparte
the construction of the apparatus, quite apart from de lo que hace.
what it does.
(Nothing would be more confusing here than to use
the words "conscious" and "unconscious" for the
contrast between states of consciousness and
dispositions. For this pair of terms covers up a
grammatical difference.) (149)
Here Wittgenstein's objection seems to be that talk of
dispositions is likely to be accompanied by the idea
that knowledge is a state of mind; and he thinks that
this way of conceiving of knowledge leads to the
mistaken idea that there are two independent ways of
telling whether someone (e.g.) knows the ABC - by
examining his mental apparatus or by seeing what he
does. Wittgenstein's purpose is, as usual, to discourage
the inner state model of concepts such as knowledge,
and he is warning us that talk of dispositions is apt to
go along with this model; instead we should attend to
what the person does. If Kripke's interpretation were
correct Wittgenstein would have to be saying that
what a person it disposed to do does not fix what he
knows when he knows the ABC, but this is not what
Wittgenstein says and indeed he seems to be
suggesting just the contrary. (20)
Third, Wittgenstein makes remarks that actually
support the kind of dispositional suggestion Kripke
pits himself against: that is, Wittgenstein can be found
explaining, meaning in terms of counterfactuals about
use, thus consider this passage:
What is essential is to see that the same thing can
come before our minds when we hear the word and
the application still be different. Has it the same
meaning both times? I think we shall say not. (140)
That is, if two speakers differ in their application of a
sign then we should say that they mean something
different, despite the identity of their conscious states:
use determines meaning, not what transpires within.
This thought of Wittgenstein's hardly fits with
Kripke's claim that differences of dispositions to use
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(Nada sería más confuso aquí que destinar las
palabras: "consciencia" e "inconsciencia" para el
contraste entre estados de conciencia y las
disposiciones. (Pues este par de términos encubren
una diferencia gramatical.) (149)
La objeción de Wittgenstein parece hablar aquí, sobre
aquellas disposiciones que tienen probabilidad de estar
acompañadas por la idea de que el conocimiento es un
estado mental; Y él piensa que esta forma de imaginar el
conocimiento conduce a la idea equivocada de que hay dos
formas independientes de decir si alguien (por ejemplo)
sabe el abecedario - examinando su aparato mental o
viendo lo que él hace. El propósito de Wittgenstein es,
como siempre, desalentar el modelo del "estado interior" de
conceptos, como conocimiento, y él nos advierte que hablar
de disposiciones es algo muy propenso a estar de acuerdo
con este modelo; en lugar de eso deberíamos ocuparnos de
lo que la persona hace. Si la interpretación de Kripke
estuviera en lo correcto Wittgenstein tendría que decir que
lo que una persona se disponga a hacer, no altera lo que
ella sabe sobre el abecedario, pero esto no es lo que
Wittgenstein dice y es un hecho que él parece sugerir
simplemente lo contrario. (20)
En tercer lugar, Wittgenstein hace comentarios que en
realidad sustentan la clase de sugerencia disposicional
contra las que Kripke mismo compite: Es decir, Wittgenstein
puede ser encontrado justificando, el significado en
términos de un uso condicional más objetivo, de ese modo
considere este pasaje:
Lo que es esencial es observar que la misma cosa
puede llegar con antelación a nuestras mentes cuando
oímos la palabra, y sin embargo la aplicación todavía
puede ser diferente. ¿Tiene el mismo significado ambas
veces? Pienso que debemos decir con firmeza que no.
(140)
Es decir, si dos oradores difieren en su aplicación de un
signo en ese entonces deberíamos decir que quieren decir
algo diferente, a pesar de la identidad de sus estados
conscientes: El uso determina el significado, no lo que
subyace dentro de él. Este pensamiento de Wittgenstein no
se ajusta bien al comentario de Kripke respecto a que las
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do not suffice to establish differences of meaning, on
account of the possibility of systematic mistake
Wittgenstein remark from 140 shows no sign of
acknowledgment of this kind of point, which would be
amazing if he were really arguing in the way Kripke
suggests.
What Wittgenstein is doing here is drawing contrast
between application and what presents itself to the
mind holding that identity of meaning between people
depends upon identity in respect of the former not the
latter; but Kripke's interpretation would have
Wittgenstein insisting upon the parity of the two sorts
of circumstance, not upon the contrast between them.
On Kripke's view, both conscious states and
application fail to fix meaning, and so equally make
no progress against the sceptic; but Wittgenstein
himself evidently believes that there is an important
difference between these with respect to the
determination of meaning. (This is not to say that
Wittgenstein has some answer to Kripke's point about
mistakes; it is just that Wittgenstein shows himself to
be unconcerned about such issues in the passage
quoted - so it cannot be that he has on his mind what
Kripke has on his.) A second passage of so me
significance for the present issue is this:
"But I already knew at the time when I gave the
order, that he ought write 1002 after 1000 -
Certainly; and you can also say you meant it then;
only yon should not let yourself be mislead by the
grammar of the words "know" and "mean". For
you don't want to say that you thought of the step
from 1000 to 1002 at that time - and even if you did
think of this step, still you did not think of other
ones. When you said "1 already knew at the time . .
." that meant something like: "If I had then been
asked what number should he written after 1000. I
should have replied 1002." And that I don't doubt.
This assumption is rather of the same kind as: "If
he had fallen into the water then, 1 should have
jumped in after him". - Now, what was wrong with
your idea? (187)
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75
diferencias entre disposiciones de uso, no son suficientes
para establecer diferencias de significado, pues existe la
posibilidad de errores semánticos, por eso Wittgenstein no
muestra desde el 140 ningún signo de simpatía respecto a
esta clase de punto, lo cuál sería realmente sorprendente si
realmente estuviéramos argumentando todo esto en la
forma que sugiere Kripke.
Lo que Wittgenstein está haciendo aquí es dibujar el
contraste entre la aplicación y lo que se presenta a la
mente, estableciendo que la identidad de significado entre
personas depende de una identidad con relación "a lo
anterior" no "a lo más reciente"; Pero la interpretación de
Kripke tendría a Wittgenstein insistiendo en la paridad de
los dos tipos de circunstancia, no en el contraste entre ellos.
En la perspectiva de Kripke, los estados conscientes y la
aplicación se rehúsan a anclar el significado, y entonces por
esto no se logra progresar en contra del escéptico; Pero
Wittgenstein mismo evidentemente cree que hay una
diferencia importante entre éstos con relación a la
determinación del significado. (Esto es para no decir que
Wittgenstein tenga alguna respuesta para el punto de
Kripke acerca de los errores; Es simplemente que
Wittgenstein se muestra despreocupado acerca de tales
cuestiones en el pasaje citado - así que no podría ser que
tuviera en mente lo que Kripke dice de él.) Un segundo
pasaje sobre el significado de la presente cuestión, es éste:
"Pero en aquel momento ya sabía (cuando di la orden), que
él tenía que escribir 1002 después de 1000 - En efecto, y
así usted puede decir que : "quiso decir aquello". La única
condición es que no debe permitirse a si mismo el ser
confundido por las gramáticas de las palabras "conocer" y
"querer decir". Pues resulta claro que usted no quiso decir
que "había pensado" o "conocido" el paso del 1000 al 1002
en aquel mismísimo instante -- y aún si hubiera "pensado"
en este paso, todavía no habría "pensado" en otros más.
Cuando usted dice cosas como: "Yo ya lo sabía en ese
instante"... en realidad usted quiere decir algo así como: "Si
me hubieran preguntado qué número era el que debía
escribir después de 1000, entonces yo hubiera respondido:
1002"... y afirma que no tiene ninguna duda acerca de
eso. Esta suposición es también de la misma clase que: "Si
él se hubiera caído al agua, entonces mi deber hubiera sido
saltar después de él.” - Ahora dígame: ¿Cuál es el error en
su idea? (187)
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What is notable about this passage is Wittgenstein's
willingness to employ a counterfactual about what
someone would have said in explanation of that
person's having meant something. Applied to Kripke's
favorite example. Wittgenstein's suggestion would run
as follows: for me to have meant by '+' that '125' is the
right answer to '67+58?' (assuming that this is a
computation I had not come across or thought about)
is for it to be true of me that had I been faced with that
question in the past I would have given that answer.
Wittgenstein is comparing the case of meaning (or
knowing) paring the case of meaning (or knowing)
with the case of trait of character such as bravery: to
say I was brave yesterday is to assume that there are
true counterfactuals such as 'If he had fallen into the
water, I would have jumped in'; it is not to assume that
I had somehow mentally rehearsed the brave action of
saving a potential drowner.
Similarly, to mean something at a given time is not to
have it before one's mind at that time, so that every
step of the series '+2' has already occurred to one; it is
rather to be disposed to give the right answer, i.e. for
the kinds of behavioural counterfactuals Wittgenstein
cites to be true of one. (21) It is surely incredible that
Wittgenstein could have written this if his atitude to
counterfactuals concerning use were as Kripke
suggests; for Wittgenstein is in effect saying in 187
exactly what Kripke supposes him to reject. It is true
that Wittgenstein does not claim that the
counterfactuals provide a reductive analysis of the
notion of meaning something - he says only that the
latter 'means something like' the former - but this is to
be seen as a reflection of his suspicion of the whole
idea of conceptual analysis; it is not prompted by an
unstated recognition of the kinds of argument Kripke
gives against explicating meaning in terms of
counterfactuals. What Wittgenstein is suggesting is
that we can capture enough of the grammar of the
notion of meaning by invoking counterfactuals to
point us in the right philosophical direction (or away
from the wrong direction); he cannot therefore be
taken to be conducting a sceptical campaign in which
the employment of counterfactuals is a defensive
manoeuvre to be blocked and repulsed. What
Wittgenstein ought to be saying, on Kripke's
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Lo que es notable acerca de este pasaje es la tendencia de
Wittgenstein para utilizar cierto condicional material sobre lo
que alguien dice al intentar explicar lo que otra persona
hubiera querido significar. Aplicado esto al ejemplo
preferido de Kripke, la sugerencia de Wittgenstein sería
como sigue: Para mi, ¿Es correcto decir con el signo "+"
que "125" era la respuesta correcta a la suma "67+58"?
(Suponiendo que éste es un cálculo al que no me había
enfrentado o que hubiera pensado antes)… Esta verdad
en mi, depende de haber reflexionado la cuestión en el
pasado para entonces dar la respuesta correcta. Así
Wittgenstein compara el caso del "significado" (o
conocimiento) con un atributo de carácter particular como el
de la valentía: Decir que fui valiente ayer es asumir que hay
condicionales materiales verdaderos tales como "Si él
hubiera caído al agua, yo habría saltado tras él"; aquí no se
asume como premisa que de alguna manera yo hubiera
"entrenado mentalmente" la acción valiente de salvar un
naufrago potencial.
Análogamente, querer decir algo en un momento dado es
no tenerlo delante de la mente en ese instante. De esta
forma, cada paso de la serie ' +2 ' ya ha pasado por el
número uno; eso en lugar de estar dispuesto "a dar la
respuesta correcta", por ejemplo, para el tipo de
condicionales de conducta a los que Wittgenstein se refiere
como verdaderos en la persona. (21) Es seguramente
increíble que Wittgenstein haya podido escribir esto si su
actitud para condicionales materiales relativos al uso fueran
como Kripke sugiere; Pues Wittgenstein en efecto dice en
187 exactamente lo que Kripke le supone desechar. Es
verdad que Wittgenstein no afirma que los condicionales
materiales provean un análisis reduccionista de la noción de
significado - él solamente dice que lo "más reciente"
significa algo similar a "lo anterior" - pero esto debe verse
como una reflexión sobre su sospecha ala idea entera del
análisis conceptual; y no es impulsado por algún
reconocimiento tácito a las clases de argumento que Kripke
da cuando va en contra de explicar el significado en
términos de condicionales. Lo que Wittgenstein sugiere es
que podemos captar bastante de la gramática de la noción
de significado invocando a condicionales que nos dirijan en
la dirección filosófica correcta (o lejos de la dirección
equivocada); Wittgenstein por consiguiente no puede ser
interpretado como dirigiendo una campaña escéptica en la
cual el empleo de condicionales sea una maniobra
defensiva para cerrarse y aislarse. Lo que Wittgenstein
debe estar diciendo, "en la interpretación de Kripke", es que
 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
COLIN MCGINN
interpretation, is that ascriptions of meaning are not
tantamount to (mean nothing like) the assertion of
counterfactuals about use; but this is the exact
opposite of what he does say in 187.
In this passage, as in 140, Wittgenstein is contrasting
what happens in one's mind when something is meant
with what is, true of one's behaviour, including
counterfactuals about one's behaviour; he is not
treating both as sharing as incapacity to supply the
sort of fact Kripke's sceptic is demanding.
For these reasons, then, I doubt that Kripke is right to
interpret Wittgenstein as advocating a sceptical
paradox designed to show that there is no 'fact of the
matter' about what we mean. So nothing in
Wittgenstein's discussion suggests the sort of negative
first stage characteristic of the analogous doctrines I
mentioned earlier; we are not being prepared for the
kind of sceptical solution proffered by the likes of
emotivism and instrumentalism. There is not a
distinguishing of truth conditions and assertibility
conditions accounts of meaning and then a purported
demonstration that semantic statements have no
determinate truth conditions; rather, there is an
opposition between two different conceptions of the
sort of thing meaning is - roughly speaking,
conceptions which locate meaning in the inner and in
the outer. (22) And if this is the correct interpretation,
we will not be able to construe Wittgenstein as
proposing anything that deserves to be called a
'sceptical solution': his positive view simply has the
status of a correct account of the concepts at issue,
though it is an account which for various reasons it is
hard to see ourselves clear to accepting as adequate
and complete. Nevertheless, we can still ask
whether Kripke is right to ascribe to Wittgenstein a
community conception of rule following,
independently of whether this is intended as a
sceptical solution to a sceptical paradox. 1 shall
maintain that this ascription is also mistaken.
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las adscripciones de significado no son equivalentes a la
declaración de condicionales acerca del uso (o algo
parecido). Pero en la realidad esto es el opuesto exacto de
lo que Wittgenstein intenta decirnos en 187.
En este pasaje, así como en 140, Wittgenstein contrasta lo
que ocurre en la mente de uno cuando algo es dado a
entender con lo que es el verdadero de comportamiento de
uno, incluyendo los condicionales acerca del
comportamiento de uno. Wittgenstein no está entendiendo a
estos dos aspectos como incapaces de sustituir la clase de
hecho que el escéptico de Kripke está demandando.
Por estas razones, entonces, dudo que Kripke esté en lo
correcto al interpretar a Wittgenstein como abogando a
favor de una paradoja escéptica diseñada para demostrar
que no hay "hechos materiales" respecto a lo que
queremos significar. Así que nada en la discusión de
Wittgenstein sugiere el primer estadio negativo
característico de las doctrinas que ya mencioné tiempo
atrás. No estamos preparados para la clase de solución
escéptica propuesta por los partidarios del emotivismo e
instrumentalismo. No hay un distintivo entre condiciones de
verdad y condiciones de asertibilidad que den cuenta del
significado, Y entonces una supuesta comprobación de que
las declaraciones semánticas no tienen condiciones
definidas de verdad; expresan más bien, que hay una
oposición entre dos concepciones diferentes de la
naturaleza a que pertenece el significado - hablando en
términos generales, concepciones que localizan el
significado en lo interior y en lo exterior. (22) Y si ésta es la
interpretación correcta, no estaremos justificados para
explicar a Wittgenstein, como proponiendo que cualquier
cosa merece ser llamada una "solución escéptica": su
optimista punto de vista simplemente tiene el estatus de un
recuento correcto de los conceptos en disputa, aunque sea
un recuento que por varias razones nos resulta difícil de
enfocar para aceptarlo, como algo adecuado y completo.
No obstante, todavía podemos preguntar si Kripke tiene la
razón de atribuir a Wittgenstein una concepción comunal de
seguir-la-regla, independientemente de si esto es tenido en
mente como una solución escéptica para una paradoja
escéptica. Yo aseguro que esta adscripción es también
equivocada.
 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
COLIN MCGINN
The community enters, according to Kripke, by way
of the normativeness of meaning and of rules
generally: when we say that someone is using a word
wrongly we mean that his use of that word disagrees
with the use made of it by members of a linguistic
community; and right use is agreement of use.
If we consider the individual in isolation all we can
say is that it seems to him that he is using words
correctly; but if we broaden our gaze to take in his
community we can make sense of the indispensable
idea that this seeming may be delusive, that he is not
really using words correctly at all. Thus the correct
assertibility condition for "he means addition by '+'" is
that his responses with "+" agree with mine or those of
his community, and these latter persons are
primitively entitled to take themselves to mean
addition by '+'. On this interpretation, Wittgenstein
builds the notion of community right into the notion of
rule, in such a way that rule-following cannot be
individualistically conceived - to say someone is
following a rule is necessarily to advert to other rule-
followers. Thus the notion of rule-following turns out
to be a social notion in somewhat the way the notions
of a conformist or a club member or a fashionable
dresser are social notions: none of these properties can
be possessed by individuals 'considered in isolation'.
Now is there any textual support for this interpretation
of Wittgenstein? (23)
Let us re-examine 198-202 in which Wittgenstein is
putting forward his positive view and opposing it to
the view he rejects. The most glaring feature of these
sections in the present connection is that the words
'custom', 'practice' and 'use' are never qualified with
'social' or 'community' - and 'social custom/practice' is
not pleonastic. Surely Wittgenstein would have
inserted these qualifying adjectives if he really meant
to maintain a social conception of rule-following,
especially in view of the fact that the introduction of
the community is taken to be a surprising result of
signal importance - as sharply conflicting with what
we antecedently expect. And if we look for a gloss on
the use of 'custom' etc. we find, as 1 stressed in
Chapter 1, the insistence that rules must be followed
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La comunidad entra generalmente, según Kripke, por vía de
la normatividad del significado y de las reglas: cuando
decimos que alguien está usando una palabra
equivocadamente, queremos decir que su uso de la palabra
no está acorde con el uso hecho por otros miembros de una
comunidad lingüística; y que el uso correcto esta
sincronizado con cierto uso.
Si nosotros consideramos al individuo en soledad, todo lo
que podemos decir de él es que está usando las palabras
correctamente, pero si ampliamos el panorama hasta su
comunidad, podemos darle sentido a la idea indispensable
de que esto pareciera ser algo engañoso, de que la persona
no está en realidad usando las palabras con corrección. De
esta manera, la condición de asertibilidad correcta para la
frase <<Él quiere decir adición a través de "+">> está en
que él responda con "+" para estar de acuerdo conmigo o
con su comunidad, Y estas últimas personas están
primitivamente facultadas a tomar dentro de si el significado
de "adición" con el signo ' + '. En este tenor, Wittgenstein
construye la noción de comunidad insertándola en la noción
de "regla", de tal manera que "seguir-la-regla" no pueda ser
concebida individualmente --- decir que alguien está
siguiendo la regla es reconocer necesariamente la
existencia de otros seguidores de la regla. De esta forma la
noción de seguimiento de regla llega a ser una noción
social, un poco a la manera en que las nociones de:
"conformista", "miembro de un club" o "un guardarropa muy
de moda" son nociones sociales: ninguna de estas
propiedades pueden ser poseídas por individuos
"considerados en soledad". Ahora veamos: ¿Existe alguna
evidencia en el texto para esta interpretación de
Wittgenstein? (23)
Permítasenos re-examinar el periodo 198-202 en el cuál
Wittgenstein está proponiendo una perspectiva positiva y la
opone a la opinión que él rechaza. El elemento
sobresaliente de estas secciones respecto a la presente
conexión es que las palabras: "costumbre", "práctica" y
"uso" nunca son relacionadas o "calificadas" con las
expresiones "social" o "comunidad" --- y
"costumbre/practica social" no son un pleonasmo (es decir,
no son redundantes). Seguramente Wittgenstein hubiera
insertado estos adjetivos calificativos si realmente hubiera
querido sostener una concepción social de "segur-la-regla",
especialmente en vista del hecho de que la introducción a la
idea de comunidad está tomada como un resultado
sorpresivo de simbólica importancia --- algo así Como estar
en conflicto tajante con aquello que prevemos. Y si
 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
COLIN MCGINN
on more than one occasion - i.e. the existence of rules
depends upon 'regular use'. Wittgenstein does use
'custom' and 'practice' to suggest the idea of a
multiplicity, but it is a multiplicity of instances of rule
following not of persons who follow the rules.
79
buscamos un comentario en el uso de "costumbre",
etcétera, encontraremos (como señalé en el capítulo 1) la
insistencia de que las reglas deben de seguirse en más de
una ocasión --- por ejemplo, la existencia de reglas
depende de un "uso regular". Wittgenstein usa "costumbre"
y "práctica" para sugerir la idea de "multiplicidad", pero se
refiere a la multiplicidad de instancias al "seguri-la-regla" y
no a las personas que siguen las reglas.

And this is part and parcel of Wittgenstein's general
thesis that meaning is use: a sign has meaning only in
virtue of bemg (repeatedly) used in a certain way. This
thesis does not in itself carry any suggestion that
meaning is inconceivable in social isolation. But is
there anything else in these sections which might be
supposed to encourage the community interpretation?
Two points may be mentioned here.
Y este es el detalle de la tesis general de Wittgenstein de
que el significado es uso: Un signo tiene significado sólo en
virtud de ser usado (repetidamente) de cierto modo. Esta
tesis en sí no transmite ninguna sugerencia que el
significado sea inconcebible en el aislamiento social. ¿Pero
habrá algo más en estas secciones que pudieran estar
supuestas para promover la interpretación comunal? Dos
puntos pueden ser mencionados aquí.

The first concerns the use of 'privately' in 202. Kripke
takes this word to be intended to contrast with 'social',
so that it has roughly the sense 'private' has in 'private
property', i.e. relating to a single individual; I
suggested in Chapter 1 that it contrasts rather with
'public' or 'overt', i.e. relates to what transpires
covertly within consciousness.
El primero tiene que ver con el uso de "privacidad" en 202.
Kripke toma esta palabra como un intento de contrastar la
expresión "social" a fin de que tenga aproximadamente el
sentido de "privado" contenido en "propiedad privada". Por
ejemplo, yo sugerí en el capítulo 1 que <<se contrastaba
mejor con las palabras "público" o "abierto">>, al pensar por
ejemplo, lo que se relaciona con lo acontecido
secretamente dentro de la conciencia.

On Kripke's understanding of the intended notion of
privacy a person's overt behavior say in following a
sign-post, is to be considered 'private', at least if it is
described individualistically; and so we could quite
properly claim that all non-rule-governed behaviour
(e.g. pain behaviour) can and does take place
'privately', since its description does not require
reference to other people.
En la comprensión de Kripke sobre la pretendida noción de
privacidad respecto a la conducta abierta de una persona
cuando dice estar siguiendo un "signo-establecido", debe
ser considerado "privado", al menos si es descrito
individualmente; así que muy bien podríamos afirmar que
el comportamiento no-gobernado por una regla (por ejemplo
el comportamiento de dolor) puede y de hecho toma su
lugar "privadamente", ya que su descripción no requiere de
una referencia a las otras personas.

It is thus possible to wave your arm 'privately' but not Es entonces posible agitar su brazo "privadamente" pero no
possible to follow the addition rule 'privately', posible el seguir la regla de adición "privadamente", según
according to Kripke's construal of 'privately' in 202. el constructo de Kripke respecto a lo que se sigue
"privadamente" en 202.

What is public can be 'private' in this sense
knowability by others is therefore not sufficient for
non-privacy. We can even say that (non-relational)
properties of material objects,, e.g. being cubical or
weighing a stone, are possessed 'privately' in Kripke's
sense, since their ascription does not make essential
reference to other objects and their condition.
Página 21 de 34 COLIN MCGINN
Lo que es público puede ser privado, en este sentido, la
cognoscibilidad a través de otros no es por consiguiente
suficiente para no la privacidad. Nosotros siempre podemos
decir que las propiedades de objetos materiales, por
ejemplo el ser cúbicos o pesados como una piedra, son
obtenidos "privadamente" en el sentido de Kripke, ya que
su adscripción no hace referencia esencial a otros objetos o
a su condición (es no-relacional).

