Está en la página 1de 78

"La

interpretación
de Kripke sobre
Wittgenstein:
paradoja y
comunidad"
(Kripke's
Interpretation
of
Wittgenstein:
Paradox and
Community)
en:
Wittgenstein
on Meaning.
An
Interpretation
and
Evaluation,
McGINN, Colin,
“LA Inglaterra, Basil
Blackwell
INTERPRETACIÓN Publisher L t d,
DE KRIPKE SOBRE 1984, pp. 59-92
WITTGENSTEIN: (Aristotelian
PARADOJA Y Society Series,
Volume 1)
COMUNIDAD”
POR COLIN
MCGUINN

Traducción: Profesor Joel Tucídides Madrigal Bailón,


Licenciado en Filosofía, México Distrito Federal. Egresado
de la Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana Unidad
Iztapalapa (tucidides2000@yahoo.com.mx).

Para educar y sin fines de lucro. Se permite la reproducción


total o parcial citando al autor original.
"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

Sin mis seres amados, esta traducción jamás hubiera visto la luz:

Porque su Náhuatl
me enseñó a hablar
A MARÍA IMELDA SOTO el Castellano y aún
LÓPEZ me guía para
entender el Inglés.

Licenciada en Letras
Hispanas por la Normal
Superior de México.
Mujer culta dedicada a la
educación de la niñez
mexicana…. guía de muchas
A INÉS BAILÓN SOTO
decenas de generaciones.

Excelente maestra y
magnífico ejemplo.

A mi querida Angélica, amante de los libros.

A CARMINA ITZEL RUÍZ MADRIGAL…


PORQUE SU EXISTENCIA ME
ENORGULLECE Y ME DA FUERZA PARA
INTERPRETAR LOS SIGNOS DEL
FUTURO.
"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

Porque la palabra es una…y la realidad es otra:

A los jubilados de
México y
Latinoamérica...Titanes
humillados y olvidados.
Colin McGinn

Wittgenstein on Meaning

An Interpretation and Evaluation

Aristotelian Society Series

Volume 1

Basil Blackwell • Oxford


© Colin M c G i n n 1984

First published 1984


in cooperation with The Aristotelian Society
King's College, London W C 2

Basil Blackwell Publisher L t d


108 Cowley Road, Oxford 0 X 4 1JF, England
Contents
Basil Blackwell Inc.
432 Park Avenue South, Suite 1505
New Y o r k , NY 10016, U S A

A l l rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages


for the purposes of criticism and review, no part of this publication
may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted,
in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the
prior permission of the publisher. Preface vii

British Library Cataloguing in Publishing Data N o t e on References ix

Introduction xi
M c G i n n , Colin
Wittgenstein on meaning. 1 Wittgenstein's V i e w s : M e a n i n g , U n d e r s t a n d i n g ,
1. Wittgenstein, Ludwig I. Title
Rules 1
192 B3376.W564 2 K r i p k c ' s Interpretation of Wittgenstein: Paradox
ISBN 0-631-13764-5
and C o m m u n i t y 59

3 C r i t i c a l E v a l u a t i o n of Wittgenstein's Views 93

4 Assessment of K r i p k e ' s A r g u m e n t s 139

Index 201

Photoset and printed in Great Britain by


Photobooks (Bristol) Ltd
Vili PREFACE

more substantial; in the end it turned out to be a b o o k .


My m a i n a i m in this b o o k is to give a clear and accurate
account of what Wittgenstein actually thought, w i t h a view to
critically evaluating his ideas. In pursuance of this a i m , I have
perforce included a g o o d deal of quoted material and
commented closely on Wittgenstein's actual words; I invite the
reader to check for himself whether Wittgenstein is really Note on References
saying what I say he is. I hope the b o o k w i l l be useful to
students, as well as to their teachers; indeed, I have tried to
write in a way that does not presuppose any prior knowledge of
Wittgenstein's later philosophy.
My greatest debt in the c o m p o s i t i o n of this w o r k is to
M a l c o l m B u d d . We discussed Wittgenstein protractedly, and I
was constantly reassured by the happy convergence of our
views. H i s extensive knowledge of Wittgenstein's corpus and
his sure grasp of its contents were a great help to me. He References to Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (Black-
directed me to certain important passages in Wittgenstein, and well: O x f o r d , 1974) are given simply by citing section numbers,
saved me from more than one error of interpretation. He also or page numbers where appropriate. Other works of Wittgenstein
read and commented upon the first draft and made several very are cited by using initial letters of their titles followed by
helpful comments. It is seldom that one has the benefit of section or page numbers, according to the f o l l o w i n g system:
such disinterested and agreeable cooperation from a fellow TLP : Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Routledge and
philosopher. K e g a n P a u l : L o n d o n , 1961)
Other people also helped me to w o r k out my ideas. Z : Zcttel(mi)
Audiences of seminars I gave at University College L o n d o n , RFM :
Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (1978)
the University of Southern C a l i f o r n i a , Bielefeld University and OC : On Certainty (1979)
Stanford University made helpful comments which led to PG : Philosophical Grammar (1974)
various improvements. Conversations w i t h Rogers A l b r i t t o n , RPP : Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (1980)
A n i t a A v r a m i d e s , J i m H o p k i n s , Ian M c F e t r i d g c , M a r i e WLFM : Wittgenstein s Lectures on the Foundations of
M c G i n n , D a v i d Pears, R i c h a r d Warner and C r i s p i n Wright Mathematics, ed. C. D i a m o n d (Harvester Press:
(who commented in writing on my first draft) were also m u c h Sussex, 1976)
appreciated. Peter H a c k e r generously made detailed critical
comments on my penultimate draft; I am very grateful to h i m A l l of these books (except for the first and last) are published
for undertaking this labour and for the correspondence which by Basil B l a c k w e l l , O x f o r d .
ensued. I am also grateful to M a r t i n D a v i c s for his encourage-
ment and his efficient editorial work. Lastly, I am again
grateful to Katherine Backhouse for typing the w o r k and for
he good h u m o u r in d o i n g it.
A

Colin M c G i n n
10 June 1984
"La
interpretación
de Kripke sobre
Wittgenstein:
paradoja y
comunidad"
"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
59
COLIN MCGINN
2 2
Kripke's Interpretation of Wittgenstein: Paradox La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein:
and Community paradoja y comunidad
α
POR COLIN McGUINN

TRADUCCIÓN:
JOEL TUCÍDIDES MADRIGAL BAILÓN

In this chapter I shall contrast Kripke's interpretation En este capítulo yo compararé esta interpretación de Kripke
of Wittgenstein with the interpretation I put forward in sobre Wittgenstein, con aquella interpretación que bosquejé
Chapter 1; we shall see that these interpretations are en el capítulo I. Tendremos que ver que estas
very different. Kripke's expository procedure differs interpretaciones son muy diferentes. El proceso expositivo
somewhat from that adopted in the previous chapter: de Kripke difiere de aquellos adoptados en el capítulo
he does not expound Wittgenstein by paying close previo. Kripke no expone a Wittgenstein prestando mucha
attention to the text, supporting each attribution with atención al texto, apoyando cada suposición con la cita
an apposite citation; rather, he develops a systematic correspondiente. Más bien él desarrolla un argumento
argument which he hopes will make sense of, and sistemático el cual espera, mantenga sentido con el texto
occasional contact with, Wittgenstein's text. Kripke's de Wittgenstein y haga contacto ocasional con aquel. El
assumption is that this argument is what underlies supuesto de Kripke es que este argumento es lo que
Wittgenstein's actual text, and that we shall understand subyace realmente en el texto de Wittgenstein y lo
Wittgenstein better if we see his text as the surfacing entenderemos mejor si vemos al texto como el
of this systematic argument in different ways and revestimiento de cierto argumento sistemático en diferentes
contexts: it is not that Wittgenstein is to be found maneras y contextos. No es que Wittgenstein deba de ser
explicitly propounding this argument, but we can hallado completamente explícito proponiendo este
illuminatingly treat his text as if he were. And it is this argumento, pero es posible iluminar su texto como si
feature of Kripke's exposition which causes him to pudiéramos proceder así. Y es este rasgo de la exposición
qualify his attributions to Wittgenstein from time to de Kripke, lo que le lleva a identificar sus argumentos con
time - to admit that his way of presenting Wittgenstein los de Wittgenstein, y de cuando en cuando, a admitir que
is somewhat alien to Wittgenstein's own conception of su forma de presentar a Wittgenstein es en realidad una
his views. (1) We should therefore take seriously extraña manera de presentar su propia concepción del
Kripke's prefatory caveat: “the present paper should trabajo de Wittgenstein. (1). Sin embargo, debemos tomar
be thought of as expounding neither "Wittgenstein's" en serio la advertencia preliminar de Kripke: "Este
argument nor "Kripke's" : rather Wittgenstein's documento no debe ser tomado como "la exposición de
argument as it struck Kripke, as it presented a problem Wittgenstein" ni tampoco como "el argumento de Kripke",
for him”. (p. 5). sino más bien como "el argumento de Wittgenstein como lo
descubrió Kripke", como la manera en que el problema se le
presentó a él " (p.5).

α
Tema: Kripke's Interpretation of Wittgenstein: Paradox and Community. La versión castellana puede descargarse de la página:
http://es.scribd.com/ Por favor, para mejor opinión visite la página Web del profesor Colin McGuinn en: http://mcginn.philospot.com/ .
Extraído del libro original. Referencia bibliografía: "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"( Kripke's
Interpretation of Wittgenstein: Paradox and Community) en: Wittgenstein on Meaning. An Interpretation and Evaluation, McGINN,
Colin, Inglaterra, Basil Blackwell Publisher L t d, 1984, pp. 59-92 (Aristotelian Society Series, Volume 1).
Las notas originales (1) se han colocado a final de texto y se han reservado los pies de página para algunas notas adicionales.
Esto pretende facilitar al estudiante la lectura. El acomodo de palabras ha variado ligeramente la paginación: algunos párrafos se han
recorrido “al siguiente inicio de página” respecto a la versión original (vgr. Las líneas últimas de p. 63, se trasladaron a inicio de la 64).
La paginación se maneja así: Arriba en un recuadro negro se pone el número aproximado en el formato original, y abajo la paginación
particular de este documento.
Traducido por el profesor Joel Tucídides Madrigal Bailón, Licenciado en Filosofía, México Distrito Federal. Egresado de la
Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana- Unidad Iztapalapa. (tucidides2000@yahoo.com.mx) Para educar y sin fines de lucro. Se permite
la reproducción total o parcial citando al autor original.
Página 1 de 34 COLIN MCGINN

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
60
COLIN MCGINN

Kripke is here disarmingly aware that he is foisting Kripke está sereno y consciente de que en realidad está
onto Wittgenstein's text what is not to be found parafraseando en el texto de Wittgenstein, escudriñando lo
inscribed on its surface; and this is why he adopts the que no puede hallarse en su superficie... y precisamente
method of exposition he does adopt. My own esta es la razón por la que él adopta este método de
procedure has been quite different: I have assumed exposición. Pero mi procedimiento ha sido muy diferente:
that Wittgenstein can be satisfactorily interpreted He asumido que Wittgenstein puede ser interpretado
without seeing his text as the occasional surfacing of satisfactoriamente sin contemplar su texto como el
an underlying systematic argument but rather by recubrimiento ocasional de un argumento sistemático
paying close (and perhaps somewhat pedantic) subyacente, sino más bien, prestando mucha atención (y de
attention to what he actually says. I would not alguna manera "pedante atención") a lo que realmente dice.
therefore think it appropriate to issue the sort of caveat Sin embargo no pensaría apropiado cuestionar la clase de
Kripke does. This observation is not intended as a elucidación que Kripke hace. Esta observación no es una
piece of self-congratulation on my part, but as a clase de auto-complacencia de mi parte, sino que es un
recognition of the procedural difference between auto-reconocimiento de la diferencia metodológica entre
Kripke and me. In fact I believe that the more Kripke y Yo. En realidad creo que las diferencias más
substantive differences stem fundamentally from this substanciales descansan fundamentalmente en este
difference in respect of exegetical method. For what desacuerdo respecto al método exegético. La razón por la
Kripke has done is to produce an impressive and que Kripke ha hecho esto es para producir un argumento
challenging argument which bears little affinity with impresionante y cambiante el cual mantenga una pequeña
Wittgenstein's own problems and claims: in an afinidad con los problemas y afirmaciones propias de
important sense Kripke and the real Wittgenstein are Wittgenstein. En un sentido importante, Kripke y el
not even dealing with the same issues (they have a Wittgenstein real no siempre están lidiando con las mismas
different 'problematic'). I shall begin by summarising cuestiones (ellos tienen una "problemática" diferente). Debo
Kripke's interpretation, assuming some familiarity comenzar resumiendo la interpretación de Kripke. Asumiré
with its outline, and then I shall explain why I think it alguna familiaridad con su trabajo y después explicaré el
goes wrong as an interpretation. This task should be por qué opino que no es viable su interpretación. Esta tarea
facilitated by what has already been argued in Chapter será facilitada por lo argumentado en el capítulo I, pues
1; since I believe I there gave ample textual evidence creo haber presentado evidencia textual para mi
for my interpretation, it will be necessary only to spell interpretación. Será necesario, sólo para subrayar los
out the points of disagreement and give some puntos de desacuerdo y dar un diagnóstico del cómo Kripke
diagnosis of how Kripke came to the wrong llegó a una interpretación equivocada.
interpretation.

The general structure of Wittgenstein's argument, La estructura general del argumento de Wittgenstein, según
according to Kripke, is as follows. Wittgenstein Kripke, es como sigue. Wittgenstein enfoca su atención
focuses attention upon the normative notion of an sobre la noción normativa de una aplicación de un signo
application of a sign being (linguistically) correct, i.e. que es lingüísticamente correcto, por ejemplo, de acuerdo
in accordance with its meaning. (This is not the notion con su significado. [ Esta no es la noción de exactitud
offactual correctness, i.e. stating a truth about the factual-o precisión objetiva (factual correctness)- por
world; it concerns the question which word is ejemplo al establecer una verdad sobre el mundo. Esto
linguistically appropriate to the facts. Thus, for concierne a la cuestión de qué palabra es lingüísticamente
example, suppose I believe truly that this object is red; apropiada a los hechos. Así por ejemplo, suponga que yo
the question of linguistic correctness is then which creo verdadero el que este objeto sea rojo. El caso del buen
word expresses this belief: is 'red' the word I ought to uso lingüístico será aquel donde la palabra refleje esta
use to state the fact in which I believe?) cuestión: ¿ Es "roja" la palabra que debo usar para
expresar el hecho que considero? ]

Página 2 de 34 COLIN MCGINN

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

COLIN MCGINN 61

We ordinarily think that some uses of words are Nosotros pensamos ordinariamente que algunos usos de
correct and some are incorrect, some uses correctly las palabras son correctos y otros son incorrectos. Algunos
express the fact we want to state and some do not: usos expresan correctamente el uso que deseamos
Wittgenstein's question is supposed to be what this declarar y otros no. El dilema de Wittgenstein consiste en
distinction consists in. What makes it right to use imaginar en que consiste esta distinción ¿Qué es lo que
words in one way rather than another? It is clear that hace correcto el uso de las palabras, más de una forma que
this normative property of words depends upon their de otra? Es claro que esta propiedad normativa de las
having a determinate meaning: for the notion of' a palabras depende de que tengan un significado
correct use is well-defined only if words mean one determinado. La noción de uso correcto esta bien definida si
thing rather than another - that is what makes it right las palabras significan algo de una forma mejor que otra.
to use one word rather than another to state a given Eso es lo que hace correcto el uso de una palabra en lugar
fact. Therefore we need to make sense of the idea of a de otra al expresar un hecho dado. Entonces debemos dar
word meaning one thing rather than another if we are sentido a la idea de que una palabra signifique una cosa en
to give content to the notion of correct (or incorrect) lugar de otra, si es que queremos dar contenido a la noción
use of language. To put it differently: any proposed de corrección (o incorrección) en el uso del lenguaje.
candidate for the meaning of a word must be such as Poniéndolo de otra forma: cualquier posible candidato para
to sustain linguistic normativeness; we must be able to el significado de una palabra debe ser tal que logre
read off from any alleged meaning-constituting sustentar una normatividad lingüística. Debemos ser
property of a word what is the correct use of that capaces de entender por completo cuál es el uso correcto
word. The normativeness of meaning thus functions as de una palabra a partir de cualquier pretendida propiedad
a condition of adequacy upon any account of what constitutiva de la palabra. De esta forma, la normatividad
meaning is. (2) del significado funciona como una condición de suficiencia
sobre cualquier recuento de lo que es el significado (2).

Now Kripke's claim is that Wittgenstein finds this Ahora la afirmación de Kripke es que Wittgenstein
notion of normativeness deeply problematic, and encuentra esta noción de normatividad profundamente
hence finds the whole notion of meaning confusa, y por eso encuentra la noción de significado,
correspondingly problematic. For nothing can be correspondientemente confusa. Nada es generado de forma
produced to constitute meaning that meets the tal que implique el necesario vínculo con el requisito de la
normativeness requirement: there is no property of a normatividad. No existe propiedad de una palabra desde la
word from which we can read off its correct use, and cual podamos determinar completamente su uso correcto, y
so there is nothing for meaning to be. This is what así no hay nada que apoye la existencia de cierto
Kripke calls Wittgenstein's 'sceptical paradox' - the significado. Esto es lo que Kripke llama "la paradoja
thesis that there is nothing, no fact, that could escéptica" de Wittgenstein: la tesis de que no hay nada,
constitute meaning one thing rather than another. But ningún hecho, que pudiera dar la pauta para constituir un
Wittgenstein does not (according to Kripke) want to significado a favor de otro. Pero Wittgenstein (según Kripke)
leave us helpless in the jaws of this paradox; he no desea dejarnos indefensos en las fauces de esta
proposes a 'sceptical solution' to the paradox which, paradoja. El propone una "solución escéptica" a la
while conceding to the sceptic that no fact constitutes paradoja, en la cual mientras se conceda al escéptico que
meaning, nevertheless preserves our ordinary talk of ningún hecho constituye el significado, se conservará
meaning and rules. The sceptical solution does this by nuestra habla ordinaria con sus significados y reglas. La
persuading us that we do not need to supply the kind solución escéptica procede convenciéndonos de que
of account of meaning the sceptic shows to be nosotros no necesitamos generar la clase de recuentos del
unavailable; we can take a radically different view of significado que el escéptico nos muestra que ya están
the significance of statements about meaning, namely agotados. Podemos tomar una posición totalmente radical
that such statements do not purport to state facts at all. del sentido de las afirmaciones acerca del significado, a
Since ascriptions of meaning and rule-following do saber, que tales afirmaciones no proponen para nada
establecer hechos. Puesto que las adscripciones de
Página 3 de 34 COLIN MCGINN

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
62
COLIN MCGINN
not set out to state facts, it is no disaster for them that significado y reglas de seguimiento no encaminan a
we can discover no facts for them to state; we can establecer hechos, no es tan malo que no podamos
provide a quite different account of their function. descubrir hechos que puedan ser declarados. Podemos
This, then, is the general shape of Wittgenstein's establecer un recuento completamente diferente de sus
argument, as Kripke sees it; let us now fill the funciones. Esta es pues la forma general del argumento de
argument in a bit. Wittgenstein como Kripke lo ve. Permítasenos agregarle
una pieza al argumento.

La paradoja escéptica se presenta inicialmente a través de


The sceptical paradox is initially presented by la consideración de un significado que yo ligo a signos
considering' the meaning I attach to signs I used in the usados en el pasado. Acrítica y normalmente, yo asumo
past. I normally and uncritically assume that my que mi presente uso de (por decir) "+" concuerda con mi
present use of (say) accords with my past meaning, so significado pasado. Así, al dar ahora la suma de 67 y 58, en
that when I now give the sum of 67 and 58 in answer respuesta a la pregunta "¿Cuánto es 67+58?", yo estoy
to the question '67+58? I am interpreting *+* as I did interpretando "+" como lo hice en el pasado. Esto es,
in the past: that is, I assume that in the past I meant asumo que en el pasado yo quise significar adición a través
addition by *+' and so I conform with my past de "+", y así me adapto a mi significado pasado (yo uso "+"
meaning (I use'+1 correctly) if I now take questions correctamente) si se tomar las preguntas que contengan "+"
containing '+' to require doing some addition. Kripke's como la exigencia de hacer alguna suma. La pregunta
sceptic questions whether this assumption is on escéptica de Kripke radica en si esta suposición se basa en
reflection legitimate: perhaps in the past I meant by una reflexión legítima. Quizás en el pasado yo quise decir
k+\ not addition, but quaddition, a mathematical por "+" no adición sino “meta-adición” ó "suma cuarta"
function whose value is 5 for the pair of arguments 67 (Quaddition), una función matemática cuyo valor es 5 para
and 58. What is it about my past history that makes el par de argumentos: "67 y 58" ¿Qué es eso acerca de mi
me so sure that I meant addition and not quaddition, historia pasada que me hace estar tan seguro de que quiero
and hence so confident that my present linguistic significar "suma" y no "suma cuarta", y que por ende me
response conforms with my previous meaning (the hace tan confiado de que mi respuesta lingüística presente
response of giving 125 in answer to '67 + 58?')? The deba responder conforme a mi significado previo (a saber:
sceptic's question is, in effect, what justifies my que 125 es la respuesta requerida para "67+58")? La
confidence that'+' has a constant meaning for me over pregunta escéptica es en efecto ¿Qué justifica mi confianza
time: what is it that constitutes this presumed de que "+" tenga un significado constante para mi a través
constancy? To answer this question we need to be able del tiempo?, ¿qué es lo que constituye esta presumible
to point to some feature of my past usage that constante? Para contestar debemos ser capaces de señalar
establishes that I then meant addition; and the algún rasgo o punto de mi uso pasado, a partir del cual se
semantic sceptic claims that this cannot be done. (In comienza a significar "adición". La semántica escéptica
fact, the sceptical paradox has two aspects, an afirma que esto no puede ser posible. [ En realidad la
epistemological aspect and a constitutive or paradoja escéptica tiene dos aspectos: uno epistemológico
metaphysical aspect: epistemologically, the claim is y otro constitutivo o metafísico. Epistemológicamente la
that nothing can now be cited to justify my tesis es que ahora nada puede ser invocado para justificar
assumption of semantic constancy; constitutively, the mi supuesto de constancia semántica. Constitutivamente la
claim is that there is no fact about me which could tesis es que no hay ningún hecho relacionado conmigo, el
constitute my meaning addition rather than cual pudiera constituir mejor el significado de adición en vez
quaddition. It is the second aspect which is the more del de "suma cuarta". Este es el segundo aspecto más
important in Kripke's exposition of Wittgenstein; the importante en la exposición de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein. El
epistemological challenge is regarded chiefly as a way cambio epistemológico está supuesto principalmente, como
into the constitutive challenge.) [ 3 ] un camino dentro del cambio constitutivo ] (3)

Página 4 de 34 COLIN MCGINN

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

COLIN MCGINN
63

The case for the sceptical paradox proceeds by El caso de la paradoja escéptica procede eliminando
exhausting the candidates. First, my actual candidatos. Primero, los cálculos actuales que
computations involving "+" do not suffice to envuelvan a "+" no serán suficientes para determinar
determine that I meant addition, since these are lo que yo quise significar por suma ya que estos son
logically compatible with my having meant some lógicamente compatibles con otros significados
other function which agrees with addition for just the mentales, relativos a funciones que concuerdan con
numbers on which I have performed computations mi adición. Mi cálculo es exclusivo de los números
with '+' but diverges thereafter. Actual use of "+" que realizan las operaciones que presentaron a "+".
either externally or in my head. underdetermines El caso puede cambiar en lo sucesivo. El uso actual
which function is denoted; for there are indefinitely de "+", ya sea externo o en mi cabeza, es el que sub-
many functions distinct from addition which are determina cuál es la función denotada. Hay muchas
compatible with the finitely many applications of '+' funciones indefinidas y distintas de la adición que son
I have made. For any finite sequence of applications compatibles con aplicaciones finitas de "+",
of a sign we can always envisage different ways of parecidas a la que yo realicé. En cualquier secuencia
continuing to apply the sign which conform to finita de aplicaciones de un signo, podemos planear
different assignments of meaning. siempre distintas formas de trabajo con el signo. De
esta forma el signo se adapta a distintos usos del
significado.

Second, my past inner states of consciousness cannot Segundo, mis anteriores estados inherentes de
determine what I meant because they admit of various conciencia, no pueden determinar lo que quiero
interpretations or applications: no experience I have significar, porque ellos admiten varias aplicaciones e
can dictate what is the right way to use a sign, and interpretaciones. Ninguna experiencia que haya
whatever meaning is it must provide for such tenido puede dictaminar cuál es la manera correcta
normativeness. Nor are there any 'magical states of de usar un signo y cualquier significado debe tener
consciousness which are capable of doing what the prevista tal normatividad. Tampoco hay algún "estado
mundane states cannot do. So there are no facts about mágico" de conciencia que sea capaz de hacer lo que
consciousness which can furnish a reply to the sceptic. los estados mundanos no puedan hacer. Así que, no
hay hechos relativos a la conciencia que puedan
otorgar una respuesta al escéptico.

Third, Kripke considers the suggestion that my past Tercero, Kripke considera la sugerencia de que mi
meaning consisted in my having a certain sort of significado pasado consiste en que yo tenía cierta
linguistic disposition: instead of looking to my actual clase de disposición lingüística. Por ejemplo, en lugar
use of '+' in the past, let us turn to how I was disposed de observar mi uso actual del signo "+" respecto al
to use '+1 and read my past meaning off from that. pasado, hay que cambiar a la idea sobre el cómo
The appeal of this suggestion is that it offers the hope estuve dispuesto a usar "+" y el cómo pude deducir
that the underdetermination problem will be got aquel significado pasado de todo ello. El sentido de
round: for we can now cite the fact that in the past I esta sugerencia es que ofrece la esperanza de que el
was disposed to say 4125* and not 45' in answer to problema de la indeterminación sea evadido. Ahora
467 + 58?\ even though this question never actually podemos citar el hecho de que en el pasado yo estuve
came up. Dispositions to use are thus supposed to dispuesto a decir "125" y no "5" en la respuesta a
mirror the productivity of meaning; their "67+58", aunque en realidad esta pregunta nunca
consequences extend beyond the actual history of a surgiera. Entonces, las disposiciones de uso están
person's use of a sign. Kripke's reply to this supuestas o pensadas para reflejar la productividad
dispositional suggestion consists in two observations: del significado. Sus consecuencias se extienden más
in the first place, dispositions to use arc finite, since allá de la historia actual en que la persona usa el
human beings are finite objects existing for a finite signo. La respuesta de Kripke a esta sugerencia
Página 5 de 34 COLIN MCGINN

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
64
COLIN MCGINN
time, whereas addition is a function with infinitely disposicional consiste en dos observaciones: en
main arithmetical consequences; in the second place, primer lugar, las disposiciones de uso son finitas ya
speakers are disposed to make mistakes in their use of que los seres humanos son objetos finitos existiendo
signs, and so dispositions by themselves cannot por un tiempo finito, mientras la adición es una
properly account for normativeness. The dispositional función con muchas e infinitas consecuencias
suggestion just equates, Kripke says, competence with aritméticas. En segundo lugar, los hablantes están
performance: but performance by itself cannot capture dispuestos a cometer errores en su uso de los signos.
the infinity of meaning nor its normativeness. So Así las disposiciones por sí mismas no pueden
meaning addition by '+' cannot consist in being propiamente dar cuenta de la normatividad. La
disposed to give the sum of arbitrary pairs of numbers sugerencia disposicional, dice Kripke, sólo iguala
on demand: some numbers are simply too big, and we competencia con desempeño eficiente. Pero el
may have systematic tendencies to give something desempeño eficiente por sí mismo no puede capturar
other than the sum because of errors of calculation. la infinidad del significado ni su normatividad. Así,
significar adición a través de "+" no puede consistir
en "estar dispuestos a dar la suma" de un par de
números arbitrarios dados. Algunos números
simplemente son muy grandes y podríamos tener una
tendencia sistemática a dar como resultado algo
distinto a la suma natural, debido a errores de
cálculo.

Kripke claims (on Wittgenstein's behalf) that these Kripke afirma (según su interpretación de
three replies to the semantic sceptic exhaust the Wittgenstein) que estas tres respuestas al semántico
possibilities, and so we must concede that there is escéptico agotan las posibilidades, y por eso debemos
nothing for my having meant addition to consist in. conceder que no hay nada que apoye el significado o
But once we concede this we admit that the same idea que tengo de "suma". Pero una vez que
scepticism applies to my present use of “+”: for the admitimos esto, también admitimos que el mismo
same sceptical question could be asked about my escepticismo aplica a mi uso presente de "+". En un
present meaning at some future time, and the same futuro cercano, la misma pregunta escéptica podría
range of possible answers will be shown to be aplicarse a mi significado en uso y entonces el mismo
inadequate then. Indeed, if we ask directly what rango de respuestas posibles se mostrarán también
constitutes my presently meaning addition and not como inadecuadas. En efecto, si preguntamos
quaddition we shall be faced with the same difficulty: directamente qué es lo que constituye o apoya mi
actual use, present states of consciousness and present significado actual de "adición" y "suma cuarta",
dispositions to use will all fail to fix a unique meaning habremos de encarar la misma dificultad. El uso
for my words. So there is likewise nothing about my actual, los estados presentes de conciencia y las
present use of signs that makes that use right or disposiciones presentes de uso fallarán en acordar un
wrong: the whole notion of meaning appears to significado único para mis palabras. Del mismo
collapse. (4) This, then, is the first, negative phase of modo, no hay nada en lo que respecta a mi uso
Wittgenstein's discussion of meaning, as Kripke presente, que señale que este sea correcto o
interprets him. equivocado. La noción entera de significado parece
colapsarse. (4) Esto es el primer rostro negativo de
Wittgenstein en la discusión sobre el significado,
como Kripke la interpreta.