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2

 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
COLIN MCGINN
Now it seems to me that this would be a very odd way
for Wittgenstein to intend his use of 'privately' in 202:
in general he opposes 'private' to 'public' or 'oven', as
in "private sensations)" (24) Kripke takes
Wittgenstein to be saying in 202 that if rule-following
were private in the sense that it involved just the
individual rule-follower. then rules could not be
nonnative - correct rule-following would collapse into
apparently correct rule-following; whereas I take the
claim of 202 to be that if rule-following were private
in the sense of being a condition or process of
consciousness, then self-ascriptions of rule-following
would be infallible.
Aside from the overall plausibility of the
interpretation I prefer, I think that my interpretation
makes better sense of Wittgenstein's use of 'privately'
in 202 - it conforms better with Wittgenstein's general
use of the notion of privacy. At the very least it should
be agreed that the use of 'privately' in 202 cannot be
cited to establish the correctness of the community
interpretation.
The second point concerns Wittgenstein's mention of El segundo punto concierne a la mención de Wittgenstein
'one man' in 199: de '"un hombre" en 199:
Is what we call "obeying a rule" something that it
would be possible for only one man to do, and to do
only once in his life?-This:, of course a note on the
grammar of the expression "to obey a rule". (199)
Wittgenstein's reply to this question is: "ít is not
possible that there should have been only one occasion
on which someone obeyed a rule." What is prima facie
puzzling here is why Wittgenstein should raise the
question whether it is possible for one man to follow a
rule and answer it by saying that it is not possible for
there to be a single occasion of rule-following. (25)
His reply, let it be noted, is not that it is not possible
for one man to obey a rule: Why then does he appear
to ask a question to which lie gives no answer (or half
an answer)? Since Wittgenstein does not answer his
question by saying rule-following requires more than
one man, 199 cannot be cited as evidence that
Wittgenstein endorses a community conception of
rules; but the passage certainly seems to raise the issue
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80
Ahora me parece que ésta sería una forma muy extraña
para que Wittgenstein pensara su uso de "privacidad" en
202: aunque en general él opone lo "privado" sobre
"público", tal como en el caso de las "sensaciones privadas"
(24) . Kripke toma a Wittgenstein como diciendo en 202
que seguir-la- regla es algo privado en el sentido de que
ello sólo envuelve a la persona que sigue la regla y así las
reglas no pueden ser normativas - pues el seguir bien una
regla se colapsaría en una corrección aparente del
seguimiento . Así yo tomo la afirmación en 202 sobre la
idea de que, si el seguimiento de reglas fuera privado en el
sentido de ser una condición o un proceso de la conciencia,
entonces nuestras auto-adscripciones al seguir la regla
serían infalibles.
Además de la plausibilidad global de la interpretación que
prefiero, pienso que mi interpretación obtiene un mejor
sentido del uso que Wittgenstein da a: "privadamente" en
202 - se ajusta mejor con el uso general de Wittgenstein de
la noción de "privacidad". Como mínimo debería estar
convenido que el uso de ' privadamente ' en 202 no puede
ser citado para establecer la exactitud de la interpretación
comunal.
¿Acaso lo que llamamos "obedecer una regla " es algo
que sería posible hacer por solamente un hombre, y
además hacerlo solamente una vez en su vida? - Esto
es por supuesto una nota sobre la gramática de la
expresión "obedecer una regla". (199)
Lo que Wittgenstein antepone a esta cuestión es: "No es
posible que hubiera debido haber solamente una ocasión
en la cual alguien obedeciera una regla". El enigma que
surge a primera vista aquí es: ¿por qué Wittgenstein
debería plantear la pregunta de si es posible para un
hombre "seguir una regla", para después contestarla
diciendo que no es posible que exista una ocasión única de
seguir una regla? (25) .
Su respuesta, permítasenos notarlo, no es que "no sea
posible para un hombre obedecer una regla": ¿Por qué
parece entonces hacer una pregunta para la cuál no da
respuesta (o quizás da media respuesta)? " Ya que
Wittgenstein no contesta su pregunta diciendo que "el
seguir reglas requiere más que un hombre", entonces el
apartado 199 no puede ser citado como prueba de que
Wittgenstein respalda una concepción comunal de reglas;
 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
COLIN MCGINN
of whether rule-following is individual or .social. Sin embargo, este pasaje ciertamente parece desarrollar el
What is going on here? asunto de si el seguir reglas es algo individual o social
¿Qué está ocurriendo aquí?
The explanation that seems to me the most
plausible is this: Wittgenstein's central contention in
these passages, viz., that rules require many occasions
of manifestation. is ambiguous as stated, between (a)
the claim that each individual who grasps a rule must
obey it on more than one occasion and (b) the weaker
claim that there must be many occasions of rule-
following possible distributed over several
individuals. The latter claim would allow as possible
the circumstance that each of many people obey a
given rule only once, since this would be enough for
the rule to be followed on many occasions. Now
Wittgenstein's actual words in 199 commit him only
to the weaker thesis, and so are compatible with the
possibility that each person follows a rule only once;
what they are not compatible with is the possibility
that one man follows a rule just once - exactly the
question he raises. The point being made, then, is that
if there is just one man then he must follow his rules
more than once, but if there are many men it can be
enough to each follows his rules just once (or possibly
not at all) I think this reading of 199 is consonant with
the gist of other passages in which the question of how
many occasions of rule-following are necessary is
raised and answered; for example:
In the same way it cannot be said either that just
once in the history of mankind did someone follow
a sign-post. Whereas it can be said that just once in
the history of mankind did someone walk parallel
with a board. And that first impossibility is again
not a psychological one. (RFM p. 346)
There is no suggestion here that solitary rule-
following is impossible; for this is not ruled out by the
claim that sign-posts have to be obeyed more than
once. The reason Wittgenstein broaches the question
of solitary rule-following in 199 is that he wants to
make allowance for the possibility that the occasions
are spread over many individuals when he claims that
many occasions are required. It is not, 1 think, that he
is greatly attracted to the idea of spreading the many
occasions over equally many individuals - one
occasion each, so to speak - but he feels the need to
acknowledge that this is logically compatible with his
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Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2
81
La explicación que a mi me parece la más plausible es esta:
la controversia central de Wittgenstein en estos pasajes, a
saber, que las reglas requieren muchas ocasiones de
manifestación, es ambigua como se propone entre (a) la
afirmación de que cada individuo que sigue la regla debe
obedecer la regla en más de una ocasión y (b) la
declarativa más débil de que deben haber muchas
ocasiones de seguir la regla, posiblemente distribuidas
sobre varios individuos. La última afirmación concedería
como algo posible la circunstancia de que cada individuo
entre la gente obedeciera a una regla dada tan sólo una
vez, y esto sería suficiente para que la regla sea seguida en
muchos casos. Ahora, las verdaderas palabras de
Wittgenstein en 199 lo comprometen a la primera tesis, y
de esta forma son compatibles con la posibilidad de que un
hombre sigua una regla solamente una vez --- exactamente
la cuestión original. El punto expuesto entonces, es que "si
existe solamente un hombre", entonces él debe seguir sus
reglas más de una vez, pero si existen muchos hombres,
podría ser suficiente para cada uno el seguir sus reglas
sólo una vez (o posiblemente ninguna) . Pienso que esta
lectura de 199 está acorde con la expuesta en otros pasajes
en los cuales la cuestión de "cuántas ocasiones de seguir
la regla son necesarias", es planteada y respondida; por
ejemplo:
En el mismo sentido: No se puede decir tampoco que
sólo una vez en la historia del género humano alguien
halla seguido un signo-establecido, aunque si se puede
decir que solamente una vez en la historia del género
humano alguien "haya caminado en paralelo con una
tabla" Y la primera imposibilidad no es, una vez más,
una de corte psicológico. (RFM p. 346)
Nada parece sugerir aquí que un solitario seguimiento-de-
la-regla sea imposible; pues esto no se descarta en la
aseveración de que los signos establecidos tienen que
obedecerse más de una vez. La razón que Wittgenstein
saca a colación sobre la cuestión del "solitario seguimiento
de reglas" en el 199 es que el quiere conceder la posibilidad
de que estas ocasiones estén diseminadas sobre muchos
individuos, cuando se afirma que "muchos casos son
requeridos". No es, pienso, que él esté poderosamente
atraído por la idea de "que existan muchos casos dispersos
sobre los individuos" - cada uno de ellos, por así decirlo -
pero el siente la necesidad de admitir que esto es
 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
COLIN MCGINN
fundamental contention, viz, the multiple application
thesis. As we saw in Chapter 1, he is anxious not to
over-state this thesis, requiring only that there be some
rules which are multiply obeyed and not that all
should be; I surmise that in 199 he is again guarding
against exaggerating a thesis which he thinks his
readers may find it hard to accept even in its weakest
form.
So I conclude that 199 cannot be cited to establish the
community interpretation either, once it is seen in
context and read carefully. And besides, would it not
be astonishing if Wittgenstein had put forward his
major positive thesis in such an oblique and laconic
remark? (26)
Perhaps I should make it clear that I am not suggesting
that in these disputed passages Wittgenstein is
consciously opting for an individualistic as opposed to
a social conception of rule-following: that is, my
interpretation is not that Wittgenstein IS centrally
exercised with this question and is taking a definite
stand on it. Rather, my view is that this whole issue is
foreign to his true concerns: it is simply not a question
with which he is wrestling. So when I say that his
positive view is individualistic I am imposing a
classification upon his position which is imported
from outside: if he had been ask where he stood on
this issue, he would have said on the individualistic
side, but I do not think he would have reckoned this to
be especially relevant to the problems with which he
was centrally occupied. This general lack of concern
with the kind of question Kripke sets up seems to me
to indicate how fundamentally Kripke's interpretation
misrepresents what Wittgenstein is really up to. Not
only does Wittgenstein not advocate a community
conception of rules; this is not even a considered
position in the space of philosophical views within
which he is operating. So the individualism I claim lo
discern in Wittgenstein's stated views is not to be seen
as a doctrine he is keen to promote; it is rather a claim
about what his positive view in fact comes to,
irrespective of his own main intentions.
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Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2
82
lógicamente compatible con esta argumentación
fundamental, a saber, la aplicación múltiple de una tesis.
Como vimos en el capitulo 1 el está ansioso no por imponer
esta tesis, exigiendo solamente que existan algunas reglas,
las cuales sean múltiplemente obedecidas aunque no lo
sean todas ellas. Pero yo sospecho que en 199
Wittgenstein otra vez se cuida de exagerar alguna tesis
que piense que sus lectores puedan encontrar difícil aceptar
aun en su forma más débil.
Así que yo concluyo que el apartado 199 no puede ser
citado tampoco para establecer la interpretación comunal,
una vez que está visto en el contexto y se ha leído
cuidadosamente. Y además, ¿no sería asombroso si
Wittgenstein hubiera adelantado su "tesis positiva" principal
en un comentario tan corto y confuso? (26)
Quizás debo aclarar que yo no estoy sugiriendo que en
estos pasajes discutidos, Wittgenstein esté optando
conscientemente por una concepción individualista, en
oposición a otra concepción social del seguimiento de regla:
esto es… no es que Wittgenstein halla hecho un análisis
central con esta pregunta en mente y halla tomado una
posición definitiva en ella. Más bien, mi opinión es que esta
cuestión por entero es extraña a sus preocupaciones
verdaderas: Sencillamente no es una pregunta contra la
cual Wittgenstein estuviera combatiendo. Así que cuando
yo digo que su enfoque positivo es "individualistico" yo más
bien estoy imponiendo una clasificación sobre su posición,
la cual ha sido traída desde el exterior. Si Wittgenstein
hubiera sido cuestionado sobre la posición que tenía en
este asunto, entonces creo que él habría respondido que
estaba del lado individualista, pero no pienso que en verdad
hubiera considerado esto de alguna importancia para la
clase de problemas con los cuales se ocupaba
principalmente. Esta debilidad general tiene que ver con el
tipo de cuestionamiento que Kripke parece establecer. Esta
debilidad, me parece, indica qué tan básica y
profundamente la interpretación de Kripke se equivoca
respecto a lo que Wittgenstein realmente tiene en mente.
No sólo hace de Wittgenstein un defensor de la concepción
comunitaria de la regla; sino que de hecho, lo inscribe fuera
de cualquier posición considerada dentro del espacio de las
perspectivas filosóficas en las que Wittgenstein opera. Así
que el "Individualismo" que yo señalo en las opiniones
establecidas por Wittgenstein, no deben verse como una
doctrina que él esté "presto a defender"; es más bien una
aclaración acerca de lo que encierra su "opinión positiva"
del hecho, sin distinción de sus intenciones principales.
 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
COLIN MCGINN
So far I have been addressing myself to detailed
textual considerarons; I now want to object to the
community interpretation on a more general or
thematic ground, namely its relation to
Wittgenstein's thesis that we follow rules 'blindly'.
For I think that the kind of epistemology of rule-
following Wittgenstein advocates is inconsistent with
Kripke's suggestion that right rule-following consists
in agreement with the community. As we saw in
Chapter 1, Wittgenstein's view is that our natural
inclination to follow rules as we do is not something
we can justify, nor are we required to justify it - we
obey rules 'blindly', without guidance. So if someone
challenges me to justify an application of a sign, all 1
can ultimately reply is 'This is simply what I do' (217);
nothing demostrates that my application is correct.
(27) But on Kripke's community interpretation this
will not be the epistemoiogical situation: for
agreement with others does provide a court of appeal
in case of such a challenge. Suppose someone claims
that it only strikes me that my present application of
"+" is correct (accords with its past meaning) and that
in fact I am now using "+" wrongly; then Kripke's
sceptical solution offers me an answer, namely that
my present use is correct because it agrees with the
use made of that sign by others.
That is to say, the community view allows me to get
beyond, or beneath, my natural sign-using propensities
to something that can be cited to give these
propensities a justification, since correctness, on
Kripke's view, is precisely a matter of community
concordance in use: the community, in short,
provides the kind of guidance that Wittgenstein
expltcitly says there isn't. (28) Kripke's conception
makes rule-following like being in fashíon in this
respect: if someone challenges my belief that 1 am in
fashion, I can rebut him by pointing out that my mode
of dress agrees with that of (certain) members of my
cottimunity - I am not reduced to saying that this is a
belief for which a justification is neither possible nor
required.
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Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2
83
Hasta aquí me he dirigido a detallar consideraciones
textuales, ahora quiero objetar algo a la interpretación
Comunitaria bajo un telón de fondo más general,
particularmente la relación con la tesis de Wittgenstein
respecto a que seguimos reglas "ciegamente". Ya que
pienso que el tipo de epistemología del Seguimiento de
Reglas de Wittgenstein defendido es inconsistente con la
sugerencia de Kripke respecto a que un seguimiento
correcto consiste en llegar a un acuerdo con la comunidad.
Como vimos en el capítulo 1, la opinión de Wittgenstein es
que nuestra inclinación natural a seguir reglas como lo
hacemos, no es algo que podamos justificar y tampoco
solemos ser cuestionados para hacerlo --- obedecemos a
las reglas "ciegamente" sin garantía alguna. Así que si
alguien me desafía a justificar la aplicación de algún signo,
todo lo que podemos responder al final es: "porque
simplemente así lo hago siempre" (217), y nada demuestra
en realidad que mi aplicación sea correcta (27) . Pero en la
interpretación comunitaria de Kripke esta no sería la
situación epistemológica, pues el consenso con otros le
proporciona un "tribunal de apelación" en el caso de tal
desafío. Suponga que alguien duda, en un ataque, que mi
aplicación presente del signo "+" sea correcta, y que de
hecho afirme que yo ahora estoy usando el signo "+"
equivocadamente; (de acuerdo con sus significados
pasados) Luego la solución escéptica de Kripke me ofrece
una respuesta, a saber que mi uso actual es correcto,
porque está de acuerdo con el uso hecho de ese signo por
otras personas.
Esto es, la perspectiva comunal me permite llegar más allá
(ó a lo que subyace) en mi propensiones naturales de uso
en el signo, como algo que puede ser citado para dar una
justificación de estas propensiones, ya que la corrección, en
la opinión de Kripke, es precisamente un dilema de
concordancia comunal sobre el uso: La comunidad, en
concreto, provee el tipo de orientación que Wittgenstein
explícitamente dice que no existe. (28) La concepción de
Kripke trata al seguimiento de reglas como un modelo de
este aspecto: Si alguien desafía mi creencia que "estoy a la
moda", entonces le puedo refutar señalando que mi modo
de vestir está de acuerdo con el de ciertos miembros de mi
comunidad - no me reduzco a decir que ésta es una
creencia para la cual posiblemente no se requiera
justificación.
 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
COLIN MCGINN
Note that Wittgenstein does not say that the
community considered as a whole follows rules
blindly, i.e. proceeds upon the basis of a collective
human nature; his claim is that I do. So it would not
be faithful to Wittgenstein's words to transpose his
claim about the absence of rational foundations to the
level of the community; and neither is it correct to
interpret him as trying to alleviate the epistemological
discomfort we may feel about my lack of reasons by
equipping me with the test of community conforrnity.
(29) In fact, it is precisely the thirst for the kind of
rational basis Wittgenstein denies that causes Kripke
to introduce the community; but of course this goes
right against the thrust of Wittgenstein's position - it is
trying to find reasons for what does not (and need not)
rest upon reasons. To put it in a nutshell, Kripke's
interpretation misses, or underestimates, Wittgenstein
epistemological naturalism.
This point leads into the question crucial for Kripke's
interpretation, of Wittgenstein's attitude toward the
normativeness of meaning - what he took its nature
and ground to be. Kripke represents Wittgenstein as
preoccupied in the Investigations with the question
what makes a present use of a sign correct, i.e. in
accordance with our previous linguistic intentions; and
Wittgenstein's answer is supposed to be that this is to
be explained in terms of agreement with the
community. However, I think that an unprejudiced
examination of the passages with which we are
concerned (138-242) reveals notably little that can be
construed as a concern with this question: that is, we
just do not find Wittgenstein fretting over the question
whether my present inclinations to apply a sign really
conform with my past meaning. It seems to me, in
fact, that Wittgenstein's attitude towards this kind of
question verges on the dismissive. (30)
His view is that what underlies (if that is the word) our
practices and customs with sings is our human nature
in interaction with our training: this is what explains
our unreflectively going on as we do, Different kinds
of being, endowed with a different "form of life',
could naturally go on in different ways given the same
training:
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84
Nótese que Wittgenstein no dice que la comunidad
considerada como un todo, siga las reglas ciegamente,
pues por ejemplo, procede sobre las bases de una
naturaleza humana colectiva, más bien su afirmación es
sobre lo que "Yo hago". Así es que no sería factible para
las palabras de Wittgenstein, el invertir su afirmación acerca
de la ausencia de fundamentos racionales para el nivel de
la comunidad, ni tampoco es correcto interpretarlo
atenuando a la incomodidad epistemológica que
pudiéramos sentir sobre mi falta de razones, dotándome
con la prueba de conformidad comunal (29) . En realidad es
precisamente la sed por el tipo de bases racionales "que
Wittgenstein niega", lo que impulsa a Kripke a introducir a la
"comunidad", más por supuesto esto va en contra directa de
la posición de Wittgenstein --- Se está tratando de
"encontrar las razones" por lo que "no se basa en razones"
(pues no es necesario). Para ponerlo en pocas palabras, la
interpretación de Kripke se equivoca, o subestima, el
naturalismo epistemológico de Wittgenstein.
Este punto es crucial para de la interpretación de Kripke,
sobre la actitud que mantiene Wittgenstein respecto a la
normatividad del significado --- lo que al parecer tomó como
su naturaleza y fundamento. Kripke representa al
Wittgenstein de la Investigaciones como preocupado con la
pregunta: ¿Qué es lo que hace correcto el uso presente de
un signo, por ejemplo, con respecto a nuestras intenciones
lingüísticas previas? Y la respuesta que se supone da
Wittgenstein, es que esto debe ser explicado en términos
del acuerdo con la comunidad. Sin embargo yo pienso que
un examen menos prejuicioso de los pasajes que nos
atañen (138-142) revela que hay muy poco que pueda
llegar a apoyar este tema, es decir, nosotros simplemente
no encontramos a Wittgenstein preocupándose sobre la
pregunta de si mis inclinaciones presentes para aplicar un
signo, realmente se alinean con mi significado pasado. Me
parece en realidad que la actitud de Wittgenstein sobre este
tipo de cuestión raya en lo despectivo. (30)
Su opinión es que: lo que subyace (si esta es la palabra) en
nuestras prácticas y costumbres de uso de los signos, es
nuestra naturaleza humana en interacción con un
entrenamiento adquirido: esto es lo que explica nuestra
irreflexibilidad al reaccionar. Las diferentes maneras de ser,
investidas con una " forma diferente de vida", naturalmente
podrían proceder de distintas maneras dado el mismo
entrenamiento:
 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
COLIN MCGINN
Now we get the pupil to continue a series (say + 2)
beyond 1000 - and he writes, 1000, 1004, 1008,
1012. We say to him: "Look what you've done"-He
doesn't understand. We say: "You were meant to
add two: look how yon began the series!"-He
answers: "Yes. isn't it right? I thought that was
how I was meant to do it." Or suppose he pointed
to the series and said: "But I went on in the same
way."-It would now be no use to say: "But can't
you see. . . .?"-and repeat the old examples and
explanations.-In such a case we might say,
perhaps: It comes natural to this person to
understand our order with our explanations as we
should understand the order: "Add 2 up to 1000, 4
up to 2000, 6 up to 3000 and so on." Such a case
would present similarities with one in which a
person naturally reacted to the gesture of pointing
with the hand by looking in the direction of the line
from finger-tip to wrist, not from wrist to finger-
tip. (185)
It is our nature that (partly) determines what we mean
by our words and which plays an ineliminable role in
our learning language. Given that this is so,
Wittgenstein sees no real substance to the question
whether what we are naturally inclined to do really
conforms with the meaning of our signs: such a
question must be futile, since what we are by nature
inclined to do is what it is that constitutes what we
mean. (31)
What we are inclined to do by nature and what we
mean cannot come apart in the way the question
assumes. There is, for Wittgenstein, not the sort of gap
that Kripke's sceptic trades on between meaning and
naturally determined use.
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85
Ahora bien, conseguimos que nuestro alumno continúe
una serie más allá de 1000 simbolizando esto con "+2"
--- y entonces él escribe: 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012.
Nosotros corregiríamos: "Mira lo que hiciste" --- y él
podría no entender. Nosotros diremos: "Seguro
quisiste decir agregar dos, pero mira cómo empezaste
la serie... --- A lo que él diría: "Si, ¿es que no es
correcto? Creí que era así como quiso decir que lo
hiciera." O bien, suponga que él señala a la serie y dice:
"Pero yo procedí como lo hago siempre. "--- En ese
caso no sería apropiado reprochar:"¿Pero no lo ves...?
--- y repetir los mismos viejos ejemplos y explicaciones.
--- En tal situación podríamos reflexionar: quizás
vendría a ser natural para esta persona entender
"nuestro orden" (según nuestras explicaciones), así
como nosotros deberíamos entender: "agregue 2 sobre
1000, 4 sobre 2000, 6 sobre 3000 y así sucesivamente."
Tal caso presentaría similitudes con aquel en el que
una persona reacciona naturalmente al gesto de dirigir
su mirada (cuando apuntamos la mano en una
dirección) desde la yema del dedo hacia la muñeca, y
no de la muñeca hacia la yema del dedo. (185)
Es nuestra naturaleza, que (en parte) se determine lo que
queremos decir a través de nuestras palabras y que estas
jueguen un rol que no pueda eliminarse de nuestro lenguaje
de aprendizaje. Dado que esto es así, Wittgenstein no
encuentra algo substancial respecto ala pregunta de si
aquello a lo que naturalmente estamos inclinados a hacer
realmente se construye con el significado de nuestros
signos: Tal pregunta debe ser inútil, ya que lo que estamos
inclinados a hacer por naturaleza es lo mismo que
constituye aquello que queremos significar. (31)
"Qué estamos inclinados a hacer por naturaleza" y "qué
queremos significar" no son cuestiones que se puedan
llegar a separar de la forma en ques estamos asumiendo el
tema. Para Wittgenstein no existe el tipo de brecha que
Kripke establece entre el significado y el uso determinado
naturalemente.
 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
COLIN MCGINN
Reading a little into what Wittgenstein says, I think
his response to Kripke's question of what determines
normativeness would be that this question erroneously
assumes that our meanings are not fixed (in part) by
our natural propensities but by something logically
independent of these propensities, since it envisages
the possibility that we should by nature treat a pattern
of use as linguistically correct and yet that pattern be
incorrect; but the thought of this possibility involves
the mistaken supposition that once the natural facts
about us are exhausted there remains somewhere else
to look for what determines meaning. What has to be
recognized is that at some level meaning is fixed by
our nature: meaning something is not an achievement
of a transcendent mind divorced from our "form of
life", The basis of the normative is the natural. (32)
A comparison of Wittgenstein with Hume may help to
clarify Wittgenstein's position. Suppose someone were
to put the question 'What makes causal judgements
correct on Hume's view?' Granted that our minds are
so constituted that we form causal beliefs upon
exposure to constantly conjoined events, what is it for
a belief so formed to be true or false: might not our
minds lead us to form a causal belief in the way Hume
describes and yet that belief be false? It is clear what
Hume would reply to this question: he would say that
there is not the sort of gap between belief and truth
that the question presupposes, since causation
involves nothing over and above constant
conjunctions and the minds natural propensity to form
expectations-- there is, in particular, nothing
independent of our minds (i.e. objective) to constitute
'necessary connexion'. On Hume's view, then,
correctness in a causal judgement ultimately rests
upon our (mental) nature; so it cannot be that we
naturally form causal judgements on the basis of
observed constant conjunctions which are
(objectively) false, at least ultimately.
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86
Leyendo un poco dentro de lo que Wittgenstein dice, creo
que su respuesta a la pregunta de Kripke sobre el "qué
determina la normatividad", podría establecer que: esta
cuestión asume erroneamente que nuestros significados
"no están sujetos (al menos en parte) a nuestras
propensiones naturales" sino a algo lógicamente
independiente de estas propensiones,luego él visualiza la
posibilidad de que nosotros debieramos establecer, por
naturaleza, un patrón de uso lingüísticamente correcto y
todavía así, ese patrón pudiera ser incorrecto; pero el
pensamiento sobre esta posibilidad envuelve la suposición
equivocada de que una vez que los hechos naturales
aecrca de nosotros se han agotado, aún permanezca cierto
espacio para buscar qué es lo que determina el significado.
Lo que debe reconocerse es que en algún nivel, el
significado es re-estructurado por nuestra naturaleza:
significar algo no es el logro de una mente trascendente
divorciada de nuestra "forma de vida". La base de la
normativa está en la naturaleza. (32)
Una comparación de Wittgenstein con Hume podría ayudar
a clarificar la posición de Wittgenstein. Supóngase que
alguien propusiera la pregunta. "¿Qué hace que los juicios
causales sean correctos a la vista de Hume? Si se concede
que nuestras mentes estan constituidas de forma tal que
formamos creencias causales cuando estamos expuestos a
constantes eventos conjuntos,pensemos:¿ De qué le
serviría a una creencia así formada, el ser verdadera o
falsa?, ¿No podría nuestra mente llevarnos a formar una
creencia causal en la forma que Hume describe, y aún así,
esa creencia ser falsa? Es claro lo que Hume respondería a
esta pregunta: no existe "el tipo de vacío" entre creencia y
verdad que la cuestión propone, ya que la relación de
causalidad no implica nada más allá de conjunciones
constantes y la propensión natural de las mentes de formar
expectativas - no hay nada en particular,
independientemente de nuestras mentes (por ejemplo, algo
"objetivo") que constituya una conexión necesaria. En la
opinión de Hume entonces, la corrección en un juicio causal
descansa, en última instancia, en nuestra naturaleza
(mental), así que no puede ser que nosotros nos formemos
juicios causales sobre la base de haber observado
"conjunciones constantes" los cuales son (objetivamente)
falsos, al menos en última instancia.
 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
COLIN MCGINN
Only if one rejects Hume's 'projectivist' account of
causation could one press the question whether our
natural propensities lead us to have true causal beliefs
upon exposure to constant conjunctions. The respect
in which Wittgenstein's position on rules resembles
Hume's on causation is that both locate the source of
correctness in our given nature, not in some aspect of
reality quite independent of us and our natural
propensities. (33) The main difference between them
(as I remarked in Chapter 1) is that Hume takes his
view to be 'sceptical', whereas Wittgenstein takes his
to be non-sceptical once we attain a right
epistemology. And it would, of course, be radically
contrary to the whole spirit of Hume's position on
causation to locate correctness in the conformity of
one's causal judgements with those of one's
community: that is. Hume would not want to say that
the distinction between seemingly true causal beliefs
and really true ones is to be explained in terms of
whether your judgemems agree with others'
judgements. This would just be a doomed attempt to
postpone the sceptical conclusion that our causal
judgements correspond to no objective or external
feature of reality. I think that Kripke's community
interpretation of Wittgenstein makes a similar mistake