Página 6 de 34 COLIN MCGINN

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
65
COLIN MCGINN
The second, positive phase consists in an effort to Lo segundo es un rostro positivo que consiste en un
draw the sting from the sceptical paradox while not esfuerzo por bosquejar el corazón de la paradoja escéptica
questioning its substance. The strategy, as I remarked, sin cuestionar su substancia. Su estrategia, como ya
is to reject the sceptic's presupposition that ascriptions subrayé, es rechazar el supuesto escéptico de que las
of meaning are in the business of stating facts; rather, atribuciones de un significado están bajo negociación de
we are to conceive of their significance in terms of (a) hechos establecidos, en lugar de ello, debemos considerar
their assertibility conditions and (b) their role or utility esos significados en términos de (a) sus condiciones de
or point in discourse. The effect of this move is to asertabilidad o precisión y (b) su rol, utilidad o punto
undercut the key assumption of the sceptic: we are to específico en el discurso. El resultado de este proceder es
see that all along he was attacking a straw man, debilitar el supuesto clave del escéptico. Debemos ver que
though a straw man with whom we naturally and en todo este tiempo se ha estado atacando a un
naively identify. According to Kripke, the change of espantapájaros, el cual se ha identificado con naturalidad e
perspective needed to fend off the sceptic reflects ingenuidad. De acuerdo con Kripke, el cambio de
Wittgenstein's shift from the philosophy of language perspectiva necesaria para evadir la reflexión escéptica de
espoused in the Tractatus to that put forward in the Wittgenstein oscila desde la filosofía del lenguaje expuesta
Investigations: the sceptic is presupposing the kind of en el Tractatus, hasta aquella puesta más adelante en las
fact-stating model of meaning advocated in the Investigaciones. El escéptico está presuponiendo el modelo
Tractatus, and the cure for this scepticism is to adopt de significado propio del "hecho establecido" presente en el
the different conception of meaning we find in the Tractatus y la cura para este escepticismo está en adoptar
Investigations - with its emphasis upon the role of la otra concepción del significado que encontramos en las
criteria and the place of language in our lives. The Investigaciones (con un énfasis especial en el rol de los
sceptic seems to us to be striking at the very notion of criterios y el lugar que tiene el lenguaje en nuestras vidas).
meaning only because we are powerfully attracted to El escéptico nos parece estar apuntando a la noción propia
the conception of language articulated in the de significado, sólo porque nosotros mismos estamos
Tractatus: if we can free ourselves from that poderosamente atraídos a la concepción del lenguaje
conception we shall no longer feel ourselves articulada en el Tractatus. Si podemos liberarnos de tal
threatened by the sceptic's arguments; but it is hard to concepción no tendremos que sentirnos amenazados por
tree ourselves from it, so the threat feels real. (5) los argumentos escépticos, pero es difícil hacerlo así que
sentimos que la amenaza es real. (5)

Although Kripke does not himself say so, there are, I Aunque Kripke no lo exprese por sí mismo de esta forma,
think, other areas of philosophy in which much the hay según creo yo, otras áreas de la filosofía en las cuáles
same strategy has been tried, and it will be useful to la misma estrategia ha sido aplicada y sería útil mantener
have these in mind when we enquire whether esto en mente cuando nos preguntemos si Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein really proceeds as Kripke suggests. realmente procede como Kripke sugiere. Tres casos
Three parallels may be mentioned. First, certain sons paralelos pueden mencionarse. Primero cierta clase de
of noncognitivism in ethics can be viewed in an ética no-cognitivista (non-cognitivist) puede ser visualizada
analogous way: the noncognitivist cannot find facts de forma análoga. El no-cognitivista tiene problemas para
suitable for correspondence with ethical statements, encontrar hechos capaces de corresponderse con
and so he suggests that ethical utterances be conceived afirmaciones éticas. Así se llega a sugerir que las
in a non-fact-stating way instead - as prescriptions to expresiones éticas han sido concebidas de una manera "no
action or expressions of emotion, say. This type of establecida de hecho" (igual que las prescripciones a la
view might be motivated by the incapacity of non- acción o expresiones de emoción). Este tipo de visión
queer facts to add up to what we intuitively demand of podría ser motivada por la incapacidad de poder agregar
ethical truth or by a conviction that what would add up hechos apropiados y "no-extraños" ("non queer facts") a lo
to that is in some way metaphysically rebarbative. (6) que una verdad ética nos demanda intuitivamente, o tal vez
Instead of abandoning ethical utterances as también, por la convicción de que lo que agregamos a esa
meaningless in the absence of ethical facts the verdad es en cierto sentido metafísicamente "raro" . (6) En
noncognitivist reinterprets their purport - he proposes lugar de abandonar las expresiones éticas como simples sin
a different conception of meaning for such sentences. sentidos en la ausencia de hechos éticos, el no-cognitivista
Página 7 de 34 COLIN MCGINN

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
66
COLIN MCGINN
Thus emotivism (say) can be seen as a sceptical reinterpreta su objetivo. Él propone una concepción
solution to a sceptical paradox - the paradox, namely, diferente de "significado" para tales afirmaciones. De esta
that there is nothing in the world that could constitute manera, el "emotivismo" (por llamarlo así) puede ser
the value-fact we naively take ethical assertions to contemplado como una solución escéptica a la "paradoja
require; and the sceptical solution is that these escéptica" . Esta paradoja, a saber, la que afirma que no
'assertions1 serve rather to express the emotions of the existe nada en el mundo que pueda llegar a constituir un
speaker or some such thing. (7) "hecho de valor". Tomamos ingenuamente las expresiones
éticas como exigencias, y la solución escéptica es que
estas "expresiones" sirven más bien para expresar las
emociones del hablante o cosas parecidas. (7)

Second, there is the doctrine of instrumentalism with Segundo, existe la doctrina del instrumentalismo en lo que
respect to the theoretical sentences of science: the respecta a los enunciados teoréticos de la ciencia. El
instrumentalist cannot (he thinks) find any genuine instrumentalista no puede (según piensa) encontrar hechos
facts to correspond to such sentences, but he preserves genuinos que se correspondan con tales enunciados, pero
their role in discourse by interpreting them in a preserva su rol en el discurso, interpretandolos de una
different way - as useful devices for organising the manera distinta (como mecanismos útiles para organizar
real facts. Instead of reacting to the lack of suitable hechos auténticos). En vez de reaccionar a la falta de
facts by declaring talk of unobservables void of hechos apropiados evidenciando un habla llena de
significance, he gives up the fact-stating model and inadvertidos vacíos de significado, se renuncia al modelo de
opts for a different account of meaning - in terms, hechos establecidos y se opta por un balance diferente del
perhaps, of assertibility conditions and organisational significado (quizás en términos de condiciones de
utility. Third, certain views of mathematical asertabilidad y utilidad organizacional). Tercero, ciertas
statements display this dialectical form: seeking facts orientaciones de los enunciados matemáticos despliegan
to correspond to mathematical sentences we find esta forma dialéctica: buscando hechos que se
ourselves discouraged either by the incapacity of correspondan con enunciados matemáticos, nos
mundane facts to do the job or by the seeming encontramos desanimados por la incapacidad de los actos
necessity to postulate 'queer' facts (platonism); so we mundanos para realizar este trabajo o por la aparente
abandon the factstating referential model altogether necesidad de postular hechos "extraños" (Platonismo). Así,
and put in its place a different account 0f meaning - abandonamos el modelo de hechos establecidos y
e.g., that mathematical sentences get their significance ponemos en su lugar una explicación diferente del
from their empirical applications. This again would be significado. Por ejemplo, que los enunciados matemáticos
aptly characterised as a sceptical solution to a consiguen su significado de sus aplicaciones empíricas. De
sceptical paradox: one agrees with the sceptic that no nuevo, esto puede ser apropiadamente caracterizado como
mathematical facts can be found, but one averts his una solución escéptica para una paradoja escéptica. Uno
radical conclusion (mathematics is meaningless) by acuerda con el escéptico que ningún hecho matemático
proposing an alternative account of meaning that puede ser encontrado, pero uno evita esta conclusión tan
makes the sceptical paradox irrelevant. (8) I think radical (las matemáticas son un absurdo sin sentido)
that these three issues exemplify the general pattern of proponiendo un explicación o recuento alternativo del
argument Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein; we can significado que haga de la paradoja escéptica algo
see Kripke's dialectic as adding yet another kind of irrelevante. (8) Creo que estos tres cuestionamientos
'noncognitivism' to the list of more familiar doctrines ejemplifican la estructura general del argumento que Kripke
of which I have given three examples. atribuye a Wittgenstein. Podemos ver la dialéctica de Kripke
como una que todavía agrega algún tipo de "anti-
cogniscitivismo" a la lista de las doctrinas más familiares
que nos han ocupado en estos tres ejemplos.

Página 8 de 34 COLIN MCGINN

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

COLIN MCGINN 67

So far I have only explained the sense in which Hasta aquí, sólo he explicado el sentido en el que la visión
Kripke's positive view of semantic statements is a positiva de Kripke sobre los enunciados semánticos, se
sceptical solution; I have not said what form that transforma en solución escéptica. No he dicho nada sobre
positive view takes. The central idea, attributed to la forma que toma aquella visión positiva. La idea central,
Wittgenstein, is that the assertibility conditions and atribuida a Wittgenstein, es que las condiciones de
point of ascriptions of meaning essentially involve the asertabilidad y el punto de la adscripción del significado,
notion of a community. Thus to say that someone envuelven esencialmente la noción de una comunidad.
means addition by "+" is warranted just if (a) he Entonces, decir que una persona significa adición con el
agrees in his responses with the responses of some signo "+" está justificado sólo si: (a) la persona converge en
community who use and (b) he can be trusted in his sus respuestas con "+", con las respuestas de alguna
interactions with members of a community in comunidad que use "+"; y (b) La persona puede confiar en
situations involving "+" . That is to say, the notion of que sus interacciones con los miembros de la comunidad
a rule is an essentially social one, involving inter- dentro de situaciones que envuelvan que envuelvan al
personal relations; solve cannot give an account of signo "+". Esto nos dice que: la noción de una regla es
rule following in individualistic terms. (9) esencialmente la de una regla social. Envuelve relaciones
interpersonales y así, no podemos dar recuentos de reglas
seguidas en términos individuales. (9)

We cannot, Kripke says, make sense of someone No podemos, afirma Kripke, concederle sentido a alguien
following a rule “considered in isolation”. Kripke que sigue una regla "pensada en soledad". Kripke compara
compares this result with Hume's positive account of el resultado de esto con la explicación positiva de Hume
causation: the relation of causation between a pair of acerca de la causación. La relación de causación entre un
events cannot be explicated solely by reference to par de eventos no puede ser explicada solamente haciendo
those events, as we naively suppose; rather, when we referencia a aquellos eventos, como suponemos
speak of causal relations we are (tacitly) subsuming ingenuamente. Más bien, cuando hablamos de relaciones
the pair of events in question under a generalisation causales, estamos (tácitamente) subsumiendo el par de
involving other events. Thus the assertibility eventos en cuestión, bajo una generalización que envuelve
conditions of "e caused f" are inherently 'social': otros eventos. De esta forma, las condiciones de
events can stand in causal relations only in virtue of asertabilidad de la expresión: " e causó f " son
their membership in a 'community1 of events. Kripke inherentemente sociales. Los eventos pueden descansar en
puts this by saying that there cannot, on Hume's view, relaciones causales sólo en virtud de su filiación en una
be 'private causation'; as there cannot be 'private', i.e. "Comunidad" de eventos. Kripke expone esto diciendo que
individualistic, rule-following, according to no puede existir, según Hume, "causación privada", por
Wittgenstein. In sum, then, the 'sceptical solution' ejemplo, una "regla de seguimiento individualista" a la
consists in two moves: first the replacement of truth manera de Wittgenstein. En suma, La solución escéptica
conditions (correspondence to facts) by assertibility consiste en dos movimientos: primero, el reemplazo de las
conditions, and second the introduction of the condiciones de verdad (correspondientes con los actos) por
community into the notion of rule-following. These las condiciones de asertabilidad. Segundo, la introducción
two moves are, of course, logically independent, but del concepto de comunidad dentro de las noción de regla
Kripke's claim is that both are necessary if the de seguimiento. Estos dos movimientos son lógicamente
sceptical paradox is to be answered. (10) independientes pero lo que Kripke afirma es que ambos son
necesarios si la paradoja escéptica se quiere resolver. (10)

Página 9 de 34 COLIN MCGINN

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
68
COLIN MCGINN
What I have just given is a swift summary of a rich Lo que acabo de dar es un resumen ligero de un rico y
and detailed course of argument, intended to remind detallado argumento. Intenta recordarle al lector los puntos
the reader of the salient points of Kripke's principales de la interpretación de Kripke más que sustituir
interpretation rather than substitute for.it. Let us now aquel. Permítasenos ahora preguntar si esta interpretación
ask whether this interpretation accords with what esta de acuerdo con lo que Wittgenstein dice, comenzando
Wittgenstein says, beginning with the question con la pregunta de si Wittgenstein realmente aboga por una
whether Wittgenstein really advocates a sceptical paradoja escéptica acerca del significado y las reglas. Los
paradox about meaning and rules. The central pasajes centrales para considerar esto son el 198 y el 201
passages to consider here are 198 and 201 in which en los cuales Kripke interpreta a un Wittgenstein que recién
Kripke takes Wittgenstein to be stating his sceptical toma la tesis escéptica de que no hay hechos que puedan
thesis that there are no facts for meaning to consist in. denotar en qué consiste un significado.

Kripke quotes the beginning of 201: Kripke cita el comienzo del 201

This was our paradox: no course of action could be Esta fue nuestra paradoja: ningún curso de la acción
determined by a rule, because every course of action podría ser determinada por una regla, porque todo
can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer curso de acción puede ser elaborado para coincidir con
was: if everything can be made out to accord with the la regla. La respuesta fue: Si todo puede ser elaborado
rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. para estar de acuerdo con la regla, en ese entonces
And so there would be neither accord nor conflict también puede ser elaborado para estar en conflicto
here. (201) con ella. y de esta forma, no tendríamos conflicto o
coincidencia aquí. (201)

But he signally fails to quote, or even to heed, what Pero él, señaladamente se olvida de citar, o aun de prestar
immediately follows this: atención, a lo que inmediatamente sigue de esto:

It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here Puede verse que existe un malentendido aquí por el
from the mere fact that in the course of our solo hecho de que en el transcurso de nuestro
argument we give one interpretation after another; argumento, nosotros damos una interpretación
as if each one contented us at least for a moment, después de otra; Como si cada uno se contentara al
until we thought of yet another standing behind it. menos por un momento, hasta que se nos ocurriera
What this shews is that there is a way of grasping a quizás alguna idea detrás de ella. Lo que esto muestra
rule which is not an interpretation, but which is es que hay una forma de captar la regla que no es una
exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and interpretación, pero que es exhibida en lo que nosotros
"going against it" in actual cases. llamamos el "obedecer la regla" e "ir en contra de ella"
en los casos reales.

Hence there is an inclination to say: every action Por lo tanto hay una inclinación para decir: Cada acción
according to the rule is an interpretation. But we según la regla es una interpretación. Pero debemos
ought to restrict the term "interpretation" to the restringir el término "interpretación" a la sustitución de
substitution of one expression of the rule for una expresión de la regla por otra. (201)
another. (201)

Página 10 de 34 COLIN MCGINN

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

COLIN MCGINN 69

There are two things to notice about this passage Hay dos cosas a notar sobre este pasaje que desmienten la
which give the lie to Kripke's interpretation. (11) primera parte de la interpretación de Kripke (11) , Primero,
First, Wittgenstein makes it clear immediately that the Wittgenstein aclara inmediatamente que la paradoja
stated paradox arises from a 'misunderstanding', i.e. a indicada proviene de un malentendido, o sea una
false presupposition; so he cannot really be endorsing presuposición falsa. Así es que él no puede realmente
the paradox, as Hume embraces his own sceptical estar respaldando a la paradoja, así como Hume no acepta
claims about causation. Second, when we ask what the los reclamos escépticos acerca de la causación. En
misunderstanding is we are told that it is the mistake segundo lugar, cuando nos preguntamos en qué consiste el
of assuming that grasping a rule is placing an malentendido, se nos dice que es el error de asumir que:
interpretation upon a sign, i.e. associating it with seguir la regla significa establecer una interpretación sobre
another sign - an assumption which Wittgenstein algún signo, es decir, asociándola con otra señal - una
thinks we are by no means compelled to make. In suposición que Wittgenstein piensa, estamos
other words, Wittgenstein is putting forward the acostumbrados a seguir, pero no obligados a realizar. En
paradox as a reductio ad absurdum of the otras palabras, Wittgenstein propone la paradoja como una
interpretational conception; it is the inevitable result reducción al absurdo de la concepción interpretacional;
of that particular misunderstanding about the nature of porque es el resultado inevitable de este malentendiendo
grasp of a rule. Wittgenstein no more endorses the sobre la naturaleza de seguir una regla. Wittgenstein no
stated paradox than does any philosopher who gives a respalda más a la paradoja indicada, de lo que lo haría
reductio of his opponent's position. Wittgenstein does cualquier filósofo que da un Reductio a la posición de su
not say that the paradox arises from the adversario. Wittgenstein no dice que la paradoja surja del
misunderstanding that ascriptions of rules state facts malentendido de las atribuciones a los "estados de hechos"
or have truth conditions, nor does he suggest that the en las reglas o a sus condiciones de verdad, ni sugiere que
underlying mistake is to consider the rule-follower in el error subyacente sea considerar al seguidor de la regla
social isolation; what he is objecting to is the specific en alguna clase de aislamiento social; lo que él desaprueba
conception of understanding as a mental operation of es la concepción específica de entender todo esto como
translation. una operación mental de traducción.

If Kripke were right, Wittgenstein ought to be found Si Kripke estuviera en lo correcto, Wittgenstein debe ser
saying, after his statement of the paradox: “What this encontrado diciendo, después de su declaración de la
shows is that grasping a rule is not a fact about an paradoja: " Lo que esto muestra es que seguir una regla no
individual considered in social isolation” ; but this is es un hecho acerca de un individuo considerado en el
nothing like what he actually does say. If there is one aislamiento social "; pero esto es ni de lejos lo que él en
key oversight in Kripke's exposition of Wittgenstein, realidad dice. Si hay un descuido crucial en la exposición de
it is that of ignoring what Wittgenstein says in 201 Kripke sobre Wittgenstein, es el de pasar por alto lo que
straight after stating the paradox: for Wittgenstein Wittgenstein dice en 201 enseguida de decir la paradoja,
here gives his most explicit diagnosis of the paradox pues Wittgenstein da aquí su diagnóstico más explícito de
and what he says is remote from Kripke's attribution. la paradoja… y lo que él dice está alejado de la imputación
This is also made very clear in 198: the lesson of the de Kripke. Esto se hace también muy claro en 198: La
paradox is said to be that interpretations do not lección de la paradoja es que las interpretaciones no
determine meaning; it is not that meaning does not determinan el significado; No es que el significado no
consist in individualistic facts. What Wittgenstein is consista en hechos individuales. Lo que Wittgenstein dice
saying is that certain sorts of facts fail to determine es que ciertos tipos de hechos se fallan al determinar el
meaning, viz. substituting one sign for another, not significado, por ejemplo al sustituir un signo por otro, más
that no facts do . (12) no dice que no exista hecho alguno. (12)

Página 11 de 34 COLIN MCGINN

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

COLIN MCGINN 70

Kripke's misinterpretation comes out clearly in his La mala interpretación de Kripke se vuelve evidente en sus
remarks about Wittgenstein's treatment of 'reading'. comentarios acerca del tratamiento de Wittgenstein sobre el
Reading is a kind of rule-following, and so Kripke ' leer '. La lectura es un tipo de seguimiento de la regla, y de
takes Wittgenstein to be propounding his paradox for esta manera es que Kripke supone que Wittgenstein
reading - reading is not an individualistic fact but is to propone su paradoja para "leer", lo que consiste en un
be understood in terms of social assertibility proceso interior - esto significa que la lectura no es un
conditions. (13) But when we consult the text we find hecho individual sino que debe ser comprendido en
that what Wittgenstein is opposing is a particular términos de unas condiciones de asertibilidad social (13) .
family of views about the sort of fact reading is - that Pero cuando consultamos el texto encontramos que lo que
it consists in an inner process: conscious, queer, or Wittgenstein está oponiendo es una familia particular de
physical - and advising us to look to what the reader puntos de vista acerca de la clase de hecho que supone el
does: acto de leer: sea esto algo consciente, subconsciente o
físico - y nos aconseja a mirar hacia lo que el lector hace:

But in the case of the living reading-machine Pero en el caso de la máquina-lectora viviente,
"reading" meant reacting to written signs in such- "leyendo" significó reaccionar a las señales escritas de
and-such ways. This concept was therefore quite tal o cual forma. Este concepto fue por consiguiente,
independent of that of a mental or other muy independiente al de un mecanismo mental u otro
mechanism.—Nor can the teacher here say of the parecido. - Ni el maestro puede decir aquí del alumno:
pupil: "Perhaps he was already reading when he "Quizás él ya estaba leyendo cuando dijo aquella
said that word". For there is no doubt about what he palabra". En este caso no hay duda acerca de lo que él
did.—The change when the pupil began to read was hizo.- El cambio cuando el pupilo comenzó a leer fue
a change in his behaviour; and it makes no sense un cambio en su comportamiento, y tiene poco sentido
here to speak of la first word in his new state'. (157) aquí el hablar de una "primera palabra en su nuevo
estado" . (157)

There is no suggestion in these sections that we are No hay evidencia en estas secciones de que estemos bajo
under threat of the paradox that reading never occurs, la amenaza de que la paradoja sobre la lectura nunca
that there is nothing for reading to consist in; rather, ocurra, de que no exista algún elemento en la lectura que
we are told to redirect our attention from supposed de origen a esta; más bien, recibimos instrucciones de
inner processes to the outer criteria we use forjudging redireccionar nuestra atención de supuestos procesos
someone to be a reader. In fact these sections do not interiores hacia los criterios exteriores que usamos al juzgar
contain a statement of the paradox at all, yet a alguien como un lector. De hecho estas secciones no
Wittgenstein is considering a case of rule-following; contienen una declaración de la paradoja en absoluto, si no
so it can hardly be maintained that the paradox is que más bien Wittgenstein está considerando un caso de
Wittgenstein's central and recurrent theme. (14) I seguir-la-regla; así es que a duras penas puede afirmarse
think the paradox is best seen as just one battle in a que la paradoja sea el tema central y recurrente de
general campaign against the inner process model, not Wittgenstein. (14) Pienso que la paradoja es mejor vista
as the primary focus of Wittgenstein's whole como simplemente una batalla en una guerra general en
discussion. Kripke says that the paradox is really the contra del modelo del proceso interno, no como el foco
main problem of the Investigations, but its infrequent primario de la discusión entera de Wittgenstein. Kripke dice
appearance belies this suggestion; and when it does que la paradoja es en realidad el problema principal de las
appear it figures as one more nail in the coffin of the Investigaciones, pero su aparición aislada desmiente esta
inner process model, to be hammered in along with a sugerencia; Y cuando esta aparece se nos figura más bien
number of other nails. "como un clavo más en el ataúd del modelo del proceso
interior, que termina clavado junto con algún número de
otros clavos."

Página 12 de 34 COLIN MCGINN

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

COLIN MCGINN
71

So the passages upon which Kripke bases his De esta manera los pasajes sobre los cuales Kripke basa
interpretation fail to support it and suggest instead a su interpretación fracasan en darle sostén y sugieren en
quite different view of Wittgenstein's intentions; but lugar de eso, un panorama muy diferente de las intenciones
can Kripke's interpretation find sustenance in more originales de Wittgenstein; ¿Pero la interpretación de Kripke
general considerations? This question has two parts, puede encontrar sustento en consideraciones más
corresponding to the constitutive and epistemological generales? Esta cuestión tiene dos partes, que se
versions of semantic scepticism. That Wittgenstein is corresponden con las versiones constitutivas y las
advocating a constitutive scepticism certainly seems epistemológicas del escepticismo semántico. Que
hard to square with the fact that he does offer an Wittgenstein "abogue por un escepticismo constitutivo"
account of the sort of thing understanding is: it is ciertamente parece no cuadrar con el hecho que él ofrece
mastery of a technique, possession of a capacity, un argumento sobre la clase de cosa que es el
participation in a custom. And it is notable that Kripke entendimiento: Es maestría de una técnica, posesión de
nowhere registers Wittgenstein's concern to connect una capacidad, participación en una costumbre. Y es
understanding with the concept of ability, as an notable que Kripke en ninguna parte registre la
alternative to the conception of understanding as a preocupación de Wittgenstein por conectar el concepto de
condition of consciousness. Nor does Wittgenstein entendimiento con el concepto de habilidad, como una
show any tendency to contest the factuality of alternativa a la concepción del entendimiento como una
ascriptions of ability; he merely protests against what condición de la conciencia. Ni tampoco nos muestra en
he takes to be misunderstandings about the sort of Wittgenstein, alguna tendencia a objetar la factibilidad que
thing an ability is (e.g. a configuration of one's 'mental tienen las "adscripciones de habilidad": Él solamente
apparatus'). [15] protesta en contra de aquello que nos confunde y nos lleva
a malentendidos acerca de la clase de cosa que es una
habilidad (por ejemplo la configuración de un ' aparato
mental'). (15)

It would be more accurate I think to say that Sería más preciso, creo yo, decir que Wittgenstein sitúa al
Wittgenstein locates understanding in one kind of fact entendimiento en una clase de hecho más que en otra tipo
rather than another kind; but if we want to capture the de figura; Pero si queremos capturar el espíritu verdadero
true spirit of Wittgenstein's discussion we do better de la discusión de Wittgenstein haremos mejor todavía en
still to drop all play with the notion of fact and simply descartar todo juego con la noción de hecho y simplemente
say that Wittgenstein is offering a description of the digamos que Wittgenstein ofrece una descripción de la '
'grammar' of the notion of understanding in terms of gramática ' de la noción de entendimiento en términos de
the notions of ability, technique, etc. I do not believe las nociones de habilidad, técnica, etcétera. No creo que
that Wittgenstein is thinking in terms of facts and non- Wittgenstein esté pensando aquí en términos de "hechos" y
facts at all here; certainly there is no hard textual "no-hechos"; Ciertamente no hay evidencia textual
evidence to support this sort of interpretation. Any contundente para sustentar este tipo de interpretación.
resistance on Wittgenstein's part to saying that Cualquier resistencia por parte de Wittgenstein para decir
understanding consists in, or is constituted by, a que el entendimiento consiste en, o es constituido por una
capacity stems from a general distrust of the enterprise capacidad, se arraiga en la desconfianza general sobre la
of philosophical analysis, not from a conviction that empresa del análisis filosófico, y no de alguna convicción de
understanding is somehow not a fact. (16) Indeed, I que el entendimiento sea alguna clase de hecho. (16)
think Wittgenstein would have regarded such an Ciertamente, pienso que Wittgenstein habría estimado tal
assertion, and such a debate, as quite empty, since aseveración, y tal debate, como muy vacío, ya que no
there is no substantial philosophical mileage to be got existe el recorrido filosófico sustancial para salirse de las
out of the notions of fact, truth conditions and nociones de: hechos, condiciones de verdad y
correspondence to conditions-in-the-world. Kripke correspondencia con las condiciones-en-el-mundo. Kripke
himself shows some awareness of this kind of point, mismo muestra alguna conciencia de esta situación, pero él

Página 13 de 34 COLIN MCGINN

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
72
COLIN MCGINN
but he boldly brushes it aside in the expectation that atrevidamente disuelve la cuestión con la actitud de tan sólo
he is conforming to the real spirit of Wittgenstein's "llegarse a asemejar" al espíritu real de la posición de
position; but I think he should take more seriously Wittgenstein; Pero pienso que él debería tomar más
Wittgenstein's deflationary remarks about truth and seriamente los comentarios negativos de Wittgenstein
facts. (17) At any rate, if we want to talk in terms of acerca de la verdad y los hechos. (17) En cualquier caso,
facts it seems that Wittgenstein does suggest that si es que deseamos hablar en términos de los hechos, tal
understanding consists in a fact, the fact of having an parece ser que Wittgenstein sugiere que la comprensión
ability to use signs. consiste en un hecho, el hecho de tener una habilidad para
usar signos.

It would also be wrong to interpret Wittgenstein as an También estaría mal el interpretar a Wittgenstein como un
epistemological sceptic. As I emphasised in Chapter 1, escéptico epistemológico. Como enfaticé en el Capítulo 1,
Wittgenstein's denial that our use of words is founded la negación de Wittgenstein respecto a que nuestro uso de
on reasons is not intended sceptically: the traditional palabras se funda en razones, no es aplicable
sceptic makes an inappropriate and impossible escépticamente: El escéptico tradicional establece una
demand on our epistemic concepts, and the right demanda inadecuada e imposible sobre nuestros conceptos
response to him is to question the need for what he epistémicos, y la respuesta correcta para él, es cuestionar
says there isn't. To lack reasons is not to be in a la necesidad de lo que a su decir: "no existe allí" . Andar
predicament to which doubt is the proper response; for escaso de razones, no significa estar en un apuro en el cual
doubt can be removed (better pre-empted) by our la duda sea la respuesta correcta; pues la duda puede ser
natural and habitual reactions. (18) This eliminada por vía de nuestras reacciones habituales
epistemoiogical position would prompt Wittgenstein naturales. (18) Esta posición epistemológica instigaría a
to dismiss Kripke's sceptic with the remark that of Wittgenstein a concederle al escéptico de Kripke, el
course our reasons come to an end but this does not comentario de que por supuesto que nuestras razones se
mean we are in any sort of epistemological trouble: acaban, pero esto no quiere decir que estemos en alguna
that I cannot prove to a determined sceptic that my clase de problema epistemológico (o mejor dicho de " pre -
present use of "+" is correct does not show that I do vaciado " ): Que no pueda probar a un escéptico decidido
not know how to apply it correctly or that I have que mi uso actual de ' + ' es correcto, no demuestra que no
anything less than a perfect right to proceed as I feel sepa cómo aplicarlo correctamente o que tengo menos
inclined. The author of On Certainty would surely not derecho a proceder como me sienta inclinado. El autor de
propound the kind of sceptical argument Kripke Sobre la Certeza seguramente no propondría la clase de
develops, resting as it does upon a conception of argumento escéptico que Kripke desarrolla, deteniéndose
knowledge and epistemic right that he steadfastly sobre una concepción de conocimiento y derecho
resists. Wittgenstein's epistemology would stop epistémico que él con tenacidad contrarresta. La
Kripke's sceptic before he got going; so we cannot epistemología de Wittgenstein detendría al escéptico de
interpret Wittgenstein as conceding victory to Kripke's Kripke antes de que él emprendiera el camino; Así es que
epistemoiogical sceptic and then offering what is at no podemos interpretar a Wittgenstein como concediendo
best a salvage operation. victoria al escéptico epistemológico de Kripke y entonces
ofreciendo lo que es en el mejor de los casos, una
operación de salvamento.

A crucial part of Kripke's constitutive paradox is his Una parte crucial de la paradoja constitutiva de Kripke es su
rejection of a dispositional conception of rechazo de una concepción disposicional del entendimiento;
understanding; so we should expect, if Kripke has Así es que deberíamos esperar, si Kripke comprende a
Wittgenstein right, that the same sort of argument be Wittgenstein correctamente, que el mismo tipo de
found in Wittgenstein, in view of its importance to the argumento sea encontrado en Wittgenstein, en vista de su
success of the sceptical thesis. What we find, importancia para el éxito de la tesis escéptica. Lo que
however, when we scour Wittgenstein's text is a total encontramos, sin embargo, cuando nosotros buscamos por
lack of anything remotely resembling the sorts of todos los sitios del texto de Wittgenstein es una falta total
considerations about dispositions advanced by Kripke. de cualquier cosa remotamente semejante a los tipos de
Página 14 de 34 COLIN MCGINN

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
73
COLIN MCGINN
All Kripke can say to explain this disparity is that consideraciones hechas por Kripke respecto de las
Wittgenstein is assuming the dispositional reply to the disposiciones. Todo lo que Kripke puede decir para explicar
sceptic to be unattractive to the audience of his book esta disparidad es que Wittgenstein asume la respuesta
at the time of writing - whereas the conscious state disposicional del escéptico como algo poco atractivo para
reply is taken to be the natural response to the sceptic la audiencia de su libro al momento de escribir - mientras
for that audience. que la respuesta del estado consciente sea tomada como la
respuesta natural para el escéptico, por parte de la
audiencia.

It is the change in the philosophical climate that Es el cambio en el clima filosófico lo que explica el aparente
explains the apparent difference between what desacuerdo entre lo que Wittgenstein dice y lo que Kripke
Wittgenstein says and what Kripke argues. (19) I find argumenta. (19) Yo encuentro esta explicación poco
this explanation unconvincing - for three reasons. convincente - por tres razones. Primero. me parece
First, it seems to me inconceivable that Wittgenstein inconcebible que Wittgenstein se negara totalmente a
would wholly neglect to consider what is probably the considerar lo que es probablemente la reacción más natural
most natural reaction lo the constitutive sceptic; surely del escéptico constitutivo; Seguramente la demolición de
the demolition of this idea is essential if the paradox is esta idea es esencial si la paradoja debe ser llevada a su
to be carried through. And the form of Kripke's término. Y la forma de la demolición de Kripke - las
demolition - the arguments from finiteness and discusiones de finitud y errores - no encuentra eco en el
mistakes - finds no echo in Wittgenstein's text: in texto de Wittgenstein: En particular, en los lugares donde
particular, at the places where Wittgenstein states his Wittgenstein enuncia su paradoja uno esperaría que él
paradox one would expect him to indicate that the indicara que la paradoja muestra (entre otras cosas) que la
paradox shows {inter alia) that understanding is not a comprensión no es una disposición y no es explicada en
disposition and is not to be explicated in terms of términos de "recuentos de hechos" acerca del uso, en lugar
counterfactuals about use, instead of saying (as he de decir que (como él hace) que la paradoja refuta la
does) that the paradox refutes the interpretational concepción del interpretacional. En ningún sitio
conception. Nowhere does Wittgenstein say, in Wittgenstein dice, en el paralelo con su reclamo que las
parallel with his claim that interpretations do not interpretaciones no determinan el significado, que las
determine meaning, that 'dispositions fail to determine disposiciones fracasan al determinar el significado y que lo
meaning' and that 'what this shows is that there is a que esto demuestra es "que estemos lejos de captar una
way of grasping a rule which is not a disposition'. We regla que no sea una disposición". Nosotros simplemente
just do not find the kinds of remark about dispositions no encontramos las clases de comentario acerca de las
which Kripke's interpretation leads us to expect. disposiciones que la interpretación de Kripke nos conduce a
esperar.