as this community interpretation of Hume in respect of
what constitutes the correctness of a causal bclief:
Kripke is in effect jibbing at one of Wittgenstein's
main theses-that there is nowhere 1 can turn to
underpin or bolster how 1 naturally proceed in my
application of signs, not even to other people Kripke is
trying to locate what 1 mean, and hence linguistic
correctness, in something external to my nature as a
language-user, i.e. in my relations to a community; but
this would be to refuse to accept Wittgenstein's claim
that my judgements of linguistic correctness are not
based upon reasons. Wittgenstein's position is simply
this: what I mean is determined by my natural use of
words, so that we cannot sensibly ask whether my use
really conforms to what my words mean. (34)
Página 29 de 34 COLIN MCGINN
Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2
87
Solamente si uno rechaza la explicación "proyectivista" de
la causación en Hume, podría tocar la cuestión de si
nuestras inclinaciones naturales nos encaminan a tener
creencias causales verdaderas al estar expuestos a
conjunciones (encadenaciones) constantes. El aspecto en
el que la posición de Wittgesntein se asemeja con la
causación de Hume, es que ambos localizan la "fuente de la
corrección" en una naturaleza dada, y no en algún aspecto
de la realidad totalmente independiente de nosotros y
nuestras inclinaciones naturales (33). La diferencia
principal entre ellos (como lo subrayé en el capítulo 1) está
que en Hume considera que su opinión es "Escéptica",
mientras que Wittgenstein toma a la suya como "no-
escéptica", una vez que nosotros nos atenemos a la
epistemología correcta. Y eso, por supuesto, sería
radicalmente opuesto al espíritu entero de la posición de
Hume sobre la causación, <<al encontrar una "corrección"
acorde a los juicios causales de una persona, y
compararlos con los de la propia comunidad>> : esto es,
Hume podría no querer decir que la distinción entre
creencias aparentemente correctas y las realmente
correctas, se explica en términos de si "sus juicios" están de
acuerdo con los "juicios de otros". Esto sólo sería un intento
forzado por aplazar la conclusión escéptica de que nuestros
juicios causales no se corresponden con ningún objeto o
elemento externo de la realidad. Yo pienso que la
interpetación comunitaria de Kripke cae en un error similar
al de esta interpretación comunitaria de Hume respecto al
qué constituye la corrección de una creencia causal: Kripke
está obstaculizando una de las principales tesis de
Wittgenstein --- que no existe un sitio en el que pueda
apoyarme de inicio para justificar el cómo pudiera proceder
naturalmente en mi aplicación de los signos, ni tampoco en
la aplicación de otras personas. Kripke está tratando de
localizar "lo que quiero significar" y en consecuencia busca
una corrección lingüistica en algo externo a mi naturaleza
como usuario del lenguaje, por ejemplo: en mis relaciones
con una comunidad. Pero ello sería negarse a aceptar la
afirmación de Wittgenstein de que mis juicios de corrección
lingüistica no están basados en razones. La posición de
Wittgenstein simplemente es esta: Lo que "quiero significar"
es determinado por mi uso natural de las palabras, así que
no podemos decir sensatamente si mi uso realmente está
alineado y conforme a lo que mis palabras quieren
significar. (34)
 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
COLIN MCGINN
(Compare Hume: the causal truths are determined by
regularities acting upon our minds to produce
expectations, so that we cannot sensibly ask whether
the expectations thereby produced are really correct,
i.e. lead us to form true causal beliefs.)
This is not, of course, to say that our application of
words can never be mistaken, that every use is self-
certifyingly correct; but it is to say that judgements of
linguistic correctness always rest in the end upon
natural propensities to apply words in a certain way:
we do sometimes make judgements of linguistic
mistake, but these judgements have their ultimate
source in our natural sense of what is right- they do
not involve prescinding altogether from our natural
propensities to apply signs. So, on Wittgenstein's
view, linguistic mistake is necessarily local; we cannot
make real sense of the idea that our natural ways of
using signs are globally mistaken, since that would be
to assume that our meaning is fixed by something
external to us. (35) In a sense, then, Wittgenstein
dismisses as incoherent the kind of scepticism that lies
behind Kripke's sceptical paradox: I mean the general
scepticism that questions whether my use of signs has
ever conformed with their meaning - for their meaning
cannot in this way come apart from the use 1 make of
them. It is for these reasons that I say that
Wittgenstein would not have pursued and pressed the
question of normativeness in the way Kripke does;
and, as I remarked, he does not in point of fact make a
great deal of the question of normativeness in these
sections of the Investigations.
My rejection of the community interpretation is not
yet complete. Someone wedded to this interpretation
might allow that 198-202 fail on their own to establish
that Wittgenstein held a social conception of rules but
urge that these sections should themselves not be
considered in isolation: and when we place them in
the context of other passages we will see that they
should be read as embodying the social conception;
that is, 198-202 have implicit what other passages
make explicit.
Página 30 de 34 COLIN MCGINN
Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2
88
(compara Hume: las verdades causales son determinadas
por regularidades que actuan sobre nuestras mentes para
producir espectativas, así que no podemos sensatamente
pedir que las expectativas consecuentemente producidas
sean realmente correctas, es decir, que nos lleven a formar
creencias causales verdaderas.)
Esto no es, por supuesto, para decir que nuestra aplicación
de las palabras jamás está equivocada, o que todo uso es
auto-certificadamente correcto, sino que es para decir que
los juicios de corrección lingüistica siempre descansan
finalmente sobre propensiones a aplicar las palabras de
cierta manera; A veces llegamos a hacer juicios de error
lingüístico, pero estos juicios tienen su fuente última en
nuestro sentido de lo que es correcto --- cosa que no
implica prescindir por completo de nuestras inclinaciones
naturales para aplicar los signos. Así que en la opinión de
Wittgenstein, el error lingüístico es algo necesariamente
local; No podemos hacer sentido real de la idea que
nuestras formas naturales de uso de los signos están
universalmente equivocadas, pues eso debería dar por
supuesto que nuestro significado está arreglado por algo
externo a nosostros . (35) En Cierto Sentido, entonces,
Wittgenstein descarta como incoherente el tipo de
escepticismo que yace detrás de la paradoja escéptica de
Kripke: Me refiero al escepticismo general que cuestiona si
mi uso de los signos alguna vez ha estado alineado con su
significado - pues su significado de este modo no puede
apartarse del uso que yo tenga de ellos. Es por esta razón
que yo digo que Wittgenstein no habría perseguido ni
hubiera forzado la cuestión de la normatividad, de la
manera en que Kripke lo hizo; Y, como lo comenté,
Wittgenstein en realidad no da importancia a la cuestión de
la normatividad en estos capítulos de las Investigaciones
Filosóficas.
Mi replica a la interpretación comunitaria todavía no está
completa. Alguien "casado" con esta interpretación podría
permitir que los parágrafos 198-202 cayeran por si mismos
en la cuenta de que Wittgenstein abraza una concepción
social de las reglas, pero insistimos en que estas secciones
no deben ser considerados de forma aislada, y cuando las
ponemos en el contexto de otros pasajes veremos que
deben ser leídos "como envolviendo" a la concepción
social; es decir, 198-201 contienen implícitamente lo que
otros pasajes hacen explícito.
 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
COLIN MCGINN
1 need, then, to consider what other passages might be
thought to lend themselves to a community
interpretation and show that they have a different
purport. The section 1 have most often heard cited as
displaying Wittgenstein's commitment to the social
conception is 242:
If language is to be a means of communication there
must be agreement not only in definitions but also
(queer as this may sound) in judgments. This seems to
abolish logic, but does not do so.-It is one thing to
describe methods of measurement, and another to
obtain and state results of measurement. But what we
call "measuring" is partly determined by a certain
constancy in results of measurement. (242)
The claim is that Wittgenstein is here building the
notion of agreement into the notion of meaning. This
interpretation ignores, what I stressed in Chapter 1,
that Wittgenstein is in this passage making a claim
about the necessary conditions of communication: his
claim is that for two or more people to share a
language - to mean the same by their words- they must
agree in their judgements. This claim expressly
concerns a social concept, viz. that of a linguistic
community, and so naturally it is formulated in
social terms, vi:, agreement between members of
that community. What Wittgenstein does not say, and
what fails to follow from what he does say, is that for
there to be meaning at all there has to be inter-
personal agreement. He is certainly not saying in this
section that the idea of an idiolect makes no sense: he
is not ruling out the possibility that 1 might employ
words with different meanings from those of other
people. His point is that if we are to use words with
the same meanings then we must agree in their use.
Indeed, the interpretation I am rejecting would have
Wittgenstein claiming, absurdly, that I cannot mean
by a word what no-one else means by it, since
meaning requires Ínter-personal agreement of use. In
general, the relation between agreement and rules, as
Wittgenstein sees it, concerns the notion of two or
more people following the same rules; agreement is
not supposed to be a necessary condition of an
individual's following a rule - that requires, rather, a
multiplicity of occasions of application.
Página 31 de 34 COLIN MCGINN
Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2
89
Yo necesito de esta manera, considerar lo que otros
pasajes pudieran haber reflexionado para llegar a prestarse
a una "interpretación comunitaria" y después demostrar que
tenían diferente propósito. La sección que más a menudo
he oído citar como afirmando el compromiso de
Wittgenstein con la concepción social es el 242:
Si el lenguaje es un medio de comunicación debe haber un
acuerdo no sólo en las definiciones, sino también (por raro
que pueda parecer) en los juicios. Esto da la impresión de
abolir la lógica, pero no es así.- por un lado el caso es
describir los métodos de medida, y por el otro, el de obtener
y enunciar los resultados de la medida. Pero lo que
llamemos "la medida" es en parte determinado a través de
una cierta constancia en los resultados de medida.(242)
El punto es que Wittgenstein está construyendo aquí la
noción de acuerdo, dentro de la noción de significado. Esta
interpretación ignora, como lo enfaticé en el capítulo 1, que
Wittgenstein hace en este pasaje una afirmación sobre las
condiciones necesarias de comunicación: su afirmación es
que para dos o más personas, compartir un lenguaje ---
significar lo mismo con las mismas palabras --- ellos
también deben tener un acuerdo sobre sus juicios. Esta
afirmación le concierne expresamente a un concepto social,
en este caso, el de la comunidad lingüística, y así,
naturalmente, está formulado en términos sociales; a saber,
los de un acuerdo entre los miembros de una comunidad.
Lo que Wittgenstein no dice, es que para que exista
significado alguno, tiene que haber también un acuerdo
inter-personal. Precisamente, lo que él no dice en esta
sección es que la idea de "un dialecto individual" no tiene
sentido. Él no descarta la posibilidad de que yo pueda
emplear palabras con significados diferentes de los de
otras personas, pero su punto es que si vamos a usar las
palabras con el mismo significado continuo, entonces
debemos estar de acuerdo en su uso. En efecto, a la
interpretación que estoy rechazando, Wittgenstein habría
contestado que absurdamente, no puedo decir con una
palabra lo que "nadie más quiere significar con ella", ya que
el sentido requiere un acuerdo inter-personal de uso. En
general, la relación entre el acuerdo y las reglas, como
Wittgenstein lo ve, se refiere a la noción de dos o más
personas siguiendo las mismas reglas; acuerdo que no
supone sea una condición necesaria del segumiento
individual de la regla --- que requiere más bien, de una
multiplicidad de ocasiones para su aplicación.
 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
COLIN MCGINN
What may also mislead is that Wittgenstein speaks
typically of communal languages, e.g. English and
German, and so formulates his claims in terms of
these shared languages; but it is not to be inferred
from this that he rejects the very notion of a language
confined to a single individual. Since most actual rules
are in fact shared, including the semantic rules of
natural languages, it is only to be expected that
Wittgenstein's examples should be of this kind; but
this should not be taken to exclude the very possibility
of rules followed by only one person - and
Wittgenstein says nothing to suggest that he intends lo
exclude this possibility. it is not, as I remarked earlier,
that he is especially anxious to insist on the coherence
of solitary rule-following and to contest a community
conception; the truth is that he is simply unconcerned
whit this kind of question. His citation of communal
signs thus does not betoken a commitment to the
essentially communal employment of signs; rather, he
is, for his purposes, indifferent to the question.
Much the same should be said of Wittgenstein's
emphasis upon the notion of training in his account of
language and rules. Training is, of course, a social
concept - it involves an inter-personal relation - and
training in the use of a sign may be said to aim at
agreement between the trainee's behaviour and that of
the trainer. Does this commit Wittgenstein to a
community conception of what it is to grasp a rule?
Clearly not, since nothing so far said implies that in
order to explicate the concept of the learner's grasping
a rule we must make essential reference to the
behaviour of the trainer - any more so than for any
skill acquired by means of training, e.g. kicking a ball.
Wittgenstein emphasises training not because he
thinks all rules are necessarily social but because it
helps to remind us of what really goes on when
someone achieves understanding: it acts as a
prophylactic against myth-making (36) (I should say
that Kripke himself shows no tendency to rest his
community interpretation on either of the last two
considerations; I mention them because I have heard
them cited by others in support of a community
interpretation.)
Página 32 de 34 COLIN MCGINN
Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2
90
Lo que también pudiera confundirnos es que Wittgenstein
habla típicamente de lenguajes comunales, por ejemplo el
Inglés y el Alemán, y así formula sus afirmaciones en
términos de estos lenguajes compartidos, pero no se debe
deducir de ello que rechaza la noción misma de un lenguaje
limitado a un solo individuo. Ya que muchas de la reglas
reales son compartidas, (incluidas las reglas semánticas de
los lenguajes naturales) es de esperarse que los ejemplos
de Wittgenstein deban ser de este tipo; pero esto no debe
tomarse para excluir la gran posibilidad de hallar reglas
seguidas por solamente una persona --- y Wittgenstein no
dice nada que sugiera que él intenta excluir esta posibilidad.
No es que (como lo subrayé más atrás) Wittgenstein se
halle especialmente ansioso de insistir en la coherencia un
seguimiento solitario de reglas y de contestar a la
concepción comunitaria, la verdad es que él simplemente
está desinteresado en este tipo de cuestiones. Su cita de
los signos comunales, por lo tanto, no significará un
compromiso con el empleo esencialmente comunal de los
signos; es más bien que para estos propósitos, él se
encuentra indiferente a la cuestión.
De manera similar, mucho puede ser dicho sobre el énfasis
de Wittgenstein sobre la noción de entrenamiento en este
recuento del lenguaje y las reglas. El entrenamiento es, por
supuesto, un concepto social --- que envuelve una relación
inter-personal --- y el entrenamiento en el uso de un signo
puede decirse que apunta a un acuerdo entre el
comportamiento del aprendiz y el del entrenador ¿Es este
un compromiso de Wittgenstein con una concepción
comunal de lo que es captar una regla? Evidentemente no,
ya que lo dicho hasta ahora, implica que con el objeto de
explicar el concepto del cómo un alumno capta la regla,
nosotros debamos esencialmente hacer referencia al
comportamiento del entrenador --- a menos que se trate de
alguna habilidad adquirida por medio del entrenamiento, por
ejemplo, patear una pelota. Wittgenstein hace énfasis en el
entrenamiento no porque piense que todas las reglas son
necesariamente sociales, sino porque ello ayuda a
recordarnos sobre lo que realmente sucede cuando se
consigue un entendimiento de las cosas: que este actúa
como una prevención ( "o profiláctico") contra la creación de
mitos. (36) (Debo decir que Wittgenstein mismo no
muestra ninguna tendencia a apoyar su interpretación de la
comunidad en cualquiera de las dos últimas
consideraciones; lo menciono porque yo he escuchado citar
estas ideas por otros, para dar soporte a la interpretación
de la comunidad)
 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
COLIN MCGINN
I am not, in rejecting the community interpretation,
saying that Wittgenstein thinks the notion of a
linguistic community is 'unimportant' or totally
irrelevant to a proper account of meaning; nor am I
denying that when a language is communal others
may legitimately correct one's use of words: I am not
even denying; that what others mean by words can
determine their meaning on the lips of a given
speaker. I am saying only that Wittgenstein does not
hold that the very notion of a rule of language must
needs be explicated in social terms - that we cannot
make sense of rule-following on the part of a given
individual unless we relate that individual's behaviour
to the behaviour of some community of rule-
followers. Wittgenstein no more holds this view about
understanding a rule than he holds a parallel view
about being in pain or remembering something. And,
as I shall argue in Chapter 4, it is well that
Wittgenstein did not hold such a view, because it is
dearly wrong.
The divergence between Kripke's interpretation and
mine shows up sharply in our different views of the
way 202 relates to the latter sections dealing
(explicitly) with private language (243f). Kripke's
view is that by 202 the argument against the
possibility of a private language is essentially
complete - Wittgenstein has already shown that there
must always be public criteria for the correctness of
linguistic use. This result has already been established
because rule-following in general depends upon
communal agreement of response for an individual to
be following any rule he must exhibit behaviour which
others can use to correct his sincere avowal that he is
following a rule, since this is what the normativeness
of rule comes to. The notion of correct rule-following
is explicated in terms of assertibility conditions which
are available to members of one's linguistic
community, and so there is no possibility of following
a rule which others cannot know one is following
correctly or incorrectly. (37) This view of what is
going on in 202 obviously depends upon the
community interpretation interpretation, i.e. upon
building agreement of response into the notion of rule-
following.
Página 33 de 34 COLIN MCGINN
Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2
91
Yo no estoy, en esta réplica de la interpretación comunal,
diciendo que Wittgenstein piense que la noción de una
comunidad lingüística "no tenga importancia" o que sea
totalmente irrelevante para un recuento apropiado del
significado; ni tampoco estoy negando que cuando una
lengua es común a otros pueda corregirse legítimamente el
uso de las palabras: tampoco estoy negando que lo que
otros significan con las palabras, pueda llegar a influir en lo
que dice un hablante dado. Lo que yo estoy diciendo es que
Wittgenstein no afirma que la misma noción de "regla del
lenguaje" precise ser explicada en términos sociales --- que
nosotros no podamos darle sentido a la regla --- .
Wittgenstein continua de parte de un individuo dado a
menos que relacionemos ese comportamiento individual
con el comportamiento de alguna comunidad de
seguidores-de-la-regla. Sin embargo Wittgenstein no apoya
esta opinón acerca del entendimiento de una regla, más de
lo que apoyaría a una visión paralela acerca del tener algún
dolor o del recordar algo. y como lo he argumentado en el
capítulo 4, es bueno que Wittgenstein no abrace estas
ideas, pues estaría obviamente en un error.
La diferencia entre la interpretación de Kripke y la mía se
vuelve muy clara respecto a nuestros enfoques sobre la
manera en que el parágrafo 202 se relaciona con las
secciones posteriores, vinculándose (explícitamente) con el
lenguaje privado (243F). La opinión de Kripke es que a
través del 202, el argumento contra la posibilidad de un
lenguaje privado, está esencialmente completo --- pues
Wittgenstein ya demostró que tiene que existir un criterio
público para la corrección de un uso lingüístico. Este
resultado ya ha sido establecido porque el seguimiento de
regla en general depende del acuerdo colectivo de la
respuesta que un individuo ha de tener al seguir una regla,
pues debe exhibir un comportamiento que otros puedan
utilizar para corregir su declaratoria sincera de que está
siguiendo cierta regla, ya que en esto consiste la
normatividad de la regla. La noción de corregir la regla es
explicada en términos de de la asertibilidad de condiciones,
las cuales, están disponibles para los miembros de una
comunidad lingüística, y así no existe la posibilidad de un
seguimiento de reglas en el que otros no puedan saber si
uno está siguiendo la regla correcta o incorrectamente
(37). Este enfoque de lo que está pasando en el parágrafo
202 obviamente depende de la interpretación comunal que
se tenga, por ejemplo, respecto a la construcción de un
"acuerdo de respuesta" dentro de la noción del seguimiento
de regla.
 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
COLIN MCGINN
On the interpretation I have put forward, there is not
this direct link between 202 and the private language
argument: 202 sets the stage for that argument without
actually completing it; more argumentative work has
to be done before the possibility of a private language
can be excluded. What is left open by 202 is the
possibility of a 'private technique', i.e. a capacity to
apply a sign in a regular way which is not checkable
by others. In the case of public objects the technique
of use will be checkable by others because the objects
themselves are accessible to others and hence
regularity of use is verifiable; but if the objects are
private, as sensations have often been supposed to be,
then there will be no telling whether the speaker is
referring to the same (kind of) sensation on different
occasions of use. I think my interpretation of the
relation between 202 and the later material on private
language better fits Wittgenstein's procedure in those
latter sections, for he speaks as if new considerations
were been advanced and not simply a specific
consequence of earlier conclusions being drawn. (38)
Kripke, in fact, claims that Wittgenstein anticipates
his sceptical paradox and its solution as early as the
very first section of the Investigations, in which case
the possibility of a private language would have been
excluded right at the beginning: this seems
implausible in itself, and inspection of section 1
discloses only an emphasis upon acting as against
'explanations' - there is no essential mention there of
the community. My conclusion is then that the more
traditional view of where the private language
argument occurs (after 243) is to be preferred to
Kripke's. It would, perhaps, be pleasant if Kripke's
view of the overall structure of the Investigations were
correct, but it does not seem to me that it is. And the
reason Wittgenstein's book does not have the structure
Kripke attributes to it is that it does not have the
content he attributes to it.
Página 34 de 34 COLIN MCGINN
Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2
92
En la interpretación que he presentado, no hay enlace
directo entre el 202 y el argumento del lenguaje privado:
202 establece el escenario para esta discusión sin
realmente completarlo. Mucha más labor argumentativa
debe realizarse antes de la posibilidad de que el lenguaje
privado pueda ser excluido.Lo que ha sido insinuado por el
parágrafo 202 es la posibilidad de una "técnica privada", es
decir, una capacidad de aplicar un signo de forma regular,
la cuál no es constatada por otros. En el caso de los objetos
públicos la técnica de uso será comprobable porque los
objetos en sí mismos están accesibles a otros y entonces la
regularidad de uso es verificable; pero si los objetos son
privados, como se supone que las sensaciones siempre lo
son, entonces no existirá explicación si el que habla se
refiere a la misma (clase de) sensaciones en ocasiones
distintas de uso. Creo que mi interpretación de la relación
entre 202 y el material posterior sobre el lenguaje privado
se ajusta mejor al procedimiento de Wittgenstein en
aquellas secciones posteriores, pues Wittgenstein habla
como si nuevas consideraciones hubieran tenido avances y
no como si dibujáramos simplemente una consecuencia
específica de conclusiones anteriores (38). Kripke, de
hecho, afirma que Wittgenstein anticipa su paradoja
escéptica con su solución desde antes de la primera
sección de las Investigaciones, en cuyo caso la posibilidad
de un lenguaje privado hubiera sido excluida desde el
principio: pero esto parece ser improbable por sí mismo y
una inspección de la sección 1 describe tan sólo un énfasis
a favor de los actos y en contra de las "explicaciones" --- no
existe ninguna mención especial ahí de la comunidad. Mi
conclusión es entonces que el enfoque más tradicional
donde el argumento del lenguaje privado surge (después
del 243) es preferible a la de Kripke. Tal vez sería aceptable
si el criterio de la estructura global de Kripke de las
Investigaciones fuera correcto, pero no me da la impresión
que así sea. Y la razón de que el libro de Wittgenstein no
tenga la estructura que Kripke le atribuye, radica
simplemente en que no tiene el contenido que Kripke
piensa.
 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2
NOTAS CAPÍTULO 2
1. See Kripke, pp. 5, 67-71. These qualifications
particularly concern the skeptical thesis Kripke
attributes to Wittgenstein.
2. See Kripke, pp. II, 23-4.
3 Kripke emphasises that his central problem is
constitutive on p. 21, though he does initially state
the problem more epistemologically (sec p. 8). His
use of (he term 'sceptic' must therefore be
understood in a slightly nonstandard way:
Kripkc's scepticis not (primarily) interested in
questions of certainty, knowledge or justification -
his real interest is 'ontological' or 'metaphysical'.
4. 'It seems that the entire idea of meaning
vanishes into thin air' (Kripke, p. 22);
understandably, this gives Kripke 'an eerie
feeling' (p. 21).
5. Kripke exploits this alleged contrast with the
Tractatus to impose a structure or, the
Investigations according to which the early
sections (1-137) are concerned to undermine the
Tractatus truth-conditional conception of
language, as a picliminary to solving the sceptical
problem (see Kripke, pp. 78-0). Plainly, this
architectonic suggestion can be correct only if
Kripke is right to interpret Wittgenstein as
solving a sceptical problem by means of a
sceptical solution based upon assertibility
conditions; and I do not think he is right so to
interpret Wittgenstein.
6. I am thinking here of J . L . Mackie's view that
objective values would be metaphysically 'queer':
sec his Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
(Penguin Books. 1977), chapter I.
Traducción: Madrigal Bailón Joel Tucídides / UAM-iztapalapa / IN CALLI IXCAHUICOPA
1
1. Véase Kripke, pp. 5, 67-71. Estas caracterizaciones
particulares pertenecen a la tesis escéptica que Kripke
atribuye a Wittgenstein.
2. véase Kripke, pp. 11, 23-4.
3 En la página 21 Kripke hace énfasis en que su
problema central es constitutivo, aunque inicialmente el
hace la declaración de que el problema es más
epistemológico (véase p. 8). Sin embargo su uso del
término "Escéptico" debe ser ligeramente entendido de
una forma no convencional. La Escéptica de Kripke no
está (fundamentalmente) interesada en cuestiones de
certeza, conocimiento o justificación. Su interés real es
"Ontológico" o "Metafísico".
4. "Parece ser que la idea entera de significado se
desvanece en un soplo de aire" (Krpke p. 22)
Inexplicablemente, esto da a Kripke "un sentimiento
extraño y terrorífico" (p. 21)
5. Kripke explota este contraste relacionado con el
Tractatus para imponer una estructura a las
Investigaciones. Así las primeras secciones (1 - 137)
tienen que ver con el derribe de la "verdad condicional",
que es una concepción del lenguaje presente en el
Tractatus, y además son la preliminar para resolver el
problema escéptico (véase Kripke pp. 78 -9).
Evidentemente, esta sugerencia arquitectónica podría ser
correcta sólo si Kripke está en lo cierto al interpretar que
Wittgenstein está resolviendo un problema escéptico, lo
que significa una solución escéptica basada en
condiciones de asertabilidad. Yo no creo que Kripke esté
en lo correcto al interpretar así a Wittgenstein.
6. Pienso aquí en la opinión de J. L. Mackie de que los
valores objetivos podrían ser metafísicamente "extraños".
Véase su Ética: Inventando lo bueno y lo malo (Penguin
Books, 1977) Capítulo I.
 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2
7. This type of view saves meaningful ethical
utterances in the absence of ethical tacts (truth)
by rcconstruing such utterances as (logically) non-
assertoric: an ethical sentence is meaningful while
lacking genuine truth conditions because it is rcail)
imperatival or exclamatory or hortatory or some
such. And clearly a sentence can be meaningful in
these ways without purporting to slate a fact.
8. One might see Paul Benacerraf, in
'Mathematical Truth', Journal of Philosophy LXX
(1973), as posing a kind of sceptical problem, viz.
how can mathematical propositions be true and
known; and Hartry Field, in Science Without
Numbers (Blackwcll: Oxford, 1980), as offering a
kind of sceptical solution, viz. mathematical
sentences need not be regarded as possessing
genuine truth conditions and so do not call for
'queer' facts to correspond to them.
9. I am using 'individualistic1 roughly in the sense
Tyler Burge does in 'Individualism and the
Mental', Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. IV,
ed. P.A. French, T . E . Uehling and H . K .
Wettstein (University of Minnesota Press, 1979):
that is, a property of a person is individualistic just
if the instantiation of that property can be
explained without reference to the condition of any
other person; a property is social just if this is not
so.
10. It is especially important to see that the
introduction of the community pertains to
assertibility conditions and not truth conditions;
for essentially the same difficulties would afflict
the attempt to find a social fact for meaning to
consist in.
11. It is significant that in other passages in which
the interpretational conception is rejected, e.g. BB
pp. 33—35, there is no mention of a paradox into
which we arc in imminent danger of falling;
Wittgenstein's point in these passages is just that
we should not think of meaning and understanding
in terms of inner interpretations (i.e. symbols) - he
is not saying that this is the only way we can think
if we cleave to a Tactual1conception of these
concepts.
Traducción: Madrigal Bailón Joel Tucídides / UAM-iztapalapa / IN CALLI IXCAHUICOPA
2
7. Este tipo de visión conserva expresiones éticas con
sentido aún en la ausencia de hechos éticos (verdades) al
reconstruir (lógicamente) tales expresiones como no-
asertóricas. Un enunciado ético guarda completo
significado a la vez que tiene ausencia de condiciones
genuinas de verdad porque es en realidad una expresión
imperativa, exclamativa o goza del el recurso conativo del
lenguaje (por exhortación o fuerte petición: “¡Callad!”, “no
matarás”). Evidentemente una oración puede llegar a tener
completo sentido con estos medios sin proponerse por ello
establecer un hecho.
8. Uno puede revisar a Paul Benacerraf, en su artículo
"Verdad Matemática", Gaceta de Filosofía LXX (1973)
como poseedor de una clase de problema escéptico, viz.
¿Cómo pueden ser las proposiciones matemáticas
verdaderas y conocidas?. También vemos a Harry Field, en
Ciencia sin números (Blackwell: Oxford, 1980)
ofreciéndonos un tipo de solución escéptica, viz. Los
enunciados matemáticos no necesitan estar supuestas
como las poseedoras de genuinas condiciones de verdad, y
así, no se invocan "extraños" hechos que puedan
corresponderse con ellas.
9. Yo estoy usando "individualista" en el sentido en que
Tyler Burge lo hace en su artículo: "Lo individualista y lo
mental" en Estudios Filosóficos del Oeste Medio. Vol. IV,
editado por P. A. French, T. E. Uething y H. K. Wettsein
(Impresiones de la Universidad de Minesota , 1979). Esto
es, la propiedad de una persona es individualista sólo en la
idea de que esa propiedad pueda ser explicada sin
referencia a la condición de alguna otra persona. Una
propiedad es social en el caso contrario.
10. Es especialmente importante ver que la introducción a
la comunidad se corresponde con las condiciones de
asertabilidad y no con las condiciones de verdad.
Esencialmente los mismos problemas afectarían un intento
de encontrar un hecho social que quisiera dar razón de los
fundamentos del significado.
11. Resulta significativo que en otros pasajes en los que la
concepción interpretacional es rechazada, por ejemplo en
BB p. 33-35 no se mencione a ninguna paradoja en la cuál
nos encontremos en peligro inminente de caer, el punto de
Wittgenstein respecto a estos pasajes estriba solamente en
que nosotros no deberíamos pensar sobre el significado y
el entendimiento en términos de interpretaciones internas
(por ejemplo, símbolos) - él no está diciendo que esta sea
la única manera en que podamos pensar si nos apegamos
a una concepción "objetiva" de estos conceptos.
 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2
12. More specifically, Wittgenstein is asking what
it is about a person that determines his future use
of a sign, and hts answer is that this is a matter of
the technique of use of which he is master, not of
what comes before his mind. If you like: the fact
that gives signs life is a fact about use, not a fact
about inner states.
13. See Kripke, pp. 45-49.
14. Kripke says: 'The sceptical paradox is the
fundamental problem of Philosophical
Investigations (p. 78). It might clarify
Wittgenstein's attitude to this paradox to contrast
it with Russell's attitude towards his class
paradox. Wittgenstein sees hisparadox as a
problem for anyone who assumes that meaning is
a matter of interpretation, but he thinks that this
assumption is not at all compulsory or
unavoidable; whereas Russell's paradox arises
from assumptions that seem inescapable - there is
no straightforward mistake in the premisses that
generate the contradiction. In a word,
Wittgenstein's paradox is not a problem for
Wittgenstein, as Russell's paradox is a problem
for Russell.
15. In particular, BB pp. 113-17, which deals at
some length with the notion of ability, does not
suggest that sentences containing 'can' and its
cognates do not correspond to 'conditions-in-the-
world'; the point there is rather that we should
not construe abilities as special sorts of inner
processor state which lie 'behind' what counts as
the exercise of the ability.
16. Remember that the form of Wittgenstein's
account is to be the perspicuous connecting of
concepts (see 122): he says that the 'grammar' of
‘can’ and 'is able to' is 'closely related' to that of
'understands' (150), not that we can actually
analyze the latter in terms of the former. In fact, I
think that the failure to provide necessary and
sufficient conditions for the application of a
concept would, for Wittgenstein, have no
significance whatever for the question whether
that concept could be interpreted in a 'fact-
stating' way.
Traducción: Madrigal Bailón Joel Tucídides / UAM-iztapalapa / IN CALLI IXCAHUICOPA
12. Más específicamente Wittgenstein está
preguntándose qué sucedería con una persona que
determina sus usos futuros de un signo, y su respuesta es
que este es un problema en la técnica de uso que él
domina, y no en lo que viene desde antes a su mente. Si
usted gusta: el hecho que da vida al signo es un hecho
que tiene que ver con el uso, no es un hecho relacionado
con ningún estado interno.
13. Véase Kripke, pp. 45 - 49.
14. Kripke dice: la paradoja escéptica es el problema
fundamental de <<Investigaciones Filosóficas>> (p. 78)
Parece ser muy clara la actitud de Wittgenstein hacia esta
paradoja, lo que contrasta con la actitud de Russell con
respecto a su paradoja clásica. Wittgenstein parece ver a
su paradoja como un problema para todo aquel que asuma
que el significado es una cuestión de interpretación,
aunque no obstante él piensa que esa suposición no es
del todo "compulsiva" e ineludible; mientras que la
paradoja de Russell parte de suposiciones que parecen
ser ineludibles - no hay sencillamente error en las
premisas que generan contradicción. En una palabra, la
paradoja de Wittgenstein no es un problema para
Wittgenstein, pero la paradoja de Russell es un problema
para Russell.
15. En particular el apartado BB pp. 113-17, que se ocupó
de aclarar que la noción de habilidad no sugiere que
aquellas sentencias que contengan el verbo << poder >> o
alguno de sus cognados, no correspondan a ciertas
"condiciones-en-el-mundo", sino que más bien deberíamos
interpretar a las habilidades como una clase especial de
proceso interno o estado que subyace "detrás" de lo que
consideramos el ejercicio de habilidad.
16. Recuérdese que la forma que adopta la exposición de
Wittgenstein es la de tener una perspicaz conexión de
conceptos (véase 122): Él dice que la "gramática" del
verbo "poder" y "ser capaz de" están "íntimamente ligadas"
al verbo "entender·" (150) y no que nosotros podamos
analizar verdaderamente lo posterior en términos de lo
anterior. En realidad creo que la falla de enunciar
condiciones suficientes y necesarias para la aplicación de
un concepto, podría no tener sentido alguno para
Wittgenstein, no importando la cuestión de si ese
concepto pudiera ser interpretado en forma de un "hecho -
declarado".
 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2
17. Kripke notes that Wittgenstein subscribes to a
redundancy theory of truth (so called) in 136
(Kripke. p. 86), but he docs not, I think, draw the
right lesson from this: given that 'true' adds
nothing to the content of an assertion, it cannot be
that Wittgenstein really wishes to deny that
semantic sentences have truth conditions – on
pain of denying that they express propositions.
Similarly for 'it is a fact that 'or 'states a fact'.
18. Cf. "But if you are certain, isn't it that you
are shutting your eyes in lace of doubt - They are
shut" (p. 2?4). He is saying that the question of
doubt, in certain standard sorts of case, simply
does not arise for us; so the sceptic can make no
impact on our customary confidence by inventing
if doubt (we should keep yur eyes firmly shut).
19. See Kripke, p. 43, In tact, this explanation of
the disparity docs not tit the historical tacts very
well, since behaviourism was enjoying a
considerable vogue at the time Wittgenstein was
writing what became the Investigations, and di1
positional accounts ol psychological concepts were
widely advocated Russell, in particular, was
strongly inttuenceil by behaviourism, as Kripke
himself notes (Kripke, p. 1 see Russell's My
Philosophical Development (George Allen and
Unwin: London, 1959), esp. chapters 11-13. In
view of the prevalence of such, doctrines at the
time of his writing, imr might have thought
Wittgenstein would take thru refutation as an first
priority, if Kripke's interpretation were on the
tight lines.
20. that is, Wittgenstein is objecting to the notion
of disposition if this notion is understood
independently of behavior, i.e. as an internal state
that is explanatory of behavior; but Kripke's
objections to the dispositional suggestion construe
dispositions precisely in terms of counterfactuals
about behavior: so Wittgenstein and Kripke mean
quite different things by "disposition" and hence
are making quite different objections to the
invocation of this notion. )This explain why
Wittgenstein objects to talk of dispositions, but
commends the use of counterfactuals to elucidate
meaning and knowledge.)
Traducción: Madrigal Bailón Joel Tucídides / UAM-iztapalapa / IN CALLI IXCAHUICOPA
17. Kripke repara en que Wittgenstein se suscribe a una
redundante teoría de la verdad (por así llamarla) en 136
(véase Kripke, p. 86), pero pienso que él no rescata la
lección correcta de todo esto: Dado que ' "la verdad" no le
añade nada al el contenido de una aseveración, no puede
ser que Wittgenstein realmente desee negar que las frases
semánticas tengan condiciones de verdad - so pena de
negar que ellas expresan proposiciones. Algo semejante
sucede con las expresiones: "es un hecho que " y " estado
de hecho".
18. Véase este fragmento: << Pero si usted "está seguro",
pues no es que usted este "cerrando los ojos" al encarar la
duda - lo que pasa es que ya están cerrados>> (p. 224) Él
dice que el asunto de la duda, en ciertos tipos de caso
estándar, simplemente no surge de nosotros, así es que el
escéptico no puede causar impacto en nuestra confianza
usual, inventando alguna duda (en tal caso, deberíamos
mantener nuestros ojos firmemente cerrados).
19. Véase a Kripke, p.43. En realidad esta explicación de
la disparidad no encuadra en los hechos históricos muy
adecuadamente, ya que el conductismo disfrutó de una
considerable moda en el tiempo que Wittgenstein estaba
escribiendo lo que se convertiría en las Investigaciones y
en los argumentos disposicionales psicológicos donde fue
ampliamente apoyado por Russell, en particular, fue
poderosamente influenciado por el conductismo, tal como
Kripke mismo lo reconoce [Kripke p . 25 ] véase Russell,
Mi Desarrollo Filosófico (George Allen y Uwin: Londres,
1959, especialmente capítulos 11-13). Si la interpretación
de Kripke fuera correcta, en vista del predominio de tales
doctrinas al momento de la redacción de su obra, uno
podría haber pensado que Wittgenstein tomaría entonces
ideas y refutaciones con alguna prioridad inicial.
20. Esto es, Wittgenstein desaprueba la noción de
disposición si esta noción es comprendida
independientemente del comportamiento, o sea como un
estado interno que es explicativo de comportamiento; Pero
las objeciones de Kripke a la sugerencia disposicional
interpretan a las disposiciones precisamente en términos
de condicionales materiales acerca del comportamiento:
Entonces Wittgenstein y Kripke quieren decir cosas muy
diferentes por "disposición" y por lo tanto hacen objeciones
muy diferentes a la invocación de esta noción. )Esto
explica por qué Wittgenstein desaprueba hablar de
disposiciones, pero recomienda el uso de condicionales
materiales para distinguir entre "lo que se quiere decir" y
"el conocimiento".)
 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2
21 This, then, is Wittgenstein's answer to the
question that ends 187, and to the puzzle
originally raised in 138: when one suddenly comes
to understand a word, or hears it whit
understanding, or knows the meaning of a word,
what is true of one is that certain counterfactuals
hold, which correspond to the possession of an
ability; it is not that one performs a remarkable
mental act in which the whole of the future and
possible use comes before one's mind as a
condensed series of thoughts or images or some
such (see 188). A man's entire life may flash
before his mind when he believes he is about to die
but his temporally extended use of a word does
not similarly flash before his mind when he means
it in certain way.
22 As I observed in chapter one, Wittgenstein's
treatment of the concept of meaning takes its
place along whit a like treatment of a wide range
of other psychological concepts and his general
aim is to resist driving these psychological
phenomena inward. If Kripke were right about
Wittgenstein's treatment of meaning, then he
would have to take a parallel line about the whole
range of psychological concepts treated by
Wittgenstein: he would have to say that
Wittgenstein is advocating skeptical paradox
about believing, recognizing, remembering,
comparing, wiling, etc. , and proposing a
community - based skeptical solution. Or he did
not, he would have to explain why Wittgenstein
himself treat all this concepts in a similar way.
23. Kripke is, of course, not first to propose a
broadly community interpretation of
Wittgenstein's discussion of following a rule; an
early exponent of this interpretation is Peter
Winch, in The Idea Of Social Science (Routledge
and Kegan Paul: London, 1958), esp. pp. 24-39.
And this general interpretation has been endorsed
by a great many, perhaps the majority, of
commentators since then.
Traducción: Madrigal Bailón Joel Tucídides / UAM-iztapalapa / IN CALLI IXCAHUICOPA
21. Ésta, entonces, es la respuesta de Wittgenstein para
la pregunta que termina 187, y para el acertijo
originalmente planteado en 138: Cuando uno
repentinamente consigue comprender una palabra, o la
escucha con un poco de entendimiento, o sabe el
significado de una palabra, sucede que ciertos
condicionales abrazan aplicaciones que se corresponden
con la posesión de una habilidad. No es que uno
represente un acto mental extraordinario en el cual, todo el
futuro y todo uso posible vengan desde antes a la mente
de uno, como una serie condensada de pensamientos e
imágenes o algo semejante (véase 188) . La vida entera
de un hombre puede pasar ante de su mente cuando él
cree que él está a punto de morir; pero su uso extendido
temporal de la palabra no "pasa ante su mente"
(análogamente) cuando él quiere decir algo en cierta
forma.
22. Como lo observé en el capítulo uno, la relación que
Wittgenstein establece del concepto de significado toma
lugar a lo largo de ciertos detalles como el tratamiento de
una gran variedad de otros conceptos psicológicos y su
meta general es la de resistirse a impulsar estos
fenómenos psicológicos interiormente. Si Kripke estuviera
en lo correcto respecto al argumento de Wittgenstein sobre
el significado, entonces el tendría que tomar una línea
paralela de estudio acerca del rango completo de los
fenómenos psicológicos tratados por Wittgenstein: él
tendría que decir que Wittgenstein está abogando por una
paradoja escéptica acerca del creer, reconocer, recordar,
comparar, desear, etcétera y estaría proponiendo una
comunidad fundamentada en la solución escéptica, de no
hacerlo, él tendría que explicar por qué Wittgenstein
mismo trata todos estos conceptos de una forma similar.
23. Kripke no es por supuesto el primero en proponer una
interpretación ampliamente comunal de la discusión de
Wittgenstein de seguir una regla; Un exponente antiguo de
esta interpretación es Peter Winch, en La Idea De
Sociología (Routledge y Kegan Paul: Londres, 1958),
parágrafo pp. 24-39. Y esta interpretación general ha sido
justificada por una gran cantidad, quizá la mayoría, de
comentaristas de allí en adelante.
 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2
24 Wittgenstein does not, perhaps, use "private"
and "privately" in an entirely uniform way; but
its central meaning for him is, I think, twofold: he
uses It to suggest a condition of consciousness, and
he uses It to suggest unknowability by another (
see 251, 272, 294). When states of consciousness
are conceived in an erroneous way their
(admitted) "privacy" becomes a kind of
unknowability, instead od a harmless truth about
them ( The preposition << Sensations are
private>> is comparable to <<one place patience
by oneself>> (248), i.e. this is a "grammatical
remark"). I think both of these connotations are
present in Wittgenstein's use of "privately" in
202. I do not know of any passage in which
Wittgenstein clearly uses "private" in the sense
Kripke gives to it in 202, i.e. as meaning "making
no reference to other people".
25 The question is also raised in RFM p. 349:
"Could there be only one human been than
calculated? Could there be only one that followed
a rule? This is not, however, answered negatively.
Elsewhere we read: "But what about this
consensus - doesn't It mean that one human been
by himself could not calculate? Well, one human
been could at any rate not calculate just one in his
life" (RFM p. 193). These remarks seems best
explained as I explain the passage from the
Investigations cited in the text: Wittgenstein's
underlying point is that we need a plurality of
occasions, and it is a question to be raised whether
one man provides enough of these. Wittgenstein
implication appears to be that he does, so long as
calculates more than once.
26 Kripke never so much as mentions what I
have argued to be Wittgenstein's main point in
these passages about rules and customs, viz. the
multiple application thesis. Since It seems, beyond
question that is at least one thing Wittgenstein is
saying. Kripke must hold that Wittgenstein is
making the community claim in the same breath
as he is propounding the multiple application
thesis. However in view of the toto caelo difference
between these two claims, it would seem at best
highly confusing for Wittgenstein to be running
them together so carelessly. Better to attribute
only one of them to him, and there seems no
question but that he held the multiple application
thesis.
Traducción: Madrigal Bailón Joel Tucídides / UAM-iztapalapa / IN CALLI IXCAHUICOPA
24. Wittgenstein quizá no usa " privado " y "
privadamente " en una forma enteramente uniforme; Pero
su significado central para él es, pienso, doble: Él lo usa
para sugerir una condición de conciencia, y la usa para
sugerir la no cognoscibilidad por medio de otro (véase 251,
272, 294). Cuando los estados de conciencia son
concebidos en una forma errónea su " privacidad " se
convierte en un tipo de no cognoscibilidad, en lugar de ser
alguna verdad acerca de ellos (La preposición "Las
sensaciones son privadas" es comparable a "uno juega a
la paciencia por si mismo" (248) y esto es un ejemplo de
un "enunciado gramatical").. Pienso que ambas de estas
connotaciones están presentes en el uso de Wittgenstein
de " privadamente " en 202. No sé de algún pasaje en el
cual Wittgenstein claramente use " privado " en el sentido
que Kripke da a 202, esto es, como intentando "no hacer
referencia a las otras personas ".
25. Esta cuestión también surge en RFM p. 349: ¿podría
haber un solo ser humano que pudiera calcular?¿podría
haber uno solo que siguiera una regla? A pesar de todo,
esto no se contesta negativamente. En otro lugar
leemos:"Pero ¿qué sucede con este consenso? --- ¿no
significa que un ser humano por si mismo no pueda
calcular? Bueno, un ser humano pudiera no calcular en
ningún porcentaje un sólo caso en su vida" (RFM p. 193).
Estos señalamientos parecen estar mejor explicados
según mi cita del pasaje de Investigaciones expuesto
antes: El punto que señala Wittgenstein es que nosotros
necesitamos una pluralidad de ocasiones y esta cuestión
se hace presente si un hombre proporciona suficiente de
ellas. La implicación de Wittgenstein parece ser que es
posible a medida que se calcula más de una vez.
26. Kripke no menciona lo que yo argumento que es "el
principal punto de Wittgenstein" en estos pasajes acerca
de las reglas y las costumbres, a saber, la tesis de la
aplicación múltiple. Le parece que Wittgenstein sólo dice
una cosa. Kripke tendría que establecer que Wittgenstein
construye la afirmación Comunitaria al mismo tiempo que
propone la tesis de la aplicación múltiple. Sin embargo en
vista de las diferencias evidentes entre estas dos
afirmaciones, pareciera en el mejor de los casos, que sería
algo extraño para Wittgenstein el aplicar ambas tesis con
tanto descuido. debido a esto decide atribuir a Wittgenstein
una sola de ellas y no dar lugar a problemas aparentes al
cuestionar si aquél sostuvo la tesis de la aplicación
múltiple.
 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2
27. Cf. "The danger here, I believe, is one of
giving a justification of our procedure where there
is no such thing as justification and we ought
simply to have said : tha's how we do it" (RFM p.
199) But this not imply any episteme defect, since
"To use the word withouth a justification does not
mean to use it wrongfully" (RFM p. 406).
Essencially the same point could be put by saying
that I have (and need) no criterion for appliying a
word as I do, i.e. , for supposing that I am using it
a rule - governed way.
28. Thus "we look to the rule for instruction and
do something, whithout appealing to anything else
for guidance" (228): that is, when I naturally
react in certain way to a rule (expression of a rule)
I cannot check that this reaction is rigth by
looking to the community for guidence. What
prompts this appeal to community guidence is
what also prompts the appeal to a voice of
intuition, namely the feeling that we must be able
to provide some reason for what we do when we
follow rules.
29. In Z 319 Wittgenstein says something very
relevant to this, which seems to me of considerable
significance for community interpretations of
Wittgenstein thought about rule following. After
saying, "I cannot describe how (in general) to
employ rules, except by teaching you, training you
to employ rules" (Z 318), he goes on, "I may now,
e.g. make a talkie of such instruction. The teacher
will sometimes say "That´s right". If the pupil
should ask him "Why?" - He will answer nothing,
or at any rate nothing relevant not even: "Well,
because we all do it like that"; that will not be the
reason. It is very hard to see how this passage
could be squared with the idea that for
Wittgenstein, correctness in following rule is a
matter of agreement whit the reactions of the
community - either in respect of truth conditions
or assertibility condition.
Traducción: Madrigal Bailón Joel Tucídides / UAM-iztapalapa / IN CALLI IXCAHUICOPA
27. Cfr. "El peligro aquí, creo yo, es el dar justificación a
nuestro procedimiento ahi donde no la haya para nuestro
procedimiento, y que nosotros simplemente tengamos que
decir: es lo que hago siempre" (RFM p. 199), pero este no
es simplemente un defecto epistémico, ya que "usar una
palabra sin justificación no significa usarla
incorrectamente" (RFM p. 406) Esencialmente el mismo
punto podría ponerse diciendo que yo no tengo (ni
necesito) algún criterio para aplicar una palabra como
suelo hacerlo, por ejemplo, para suponer que yo la estoy
usando como una regla-de-gobierno.
28. De esta forma "nosotros atendemos a la regla para
obtener instrucción y hacer algo, sin apelar a nada más
para conseguir guía" (228); esto es, cuando yo reacciono
con naturalidad a cierta regla (o expresión de la regla) yo
no puedo advertir que esta reacción sea correcta sólo
observando a la comunidad para guiarme. Lo que implica
esta apelación a la guía comunitaria es lo que también se
implica al apelar a la voz de la intuición, a saber, el
sentimiento que solemos tener para proporcionar alguna
razón para lo que hacemos cuando seguimos las reglas.
29. En Z 319 Wittgenstein dice algo muy relevante al
respecto, lo cual me parece de considerable importancia
para las interpretaciones comunitarias sobre el
pensamiento de Wittgesntein cuando habla acerca del
seguimiento de reglas. Después de decir: "Yo no puedo
describir cómo (en general) emplear las reglas, excepto
enseñándolas, entrenándote en el empleo de reglas" (Z
318), él continua: "Yo podría ahora, por ejemplo, "hacer
una película hablada" de tal instrucción. El maestro
algunas veces dirá: "Eso es correcto", y si el pupilo le
debiera preguntar "¿Por qué?" --- El no contestará nada, o
en cualquier caso algo poco relevante como: "Bueno, pues
porque todos lo hacemos así"; eso no sería ninguna razón.
Es muy difícil ver cómo este pasaje puede ser equiparado
con la idea de que para Wittgenstein la corrección de
seguir la regla sea materia de algún acuerdo con las
reacciones de la comunidad --- ya sea en materia de
"condiciones de verdad" o condiciones de asertibilidad.
 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2
30. The question of correctness in the application
of a rule is the question what counts as a mistake
in applying the rule. Wittgenstein does not in fact
make heavy weather of this question, as witness
this passage: "But now does the observer
distinguish in this case between players" mistakes
and correct play? - there are characteristic sings
of it in the players' behavior. Think of the
behavior characteristic of correcting slip of the
tongue. It would be possible to recognize that
someone was doing so even without knowing his
language" (54); see also 143, in which mistaking
the order of a series is said to be simply a matter
of "frequency". That is, Wittgenstein takes there
to be readily recognizable criteria for making a
mistake; he is not supposing there to be a deep
and perplexing problem about what the
distinction of correct and incorrect application
consists in (for the case of language about public
objects) Rather he typically assumes a given
pattern of possible future use to be correct and is
then exercised with the question how this relates
to what I now mean.
31. Here we might think of very simple language-
games in which trining produces fairly uniform
and mechanical reactions; or even of the
'language' of bees.
32 . On this point I am in agreement with Barry
Stroud, 'Wittgenstein and Logical Necessity',
Philosophical Review LXXIV (1965) . This
interpretation contrast whit the idea that
Wittgenstein is some kind of "conventionalist".
33. There is even in Wittgenstein some analogue of
Hume's projectivist "error theory" when we
reflect philosophically upon our following rules
we are irresistibly tempted to suppose that our
natural propensities have some foundation on
what is "out there" and hence we get the idea of
"rails invisibly laid to infinity" (218) and of
"something which only needs the addition of "and
so on", in order to reach to infinity" (229). These
illusions result from a kind of "externalization" of
the compulsion we are under when we follow a
rule - rather as Hume thought that we
"externalize" necessary connexion in our thought
about causation. (Of course this analogy should
not be pressed too far; there also plenty of
differences between Hume and Wittgenstein in
this regard.)
Traducción: Madrigal Bailón Joel Tucídides / UAM-iztapalapa / IN CALLI IXCAHUICOPA
30. La cuestión de la corrección en la aplicación de una 8
regla, es la cuestión sobre lo que cuenta como error en la
aplicación de la regla. Wittgenstein en realidad no hace
mucho caso de este punto, como lo atestigua este pasaje:
"Pero ahora ¿podría el observador distinguir en este caso
entre dos jugadores...entre los errores y un juego
correcto? --- Existen signos característicos de esto en el
comportamiento de los jugadores. Piense en el
comportamiento característico al corregir un tartamudeo
con la lengua. Se lograría reconocer que alguien estuviera
desempeñándose al parejo sin saber su idioma" (54);
véase también 143, en el cual En el que confundir la orden
de una serie - se dice - es simplemente un asunto de "
frecuencia ". Esto es, Wittgenstein toma este criterio para
localizar criterios fácilmente reconocibles que den cuenta
de la equivocación; Él no supone aquí que esté frente a un
problema profundo y desconcertante acerca de lo que
implica la distinción de una aplicación correcta e incorrecta
(para el caso de lenguaje acerca de objetos del públicos) .
Más Bien él asume típicamente que un patrón dado de uso
futuro posible puede ser correcto y ello es entonces
ejercitado con la pregunta del cómo se relaciona esto, con
lo que yo ahora significo.
31. Aquí podríamos pensar en juegos muy simples del
lenguaje en los cuales un entrenamiento produce
reacciones mecánicas y muy uniformes o por así decirlo,
un "lenguaje de abejas".
32. En este punto yo estoy de acuerdo con Barry Stroud,
"Wittgenstein y la necesidad Lógica", Revista Filosófica
LXXIV (1965) . Esta interpretación contrasta con la idea de
que Wittgenstein es una clase de "Convencionalista".
33. Todavía existe en Wittgenstein algunas analogías con
respecto a la "teoría del error" que tiene el proyectivismo
de Hume. Cuando reflexionamos filosóficamente sobre
nuestro seguimiento de reglas nos encontramos
irresistiblemente tentados a suponer que nuestras
inclinaciones naturales tienen algún fundamento sobre lo
que está "allá afuera" y en consecuencia nosotros
abrazamos la idea de que "existen rieles que nos llevan
hasta el infinito" (218) y de que "Cualquier adición tan sólo
necesita la premisa <<y así sucesivamente>> para llegar
hasta el infinito" (229). Estas ilusiones son el resultado de
una "externalización" compulsiva que experimentamos
cuando seguimos una regla --- algo como lo que pensaba
Hume respecto a que nosotros "externalizamos" una
conexión necesaria en nuestro pensamiento acerca de la
causación. (Por supuesto, esta analogía no debe llevarse
demasiado lejos, hay también un montón de diferencias
entre Hume y Wittgenstein en este sentido.)
 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2
34. It is important here that my use of language is
interwoven with various kinds of non-linguistic
activity in such a way as to fix what my words
mean; so correctness of use will (partially) consist
in how my linguistic actions fit in with my non-
linguistic actions.
35 'Philosophers very often talk about
investigating, analysing, the meaning of words.
But let's not forget that a word hasn't got a
meaning giving to it, as it were, by a power
independent of us, so that there could be a kind of
scientific investigation into what the word really
means. A word has the meaning someone has
given to it' (BB pp. 27-8). So it could not turn out
that a word has a meaning different from that
which 1 (we) give to it by dint of my (our) use of
the word.
36. See esp. 208-10, in which it is ernphasised
that in teaching someone a rule I don not
communicate lees than 1 myself know. This claim
of Wittgenstein's bears certain similarities to W.
V. Quine's position on radical translation in Word
and Object (MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass, 1960),
chap. 2; and to Michael Dummett's insistence
upon the exhaustive manifestability of linguistic
understanding in 'What is a Theory of Meaning?
(II)', in Truth and Meaning, ed. G. Evans and J.
McDowell (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1976).
37 See Kripke, pp. 3, 98-113
38. He does not anywhere say or imply that a
private language has already been excluded by he
earlier considerations, and that it is necessary for
him now only to bring out how those
considerations apply to the skeptical case of words
for sensations. In fact. I think he writes as in the
earlier conclusion -that understanding is mastery
of a practice- leaves open the possibility of a
private language. Hence the need to show that we
have to impose further conditions on what it takes
for a genuine practice (rule) to exist, notably
third-person criteria of correctness.
Traducción: Madrigal Bailón Joel Tucídides / UAM-iztapalapa / IN CALLI IXCAHUICOPA
34. Es importante aquí que mi uso del lenguaje está
entretejido con varias clases de actividad no-lingüística, de
tal manera que es posible "arreglar" lo que mis palabras
quieren decir; así la "corrección" en el uso consistirá
(parcialmente) en la manera en que mis acciones
lingüísticas se ajusten y correspondan con mis acciones
no-lingüísticas.
35. "Los filósofos usualmente hablan acerca de investigar
y analizar el significado de las palabras. Pero no se nos
olvide que una palabra no adquiere un significado
dándoselo, por así decirlo, mediante un poder
independiente a nosotros, de tal forma que pudiera haber
"algún tipo de investigación científica" sobre lo que una
palabra realmente significa. "Una palabra tiene el
significado que alguien le ha querido dar" (88 pp. 276-8).
Por lo tanto no podría ser que una palabra tuviera un
significado diferente de aquel que yo (o nosotros) le
hayamos dado valiéndonos de nuestro (o de mi) uso de la
palabra.
36. Véase el periodo 208-10 en el cual se enfatiza que al
enseñarle a alguien una regla, yo no comunico nada que
yo mismo no conozca. Esta afirmación de Wittgenstein
tiene ciertas similitudes con la posición de W. V. Quine
sobre la traducción radical entre la Palabra y el objeto (MIT
Press: Cambridge, Mass, 1960), capítulo 2; y a la
insistencia de Michael Dummett sobre la "exhaustiva
manifestabilidad" del entendimiento lingüístico, en su
artículo "¿Qué es la teoría del significado? (II)" dentro de
"Verdad y significado", ed. G. Evans y J. McDowell
(Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1976).
37 véase Kripke, pp. 3, 98-113
38. Wittgenstein en ningún lado dice o implica que un
lenguaje privado ya haya sido excluido por
consideraciones anteriores, que ahora sea necesario para
él considerar cómo se aplican esas consideraciones para
el caso escéptico de palabras en sensaciones. De hecho.
Pienso que Wittgenstein escribe (al igual que en la
conclusión anterior), dejando siempre en claro la
posibilidad de un lenguaje privado - que la comprensión es
consecuencia de una práctica -.De aquí la necesidad de
mostrar que nosotros tenemos que dictar condiciones
adicionales sobre lo que se necesita para que exista una
práctica genuina, el criterio de corrección de "la notación
de una tercera persona" (la regla) .
"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2