Second, and more privatively, in those rare places in En segundo lugar, y más probablemente, en aquellos raros
which the notion of disposition is invoked casos en los cuales la noción de disposición es invocada
Wittgenstein is clearly making a quite different point por Wittgenstein, se construye una gran diferencia de
from Kripke. Thus consider 149, the only passage in enfoque respecto a Kripke. Así considere 149, el único
the relevant sections of the Investigations in which the pasaje en las secciones pertinentes de las investigaciones
notion of disposition is explicitly invoked: en las cuales la noción de disposición es explícitamente
invocada:

If one says that knowing the ABC is a state of the Si uno dice que conocer el abecedario es un estado de
mind, one is thinking of a state of a mental la mente, uno piensa en un estado de un aparato mental
apparatus (perhaps of the brain) by means of (quizá del cerebro) por medio de lo cual explicamos las
which we explain the manifestations of that manifestaciones de ese conocimiento. Tal estado es
knowledge. Such a state is called a disposition. But llamado una disposición. Pero hay objeciones, para
there are objections to speaking of a state of the hablar de un estado de la mente aquí, en tal medida que
Página 15 de 34 COLIN MCGINN

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
74
COLIN MCGINN
mind here, inasmuch as there ought to be two deben haber dos criterios diferentes para tal estado: Un
different criteria for such a state: a knowledge of conocimiento de construcción del aparato, muy aparte
the construction of the apparatus, quite apart from de lo que hace.
what it does.

(Nothing would be more confusing here than to use (Nada sería más confuso aquí que destinar las
the words "conscious" and "unconscious" for the palabras: "consciencia" e "inconsciencia" para el
contrast between states of consciousness and contraste entre estados de conciencia y las
dispositions. For this pair of terms covers up a disposiciones. (Pues este par de términos encubren
grammatical difference.) (149) una diferencia gramatical.) (149)

Here Wittgenstein's objection seems to be that talk of La objeción de Wittgenstein parece hablar aquí, sobre
dispositions is likely to be accompanied by the idea aquellas disposiciones que tienen probabilidad de estar
that knowledge is a state of mind; and he thinks that acompañadas por la idea de que el conocimiento es un
this way of conceiving of knowledge leads to the estado mental; Y él piensa que esta forma de imaginar el
mistaken idea that there are two independent ways of conocimiento conduce a la idea equivocada de que hay dos
telling whether someone (e.g.) knows the ABC - by formas independientes de decir si alguien (por ejemplo)
examining his mental apparatus or by seeing what he sabe el abecedario - examinando su aparato mental o
does. Wittgenstein's purpose is, as usual, to discourage viendo lo que él hace. El propósito de Wittgenstein es,
the inner state model of concepts such as knowledge, como siempre, desalentar el modelo del "estado interior" de
and he is warning us that talk of dispositions is apt to conceptos, como conocimiento, y él nos advierte que hablar
go along with this model; instead we should attend to de disposiciones es algo muy propenso a estar de acuerdo
what the person does. If Kripke's interpretation were con este modelo; en lugar de eso deberíamos ocuparnos de
correct Wittgenstein would have to be saying that lo que la persona hace. Si la interpretación de Kripke
what a person it disposed to do does not fix what he estuviera en lo correcto Wittgenstein tendría que decir que
knows when he knows the ABC, but this is not what lo que una persona se disponga a hacer, no altera lo que
Wittgenstein says and indeed he seems to be ella sabe sobre el abecedario, pero esto no es lo que
suggesting just the contrary. (20) Wittgenstein dice y es un hecho que él parece sugerir
simplemente lo contrario. (20)

Third, Wittgenstein makes remarks that actually En tercer lugar, Wittgenstein hace comentarios que en
support the kind of dispositional suggestion Kripke realidad sustentan la clase de sugerencia disposicional
pits himself against: that is, Wittgenstein can be found contra las que Kripke mismo compite: Es decir, Wittgenstein
explaining, meaning in terms of counterfactuals about puede ser encontrado justificando, el significado en
use, thus consider this passage: términos de un uso condicional más objetivo, de ese modo
considere este pasaje:

What is essential is to see that the same thing can Lo que es esencial es observar que la misma cosa
come before our minds when we hear the word and puede llegar con antelación a nuestras mentes cuando
the application still be different. Has it the same oímos la palabra, y sin embargo la aplicación todavía
meaning both times? I think we shall say not. (140) puede ser diferente. ¿Tiene el mismo significado ambas
veces? Pienso que debemos decir con firmeza que no.
(140)

That is, if two speakers differ in their application of a Es decir, si dos oradores difieren en su aplicación de un
sign then we should say that they mean something signo en ese entonces deberíamos decir que quieren decir
different, despite the identity of their conscious states: algo diferente, a pesar de la identidad de sus estados
use determines meaning, not what transpires within. conscientes: El uso determina el significado, no lo que
This thought of Wittgenstein's hardly fits with subyace dentro de él. Este pensamiento de Wittgenstein no
Kripke's claim that differences of dispositions to use se ajusta bien al comentario de Kripke respecto a que las
Página 16 de 34 COLIN MCGINN

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
75
COLIN MCGINN
do not suffice to establish differences of meaning, on diferencias entre disposiciones de uso, no son suficientes
account of the possibility of systematic mistake para establecer diferencias de significado, pues existe la
Wittgenstein remark from 140 shows no sign of posibilidad de errores semánticos, por eso Wittgenstein no
acknowledgment of this kind of point, which would be muestra desde el 140 ningún signo de simpatía respecto a
amazing if he were really arguing in the way Kripke esta clase de punto, lo cuál sería realmente sorprendente si
suggests. realmente estuviéramos argumentando todo esto en la
forma que sugiere Kripke.

What Wittgenstein is doing here is drawing contrast Lo que Wittgenstein está haciendo aquí es dibujar el
between application and what presents itself to the contraste entre la aplicación y lo que se presenta a la
mind holding that identity of meaning between people mente, estableciendo que la identidad de significado entre
depends upon identity in respect of the former not the personas depende de una identidad con relación "a lo
latter; but Kripke's interpretation would have anterior" no "a lo más reciente"; Pero la interpretación de
Wittgenstein insisting upon the parity of the two sorts Kripke tendría a Wittgenstein insistiendo en la paridad de
of circumstance, not upon the contrast between them. los dos tipos de circunstancia, no en el contraste entre ellos.
On Kripke's view, both conscious states and En la perspectiva de Kripke, los estados conscientes y la
application fail to fix meaning, and so equally make aplicación se rehúsan a anclar el significado, y entonces por
no progress against the sceptic; but Wittgenstein esto no se logra progresar en contra del escéptico; Pero
himself evidently believes that there is an important Wittgenstein mismo evidentemente cree que hay una
difference between these with respect to the diferencia importante entre éstos con relación a la
determination of meaning. (This is not to say that determinación del significado. (Esto es para no decir que
Wittgenstein has some answer to Kripke's point about Wittgenstein tenga alguna respuesta para el punto de
mistakes; it is just that Wittgenstein shows himself to Kripke acerca de los errores; Es simplemente que
be unconcerned about such issues in the passage Wittgenstein se muestra despreocupado acerca de tales
quoted - so it cannot be that he has on his mind what cuestiones en el pasaje citado - así que no podría ser que
Kripke has on his.) A second passage of so me tuviera en mente lo que Kripke dice de él.) Un segundo
significance for the present issue is this: pasaje sobre el significado de la presente cuestión, es éste:

"But I already knew at the time when I gave the "Pero en aquel momento ya sabía (cuando di la orden), que
order, that he ought write 1002 after 1000 - él tenía que escribir 1002 después de 1000 - En efecto, y
Certainly; and you can also say you meant it then; así usted puede decir que : "quiso decir aquello". La única
only yon should not let yourself be mislead by the condición es que no debe permitirse a si mismo el ser
grammar of the words "know" and "mean". For confundido por las gramáticas de las palabras "conocer" y
you don't want to say that you thought of the step "querer decir". Pues resulta claro que usted no quiso decir
from 1000 to 1002 at that time - and even if you did que "había pensado" o "conocido" el paso del 1000 al 1002
think of this step, still you did not think of other en aquel mismísimo instante -- y aún si hubiera "pensado"
ones. When you said "1 already knew at the time . . en este paso, todavía no habría "pensado" en otros más.
." that meant something like: "If I had then been Cuando usted dice cosas como: "Yo ya lo sabía en ese
asked what number should he written after 1000. I instante"... en realidad usted quiere decir algo así como: "Si
should have replied 1002." And that I don't doubt. me hubieran preguntado qué número era el que debía
This assumption is rather of the same kind as: "If escribir después de 1000, entonces yo hubiera respondido:
he had fallen into the water then, 1 should have 1002"... y afirma que no tiene ninguna duda acerca de
jumped in after him". - Now, what was wrong with eso. Esta suposición es también de la misma clase que: "Si
your idea? (187) él se hubiera caído al agua, entonces mi deber hubiera sido
saltar después de él.” - Ahora dígame: ¿Cuál es el error en
su idea? (187)

Página 17 de 34 COLIN MCGINN

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

COLIN MCGINN 76

What is notable about this passage is Wittgenstein's Lo que es notable acerca de este pasaje es la tendencia de
willingness to employ a counterfactual about what Wittgenstein para utilizar cierto condicional material sobre lo
someone would have said in explanation of that que alguien dice al intentar explicar lo que otra persona
person's having meant something. Applied to Kripke's hubiera querido significar. Aplicado esto al ejemplo
favorite example. Wittgenstein's suggestion would run preferido de Kripke, la sugerencia de Wittgenstein sería
as follows: for me to have meant by '+' that '125' is the como sigue: Para mi, ¿Es correcto decir con el signo "+"
right answer to '67+58?' (assuming that this is a que "125" era la respuesta correcta a la suma "67+58"?
computation I had not come across or thought about) (Suponiendo que éste es un cálculo al que no me había
is for it to be true of me that had I been faced with that enfrentado o que hubiera pensado antes)… Esta verdad
question in the past I would have given that answer. en mi, depende de haber reflexionado la cuestión en el
Wittgenstein is comparing the case of meaning (or pasado para entonces dar la respuesta correcta. Así
knowing) paring the case of meaning (or knowing) Wittgenstein compara el caso del "significado" (o
with the case of trait of character such as bravery: to conocimiento) con un atributo de carácter particular como el
say I was brave yesterday is to assume that there are de la valentía: Decir que fui valiente ayer es asumir que hay
true counterfactuals such as 'If he had fallen into the condicionales materiales verdaderos tales como "Si él
water, I would have jumped in'; it is not to assume that hubiera caído al agua, yo habría saltado tras él"; aquí no se
I had somehow mentally rehearsed the brave action of asume como premisa que de alguna manera yo hubiera
saving a potential drowner. "entrenado mentalmente" la acción valiente de salvar un
naufrago potencial.

Similarly, to mean something at a given time is not to Análogamente, querer decir algo en un momento dado es
have it before one's mind at that time, so that every no tenerlo delante de la mente en ese instante. De esta
step of the series '+2' has already occurred to one; it is forma, cada paso de la serie ' +2 ' ya ha pasado por el
rather to be disposed to give the right answer, i.e. for número uno; eso en lugar de estar dispuesto "a dar la
the kinds of behavioural counterfactuals Wittgenstein respuesta correcta", por ejemplo, para el tipo de
cites to be true of one. (21) It is surely incredible that condicionales de conducta a los que Wittgenstein se refiere
Wittgenstein could have written this if his atitude to como verdaderos en la persona. (21) Es seguramente
counterfactuals concerning use were as Kripke increíble que Wittgenstein haya podido escribir esto si su
suggests; for Wittgenstein is in effect saying in 187 actitud para condicionales materiales relativos al uso fueran
exactly what Kripke supposes him to reject. It is true como Kripke sugiere; Pues Wittgenstein en efecto dice en
that Wittgenstein does not claim that the 187 exactamente lo que Kripke le supone desechar. Es
counterfactuals provide a reductive analysis of the verdad que Wittgenstein no afirma que los condicionales
notion of meaning something - he says only that the materiales provean un análisis reduccionista de la noción de
latter 'means something like' the former - but this is to significado - él solamente dice que lo "más reciente"
be seen as a reflection of his suspicion of the whole significa algo similar a "lo anterior" - pero esto debe verse
idea of conceptual analysis; it is not prompted by an como una reflexión sobre su sospecha ala idea entera del
unstated recognition of the kinds of argument Kripke análisis conceptual; y no es impulsado por algún
gives against explicating meaning in terms of reconocimiento tácito a las clases de argumento que Kripke
counterfactuals. What Wittgenstein is suggesting is da cuando va en contra de explicar el significado en
that we can capture enough of the grammar of the términos de condicionales. Lo que Wittgenstein sugiere es
notion of meaning by invoking counterfactuals to que podemos captar bastante de la gramática de la noción
point us in the right philosophical direction (or away de significado invocando a condicionales que nos dirijan en
from the wrong direction); he cannot therefore be la dirección filosófica correcta (o lejos de la dirección
taken to be conducting a sceptical campaign in which equivocada); Wittgenstein por consiguiente no puede ser
the employment of counterfactuals is a defensive interpretado como dirigiendo una campaña escéptica en la
manoeuvre to be blocked and repulsed. What cual el empleo de condicionales sea una maniobra
Wittgenstein ought to be saying, on Kripke's defensiva para cerrarse y aislarse. Lo que Wittgenstein
debe estar diciendo, "en la interpretación de Kripke", es que
Página 18 de 34 COLIN MCGINN

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
77
COLIN MCGINN
interpretation, is that ascriptions of meaning are not las adscripciones de significado no son equivalentes a la
tantamount to (mean nothing like) the assertion of declaración de condicionales acerca del uso (o algo
counterfactuals about use; but this is the exact parecido). Pero en la realidad esto es el opuesto exacto de
opposite of what he does say in 187. lo que Wittgenstein intenta decirnos en 187.

En este pasaje, así como en 140, Wittgenstein contrasta lo


In this passage, as in 140, Wittgenstein is contrasting que ocurre en la mente de uno cuando algo es dado a
what happens in one's mind when something is meant entender con lo que es el verdadero de comportamiento de
with what is, true of one's behaviour, including uno, incluyendo los condicionales acerca del
counterfactuals about one's behaviour; he is not comportamiento de uno. Wittgenstein no está entendiendo a
treating both as sharing as incapacity to supply the estos dos aspectos como incapaces de sustituir la clase de
sort of fact Kripke's sceptic is demanding. hecho que el escéptico de Kripke está demandando.

Por estas razones, entonces, dudo que Kripke esté en lo


For these reasons, then, I doubt that Kripke is right to correcto al interpretar a Wittgenstein como abogando a
interpret Wittgenstein as advocating a sceptical favor de una paradoja escéptica diseñada para demostrar
paradox designed to show that there is no 'fact of the que no hay "hechos materiales" respecto a lo que
matter' about what we mean. So nothing in queremos significar. Así que nada en la discusión de
Wittgenstein's discussion suggests the sort of negative Wittgenstein sugiere el primer estadio negativo
first stage characteristic of the analogous doctrines I característico de las doctrinas que ya mencioné tiempo
mentioned earlier; we are not being prepared for the atrás. No estamos preparados para la clase de solución
kind of sceptical solution proffered by the likes of escéptica propuesta por los partidarios del emotivismo e
emotivism and instrumentalism. There is not a instrumentalismo. No hay un distintivo entre condiciones de
distinguishing of truth conditions and assertibility verdad y condiciones de asertibilidad que den cuenta del
conditions accounts of meaning and then a purported significado, Y entonces una supuesta comprobación de que
demonstration that semantic statements have no las declaraciones semánticas no tienen condiciones
determinate truth conditions; rather, there is an definidas de verdad; expresan más bien, que hay una
opposition between two different conceptions of the oposición entre dos concepciones diferentes de la
sort of thing meaning is - roughly speaking, naturaleza a que pertenece el significado - hablando en
conceptions which locate meaning in the inner and in términos generales, concepciones que localizan el
the outer. (22) And if this is the correct interpretation, significado en lo interior y en lo exterior. (22) Y si ésta es la
we will not be able to construe Wittgenstein as interpretación correcta, no estaremos justificados para
proposing anything that deserves to be called a explicar a Wittgenstein, como proponiendo que cualquier
'sceptical solution': his positive view simply has the cosa merece ser llamada una "solución escéptica": su
status of a correct account of the concepts at issue, optimista punto de vista simplemente tiene el estatus de un
though it is an account which for various reasons it is recuento correcto de los conceptos en disputa, aunque sea
hard to see ourselves clear to accepting as adequate un recuento que por varias razones nos resulta difícil de
and complete. Nevertheless, we can still ask enfocar para aceptarlo, como algo adecuado y completo.
whether Kripke is right to ascribe to Wittgenstein a No obstante, todavía podemos preguntar si Kripke tiene la
community conception of rule following, razón de atribuir a Wittgenstein una concepción comunal de
independently of whether this is intended as a seguir-la-regla, independientemente de si esto es tenido en
sceptical solution to a sceptical paradox. 1 shall mente como una solución escéptica para una paradoja
maintain that this ascription is also mistaken. escéptica. Yo aseguro que esta adscripción es también
equivocada.

Página 19 de 34 COLIN MCGINN

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

COLIN MCGINN 78

The community enters, according to Kripke, by way La comunidad entra generalmente, según Kripke, por vía de
of the normativeness of meaning and of rules la normatividad del significado y de las reglas: cuando
generally: when we say that someone is using a word decimos que alguien está usando una palabra
wrongly we mean that his use of that word disagrees equivocadamente, queremos decir que su uso de la palabra
with the use made of it by members of a linguistic no está acorde con el uso hecho por otros miembros de una
community; and right use is agreement of use. comunidad lingüística; y que el uso correcto esta
sincronizado con cierto uso.

If we consider the individual in isolation all we can Si nosotros consideramos al individuo en soledad, todo lo
say is that it seems to him that he is using words que podemos decir de él es que está usando las palabras
correctly; but if we broaden our gaze to take in his correctamente, pero si ampliamos el panorama hasta su
community we can make sense of the indispensable comunidad, podemos darle sentido a la idea indispensable
idea that this seeming may be delusive, that he is not de que esto pareciera ser algo engañoso, de que la persona
really using words correctly at all. Thus the correct no está en realidad usando las palabras con corrección. De
assertibility condition for "he means addition by '+'" is esta manera, la condición de asertibilidad correcta para la
that his responses with "+" agree with mine or those of frase <<Él quiere decir adición a través de "+">> está en
his community, and these latter persons are que él responda con "+" para estar de acuerdo conmigo o
primitively entitled to take themselves to mean con su comunidad, Y estas últimas personas están
addition by '+'. On this interpretation, Wittgenstein primitivamente facultadas a tomar dentro de si el significado
builds the notion of community right into the notion of de "adición" con el signo ' + '. En este tenor, Wittgenstein
rule, in such a way that rule-following cannot be construye la noción de comunidad insertándola en la noción
individualistically conceived - to say someone is de "regla", de tal manera que "seguir-la-regla" no pueda ser
following a rule is necessarily to advert to other rule- concebida individualmente --- decir que alguien está
followers. Thus the notion of rule-following turns out siguiendo la regla es reconocer necesariamente la
to be a social notion in somewhat the way the notions existencia de otros seguidores de la regla. De esta forma la
of a conformist or a club member or a fashionable noción de seguimiento de regla llega a ser una noción
dresser are social notions: none of these properties can social, un poco a la manera en que las nociones de:
be possessed by individuals 'considered in isolation'. "conformista", "miembro de un club" o "un guardarropa muy
Now is there any textual support for this interpretation de moda" son nociones sociales: ninguna de estas
of Wittgenstein? (23) propiedades pueden ser poseídas por individuos
"considerados en soledad". Ahora veamos: ¿Existe alguna
evidencia en el texto para esta interpretación de
Wittgenstein? (23)

Let us re-examine 198-202 in which Wittgenstein is Permítasenos re-examinar el periodo 198-202 en el cuál
putting forward his positive view and opposing it to Wittgenstein está proponiendo una perspectiva positiva y la
the view he rejects. The most glaring feature of these opone a la opinión que él rechaza. El elemento
sections in the present connection is that the words sobresaliente de estas secciones respecto a la presente
'custom', 'practice' and 'use' are never qualified with conexión es que las palabras: "costumbre", "práctica" y
'social' or 'community' - and 'social custom/practice' is "uso" nunca son relacionadas o "calificadas" con las
not pleonastic. Surely Wittgenstein would have expresiones "social" o "comunidad" --- y
inserted these qualifying adjectives if he really meant "costumbre/practica social" no son un pleonasmo (es decir,
to maintain a social conception of rule-following, no son redundantes). Seguramente Wittgenstein hubiera
especially in view of the fact that the introduction of insertado estos adjetivos calificativos si realmente hubiera
the community is taken to be a surprising result of querido sostener una concepción social de "segur-la-regla",
signal importance - as sharply conflicting with what especialmente en vista del hecho de que la introducción a la
we antecedently expect. And if we look for a gloss on idea de comunidad está tomada como un resultado
the use of 'custom' etc. we find, as 1 stressed in sorpresivo de simbólica importancia --- algo así Como estar
Chapter 1, the insistence that rules must be followed en conflicto tajante con aquello que prevemos. Y si
Página 20 de 34 COLIN MCGINN

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
79
COLIN MCGINN
on more than one occasion - i.e. the existence of rules buscamos un comentario en el uso de "costumbre",
depends upon 'regular use'. Wittgenstein does use etcétera, encontraremos (como señalé en el capítulo 1) la
'custom' and 'practice' to suggest the idea of a insistencia de que las reglas deben de seguirse en más de
multiplicity, but it is a multiplicity of instances of rule una ocasión --- por ejemplo, la existencia de reglas
following not of persons who follow the rules. depende de un "uso regular". Wittgenstein usa "costumbre"
y "práctica" para sugerir la idea de "multiplicidad", pero se
refiere a la multiplicidad de instancias al "seguri-la-regla" y
no a las personas que siguen las reglas.

And this is part and parcel of Wittgenstein's general Y este es el detalle de la tesis general de Wittgenstein de
thesis that meaning is use: a sign has meaning only in que el significado es uso: Un signo tiene significado sólo en
virtue of bemg (repeatedly) used in a certain way. This virtud de ser usado (repetidamente) de cierto modo. Esta
thesis does not in itself carry any suggestion that tesis en sí no transmite ninguna sugerencia que el
meaning is inconceivable in social isolation. But is significado sea inconcebible en el aislamiento social. ¿Pero
there anything else in these sections which might be habrá algo más en estas secciones que pudieran estar
supposed to encourage the community interpretation? supuestas para promover la interpretación comunal? Dos
Two points may be mentioned here. puntos pueden ser mencionados aquí.

The first concerns the use of 'privately' in 202. Kripke El primero tiene que ver con el uso de "privacidad" en 202.
takes this word to be intended to contrast with 'social', Kripke toma esta palabra como un intento de contrastar la
so that it has roughly the sense 'private' has in 'private expresión "social" a fin de que tenga aproximadamente el
property', i.e. relating to a single individual; I sentido de "privado" contenido en "propiedad privada". Por
suggested in Chapter 1 that it contrasts rather with ejemplo, yo sugerí en el capítulo 1 que <<se contrastaba
'public' or 'overt', i.e. relates to what transpires mejor con las palabras "público" o "abierto">>, al pensar por
covertly within consciousness. ejemplo, lo que se relaciona con lo acontecido
secretamente dentro de la conciencia.

On Kripke's understanding of the intended notion of En la comprensión de Kripke sobre la pretendida noción de
privacy a person's overt behavior say in following a privacidad respecto a la conducta abierta de una persona
sign-post, is to be considered 'private', at least if it is cuando dice estar siguiendo un "signo-establecido", debe
described individualistically; and so we could quite ser considerado "privado", al menos si es descrito
properly claim that all non-rule-governed behaviour individualmente; así que muy bien podríamos afirmar que
(e.g. pain behaviour) can and does take place el comportamiento no-gobernado por una regla (por ejemplo
'privately', since its description does not require el comportamiento de dolor) puede y de hecho toma su
reference to other people. lugar "privadamente", ya que su descripción no requiere de
una referencia a las otras personas.

It is thus possible to wave your arm 'privately' but not Es entonces posible agitar su brazo "privadamente" pero no
possible to follow the addition rule 'privately', posible el seguir la regla de adición "privadamente", según
according to Kripke's construal of 'privately' in 202. el constructo de Kripke respecto a lo que se sigue
"privadamente" en 202.

What is public can be 'private' in this sense Lo que es público puede ser privado, en este sentido, la
knowability by others is therefore not sufficient for cognoscibilidad a través de otros no es por consiguiente
non-privacy. We can even say that (non-relational) suficiente para no la privacidad. Nosotros siempre podemos
properties of material objects,, e.g. being cubical or decir que las propiedades de objetos materiales, por
weighing a stone, are possessed 'privately' in Kripke's ejemplo el ser cúbicos o pesados como una piedra, son
sense, since their ascription does not make essential obtenidos "privadamente" en el sentido de Kripke, ya que
reference to other objects and their condition. su adscripción no hace referencia esencial a otros objetos o
a su condición (es no-relacional).
Página 21 de 34 COLIN MCGINN

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
80
COLIN MCGINN
Now it seems to me that this would be a very odd way Ahora me parece que ésta sería una forma muy extraña
for Wittgenstein to intend his use of 'privately' in 202: para que Wittgenstein pensara su uso de "privacidad" en
in general he opposes 'private' to 'public' or 'oven', as 202: aunque en general él opone lo "privado" sobre
in "private sensations)" (24) Kripke takes "público", tal como en el caso de las "sensaciones privadas"
Wittgenstein to be saying in 202 that if rule-following (24) . Kripke toma a Wittgenstein como diciendo en 202
were private in the sense that it involved just the que seguir-la- regla es algo privado en el sentido de que
individual rule-follower. then rules could not be ello sólo envuelve a la persona que sigue la regla y así las
nonnative - correct rule-following would collapse into reglas no pueden ser normativas - pues el seguir bien una
apparently correct rule-following; whereas I take the regla se colapsaría en una corrección aparente del
claim of 202 to be that if rule-following were private seguimiento . Así yo tomo la afirmación en 202 sobre la
in the sense of being a condition or process of idea de que, si el seguimiento de reglas fuera privado en el
consciousness, then self-ascriptions of rule-following sentido de ser una condición o un proceso de la conciencia,
would be infallible. entonces nuestras auto-adscripciones al seguir la regla
serían infalibles.

Aside from the overall plausibility of the Además de la plausibilidad global de la interpretación que
interpretation I prefer, I think that my interpretation prefiero, pienso que mi interpretación obtiene un mejor
makes better sense of Wittgenstein's use of 'privately' sentido del uso que Wittgenstein da a: "privadamente" en
in 202 - it conforms better with Wittgenstein's general 202 - se ajusta mejor con el uso general de Wittgenstein de
use of the notion of privacy. At the very least it should la noción de "privacidad". Como mínimo debería estar
be agreed that the use of 'privately' in 202 cannot be convenido que el uso de ' privadamente ' en 202 no puede
cited to establish the correctness of the community ser citado para establecer la exactitud de la interpretación
interpretation. comunal.

The second point concerns Wittgenstein's mention of El segundo punto concierne a la mención de Wittgenstein
'one man' in 199: de '"un hombre" en 199:

Is what we call "obeying a rule" something that it ¿Acaso lo que llamamos "obedecer una regla " es algo
would be possible for only one man to do, and to do que sería posible hacer por solamente un hombre, y
only once in his life?-This:, of course a note on the además hacerlo solamente una vez en su vida? - Esto
grammar of the expression "to obey a rule". (199) es por supuesto una nota sobre la gramática de la
expresión "obedecer una regla". (199)

Wittgenstein's reply to this question is: "ít is not Lo que Wittgenstein antepone a esta cuestión es: "No es
possible that there should have been only one occasion posible que hubiera debido haber solamente una ocasión
on which someone obeyed a rule." What is prima facie en la cual alguien obedeciera una regla". El enigma que
puzzling here is why Wittgenstein should raise the surge a primera vista aquí es: ¿por qué Wittgenstein
question whether it is possible for one man to follow a debería plantear la pregunta de si es posible para un
rule and answer it by saying that it is not possible for hombre "seguir una regla", para después contestarla
there to be a single occasion of rule-following. (25) diciendo que no es posible que exista una ocasión única de
seguir una regla? (25) .

His reply, let it be noted, is not that it is not possible Su respuesta, permítasenos notarlo, no es que "no sea
for one man to obey a rule: Why then does he appear posible para un hombre obedecer una regla": ¿Por qué
to ask a question to which lie gives no answer (or half parece entonces hacer una pregunta para la cuál no da
an answer)? Since Wittgenstein does not answer his respuesta (o quizás da media respuesta)? " Ya que
question by saying rule-following requires more than Wittgenstein no contesta su pregunta diciendo que "el
one man, 199 cannot be cited as evidence that seguir reglas requiere más que un hombre", entonces el
Wittgenstein endorses a community conception of apartado 199 no puede ser citado como prueba de que
rules; but the passage certainly seems to raise the issue Wittgenstein respalda una concepción comunal de reglas;
Página 22 de 34 COLIN MCGINN

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
81
COLIN MCGINN
of whether rule-following is individual or .social. Sin embargo, este pasaje ciertamente parece desarrollar el
What is going on here? asunto de si el seguir reglas es algo individual o social
¿Qué está ocurriendo aquí?

The explanation that seems to me the most La explicación que a mi me parece la más plausible es esta:
plausible is this: Wittgenstein's central contention in la controversia central de Wittgenstein en estos pasajes, a
these passages, viz., that rules require many occasions saber, que las reglas requieren muchas ocasiones de
of manifestation. is ambiguous as stated, between (a) manifestación, es ambigua como se propone entre (a) la
the claim that each individual who grasps a rule must afirmación de que cada individuo que sigue la regla debe
obey it on more than one occasion and (b) the weaker obedecer la regla en más de una ocasión y (b) la
claim that there must be many occasions of rule- declarativa más débil de que deben haber muchas
following possible distributed over several ocasiones de seguir la regla, posiblemente distribuidas
individuals. The latter claim would allow as possible sobre varios individuos. La última afirmación concedería
the circumstance that each of many people obey a como algo posible la circunstancia de que cada individuo
given rule only once, since this would be enough for entre la gente obedeciera a una regla dada tan sólo una
the rule to be followed on many occasions. Now vez, y esto sería suficiente para que la regla sea seguida en
Wittgenstein's actual words in 199 commit him only muchos casos. Ahora, las verdaderas palabras de
to the weaker thesis, and so are compatible with the Wittgenstein en 199 lo comprometen a la primera tesis, y
possibility that each person follows a rule only once; de esta forma son compatibles con la posibilidad de que un
what they are not compatible with is the possibility hombre sigua una regla solamente una vez --- exactamente
that one man follows a rule just once - exactly the la cuestión original. El punto expuesto entonces, es que "si
question he raises. The point being made, then, is that existe solamente un hombre", entonces él debe seguir sus
if there is just one man then he must follow his rules reglas más de una vez, pero si existen muchos hombres,
more than once, but if there are many men it can be podría ser suficiente para cada uno el seguir sus reglas
enough to each follows his rules just once (or possibly sólo una vez (o posiblemente ninguna) . Pienso que esta
not at all) I think this reading of 199 is consonant with lectura de 199 está acorde con la expuesta en otros pasajes
the gist of other passages in which the question of how en los cuales la cuestión de "cuántas ocasiones de seguir
many occasions of rule-following are necessary is la regla son necesarias", es planteada y respondida; por
raised and answered; for example: ejemplo:

In the same way it cannot be said either that just En el mismo sentido: No se puede decir tampoco que
once in the history of mankind did someone follow sólo una vez en la historia del género humano alguien
a sign-post. Whereas it can be said that just once in halla seguido un signo-establecido, aunque si se puede
the history of mankind did someone walk parallel decir que solamente una vez en la historia del género
with a board. And that first impossibility is again humano alguien "haya caminado en paralelo con una
not a psychological one. (RFM p. 346) tabla" Y la primera imposibilidad no es, una vez más,
una de corte psicológico. (RFM p. 346)

There is no suggestion here that solitary rule- Nada parece sugerir aquí que un solitario seguimiento-de-
following is impossible; for this is not ruled out by the la-regla sea imposible; pues esto no se descarta en la
claim that sign-posts have to be obeyed more than aseveración de que los signos establecidos tienen que
once. The reason Wittgenstein broaches the question obedecerse más de una vez. La razón que Wittgenstein
of solitary rule-following in 199 is that he wants to saca a colación sobre la cuestión del "solitario seguimiento
make allowance for the possibility that the occasions de reglas" en el 199 es que el quiere conceder la posibilidad
are spread over many individuals when he claims that de que estas ocasiones estén diseminadas sobre muchos
many occasions are required. It is not, 1 think, that he individuos, cuando se afirma que "muchos casos son
is greatly attracted to the idea of spreading the many requeridos". No es, pienso, que él esté poderosamente
occasions over equally many individuals - one atraído por la idea de "que existan muchos casos dispersos
occasion each, so to speak - but he feels the need to sobre los individuos" - cada uno de ellos, por así decirlo -
acknowledge that this is logically compatible with his pero el siente la necesidad de admitir que esto es
Página 23 de 34 COLIN MCGINN

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
82
COLIN MCGINN
fundamental contention, viz, the multiple application lógicamente compatible con esta argumentación
thesis. As we saw in Chapter 1, he is anxious not to fundamental, a saber, la aplicación múltiple de una tesis.
over-state this thesis, requiring only that there be some Como vimos en el capitulo 1 el está ansioso no por imponer
rules which are multiply obeyed and not that all esta tesis, exigiendo solamente que existan algunas reglas,
should be; I surmise that in 199 he is again guarding las cuales sean múltiplemente obedecidas aunque no lo
against exaggerating a thesis which he thinks his sean todas ellas. Pero yo sospecho que en 199
readers may find it hard to accept even in its weakest Wittgenstein otra vez se cuida de exagerar alguna tesis
form. que piense que sus lectores puedan encontrar difícil aceptar
aun en su forma más débil.

So I conclude that 199 cannot be cited to establish the Así que yo concluyo que el apartado 199 no puede ser
community interpretation either, once it is seen in citado tampoco para establecer la interpretación comunal,
context and read carefully. And besides, would it not una vez que está visto en el contexto y se ha leído
be astonishing if Wittgenstein had put forward his cuidadosamente. Y además, ¿no sería asombroso si
major positive thesis in such an oblique and laconic Wittgenstein hubiera adelantado su "tesis positiva" principal
remark? (26) en un comentario tan corto y confuso? (26)

Perhaps I should make it clear that I am not suggesting Quizás debo aclarar que yo no estoy sugiriendo que en
that in these disputed passages Wittgenstein is estos pasajes discutidos, Wittgenstein esté optando
consciously opting for an individualistic as opposed to conscientemente por una concepción individualista, en
a social conception of rule-following: that is, my oposición a otra concepción social del seguimiento de regla:
interpretation is not that Wittgenstein IS centrally esto es… no es que Wittgenstein halla hecho un análisis
exercised with this question and is taking a definite central con esta pregunta en mente y halla tomado una
stand on it. Rather, my view is that this whole issue is posición definitiva en ella. Más bien, mi opinión es que esta
foreign to his true concerns: it is simply not a question cuestión por entero es extraña a sus preocupaciones
with which he is wrestling. So when I say that his verdaderas: Sencillamente no es una pregunta contra la
positive view is individualistic I am imposing a cual Wittgenstein estuviera combatiendo. Así que cuando
classification upon his position which is imported yo digo que su enfoque positivo es "individualistico" yo más
from outside: if he had been ask where he stood on bien estoy imponiendo una clasificación sobre su posición,
this issue, he would have said on the individualistic la cual ha sido traída desde el exterior. Si Wittgenstein
side, but I do not think he would have reckoned this to hubiera sido cuestionado sobre la posición que tenía en
be especially relevant to the problems with which he este asunto, entonces creo que él habría respondido que
was centrally occupied. This general lack of concern estaba del lado individualista, pero no pienso que en verdad
with the kind of question Kripke sets up seems to me hubiera considerado esto de alguna importancia para la
to indicate how fundamentally Kripke's interpretation clase de problemas con los cuales se ocupaba
misrepresents what Wittgenstein is really up to. Not principalmente. Esta debilidad general tiene que ver con el
only does Wittgenstein not advocate a community tipo de cuestionamiento que Kripke parece establecer. Esta
conception of rules; this is not even a considered debilidad, me parece, indica qué tan básica y
position in the space of philosophical views within profundamente la interpretación de Kripke se equivoca
which he is operating. So the individualism I claim lo respecto a lo que Wittgenstein realmente tiene en mente.
discern in Wittgenstein's stated views is not to be seen No sólo hace de Wittgenstein un defensor de la concepción
as a doctrine he is keen to promote; it is rather a claim comunitaria de la regla; sino que de hecho, lo inscribe fuera
about what his positive view in fact comes to, de cualquier posición considerada dentro del espacio de las
irrespective of his own main intentions. perspectivas filosóficas en las que Wittgenstein opera. Así
que el "Individualismo" que yo señalo en las opiniones
establecidas por Wittgenstein, no deben verse como una
doctrina que él esté "presto a defender"; es más bien una
aclaración acerca de lo que encierra su "opinión positiva"
del hecho, sin distinción de sus intenciones principales.

Página 24 de 34 COLIN MCGINN

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

COLIN MCGINN 83

So far I have been addressing myself to detailed Hasta aquí me he dirigido a detallar consideraciones
textual considerarons; I now want to object to the textuales, ahora quiero objetar algo a la interpretación
community interpretation on a more general or Comunitaria bajo un telón de fondo más general,
thematic ground, namely its relation to particularmente la relación con la tesis de Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein's thesis that we follow rules 'blindly'. respecto a que seguimos reglas "ciegamente". Ya que
For I think that the kind of epistemology of rule- pienso que el tipo de epistemología del Seguimiento de
following Wittgenstein advocates is inconsistent with Reglas de Wittgenstein defendido es inconsistente con la
Kripke's suggestion that right rule-following consists sugerencia de Kripke respecto a que un seguimiento
in agreement with the community. As we saw in correcto consiste en llegar a un acuerdo con la comunidad.
Chapter 1, Wittgenstein's view is that our natural Como vimos en el capítulo 1, la opinión de Wittgenstein es
inclination to follow rules as we do is not something que nuestra inclinación natural a seguir reglas como lo
we can justify, nor are we required to justify it - we hacemos, no es algo que podamos justificar y tampoco
obey rules 'blindly', without guidance. So if someone solemos ser cuestionados para hacerlo --- obedecemos a
challenges me to justify an application of a sign, all 1 las reglas "ciegamente" sin garantía alguna. Así que si
can ultimately reply is 'This is simply what I do' (217); alguien me desafía a justificar la aplicación de algún signo,
nothing demostrates that my application is correct. todo lo que podemos responder al final es: "porque
(27) But on Kripke's community interpretation this simplemente así lo hago siempre" (217), y nada demuestra
will not be the epistemoiogical situation: for en realidad que mi aplicación sea correcta (27) . Pero en la
agreement with others does provide a court of appeal interpretación comunitaria de Kripke esta no sería la
in case of such a challenge. Suppose someone claims situación epistemológica, pues el consenso con otros le
that it only strikes me that my present application of proporciona un "tribunal de apelación" en el caso de tal
"+" is correct (accords with its past meaning) and that desafío. Suponga que alguien duda, en un ataque, que mi
in fact I am now using "+" wrongly; then Kripke's aplicación presente del signo "+" sea correcta, y que de
sceptical solution offers me an answer, namely that hecho afirme que yo ahora estoy usando el signo "+"
my present use is correct because it agrees with the equivocadamente; (de acuerdo con sus significados
use made of that sign by others. pasados) Luego la solución escéptica de Kripke me ofrece
una respuesta, a saber que mi uso actual es correcto,
porque está de acuerdo con el uso hecho de ese signo por
otras personas.

That is to say, the community view allows me to get Esto es, la perspectiva comunal me permite llegar más allá
beyond, or beneath, my natural sign-using propensities (ó a lo que subyace) en mi propensiones naturales de uso
to something that can be cited to give these en el signo, como algo que puede ser citado para dar una
propensities a justification, since correctness, on justificación de estas propensiones, ya que la corrección, en
Kripke's view, is precisely a matter of community la opinión de Kripke, es precisamente un dilema de
concordance in use: the community, in short, concordancia comunal sobre el uso: La comunidad, en
provides the kind of guidance that Wittgenstein concreto, provee el tipo de orientación que Wittgenstein
expltcitly says there isn't. (28) Kripke's conception explícitamente dice que no existe. (28) La concepción de
makes rule-following like being in fashíon in this Kripke trata al seguimiento de reglas como un modelo de
respect: if someone challenges my belief that 1 am in este aspecto: Si alguien desafía mi creencia que "estoy a la
fashion, I can rebut him by pointing out that my mode moda", entonces le puedo refutar señalando que mi modo
of dress agrees with that of (certain) members of my de vestir está de acuerdo con el de ciertos miembros de mi
cottimunity - I am not reduced to saying that this is a comunidad - no me reduzco a decir que ésta es una
belief for which a justification is neither possible nor creencia para la cual posiblemente no se requiera
required. justificación.

Página 25 de 34 COLIN MCGINN

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

COLIN MCGINN
84

Note that Wittgenstein does not say that the Nótese que Wittgenstein no dice que la comunidad
community considered as a whole follows rules considerada como un todo, siga las reglas ciegamente,
blindly, i.e. proceeds upon the basis of a collective pues por ejemplo, procede sobre las bases de una
human nature; his claim is that I do. So it would not naturaleza humana colectiva, más bien su afirmación es
be faithful to Wittgenstein's words to transpose his sobre lo que "Yo hago". Así es que no sería factible para
claim about the absence of rational foundations to the las palabras de Wittgenstein, el invertir su afirmación acerca
level of the community; and neither is it correct to de la ausencia de fundamentos racionales para el nivel de
interpret him as trying to alleviate the epistemological la comunidad, ni tampoco es correcto interpretarlo
discomfort we may feel about my lack of reasons by atenuando a la incomodidad epistemológica que
equipping me with the test of community conforrnity. pudiéramos sentir sobre mi falta de razones, dotándome
(29) In fact, it is precisely the thirst for the kind of con la prueba de conformidad comunal (29) . En realidad es
rational basis Wittgenstein denies that causes Kripke precisamente la sed por el tipo de bases racionales "que
to introduce the community; but of course this goes Wittgenstein niega", lo que impulsa a Kripke a introducir a la
right against the thrust of Wittgenstein's position - it is "comunidad", más por supuesto esto va en contra directa de
trying to find reasons for what does not (and need not) la posición de Wittgenstein --- Se está tratando de
rest upon reasons. To put it in a nutshell, Kripke's "encontrar las razones" por lo que "no se basa en razones"
interpretation misses, or underestimates, Wittgenstein (pues no es necesario). Para ponerlo en pocas palabras, la
epistemological naturalism. interpretación de Kripke se equivoca, o subestima, el
naturalismo epistemológico de Wittgenstein.

This point leads into the question crucial for Kripke's Este punto es crucial para de la interpretación de Kripke,
interpretation, of Wittgenstein's attitude toward the sobre la actitud que mantiene Wittgenstein respecto a la
normativeness of meaning - what he took its nature normatividad del significado --- lo que al parecer tomó como
and ground to be. Kripke represents Wittgenstein as su naturaleza y fundamento. Kripke representa al
preoccupied in the Investigations with the question Wittgenstein de la Investigaciones como preocupado con la
what makes a present use of a sign correct, i.e. in pregunta: ¿Qué es lo que hace correcto el uso presente de
accordance with our previous linguistic intentions; and un signo, por ejemplo, con respecto a nuestras intenciones
Wittgenstein's answer is supposed to be that this is to lingüísticas previas? Y la respuesta que se supone da
be explained in terms of agreement with the Wittgenstein, es que esto debe ser explicado en términos
community. However, I think that an unprejudiced del acuerdo con la comunidad. Sin embargo yo pienso que
examination of the passages with which we are un examen menos prejuicioso de los pasajes que nos
concerned (138-242) reveals notably little that can be atañen (138-142) revela que hay muy poco que pueda
construed as a concern with this question: that is, we llegar a apoyar este tema, es decir, nosotros simplemente
just do not find Wittgenstein fretting over the question no encontramos a Wittgenstein preocupándose sobre la
whether my present inclinations to apply a sign really pregunta de si mis inclinaciones presentes para aplicar un
conform with my past meaning. It seems to me, in signo, realmente se alinean con mi significado pasado. Me
fact, that Wittgenstein's attitude towards this kind of parece en realidad que la actitud de Wittgenstein sobre este
question verges on the dismissive. (30) tipo de cuestión raya en lo despectivo. (30)

His view is that what underlies (if that is the word) our Su opinión es que: lo que subyace (si esta es la palabra) en
practices and customs with sings is our human nature nuestras prácticas y costumbres de uso de los signos, es
in interaction with our training: this is what explains nuestra naturaleza humana en interacción con un
our unreflectively going on as we do, Different kinds entrenamiento adquirido: esto es lo que explica nuestra
of being, endowed with a different "form of life', irreflexibilidad al reaccionar. Las diferentes maneras de ser,
could naturally go on in different ways given the same investidas con una " forma diferente de vida", naturalmente
training: podrían proceder de distintas maneras dado el mismo
entrenamiento:

Página 26 de 34 COLIN MCGINN

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
85
COLIN MCGINN

Now we get the pupil to continue a series (say + 2) Ahora bien, conseguimos que nuestro alumno continúe
beyond 1000 - and he writes, 1000, 1004, 1008, una serie más allá de 1000 simbolizando esto con "+2"
1012. We say to him: "Look what you've done"-He --- y entonces él escribe: 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012.
doesn't understand. We say: "You were meant to Nosotros corregiríamos: "Mira lo que hiciste" --- y él
add two: look how yon began the series!"-He podría no entender. Nosotros diremos: "Seguro
answers: "Yes. isn't it right? I thought that was quisiste decir agregar dos, pero mira cómo empezaste
how I was meant to do it." Or suppose he pointed la serie... --- A lo que él diría: "Si, ¿es que no es
to the series and said: "But I went on in the same correcto? Creí que era así como quiso decir que lo
way."-It would now be no use to say: "But can't hiciera." O bien, suponga que él señala a la serie y dice:
you see. . . .?"-and repeat the old examples and "Pero yo procedí como lo hago siempre. "--- En ese
explanations.-In such a case we might say, caso no sería apropiado reprochar:"¿Pero no lo ves...?
perhaps: It comes natural to this person to --- y repetir los mismos viejos ejemplos y explicaciones.
understand our order with our explanations as we --- En tal situación podríamos reflexionar: quizás
should understand the order: "Add 2 up to 1000, 4 vendría a ser natural para esta persona entender
up to 2000, 6 up to 3000 and so on." Such a case "nuestro orden" (según nuestras explicaciones), así
would present similarities with one in which a como nosotros deberíamos entender: "agregue 2 sobre
person naturally reacted to the gesture of pointing 1000, 4 sobre 2000, 6 sobre 3000 y así sucesivamente."
with the hand by looking in the direction of the line Tal caso presentaría similitudes con aquel en el que
from finger-tip to wrist, not from wrist to finger- una persona reacciona naturalmente al gesto de dirigir
tip. (185) su mirada (cuando apuntamos la mano en una
dirección) desde la yema del dedo hacia la muñeca, y
no de la muñeca hacia la yema del dedo. (185)

It is our nature that (partly) determines what we mean Es nuestra naturaleza, que (en parte) se determine lo que
by our words and which plays an ineliminable role in queremos decir a través de nuestras palabras y que estas
our learning language. Given that this is so, jueguen un rol que no pueda eliminarse de nuestro lenguaje
Wittgenstein sees no real substance to the question de aprendizaje. Dado que esto es así, Wittgenstein no
whether what we are naturally inclined to do really encuentra algo substancial respecto ala pregunta de si
conforms with the meaning of our signs: such a aquello a lo que naturalmente estamos inclinados a hacer
question must be futile, since what we are by nature realmente se construye con el significado de nuestros
inclined to do is what it is that constitutes what we signos: Tal pregunta debe ser inútil, ya que lo que estamos
mean. (31) inclinados a hacer por naturaleza es lo mismo que
constituye aquello que queremos significar. (31)

What we are inclined to do by nature and what we "Qué estamos inclinados a hacer por naturaleza" y "qué
mean cannot come apart in the way the question queremos significar" no son cuestiones que se puedan
assumes. There is, for Wittgenstein, not the sort of gap llegar a separar de la forma en ques estamos asumiendo el
that Kripke's sceptic trades on between meaning and tema. Para Wittgenstein no existe el tipo de brecha que
naturally determined use. Kripke establece entre el significado y el uso determinado
naturalemente.

Página 27 de 34 COLIN MCGINN

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

COLIN MCGINN
86

Reading a little into what Wittgenstein says, I think Leyendo un poco dentro de lo que Wittgenstein dice, creo
his response to Kripke's question of what determines que su respuesta a la pregunta de Kripke sobre el "qué
normativeness would be that this question erroneously determina la normatividad", podría establecer que: esta
assumes that our meanings are not fixed (in part) by cuestión asume erroneamente que nuestros significados
our natural propensities but by something logically "no están sujetos (al menos en parte) a nuestras
independent of these propensities, since it envisages propensiones naturales" sino a algo lógicamente
the possibility that we should by nature treat a pattern independiente de estas propensiones,luego él visualiza la
of use as linguistically correct and yet that pattern be posibilidad de que nosotros debieramos establecer, por
incorrect; but the thought of this possibility involves naturaleza, un patrón de uso lingüísticamente correcto y
the mistaken supposition that once the natural facts todavía así, ese patrón pudiera ser incorrecto; pero el
about us are exhausted there remains somewhere else pensamiento sobre esta posibilidad envuelve la suposición
to look for what determines meaning. What has to be equivocada de que una vez que los hechos naturales
recognized is that at some level meaning is fixed by aecrca de nosotros se han agotado, aún permanezca cierto
our nature: meaning something is not an achievement espacio para buscar qué es lo que determina el significado.
of a transcendent mind divorced from our "form of Lo que debe reconocerse es que en algún nivel, el
life", The basis of the normative is the natural. (32) significado es re-estructurado por nuestra naturaleza:
significar algo no es el logro de una mente trascendente
divorciada de nuestra "forma de vida". La base de la
normativa está en la naturaleza. (32)

A comparison of Wittgenstein with Hume may help to Una comparación de Wittgenstein con Hume podría ayudar
clarify Wittgenstein's position. Suppose someone were a clarificar la posición de Wittgenstein. Supóngase que
to put the question 'What makes causal judgements alguien propusiera la pregunta. "¿Qué hace que los juicios
correct on Hume's view?' Granted that our minds are causales sean correctos a la vista de Hume? Si se concede
so constituted that we form causal beliefs upon que nuestras mentes estan constituidas de forma tal que
exposure to constantly conjoined events, what is it for formamos creencias causales cuando estamos expuestos a
a belief so formed to be true or false: might not our constantes eventos conjuntos,pensemos:¿ De qué le
minds lead us to form a causal belief in the way Hume serviría a una creencia así formada, el ser verdadera o
describes and yet that belief be false? It is clear what falsa?, ¿No podría nuestra mente llevarnos a formar una
Hume would reply to this question: he would say that creencia causal en la forma que Hume describe, y aún así,
there is not the sort of gap between belief and truth esa creencia ser falsa? Es claro lo que Hume respondería a
that the question presupposes, since causation esta pregunta: no existe "el tipo de vacío" entre creencia y
involves nothing over and above constant verdad que la cuestión propone, ya que la relación de
conjunctions and the minds natural propensity to form causalidad no implica nada más allá de conjunciones
expectations-- there is, in particular, nothing constantes y la propensión natural de las mentes de formar
independent of our minds (i.e. objective) to constitute expectativas - no hay nada en particular,
'necessary connexion'. On Hume's view, then, independientemente de nuestras mentes (por ejemplo, algo
correctness in a causal judgement ultimately rests "objetivo") que constituya una conexión necesaria. En la
upon our (mental) nature; so it cannot be that we opinión de Hume entonces, la corrección en un juicio causal
naturally form causal judgements on the basis of descansa, en última instancia, en nuestra naturaleza
observed constant conjunctions which are (mental), así que no puede ser que nosotros nos formemos
(objectively) false, at least ultimately. juicios causales sobre la base de haber observado
"conjunciones constantes" los cuales son (objetivamente)
falsos, al menos en última instancia.

Página 28 de 34 COLIN MCGINN

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

COLIN MCGINN 87

Only if one rejects Hume's 'projectivist' account of Solamente si uno rechaza la explicación "proyectivista" de
causation could one press the question whether our la causación en Hume, podría tocar la cuestión de si
natural propensities lead us to have true causal beliefs nuestras inclinaciones naturales nos encaminan a tener
upon exposure to constant conjunctions. The respect creencias causales verdaderas al estar expuestos a
in which Wittgenstein's position on rules resembles conjunciones (encadenaciones) constantes. El aspecto en
Hume's on causation is that both locate the source of el que la posición de Wittgesntein se asemeja con la
correctness in our given nature, not in some aspect of causación de Hume, es que ambos localizan la "fuente de la
reality quite independent of us and our natural corrección" en una naturaleza dada, y no en algún aspecto
propensities. (33) The main difference between them de la realidad totalmente independiente de nosotros y
(as I remarked in Chapter 1) is that Hume takes his nuestras inclinaciones naturales (33). La diferencia
view to be 'sceptical', whereas Wittgenstein takes his principal entre ellos (como lo subrayé en el capítulo 1) está
to be non-sceptical once we attain a right que en Hume considera que su opinión es "Escéptica",
epistemology. And it would, of course, be radically mientras que Wittgenstein toma a la suya como "no-
contrary to the whole spirit of Hume's position on escéptica", una vez que nosotros nos atenemos a la
causation to locate correctness in the conformity of epistemología correcta. Y eso, por supuesto, sería
one's causal judgements with those of one's radicalmente opuesto al espíritu entero de la posición de
community: that is. Hume would not want to say that Hume sobre la causación, <<al encontrar una "corrección"
the distinction between seemingly true causal beliefs acorde a los juicios causales de una persona, y
and really true ones is to be explained in terms of compararlos con los de la propia comunidad>> : esto es,
whether your judgemems agree with others' Hume podría no querer decir que la distinción entre
judgements. This would just be a doomed attempt to creencias aparentemente correctas y las realmente
postpone the sceptical conclusion that our causal correctas, se explica en términos de si "sus juicios" están de
judgements correspond to no objective or external acuerdo con los "juicios de otros". Esto sólo sería un intento
feature of reality. I think that Kripke's community forzado por aplazar la conclusión escéptica de que nuestros
interpretation of Wittgenstein makes a similar mistake juicios causales no se corresponden con ningún objeto o
as this community interpretation of Hume in respect of elemento externo de la realidad. Yo pienso que la
what constitutes the correctness of a causal bclief: interpetación comunitaria de Kripke cae en un error similar
Kripke is in effect jibbing at one of Wittgenstein's al de esta interpretación comunitaria de Hume respecto al
main theses-that there is nowhere 1 can turn to qué constituye la corrección de una creencia causal: Kripke
underpin or bolster how 1 naturally proceed in my está obstaculizando una de las principales tesis de
application of signs, not even to other people Kripke is Wittgenstein --- que no existe un sitio en el que pueda
trying to locate what 1 mean, and hence linguistic apoyarme de inicio para justificar el cómo pudiera proceder
correctness, in something external to my nature as a naturalmente en mi aplicación de los signos, ni tampoco en
language-user, i.e. in my relations to a community; but la aplicación de otras personas. Kripke está tratando de
this would be to refuse to accept Wittgenstein's claim localizar "lo que quiero significar" y en consecuencia busca
that my judgements of linguistic correctness are not una corrección lingüistica en algo externo a mi naturaleza
based upon reasons. Wittgenstein's position is simply como usuario del lenguaje, por ejemplo: en mis relaciones
this: what I mean is determined by my natural use of con una comunidad. Pero ello sería negarse a aceptar la
words, so that we cannot sensibly ask whether my use afirmación de Wittgenstein de que mis juicios de corrección
really conforms to what my words mean. (34) lingüistica no están basados en razones. La posición de
Wittgenstein simplemente es esta: Lo que "quiero significar"
es determinado por mi uso natural de las palabras, así que
no podemos decir sensatamente si mi uso realmente está
alineado y conforme a lo que mis palabras quieren
significar. (34)

Página 29 de 34 COLIN MCGINN

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

COLIN MCGINN 88

(Compare Hume: the causal truths are determined by (compara Hume: las verdades causales son determinadas
regularities acting upon our minds to produce por regularidades que actuan sobre nuestras mentes para
expectations, so that we cannot sensibly ask whether producir espectativas, así que no podemos sensatamente
the expectations thereby produced are really correct, pedir que las expectativas consecuentemente producidas
i.e. lead us to form true causal beliefs.) sean realmente correctas, es decir, que nos lleven a formar
creencias causales verdaderas.)

This is not, of course, to say that our application of Esto no es, por supuesto, para decir que nuestra aplicación
words can never be mistaken, that every use is self- de las palabras jamás está equivocada, o que todo uso es
certifyingly correct; but it is to say that judgements of auto-certificadamente correcto, sino que es para decir que
linguistic correctness always rest in the end upon los juicios de corrección lingüistica siempre descansan
natural propensities to apply words in a certain way: finalmente sobre propensiones a aplicar las palabras de
we do sometimes make judgements of linguistic cierta manera; A veces llegamos a hacer juicios de error
mistake, but these judgements have their ultimate lingüístico, pero estos juicios tienen su fuente última en
source in our natural sense of what is right- they do nuestro sentido de lo que es correcto --- cosa que no
not involve prescinding altogether from our natural implica prescindir por completo de nuestras inclinaciones
propensities to apply signs. So, on Wittgenstein's naturales para aplicar los signos. Así que en la opinión de
view, linguistic mistake is necessarily local; we cannot Wittgenstein, el error lingüístico es algo necesariamente
make real sense of the idea that our natural ways of local; No podemos hacer sentido real de la idea que
using signs are globally mistaken, since that would be nuestras formas naturales de uso de los signos están
to assume that our meaning is fixed by something universalmente equivocadas, pues eso debería dar por
external to us. (35) In a sense, then, Wittgenstein supuesto que nuestro significado está arreglado por algo
dismisses as incoherent the kind of scepticism that lies externo a nosostros . (35) En Cierto Sentido, entonces,
behind Kripke's sceptical paradox: I mean the general Wittgenstein descarta como incoherente el tipo de
scepticism that questions whether my use of signs has escepticismo que yace detrás de la paradoja escéptica de
ever conformed with their meaning - for their meaning Kripke: Me refiero al escepticismo general que cuestiona si
cannot in this way come apart from the use 1 make of mi uso de los signos alguna vez ha estado alineado con su
them. It is for these reasons that I say that significado - pues su significado de este modo no puede
Wittgenstein would not have pursued and pressed the apartarse del uso que yo tenga de ellos. Es por esta razón
question of normativeness in the way Kripke does; que yo digo que Wittgenstein no habría perseguido ni
and, as I remarked, he does not in point of fact make a hubiera forzado la cuestión de la normatividad, de la
great deal of the question of normativeness in these manera en que Kripke lo hizo; Y, como lo comenté,
sections of the Investigations. Wittgenstein en realidad no da importancia a la cuestión de
la normatividad en estos capítulos de las Investigaciones
Filosóficas.

My rejection of the community interpretation is not Mi replica a la interpretación comunitaria todavía no está
yet complete. Someone wedded to this interpretation completa. Alguien "casado" con esta interpretación podría
might allow that 198-202 fail on their own to establish permitir que los parágrafos 198-202 cayeran por si mismos
that Wittgenstein held a social conception of rules but en la cuenta de que Wittgenstein abraza una concepción
urge that these sections should themselves not be social de las reglas, pero insistimos en que estas secciones
considered in isolation: and when we place them in no deben ser considerados de forma aislada, y cuando las
the context of other passages we will see that they ponemos en el contexto de otros pasajes veremos que
should be read as embodying the social conception; deben ser leídos "como envolviendo" a la concepción
that is, 198-202 have implicit what other passages social; es decir, 198-201 contienen implícitamente lo que
make explicit. otros pasajes hacen explícito.

Página 30 de 34 COLIN MCGINN

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"
89
COLIN MCGINN
1 need, then, to consider what other passages might be Yo necesito de esta manera, considerar lo que otros
thought to lend themselves to a community pasajes pudieran haber reflexionado para llegar a prestarse
interpretation and show that they have a different a una "interpretación comunitaria" y después demostrar que
purport. The section 1 have most often heard cited as tenían diferente propósito. La sección que más a menudo
displaying Wittgenstein's commitment to the social he oído citar como afirmando el compromiso de
conception is 242: Wittgenstein con la concepción social es el 242:

If language is to be a means of communication there Si el lenguaje es un medio de comunicación debe haber un


must be agreement not only in definitions but also acuerdo no sólo en las definiciones, sino también (por raro
(queer as this may sound) in judgments. This seems to que pueda parecer) en los juicios. Esto da la impresión de
abolish logic, but does not do so.-It is one thing to abolir la lógica, pero no es así.- por un lado el caso es
describe methods of measurement, and another to describir los métodos de medida, y por el otro, el de obtener
obtain and state results of measurement. But what we y enunciar los resultados de la medida. Pero lo que
call "measuring" is partly determined by a certain llamemos "la medida" es en parte determinado a través de
constancy in results of measurement. (242) una cierta constancia en los resultados de medida.(242)

The claim is that Wittgenstein is here building the El punto es que Wittgenstein está construyendo aquí la
notion of agreement into the notion of meaning. This noción de acuerdo, dentro de la noción de significado. Esta
interpretation ignores, what I stressed in Chapter 1, interpretación ignora, como lo enfaticé en el capítulo 1, que
that Wittgenstein is in this passage making a claim Wittgenstein hace en este pasaje una afirmación sobre las
about the necessary conditions of communication: his condiciones necesarias de comunicación: su afirmación es
claim is that for two or more people to share a que para dos o más personas, compartir un lenguaje ---
language - to mean the same by their words- they must significar lo mismo con las mismas palabras --- ellos
agree in their judgements. This claim expressly también deben tener un acuerdo sobre sus juicios. Esta
concerns a social concept, viz. that of a linguistic afirmación le concierne expresamente a un concepto social,
community, and so naturally it is formulated in en este caso, el de la comunidad lingüística, y así,
social terms, vi:, agreement between members of naturalmente, está formulado en términos sociales; a saber,
that community. What Wittgenstein does not say, and los de un acuerdo entre los miembros de una comunidad.
what fails to follow from what he does say, is that for Lo que Wittgenstein no dice, es que para que exista
there to be meaning at all there has to be inter- significado alguno, tiene que haber también un acuerdo
personal agreement. He is certainly not saying in this inter-personal. Precisamente, lo que él no dice en esta
section that the idea of an idiolect makes no sense: he sección es que la idea de "un dialecto individual" no tiene
is not ruling out the possibility that 1 might employ sentido. Él no descarta la posibilidad de que yo pueda
words with different meanings from those of other emplear palabras con significados diferentes de los de
people. His point is that if we are to use words with otras personas, pero su punto es que si vamos a usar las
the same meanings then we must agree in their use. palabras con el mismo significado continuo, entonces
Indeed, the interpretation I am rejecting would have debemos estar de acuerdo en su uso. En efecto, a la
Wittgenstein claiming, absurdly, that I cannot mean interpretación que estoy rechazando, Wittgenstein habría
by a word what no-one else means by it, since contestado que absurdamente, no puedo decir con una
meaning requires Ínter-personal agreement of use. In palabra lo que "nadie más quiere significar con ella", ya que
general, the relation between agreement and rules, as el sentido requiere un acuerdo inter-personal de uso. En
Wittgenstein sees it, concerns the notion of two or general, la relación entre el acuerdo y las reglas, como
more people following the same rules; agreement is Wittgenstein lo ve, se refiere a la noción de dos o más
not supposed to be a necessary condition of an personas siguiendo las mismas reglas; acuerdo que no
individual's following a rule - that requires, rather, a supone sea una condición necesaria del segumiento
multiplicity of occasions of application. individual de la regla --- que requiere más bien, de una
multiplicidad de ocasiones para su aplicación.

Página 31 de 34 COLIN MCGINN

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

COLIN MCGINN
90

What may also mislead is that Wittgenstein speaks Lo que también pudiera confundirnos es que Wittgenstein
typically of communal languages, e.g. English and habla típicamente de lenguajes comunales, por ejemplo el
German, and so formulates his claims in terms of Inglés y el Alemán, y así formula sus afirmaciones en
these shared languages; but it is not to be inferred términos de estos lenguajes compartidos, pero no se debe
from this that he rejects the very notion of a language deducir de ello que rechaza la noción misma de un lenguaje
confined to a single individual. Since most actual rules limitado a un solo individuo. Ya que muchas de la reglas
are in fact shared, including the semantic rules of reales son compartidas, (incluidas las reglas semánticas de
natural languages, it is only to be expected that los lenguajes naturales) es de esperarse que los ejemplos
Wittgenstein's examples should be of this kind; but de Wittgenstein deban ser de este tipo; pero esto no debe
this should not be taken to exclude the very possibility tomarse para excluir la gran posibilidad de hallar reglas
of rules followed by only one person - and seguidas por solamente una persona --- y Wittgenstein no
Wittgenstein says nothing to suggest that he intends lo dice nada que sugiera que él intenta excluir esta posibilidad.
exclude this possibility. it is not, as I remarked earlier, No es que (como lo subrayé más atrás) Wittgenstein se
that he is especially anxious to insist on the coherence halle especialmente ansioso de insistir en la coherencia un
of solitary rule-following and to contest a community seguimiento solitario de reglas y de contestar a la
conception; the truth is that he is simply unconcerned concepción comunitaria, la verdad es que él simplemente
whit this kind of question. His citation of communal está desinteresado en este tipo de cuestiones. Su cita de
signs thus does not betoken a commitment to the los signos comunales, por lo tanto, no significará un
essentially communal employment of signs; rather, he compromiso con el empleo esencialmente comunal de los
is, for his purposes, indifferent to the question. signos; es más bien que para estos propósitos, él se
encuentra indiferente a la cuestión.