10
Tema: Kripke's Interpretation of Wittgenstein: Paradox and Community. La versión castellana puede descargarse de
la página: http://es.scribd.com/ ubicando Colin Mcginn, "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein:
paradoja y comunidad" y en www.losriosdeheraclito.blogspot.com . Por favor, para mejor opinión visite la página
Web del profesor Colin McGuinn en: http://mcginn.philospot.com/ .

Referencia bibliografía:

"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein:

Extraído del libro original. paradoja y comunidad"( Kripke's Interpretation of
Wittgenstein: Paradox and Community) en:
Wittgenstein on Meaning. An Interpretation and
Evaluation, McGINN, Colin, Inglaterra, Basil Blackwell
Publisher L t d, 1984, pp. 59-92 (Aristotelian Society
Series, Volume 1).

Las notas originales (1) se han colocado a final de
texto y se han reservado los pies de página para
algunas notas adicionales. Esto pretende facilitar
al estudiante la lectura. El acomodo de palabras ha
variado ligeramente la paginación: algunos
párrafos se han recorrido “al siguiente inicio de
página” respecto a la versión original (vgr. Las
líneas últimas de p. 63, se trasladaron a inicio de la
64). La paginación se maneja así:
Arriba en un recuadro negro se pone el
número aproximado en el formato
original, y abajo la paginación
particular de este documento.

Escaneado y Traduci do y edi tado por el Profesor Joel

Tu cí di des Madrigal Bailó n, Li cen ciado en Filosofía,
Méx ico Distrito Federal. Univ ersidad Autónoma
Metropolitana- Uni dad Iztapalapa.
(tuc id ides2000 @yahoo.com.m x) Para educar y sin fin es
d e lucro. Se permite la reprodu cc ión total o parcial
c itando al autor origi nal.

Invito a mis amigos a que colaboren generosamente con sus

escritos traducidos en bien de las generaciones futuras.

Traducción: Madrigal Bailón Joel Tucídides / UAM-iztapalapa / IN CALLI IXCAHUICOPA

 "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

Sin mis seres amados, esta traducción jamás hubiera visto la luz:

Porque su Náhuatl
me enseñó a hablar
A MARÍA IMELDA SOTO el Castellano y aún
LÓPEZ me guía para
entender el Inglés.

Licenciada en Letras
Hispanas por la Normal
Superior de México.
Mujer culta dedicada a la
educación de la niñez
mexicana…. guía de muchas
A INÉS BAILÓN SOTO
decenas de generaciones.

Excelente maestra y
magnífico ejemplo.

A mi querida Angélica, amante de los libros.

A CARMINA ITZEL RUÍZ MADRIGAL…

PORQUE SU EXISTENCIA ME
ENORGULLECE Y ME DA FUERZA PARA
INTERPRETAR LOS SIGNOS DEL
FUTURO.
"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

LECTURAS SUGERIDAS SOBRE EL

TEMA:
Reflexión sobre lenguaje, significado y
seguimiento de reglas.
(INGLÉS) 1
 Ludwig Wittgenstein in 20th Century Philosophy Meaning in Philosophy of Language
Pragmatics in Philosophy of Language Rule-Following in Philosophy of Mind
 Alexander Miller (2010). Kripke's Wittgenstein, Factualism and Meaning. In Daniel
Whiting (ed.), The Later Wittgenstein on Language. Palgrave Macmillan. Ludwig
Wittgenstein in 20th Century Philosophy
 Alexander Miller (1999). Horwich, Meaning and Kripke's Wittgenstein. Philosophical
Quarterly 49 (199):161-174. Kripkenstein on Meaning in Philosophy of Language
Ludwig Wittgenstein in 20th Century Philosophy
 Adam M. Croom (2010). Wittgenstein, Kripke, and the Rule Following Paradox.
Dialogue 52 (2/3):103-109.
o In §201 of Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein puts forward his
famous “rule-following paradox.” The paradox is how can one follow in accord
with a rule – the applications of which are potentially infinite – when the
instances from which one learns the rule and the instances in which one
displays that one has learned the rule are only finite? How can one be certain
of rule-following at all? In Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language, Saul
Kripke concedes the skeptical position that there are no facts that we follow a
rule but that there are still conditions under which we are warranted in
asserting of others that they are following a rule. In this paper, I explain why
Kripke’s solution to the rule-following paradox fails. I then offer an alternative.
 Jakob Hohwy (2003). A Reduction of Kripke-Wittgenstein's Objections to
Dispositionalism About Meaning. Minds and Machines 13 (2):257-68.
o A central part of Kripke's influential interpretation of Wittgenstein's sceptical
argument about meaning is the rejection of dispositional analyses of what it is
for a word to mean what it does (Kripke, 1982). In this paper I show that
Kripke's arguments prove too much: if they were right, they would preclude
not only the idea that dispositional properties can make statements about the
meanings of words true, but also the idea that dispositional properties can
make true statements about paradigmatic dispositional properties such as a
cup's fragility or a person's bravery. However, since dispositional properties
can make such statements true, Kripke-Wittgenstein's arguments against
dispositionalism about meaning are mistaken.

1
Fuente: Wittgenstein on Meaning | PhilPapers http://philpapers.org/rec/MCGWOM
Página 1 de 3 Joel Tucídides Madrigal Bailón
"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

 Paul A. Boghossian (1989). The Rule-Following Considerations. Mind 98 (392):507-49.

o Recent years have witnessed a great resurgence of interest in the writings of
the later Wittgenstein, especially with those passages roughly, Philosophical
Investigations p)I 38 â⠬â 242 and Remarks on the Foundations of
mathematics, section VI that are concerned with the topic of rules. Much of
the credit for all this excitement, unparalleled since the heyday of
Wittgenstein scholarship in the early IIJ6os, must go to Saul Kripke's
I4rittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. It is easy to explain why. To
begin with, the dialectic Kripke uncovered from Wittgenstein's.
 Paul Horwich (1990). Wittgenstein and Kripke on the Nature of Meaning. Mind and
Language 5 (2):105-121.
 Collins (1992). On the Paradox Kripke Finds in Wittgenstein. Midwest Studies in
Philosophy 18 (1):74-88.
 Kai-Yuan Cheng (forthcoming). A New Look at the Problem of Rule-Following: A
Generic Perspective. Philosophical Studies.
o The purpose of this paper is to look at the problem of rule-following—notably
discussed by Kripke (Wittgenstein on rules and private language, 1982 ) and
Wittgenstein (Philosophical investigations, 1953 )—from the perspective of the
study of generics. Generics are sentences that express generalizations that
tolerate exceptions. I first suggest that meaning ascriptions be viewed as
habitual sentences, which are a sub-set of generics. I then seek a proper
semantic analysis for habitually construed meaning sentences. The
quantificational approach is rejected, due to its persistent difficulties. Instead,
a cognitive approach is adopted, where psychological considerations of
meaning attributors play a crucial role. This account is then compared with the
picture of meaning offered by Kripke and Wittgenstein, respectively. I show
how this fresh way of conceiving of meaning sentences respects some of their
insights while avoiding some of the drawbacks, and serves to improve the
framework in which the current debate and inquiry about rule-following are
conducted.

Página 2 de 3 Joel Tucídides Madrigal Bailón

"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

 Daniel Whiting (2010). Particular and General: Wittgenstein, Linguistic Rules, and
Context. In Daniel Whiting (ed.), The Later Wittgenstein on Language. Palgrave
Macmillan.
o Wittgenstein famously remarks that ‘the meaning of a word is its use’ (PI §43).
Whether or not one views this as gesturing at a ‘theory’ of meaning, or instead
as aiming primarily at dissuading us from certain misconceptions of language
that are a source of puzzlement, it is clear that Wittgenstein held that for
certain purposes the meaning of an expression could profitably be
characterised as its use. Throughout his later writings, however, Wittgenstein’s
appeal to the notion of use pulls in two directions. In several places,
Wittgenstein seems to connect the notion of an expression’s meaning with
that of use in the sense of usage or practice. More specifically, he suggests
that for an expression to possess meaning is for there to be a practice of
employing it according to certain rules. ‘That’, he tells us, ‘is why there exists a
correspondence between the concepts “rule” and “meaning”’ (OC §62; cf. PG
68; PO 51; RFM VI §28; VW 103). Indeed, Wittgenstein goes so far as to say,
‘The rule-governed nature of our languages permeates our life’ (RC §303). Call
the view that the meaning of an expression is determined by a general
principle governing its use, rulism.
 Carl A. Ginet (1992). The Dispositionalist Solutions to Wittgenstein's Problem About
Understanding a Rule: Answering Kripke's Objection. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17
(1):53-73.
 Kripkenstein on Meaning in Philosophy of Language Ludwig Wittgenstein in 20th
Century Philosophy