Much the same should be said of Wittgenstein's De manera similar, mucho puede ser dicho sobre el énfasis
emphasis upon the notion of training in his account of de Wittgenstein sobre la noción de entrenamiento en este
language and rules. Training is, of course, a social recuento del lenguaje y las reglas. El entrenamiento es, por
concept - it involves an inter-personal relation - and supuesto, un concepto social --- que envuelve una relación
training in the use of a sign may be said to aim at inter-personal --- y el entrenamiento en el uso de un signo
agreement between the trainee's behaviour and that of puede decirse que apunta a un acuerdo entre el
the trainer. Does this commit Wittgenstein to a comportamiento del aprendiz y el del entrenador ¿Es este
community conception of what it is to grasp a rule? un compromiso de Wittgenstein con una concepción
Clearly not, since nothing so far said implies that in comunal de lo que es captar una regla? Evidentemente no,
order to explicate the concept of the learner's grasping ya que lo dicho hasta ahora, implica que con el objeto de
a rule we must make essential reference to the explicar el concepto del cómo un alumno capta la regla,
behaviour of the trainer - any more so than for any nosotros debamos esencialmente hacer referencia al
skill acquired by means of training, e.g. kicking a ball. comportamiento del entrenador --- a menos que se trate de
Wittgenstein emphasises training not because he alguna habilidad adquirida por medio del entrenamiento, por
thinks all rules are necessarily social but because it ejemplo, patear una pelota. Wittgenstein hace énfasis en el
helps to remind us of what really goes on when entrenamiento no porque piense que todas las reglas son
someone achieves understanding: it acts as a necesariamente sociales, sino porque ello ayuda a
prophylactic against myth-making (36) (I should say recordarnos sobre lo que realmente sucede cuando se
that Kripke himself shows no tendency to rest his consigue un entendimiento de las cosas: que este actúa
community interpretation on either of the last two como una prevención ( "o profiláctico") contra la creación de
considerations; I mention them because I have heard mitos. (36) (Debo decir que Wittgenstein mismo no
them cited by others in support of a community muestra ninguna tendencia a apoyar su interpretación de la
interpretation.) comunidad en cualquiera de las dos últimas
consideraciones; lo menciono porque yo he escuchado citar
estas ideas por otros, para dar soporte a la interpretación
de la comunidad)

Página 32 de 34 COLIN MCGINN

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

COLIN MCGINN 91

I am not, in rejecting the community interpretation, Yo no estoy, en esta réplica de la interpretación comunal,
saying that Wittgenstein thinks the notion of a diciendo que Wittgenstein piense que la noción de una
linguistic community is 'unimportant' or totally comunidad lingüística "no tenga importancia" o que sea
irrelevant to a proper account of meaning; nor am I totalmente irrelevante para un recuento apropiado del
denying that when a language is communal others significado; ni tampoco estoy negando que cuando una
may legitimately correct one's use of words: I am not lengua es común a otros pueda corregirse legítimamente el
even denying; that what others mean by words can uso de las palabras: tampoco estoy negando que lo que
determine their meaning on the lips of a given otros significan con las palabras, pueda llegar a influir en lo
speaker. I am saying only that Wittgenstein does not que dice un hablante dado. Lo que yo estoy diciendo es que
hold that the very notion of a rule of language must Wittgenstein no afirma que la misma noción de "regla del
needs be explicated in social terms - that we cannot lenguaje" precise ser explicada en términos sociales --- que
make sense of rule-following on the part of a given nosotros no podamos darle sentido a la regla --- .
individual unless we relate that individual's behaviour Wittgenstein continua de parte de un individuo dado a
to the behaviour of some community of rule- menos que relacionemos ese comportamiento individual
followers. Wittgenstein no more holds this view about con el comportamiento de alguna comunidad de
understanding a rule than he holds a parallel view seguidores-de-la-regla. Sin embargo Wittgenstein no apoya
about being in pain or remembering something. And, esta opinón acerca del entendimiento de una regla, más de
as I shall argue in Chapter 4, it is well that lo que apoyaría a una visión paralela acerca del tener algún
Wittgenstein did not hold such a view, because it is dolor o del recordar algo. y como lo he argumentado en el
dearly wrong. capítulo 4, es bueno que Wittgenstein no abrace estas
ideas, pues estaría obviamente en un error.

The divergence between Kripke's interpretation and La diferencia entre la interpretación de Kripke y la mía se
mine shows up sharply in our different views of the vuelve muy clara respecto a nuestros enfoques sobre la
way 202 relates to the latter sections dealing manera en que el parágrafo 202 se relaciona con las
(explicitly) with private language (243f). Kripke's secciones posteriores, vinculándose (explícitamente) con el
view is that by 202 the argument against the lenguaje privado (243F). La opinión de Kripke es que a
possibility of a private language is essentially través del 202, el argumento contra la posibilidad de un
complete - Wittgenstein has already shown that there lenguaje privado, está esencialmente completo --- pues
must always be public criteria for the correctness of Wittgenstein ya demostró que tiene que existir un criterio
linguistic use. This result has already been established público para la corrección de un uso lingüístico. Este
because rule-following in general depends upon resultado ya ha sido establecido porque el seguimiento de
communal agreement of response for an individual to regla en general depende del acuerdo colectivo de la
be following any rule he must exhibit behaviour which respuesta que un individuo ha de tener al seguir una regla,
others can use to correct his sincere avowal that he is pues debe exhibir un comportamiento que otros puedan
following a rule, since this is what the normativeness utilizar para corregir su declaratoria sincera de que está
of rule comes to. The notion of correct rule-following siguiendo cierta regla, ya que en esto consiste la
is explicated in terms of assertibility conditions which normatividad de la regla. La noción de corregir la regla es
are available to members of one's linguistic explicada en términos de de la asertibilidad de condiciones,
community, and so there is no possibility of following las cuales, están disponibles para los miembros de una
a rule which others cannot know one is following comunidad lingüística, y así no existe la posibilidad de un
correctly or incorrectly. (37) This view of what is seguimiento de reglas en el que otros no puedan saber si
going on in 202 obviously depends upon the uno está siguiendo la regla correcta o incorrectamente
community interpretation interpretation, i.e. upon (37). Este enfoque de lo que está pasando en el parágrafo
building agreement of response into the notion of rule- 202 obviamente depende de la interpretación comunal que
following. se tenga, por ejemplo, respecto a la construcción de un
"acuerdo de respuesta" dentro de la noción del seguimiento
de regla.

Página 33 de 34 COLIN MCGINN

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

COLIN MCGINN 92

On the interpretation I have put forward, there is not En la interpretación que he presentado, no hay enlace
this direct link between 202 and the private language directo entre el 202 y el argumento del lenguaje privado:
argument: 202 sets the stage for that argument without 202 establece el escenario para esta discusión sin
actually completing it; more argumentative work has realmente completarlo. Mucha más labor argumentativa
to be done before the possibility of a private language debe realizarse antes de la posibilidad de que el lenguaje
can be excluded. What is left open by 202 is the privado pueda ser excluido.Lo que ha sido insinuado por el
possibility of a 'private technique', i.e. a capacity to parágrafo 202 es la posibilidad de una "técnica privada", es
apply a sign in a regular way which is not checkable decir, una capacidad de aplicar un signo de forma regular,
by others. In the case of public objects the technique la cuál no es constatada por otros. En el caso de los objetos
of use will be checkable by others because the objects públicos la técnica de uso será comprobable porque los
themselves are accessible to others and hence objetos en sí mismos están accesibles a otros y entonces la
regularity of use is verifiable; but if the objects are regularidad de uso es verificable; pero si los objetos son
private, as sensations have often been supposed to be, privados, como se supone que las sensaciones siempre lo
then there will be no telling whether the speaker is son, entonces no existirá explicación si el que habla se
referring to the same (kind of) sensation on different refiere a la misma (clase de) sensaciones en ocasiones
occasions of use. I think my interpretation of the distintas de uso. Creo que mi interpretación de la relación
relation between 202 and the later material on private entre 202 y el material posterior sobre el lenguaje privado
language better fits Wittgenstein's procedure in those se ajusta mejor al procedimiento de Wittgenstein en
latter sections, for he speaks as if new considerations aquellas secciones posteriores, pues Wittgenstein habla
were been advanced and not simply a specific como si nuevas consideraciones hubieran tenido avances y
consequence of earlier conclusions being drawn. (38) no como si dibujáramos simplemente una consecuencia
Kripke, in fact, claims that Wittgenstein anticipates específica de conclusiones anteriores (38). Kripke, de
his sceptical paradox and its solution as early as the hecho, afirma que Wittgenstein anticipa su paradoja
very first section of the Investigations, in which case escéptica con su solución desde antes de la primera
the possibility of a private language would have been sección de las Investigaciones, en cuyo caso la posibilidad
excluded right at the beginning: this seems de un lenguaje privado hubiera sido excluida desde el
implausible in itself, and inspection of section 1 principio: pero esto parece ser improbable por sí mismo y
discloses only an emphasis upon acting as against una inspección de la sección 1 describe tan sólo un énfasis
'explanations' - there is no essential mention there of a favor de los actos y en contra de las "explicaciones" --- no
the community. My conclusion is then that the more existe ninguna mención especial ahí de la comunidad. Mi
traditional view of where the private language conclusión es entonces que el enfoque más tradicional
argument occurs (after 243) is to be preferred to donde el argumento del lenguaje privado surge (después
Kripke's. It would, perhaps, be pleasant if Kripke's del 243) es preferible a la de Kripke. Tal vez sería aceptable
view of the overall structure of the Investigations were si el criterio de la estructura global de Kripke de las
correct, but it does not seem to me that it is. And the Investigaciones fuera correcto, pero no me da la impresión
reason Wittgenstein's book does not have the structure que así sea. Y la razón de que el libro de Wittgenstein no
Kripke attributes to it is that it does not have the tenga la estructura que Kripke le atribuye, radica
content he attributes to it. simplemente en que no tiene el contenido que Kripke
piensa.

Página 34 de 34 COLIN MCGINN

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2

NOTAS CAPÍTULO 2 1

1. See Kripke, pp. 5, 67-71. These qualifications 1. Véase Kripke, pp. 5, 67-71. Estas caracterizaciones
particularly concern the skeptical thesis Kripke particulares pertenecen a la tesis escéptica que Kripke
attributes to Wittgenstein. atribuye a Wittgenstein.

2. See Kripke, pp. II, 23-4. 2. véase Kripke, pp. 11, 23-4.

3 Kripke emphasises that his central problem is 3 En la página 21 Kripke hace énfasis en que su
constitutive on p. 21, though he does initially state problema central es constitutivo, aunque inicialmente el
the problem more epistemologically (sec p. 8). His hace la declaración de que el problema es más
use of (he term 'sceptic' must therefore be epistemológico (véase p. 8). Sin embargo su uso del
understood in a slightly nonstandard way: término "Escéptico" debe ser ligeramente entendido de
Kripkc's scepticis not (primarily) interested in una forma no convencional. La Escéptica de Kripke no
questions of certainty, knowledge or justification - está (fundamentalmente) interesada en cuestiones de
his real interest is 'ontological' or 'metaphysical'. certeza, conocimiento o justificación. Su interés real es
"Ontológico" o "Metafísico".

4. 'It seems that the entire idea of meaning 4. "Parece ser que la idea entera de significado se
vanishes into thin air' (Kripke, p. 22); desvanece en un soplo de aire" (Krpke p. 22)
understandably, this gives Kripke 'an eerie Inexplicablemente, esto da a Kripke "un sentimiento
feeling' (p. 21). extraño y terrorífico" (p. 21)

5. Kripke exploits this alleged contrast with the 5. Kripke explota este contraste relacionado con el
Tractatus to impose a structure or, the Tractatus para imponer una estructura a las
Investigations according to which the early Investigaciones. Así las primeras secciones (1 - 137)
sections (1-137) are concerned to undermine the tienen que ver con el derribe de la "verdad condicional",
Tractatus truth-conditional conception of que es una concepción del lenguaje presente en el
language, as a picliminary to solving the sceptical Tractatus, y además son la preliminar para resolver el
problem (see Kripke, pp. 78-0). Plainly, this problema escéptico (véase Kripke pp. 78 -9).
architectonic suggestion can be correct only if Evidentemente, esta sugerencia arquitectónica podría ser
Kripke is right to interpret Wittgenstein as correcta sólo si Kripke está en lo cierto al interpretar que
solving a sceptical problem by means of a Wittgenstein está resolviendo un problema escéptico, lo
sceptical solution based upon assertibility que significa una solución escéptica basada en
conditions; and I do not think he is right so to condiciones de asertabilidad. Yo no creo que Kripke esté
interpret Wittgenstein. en lo correcto al interpretar así a Wittgenstein.

6. I am thinking here of J . L . Mackie's view that 6. Pienso aquí en la opinión de J. L. Mackie de que los
objective values would be metaphysically 'queer': valores objetivos podrían ser metafísicamente "extraños".
sec his Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong Véase su Ética: Inventando lo bueno y lo malo (Penguin
(Penguin Books. 1977), chapter I. Books, 1977) Capítulo I.

Traducción: Madrigal Bailón Joel Tucídides / UAM-iztapalapa / IN CALLI IXCAHUICOPA


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2

2
7. This type of view saves meaningful ethical 7. Este tipo de visión conserva expresiones éticas con
utterances in the absence of ethical tacts (truth) sentido aún en la ausencia de hechos éticos (verdades) al
by rcconstruing such utterances as (logically) non- reconstruir (lógicamente) tales expresiones como no-
assertoric: an ethical sentence is meaningful while asertóricas. Un enunciado ético guarda completo
lacking genuine truth conditions because it is rcail) significado a la vez que tiene ausencia de condiciones
imperatival or exclamatory or hortatory or some genuinas de verdad porque es en realidad una expresión
such. And clearly a sentence can be meaningful in imperativa, exclamativa o goza del el recurso conativo del
these ways without purporting to slate a fact. lenguaje (por exhortación o fuerte petición: “¡Callad!”, “no
matarás”). Evidentemente una oración puede llegar a tener
completo sentido con estos medios sin proponerse por ello
establecer un hecho.

8. One might see Paul Benacerraf, in 8. Uno puede revisar a Paul Benacerraf, en su artículo
'Mathematical Truth', Journal of Philosophy LXX "Verdad Matemática", Gaceta de Filosofía LXX (1973)
(1973), as posing a kind of sceptical problem, viz. como poseedor de una clase de problema escéptico, viz.
how can mathematical propositions be true and ¿Cómo pueden ser las proposiciones matemáticas
known; and Hartry Field, in Science Without verdaderas y conocidas?. También vemos a Harry Field, en
Numbers (Blackwcll: Oxford, 1980), as offering a Ciencia sin números (Blackwell: Oxford, 1980)
kind of sceptical solution, viz. mathematical ofreciéndonos un tipo de solución escéptica, viz. Los
sentences need not be regarded as possessing enunciados matemáticos no necesitan estar supuestas
genuine truth conditions and so do not call for como las poseedoras de genuinas condiciones de verdad, y
'queer' facts to correspond to them. así, no se invocan "extraños" hechos que puedan
corresponderse con ellas.

9. I am using 'individualistic1 roughly in the sense 9. Yo estoy usando "individualista" en el sentido en que
Tyler Burge does in 'Individualism and the Tyler Burge lo hace en su artículo: "Lo individualista y lo
Mental', Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. IV, mental" en Estudios Filosóficos del Oeste Medio. Vol. IV,
ed. P.A. French, T . E . Uehling and H . K . editado por P. A. French, T. E. Uething y H. K. Wettsein
Wettstein (University of Minnesota Press, 1979): (Impresiones de la Universidad de Minesota , 1979). Esto
that is, a property of a person is individualistic just es, la propiedad de una persona es individualista sólo en la
if the instantiation of that property can be idea de que esa propiedad pueda ser explicada sin
explained without reference to the condition of any referencia a la condición de alguna otra persona. Una
other person; a property is social just if this is not propiedad es social en el caso contrario.
so.

10. It is especially important to see that the 10. Es especialmente importante ver que la introducción a
introduction of the community pertains to la comunidad se corresponde con las condiciones de
assertibility conditions and not truth conditions; asertabilidad y no con las condiciones de verdad.
for essentially the same difficulties would afflict Esencialmente los mismos problemas afectarían un intento
the attempt to find a social fact for meaning to de encontrar un hecho social que quisiera dar razón de los
consist in. fundamentos del significado.

11. It is significant that in other passages in which 11. Resulta significativo que en otros pasajes en los que la
the interpretational conception is rejected, e.g. BB concepción interpretacional es rechazada, por ejemplo en
pp. 33—35, there is no mention of a paradox into BB p. 33-35 no se mencione a ninguna paradoja en la cuál
which we arc in imminent danger of falling; nos encontremos en peligro inminente de caer, el punto de
Wittgenstein's point in these passages is just that Wittgenstein respecto a estos pasajes estriba solamente en
we should not think of meaning and understanding que nosotros no deberíamos pensar sobre el significado y
in terms of inner interpretations (i.e. symbols) - he el entendimiento en términos de interpretaciones internas
is not saying that this is the only way we can think (por ejemplo, símbolos) - él no está diciendo que esta sea
if we cleave to a Tactual1conception of these la única manera en que podamos pensar si nos apegamos
concepts. a una concepción "objetiva" de estos conceptos.

Traducción: Madrigal Bailón Joel Tucídides / UAM-iztapalapa / IN CALLI IXCAHUICOPA


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2

12. More specifically, Wittgenstein is asking what 12. Más específicamente Wittgenstein está
it is about a person that determines his future use preguntándose qué sucedería con una persona que
of a sign, and hts answer is that this is a matter of determina sus usos futuros de un signo, y su respuesta es
the technique of use of which he is master, not of que este es un problema en la técnica de uso que él
what comes before his mind. If you like: the fact domina, y no en lo que viene desde antes a su mente. Si
that gives signs life is a fact about use, not a fact usted gusta: el hecho que da vida al signo es un hecho
about inner states. que tiene que ver con el uso, no es un hecho relacionado
con ningún estado interno.

13. See Kripke, pp. 45-49. 13. Véase Kripke, pp. 45 - 49.

14. Kripke says: 'The sceptical paradox is the 14. Kripke dice: la paradoja escéptica es el problema
fundamental problem of Philosophical fundamental de <<Investigaciones Filosóficas>> (p. 78)
Investigations (p. 78). It might clarify Parece ser muy clara la actitud de Wittgenstein hacia esta
Wittgenstein's attitude to this paradox to contrast paradoja, lo que contrasta con la actitud de Russell con
it with Russell's attitude towards his class respecto a su paradoja clásica. Wittgenstein parece ver a
paradox. Wittgenstein sees hisparadox as a su paradoja como un problema para todo aquel que asuma
problem for anyone who assumes that meaning is que el significado es una cuestión de interpretación,
a matter of interpretation, but he thinks that this aunque no obstante él piensa que esa suposición no es
assumption is not at all compulsory or del todo "compulsiva" e ineludible; mientras que la
unavoidable; whereas Russell's paradox arises paradoja de Russell parte de suposiciones que parecen
from assumptions that seem inescapable - there is ser ineludibles - no hay sencillamente error en las
no straightforward mistake in the premisses that premisas que generan contradicción. En una palabra, la
generate the contradiction. In a word, paradoja de Wittgenstein no es un problema para
Wittgenstein's paradox is not a problem for Wittgenstein, pero la paradoja de Russell es un problema
Wittgenstein, as Russell's paradox is a problem para Russell.
for Russell.
15. In particular, BB pp. 113-17, which deals at 15. En particular el apartado BB pp. 113-17, que se ocupó
some length with the notion of ability, does not de aclarar que la noción de habilidad no sugiere que
suggest that sentences containing 'can' and its aquellas sentencias que contengan el verbo << poder >> o
cognates do not correspond to 'conditions-in-the- alguno de sus cognados, no correspondan a ciertas
world'; the point there is rather that we should "condiciones-en-el-mundo", sino que más bien deberíamos
not construe abilities as special sorts of inner interpretar a las habilidades como una clase especial de
processor state which lie 'behind' what counts as proceso interno o estado que subyace "detrás" de lo que
the exercise of the ability. consideramos el ejercicio de habilidad.

16. Remember that the form of Wittgenstein's 16. Recuérdese que la forma que adopta la exposición de
account is to be the perspicuous connecting of Wittgenstein es la de tener una perspicaz conexión de
concepts (see 122): he says that the 'grammar' of conceptos (véase 122): Él dice que la "gramática" del
‘can’ and 'is able to' is 'closely related' to that of verbo "poder" y "ser capaz de" están "íntimamente ligadas"
'understands' (150), not that we can actually al verbo "entender·" (150) y no que nosotros podamos
analyze the latter in terms of the former. In fact, I analizar verdaderamente lo posterior en términos de lo
think that the failure to provide necessary and anterior. En realidad creo que la falla de enunciar
sufficient conditions for the application of a condiciones suficientes y necesarias para la aplicación de
concept would, for Wittgenstein, have no un concepto, podría no tener sentido alguno para
significance whatever for the question whether Wittgenstein, no importando la cuestión de si ese
that concept could be interpreted in a 'fact- concepto pudiera ser interpretado en forma de un "hecho -
stating' way. declarado".

Traducción: Madrigal Bailón Joel Tucídides / UAM-iztapalapa / IN CALLI IXCAHUICOPA


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2

17. Kripke notes that Wittgenstein subscribes to a 17. Kripke repara en que Wittgenstein se suscribe a una
redundancy theory of truth (so called) in 136 redundante teoría de la verdad (por así llamarla) en 136
(Kripke. p. 86), but he docs not, I think, draw the (véase Kripke, p. 86), pero pienso que él no rescata la
right lesson from this: given that 'true' adds lección correcta de todo esto: Dado que ' "la verdad" no le
nothing to the content of an assertion, it cannot be añade nada al el contenido de una aseveración, no puede
that Wittgenstein really wishes to deny that ser que Wittgenstein realmente desee negar que las frases
semantic sentences have truth conditions – on semánticas tengan condiciones de verdad - so pena de
pain of denying that they express propositions. negar que ellas expresan proposiciones. Algo semejante
Similarly for 'it is a fact that 'or 'states a fact'. sucede con las expresiones: "es un hecho que " y " estado
de hecho".

18. Cf. "But if you are certain, isn't it that you 18. Véase este fragmento: << Pero si usted "está seguro",
are shutting your eyes in lace of doubt - They are pues no es que usted este "cerrando los ojos" al encarar la
shut" (p. 2?4). He is saying that the question of duda - lo que pasa es que ya están cerrados>> (p. 224) Él
doubt, in certain standard sorts of case, simply dice que el asunto de la duda, en ciertos tipos de caso
does not arise for us; so the sceptic can make no estándar, simplemente no surge de nosotros, así es que el
impact on our customary confidence by inventing escéptico no puede causar impacto en nuestra confianza
if doubt (we should keep yur eyes firmly shut). usual, inventando alguna duda (en tal caso, deberíamos
mantener nuestros ojos firmemente cerrados).

19. See Kripke, p. 43, In tact, this explanation of 19. Véase a Kripke, p.43. En realidad esta explicación de
the disparity docs not tit the historical tacts very la disparidad no encuadra en los hechos históricos muy
well, since behaviourism was enjoying a adecuadamente, ya que el conductismo disfrutó de una
considerable vogue at the time Wittgenstein was considerable moda en el tiempo que Wittgenstein estaba
writing what became the Investigations, and di1 escribiendo lo que se convertiría en las Investigaciones y
positional accounts ol psychological concepts were en los argumentos disposicionales psicológicos donde fue
widely advocated Russell, in particular, was ampliamente apoyado por Russell, en particular, fue
strongly inttuenceil by behaviourism, as Kripke poderosamente influenciado por el conductismo, tal como
himself notes (Kripke, p. 1 see Russell's My Kripke mismo lo reconoce [Kripke p . 25 ] véase Russell,
Philosophical Development (George Allen and Mi Desarrollo Filosófico (George Allen y Uwin: Londres,
Unwin: London, 1959), esp. chapters 11-13. In 1959, especialmente capítulos 11-13). Si la interpretación
view of the prevalence of such, doctrines at the de Kripke fuera correcta, en vista del predominio de tales
time of his writing, imr might have thought doctrinas al momento de la redacción de su obra, uno
Wittgenstein would take thru refutation as an first podría haber pensado que Wittgenstein tomaría entonces
priority, if Kripke's interpretation were on the ideas y refutaciones con alguna prioridad inicial.
tight lines.
20. that is, Wittgenstein is objecting to the notion 20. Esto es, Wittgenstein desaprueba la noción de
of disposition if this notion is understood disposición si esta noción es comprendida
independently of behavior, i.e. as an internal state independientemente del comportamiento, o sea como un
that is explanatory of behavior; but Kripke's estado interno que es explicativo de comportamiento; Pero
objections to the dispositional suggestion construe las objeciones de Kripke a la sugerencia disposicional
dispositions precisely in terms of counterfactuals interpretan a las disposiciones precisamente en términos
about behavior: so Wittgenstein and Kripke mean de condicionales materiales acerca del comportamiento:
quite different things by "disposition" and hence Entonces Wittgenstein y Kripke quieren decir cosas muy
are making quite different objections to the diferentes por "disposición" y por lo tanto hacen objeciones
invocation of this notion. )This explain why muy diferentes a la invocación de esta noción. )Esto
Wittgenstein objects to talk of dispositions, but explica por qué Wittgenstein desaprueba hablar de
commends the use of counterfactuals to elucidate disposiciones, pero recomienda el uso de condicionales
meaning and knowledge.) materiales para distinguir entre "lo que se quiere decir" y
"el conocimiento".)

Traducción: Madrigal Bailón Joel Tucídides / UAM-iztapalapa / IN CALLI IXCAHUICOPA


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2

21 This, then, is Wittgenstein's answer to the 21. Ésta, entonces, es la respuesta de Wittgenstein para
question that ends 187, and to the puzzle la pregunta que termina 187, y para el acertijo
originally raised in 138: when one suddenly comes originalmente planteado en 138: Cuando uno
to understand a word, or hears it whit repentinamente consigue comprender una palabra, o la
understanding, or knows the meaning of a word, escucha con un poco de entendimiento, o sabe el
what is true of one is that certain counterfactuals significado de una palabra, sucede que ciertos
hold, which correspond to the possession of an condicionales abrazan aplicaciones que se corresponden
ability; it is not that one performs a remarkable con la posesión de una habilidad. No es que uno
mental act in which the whole of the future and represente un acto mental extraordinario en el cual, todo el
possible use comes before one's mind as a futuro y todo uso posible vengan desde antes a la mente
condensed series of thoughts or images or some de uno, como una serie condensada de pensamientos e
such (see 188). A man's entire life may flash imágenes o algo semejante (véase 188) . La vida entera
before his mind when he believes he is about to die de un hombre puede pasar ante de su mente cuando él
but his temporally extended use of a word does cree que él está a punto de morir; pero su uso extendido
not similarly flash before his mind when he means temporal de la palabra no "pasa ante su mente"
it in certain way. (análogamente) cuando él quiere decir algo en cierta
forma.

22 As I observed in chapter one, Wittgenstein's 22. Como lo observé en el capítulo uno, la relación que
treatment of the concept of meaning takes its Wittgenstein establece del concepto de significado toma
place along whit a like treatment of a wide range lugar a lo largo de ciertos detalles como el tratamiento de
of other psychological concepts and his general una gran variedad de otros conceptos psicológicos y su
aim is to resist driving these psychological meta general es la de resistirse a impulsar estos
phenomena inward. If Kripke were right about fenómenos psicológicos interiormente. Si Kripke estuviera
Wittgenstein's treatment of meaning, then he en lo correcto respecto al argumento de Wittgenstein sobre
would have to take a parallel line about the whole el significado, entonces el tendría que tomar una línea
range of psychological concepts treated by paralela de estudio acerca del rango completo de los
Wittgenstein: he would have to say that fenómenos psicológicos tratados por Wittgenstein: él
Wittgenstein is advocating skeptical paradox tendría que decir que Wittgenstein está abogando por una
about believing, recognizing, remembering, paradoja escéptica acerca del creer, reconocer, recordar,
comparing, wiling, etc. , and proposing a comparar, desear, etcétera y estaría proponiendo una
community - based skeptical solution. Or he did comunidad fundamentada en la solución escéptica, de no
not, he would have to explain why Wittgenstein hacerlo, él tendría que explicar por qué Wittgenstein
himself treat all this concepts in a similar way. mismo trata todos estos conceptos de una forma similar.

23. Kripke is, of course, not first to propose a 23. Kripke no es por supuesto el primero en proponer una
broadly community interpretation of interpretación ampliamente comunal de la discusión de
Wittgenstein's discussion of following a rule; an Wittgenstein de seguir una regla; Un exponente antiguo de
early exponent of this interpretation is Peter esta interpretación es Peter Winch, en La Idea De
Winch, in The Idea Of Social Science (Routledge Sociología (Routledge y Kegan Paul: Londres, 1958),
and Kegan Paul: London, 1958), esp. pp. 24-39. parágrafo pp. 24-39. Y esta interpretación general ha sido
And this general interpretation has been endorsed justificada por una gran cantidad, quizá la mayoría, de
by a great many, perhaps the majority, of comentaristas de allí en adelante.
commentators since then.

Traducción: Madrigal Bailón Joel Tucídides / UAM-iztapalapa / IN CALLI IXCAHUICOPA


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2

24 Wittgenstein does not, perhaps, use "private" 24. Wittgenstein quizá no usa " privado " y "
and "privately" in an entirely uniform way; but privadamente " en una forma enteramente uniforme; Pero
its central meaning for him is, I think, twofold: he su significado central para él es, pienso, doble: Él lo usa
uses It to suggest a condition of consciousness, and para sugerir una condición de conciencia, y la usa para
he uses It to suggest unknowability by another ( sugerir la no cognoscibilidad por medio de otro (véase 251,
see 251, 272, 294). When states of consciousness 272, 294). Cuando los estados de conciencia son
are conceived in an erroneous way their concebidos en una forma errónea su " privacidad " se
(admitted) "privacy" becomes a kind of convierte en un tipo de no cognoscibilidad, en lugar de ser
unknowability, instead od a harmless truth about alguna verdad acerca de ellos (La preposición "Las
them ( The preposition << Sensations are sensaciones son privadas" es comparable a "uno juega a
private>> is comparable to <<one place patience la paciencia por si mismo" (248) y esto es un ejemplo de
by oneself>> (248), i.e. this is a "grammatical un "enunciado gramatical").. Pienso que ambas de estas
remark"). I think both of these connotations are connotaciones están presentes en el uso de Wittgenstein
present in Wittgenstein's use of "privately" in de " privadamente " en 202. No sé de algún pasaje en el
202. I do not know of any passage in which cual Wittgenstein claramente use " privado " en el sentido
Wittgenstein clearly uses "private" in the sense que Kripke da a 202, esto es, como intentando "no hacer
Kripke gives to it in 202, i.e. as meaning "making referencia a las otras personas ".
no reference to other people".
25 The question is also raised in RFM p. 349: 25. Esta cuestión también surge en RFM p. 349: ¿podría
"Could there be only one human been than haber un solo ser humano que pudiera calcular?¿podría
calculated? Could there be only one that followed haber uno solo que siguiera una regla? A pesar de todo,
a rule? This is not, however, answered negatively. esto no se contesta negativamente. En otro lugar
Elsewhere we read: "But what about this leemos:"Pero ¿qué sucede con este consenso? --- ¿no
consensus - doesn't It mean that one human been significa que un ser humano por si mismo no pueda
by himself could not calculate? Well, one human calcular? Bueno, un ser humano pudiera no calcular en
been could at any rate not calculate just one in his ningún porcentaje un sólo caso en su vida" (RFM p. 193).
life" (RFM p. 193). These remarks seems best Estos señalamientos parecen estar mejor explicados
explained as I explain the passage from the según mi cita del pasaje de Investigaciones expuesto
Investigations cited in the text: Wittgenstein's antes: El punto que señala Wittgenstein es que nosotros
underlying point is that we need a plurality of necesitamos una pluralidad de ocasiones y esta cuestión
occasions, and it is a question to be raised whether se hace presente si un hombre proporciona suficiente de
one man provides enough of these. Wittgenstein ellas. La implicación de Wittgenstein parece ser que es
implication appears to be that he does, so long as posible a medida que se calcula más de una vez.
calculates more than once.
26 Kripke never so much as mentions what I 26. Kripke no menciona lo que yo argumento que es "el
have argued to be Wittgenstein's main point in principal punto de Wittgenstein" en estos pasajes acerca
these passages about rules and customs, viz. the de las reglas y las costumbres, a saber, la tesis de la
multiple application thesis. Since It seems, beyond aplicación múltiple. Le parece que Wittgenstein sólo dice
question that is at least one thing Wittgenstein is una cosa. Kripke tendría que establecer que Wittgenstein
saying. Kripke must hold that Wittgenstein is construye la afirmación Comunitaria al mismo tiempo que
making the community claim in the same breath propone la tesis de la aplicación múltiple. Sin embargo en
as he is propounding the multiple application vista de las diferencias evidentes entre estas dos
thesis. However in view of the toto caelo difference afirmaciones, pareciera en el mejor de los casos, que sería
between these two claims, it would seem at best algo extraño para Wittgenstein el aplicar ambas tesis con
highly confusing for Wittgenstein to be running tanto descuido. debido a esto decide atribuir a Wittgenstein
them together so carelessly. Better to attribute una sola de ellas y no dar lugar a problemas aparentes al
only one of them to him, and there seems no cuestionar si aquél sostuvo la tesis de la aplicación
question but that he held the multiple application múltiple.
thesis.

Traducción: Madrigal Bailón Joel Tucídides / UAM-iztapalapa / IN CALLI IXCAHUICOPA


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2

27. Cf. "The danger here, I believe, is one of 27. Cfr. "El peligro aquí, creo yo, es el dar justificación a
giving a justification of our procedure where there nuestro procedimiento ahi donde no la haya para nuestro
is no such thing as justification and we ought procedimiento, y que nosotros simplemente tengamos que
simply to have said : tha's how we do it" (RFM p. decir: es lo que hago siempre" (RFM p. 199), pero este no
199) But this not imply any episteme defect, since es simplemente un defecto epistémico, ya que "usar una
"To use the word withouth a justification does not palabra sin justificación no significa usarla
mean to use it wrongfully" (RFM p. 406). incorrectamente" (RFM p. 406) Esencialmente el mismo
Essencially the same point could be put by saying punto podría ponerse diciendo que yo no tengo (ni
that I have (and need) no criterion for appliying a necesito) algún criterio para aplicar una palabra como
word as I do, i.e. , for supposing that I am using it suelo hacerlo, por ejemplo, para suponer que yo la estoy
a rule - governed way. usando como una regla-de-gobierno.

28. Thus "we look to the rule for instruction and 28. De esta forma "nosotros atendemos a la regla para
do something, whithout appealing to anything else obtener instrucción y hacer algo, sin apelar a nada más
for guidance" (228): that is, when I naturally para conseguir guía" (228); esto es, cuando yo reacciono
react in certain way to a rule (expression of a rule) con naturalidad a cierta regla (o expresión de la regla) yo
I cannot check that this reaction is rigth by no puedo advertir que esta reacción sea correcta sólo
looking to the community for guidence. What observando a la comunidad para guiarme. Lo que implica
prompts this appeal to community guidence is esta apelación a la guía comunitaria es lo que también se
what also prompts the appeal to a voice of implica al apelar a la voz de la intuición, a saber, el
intuition, namely the feeling that we must be able sentimiento que solemos tener para proporcionar alguna
to provide some reason for what we do when we razón para lo que hacemos cuando seguimos las reglas.
follow rules.
29. In Z 319 Wittgenstein says something very 29. En Z 319 Wittgenstein dice algo muy relevante al
relevant to this, which seems to me of considerable respecto, lo cual me parece de considerable importancia
significance for community interpretations of para las interpretaciones comunitarias sobre el
Wittgenstein thought about rule following. After pensamiento de Wittgesntein cuando habla acerca del
saying, "I cannot describe how (in general) to seguimiento de reglas. Después de decir: "Yo no puedo
employ rules, except by teaching you, training you describir cómo (en general) emplear las reglas, excepto
to employ rules" (Z 318), he goes on, "I may now, enseñándolas, entrenándote en el empleo de reglas" (Z
e.g. make a talkie of such instruction. The teacher 318), él continua: "Yo podría ahora, por ejemplo, "hacer
will sometimes say "That´s right". If the pupil una película hablada" de tal instrucción. El maestro
should ask him "Why?" - He will answer nothing, algunas veces dirá: "Eso es correcto", y si el pupilo le
or at any rate nothing relevant not even: "Well, debiera preguntar "¿Por qué?" --- El no contestará nada, o
because we all do it like that"; that will not be the en cualquier caso algo poco relevante como: "Bueno, pues
reason. It is very hard to see how this passage porque todos lo hacemos así"; eso no sería ninguna razón.
could be squared with the idea that for Es muy difícil ver cómo este pasaje puede ser equiparado
Wittgenstein, correctness in following rule is a con la idea de que para Wittgenstein la corrección de
matter of agreement whit the reactions of the seguir la regla sea materia de algún acuerdo con las
community - either in respect of truth conditions reacciones de la comunidad --- ya sea en materia de
or assertibility condition. "condiciones de verdad" o condiciones de asertibilidad.

Traducción: Madrigal Bailón Joel Tucídides / UAM-iztapalapa / IN CALLI IXCAHUICOPA


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2

30. The question of correctness in the application 30. La cuestión de la corrección en la aplicación de una 8
of a rule is the question what counts as a mistake regla, es la cuestión sobre lo que cuenta como error en la
in applying the rule. Wittgenstein does not in fact aplicación de la regla. Wittgenstein en realidad no hace
make heavy weather of this question, as witness mucho caso de este punto, como lo atestigua este pasaje:
this passage: "But now does the observer "Pero ahora ¿podría el observador distinguir en este caso
distinguish in this case between players" mistakes entre dos jugadores...entre los errores y un juego
and correct play? - there are characteristic sings correcto? --- Existen signos característicos de esto en el
of it in the players' behavior. Think of the comportamiento de los jugadores. Piense en el
behavior characteristic of correcting slip of the comportamiento característico al corregir un tartamudeo
tongue. It would be possible to recognize that con la lengua. Se lograría reconocer que alguien estuviera
someone was doing so even without knowing his desempeñándose al parejo sin saber su idioma" (54);
language" (54); see also 143, in which mistaking véase también 143, en el cual En el que confundir la orden
the order of a series is said to be simply a matter de una serie - se dice - es simplemente un asunto de "
of "frequency". That is, Wittgenstein takes there frecuencia ". Esto es, Wittgenstein toma este criterio para
to be readily recognizable criteria for making a localizar criterios fácilmente reconocibles que den cuenta
mistake; he is not supposing there to be a deep de la equivocación; Él no supone aquí que esté frente a un
and perplexing problem about what the problema profundo y desconcertante acerca de lo que
distinction of correct and incorrect application implica la distinción de una aplicación correcta e incorrecta
consists in (for the case of language about public (para el caso de lenguaje acerca de objetos del públicos) .
objects) Rather he typically assumes a given Más Bien él asume típicamente que un patrón dado de uso
pattern of possible future use to be correct and is futuro posible puede ser correcto y ello es entonces
then exercised with the question how this relates ejercitado con la pregunta del cómo se relaciona esto, con
to what I now mean. lo que yo ahora significo.

31. Here we might think of very simple language- 31. Aquí podríamos pensar en juegos muy simples del
games in which trining produces fairly uniform lenguaje en los cuales un entrenamiento produce
and mechanical reactions; or even of the reacciones mecánicas y muy uniformes o por así decirlo,
'language' of bees. un "lenguaje de abejas".

32 . On this point I am in agreement with Barry 32. En este punto yo estoy de acuerdo con Barry Stroud,
Stroud, 'Wittgenstein and Logical Necessity', "Wittgenstein y la necesidad Lógica", Revista Filosófica
Philosophical Review LXXIV (1965) . This LXXIV (1965) . Esta interpretación contrasta con la idea de
interpretation contrast whit the idea that que Wittgenstein es una clase de "Convencionalista".
Wittgenstein is some kind of "conventionalist".

33. There is even in Wittgenstein some analogue of 33. Todavía existe en Wittgenstein algunas analogías con
Hume's projectivist "error theory" when we respecto a la "teoría del error" que tiene el proyectivismo
reflect philosophically upon our following rules de Hume. Cuando reflexionamos filosóficamente sobre
we are irresistibly tempted to suppose that our nuestro seguimiento de reglas nos encontramos
natural propensities have some foundation on irresistiblemente tentados a suponer que nuestras
what is "out there" and hence we get the idea of inclinaciones naturales tienen algún fundamento sobre lo
"rails invisibly laid to infinity" (218) and of que está "allá afuera" y en consecuencia nosotros
"something which only needs the addition of "and abrazamos la idea de que "existen rieles que nos llevan
so on", in order to reach to infinity" (229). These hasta el infinito" (218) y de que "Cualquier adición tan sólo
illusions result from a kind of "externalization" of necesita la premisa <<y así sucesivamente>> para llegar
the compulsion we are under when we follow a hasta el infinito" (229). Estas ilusiones son el resultado de
rule - rather as Hume thought that we una "externalización" compulsiva que experimentamos
"externalize" necessary connexion in our thought cuando seguimos una regla --- algo como lo que pensaba
about causation. (Of course this analogy should Hume respecto a que nosotros "externalizamos" una
not be pressed too far; there also plenty of conexión necesaria en nuestro pensamiento acerca de la
differences between Hume and Wittgenstein in causación. (Por supuesto, esta analogía no debe llevarse
this regard.) demasiado lejos, hay también un montón de diferencias
entre Hume y Wittgenstein en este sentido.)

Traducción: Madrigal Bailón Joel Tucídides / UAM-iztapalapa / IN CALLI IXCAHUICOPA


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2

34. It is important here that my use of language is 34. Es importante aquí que mi uso del lenguaje está
interwoven with various kinds of non-linguistic entretejido con varias clases de actividad no-lingüística, de
activity in such a way as to fix what my words tal manera que es posible "arreglar" lo que mis palabras
mean; so correctness of use will (partially) consist quieren decir; así la "corrección" en el uso consistirá
in how my linguistic actions fit in with my non- (parcialmente) en la manera en que mis acciones
linguistic actions. lingüísticas se ajusten y correspondan con mis acciones
no-lingüísticas.

35 'Philosophers very often talk about 35. "Los filósofos usualmente hablan acerca de investigar
investigating, analysing, the meaning of words. y analizar el significado de las palabras. Pero no se nos
But let's not forget that a word hasn't got a olvide que una palabra no adquiere un significado
meaning giving to it, as it were, by a power dándoselo, por así decirlo, mediante un poder
independent of us, so that there could be a kind of independiente a nosotros, de tal forma que pudiera haber
scientific investigation into what the word really "algún tipo de investigación científica" sobre lo que una
means. A word has the meaning someone has palabra realmente significa. "Una palabra tiene el
given to it' (BB pp. 27-8). So it could not turn out significado que alguien le ha querido dar" (88 pp. 276-8).
that a word has a meaning different from that Por lo tanto no podría ser que una palabra tuviera un
which 1 (we) give to it by dint of my (our) use of significado diferente de aquel que yo (o nosotros) le
the word. hayamos dado valiéndonos de nuestro (o de mi) uso de la
palabra.

36. See esp. 208-10, in which it is ernphasised 36. Véase el periodo 208-10 en el cual se enfatiza que al
that in teaching someone a rule I don not enseñarle a alguien una regla, yo no comunico nada que
communicate lees than 1 myself know. This claim yo mismo no conozca. Esta afirmación de Wittgenstein
of Wittgenstein's bears certain similarities to W. tiene ciertas similitudes con la posición de W. V. Quine
V. Quine's position on radical translation in Word sobre la traducción radical entre la Palabra y el objeto (MIT
and Object (MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass, 1960), Press: Cambridge, Mass, 1960), capítulo 2; y a la
chap. 2; and to Michael Dummett's insistence insistencia de Michael Dummett sobre la "exhaustiva
upon the exhaustive manifestability of linguistic manifestabilidad" del entendimiento lingüístico, en su
understanding in 'What is a Theory of Meaning? artículo "¿Qué es la teoría del significado? (II)" dentro de
(II)', in Truth and Meaning, ed. G. Evans and J. "Verdad y significado", ed. G. Evans y J. McDowell
McDowell (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1976). (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1976).

37 See Kripke, pp. 3, 98-113 37 véase Kripke, pp. 3, 98-113

38. He does not anywhere say or imply that a 38. Wittgenstein en ningún lado dice o implica que un
private language has already been excluded by he lenguaje privado ya haya sido excluido por
earlier considerations, and that it is necessary for consideraciones anteriores, que ahora sea necesario para
him now only to bring out how those él considerar cómo se aplican esas consideraciones para
considerations apply to the skeptical case of words el caso escéptico de palabras en sensaciones. De hecho.
for sensations. In fact. I think he writes as in the Pienso que Wittgenstein escribe (al igual que en la
earlier conclusion -that understanding is mastery conclusión anterior), dejando siempre en claro la
of a practice- leaves open the possibility of a posibilidad de un lenguaje privado - que la comprensión es
private language. Hence the need to show that we consecuencia de una práctica -.De aquí la necesidad de
have to impose further conditions on what it takes mostrar que nosotros tenemos que dictar condiciones
for a genuine practice (rule) to exist, notably adicionales sobre lo que se necesita para que exista una
third-person criteria of correctness. práctica genuina, el criterio de corrección de "la notación
de una tercera persona" (la regla) .

Traducción: Madrigal Bailón Joel Tucídides / UAM-iztapalapa / IN CALLI IXCAHUICOPA


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

Wittgenstein: Sobre el Significado. Una Interpretación y una evaluación. - Capítulo 2

10
Tema: Kripke's Interpretation of Wittgenstein: Paradox and Community. La versión castellana puede descargarse de
la página: http://es.scribd.com/ ubicando Colin Mcginn, "La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein:
paradoja y comunidad" y en www.losriosdeheraclito.blogspot.com . Por favor, para mejor opinión visite la página
Web del profesor Colin McGuinn en: http://mcginn.philospot.com/ .

Referencia bibliografía:

"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein:


Extraído del libro original. paradoja y comunidad"( Kripke's Interpretation of
Wittgenstein: Paradox and Community) en:
Wittgenstein on Meaning. An Interpretation and
Evaluation, McGINN, Colin, Inglaterra, Basil Blackwell
Publisher L t d, 1984, pp. 59-92 (Aristotelian Society
Series, Volume 1).

Las notas originales (1) se han colocado a final de 64). La paginación se maneja así:
texto y se han reservado los pies de página para Arriba en un recuadro negro se pone el
algunas notas adicionales. Esto pretende facilitar número aproximado en el formato
al estudiante la lectura. El acomodo de palabras ha original, y abajo la paginación
variado ligeramente la paginación: algunos particular de este documento.
párrafos se han recorrido “al siguiente inicio de
página” respecto a la versión original (vgr. Las
líneas últimas de p. 63, se trasladaron a inicio de la

Escaneado y Traduci do y edi tado por el Profesor Joel


Tu cí di des Madrigal Bailó n, Li cen ciado en Filosofía,
Méx ico Distrito Federal. Univ ersidad Autónoma
Metropolitana- Uni dad Iztapalapa.
(tuc id ides2000 @yahoo.com.m x) Para educar y sin fin es
d e lucro. Se permite la reprodu cc ión total o parcial
c itando al autor origi nal.

Invito a mis amigos a que colaboren generosamente con sus


escritos traducidos en bien de las generaciones futuras.

Traducción: Madrigal Bailón Joel Tucídides / UAM-iztapalapa / IN CALLI IXCAHUICOPA


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

Sin mis seres amados, esta traducción jamás hubiera visto la luz:

Porque su Náhuatl
me enseñó a hablar
A MARÍA IMELDA SOTO el Castellano y aún
LÓPEZ me guía para
entender el Inglés.

Licenciada en Letras
Hispanas por la Normal
Superior de México.
Mujer culta dedicada a la
educación de la niñez
mexicana…. guía de muchas
A INÉS BAILÓN SOTO
decenas de generaciones.

Excelente maestra y
magnífico ejemplo.

A mi querida Angélica, amante de los libros.

A CARMINA ITZEL RUÍZ MADRIGAL…


PORQUE SU EXISTENCIA ME
ENORGULLECE Y ME DA FUERZA PARA
INTERPRETAR LOS SIGNOS DEL
FUTURO.
"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

LECTURAS SUGERIDAS SOBRE EL


TEMA:
Reflexión sobre lenguaje, significado y
seguimiento de reglas.
(INGLÉS) 1
 Ludwig Wittgenstein in 20th Century Philosophy Meaning in Philosophy of Language
Pragmatics in Philosophy of Language Rule-Following in Philosophy of Mind
 Alexander Miller (2010). Kripke's Wittgenstein, Factualism and Meaning. In Daniel
Whiting (ed.), The Later Wittgenstein on Language. Palgrave Macmillan. Ludwig
Wittgenstein in 20th Century Philosophy
 Alexander Miller (1999). Horwich, Meaning and Kripke's Wittgenstein. Philosophical
Quarterly 49 (199):161-174. Kripkenstein on Meaning in Philosophy of Language
Ludwig Wittgenstein in 20th Century Philosophy
 Adam M. Croom (2010). Wittgenstein, Kripke, and the Rule Following Paradox.
Dialogue 52 (2/3):103-109.
o In §201 of Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein puts forward his
famous “rule-following paradox.” The paradox is how can one follow in accord
with a rule – the applications of which are potentially infinite – when the
instances from which one learns the rule and the instances in which one
displays that one has learned the rule are only finite? How can one be certain
of rule-following at all? In Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language, Saul
Kripke concedes the skeptical position that there are no facts that we follow a
rule but that there are still conditions under which we are warranted in
asserting of others that they are following a rule. In this paper, I explain why
Kripke’s solution to the rule-following paradox fails. I then offer an alternative.
 Jakob Hohwy (2003). A Reduction of Kripke-Wittgenstein's Objections to
Dispositionalism About Meaning. Minds and Machines 13 (2):257-68.
o A central part of Kripke's influential interpretation of Wittgenstein's sceptical
argument about meaning is the rejection of dispositional analyses of what it is
for a word to mean what it does (Kripke, 1982). In this paper I show that
Kripke's arguments prove too much: if they were right, they would preclude
not only the idea that dispositional properties can make statements about the
meanings of words true, but also the idea that dispositional properties can
make true statements about paradigmatic dispositional properties such as a
cup's fragility or a person's bravery. However, since dispositional properties
can make such statements true, Kripke-Wittgenstein's arguments against
dispositionalism about meaning are mistaken.

1
Fuente: Wittgenstein on Meaning | PhilPapers http://philpapers.org/rec/MCGWOM
Página 1 de 3 Joel Tucídides Madrigal Bailón
"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

 Paul A. Boghossian (1989). The Rule-Following Considerations. Mind 98 (392):507-49.


o Recent years have witnessed a great resurgence of interest in the writings of
the later Wittgenstein, especially with those passages roughly, Philosophical
Investigations p)I 38 â⠬â 242 and Remarks on the Foundations of
mathematics, section VI that are concerned with the topic of rules. Much of
the credit for all this excitement, unparalleled since the heyday of
Wittgenstein scholarship in the early IIJ6os, must go to Saul Kripke's
I4rittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. It is easy to explain why. To
begin with, the dialectic Kripke uncovered from Wittgenstein's.
 Paul Horwich (1990). Wittgenstein and Kripke on the Nature of Meaning. Mind and
Language 5 (2):105-121.
 Collins (1992). On the Paradox Kripke Finds in Wittgenstein. Midwest Studies in
Philosophy 18 (1):74-88.
 Kai-Yuan Cheng (forthcoming). A New Look at the Problem of Rule-Following: A
Generic Perspective. Philosophical Studies.
o The purpose of this paper is to look at the problem of rule-following—notably
discussed by Kripke (Wittgenstein on rules and private language, 1982 ) and
Wittgenstein (Philosophical investigations, 1953 )—from the perspective of the
study of generics. Generics are sentences that express generalizations that
tolerate exceptions. I first suggest that meaning ascriptions be viewed as
habitual sentences, which are a sub-set of generics. I then seek a proper
semantic analysis for habitually construed meaning sentences. The
quantificational approach is rejected, due to its persistent difficulties. Instead,
a cognitive approach is adopted, where psychological considerations of
meaning attributors play a crucial role. This account is then compared with the
picture of meaning offered by Kripke and Wittgenstein, respectively. I show
how this fresh way of conceiving of meaning sentences respects some of their
insights while avoiding some of the drawbacks, and serves to improve the
framework in which the current debate and inquiry about rule-following are
conducted.

Página 2 de 3 Joel Tucídides Madrigal Bailón


"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

 Daniel Whiting (2010). Particular and General: Wittgenstein, Linguistic Rules, and
Context. In Daniel Whiting (ed.), The Later Wittgenstein on Language. Palgrave
Macmillan.
o Wittgenstein famously remarks that ‘the meaning of a word is its use’ (PI §43).
Whether or not one views this as gesturing at a ‘theory’ of meaning, or instead
as aiming primarily at dissuading us from certain misconceptions of language
that are a source of puzzlement, it is clear that Wittgenstein held that for
certain purposes the meaning of an expression could profitably be
characterised as its use. Throughout his later writings, however, Wittgenstein’s
appeal to the notion of use pulls in two directions. In several places,
Wittgenstein seems to connect the notion of an expression’s meaning with
that of use in the sense of usage or practice. More specifically, he suggests
that for an expression to possess meaning is for there to be a practice of
employing it according to certain rules. ‘That’, he tells us, ‘is why there exists a
correspondence between the concepts “rule” and “meaning”’ (OC §62; cf. PG
68; PO 51; RFM VI §28; VW 103). Indeed, Wittgenstein goes so far as to say,
‘The rule-governed nature of our languages permeates our life’ (RC §303). Call
the view that the meaning of an expression is determined by a general
principle governing its use, rulism.
 Carl A. Ginet (1992). The Dispositionalist Solutions to Wittgenstein's Problem About
Understanding a Rule: Answering Kripke's Objection. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17
(1):53-73.
 Kripkenstein on Meaning in Philosophy of Language Ludwig Wittgenstein in 20th
Century Philosophy

Página 3 de 3 Joel Tucídides Madrigal Bailón


"La
interpretación
de Kripke sobre
Wittgenstein:
paradoja y
comunidad"
58 WITTGENSTEIN'S VIEWS

discussed his emphasis upon the diversity of meaning, i.e. the


important differences between the various language-games
there are; but I have, I think, laid out his basic ideas about
54

meaning, understanding and rules. I have done this without


entering into exegetical disputes w i t h other expositors of
Wittgenstein, in full knowledge that the interpretation I have
offered w o u l d be resisted by others; and I have refrained from Kripke's Interpretation of Wittgenstein:
expressing my o w n views on the claims I have taken
Wittgenstein to be m a k i n g . In the next two chapters these Paradox and Community
restraints w i l l be t h r o w n off, first by c o m p a r i n g my interpret-
ation with K r i p k e ' s and then by critically assessing W i t t g e n -
stein's views.

In this chapter I shall contrast K r i p k e ' s interpretation of


Wittgenstein with the interpretation I put forward in Chapter
1; we shall see that these interpretations are very different.
K r i p k e ' s expository procedure differs somewhat from that
adopted in the previous chapter: he does not expound
Wittgenstein by p a y i n g close attention to the text, supporting
each attribution w i t h an apposite citation; rather, he develops a
systematic argument which he hopes will make sense of, and
occasional contact w i t h , Wittgenstein's text. K r i p k e ' s assump-
tion is that this argument is what underlies Wittgenstein's
actual text, and that we shall understand Wittgenstein better if
we see his text as the surfacing of this systematic argument in
different ways and contexts: it is not that Wittgenstein is to be
found explicitly p r o p o u n d i n g this argument, but we can
i l l u m i n a t i n g l y treat his text as if he were. A n d it is this feature
of K r i p k e ' s exposition w h i c h causes h i m to qualify his
attributions to Wittgenstein from time to time - to admit that
his way of presenting Wittgenstein is somewhat alien to
Wittgenstein's o w n conception of his views. We should 1

therefore take seriously K r i p k e ' s prefatory caveat: 'the present


paper should be thought of as e x p o u n d i n g neither " W i t t g e n -
54
See 24, 65, p. 224. Despite this emphasis on the variety of language-games and of stein's" argument nor " K r i p k e ' s " : rather Wittgenstein's argu-
words, I know of no passage in which Wittgenstein explicitly asserts that the notions of ment as it struck K r i p k e , as it presented a p r o b l e m for h i m . '
rule, meaning and understanding arc themselves family-resemblance concepts; and it
seems to me not an easy matter to determine what he shouldhave said about this, given 'See K r i p k e , pp. 5, 67-71. These qualifications particularly concern the sceptical
his general views. thesis Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein.
60 KRIPKE'S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN KRIPKE'S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN 61
(p. 5) K r i p k e is here d i s a r m i n g l y aware that he is foisting onto right to use words in one way rather than another? It is clear
Wittgenstein's text what is not to be found inscribed on its that this normative property of words depends upon their
surface; and this is why he adopts the method of exposition he having a determinate meaning: for the notion of'acorrect use is
does adopt. My o w n procedure has been quite different: I have well-defined only if words mean one thing rather than another
assumed that Wittgenstein can be satisfactorily interpreted - that is what makes it right to use one w o r d rather than
without seeing his text as the occasional surfacing of an another to state a given fact. Therefore we need to make sense
underlying systematic argument but rather by paying close of the idea of a w o r d meaning one thing rather than another if
(and perhaps somewhat pedantic) attention to what he actually we are to give content to the n o t i o n of correct (or incorrect) use
says. I w o u l d not therefore think it appropriate to issue the sort of language. To put it differently: any proposed candidate for
of caveat K r i p k e does. This observation is not intended as a the meaning of a w o r d must be such as to sustain linguistic
piece of self-congratulation on my part, but as a recognition of normativeness; we must be able to read off from any alleged
the procedural difference between K r i p k e and me. In fact I meaning-constituting property of a w o r d what is the correct
believe that the more substantive differences stem fundamen- use of that w o r d . The normativeness of meaning thus functions
tally from this difference in respect of exegetical method. F o r as a c o n d i t i o n of adequacy upon any account of what meaning
what K r i p k e has done is to produce an impressive and is. N o w K r i p k e ' s c l a i m is that Wittgenstein finds this notion of
2

challenging argument w h i c h bears little affinity with W i t t g e n - normativeness deeply problematic, and hence finds the whole
stein's o w n problems and claims: in an important sense K r i p k e notion o f meaning correspondingly problematic. F o r nothing
and the real Wittgenstein are not even dealing with the same can be produced to constitute meaning that meets the
issues (they have a different ' p r o b l e m a t i c ' ) . I shall begin by normativeness requirement: there is no property of a w o r d
summarising K r i p k e ' s interpretation, assuming some familiarity from w h i c h we can read off its correct use, and so there is
with its outline, and then I shall explain why I think it goes nothing for meaning to be. T h i s is what K r i p k e calls
w r o n g as an interpretation. T h i s task s h o u l d be facilitated by Wittgenstein's 'sceptical p a r a d o x ' - the thesis that there is
what has already been argued in C h a p t e r 1; since I believe I nothing, no fact, that c o u l d constitute meaning one thing
there gave ample textual evidence for my interpretation, it w i l l rather than another. But Wittgenstein does not (according to
be necessary only to spell out the points of disagreement and K r i p k e ) want to leave us helpless in the jaws of this paradox; he
give some diagnosis of how K r i p k e came to the w r o n g proposes a 'sceptical s o l u t i o n ' to the paradox w h i c h , while
interpretation. conceding to the sceptic that no fact constitutes meaning,
The general structure of Wittgenstein's argument, a c c o r d i n g nevertheless preserves our o r d i n a r y talk of meaning and rules.
to K r i p k e , is as follows. Wittgenstein focuses attention upon The sceptical solution does this by persuading us that we do not
the normative n o t i o n of an a p p l i c a t i o n of a sign being need to supply the k i n d of account of meaning the sceptic
(linguistically) correct, i.e. in accordance w i t h its meaning. shows to be unavailable; we can take a radically different view
(This is not the n o t i o n offactual correctness, i.e. stating a truth of the significance of statements about meaning, namely that
about the w o r l d ; it concerns the question which word is such statements do not purport to state facts at a l l . Since as-
linguistically appropriate to the facts. T h u s , for example, criptions of meaning and rule-following do not set out to state
suppose I believe truly that this object is red; the question of facts, it is no disaster for them that we can discover no facts for
linguistic correctness is then w h i c h w o r d expresses this belief: is them to state; we can provide a quite different account of their
'red' the w o r d I ought to use to state the fact in w h i c h I believe?) function. T h i s , then, is the general shape of Wittgenstein's
We o r d i n a r i l y think that some uses of words are correct and argument, as K r i p k e sees it; let us now fill the argument in a bit.
some are incorrect, some uses correctly express the fact we The sceptical paradox is initially presented by considering'
want to state and some do not: Wittgenstein's question is
supposed to be what this distinction consists i n . W h a t makes it *Scc K r i p k e , pp. II, 23-4.
62 KKIPKI-'S INTERPRETATION 01 WITTGENSTEIN KRIPKE'S I N T E R P R E T A T I O N OF WITTCil NS I I IN 63
the meaning I attach to signs I used in the past. I n o r m a l l y and thereafter. A c t u a l use of + \ either externally or in my head.
4

uncritically assume that my present use of (say) accords underdetennines w h i c h function is denoted; for there arc
with my past meaning, so that when I now give the sum of 67 indefinitely many functions distinct from addition which are
and 58 in answer to the question ' 6 7 + 5 8 ? I am interpreting *+* compatible with the finitely many applications of '+' I have
as I d i d in the past: that is, I assume that in the past I meant made. F o r any finite sequence of applications of a sign we can
addition by *+' and so I conform with my past meaning (I u s e ' + 1
always envisage different ways of c o n t i n u i n g to apply the sign
correctly) if I n o w take questions c o n t a i n i n g '+' to require w h i c h c o n f o r m to different assignments of meaning.|Second,
d o i n g some a d d i t i o n . K r i p k e ' s sceptic questions whether this my past inner states of consciousness cannot determine what I
assumption is on reflection legitimate: perhaps in the past I meant because they admit of various interpretations or
meant by + \ not a d d i t i o n , but q u a d d i t i o n , a mathematical
k
applications: no experience I have can dictate what is the right
function whose value is 5 for the pair of arguments 67 and 58. way to use a sign, and whatever meaning is it must provide for
W h a t is it about my past history that makes me so sure that I such normativeness. N o r are there any 'magical states of
meant addition and not q u a d d i t i o n , and hence so confident consciousness w h i c h are capable of d o i n g what the mundane
that my present linguistic response conforms w i t h my previous states cannot d o . So there are no facts about consciousness
meaning (the response of giving 125 in answer to '67 + 58?')? which can furnish a reply to the sceptic. T h i r d , K r i p k e
The sceptic's question is, in effect, what justifies my confidence considers the suggestion that my past meaning consisted in my
t h a t ' + ' has a constant meaning for me over time: what is it that having a certain sort of linguistic disposition: instead of l o o k i n g
constitutes this presumed constancy? To answer this question to my actual use of '+' in the past, let us turn to how I was
we need to be able to point to some feature of my past usage disposed to use '+ and read my past meaning off from that. The
1

that establishes that I then meant a d d i t i o n ; and the semantic appeal of this suggestion is that it offers the hope that the
sceptic claims that this cannot be done. (In fact, the sceptical underdetermination problem w i l l be got round: for we can now
paradox has two aspects, an epistemological aspect and a cite the fact that in the past I was disposed to say 125* and not
4

constitutive or metaphysical aspect: epistemologically, the 4


5 ' in answer to 67 + 58?\ even though this question never
4

c l a i m is that nothing can now be cited to justify my actually came up. Dispositions to use are thus supposed to
assumption of semantic constancy; constitutively, the c l a i m is m i r r o r the productivTTyljT meaning; their consequences extend
that there is no fact about me which could constitute my meaning beyond the actual history of a person's use of a sign. K r i p k e ' s
addition rather than quaddition. It is the second aspect which is reply to this dispositional suggestion consists in two obser-
the more important in K r i p k e ' s exposition of Wittgenstein; the vations: in the first place, dispositions to use arc finite, since
epistemological challenge is regarded chiefly as a way into the h u m a n beings are finite objects existing for a finite time,
constitutive challenge. ) 3

whereas addition is a function with infinitely m a i n arithmetical


The case for the sceptical paradox proceeds by exhausting consequences; in the second place, speakers are disposed to
the candidates. First, my actual computations i n v o l v i n g '+ do 1
make mistakes in their use of signs, and so dispositions by
not suffice to determine that I meant a d d i t i o n , since these are themselves cannot properly account for normativeness. The
logically compatible with my having meant some other dispositional suggestion just equates, K r i p k e says, competence
function w h i c h agrees with a d d i t i o n for just the numbers on with performance: but performance by itself cannot capture
which I have performed computations w i t h '+' but diverges the infinity of meaning nor its normativeness. So meaning
a d d i t i o n by '+' cannot consist in being disposed to give the sum
' K r i p k e emphasises that his central problem is constitutive on p. 21, though he
of arbitrary pairs of numbers on demand: some numbers are
does initially state the problem more epistemologically (sec p. 8). His use of (he term simply too b i g , and we may have systematic tendencies to give
'sceptic' must therefore be understood in a slightly nonstandard way: Kripkc's sceptic- something other than the sum because of errors of c a l c u l a t i o n .
is not (primarily) interested in questions of certainty, knowledge or justification - his
K r i p k e claims (on Wittgenstein's behalf) that these three

il
real interest is 'ontological' or 'metaphysical'.
64 KRIPKF.'S I N T E R P R E T A T I O N O F W I T T G E N S T E I N K R I P K H ' S I N T E R P R E T A T I O N O F W ! f T G l NS1 I I N

replies to the semantic sceptic exhaust the possibilities, and so sceptic's arguments; but it is hard to tree ourselves from it, so
we must concede that there is n o t h i n g for my having meant the threat feels real. 5

addition to consist i n . But once we concede this we admit that A l t h o u g h K r i p k e does not himself say so, there are, I think,
the same scepticism applies to my present use of '+*: for the other areas of p h i l o s o p h y in w h i c h much the same strategy has
same sceptical question c o u l d be asked about my present been tried, and it will be useful to have these in m i n d when v c
meaning at some future time, and the same range of possible enquire whether Wittgenstein really proceeds as K r i p k e
answers w i l l be shown to be inadequate then. Indeed, i f we ask suggests. Three parallels may be mentioned. First, certain sons
directly what constitutes my presently meaning a d d i t i o n and of n o n c o g n i t i v i s m in ethics can be viewed in an analogous way:
not q u a d d i t i o n we shall be faced w i t h the same difficulty: the noncognitivist cannot find facts suitable for correspondence
actual use, present states of consciousness and present with ethical statements, and so he suggests that ethical
dispositions to use will all fail to fix a unique meaning for my utterances be conceived in a non-fact-stating way instead - as
words. So there is likewise n o t h i n g about my present use of prescriptions to action or expressions of e m o t i o n , say. This
signs that makes that use right or w r o n g : the whole n o t i o n of type of view might be motivated by the incapacity of non-queer
meaning appears to collapse. T h i s , then, is the first, negative
4

facts to add up to what we intuitively demand of ethical truth


phase of Wittgenstein's discussion of meaning, as K r i p k e or by a c o n v i c t i o n that what w o u l d add up to that is in some
interprets h i m . way metaphysically rebarbative. Instead of abandoning 6