Página 3 de 3 Joel Tucídides Madrigal Bailón

"La
interpretación
de Kripke sobre
Wittgenstein:
paradoja y
comunidad"
58 WITTGENSTEIN'S VIEWS
discussed his emphasis upon the diversity of meaning, i.e. the
important differences between the various language-games
there are; but I have, I think, laid out his basic ideas about
54
meaning, understanding and rules. I have done this without
entering into exegetical disputes w i t h other expositors of
Wittgenstein, in full knowledge that the interpretation I have
offered w o u l d be resisted by others; and I have refrained from
expressing my o w n views on the claims I have taken
Wittgenstein to be m a k i n g . In the next two chapters these
restraints w i l l be t h r o w n off, first by c o m p a r i n g my interpret-
ation with K r i p k e ' s and then by critically assessing W i t t g e n -
stein's views.
54
See 24, 65, p. 224. Despite this emphasis on the variety of language-games and of
words, I know of no passage in which Wittgenstein explicitly asserts that the notions of
rule, meaning and understanding arc themselves family-resemblance concepts; and it
seems to me not an easy matter to determine what he shouldhave said about this, given
his general views.
Kripke's Interpretation of Wittgenstein:
Paradox and Community
In this chapter I shall contrast K r i p k e ' s interpretation of
Wittgenstein with the interpretation I put forward in Chapter
1; we shall see that these interpretations are very different.
K r i p k e ' s expository procedure differs somewhat from that
adopted in the previous chapter: he does not expound
Wittgenstein by p a y i n g close attention to the text, supporting
each attribution w i t h an apposite citation; rather, he develops a
systematic argument which he hopes will make sense of, and
occasional contact w i t h , Wittgenstein's text. K r i p k e ' s assump-
tion is that this argument is what underlies Wittgenstein's
actual text, and that we shall understand Wittgenstein better if
we see his text as the surfacing of this systematic argument in
different ways and contexts: it is not that Wittgenstein is to be
found explicitly p r o p o u n d i n g this argument, but we can
i l l u m i n a t i n g l y treat his text as if he were. A n d it is this feature
of K r i p k e ' s exposition w h i c h causes h i m to qualify his
attributions to Wittgenstein from time to time - to admit that
his way of presenting Wittgenstein is somewhat alien to
Wittgenstein's o w n conception of his views. We should 1
therefore take seriously K r i p k e ' s prefatory caveat: 'the present
paper should be thought of as e x p o u n d i n g neither " W i t t g e n -
stein's" argument nor " K r i p k e ' s " : rather Wittgenstein's argu-
ment as it struck K r i p k e , as it presented a p r o b l e m for h i m . '
'See K r i p k e , pp. 5, 67-71. These qualifications particularly concern the sceptical
thesis Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein.
60 KRIPKE'S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN
(p. 5) K r i p k e is here d i s a r m i n g l y aware that he is foisting onto
Wittgenstein's text what is not to be found inscribed on its
surface; and this is why he adopts the method of exposition he
does adopt. My o w n procedure has been quite different: I have
assumed that Wittgenstein can be satisfactorily interpreted
without seeing his text as the occasional surfacing of an
underlying systematic argument but rather by paying close
(and perhaps somewhat pedantic) attention to what he actually
says. I w o u l d not therefore think it appropriate to issue the sort
of caveat K r i p k e does. This observation is not intended as a
piece of self-congratulation on my part, but as a recognition of
the procedural difference between K r i p k e and me. In fact I
believe that the more substantive differences stem fundamen-
tally from this difference in respect of exegetical method. F o r
what K r i p k e has done is to produce an impressive and
challenging argument w h i c h bears little affinity with W i t t g e n -
stein's o w n problems and claims: in an important sense K r i p k e
and the real Wittgenstein are not even dealing with the same
issues (they have a different ' p r o b l e m a t i c ' ) . I shall begin by
summarising K r i p k e ' s interpretation, assuming some familiarity
with its outline, and then I shall explain why I think it goes
w r o n g as an interpretation. T h i s task s h o u l d be facilitated by
what has already been argued in C h a p t e r 1; since I believe I
there gave ample textual evidence for my interpretation, it w i l l
be necessary only to spell out the points of disagreement and
give some diagnosis of how K r i p k e came to the w r o n g
interpretation.
The general structure of Wittgenstein's argument, a c c o r d i n g
to K r i p k e , is as follows. Wittgenstein focuses attention upon
the normative n o t i o n of an a p p l i c a t i o n of a sign being
(linguistically) correct, i.e. in accordance w i t h its meaning.
(This is not the n o t i o n offactual correctness, i.e. stating a truth
about the w o r l d ; it concerns the question which word is
linguistically appropriate to the facts. T h u s , for example,
suppose I believe truly that this object is red; the question of
linguistic correctness is then w h i c h w o r d expresses this belief: is
'red' the w o r d I ought to use to state the fact in w h i c h I believe?)
We o r d i n a r i l y think that some uses of words are correct and
some are incorrect, some uses correctly express the fact we
want to state and some do not: Wittgenstein's question is
supposed to be what this distinction consists i n . W h a t makes it
KRIPKE'S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN 61
right to use words in one way rather than another? It is clear
that this normative property of words depends upon their
having a determinate meaning: for the notion of'acorrect use is
well-defined only if words mean one thing rather than another
- that is what makes it right to use one w o r d rather than
another to state a given fact. Therefore we need to make sense
of the idea of a w o r d meaning one thing rather than another if
we are to give content to the n o t i o n of correct (or incorrect) use
of language. To put it differently: any proposed candidate for
the meaning of a w o r d must be such as to sustain linguistic
normativeness; we must be able to read off from any alleged
meaning-constituting property of a w o r d what is the correct
use of that w o r d . The normativeness of meaning thus functions
as a c o n d i t i o n of adequacy upon any account of what meaning
is. N o w K r i p k e ' s c l a i m is that Wittgenstein finds this notion of
2
normativeness deeply problematic, and hence finds the whole
notion o f meaning correspondingly problematic. F o r nothing
can be produced to constitute meaning that meets the
normativeness requirement: there is no property of a w o r d
from w h i c h we can read off its correct use, and so there is
nothing for meaning to be. T h i s is what K r i p k e calls
Wittgenstein's 'sceptical p a r a d o x ' - the thesis that there is
nothing, no fact, that c o u l d constitute meaning one thing
rather than another. But Wittgenstein does not (according to
K r i p k e ) want to leave us helpless in the jaws of this paradox; he
proposes a 'sceptical s o l u t i o n ' to the paradox w h i c h , while
conceding to the sceptic that no fact constitutes meaning,
nevertheless preserves our o r d i n a r y talk of meaning and rules.
The sceptical solution does this by persuading us that we do not
need to supply the k i n d of account of meaning the sceptic
shows to be unavailable; we can take a radically different view
of the significance of statements about meaning, namely that
such statements do not purport to state facts at a l l . Since as-
criptions of meaning and rule-following do not set out to state
facts, it is no disaster for them that we can discover no facts for
them to state; we can provide a quite different account of their
function. T h i s , then, is the general shape of Wittgenstein's
argument, as K r i p k e sees it; let us now fill the argument in a bit.
The sceptical paradox is initially presented by considering'
*Scc K r i p k e , pp. II, 23-4.
 62 KKIPKI-'S INTERPRETATION 01 WITTGENSTEIN
the meaning I attach to signs I used in the past. I n o r m a l l y and
uncritically assume that my present use of (say) accords
with my past meaning, so that when I now give the sum of 67
and 58 in answer to the question ' 6 7 + 5 8 ? I am interpreting *+*
as I d i d in the past: that is, I assume that in the past I meant
addition by *+' and so I conform with my past meaning (I u s e ' +
correctly) if I n o w take questions c o n t a i n i n g '+' to require
d o i n g some a d d i t i o n . K r i p k e ' s sceptic questions whether this
assumption is on reflection legitimate: perhaps in the past I
meant by + \ not a d d i t i o n , but q u a d d i t i o n , a mathematical
k
function whose value is 5 for the pair of arguments 67 and 58.
W h a t is it about my past history that makes me so sure that I
meant addition and not q u a d d i t i o n , and hence so confident
that my present linguistic response conforms w i t h my previous
meaning (the response of giving 125 in answer to '67 + 58?')?
The sceptic's question is, in effect, what justifies my confidence
t h a t ' + ' has a constant meaning for me over time: what is it that
constitutes this presumed constancy? To answer this question
we need to be able to point to some feature of my past usage
that establishes that I then meant a d d i t i o n ; and the semantic
sceptic claims that this cannot be done. (In fact, the sceptical
paradox has two aspects, an epistemological aspect and a
constitutive or metaphysical aspect: epistemologically, the
c l a i m is that nothing can now be cited to justify my
assumption of semantic constancy; constitutively, the c l a i m is
that there is no fact about me which could constitute my meaning
addition rather than quaddition. It is the second aspect which is
the more important in K r i p k e ' s exposition of Wittgenstein; the
epistemological challenge is regarded chiefly as a way into the
constitutive challenge. ) 3
The case for the sceptical paradox proceeds by exhausting
the candidates. First, my actual computations i n v o l v i n g '+ do 1
not suffice to determine that I meant a d d i t i o n , since these are
logically compatible with my having meant some other
function w h i c h agrees with a d d i t i o n for just the numbers on
which I have performed computations w i t h '+' but diverges
' K r i p k e emphasises that his central problem is constitutive on p. 21, though he
does initially state the problem more epistemologically (sec p. 8). His use of (he term
'sceptic' must therefore be understood in a slightly nonstandard way: Kripkc's sceptic-
is not (primarily) interested in questions of certainty, knowledge or justification - his
il
real interest is 'ontological' or 'metaphysical'.
KRIPKE'S I N T E R P R E T A T I O N OF WITTCil NS I I IN 63
thereafter. A c t u a l use of + \ either externally or in my head.
4
underdetennines w h i c h function is denoted; for there arc
indefinitely many functions distinct from addition which are
compatible with the finitely many applications of '+' I have
made. F o r any finite sequence of applications of a sign we can
1
always envisage different ways of c o n t i n u i n g to apply the sign
w h i c h c o n f o r m to different assignments of meaning.|Second,
my past inner states of consciousness cannot determine what I
meant because they admit of various interpretations or
applications: no experience I have can dictate what is the right
way to use a sign, and whatever meaning is it must provide for
such normativeness. N o r are there any 'magical states of
consciousness w h i c h are capable of d o i n g what the mundane
states cannot d o . So there are no facts about consciousness
which can furnish a reply to the sceptic. T h i r d , K r i p k e
considers the suggestion that my past meaning consisted in my
having a certain sort of linguistic disposition: instead of l o o k i n g
to my actual use of '+' in the past, let us turn to how I was
disposed to use '+ and read my past meaning off from that. The
1
appeal of this suggestion is that it offers the hope that the
underdetermination problem w i l l be got round: for we can now
cite the fact that in the past I was disposed to say 125* and not
4
4
5 ' in answer to 67 + 58?\ even though this question never
4
actually came up. Dispositions to use are thus supposed to
m i r r o r the productivTTyljT meaning; their consequences extend
beyond the actual history of a person's use of a sign. K r i p k e ' s
reply to this dispositional suggestion consists in two obser-
vations: in the first place, dispositions to use arc finite, since
h u m a n beings are finite objects existing for a finite time,
whereas addition is a function with infinitely m a i n arithmetical
consequences; in the second place, speakers are disposed to
make mistakes in their use of signs, and so dispositions by
themselves cannot properly account for normativeness. The
dispositional suggestion just equates, K r i p k e says, competence
with performance: but performance by itself cannot capture
the infinity of meaning nor its normativeness. So meaning
a d d i t i o n by '+' cannot consist in being disposed to give the sum
of arbitrary pairs of numbers on demand: some numbers are
simply too b i g , and we may have systematic tendencies to give
something other than the sum because of errors of c a l c u l a t i o n .
K r i p k e claims (on Wittgenstein's behalf) that these three
64 KRIPKF.'S I N T E R P R E T A T I O N O F W I T T G E N S T E I N
replies to the semantic sceptic exhaust the possibilities, and so
we must concede that there is n o t h i n g for my having meant
addition to consist i n . But once we concede this we admit that
the same scepticism applies to my present use of '+*: for the
same sceptical question c o u l d be asked about my present
meaning at some future time, and the same range of possible
answers w i l l be shown to be inadequate then. Indeed, i f we ask
directly what constitutes my presently meaning a d d i t i o n and
not q u a d d i t i o n we shall be faced w i t h the same difficulty:
actual use, present states of consciousness and present
dispositions to use will all fail to fix a unique meaning for my
words. So there is likewise n o t h i n g about my present use of
signs that makes that use right or w r o n g : the whole n o t i o n of
meaning appears to collapse. T h i s , then, is the first, negative
4
phase of Wittgenstein's discussion of meaning, as K r i p k e
interprets h i m .
The second, positive phase consists in an effort to d r a w the
sting from the sceptical paradox while not questioning its
substance. The strategy, as I r e m a r k e d , is to reject the sceptic's
presupposition that ascriptions of meaning are in the business
of stating facts; rather, we are to conceive of their significance
in terms of (a) their assertibility conditions and (b) their role or
utility or point in discourse. The effect of this move is to
undercut the key assumption of the sceptic: we are to see that
all a l o n g he was attacking a straw m a n , though a straw m a n
with w h o m we naturally and naively identify. A c c o r d i n g to
K r i p k e , the change of perspective needed to fend off the sceptic
reflects Wittgenstein's shift f r o m the p h i l o s o p h y of language
espoused in the Tractatus to that put f o r w a r d in the Investi-
gations: the sceptic is presupposing the k i n d of fact-stating
model of meaning advocated in the Tractatus, and the cure for
this scepticism is to adopt the different conception of meaning
we find in the Investigations - with its emphasis upon the role of
criteria and the place of language in our lives. The sceptic seems
to us to be striking at the very n o t i o n of meaning o n l y because
we are powerfully attracted to the conception of language
articulated in the Tractatus: if we can free ourselves from that
conception we shall no longer feel ourselves threatened by the
'It seems that the entire idea of meaning vanishes into thin air' ( K r i p k e , p. 22);
4
understandably, this gives Kripke 'an eerie feeling' (p. 21).
K R I P K H ' S I N T E R P R E T A T I O N O F W ! f T G l NS1 I I N
sceptic's arguments; but it is hard to tree ourselves from it, so
the threat feels real. 5
A l t h o u g h K r i p k e does not himself say so, there are, I think,
other areas of p h i l o s o p h y in w h i c h much the same strategy has
been tried, and it will be useful to have these in m i n d when v c
enquire whether Wittgenstein really proceeds as K r i p k e
suggests. Three parallels may be mentioned. First, certain sons
of n o n c o g n i t i v i s m in ethics can be viewed in an analogous way:
the noncognitivist cannot find facts suitable for correspondence
with ethical statements, and so he suggests that ethical
utterances be conceived in a non-fact-stating way instead - as
prescriptions to action or expressions of e m o t i o n , say. This
type of view might be motivated by the incapacity of non-queer
facts to add up to what we intuitively demand of ethical truth
or by a c o n v i c t i o n that what w o u l d add up to that is in some
way metaphysically rebarbative. Instead of abandoning 6
ethical utterances as meaningless in the absence of ethical facts
the noncognitivist reinterprets their purport - he proposes a
different conception of meaning for such sentences. Thus
emotivism (say) can be seen as a sceptical solution to a sceptical
paradox - the paradox, namely, that there is nothing in the
w o r l d that c o u l d constitute the value-fact we naively take
ethical assertions to require; and the sceptical solution is that
these 'assertions serve rather to express the emotions of the
1
speaker or some such t h i n g . Second, there is the doctrine of
7
instrumentalism w i t h respect to the theoretical sentences of
science: the instrumentalist cannot (he thinks) find any genuine
facts to correspond to such sentences, but he preserves their
* Kripke exploits this alleged contrast with the Tractatus to impose a structure or, the
Investigations according to which the early sections (1-137) are concerned to
undermine the Tractatus truth-conditional conception of language, as a picliminary to
solving the sceptical problem (see K r i p k e , pp. 78-0). Plainly, this architectonic
suggestion can be correct only if Kripke is right to interpret Wittgenstein as solving a
sceptical problem by means of a sceptical solution based upon assertibility conditions;
and I do not think he is right so to interpret Wittgenstein.
M am thinking here of J . L . Mackie's view that objective values would be
metaphysically 'queer': sec his Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Penguin Books.
1977), chapter I.
7
This type of view saves meaningful ethical utterances in the absence of ethical tacts
(truth) by rcconstruing such utterances as (logically) non-asscrtoric: an ethical
sentence is meaningful while lacking genuine truth conditions because :t is rcail)
imperatival or exclamatory or hortatory or some such. A n d clearly a sentence can be
meaningful in these ways without purporting to slate a fact.