The second, positive phase consists in an effort to d r a w the ethical utterances as meaningless in the absence of ethical facts
sting from the sceptical paradox while not questioning its the noncognitivist reinterprets their purport - he proposes a
substance. The strategy, as I r e m a r k e d , is to reject the sceptic's different conception of meaning for such sentences. Thus
presupposition that ascriptions of meaning are in the business emotivism (say) can be seen as a sceptical solution to a sceptical
of stating facts; rather, we are to conceive of their significance paradox - the paradox, namely, that there is nothing in the
in terms of (a) their assertibility conditions and (b) their role or w o r l d that c o u l d constitute the value-fact we naively take
utility or point in discourse. The effect of this move is to ethical assertions to require; and the sceptical solution is that
undercut the key assumption of the sceptic: we are to see that these 'assertions serve rather to express the emotions of the
1

all a l o n g he was attacking a straw m a n , though a straw m a n speaker or some such t h i n g . Second, there is the doctrine of
7

with w h o m we naturally and naively identify. A c c o r d i n g to instrumentalism w i t h respect to the theoretical sentences of
K r i p k e , the change of perspective needed to fend off the sceptic science: the instrumentalist cannot (he thinks) find any genuine
reflects Wittgenstein's shift f r o m the p h i l o s o p h y of language facts to correspond to such sentences, but he preserves their
espoused in the Tractatus to that put f o r w a r d in the Investi-
gations: the sceptic is presupposing the k i n d of fact-stating
* Kripke exploits this alleged contrast with the Tractatus to impose a structure or, the
model of meaning advocated in the Tractatus, and the cure for
Investigations according to which the early sections (1-137) are concerned to
this scepticism is to adopt the different conception of meaning undermine the Tractatus truth-conditional conception of language, as a picliminary to
we find in the Investigations - with its emphasis upon the role of solving the sceptical problem (see K r i p k e , pp. 78-0). Plainly, this architectonic
suggestion can be correct only if Kripke is right to interpret Wittgenstein as solving a
criteria and the place of language in our lives. The sceptic seems
sceptical problem by means of a sceptical solution based upon assertibility conditions;
to us to be striking at the very n o t i o n of meaning o n l y because and I do not think he is right so to interpret Wittgenstein.
we are powerfully attracted to the conception of language M am thinking here of J . L . Mackie's view that objective values would be
articulated in the Tractatus: if we can free ourselves from that metaphysically 'queer': sec his Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Penguin Books.
1977), chapter I.
conception we shall no longer feel ourselves threatened by the 7
This type of view saves meaningful ethical utterances in the absence of ethical tacts
(truth) by rcconstruing such utterances as (logically) non-asscrtoric: an ethical
sentence is meaningful while lacking genuine truth conditions because :t is rcail)
'It seems that the entire idea of meaning vanishes into thin air' ( K r i p k e , p. 22);
4

imperatival or exclamatory or hortatory or some such. A n d clearly a sentence can be


understandably, this gives Kripke 'an eerie feeling' (p. 21). meaningful in these ways without purporting to slate a fact.
KRIPKE'S INTERPR1 I ATION 01 WP rOFNRTWN
66 KRIPKE'S IN fERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN
inter-personal relations; so \vc cannot give an a c c o u n t ol ttlk
role in discourse by interpreting them in a different way - as f o l l o w i n g in individualistic terms.* We cannot, K r i p k e says,
useful devices for organising the real facts. Instead of reacting make sense of someone f o l l o w i n g a rule 'considered in
to the lack of suitable facts by declaring talk of unobservables i s o l a t i o n . K r i p k e compares this result with H u m e ' s positive
1

v o i d of significance, he gives up the fact-stating model and opts account of causation: the relation of causation between a p a i r
for a different account of meaning - in terms, perhaps, of of events cannot be explicated solely by reference to those
assertibility conditions and organisational utility. T h i r d , events, as we naively suppose; rather, when we speak of causal
certain views of mathematical statements display this dialectical relations we are (tacitly) subsuming the pair of events in
form: seeking facts to correspond to mathematical sentences question under a generalisation i n v o l v i n g other events. Thus
we find ourselves discouraged either by the incapacity of the assertibility conditions of "c c a u s e d / ' are inherently 'social':
mundane facts to do the j o b or by the seeming necessity to events can stand in causal relations only in virtue of their
postulate 'queer' facts (platonism); so we abandon the fact- membership in a 'community of events. K r i p k e puts this by
1

stating referential model altogether and put in its place a saying that there cannot, on H u m e ' s view, be 'private
different account 01 meaning - e.g., that mathematical causation'; as there cannot be 'private', i.e. individualistic,
sentences get their significance from their empirical a p p l i - rule-following, according to Wittgenstein. In s u m , then, the
cations. This again w o u l d be aptly characterised as a sceptical 'sceptical s o l u t i o n ' consists in two moves: first the replacement
solution to a sceptical paradox: one agrees with the sceptic that of truth conditions (correspondence to facts) by assertibility
no mathematical facts can be found, but one averts his radical conditions, and second the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the c o m m u n i t y into
conclusion (mathematics is meaningless) by proposing an the notion of rule-following. These two moves are, of course,
alternative account of meaning that makes the sceptical logically independent, but K r i p k e ' s c l a i m is that both are
paradox irrelevant. I think that these three issues exemplify
8

necessary if the sceptical paradox is to be answered. 50

the general pattern of argument K r i p k e attributes to Wittgen-


What I have just given is a swift summary of a rich and
stein; we can see K r i p k e ' s dialectic as adding yet another k i n d
detailed course of argument, intended to remind the reader of
of ' n o n c o g n i t i v i s m ' to the list of more familiar doctrines of
the salient points of K r i p k e ' s interpretation rather than
which I have given three examples.
substitute for.it. Let us now ask whether this interpretation
So far I have only explained the sense in which K r i p k e ' s accords with what Wittgenstein says, beginning w i t h the
positive view of semantic statements is a sceptical s o l u t i o n ; I question whether Wittgenstein really advocates a sceptical
have not said what form that positive view takes. The central paradox about meaning and rules. The central passages to
idea, attributed to Wittgenstein, is that the assertibility consider here are 198 and 201 in w h i c h K r i p k e takes W i t t -
conditions and point of ascriptions of meaning essentially genstein to be stating his sceptical thesis that there are no facts
involve the notion of a community. Thus to say that someone for meaning to consist i n . K r i p k e quotes the beginning of 201:
means addition by +' is warranted just if (a) he agrees in his
l

responses with with the responses of some c o m m u n i t y who This was our paradox: no course of action could be
use and (b) he can be trusted in his interactions with determined by a rule, because every course of action can be
members of a c o m m u n i t y in situations i n v o l v i n g H - \ That is to g
I am using 'individualistic roughly in the sense Tyler Burge does in 'Individualism
1

say, the n o t i o n of a rule is an essentially social one, i n v o l v i n g and the Mental', Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. IV, ed. P . A . French, T . E . Uehling
and H . K . Wettstein (University of Minnesota Press, 1979): that is, a property of a
person is individualistic just if the instantiation of that property can be explained
"One might see Paul Benacerraf, in 'Mathematical T r u t h ' , Journal of Philosophy
without reference to the condition of any other person; a property is social just if this is
L X X (1973), as posing a kind of sceptical problem, viz. how can mathematical
not so.
propositions be true and known; and Hartry Field, in Science Without Numbers 10
It is especially important to see that the introduction of the community pertains t<;
(Blackwcll: O x f o r d , 1980), as offering a kind of sceptical solution, viz. mathematical
assertibility conditions and not truth conditions; for essentially the same difficulties
sentences need not be regarded as possessing genuine truth conditions and so do not
A'ould afflict the attempt to find a social fact for meaning to consist in
call for 'queer' facts to correspond to them.
68 KRIPKE'S I N T E R P R E T A T I O N O F W I T T G E N S T E I N KRIPKE'S INTERPRETATION OF W H T G E N S T E I N 69

made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything or have truth c o n d i t i o n s , nor does he suggest that the
can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be u n d e r l y i n g mistake is to consider the rule-follower in social
made out to conflict with it. A n d so there would be neither i s o l a t i o n ; what he is objecting to is the specific conception of
accord nor conflict here. (201)
understanding as a mental operation of translation. If K r i p k e
But he signally fails to quote, or even to heed, what were right, Wittgenstein ought to be f o u n d saying, after his
immediately follows this: statement of the paradox: ' W h a t this shows is that grasping a
rule is not a fact about an i n d i v i d u a l considered in social
It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the
i s o l a t i o n ; but this is nothing like what he actually does say. If
1

mere fact that in the course of our argument we give one


there is one key oversight in K r i p k e ' s exposition of W i t t g e n -
interpretation after another; as if each one contented us at least
for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind stein, it is that of i g n o r i n g what Wittgenstein says in 201
it. What this shews is that there is a way of grasping a rule which straight after stating the paradox: for Wittgenstein here gives
is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call his most explicit diagnosis of the paradox and what he says is
"obeying the rule" and "going against i t " in actual cases. remote from K r i p k e ' s a t t r i b u t i o n . T h i s is also made very clear
Hence there is an inclination to say: every action according to in 198: the lesson of the paradox is said to be that interpretations
the rule is an interpretation. But we ought to restrict the term do not determine meaning; it is not that meaning does not
"interpretation" to the substitution of one expression of the consist in individualistic facts. W h a t Wittgenstein is saying is
rule for another. (201) that certain sorts of facts fail to determine meaning, viz.
There are two things to notice about this passage w h i c h give the substituting one sign for another, not that no facts d o . 1 2

lie to K r i p k e ' s interpretation. F i r s t , Wittgenstein makes it


11
K r i p k e ' s misinterpretation comes out clearly in his remarks
clear immediately that the stated paradox arises from a about Wittgenstein's treatment of 'reading'. R e a d i n g is a k i n d
'misunderstanding', i.e. a false presupposition; so he cannot of r u l e - f o l l o w i n g , and so K r i p k e takes Wittgenstein to be
really be endorsing the paradox, as H u m e embraces his o w n p r o p o u n d i n g his paradox for reading - reading is not an
sceptical claims about causation. Second, when we ask what individualistic fact but is to be understood in terms of social
the misunderstanding is we are t o l d that it is the mistake of assertibility c o n d i t i o n s . But when we consult the text we find
13

assuming that grasping a rule is placing an interpretation u p o n that what Wittgenstein is opposing is a particular family of
a sign, i.e. associating it w i t h another sign - an assumption views about the sort of fact reading is - that it consists in an
which Wittgenstein thinks we are by no means c o m p e l l e d to inner process: conscious, queer, or physical - and advising us
make. In other words, Wittgenstein is putting f o r w a r d the to l o o k to what the reader does:
paradox as a reductio ad absurdum of the interpretational But in the case of the living reading-machine "reading"
conception; it is the inevitable result of that particular meant reacting to written signs in such-and-such ways. This
misunderstanding about the nature of grasp of a rule. concept was therefore quite independent of that of a mental or
Wittgenstein no more endorses the stated paradox than does other mechanism.—Nor can the teacher here say of the pupil:
any philosopher who gives a reductio of his opponent's "Perhaps he was already reading when he said that word". For
p o s i t i o n . Wittgenstein does not say that the paradox arises there is no doubt about what he did.—The change when the
from the misunderstanding that ascriptions of rules state facts pupil began to read was a change in his behaviour; and it makes
no sense here to speak of a first word in his new state'. (157)
l

11
It is significant that in other passages in which the interpretational conception is
rejected, e.g. BR pp. 33—35, there is no mention of a paradox into which we arc in 12
M o r e specifically, Wittgenstein is asking what it is about a person that determines
imminent danger of falling; Wittgenstein's point in these passages isjust that we should his future use of a sign, and hts answer is that this is a matter of the technique of use of
not think of meaning and understanding in terms of inner interpretations (i.e. symbols) which he is master, not of what comes before his mind. If you like: the fact that gives
- he is not saying that this is the only way we can think if we cleave to a Tactual 1

signs life is a fact about use, not a fact about inner states.
conception of these concepts. 11
See K r i p k e , pp. 45~4 ).
l
70 KRIPKE'S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN
KRIPKE'S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENST1EIN 71
There is no suggestion in these sections that we are under threat
of the paradox that reading never occurs, that there is nothing an ability is (e.g. a configuration of one's 'mental apparatus'). 15

for reading to consist i n ; rather, we are t o l d to redirect our It w o u l d be more accurate I think to say that Wittgenstein
attention from supposed inner processes to the outer criteria locates understanding in one k i n d of fact rather than another
we use f o r j u d g i n g someone to be a reader. In fact these sections k i n d ; but if we want to capture the true spirit of Wittgenstein's
do not contain a statement of the paradox at a l l , yet discussion we do better still to d r o p all play with the notion of
Wittgenstein is considering a case of rule-following; so it can fact and simply say that Wittgenstein is offering a description
hardly be maintained that the paradox is Wittgenstein's central of the ' g r a m m a r ' of the n o t i o n of understanding in terms of the
and recurrent theme. I think the paradox is best seen as just
14
notions of ability, technique, etc. I do not believe that
one battle in a general campaign against the inner process Wittgenstein is t h i n k i n g in terms of facts and non-facts at all
model, not as the primary focus of Wittgenstein's whole here; certainly there is no hard textual evidence to support this
discussion. K r i p k e says that the paradox is really the main sort of interpretation. A n y resistance on Wittgenstein's part to
p r o b l e m of the Investigations, but its infrequent appearance saying that understanding consists in, or is constituted by, a
belies this suggestion; and when it does appear it figures as one capacity stems from a general distrust of the enterprise of
more nail in the coffin of the inner process m o d e l , to be p h i l o s o p h i c a l analysis, not from a conviction that under-
hammered in along with a number of other nails. standing is somehow not a fact. Indeed, I think Wittgenstein
16

So the passages upon which K r i p k e bases his interpretation w o u l d have regarded such an assertion, and such a debate, as
fail to support it and suggest instead a quite different view of quite empty, since there is no substantial philosophical mileage
Wittgenstein's intentions; but can K r i p k e ' s interpretation find to be got out of the notions of fact, truth conditions and
sustenance in more general considerations? This question has correspondence to conditions-in-the-world. K r i p k e himself
two parts, corresponding to the constitutive and epistemological shows some awareness of this k i n d of point, but he boldly
versions of semantic scepticism. That Wittgenstein is advo- brushes it aside in the expectation that he is c o n f o r m i n g to the
cating a constitutive scepticism certainly seems hard to square real spirit of Wittgenstein's position; but I think he should take
with the fact that he does offer an account of the sort of thing more seriously Wittgenstein's deflationary remarks about
understanding is: it is mastery of a technique, possession of a truth and facts. At any rate, if we want to talk in terms of facts
17

capacity, participation in a custom. A n d it is notable that it seems that Wittgenstein does suggest that understanding
K r i p k e nowhere registers Wittgenstein's concern to connect consists in a fact, the fact of having an ability to use signs.
understanding with the concept of ability, as an alternative to
the conception of understanding as a c o n d i t i o n of conscious- 1 5
In particular, IUipp. 113-17, which deals at some length with the notion of ability,
ness. N o r does Wittgenstein show any tendency to contest the does not suggest that sentences containing 'can' and its cognates do not correspond to
'conditions-in-the-world'; the point there is rather that we should not construe abilities
/actuality of ascriptions of ability; he merely protests against
as special sorts of inner processor state which lie 'behind' what counts as the exercise of
what he takes to be misunderstandings about the sort of thing the ability.
1 6
Remember that the form of Wittgenstein's account is to be the perspicuous
connecting of concepts (see 122): he says that the 'grammar' o f ' c a n ' and 'is able to' i<
'closely related' to that of 'understands' (150), not that we can actually analyse the
14
Kripke says: 'The sceptical paradox is the fundamental problem of Philosophical latter in terms of the former. In fact, I think that the failure to provide necessars and
Investigations (p. 78). It might clarify Wittgenstein's attitude to this paradox to sufficient conditions for the application of a concept would, for Wittgenstein, have no
contrast it with Russell's attitude towards his class paradox. Wittgenstein sees his significance whatever for the question whether that concept could be interpreted in a
paradox as a problem for anyone who assumes that meaning is a matter of 'fact-stating' way.
interpretation, but he thinks that this assumption is not at all compulsory or 17
K ipke notes that Wittgenstein subscribes to a redundancy theory of truth (so-
unavoidable; whereas Russell's paradox arises from assumptions that seem inescapable called) in 136 (Kripke. p. 86), but he docs not, I think, draw the right lesson from this:
- there is no straightforward mistake in the premisses that generate the contradiction. given that 'true' adds nothing to the content of an assertion, it cannot be that
In a word, Wittgenstein's paradox is not a problem for Wittgenstein, as Russell's
Wittgenstein really wishes to deny that semantic sentences have truth conditions - on
paradox is a problem for Russell.
pain of denying that they express propositions. Similarly f o r 'it is a fact that'or 'states a
fact'.
72 K R I P K E ' S I N T E R P R E T A T I O N 01 W l I led N S I I IN KRIPE'S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN 73
It w o u l d also be w r o n g to interpret Wittgenstein as an sceptic for that audience. It is the change in the p h i l o s o p h i c a l
epistemoiogical sceptic. As I emphasised in Chapter 1, climate that explains the apparent difference between whai
Wittgenstein's denial that our use of words is founded on Wittgenstein says and what K r i p k e argues. I find this
19

reasons is not intended sceptically: the traditional sceptic explanation u n c o n v i n c i n g - for three reasons. F i r s t , it seems to
makes an inappropriate and impossible demand on our me inconceivable that Wittgenstein w o u l d w h o l l y neglect to
epistemic concepts, and the right response to h i m is to question consider what is probably the most natural reaction lo the
the need for what he says there isn't. To lack reasons is not to be constitutive sceptic; surely the d e m o l i t i o n of this idea is
in a predicament to w h i c h doubt is the proper response; for essential if the paradox is to be carried through. A n d the form
doubt can be removed (better pre-empted) by our natural and of K r i p k e ' s d e m o l i t i o n - the arguments f r o m finiteness and
habitual reactions. T h i s epistemoiogical position w o u l d
18
mistakes - finds no echo in Wittgenstein's text: in particular, at
prompt Wittgenstein to dismiss K r i p k e ' s sceptic with the the places where Wittgenstein states his paradox one w o u l d
remark that of course o u r reasons come to an end but this does expect h i m to indicate that the paradox shows {inter alia) that
not mean we are in any sort of epistemoiogical trouble: that I understanding is not a disposition and is not to be explicated in
cannot prove to a determined sceptic that my present use of +' 4
terms of counterfactuals about use, instead of saying (as he
is correct does not show that I do not k n o w h o w to a p p l y it does) that the paradox refutes the interpretational conception.
correctly or that I have anything less than a perfect right to N o w h e r e does Wittgenstein say, in parallel with his c l a i m that
proceed as I feel i n c l i n e d . The author of On Certainty w o u l d interpretations do not determine meaning, that 'dispositions
surely not p r o p o u n d the k i n d of sceptical argument K r i p k e fail to determine m e a n i n g ' and that 'what this shows is that
develops, resting as it does u p o n a conception of knowledge there is a way of grasping a rule w h i c h is not a d i s p o s i t i o n ' . We
and epistemic right that he steadfastly resists. Wittgenstein's just do not find the kinds of remark about dispositions which
epistemology w o u l d stop K r i p k e ' s sceptic before he got going; K r i p k e ' s interpretation leads us to expect.
so we cannot interpret Wittgenstein as conceding victory to Second, and more probatively, in those rare places in which
K r i p k e ' s epistemoiogical sceptic and then offering what is at the n o t i o n of disposition is i n v o k e d Wittgenstein is clearly
best a salvage operation. m a k i n g a quite different point from K r i p k e . T h u s consider 149,
A crucial part of K r i p k e ' s constitutive paradox is his the o n l y passage in the relevant sections of the Investigations in
rejection of a dispositional conception of understanding; so we w h i c h the n o t i o n of disposition is explicitly i n v o k e d :
should expect, if K r i p k e has Wittgenstein right, that the same
If one says that k n o w i n g the A B C is a state of the mind, one is
sort of argument be found in Wittgenstein, in view of its t h i n k i n g of a state of a mental apparatus (perhaps of the brain)
importance to the success of the sceptical thesis. W h a t we f i n d , by means of w h i c h we explain the manifestations of that
however, when we scour Wittgenstein's text is a total lack of knowledge. Such a state is called a d i s p o s i t i o n . But there are
anything remotely resembling the sorts of considerations objections to speaking of a state of the m i n d here, i n a s m u c h as
about dispositions advanced by K r i p k e . A l l K r i p k e can say to there ought to be two different criteria l o r such a state: a
explain this disparity is that Wittgenstein is assuming the knowledge of the c o n s t r u c t i o n of the apparatus, quite apart
dispositional reply to the sceptic to be unattractive to the
audience of his book at the time of writing - whereas the '"Sec K r i p k e , p. 43, In tact, this explanation of the disparity docs not tit the
conscious state reply is taken to be the natural response to the historical tacts very well, since behaviourism was enjoying a considerable vogue at the
time Wittgenstein was writing what became the Investigations, and d i positional
1

accounts ol psychological concepts were widely advocated R u s s e l l , in particular, was


" C / . "'Hut, il you arc certain, isn't it thai von an: shutting your eyes in lace ol strongly inttuenceil by behaviourism, as Kripke hunsetl notes (Rtipke, p. 1» >ee
doubt'" - They are shut' (p. 2?4). He is saying that the question of doubt, in certain Russell's My Philosophical Development (George Allen and Unwin: L o n d o n , 1959),
standard sorts of case, simply does not arise Cor us; so the sceptic can make no impact esp. chapters 11-13. In view of the prevalence of such, doctrines at the time of his
on oil! customary confidence by in vent n ig ;i doubt (we should k e e p < >ur eyes firmly writing, imr might have thought Wittgenstein would take thru refutation ,i> .i fiivt
shut). priority, il Kripke's interpretation were on the tight lines.
74 KRIPKE’S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN KRIPKE’S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN 75

from what it does. (Nothing would be more confusing here than to use the possibility of systematic mistake Wittgenstein remark from
the w ords "conscious " and "u ncons cious " for the contrast 140 shows no sign of acknowledgment of this kind of point,
between states of consciousness and dispositions. For t h i s p a i r o f which would be amazing if he were really arguing in the way
t e r m s c o v e r s u p a g r a m m a t i c a l d i f f e r e n c e . ) (149) Kripke suggests. What Wittgenstein is doing here is drawing
contrast between application and what presents i t s e l f to the
Here Wittgenstein's objection seems to be that talk of
mind holding that identity of meaning between people depends
dispositions is likely to be accompanied by the idea that
upon identity in respect of the former not t h e latter; but
knowledge is a state of mind; and he thinks that this way of
Kripke's interpretation would have Wittgenstein insisting
conceiving of knowledge leads to the mistaken idea that there
upon the parity of the two sorts of circumstance, not upon the
are two independent ways of telling whether someone (e.g.)
contrast between them. On Kripke's view, both conscious
knows the ABC - by examining his mental apparatus or by
states and application fail to fix meaning, and so equally make
seeing what he does. Wittgenstein's purpose is, as usual, to
no progress against the sceptic; but Wittgenstein himself
discourage the inner state model of concepts such as knowledge,
evidently believes that there is an important difference between
and he is warning us that talk of dispositions is apt to go along
these with respect to the determination of meaning. (This is not
with this model; instead we should attend to what the person
to say that Wittgenstein has some answer to Kripke's point
does. If Kripke's interpretation were correct Wittgenstein
about mistakes; it is just that Wittgenstein shows himself to be
would have to be saying that what a person it disposed to do
unconcerned about such issues in the passage quoted - so it
does not fix what he knows when he knows the ABC, but this is
cannot be that he has on his mind what Kripke has on his.) A
not what Wittgenstein says and indeed he seems to be
second passage of so me significance for the present issue is this:
suggesting just the contrary. 20
Third, Wittgenstein makes remarks that actually support the "But I already knew at the time when I gave the order, that he
kind of dispositional suggestion Kripke pits himself against: ought write 1002 after 1000 — Certainly; and you can also say
that is, Wittgenstein can be found explaining, meaning in terms you meant it then; only yon should not let yourself be mislead by
of counterfactuals about use, thus consider t h i s passage: the grammar of the words "know" and "mean". For you don't
want to say that you thought of the step from 1000 to 1002 at
What is essential is to see that the same thing can come before that time — and even if you did think of this step, st il l you did
our minds when we hear the word and the application still be not think of other ones. When you said "1 already knew at the
different. Has it the same meaning both times? I think we shall time . . ." that meant something like: "If I had then been asked
say not. (140) what number should he written after 1000. I should have replied
That is, if two speakers differ in their application of a sign then 1002." And that I don't doubt. This assumption is rather of
we should say that they mean something different, despite the the same kind as: "If he had fallen into the water then, 1 should
identity of their conscious states: use determines meaning, not have jumped in after him". — Now, what was wrong with your
idea? (187)
what transpires within. This thought of Wittgenstein's hardly
fits with Kripke's claim that differences of dispositions to use What is notable about t h i s passage is Wittgenstein’s willingness
do not suffice to establish differences of meaning, on account of to employ a counterfactual about what someone would have
said in explanation of that person's having meant
2 0 t h at i s , Wittgenstein is objecting to the notion of disposition if this notion is something. Applied to Kripke's favorite example.
understood independently of behavior, i.e. as an internal state that is explanatory of Wittgenstein’s suggestion would run as follows: for me to
behavior; but Kripke’s objections to the dispositional suggestion construe dispositions have meant by '+' that '125' is the right answer to '67+58?'
precisely in terms of counterfactuals about behavior: so Wittgenstein and Kripke mean quite
different things by “disposition” and hence are making quite different objections to the (assuming that this is a computation I had not come across or
invocation of this notion. )This explain why Wittgenstein objects to talk of dispositions, but thought about) is for it to be true of me that had I been faced
commends the use of counterfactuals to elucidate meaning and knowledge.) with that question in the past I would have given that answer.
Wittgenstein is comparing the case of meaning (or knowing)
76 KRIPKE’S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN KRIPKE’S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN 77