66 KRIPKE'S IN fERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN
role in discourse by interpreting them in a different way - as
useful devices for organising the real facts. Instead of reacting
to the lack of suitable facts by declaring talk of unobservables
v o i d of significance, he gives up the fact-stating model and opts
for a different account of meaning - in terms, perhaps, of
assertibility conditions and organisational utility. T h i r d ,
certain views of mathematical statements display this dialectical
form: seeking facts to correspond to mathematical sentences
we find ourselves discouraged either by the incapacity of
mundane facts to do the j o b or by the seeming necessity to
postulate 'queer' facts (platonism); so we abandon the fact-
stating referential model altogether and put in its place a
different account 01 meaning - e.g., that mathematical
sentences get their significance from their empirical a p p l i -
cations. This again w o u l d be aptly characterised as a sceptical
solution to a sceptical paradox: one agrees with the sceptic that
no mathematical facts can be found, but one averts his radical
conclusion (mathematics is meaningless) by proposing an
alternative account of meaning that makes the sceptical
paradox irrelevant. I think that these three issues exemplify
8
the general pattern of argument K r i p k e attributes to Wittgen-
stein; we can see K r i p k e ' s dialectic as adding yet another k i n d
of ' n o n c o g n i t i v i s m ' to the list of more familiar doctrines of
which I have given three examples.
So far I have only explained the sense in which K r i p k e ' s
positive view of semantic statements is a sceptical s o l u t i o n ; I
have not said what form that positive view takes. The central
idea, attributed to Wittgenstein, is that the assertibility
conditions and point of ascriptions of meaning essentially
involve the notion of a community. Thus to say that someone
means addition by +' is warranted just if (a) he agrees in his
l
responses with with the responses of some c o m m u n i t y who
use and (b) he can be trusted in his interactions with
members of a c o m m u n i t y in situations i n v o l v i n g H - \ That is to
say, the n o t i o n of a rule is an essentially social one, i n v o l v i n g
"One might see Paul Benacerraf, in 'Mathematical T r u t h ' , Journal of Philosophy
L X X (1973), as posing a kind of sceptical problem, viz. how can mathematical
propositions be true and known; and Hartry Field, in Science Without Numbers
(Blackwcll: O x f o r d , 1980), as offering a kind of sceptical solution, viz. mathematical
sentences need not be regarded as possessing genuine truth conditions and so do not
call for 'queer' facts to correspond to them.
KRIPKE'S INTERPR1 I ATION 01 WP rOFNRTWN
inter-personal relations; so \vc cannot give an a c c o u n t ol ttlk
f o l l o w i n g in individualistic terms.* We cannot, K r i p k e says,
make sense of someone f o l l o w i n g a rule 'considered in
i s o l a t i o n . K r i p k e compares this result with H u m e ' s positive
1
account of causation: the relation of causation between a p a i r
of events cannot be explicated solely by reference to those
events, as we naively suppose; rather, when we speak of causal
relations we are (tacitly) subsuming the pair of events in
question under a generalisation i n v o l v i n g other events. Thus
the assertibility conditions of "c c a u s e d / ' are inherently 'social':
events can stand in causal relations only in virtue of their
membership in a 'community of events. K r i p k e puts this by
1
saying that there cannot, on H u m e ' s view, be 'private
causation'; as there cannot be 'private', i.e. individualistic,
rule-following, according to Wittgenstein. In s u m , then, the
'sceptical s o l u t i o n ' consists in two moves: first the replacement
of truth conditions (correspondence to facts) by assertibility
conditions, and second the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the c o m m u n i t y into
the notion of rule-following. These two moves are, of course,
logically independent, but K r i p k e ' s c l a i m is that both are
necessary if the sceptical paradox is to be answered. 50
What I have just given is a swift summary of a rich and
detailed course of argument, intended to remind the reader of
the salient points of K r i p k e ' s interpretation rather than
substitute for.it. Let us now ask whether this interpretation
accords with what Wittgenstein says, beginning w i t h the
question whether Wittgenstein really advocates a sceptical
paradox about meaning and rules. The central passages to
consider here are 198 and 201 in w h i c h K r i p k e takes W i t t -
genstein to be stating his sceptical thesis that there are no facts
for meaning to consist i n . K r i p k e quotes the beginning of 201:
This was our paradox: no course of action could be
determined by a rule, because every course of action can be
g
I am using 'individualistic roughly in the sense Tyler Burge does in 'Individualism
1
and the Mental', Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. IV, ed. P . A . French, T . E . Uehling
and H . K . Wettstein (University of Minnesota Press, 1979): that is, a property of a
person is individualistic just if the instantiation of that property can be explained
without reference to the condition of any other person; a property is social just if this is
not so.
10
It is especially important to see that the introduction of the community pertains t<;
assertibility conditions and not truth conditions; for essentially the same difficulties
A'ould afflict the attempt to find a social fact for meaning to consist in
 68 KRIPKE'S I N T E R P R E T A T I O N O F W I T T G E N S T E I N
made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything
can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be
made out to conflict with it. A n d so there would be neither
accord nor conflict here. (201)
But he signally fails to quote, or even to heed, what
immediately follows this:
It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the
mere fact that in the course of our argument we give one
interpretation after another; as if each one contented us at least
for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind
it. What this shews is that there is a way of grasping a rule which
is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call
"obeying the rule" and "going against i t " in actual cases.
Hence there is an inclination to say: every action according to
the rule is an interpretation. But we ought to restrict the term
"interpretation" to the substitution of one expression of the
rule for another. (201)
There are two things to notice about this passage w h i c h give the
lie to K r i p k e ' s interpretation. F i r s t , Wittgenstein makes it
11
clear immediately that the stated paradox arises from a
'misunderstanding', i.e. a false presupposition; so he cannot
really be endorsing the paradox, as H u m e embraces his o w n
sceptical claims about causation. Second, when we ask what
the misunderstanding is we are t o l d that it is the mistake of
assuming that grasping a rule is placing an interpretation u p o n
a sign, i.e. associating it w i t h another sign - an assumption
which Wittgenstein thinks we are by no means c o m p e l l e d to
make. In other words, Wittgenstein is putting f o r w a r d the
paradox as a reductio ad absurdum of the interpretational
conception; it is the inevitable result of that particular
misunderstanding about the nature of grasp of a rule.
Wittgenstein no more endorses the stated paradox than does
any philosopher who gives a reductio of his opponent's
p o s i t i o n . Wittgenstein does not say that the paradox arises
from the misunderstanding that ascriptions of rules state facts
11
It is significant that in other passages in which the interpretational conception is
rejected, e.g. BR pp. 33—35, there is no mention of a paradox into which we arc in
imminent danger of falling; Wittgenstein's point in these passages isjust that we should
not think of meaning and understanding in terms of inner interpretations (i.e. symbols)
- he is not saying that this is the only way we can think if we cleave to a Tactual 1
conception of these concepts.
KRIPKE'S INTERPRETATION OF W H T G E N S T E I N 69
or have truth c o n d i t i o n s , nor does he suggest that the
u n d e r l y i n g mistake is to consider the rule-follower in social
i s o l a t i o n ; what he is objecting to is the specific conception of
understanding as a mental operation of translation. If K r i p k e
were right, Wittgenstein ought to be f o u n d saying, after his
statement of the paradox: ' W h a t this shows is that grasping a
rule is not a fact about an i n d i v i d u a l considered in social
i s o l a t i o n ; but this is nothing like what he actually does say. If
1
there is one key oversight in K r i p k e ' s exposition of W i t t g e n -
stein, it is that of i g n o r i n g what Wittgenstein says in 201
straight after stating the paradox: for Wittgenstein here gives
his most explicit diagnosis of the paradox and what he says is
remote from K r i p k e ' s a t t r i b u t i o n . T h i s is also made very clear
in 198: the lesson of the paradox is said to be that interpretations
do not determine meaning; it is not that meaning does not
consist in individualistic facts. W h a t Wittgenstein is saying is
that certain sorts of facts fail to determine meaning, viz.
substituting one sign for another, not that no facts d o . 1 2
K r i p k e ' s misinterpretation comes out clearly in his remarks
about Wittgenstein's treatment of 'reading'. R e a d i n g is a k i n d
of r u l e - f o l l o w i n g , and so K r i p k e takes Wittgenstein to be
p r o p o u n d i n g his paradox for reading - reading is not an
individualistic fact but is to be understood in terms of social
assertibility c o n d i t i o n s . But when we consult the text we find
13
that what Wittgenstein is opposing is a particular family of
views about the sort of fact reading is - that it consists in an
inner process: conscious, queer, or physical - and advising us
to l o o k to what the reader does:
But in the case of the living reading-machine "reading"
meant reacting to written signs in such-and-such ways. This
concept was therefore quite independent of that of a mental or
other mechanism.—Nor can the teacher here say of the pupil:
"Perhaps he was already reading when he said that word". For
there is no doubt about what he did.—The change when the
pupil began to read was a change in his behaviour; and it makes
no sense here to speak of a first word in his new state'. (157)
l
12
M o r e specifically, Wittgenstein is asking what it is about a person that determines
his future use of a sign, and hts answer is that this is a matter of the technique of use of
which he is master, not of what comes before his mind. If you like: the fact that gives
signs life is a fact about use, not a fact about inner states.
11
See K r i p k e , pp. 45~4 ).
l
70 KRIPKE'S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN
There is no suggestion in these sections that we are under threat
of the paradox that reading never occurs, that there is nothing
for reading to consist i n ; rather, we are t o l d to redirect our
attention from supposed inner processes to the outer criteria
we use f o r j u d g i n g someone to be a reader. In fact these sections
do not contain a statement of the paradox at a l l , yet
Wittgenstein is considering a case of rule-following; so it can
hardly be maintained that the paradox is Wittgenstein's central
and recurrent theme. I think the paradox is best seen as just
14
one battle in a general campaign against the inner process
model, not as the primary focus of Wittgenstein's whole
discussion. K r i p k e says that the paradox is really the main
p r o b l e m of the Investigations, but its infrequent appearance
belies this suggestion; and when it does appear it figures as one
more nail in the coffin of the inner process m o d e l , to be
hammered in along with a number of other nails.
So the passages upon which K r i p k e bases his interpretation
fail to support it and suggest instead a quite different view of
Wittgenstein's intentions; but can K r i p k e ' s interpretation find
sustenance in more general considerations? This question has
two parts, corresponding to the constitutive and epistemological
versions of semantic scepticism. That Wittgenstein is advo-
cating a constitutive scepticism certainly seems hard to square
with the fact that he does offer an account of the sort of thing
understanding is: it is mastery of a technique, possession of a
capacity, participation in a custom. A n d it is notable that
K r i p k e nowhere registers Wittgenstein's concern to connect
understanding with the concept of ability, as an alternative to
the conception of understanding as a c o n d i t i o n of conscious-
ness. N o r does Wittgenstein show any tendency to contest the
/actuality of ascriptions of ability; he merely protests against
what he takes to be misunderstandings about the sort of thing
14
Kripke says: 'The sceptical paradox is the fundamental problem of Philosophical
Investigations (p. 78). It might clarify Wittgenstein's attitude to this paradox to
contrast it with Russell's attitude towards his class paradox. Wittgenstein sees his
paradox as a problem for anyone who assumes that meaning is a matter of
interpretation, but he thinks that this assumption is not at all compulsory or
unavoidable; whereas Russell's paradox arises from assumptions that seem inescapable
- there is no straightforward mistake in the premisses that generate the contradiction.
In a word, Wittgenstein's paradox is not a problem for Wittgenstein, as Russell's
paradox is a problem for Russell.
KRIPKE'S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENST1EIN 71
an ability is (e.g. a configuration of one's 'mental apparatus'). 15
It w o u l d be more accurate I think to say that Wittgenstein
locates understanding in one k i n d of fact rather than another
k i n d ; but if we want to capture the true spirit of Wittgenstein's
discussion we do better still to d r o p all play with the notion of
fact and simply say that Wittgenstein is offering a description
of the ' g r a m m a r ' of the n o t i o n of understanding in terms of the
notions of ability, technique, etc. I do not believe that
Wittgenstein is t h i n k i n g in terms of facts and non-facts at all
here; certainly there is no hard textual evidence to support this
sort of interpretation. A n y resistance on Wittgenstein's part to
saying that understanding consists in, or is constituted by, a
capacity stems from a general distrust of the enterprise of
p h i l o s o p h i c a l analysis, not from a conviction that under-
standing is somehow not a fact. Indeed, I think Wittgenstein
16
w o u l d have regarded such an assertion, and such a debate, as
quite empty, since there is no substantial philosophical mileage
to be got out of the notions of fact, truth conditions and
correspondence to conditions-in-the-world. K r i p k e himself
shows some awareness of this k i n d of point, but he boldly
brushes it aside in the expectation that he is c o n f o r m i n g to the
real spirit of Wittgenstein's position; but I think he should take
more seriously Wittgenstein's deflationary remarks about
truth and facts. At any rate, if we want to talk in terms of facts
17
it seems that Wittgenstein does suggest that understanding
consists in a fact, the fact of having an ability to use signs.
1 5
In particular, IUipp. 113-17, which deals at some length with the notion of ability,
does not suggest that sentences containing 'can' and its cognates do not correspond to
'conditions-in-the-world'; the point there is rather that we should not construe abilities
as special sorts of inner processor state which lie 'behind' what counts as the exercise of
the ability.
1 6
Remember that the form of Wittgenstein's account is to be the perspicuous
connecting of concepts (see 122): he says that the 'grammar' o f ' c a n ' and 'is able to' i<
'closely related' to that of 'understands' (150), not that we can actually analyse the
latter in terms of the former. In fact, I think that the failure to provide necessars and
sufficient conditions for the application of a concept would, for Wittgenstein, have no
significance whatever for the question whether that concept could be interpreted in a
'fact-stating' way.
17
K ipke notes that Wittgenstein subscribes to a redundancy theory of truth (so-
called) in 136 (Kripke. p. 86), but he docs not, I think, draw the right lesson from this:
given that 'true' adds nothing to the content of an assertion, it cannot be that
Wittgenstein really wishes to deny that semantic sentences have truth conditions - on
pain of denying that they express propositions. Similarly f o r 'it is a fact that'or 'states a
fact'.
72 K R I P K E ' S I N T E R P R E T A T I O N 01 W l I led N S I I IN
It w o u l d also be w r o n g to interpret Wittgenstein as an
epistemoiogical sceptic. As I emphasised in Chapter 1,
Wittgenstein's denial that our use of words is founded on
reasons is not intended sceptically: the traditional sceptic
makes an inappropriate and impossible demand on our
epistemic concepts, and the right response to h i m is to question
the need for what he says there isn't. To lack reasons is not to be
in a predicament to w h i c h doubt is the proper response; for
doubt can be removed (better pre-empted) by our natural and
habitual reactions. T h i s epistemoiogical position w o u l d
18
prompt Wittgenstein to dismiss K r i p k e ' s sceptic with the
remark that of course o u r reasons come to an end but this does
not mean we are in any sort of epistemoiogical trouble: that I
cannot prove to a determined sceptic that my present use of +' 4
is correct does not show that I do not k n o w h o w to a p p l y it
correctly or that I have anything less than a perfect right to
proceed as I feel i n c l i n e d . The author of On Certainty w o u l d
surely not p r o p o u n d the k i n d of sceptical argument K r i p k e
develops, resting as it does u p o n a conception of knowledge
and epistemic right that he steadfastly resists. Wittgenstein's
epistemology w o u l d stop K r i p k e ' s sceptic before he got going;
so we cannot interpret Wittgenstein as conceding victory to
K r i p k e ' s epistemoiogical sceptic and then offering what is at
best a salvage operation.
A crucial part of K r i p k e ' s constitutive paradox is his
rejection of a dispositional conception of understanding; so we
should expect, if K r i p k e has Wittgenstein right, that the same
sort of argument be found in Wittgenstein, in view of its
importance to the success of the sceptical thesis. W h a t we f i n d ,
however, when we scour Wittgenstein's text is a total lack of
anything remotely resembling the sorts of considerations
about dispositions advanced by K r i p k e . A l l K r i p k e can say to
explain this disparity is that Wittgenstein is assuming the
dispositional reply to the sceptic to be unattractive to the
audience of his book at the time of writing - whereas the
conscious state reply is taken to be the natural response to the
" C / . "'Hut, il you arc certain, isn't it thai von an: shutting your eyes in lace ol
doubt'" - They are shut' (p. 2?4). He is saying that the question of doubt, in certain
standard sorts of case, simply does not arise Cor us; so the sceptic can make no impact
on oil! customary confidence by in vent n ig ;i doubt (we should k e e p < >ur eyes firmly
shut).
KRIPE'S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN 73
sceptic for that audience. It is the change in the p h i l o s o p h i c a l
climate that explains the apparent difference between whai
Wittgenstein says and what K r i p k e argues. I find this
19
explanation u n c o n v i n c i n g - for three reasons. F i r s t , it seems to
me inconceivable that Wittgenstein w o u l d w h o l l y neglect to
consider what is probably the most natural reaction lo the
constitutive sceptic; surely the d e m o l i t i o n of this idea is
essential if the paradox is to be carried through. A n d the form
of K r i p k e ' s d e m o l i t i o n - the arguments f r o m finiteness and
mistakes - finds no echo in Wittgenstein's text: in particular, at
the places where Wittgenstein states his paradox one w o u l d
expect h i m to indicate that the paradox shows {inter alia) that
understanding is not a disposition and is not to be explicated in
terms of counterfactuals about use, instead of saying (as he
does) that the paradox refutes the interpretational conception.
N o w h e r e does Wittgenstein say, in parallel with his c l a i m that
interpretations do not determine meaning, that 'dispositions
fail to determine m e a n i n g ' and that 'what this shows is that
there is a way of grasping a rule w h i c h is not a d i s p o s i t i o n ' . We
just do not find the kinds of remark about dispositions which
K r i p k e ' s interpretation leads us to expect.
Second, and more probatively, in those rare places in which
the n o t i o n of disposition is i n v o k e d Wittgenstein is clearly
m a k i n g a quite different point from K r i p k e . T h u s consider 149,
the o n l y passage in the relevant sections of the Investigations in
w h i c h the n o t i o n of disposition is explicitly i n v o k e d :
If one says that k n o w i n g the A B C is a state of the mind, one is
t h i n k i n g of a state of a mental apparatus (perhaps of the brain)
by means of w h i c h we explain the manifestations of that
knowledge. Such a state is called a d i s p o s i t i o n . But there are
objections to speaking of a state of the m i n d here, i n a s m u c h as
there ought to be two different criteria l o r such a state: a
knowledge of the c o n s t r u c t i o n of the apparatus, quite apart
'"Sec K r i p k e , p. 43, In tact, this explanation of the disparity docs not tit the
historical tacts very well, since behaviourism was enjoying a considerable vogue at the
time Wittgenstein was writing what became the Investigations, and d i positional
1
accounts ol psychological concepts were widely advocated R u s s e l l , in particular, was
strongly inttuenceil by behaviourism, as Kripke hunsetl notes (Rtipke, p. 1» >ee
Russell's My Philosophical Development (George Allen and Unwin: L o n d o n , 1959),
esp. chapters 11-13. In view of the prevalence of such, doctrines at the time of his
writing, imr might have thought Wittgenstein would take thru refutation ,i> .i fiivt
priority, il Kripke's interpretation were on the tight lines.
74 KRIPKE’S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN
from what it does. (Nothing would be more confusing here than to use
the w ords "conscious " and "u ncons cious " for the contrast
between states of consciousness and dispositions. For t h i s p a i r o f
t e r m s c o v e r s u p a g r a m m a t i c a l d i f f e r e n c e . ) (149)
Here Wittgenstein's objection seems to be that talk of
dispositions is likely to be accompanied by the idea that
knowledge is a state of mind; and he thinks that this way of
conceiving of knowledge leads to the mistaken idea that there
are two independent ways of telling whether someone (e.g.)
knows the ABC - by examining his mental apparatus or by
seeing what he does. Wittgenstein's purpose is, as usual, to
discourage the inner state model of concepts such as knowledge,
and he is warning us that talk of dispositions is apt to go along
with this model; instead we should attend to what the person
does. If Kripke's interpretation were correct Wittgenstein
would have to be saying that what a person it disposed to do
does not fix what he knows when he knows the ABC, but this is
not what Wittgenstein says and indeed he seems to be
suggesting just the contrary. 20
Third, Wittgenstein makes remarks that actually support the
kind of dispositional suggestion Kripke pits himself against:
that is, Wittgenstein can be found explaining, meaning in terms
of counterfactuals about use, thus consider t h i s passage:
What is essential is to see that the same thing can come before
our minds when we hear the word and the application still be
different. Has it the same meaning both times? I think we shall
say not. (140)
That is, if two speakers differ in their application of a sign then
we should say that they mean something different, despite the
identity of their conscious states: use determines meaning, not
what transpires within. This thought of Wittgenstein's hardly
fits with Kripke's claim that differences of dispositions to use
do not suffice to establish differences of meaning, on account of
2 0 t h at i s , Wittgenstein is objecting to the notion of disposition if this notion is
understood independently of behavior, i.e. as an internal state that is explanatory of
behavior; but Kripke’s objections to the dispositional suggestion construe dispositions
precisely in terms of counterfactuals about behavior: so Wittgenstein and Kripke mean quite
different things by “disposition” and hence are making quite different objections to the
invocation of this notion. )This explain why Wittgenstein objects to talk of dispositions, but
commends the use of counterfactuals to elucidate meaning and knowledge.)
KRIPKE’S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN 75
the possibility of systematic mistake Wittgenstein remark from
140 shows no sign of acknowledgment of this kind of point,
which would be amazing if he were really arguing in the way
Kripke suggests. What Wittgenstein is doing here is drawing
contrast between application and what presents i t s e l f to the
mind holding that identity of meaning between people depends
upon identity in respect of the former not t h e latter; but
Kripke's interpretation would have Wittgenstein insisting
upon the parity of the two sorts of circumstance, not upon the
contrast between them. On Kripke's view, both conscious
states and application fail to fix meaning, and so equally make
no progress against the sceptic; but Wittgenstein himself
evidently believes that there is an important difference between
these with respect to the determination of meaning. (This is not
to say that Wittgenstein has some answer to Kripke's point
about mistakes; it is just that Wittgenstein shows himself to be
unconcerned about such issues in the passage quoted - so it
cannot be that he has on his mind what Kripke has on his.) A
second passage of so me significance for the present issue is this:
"But I already knew at the time when I gave the order, that he
ought write 1002 after 1000 — Certainly; and you can also say
you meant it then; only yon should not let yourself be mislead by
the grammar of the words "know" and "mean". For you don't
want to say that you thought of the step from 1000 to 1002 at
that time — and even if you did think of this step, st il l you did
not think of other ones. When you said "1 already knew at the
time . . ." that meant something like: "If I had then been asked
what number should he written after 1000. I should have replied
1002." And that I don't doubt. This assumption is rather of
the same kind as: "If he had fallen into the water then, 1 should
have jumped in after him". — Now, what was wrong with your
idea? (187)
What is notable about t h i s passage is Wittgenstein’s willingness
to employ a counterfactual about what someone would have
said in explanation of that person's having meant
something. Applied to Kripke's favorite example.
Wittgenstein’s suggestion would run as follows: for me to
have meant by '+' that '125' is the right answer to '67+58?'
(assuming that this is a computation I had not come across or
thought about) is for it to be true of me that had I been faced
with that question in the past I would have given that answer.
Wittgenstein is comparing the case of meaning (or knowing)
76 KRIPKE’S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN
paring the case of meaning (or knowing) with the case of trait
of character such as bravery: to say I was brave yesterday is to
assume that there are true counterfactuals such as ' I f he had
fallen into the water, I would have jumped in'; it is not to
assume that I had somehow mentally rehearsed the brave
action of saving a potential drowner. Similarly, to mean
something at a given time is not to have it before one's mind at
that time, so that every step of the series '+2' has already
occurred to one; it is rather to be disposed to give the right
answer, i.e. for the kinds of behavioural counterfactuals
Wittgenstein cites to be true of one.21 It is surely incredible that
Wittgenstein could have written t h i s if his atitude to
counterfactuals concerning use were as Kripke suggests; for
Wittgenstein is in effect saying in 187 exactly what Kripke
supposes him to reject. It is true that Wittgenstein does not
claim that the counterfactuals provide a reductive analysis of
the notion of meaning something - he says only that the latter
'means something like' the former – but this is to be seen as a
reflection of his suspicion of the whole idea of conceptual
analysis; it is not prompted by an unstated recognition of the
kinds of argument Kripke gives against explicating meaning in
terms of counterfactuals. What Wittgenstein is suggesting is
that we can capture enough of the grammar of the notion of
meaning by invoking counterfactuals to point us in the right
philosophical direction (or away from the wrong direction); he
cannot therefore be taken to be conducting a sceptical
campaign in which the employment of counterfactuals is a
defensive manoeuvre to be blocked and repulsed. What
Wittgenstein ought to be saying, on Kripke's interpretation, is
that ascriptions of meaning are not tantamount to (mean
nothing l i k e ) the assertion of counterfactuals about use; but this is
the exact opposite of what he does say in 187. In this passage, as in
140, Wittgenstein is contrasting what happens in one's
21
This, then, is Wittgenstein’s answer to the question that ends 187, and
to the puzzle originally raised in 138: when one suddenly comes to
understand a word, or hears it whit understanding, or knows the
meaning of a word, what is true of one is that certain counterfactuals
hold, which correspond to the possession of an ability; it is not that one
performs a remarkable mental act in which the whole of the future and
possible use comes before one’s mind as a condensed series of thoughts
or images or some such (see 188). A man’s entire life may flash before
his mind when he believes he is about to die but his temporally
extended use of a word does not similarly flash before his mind when
he means it in certain way.
KRIPKE’S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN 77
mind when something is meant with what is, true of one's
behaviour, including counterfactuals about one's behaviour;
he is not treating both as sharing as incapacity to supply the
sort of fact Kripke's sceptic is demanding.
For these reasons, then, I doubt that Kripke is right to
interpret Wittgenstein as advocating a sceptical paradox
designed to show that there is no 'fact of the matter' about what
we mean. So nothing in Wittgenstein's discussion suggests the
sort of negative first stage characteristic of the analogous
doctrines I mentioned earlier; we are not being prepared for the
kind of sceptical solution proffered by the likes of emotivism
and instrumentalism. There is not a distinguishing of truth
conditions and assertibility conditions accounts of meaning
and then a purported demonstration that semantic statements
have no determinate truth conditions; rather, there is an
opposition between two different conceptions of the sort of
thing meaning is - roughly speaking, conceptions which locate
meaning in the inner and in the outer. (22) And if this is the
correct interpretation, we will not be able to construe
Wittgenstein as proposing anything that deserves to be
called a 'sceptical solution': his positive view simply has the
status of a correct account of the concepts at issue, though it is
an account which for various reasons it is hard to see ourselves
clear to accepting as adequate and complete. Nevertheless,
we can still ask whether Kripke is right to ascribe to
Wittgenstein a community conception of rule-following,
independently of whether this is intended as a sceptical
solution to a sceptical paradox. 1 shall maintain that this
ascription is also mistaken.
The community enters, according to Kripke, by way of the
normativeness of meaning and of rules generally: when we say
that someone is using a word wrongly we mean that his use of
that word disagrees with the use made of it by members of a
linguistic community; and right use is agreement of use. If we
22 As I observed in chapter one, Wittgenstein’s treatment of the concept of meaning takes its place
along whit a like treatment of a wide range of other psychological concepts and his general aim is to
resist driving these psychological phenomena inward. If Kripke were right about Wittgenstein’s
treatment of meaning, then he would have to take a parallel line about the whole range of
psychological concepts treated by Wittgenstein: he would have to say that Wittgenstein is advocating
skeptical paradox about believing, recognizing, remembering, comparing, wiling, etc. , and proposing a
community – based skeptical solution. Or he did not, he would have to explain why Wittgenstein
himself treat all this concepts in a similar way.
78 KRIPKE’S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN
consider the individual in isolation all we can say is that it
seems to hi m that he is using words correctly; but if we broaden
our gaze to take in his community we can make sense of the
indispensable idea that this seeming may be delusive, that he is
not really using words correctly at all. Thus the correct
assertibility condition for "he means addition by '+'" is that
his responses with “+” agree with mine or those of his
community, and these latter persons are primitively entitled to
take themselves to mean addition by '+'. On this interpretation,
Wittgenstein builds the notion of community right into the
notion of rule, in such a way that rule-following cannot be
individualistically conceived - to say someone is following a
rule is necessarily to advert to other rule-followers. Thus the
notion of rule-following turns out to be a social notion in
somewhat the way the notions of a conformist or a club
member or a fashionable dresser are social notions: none of
these properties can be possessed by individuals 'considered in
isolation'. Now is there any textual support for this
interpretation of Wittgenstein?23
Let us re-examine 198-202 in which Wittgenstein is putting
forward his positive view and opposing it to the view he rejects.
The most glaring feature of these sections in the present
connection is that the words 'custom', 'practice' and 'use' are
never qualified with 'social' or 'community' - and 'social
custom/practice' is not pleonastic. Surely Wittgenstein would
have inserted these qualifying adjectives if he really meant to
maintain a social conception of rule-following, especially in
view of the fact that the introduction of the community is taken
to be a surprising result of signal importance - as sharply
conflicting with what we antecedently expect. And if we look
for a gloss on the use of 'custom' etc. we find, as 1 stressed in
Chapter 1, the insistence that rules must be followed on more
than one occasion - i.e. the existence of rules depends upon
'regular use'. Wittgenstein does use 'custom' and 'practice' to
suggest the idea of a multiplicity, but it is a multiplicity of
instances of rule following not of persons who follow the rules.
23 Kripke is, of course, not first to propose a broadly community interpretation of
Wittgenstein’s discussion of following a rule; an early exponent of this interpretation is
Peter Winch, in The Idea Of Social Science (Routledge and Kegan Paul: London, 1958),
esp. pp. 24-39. And this general interpretation has been endorsed by a great many,
perhaps the majority, of commentators since then.
KRIPKE’S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN
79
And this is part and parcel of Wittgenstein's general thesis that
meaning is use: a sign has meaning only in virtue of bemg
(repeatedly) used in a certain way. This thesis does not in itself
carry any suggestion that meaning is inconceivable in social
isolation. But is there anything else in these sections which
might be supposed to encourage the community interpretation?
Two points may be mentioned here.
The first concerns the use of 'privately' in 202. Kripke takes
this word to be intended to contrast with 'social', so that it has
roughly the sense 'private' has in 'private property', i.e. relating
to a single individual; I suggested in Chapter 1 that it contrasts
rather with 'public' or 'overt', i.e. relates to what transpires
covertly within consciousness. On Kripke's understanding of
the intended notion of privacy a person’s overt behavior say in
following a sign-post, is to be considered 'private', at least if it
is described individualistically; and so we could quite properly
claim that all non-rule-governed behaviour (e.g. pain behaviour)
can and does take place 'privately', since its description
does not require reference to other people. It is thus possible to
wave your arm 'privately' but not possible to follow the
addition rule 'privately', according to Kripke's construal of
'privately' in 202. What is public can be 'private' in this sense
knowability by others is therefore not sufficient for non-
privacy. We can even say that (non-relational) properties of
material objects,, e.g. being cubical or weighing a stone, are
possessed 'privately' in Kripke's sense, since their ascription
does not make essential reference to other objects and their
condition. Now it seems to me that this would be a very odd
way for Wittgenstein to intend his use of 'privately' in 202: in
general he opposes 'private' to 'public' or 'oven', as in “private
sensations)” (24) Kripke takes Wittgenstein to be saying in
202 that if rule-following were private in the sense that it
involved
24 Wittgenstein does not, perhaps, use “private” and “privately” in an entirely uniform way; but its
central meaning for him is, I think, twofold: he uses It to suggest a condition of consciousness, and he
uses It to suggest unknowability by another ( see 251, 272, 294). When states of consciousness are
conceived in an erroneous way their (admitted) “privacy” becomes a kind of unknowability, instead od
a harmless truth about them ( The preposition << Sensations are private>> is comparable to <<one
place patience by oneself>> (248), i.e. this is a “grammatical remark”). I think both of these
connotations are present in Wittgenstein’s use of “privately” in 202. I do not know of any passage in
which Wittgenstein clearly uses “private” in the sense Kripke gives to it in 202, i.e. as meaning
“making no reference to other people”.