paring the case of meaning (or knowing) with the case of trait mind when something is meant with what is, true of one's
of character such as bravery: to say I was brave yesterday is to behaviour, including counterfactuals about one's behaviour;
assume that there are true counterfactuals such as ' I f he had he is not treating both as sharing as incapacity to supply the
fallen into the water, I would have jumped in'; it is not to sort of fact Kripke's sceptic is demanding.
assume that I had somehow mentally rehearsed the brave For these reasons, then, I doubt that Kripke is right to
action of saving a potential drowner. Similarly, to mean interpret Wittgenstein as advocating a sceptical paradox
something at a given time is not to have it before one's mind at designed to show that there is no 'fact of the matter' about what
that time, so that every step of the series '+2' has already we mean. So nothing in Wittgenstein's discussion suggests the
occurred to one; it is rather to be disposed to give the right sort of negative first stage characteristic of the analogous
answer, i.e. for the kinds of behavioural counterfactuals doctrines I mentioned earlier; we are not being prepared for the
Wittgenstein cites to be true of one.21 It is surely incredible that kind of sceptical solution proffered by the likes of emotivism
Wittgenstein could have written t h i s if his atitude to and instrumentalism. There is not a distinguishing of truth
counterfactuals concerning use were as Kripke suggests; for conditions and assertibility conditions accounts of meaning
Wittgenstein is in effect saying in 187 exactly what Kripke and then a purported demonstration that semantic statements
supposes him to reject. It is true that Wittgenstein does not have no determinate truth conditions; rather, there is an
claim that the counterfactuals provide a reductive analysis of opposition between two different conceptions of the sort of
the notion of meaning something - he says only that the latter thing meaning is - roughly speaking, conceptions which locate
'means something like' the former – but this is to be seen as a meaning in the inner and in the outer. (22) And if this is the
reflection of his suspicion of the whole idea of conceptual correct interpretation, we will not be able to construe
analysis; it is not prompted by an unstated recognition of the Wittgenstein as proposing anything that deserves to be
kinds of argument Kripke gives against explicating meaning in called a 'sceptical solution': his positive view simply has the
terms of counterfactuals. What Wittgenstein is suggesting is status of a correct account of the concepts at issue, though it is
that we can capture enough of the grammar of the notion of an account which for various reasons it is hard to see ourselves
meaning by invoking counterfactuals to point us in the right clear to accepting as adequate and complete. Nevertheless,
philosophical direction (or away from the wrong direction); he we can still ask whether Kripke is right to ascribe to
cannot therefore be taken to be conducting a sceptical Wittgenstein a community conception of rule-following,
campaign in which the employment of counterfactuals is a independently of whether this is intended as a sceptical
defensive manoeuvre to be blocked and repulsed. What solution to a sceptical paradox. 1 shall maintain that this
Wittgenstein ought to be saying, on Kripke's interpretation, is ascription is also mistaken.
that ascriptions of meaning are not tantamount to (mean The community enters, according to Kripke, by way of the
nothing l i k e ) the assertion of counterfactuals about use; but this is normativeness of meaning and of rules generally: when we say
the exact opposite of what he does say in 187. In this passage, as in that someone is using a word wrongly we mean that his use of
140, Wittgenstein is contrasting what happens in one's that word disagrees with the use made of it by members of a
21
This, then, is Wittgenstein’s answer to the question that ends 187, and linguistic community; and right use is agreement of use. If we
to the puzzle originally raised in 138: when one suddenly comes to
understand a word, or hears it whit understanding, or knows the
meaning of a word, what is true of one is that certain counterfactuals 22 As I observed in chapter one, Wittgenstein’s treatment of the concept of meaning takes its place
along whit a like treatment of a wide range of other psychological concepts and his general aim is to
hold, which correspond to the possession of an ability; it is not that one
resist driving these psychological phenomena inward. If Kripke were right about Wittgenstein’s
performs a remarkable mental act in which the whole of the future and
treatment of meaning, then he would have to take a parallel line about the whole range of
possible use comes before one’s mind as a condensed series of thoughts psychological concepts treated by Wittgenstein: he would have to say that Wittgenstein is advocating
or images or some such (see 188). A man’s entire life may flash before skeptical paradox about believing, recognizing, remembering, comparing, wiling, etc. , and proposing a
his mind when he believes he is about to die but his temporally community – based skeptical solution. Or he did not, he would have to explain why Wittgenstein
extended use of a word does not similarly flash before his mind when himself treat all this concepts in a similar way.
he means it in certain way.
78 KRIPKE’S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN KRIPKE’S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN
79
consider the individual in isolation all we can say is that it And this is part and parcel of Wittgenstein's general thesis that
seems to hi m that he is using words correctly; but if we broaden meaning is use: a sign has meaning only in virtue of bemg
our gaze to take in his community we can make sense of the (repeatedly) used in a certain way. This thesis does not in itself
indispensable idea that this seeming may be delusive, that he is carry any suggestion that meaning is inconceivable in social
not really using words correctly at all. Thus the correct isolation. But is there anything else in these sections which
assertibility condition for "he means addition by '+'" is that might be supposed to encourage the community interpretation?
his responses with “+” agree with mine or those of his Two points may be mentioned here.
community, and these latter persons are primitively entitled to The first concerns the use of 'privately' in 202. Kripke takes
take themselves to mean addition by '+'. On this interpretation, this word to be intended to contrast with 'social', so that it has
Wittgenstein builds the notion of community right into the roughly the sense 'private' has in 'private property', i.e. relating
notion of rule, in such a way that rule-following cannot be to a single individual; I suggested in Chapter 1 that it contrasts
individualistically conceived - to say someone is following a rather with 'public' or 'overt', i.e. relates to what transpires
rule is necessarily to advert to other rule-followers. Thus the covertly within consciousness. On Kripke's understanding of
notion of rule-following turns out to be a social notion in the intended notion of privacy a person’s overt behavior say in
somewhat the way the notions of a conformist or a club following a sign-post, is to be considered 'private', at least if it
member or a fashionable dresser are social notions: none of is described individualistically; and so we could quite properly
these properties can be possessed by individuals 'considered in claim that all non-rule-governed behaviour (e.g. pain behaviour)
isolation'. Now is there any textual support for this can and does take place 'privately', since its description
interpretation of Wittgenstein?23 does not require reference to other people. It is thus possible to
Let us re-examine 198-202 in which Wittgenstein is putting wave your arm 'privately' but not possible to follow the
forward his positive view and opposing it to the view he rejects. addition rule 'privately', according to Kripke's construal of
The most glaring feature of these sections in the present 'privately' in 202. What is public can be 'private' in this sense
connection is that the words 'custom', 'practice' and 'use' are knowability by others is therefore not sufficient for non-
never qualified with 'social' or 'community' - and 'social privacy. We can even say that (non-relational) properties of
custom/practice' is not pleonastic. Surely Wittgenstein would material objects,, e.g. being cubical or weighing a stone, are
have inserted these qualifying adjectives if he really meant to possessed 'privately' in Kripke's sense, since their ascription
maintain a social conception of rule-following, especially in does not make essential reference to other objects and their
view of the fact that the introduction of the community is taken condition. Now it seems to me that this would be a very odd
to be a surprising result of signal importance - as sharply way for Wittgenstein to intend his use of 'privately' in 202: in
conflicting with what we antecedently expect. And if we look general he opposes 'private' to 'public' or 'oven', as in “private
for a gloss on the use of 'custom' etc. we find, as 1 stressed in sensations)” (24) Kripke takes Wittgenstein to be saying in
Chapter 1, the insistence that rules must be followed on more 202 that if rule-following were private in the sense that it
than one occasion - i.e. the existence of rules depends upon involved
'regular use'. Wittgenstein does use 'custom' and 'practice' to
suggest the idea of a multiplicity, but it is a multiplicity of 24 Wittgenstein does not, perhaps, use “private” and “privately” in an entirely uniform way; but its
instances of rule following not of persons who follow the rules. central meaning for him is, I think, twofold: he uses It to suggest a condition of consciousness, and he
uses It to suggest unknowability by another ( see 251, 272, 294). When states of consciousness are
conceived in an erroneous way their (admitted) “privacy” becomes a kind of unknowability, instead od
23 Kripke is, of course, not first to propose a broadly community interpretation of a harmless truth about them ( The preposition << Sensations are private>> is comparable to <<one
Wittgenstein’s discussion of following a rule; an early exponent of this interpretation is place patience by oneself>> (248), i.e. this is a “grammatical remark”). I think both of these
Peter Winch, in The Idea Of Social Science (Routledge and Kegan Paul: London, 1958), connotations are present in Wittgenstein’s use of “privately” in 202. I do not know of any passage in
esp. pp. 24-39. And this general interpretation has been endorsed by a great many, which Wittgenstein clearly uses “private” in the sense Kripke gives to it in 202, i.e. as meaning
perhaps the majority, of commentators since then. “making no reference to other people”.
81
80
just the individual rule-follower. then rules could not be explanation that seems to me the most plausible is
nonnative - correct rule-following would collapse into this: Wittgenstein's central contention in these passages, viz.,
apparently correct rule-following; whereas I take the claim of that rules require many occasions of manifestation. is ambiguous
202 to be that if rule-following were private in the sense of being as stated, between (a) the claim that each individual who grasps
a condition or process of consciousness, then self-ascriptions of a rule must obey it on more than one occasion and (b) the
rule-following would be infallible. Aside from the overall weaker claim that there must be many occasions of
plausibility of the interpretation I prefer, I think that my rule-following possible distributed over several individuals.
interpretation makes better sense of Wittgenstein's use of The latter claim would allow as possible the circumstance
'privately' in 202 - it conforms better with Wittgenstein's that each of many people obey a given rule only once, since
general use of the notion of privacy. At the very least it should t his would be enough for the rule to be followed on many
be agreed that the use of 'privately' in 202 cannot be cited to occasions. Now Wittgenstein's actual words in 199 commit
establish the correctness of the community interpretation. h i m only to the weaker thesis, and so are compatible with
The second point concerns Wittgenstein's mention of 'one the possibility that each person follows a rule only once;
man' in 199: what they are not compatible with is the possibility that one
man follows a rule just once — exactly the question he raises.
Is what we call “obeying a rule” something that it would be
possible for only one man to do, and to do only once in his The point being made, then, is that if there is just one man
life?—This:, of course a note on the grammar of the expression then he must follow his rules more than once, but if there are
"to obey a rule". (199) many men it can be enough to each follows his rules just once
(or possibly not at all) I think this reading of 199 is consonant
Wittgenstein's reply to this question is: “ ít is not possible that with the gist of other passages in which the question of how
there should have been only one occasion on which someone many occasions of rule-following are necessary is raised and
obeyed a rule.” What is prima facie puzzling here is why answered; for example:
Wittgenstein should raise the question whether it is possible for
one man to follow a rule and answer it by saying that it is not In the same way it cannot be said either that just once in the history
possible for there to be a single occasion of rule-following.25 His of mankind did someone follow a sign-post. Whereas it can be said
reply, let it be noted, is not that it is not possible for one man to that just once in the history of mankind did someone walk parallel
with a board. And that fir st impossibility is again not a
obey a rule: Why then does he appear to ask a question to which
psychological one. (RFM p. 346)
lie gives no answer (or half an answer)? Since Wittgenstein does
not answer his question by saying rule-following requires more There is no suggestion here that solitary rule-following is
than one man, 199 cannot be cited as evidence that impossible; for this is not ruled out by the claim that sign-posts
Wittgenstein endorses a community conception of rules; have to be obeyed more than once. The reason Wittgenstein
but the passage certainly seems to raise the issue of whether broaches the question of solitary rule-following in 199 is that
rule-following is individual or .social. What is going on here? he wants to make allowance for the possibility that the
The occasions are spread over many individuals when he claims
25
that many occasions are required. It is not, 1 think, that he is
The question is also raised in RFM p. 349: “Could there be only greatly attracted to the idea of spreading the many occasions
one human been than calculated? Could there be only one that followed
a rule? This is not, however, answered negatively. Elsewhere we read: over equally many individuals — one occasion each, so to
“But what about this consensus — doesn’t It mean that one human been speak — but he feels the need to acknowledge that this is
by himself could not calculate? Well, one human been could at any rate logically compatible with his fundamental contention, viz, the
not calculate just one in his life” (RFM p. 193). These remarks seems
best explained as I explain the passage from the Investigations cited in multiple application thesis. As we saw in Chapter 1, he is
the text: Wittgenstein’s underlying point is that we need a plurality of anxious not to over-state this thesis, requiring only that there
occasions, and it is a question to be raised whether one man provides be some rules which are multiply obeyed and not that all should
enough of these. Wittgenstein implication appears to be that he does, so
long as calculates more than once. be; I surmise
82 KRIPKE’S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN KRIPKE’S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN 83

that in 199 he is again guarding against exaggerating a thesis its relation to Wittgenstein's thesis that we follow rules
which he thinks his readers may find it hard to accept even 'blindly'. For I think that the kind of epistemology of
in its weakest form. So I conclude that 199 cannot be cited rule-following Wittgenstein advocates is inconsistent with
to establish the community interpretation either, once it is seen Kripke's suggestion that right rule-following consists in
in context and read carefully. And besides, would it not be agreement with the community. As we saw in Chapter 1,
astonishing if Wittgenstein had put forward his major positive Wittgenstein's view is that our natural inclination to follow rules
thesis in such an oblique and laconic remark? 26 as we do is not something we can justify, nor are we required to
Perhaps I should make it clear that I am not suggesting that justify it - we obey rules 'blindly', without guidance. So if
in these disputed passages Wittgenstein is consciously opting someone challenges me to justify an application of a sign, all 1
for an individualistic as opposed to a social conception of can ultimately reply is 'This is simply what I do' (217); nothing
rule-following: that is, my interpretation is not that demostrates that my application is correct. 27 But on Kripke's
Wittgenstein IS centrally exercised with this question and is community interpretation this will not be the epistemoiogical
taking a definite stand on it. Rather, my view is that this whole situation: for agreement with others does provide a court of
issue is foreign to his true concerns: it is simply not a question appeal in case of such a challenge. Suppose someone claims that
with which he is wrestling. So when I say that his positive view it only strikes me that my present application of “+” is correct
is individualistic I am imposing a classification upon his (accords with its past meaning) and that in fact I am now using
position which is imported from outside: if he had been ask “+” wrongly; then Kripke's sceptical solution offers me an
where he stood on this issue, he would have said on the answer, namely that my present use is correct. because it agrees
individualistic side, but I do not think he would have with the use made of that sign by others. That is to say, the
reckoned this to be especially relevant to the problems with community view allows me to get beyond, or beneath, my
which he was centrally occupied. This general lack of concern natural sign-using propensities to something that can be cited to
with the kind of question Kripke sets up seems to me to give these propensities a justification, since correctness, on
indicate how fundamentally Kripke's interpretation Kripke's view, is precisely a matter of community
misrepresents what Wittgenstein is really up to. Not only does concordance in use: the community, in short, provides
Wittgenstein not advocate a community conception of rules; the kind of guidance that Wittgenstein expltcitly says there
this is not even a considered position in the space of isn't. 28 Kripke's conception makes rule-following like being in
philosophical views within which he is operating. So the fashíon in this respect: if someone challenges my belief that 1 am
individualism I claim lo discern in Wittgenstein's stated views in fashion, I can rebut him by pointing out that my mode of dress
is not to be seen as a doctrine he is keen to promote; it is rather a agrees with that of (certain) members of my cottimunity - I am
claim about what his positive view in fact comes to, irrespective not reduced to saying that this is a belief for wliich a justification
of his own main intentions. is neither
So far I have been addressing myself to detailed textual
considerarons; I now want to object to the community 27 Cf. “The danger here, I believe, is one of giving a justification of our procedure
interpretation on a more general or thematic ground, namely where there is no such thing as justification and we ought simply to have said : tha’s how
we do it” (RFM p. 199) But this not imply any episteme defect, since “To use the word
withouth a justification does not mean to use it wrongfully” (RFM p. 406). Essencially the
26 Kripke never so much as mentions what I have argued to be Wittgenstein’s main point in these passages
same point could be put by saying that I have (and need) no criterion for appliying a word
about rules and customs, viz. the multiple application thesis. Since It seems, beyond question that is at least one
as I do, i.e. , for supposing that I am using it a rule - governed way.
thing Wittgenstein is saying. Kripke must hold that Wittgenstein is making the community claim in the same
28 Thus “we look to the rule for instruction and do something, whithout appealing to anything else
breath as he is propounding the multiple application thesis. However in view of the toto caelo difference between
for guidance” (228): that is, when I naturally react in certain way to a rule (expression of a rule) I
these two claims, it would seem at best highly confusing for Wittgenstein to be running them together so
cannot check that this reaction is rigth by looking to the community for guidence. What prompts this
carelessly. Better to attribute only one of them to him, and there seems no question but that he held the multiple
appeal to community guidence is what also prompts the appeal to a voice of intuition, namely the
application thesis.
feeling that we must be able to provide some reason for what we do when we follow rules.
84 KRIPKE’S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN
K R I P K E ’ S I N T E R P R E T A T I O N O F W I T T G E N S T E I 85
Possible nor required. Note that Wittgenstein does not say verges on the dismissive. (30) His view is that what underlies
that the community considered as a whole follows rules blindly, ( i f that is the word) our practices and customs with sings is
i.e. proceeds upon the basis of a collective human nature; his our human nature in interaction with our training: this is what
claim is that I do. So it would not be faithful to Wittgenstein's explains our unreflectively going on as we do, Different kinds
words to transpose his claim about the absence of rational of being, endowed with a different “form of l i f e ' , could
foundations to the level of the community; and neither is it
naturally go on in different ways given the same training:
correct to interpret him as trying to alleviate the
epistemological discomfort we may feel about my lack of Now we get the pupil to continue a series (say + 2) beyond
reasons by equipping me with the test of community 1000 — and he writes, 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012.
conforrnity.29 In fact, it is precisely the thirst for the kind of We say to him: "Look what you've done"—He doesn't
rational basis Wittgenstein denies that causes Kripke to introduce understand. We say: "You were meant to add two: look how
the community; but of course this goes right against the thrust yon began the series!"—He answers: "Yes. isn't it right? I
thought that was how I was meant to do it." ------ Or suppose he
of Wittgenstein’s position - it is trying to find reasons for what pointed to the series and said: "But I went on in the same
does not (and need not) rest upon reasons. To put it in a way."—It would now be no use to say: "But can't you see. . .
nutshell, Kripke's interpretation misses, or underestimates, .?"—and repeat the old examples and explanations.—In such a
Wittgenstein epistemological naturalism. case we might say, perhaps: It comes natural to this person to
T h i s point leads into the question crucial for Kripke's understand our order with our explanations as we should
interpretation, of Wittgenstein's attitude toward the understand the order: "Add 2 up to 1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to
normativeness of meaning - what he took its nature and ground 3000 and so on."
to be. Kripke represents Wittgenstein as preoccupied in the Such a case would present similarities with one in which a
Investigations with the question what makes a present use of a person naturally reacted to the gesture of pointing with the
hand by looking in the direction of the line from finger-tip to
sign correct, i.e. in accordance with our previous linguistic wrist, not from wrist to finger-tip. ( 1 8 5 )
intentions; and Wittgenstein's answer is supposed to be that this
is to be explained in terms of agreement with the community. It is our nature that (partly) determines what we mean by our
However, I think that an unprejudiced examination of the words and which plays an ineliminable role in our learning
passages with which we are concerned (138-242) reveals
notably little that can be construed as a concern with this language. Given that this is so, Wittgenstein sees no real
question: that is, we just do not find Wittgenstein fretting over substance to the question whether what we are naturally
inclined to do really conforms with the meaning of our signs:
the question whether my present inclinations to apply a sign such a question must be futile, since what we are by nature
really conform with my past meaning. It seems to me, in fact,
that Wittgenstein's attitude towards this kind of question
30
The question of correctness in the application of a rule is the question what counts as a
mistake in applying the rule. Wittgenstein does not in fact make heavy weather o f t h is
question, as witness this passage: “But now does the observer distinguish in this case
29 In Z 319 Wittgenstein says something very relevant to this, which seems to me of between players” mistakes and correct play? — there are characteristic sings of it in the
considerable significance for community interpretations of Wittgenstein thought about rule players' behavior. Think of the behavior characteristic of correcting slip of the
following. After saying, “I cannot describe how (in general) to employ rules, except by tongue. It would be possible to recognize that someone was doing so even without
teaching you, training you to employ rules” (Z 318), he goes on, “I may now, e.g. make a knowing his language” (54); see also 143, in which mistaking the order of a series is
talkie of such instruction. The teacher will sometimes say “That´s right”. If the pupil should said to be simply a matter of “frequency”. That is, Wittgenstein takes there to be
ask him “Why?” — He will answer nothing, or at any rate nothing relevant not even: “Well, readily recognizable criteria for making a mistake; he is not supposing there to be a
because we all do it like that”; that will not be the reason. It is very hard to see how this deep and perplexing problem about what the distinction of correct and incorrect
passage could be squared with the idea that for Wittgenstein, correctness in following rule is application consists in (for the case of language about public objects) Rather he
a matter of agreement whit the reactions of the community — either in respect of truth typically assumes a given pattern of possible future use to be correct and is then
conditions or assertibility condition. exercised with the question how this relates to what I now mean.
86 KRIPKE'S INTERPRETATION OF VVITTGENSTEIN KRIPKE'S INTERPRETATION OF WIITEGNSTEIN 87
inclined to do is what it is that constitutes what we constant conjunctions which are (objectively) false, at least
mean.31 What we are inclined to do by nature and what we mean ultimately. Only if one rejects Hume's 'projectivist' account of
cannot come apart in the way the question assumes. There is, causation could one press the question whether our natural
for Wittgenstein, not the sort of gap that Kripke's sceptic trades propensities lead us to have true causal beliefs upon exposure
on between meaning and naturally determined use. Reading to constant conjunctions. The respect in which Wittgenstein's
a l i t t l e into what Wittgenstein says, I think his response to position on rules resembles Hume's on causation is that both
Kripke's question of what determines normativeness would be locate the source of correctness in our given nature, not in some
that this question erroneously assumes that our meanings are aspect of reality quite independent of us and our natural
not fixed ( in part) by our natural propensities but by something propensities.33 The main difference between them (as I
logically independent of these propensities, since it envisages remarked in Chapter 1) is that Hume takes his view to be
the possibility that we should by nature treat a pattern of use as 'sceptical', whereas Wittgenstein takes his to be non-sceptical
linguistically correct and yet that pattern be incorrect; but the once we attain a right epistemology. And it would, of course,
thought of this possibility involves the mistaken supposition be radically contrary to the whole spirit of Hume's position on
that once the natural facts about us are exhausted there causation to locate correctness in the conformity of one's
remains somewhere else to look for what determines meaning. causal judgements with those of one's community: that is.
What has to be recognized is that at some level meaning is fixed Hume would not want to say that the distinction between
by our nature: meaning something is not an achievement of a seemingly true causal beliefs and really true ones is to be
transcendent mind divorced from our “form of life”, The explained in terms of whether your judgemems agree with
basis of the normative is the natural. 32 others' judgements. This would just be a doomed attempt to
A comparison of Wittgenstein with Hume may help to postpone the sceptical conclusion that our causal judgements
clarify Wittgenstein's position. Suppose someone were to put correspond to no objective or external feature of reality. I
the question 'What makes causal judgements correct on think that Kripke's community interpretation of Wittgenstein
Hume's view?' Granted that our minds are so constituted that makes a similar mistake as this community interpretation of
we form causal beliefs upon exposure to constantly conjoined Hume in respect of what constitutes the correctness of a causal
events, what is it for a belief so formed to be true or false: might bclief: Kripke is in effect jibbing at one of Wittgenstein's main
not our minds lead us to form a causal belief in the way Hume theses-that there is nowhere 1 can t u r n to underpin or bolster
describes and yet that belief be false? It is clear what Hume how 1 naturally proceed in my application of signs, not even to
would reply to this question: he would say that there is not the other people Kripke is trying to locate what 1 mean, and hence
sort of gap between belief and t r u t h that the question linguistic correctness, in something external to my nature as a
presupposes, since causation involves nothing over and above language-user, i.e. in my relations to a community; but thi s
constant conjunctions and the minds natural propensity to would be to refuse to accept Wittgenstein's claim that my
form expectations-- there is, in particular, nothing independent judgements of linguistic correctness are not based upon
of our minds (i.e. objective) to constitute 'necessary connexion'. reasons. Wittgenstein's position is simply this: what I mean is
On Hume’s view, then, correctness in a causal judgement
ultimately rests upon our (mental) nature; so it cannot be that
33 There is even in Wittgenstein some analogue of Hume’s projectivist “error
we naturally form causal judgements on the basis of observed theory” when we reflect philosophically upon our following rules we are irresistibly
tempted to suppose that our natural propensities have some foundation on what is “out
31 Here we might think of very simple language-games in which trining produces there” and hence we get the idea of “rails invisibly laid to infinity” (218) and of
fairly uniform and mechanical reactions; or even of the 'language' of bees. “something which only needs the addition of “and so on”, in order to reach to infinity”
(229). These illusions result from a kind of “externalization” of the compulsion we are
32 On t h i s point I am in agreement with Barry Stroud, 'Wittgenstein and Logical under when we follow a rule — rather as Hume thought that we “externalize” necessary
Necessity', Philosophical Review LXXIV (1965) . This interpretation contrast whit the connexion in our thought about causation. (Of course this analogy should not be pressed
idea that Wittgenstein is some kind of “conventionalist”. too far; there also plenty of differences between Hume and Wittgenstein in this regard.)
88 KRIPKE’S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN KRIPKE’S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN 89
determined by my natural use of words, so that we cannot should themselves not be considered in isolation: and when we
sensibly ask whether my use really conforms to what my words place them in the context of other passages we will see that they
mean.34 (Compare Hume: the causal truths are determined by should be read as embodying the social conception; that is,
regularities acting upon our minds to produce expectations, so 198-202 have implicit what other passages make explicit. 1
that we cannot sensibly ask whether the expectations thereby need, then, to consider what other passages might be thought
produced are really correct, i.e. lead us to form true causal to lend themselves to a community interpretation and show
beliefs.) This is not, of course, to say that our application of
that they have a different purport. The section 1 have most
words can never be mistaken, that every use is self-certifyingly
correct; but it is to say that judgements of linguistic correctness often heard cited as displaying Wittgenstein's commitment to
always rest in the end upon natural propensities to apply words the social conception is 242:
in a certain way: we do sometimes make judgements of If language is to be a means of communication there must be
linguistic mistake, but these judgements have their ultimate agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may
source in our natural sense of what is right- they do not sound) in judgments. This seems to abolish logic, but does not
involve prescinding altogether from our natural propensities to do so.—It is one thing to describe methods of measurement, and
apply signs. So, on Wittgenstein's view, linguistic mistake is another to obtain and state results of measurement. But what
necessarily local; we cannot make real sense of the idea that we call "measuring" is partly determined by a certain constancy
our natural ways of using signs are globally mistaken, since in results of measurement. (242)
that would be to assume that our meaning is fixed by something
external to us.35 In a sense, then, Wittgenstein dismisses as The claim is that Wittgenstein is here building the notion of
incoherent the kind of scepticism that lies behind Kripke's agreement into the notion of meaning. This interpretation
sceptical paradox: I mean the general scepticism that questions ignores, what I stressed in Chapter 1, that Wittgenstein is in
whether my use of signs has ever conformed with their meaning this passage making a claim about the necessary conditions of
- for their meaning cannot in this way come apart from the use communication: his claim is that for two or more people to
1 make of them. It is for these reasons that I say that share a language - to mean the same by their words- they must
Wittgenstein would not have pursued and pressed the question agree in their judgements. This claim expressly concerns a
of normativeness in the way Kripke does; and, as I remarked, social concept, viz. that of a linguistic community, and so
he does not in point of fact make a great deal of the question of naturally it is formulated in social terms, vi:, agreement
normativeness in these sections of the Investigations. between members of that community. What Wittgenstein does
not say, and what fails to follow from what he does say, is that
My rejection of the community interpretation is not yet
for there to be meaning at all there has to be inter-personal
complete. Someone wedded to this interpretation might allow
agreement. He is certainly not saying in this section that the
that 198-202 fail on their own to establish that Wittgenstein idea of an idiolect makes no sense: he is not ruling out the
held a social conception of rules but urge that these sections possibility that 1 might employ words with different meanings
from those of other people. His point is that if we are to use
34
It is important here that my use of language is interwoven with various kinds of words with the same meanings then we must agree in their use.
non-linguistic activity in such a way as to fix what my words mean; so correctness of Indeed, the interpretation I am rejecting would have
use will (partially) consist in how my linguistic actions fit in with my non-linguistic
actions.
Wittgenstein claiming, absurdly, that I cannot mean by a
35
'Philosophers very often talk about investigating, analysing, the meaning of word what no-one else means by it, since meaning requires
words. But let’s not forget that a word hasn’t got a meaning giving to it, as it were, by a Ínter-personal agreement of use. In general, the relation
power independent of us, so that there could be a kind of scientific investigation into between agreement and rules, as Wittgenstein sees it, concerns
what the word really means. A word has the meaning someone has given to it' (BB pp.
27-8). So it could not turn out that a word has a meaning different from that which 1 the notion of two or more people following the same rules;
(we) give to it by dint of my (our) use of the word. agreement is not supposed to be a necessary condition
of an individual’s
90 KRIPKE’S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN . KRIPKE’S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN 91

following a rule - that requires, rather, a multiplicity of that Kripke himself shows no tendency to rest his community
occasions of application. interpretation on either of the last two considerations; I
What may also mislead is that Wittgenstein speaks typically mention them because I have heard them cited by others in
of communal languages, e.g. English and German, and so support of a community interpretation.)
formulates his claims in terms of these shared languages; but it I am not, in rejecting the community interpretation, saying
is not to be inferred from this that he rejects the very notion of a that Wittgenstein thinks the notion of a linguistic community is
language confined to a single individual. Since most actual 'unimportant' or totally irrelevant to a proper account of
rules are in fact shared, including the semantic rules of natural meaning; nor am I denying that when a language is communal
languages, it is only to be expected that Wittgenstein's others may legitimately correct one's use of words: I am not
examples should be of this kind; but t h i s should not be taken to even denying; that what others mean by words can determine their
exclude the very possibility of rules followed by only one meaning on the lips of a given speaker. I am saying only that
person - and Wittgenstein says nothing to suggest that he Wittgenstein does not hold that the very notion of a rule of
intends lo exclude this possibility. it is not, as I remarked language must needs be explicated in social terms - that we
earlier, that he is especially anxious to insist on the coherence cannot make sense of rule-following on the part of a given
of solitary rule-following and to contest a community individual unless we relate that individual's behaviour to the
conception; the truth is that he is simply unconcerned whit behaviour of some community of rule- followers. Wittgenstein no
t h i s kind of question. His citation of communal signs thus does more holds this view about understanding a rule than he
not betoken a commitment to the essentially communal holds a parallel view about being in pain or remembering
employment of signs; rather, he is, for his purposes, indifferent to something. And, as I shall argue in Chapter 4, it is well that
the question. Wittgenstein did not hold such a view, because it is dearly
Much the same should be said of Wittgenstein's emphasis wrong.
upon t h e notion of training in his account of language and The divergence between Kripke's interpretation and mine
rules. Training is, of course, a social concept - it involves an shows up sharply in our different views of the way 202 relates to
inter-personal relation - and training in the use of a sign may be the latter sections dealing (explicitly) with private language
said to aim at agreement between the trainee's behaviour and (243f). Kripke's view is that by 202 the argument against the
that of the trainer. Does this commit Wittgenstein to a possibility of a private language is essentially complete -
community conception of what it is to grasp a rule? Clearly not, Wittgenstein has already shown that there must always be
since nothing so far said implies that in order to explicate the public criteria for the correctness of linguistic use. This result
concept of the learner's grasping a rule we must make has already been established because rule-following in general
essential reference to the behaviour of the trainer - any more so depends upon communal agreement of response for an
than for any skill acquired by means of training, e.g. kicking a individual to be following any rule he must exhibit behaviour
ball. Wittgenstein emphasises training not because he thinks which others can use to correct his sincere avowal that he is
all rules are necessarily social but because it helps to remind us of following a rule, since this is what the normativeness of rule
what really goes on when someone achieves understanding: it comes to. The notion of correct rule-following is explicated in
acts as a prophylactic against myth-making36 (1 should say terms of assertibility conditions which are available to
members of one's linguistic community, and so there is no
36 See esp. 208-10, in which it is ernphasised that in teaching someone a rule I don not possibility of following a rule which others cannot know one
communicate lees than 1 myself know. This claim of Wittgenstein’s bears certain
similarities to W. V. Quine's position on radical translation in Word and Object (MIT
is following correctly or incorrectly.37 This view of what is
Press: Cambridge, Mass, 1960), chap. 2; and to Michael Dummett's insistence upon th e going on in 202 obviously depends upon the community
exhaustive manifestability of linguistic understanding in 'What is a Theory of interpretation
Meaning? ( I I ) ' , i n Truth and Meaning, ed. G. Evans and J. McDowell (Clarendon
Press: Oxford, 1976).
37 See Kripke, pp. 3, 98-113
92 KRIPKE’S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN
interpretation, i.e. upon building agreement of response into the
notion of rule-following. On the interpretation I have put
forward, there is not this direct link between 202 and the
private language argument: 202 sets the stage for that
argument without actually completing it; more argumentative
work has to be done before the possibility of a private language
can be excluded. What is left open by 202 is the possibility of a
'private technique', i.e. a capacity to apply a sign in a regular
way which is not checkable by others. In the case of public
objects the technique of use will be checkable by others because
the objects themselves are accessible to others and hence
regularity of use is verifiable; but if the objects are private, as
sensations have often been supposed to be, then there will be no
telling whether the speaker is referring to the same (kind of)
sensation on different occasions of use. I think my
interpretation of the relation between 202 and the later material
on private language better fits Wittgenstein’s procedure in
those latter sections, for he speaks as if new considerations
were been advanced and not simply a specific consequence of
earlier conclusions being drawn. (38) Kripke, in fact, claims
that Wittgenstein anticipates his sceptical paradox and i t s
solution as early as the very first section of the Investigations, in
which case the possibility of a private language would have
been excluded right at the beginning: this seems implausible
in itself, and inspection of section 1 discloses only an emphasis
upon acting as against 'explanations' - there is no essential
mention there of the community. My conclusion is then that the
more traditional view of where the private language argument
occurs (after 243) is to be preferred to Kripke's. It would, perhaps,
be pleasant if Kripke's view of the overall structure of t he
Investigations were correct, but it does not seem to me that it is.
And the reason Wittgenstein's book does not have the
structure Kripke attributes to it is that it does not have the
content he attributes to it.

38 He does not anywhere say or imply that a private language has already been
excluded by he earlier considerations, and that it is necessary for him now only to bring
out how those considerations apply to the skeptical case of words for sensations. In fact. I
think he writes as in the earlier conclusion —that understanding is mastery of a
practice— leaves open the possibility of a private language. Hence the need to show that
we have to impose further conditions on what it takes for a genuine practice (rule) to
exist, notably third-person criteria of correctness.
"La interpretación de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein: paradoja y comunidad"

Porque la palabra es una…y la realidad es otra:

A los jubilados de
México y
Latinoamérica...Titanes
humillados y olvidados.
"La
interpretación
de Kripke sobre
Wittgenstein:
paradoja y
comunidad"
(Kripke's
Interpretation
of
Wittgenstein:
Paradox and
Community)
en:
Wittgenstein
on Meaning.
An
Interpretation
and
Evaluation,
McGINN, Colin,
“LA Inglaterra, Basil
INTERPRETACIÓN Blackwell
DE KRIPKE SOBRE Publisher L t d,
1984, pp. 59-92
WITTGENSTEIN:
(Aristotelian
PARADOJA Y Society Series,
COMUNIDAD” Volume 1)

POR COLIN
MCGUINN

Traducción: Profesor Joel Tucídides


Madrigal Bailón, Licenciado en Filosofía,
México Distrito Federal. Egresado de la
Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana
Unidad Iztapalapa
(tucidides2000@yahoo.com.mx). Para
educar y sin fines de lucro. Se permite la
reproducción total o parcial citando al
autor original.

Un humilde tributo a nuestros maestros, porque A MARÍA IMELDA SOTO LÓPEZ, porque su
Náhuatl me enseñó a hablar el Castellano y
enseñan a pesar de la adversidad.