80
just the individual rule-follower. then rules could not be
nonnative - correct rule-following would collapse into
apparently correct rule-following; whereas I take the claim of
202 to be that if rule-following were private in the sense of being
a condition or process of consciousness, then self-ascriptions of
rule-following would be infallible. Aside from the overall
plausibility of the interpretation I prefer, I think that my
interpretation makes better sense of Wittgenstein's use of
'privately' in 202 - it conforms better with Wittgenstein's
general use of the notion of privacy. At the very least it should
be agreed that the use of 'privately' in 202 cannot be cited to
establish the correctness of the community interpretation.
The second point concerns Wittgenstein's mention of 'one
man' in 199:
Is what we call “obeying a rule” something that it would be
possible for only one man to do, and to do only once in his
life?—This:, of course a note on the grammar of the expression
"to obey a rule". (199)
Wittgenstein's reply to this question is: “ ít is not possible that
there should have been only one occasion on which someone
obeyed a rule.” What is prima facie puzzling here is why
Wittgenstein should raise the question whether it is possible for
one man to follow a rule and answer it by saying that it is not
possible for there to be a single occasion of rule-following.25 His
reply, let it be noted, is not that it is not possible for one man to
obey a rule: Why then does he appear to ask a question to which
lie gives no answer (or half an answer)? Since Wittgenstein does
not answer his question by saying rule-following requires more
than one man, 199 cannot be cited as evidence that
Wittgenstein endorses a community conception of rules;
but the passage certainly seems to raise the issue of whether
rule-following is individual or .social. What is going on here?
The
25
The question is also raised in RFM p. 349: “Could there be only
one human been than calculated? Could there be only one that followed
a rule? This is not, however, answered negatively. Elsewhere we read:
“But what about this consensus — doesn’t It mean that one human been
by himself could not calculate? Well, one human been could at any rate
not calculate just one in his life” (RFM p. 193). These remarks seems
best explained as I explain the passage from the Investigations cited in
the text: Wittgenstein’s underlying point is that we need a plurality of
occasions, and it is a question to be raised whether one man provides
enough of these. Wittgenstein implication appears to be that he does, so
long as calculates more than once.
81
explanation that seems to me the most plausible is
this: Wittgenstein's central contention in these passages, viz.,
that rules require many occasions of manifestation. is ambiguous
as stated, between (a) the claim that each individual who grasps
a rule must obey it on more than one occasion and (b) the
weaker claim that there must be many occasions of
rule-following possible distributed over several individuals.
The latter claim would allow as possible the circumstance
that each of many people obey a given rule only once, since
t his would be enough for the rule to be followed on many
occasions. Now Wittgenstein's actual words in 199 commit
h i m only to the weaker thesis, and so are compatible with
the possibility that each person follows a rule only once;
what they are not compatible with is the possibility that one
man follows a rule just once — exactly the question he raises.
The point being made, then, is that if there is just one man
then he must follow his rules more than once, but if there are
many men it can be enough to each follows his rules just once
(or possibly not at all) I think this reading of 199 is consonant
with the gist of other passages in which the question of how
many occasions of rule-following are necessary is raised and
answered; for example:
In the same way it cannot be said either that just once in the history
of mankind did someone follow a sign-post. Whereas it can be said
that just once in the history of mankind did someone walk parallel
with a board. And that fir st impossibility is again not a
psychological one. (RFM p. 346)
There is no suggestion here that solitary rule-following is
impossible; for this is not ruled out by the claim that sign-posts
have to be obeyed more than once. The reason Wittgenstein
broaches the question of solitary rule-following in 199 is that
he wants to make allowance for the possibility that the
occasions are spread over many individuals when he claims
that many occasions are required. It is not, 1 think, that he is
greatly attracted to the idea of spreading the many occasions
over equally many individuals — one occasion each, so to
speak — but he feels the need to acknowledge that this is
logically compatible with his fundamental contention, viz, the
multiple application thesis. As we saw in Chapter 1, he is
anxious not to over-state this thesis, requiring only that there
be some rules which are multiply obeyed and not that all should
be; I surmise
82 KRIPKE’S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN
that in 199 he is again guarding against exaggerating a thesis
which he thinks his readers may find it hard to accept even
in its weakest form. So I conclude that 199 cannot be cited
to establish the community interpretation either, once it is seen
in context and read carefully. And besides, would it not be
astonishing if Wittgenstein had put forward his major positive
thesis in such an oblique and laconic remark? 26
Perhaps I should make it clear that I am not suggesting that
in these disputed passages Wittgenstein is consciously opting
for an individualistic as opposed to a social conception of
rule-following: that is, my interpretation is not that
Wittgenstein IS centrally exercised with this question and is
taking a definite stand on it. Rather, my view is that this whole
issue is foreign to his true concerns: it is simply not a question
with which he is wrestling. So when I say that his positive view
is individualistic I am imposing a classification upon his
position which is imported from outside: if he had been ask
where he stood on this issue, he would have said on the
individualistic side, but I do not think he would have
reckoned this to be especially relevant to the problems with
which he was centrally occupied. This general lack of concern
with the kind of question Kripke sets up seems to me to
indicate how fundamentally Kripke's interpretation
misrepresents what Wittgenstein is really up to. Not only does
Wittgenstein not advocate a community conception of rules;
this is not even a considered position in the space of
philosophical views within which he is operating. So the
individualism I claim lo discern in Wittgenstein's stated views
is not to be seen as a doctrine he is keen to promote; it is rather a
claim about what his positive view in fact comes to, irrespective
of his own main intentions.
So far I have been addressing myself to detailed textual
considerarons; I now want to object to the community
interpretation on a more general or thematic ground, namely
26 Kripke never so much as mentions what I have argued to be Wittgenstein’s main point in these passages
about rules and customs, viz. the multiple application thesis. Since It seems, beyond question that is at least one
thing Wittgenstein is saying. Kripke must hold that Wittgenstein is making the community claim in the same
breath as he is propounding the multiple application thesis. However in view of the toto caelo difference between
these two claims, it would seem at best highly confusing for Wittgenstein to be running them together so
carelessly. Better to attribute only one of them to him, and there seems no question but that he held the multiple
application thesis.
KRIPKE’S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN 83
its relation to Wittgenstein's thesis that we follow rules
'blindly'. For I think that the kind of epistemology of
rule-following Wittgenstein advocates is inconsistent with
Kripke's suggestion that right rule-following consists in
agreement with the community. As we saw in Chapter 1,
Wittgenstein's view is that our natural inclination to follow rules
as we do is not something we can justify, nor are we required to
justify it - we obey rules 'blindly', without guidance. So if
someone challenges me to justify an application of a sign, all 1
can ultimately reply is 'This is simply what I do' (217); nothing
demostrates that my application is correct. 27 But on Kripke's
community interpretation this will not be the epistemoiogical
situation: for agreement with others does provide a court of
appeal in case of such a challenge. Suppose someone claims that
it only strikes me that my present application of “+” is correct
(accords with its past meaning) and that in fact I am now using
“+” wrongly; then Kripke's sceptical solution offers me an
answer, namely that my present use is correct. because it agrees
with the use made of that sign by others. That is to say, the
community view allows me to get beyond, or beneath, my
natural sign-using propensities to something that can be cited to
give these propensities a justification, since correctness, on
Kripke's view, is precisely a matter of community
concordance in use: the community, in short, provides
the kind of guidance that Wittgenstein expltcitly says there
isn't. 28 Kripke's conception makes rule-following like being in
fashíon in this respect: if someone challenges my belief that 1 am
in fashion, I can rebut him by pointing out that my mode of dress
agrees with that of (certain) members of my cottimunity - I am
not reduced to saying that this is a belief for wliich a justification
is neither
27 Cf. “The danger here, I believe, is one of giving a justification of our procedure
where there is no such thing as justification and we ought simply to have said : tha’s how
we do it” (RFM p. 199) But this not imply any episteme defect, since “To use the word
withouth a justification does not mean to use it wrongfully” (RFM p. 406). Essencially the
same point could be put by saying that I have (and need) no criterion for appliying a word
as I do, i.e. , for supposing that I am using it a rule - governed way.
28 Thus “we look to the rule for instruction and do something, whithout appealing to anything else
for guidance” (228): that is, when I naturally react in certain way to a rule (expression of a rule) I
cannot check that this reaction is rigth by looking to the community for guidence. What prompts this
appeal to community guidence is what also prompts the appeal to a voice of intuition, namely the
feeling that we must be able to provide some reason for what we do when we follow rules.
84 KRIPKE’S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN
Possible nor required. Note that Wittgenstein does not say
that the community considered as a whole follows rules blindly,
i.e. proceeds upon the basis of a collective human nature; his
claim is that I do. So it would not be faithful to Wittgenstein's
words to transpose his claim about the absence of rational
foundations to the level of the community; and neither is it
correct to interpret him as trying to alleviate the
epistemological discomfort we may feel about my lack of
reasons by equipping me with the test of community
conforrnity.29 In fact, it is precisely the thirst for the kind of
rational basis Wittgenstein denies that causes Kripke to introduce
the community; but of course this goes right against the thrust
of Wittgenstein’s position - it is trying to find reasons for what
does not (and need not) rest upon reasons. To put it in a
nutshell, Kripke's interpretation misses, or underestimates,
Wittgenstein epistemological naturalism.
T h i s point leads into the question crucial for Kripke's
interpretation, of Wittgenstein's attitude toward the
normativeness of meaning - what he took its nature and ground
to be. Kripke represents Wittgenstein as preoccupied in the
Investigations with the question what makes a present use of a
sign correct, i.e. in accordance with our previous linguistic
intentions; and Wittgenstein's answer is supposed to be that this
is to be explained in terms of agreement with the community.
However, I think that an unprejudiced examination of the
passages with which we are concerned (138-242) reveals
notably little that can be construed as a concern with this
question: that is, we just do not find Wittgenstein fretting over
the question whether my present inclinations to apply a sign
really conform with my past meaning. It seems to me, in fact,
that Wittgenstein's attitude towards this kind of question
29 In Z 319 Wittgenstein says something very relevant to this, which seems to me of
considerable significance for community interpretations of Wittgenstein thought about rule
following. After saying, “I cannot describe how (in general) to employ rules, except by
teaching you, training you to employ rules” (Z 318), he goes on, “I may now, e.g. make a
talkie of such instruction. The teacher will sometimes say “That´s right”. If the pupil should
ask him “Why?” — He will answer nothing, or at any rate nothing relevant not even: “Well,
because we all do it like that”; that will not be the reason. It is very hard to see how this
passage could be squared with the idea that for Wittgenstein, correctness in following rule is
a matter of agreement whit the reactions of the community — either in respect of truth
conditions or assertibility condition.
K R I P K E ’ S I N T E R P R E T A T I O N O F W I T T G E N S T E I 85
verges on the dismissive. (30) His view is that what underlies
( i f that is the word) our practices and customs with sings is
our human nature in interaction with our training: this is what
explains our unreflectively going on as we do, Different kinds
of being, endowed with a different “form of l i f e ' , could
naturally go on in different ways given the same training:
Now we get the pupil to continue a series (say + 2) beyond
1000 — and he writes, 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012.
We say to him: "Look what you've done"—He doesn't
understand. We say: "You were meant to add two: look how
yon began the series!"—He answers: "Yes. isn't it right? I
thought that was how I was meant to do it." ------ Or suppose he
pointed to the series and said: "But I went on in the same
way."—It would now be no use to say: "But can't you see. . .
.?"—and repeat the old examples and explanations.—In such a
case we might say, perhaps: It comes natural to this person to
understand our order with our explanations as we should
understand the order: "Add 2 up to 1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to
3000 and so on."
Such a case would present similarities with one in which a
person naturally reacted to the gesture of pointing with the
hand by looking in the direction of the line from finger-tip to
wrist, not from wrist to finger-tip. ( 1 8 5 )
It is our nature that (partly) determines what we mean by our
words and which plays an ineliminable role in our learning
language. Given that this is so, Wittgenstein sees no real
substance to the question whether what we are naturally
inclined to do really conforms with the meaning of our signs:
such a question must be futile, since what we are by nature
30
The question of correctness in the application of a rule is the question what counts as a
mistake in applying the rule. Wittgenstein does not in fact make heavy weather o f t h is
question, as witness this passage: “But now does the observer distinguish in this case
between players” mistakes and correct play? — there are characteristic sings of it in the
players' behavior. Think of the behavior characteristic of correcting slip of the
tongue. It would be possible to recognize that someone was doing so even without
knowing his language” (54); see also 143, in which mistaking the order of a series is
said to be simply a matter of “frequency”. That is, Wittgenstein takes there to be
readily recognizable criteria for making a mistake; he is not supposing there to be a
deep and perplexing problem about what the distinction of correct and incorrect
application consists in (for the case of language about public objects) Rather he
typically assumes a given pattern of possible future use to be correct and is then
exercised with the question how this relates to what I now mean.
86 KRIPKE'S INTERPRETATION OF VVITTGENSTEIN
inclined to do is what it is that constitutes what we
mean.31 What we are inclined to do by nature and what we mean
cannot come apart in the way the question assumes. There is,
for Wittgenstein, not the sort of gap that Kripke's sceptic trades
on between meaning and naturally determined use. Reading
a l i t t l e into what Wittgenstein says, I think his response to
Kripke's question of what determines normativeness would be
that this question erroneously assumes that our meanings are
not fixed ( in part) by our natural propensities but by something
logically independent of these propensities, since it envisages
the possibility that we should by nature treat a pattern of use as
linguistically correct and yet that pattern be incorrect; but the
thought of this possibility involves the mistaken supposition
that once the natural facts about us are exhausted there
remains somewhere else to look for what determines meaning.
What has to be recognized is that at some level meaning is fixed
by our nature: meaning something is not an achievement of a
transcendent mind divorced from our “form of life”, The
basis of the normative is the natural. 32
A comparison of Wittgenstein with Hume may help to
clarify Wittgenstein's position. Suppose someone were to put
the question 'What makes causal judgements correct on
Hume's view?' Granted that our minds are so constituted that
we form causal beliefs upon exposure to constantly conjoined
events, what is it for a belief so formed to be true or false: might
not our minds lead us to form a causal belief in the way Hume
describes and yet that belief be false? It is clear what Hume
would reply to this question: he would say that there is not the
sort of gap between belief and t r u t h that the question
presupposes, since causation involves nothing over and above
constant conjunctions and the minds natural propensity to
form expectations-- there is, in particular, nothing independent
of our minds (i.e. objective) to constitute 'necessary connexion'.
On Hume’s view, then, correctness in a causal judgement
ultimately rests upon our (mental) nature; so it cannot be that
we naturally form causal judgements on the basis of observed
31 Here we might think of very simple language-games in which trining produces
fairly uniform and mechanical reactions; or even of the 'language' of bees.
32 On t h i s point I am in agreement with Barry Stroud, 'Wittgenstein and Logical
Necessity', Philosophical Review LXXIV (1965) . This interpretation contrast whit the
idea that Wittgenstein is some kind of “conventionalist”.
KRIPKE'S INTERPRETATION OF WIITEGNSTEIN 87
constant conjunctions which are (objectively) false, at least
ultimately. Only if one rejects Hume's 'projectivist' account of
causation could one press the question whether our natural
propensities lead us to have true causal beliefs upon exposure
to constant conjunctions. The respect in which Wittgenstein's
position on rules resembles Hume's on causation is that both
locate the source of correctness in our given nature, not in some
aspect of reality quite independent of us and our natural
propensities.33 The main difference between them (as I
remarked in Chapter 1) is that Hume takes his view to be
'sceptical', whereas Wittgenstein takes his to be non-sceptical
once we attain a right epistemology. And it would, of course,
be radically contrary to the whole spirit of Hume's position on
causation to locate correctness in the conformity of one's
causal judgements with those of one's community: that is.
Hume would not want to say that the distinction between
seemingly true causal beliefs and really true ones is to be
explained in terms of whether your judgemems agree with
others' judgements. This would just be a doomed attempt to
postpone the sceptical conclusion that our causal judgements
correspond to no objective or external feature of reality. I
think that Kripke's community interpretation of Wittgenstein
makes a similar mistake as this community interpretation of
Hume in respect of what constitutes the correctness of a causal
bclief: Kripke is in effect jibbing at one of Wittgenstein's main
theses-that there is nowhere 1 can t u r n to underpin or bolster
how 1 naturally proceed in my application of signs, not even to
other people Kripke is trying to locate what 1 mean, and hence
linguistic correctness, in something external to my nature as a
language-user, i.e. in my relations to a community; but thi s
would be to refuse to accept Wittgenstein's claim that my
judgements of linguistic correctness are not based upon
reasons. Wittgenstein's position is simply this: what I mean is
33 There is even in Wittgenstein some analogue of Hume’s projectivist “error
theory” when we reflect philosophically upon our following rules we are irresistibly
tempted to suppose that our natural propensities have some foundation on what is “out
there” and hence we get the idea of “rails invisibly laid to infinity” (218) and of
“something which only needs the addition of “and so on”, in order to reach to infinity”
(229). These illusions result from a kind of “externalization” of the compulsion we are
under when we follow a rule — rather as Hume thought that we “externalize” necessary
connexion in our thought about causation. (Of course this analogy should not be pressed
too far; there also plenty of differences between Hume and Wittgenstein in this regard.)
88 KRIPKE’S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN
determined by my natural use of words, so that we cannot
sensibly ask whether my use really conforms to what my words
mean.34 (Compare Hume: the causal truths are determined by
regularities acting upon our minds to produce expectations, so
that we cannot sensibly ask whether the expectations thereby
produced are really correct, i.e. lead us to form true causal
beliefs.) This is not, of course, to say that our application of
words can never be mistaken, that every use is self-certifyingly
correct; but it is to say that judgements of linguistic correctness
always rest in the end upon natural propensities to apply words
in a certain way: we do sometimes make judgements of
linguistic mistake, but these judgements have their ultimate
source in our natural sense of what is right- they do not
involve prescinding altogether from our natural propensities to
apply signs. So, on Wittgenstein's view, linguistic mistake is
necessarily local; we cannot make real sense of the idea that
our natural ways of using signs are globally mistaken, since
that would be to assume that our meaning is fixed by something
external to us.35 In a sense, then, Wittgenstein dismisses as
incoherent the kind of scepticism that lies behind Kripke's
sceptical paradox: I mean the general scepticism that questions
whether my use of signs has ever conformed with their meaning
- for their meaning cannot in this way come apart from the use
1 make of them. It is for these reasons that I say that
Wittgenstein would not have pursued and pressed the question
of normativeness in the way Kripke does; and, as I remarked,
he does not in point of fact make a great deal of the question of
normativeness in these sections of the Investigations.
My rejection of the community interpretation is not yet
complete. Someone wedded to this interpretation might allow
that 198-202 fail on their own to establish that Wittgenstein
held a social conception of rules but urge that these sections
34
It is important here that my use of language is interwoven with various kinds of
non-linguistic activity in such a way as to fix what my words mean; so correctness of
use will (partially) consist in how my linguistic actions fit in with my non-linguistic
actions.
35
'Philosophers very often talk about investigating, analysing, the meaning of
words. But let’s not forget that a word hasn’t got a meaning giving to it, as it were, by a
power independent of us, so that there could be a kind of scientific investigation into
what the word really means. A word has the meaning someone has given to it' (BB pp.
27-8). So it could not turn out that a word has a meaning different from that which 1
(we) give to it by dint of my (our) use of the word.
KRIPKE’S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN 89
should themselves not be considered in isolation: and when we
place them in the context of other passages we will see that they
should be read as embodying the social conception; that is,
198-202 have implicit what other passages make explicit. 1
need, then, to consider what other passages might be thought
to lend themselves to a community interpretation and show
that they have a different purport. The section 1 have most
often heard cited as displaying Wittgenstein's commitment to
the social conception is 242:
If language is to be a means of communication there must be
agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may
sound) in judgments. This seems to abolish logic, but does not
do so.—It is one thing to describe methods of measurement, and
another to obtain and state results of measurement. But what
we call "measuring" is partly determined by a certain constancy
in results of measurement. (242)
The claim is that Wittgenstein is here building the notion of
agreement into the notion of meaning. This interpretation
ignores, what I stressed in Chapter 1, that Wittgenstein is in
this passage making a claim about the necessary conditions of
communication: his claim is that for two or more people to
share a language - to mean the same by their words- they must
agree in their judgements. This claim expressly concerns a
social concept, viz. that of a linguistic community, and so
naturally it is formulated in social terms, vi:, agreement
between members of that community. What Wittgenstein does
not say, and what fails to follow from what he does say, is that
for there to be meaning at all there has to be inter-personal
agreement. He is certainly not saying in this section that the
idea of an idiolect makes no sense: he is not ruling out the
possibility that 1 might employ words with different meanings
from those of other people. His point is that if we are to use
words with the same meanings then we must agree in their use.
Indeed, the interpretation I am rejecting would have
Wittgenstein claiming, absurdly, that I cannot mean by a
word what no-one else means by it, since meaning requires
Ínter-personal agreement of use. In general, the relation
between agreement and rules, as Wittgenstein sees it, concerns
the notion of two or more people following the same rules;
agreement is not supposed to be a necessary condition
of an individual’s
90 KRIPKE’S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN
following a rule - that requires, rather, a multiplicity of
occasions of application.
What may also mislead is that Wittgenstein speaks typically
of communal languages, e.g. English and German, and so
formulates his claims in terms of these shared languages; but it
is not to be inferred from this that he rejects the very notion of a
language confined to a single individual. Since most actual
rules are in fact shared, including the semantic rules of natural
languages, it is only to be expected that Wittgenstein's
examples should be of this kind; but t h i s should not be taken to
exclude the very possibility of rules followed by only one
person - and Wittgenstein says nothing to suggest that he
intends lo exclude this possibility. it is not, as I remarked
earlier, that he is especially anxious to insist on the coherence
of solitary rule-following and to contest a community
conception; the truth is that he is simply unconcerned whit
t h i s kind of question. His citation of communal signs thus does
not betoken a commitment to the essentially communal
employment of signs; rather, he is, for his purposes, indifferent to
the question.
Much the same should be said of Wittgenstein's emphasis
upon t h e notion of training in his account of language and
rules. Training is, of course, a social concept - it involves an
inter-personal relation - and training in the use of a sign may be
said to aim at agreement between the trainee's behaviour and
that of the trainer. Does this commit Wittgenstein to a
community conception of what it is to grasp a rule? Clearly not,
since nothing so far said implies that in order to explicate the
concept of the learner's grasping a rule we must make
essential reference to the behaviour of the trainer - any more so
than for any skill acquired by means of training, e.g. kicking a
ball. Wittgenstein emphasises training not because he thinks
all rules are necessarily social but because it helps to remind us of
what really goes on when someone achieves understanding: it
acts as a prophylactic against myth-making36 (1 should say
36 See esp. 208-10, in which it is ernphasised that in teaching someone a rule I don not
communicate lees than 1 myself know. This claim of Wittgenstein’s bears certain
similarities to W. V. Quine's position on radical translation in Word and Object (MIT
Press: Cambridge, Mass, 1960), chap. 2; and to Michael Dummett's insistence upon th e
exhaustive manifestability of linguistic understanding in 'What is a Theory of
Meaning? ( I I ) ' , i n Truth and Meaning, ed. G. Evans and J. McDowell (Clarendon
Press: Oxford, 1976).
. KRIPKE’S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN 91
that Kripke himself shows no tendency to rest his community
interpretation on either of the last two considerations; I
mention them because I have heard them cited by others in
support of a community interpretation.)
I am not, in rejecting the community interpretation, saying
that Wittgenstein thinks the notion of a linguistic community is
'unimportant' or totally irrelevant to a proper account of
meaning; nor am I denying that when a language is communal
others may legitimately correct one's use of words: I am not
even denying; that what others mean by words can determine their
meaning on the lips of a given speaker. I am saying only that
Wittgenstein does not hold that the very notion of a rule of
language must needs be explicated in social terms - that we
cannot make sense of rule-following on the part of a given
individual unless we relate that individual's behaviour to the
behaviour of some community of rule- followers. Wittgenstein no
more holds this view about understanding a rule than he
holds a parallel view about being in pain or remembering
something. And, as I shall argue in Chapter 4, it is well that
Wittgenstein did not hold such a view, because it is dearly
wrong.
The divergence between Kripke's interpretation and mine
shows up sharply in our different views of the way 202 relates to
the latter sections dealing (explicitly) with private language
(243f). Kripke's view is that by 202 the argument against the
possibility of a private language is essentially complete -
Wittgenstein has already shown that there must always be
public criteria for the correctness of linguistic use. This result
has already been established because rule-following in general
depends upon communal agreement of response for an
individual to be following any rule he must exhibit behaviour
which others can use to correct his sincere avowal that he is
following a rule, since this is what the normativeness of rule
comes to. The notion of correct rule-following is explicated in
terms of assertibility conditions which are available to
members of one's linguistic community, and so there is no
possibility of following a rule which others cannot know one
is following correctly or incorrectly.37 This view of what is
going on in 202 obviously depends upon the community
interpretation
37 See Kripke, pp. 3, 98-113
92 KRIPKE’S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN
interpretation, i.e. upon building agreement of response into the
notion of rule-following. On the interpretation I have put
forward, there is not this direct link between 202 and the
private language argument: 202 sets the stage for that
argument without actually completing it; more argumentative
work has to be done before the possibility of a private language
can be excluded. What is left open by 202 is the possibility of a
'private technique', i.e. a capacity to apply a sign in a regular
way which is not checkable by others. In the case of public
objects the technique of use will be checkable by others because
the objects themselves are accessible to others and hence
regularity of use is verifiable; but if the objects are private, as
sensations have often been supposed to be, then there will be no
telling whether the speaker is referring to the same (kind of)
sensation on different occasions of use. I think my
interpretation of the relation between 202 and the later material
on private language better fits Wittgenstein’s procedure in
those latter sections, for he speaks as if new considerations
were been advanced and not simply a specific consequence of
earlier conclusions being drawn. (38) Kripke, in fact, claims
that Wittgenstein anticipates his sceptical paradox and i t s
solution as early as the very first section of the Investigations, in
which case the possibility of a private language would have
been excluded right at the beginning: this seems implausible
in itself, and inspection of section 1 discloses only an emphasis
upon acting as against 'explanations' - there is no essential
mention there of the community. My conclusion is then that the
more traditional view of where the private language argument
occurs (after 243) is to be preferred to Kripke's. It would, perhaps,
be pleasant if Kripke's view of the overall structure of t he
Investigations were correct, but it does not seem to me that it is.
And the reason Wittgenstein's book does not have the
structure Kripke attributes to it is that it does not have the
content he attributes to it.

38 He does not anywhere say or imply that a private language has already been
excluded by he earlier considerations, and that it is necessary for him now only to bring
out how those considerations apply to the skeptical case of words for sensations. In fact. I
think he writes as in the earlier conclusion —that understanding is mastery of a
practice— leaves open the possibility of a private language. Hence the need to show that
we have to impose further conditions on what it takes for a genuine practice (rule) to
exist, notably third-person criteria of correctness.
"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

Porque la palabra es una…y la realidad es otra:

A los jubilados de
México y
Latinoamérica...Titanes
humillados y olvidados.
 "La
interpretación
de Kripke sobre
Wittgenstein:
paradoja y
comunidad"
(Kripke's
Interpretation
of
Wittgenstein:
Paradox and
Community)
en:
Wittgenstein
on Meaning.
An
Interpretation
and
Evaluation,
McGINN, Colin,
“LA Inglaterra, Basil
INTERPRETACIÓN Blackwell
DE KRIPKE SOBRE Publisher L t d,
1984, pp. 59-92
WITTGENSTEIN:
(Aristotelian
PARADOJA Y Society Series,
COMUNIDAD” Volume 1)

POR COLIN
MCGUINN

Traducción: Profesor Joel Tucídides

Madrigal Bailón, Licenciado en Filosofía,
México Distrito Federal. Egresado de la
Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana
Unidad Iztapalapa
(tucidides2000@yahoo.com.mx). Para
educar y sin fines de lucro. Se permite la
reproducción total o parcial citando al
autor original.

Un humilde tributo a nuestros maestros, porque A MARÍA IMELDA SOTO LÓPEZ, porque su
Náhuatl me enseñó a hablar el Castellano y
enseñan a pesar de la adversidad.