134 Recensioni
vocabulario de los tiempos. Ciertamente
los Papas y los concilios no ha desentrañado
de forma completa la profunda infraestruc-
tura filosófica y teológica implicada en los
derechos humanos, con las definiciones y
distinciones que la acompañan. No era su
intención ni su misión. Esto es tarea de los
filósofos y teólogos. Lo que en definitiva
muestra esta valiosa obra es que la aporta-
ción principal de la tradición católica al dis-
curso sobre los derechos humanos se en-
cuentra en la filosofía y teología
antropológicas que los fundamentan, espe-
cialmente como se ha desarrollado en el
‘personalismo tomista’.
El libro se divide en cinco capítulos. El
primero (pp. 3-52) sirve para definir los de-
rechos, aportar matices y mostrar la posi-
ción de la Iglesia. La distinción entre dere-
chos ‘naturales’ y derechos ‘positivos’ o
‘legales’ es de gran ayuda. En el segundo
(pp. 53-107) se defiende el concepto de
‘derechos humanos’ o ‘derechos naturales’
frente a las acusaciones de su no existencia,
de su inseparabilidad del liberalismo ilumi-
nista y de su carácter de novedad en el pen-
samiento de la Iglesia. El tercer capítulo es
el corazón del ensayo, donde se presenta el
‘personalismo tomista’ como fundamento
de los derechos humanos (pp. 108-216). Se
explica brillantemente lo que se entiende
por ‘personalismo’, ‘persona’ y ‘dignidad’.
Se distingue entre el amor concupiscentiae
y el amor benevolentiae, siendo éste último
el único modo justo de amar a una persona
y, por consiguiente, a cada persona, sin dis-
tinción de raza, sexo, religión, cualidades,
clase social, etc. Se muestra la íntima unión
entre el bien de la persona –que no es indi-
vidualismo o egoísmo– y el bien común. De
la dignidad de la persona surgen los dere-
chos humanos, y del amor que le debemos,
nuestra obligación de respetarlos como
modo de respetar a la persona, cuidando, en
consecuencia, de los bienes que son para
ella fundamentales, como la vida, la verdad,
la religión, el vivir en sociedad, el matrimo-
nio. Basado sobre todo en el pensamiento
filosófico y teológico de Juan Pablo II –in-
cluyendo de modo principal sus escritos
como ‘Karol Wojtyla’– el autor muestra,
en este sentido, cómo la justicia es el inicio
del amor. Toda persona, cada persona tiene
derecho a ser amada. El amor es el único
modo justo de tratar a una persona. Se ter-
mina en esta parte con el fundamento teoló-
gico de los derechos en Cristo, en su ser
‘imago Dei’.
El capítulo cuarto (pp. 217-300) es tam-
bién muy importante. Se sostiene que, aun-
que el término de los ‘derechos’ sea relati-
vamente nuevo, las ideas que entrañan
hunden sus raíces en la gran tradición teo-
lógica y filosófica del cristianismo. Son
parte integrante y esencial de la enseñanza
sobre la ley natural y el derecho natural. La
quinta parte (pp. 301-320) es también la
conclusión, donde se recapitula lo visto y se
reafirma la necesidad de responder en la
práctica, con un amor solidario, a la inquie-
tante pregunta: ‘¿quién es mi prójimo?’
Un pequeño reparo es la postura más
bien crítica hacia el pensamiento de G. Gri-
sez y J. Finnis en cuanto a la ley natural y
los bienes fundamentales. Pienso que una
cuidadosa lectura de estos pensadores puede
llevar a una diversa apreciación.
José María Antón, L.C.
Rudi te Velde, Aquinas on God: The ‘Di-
vine Science’ of the Summa Theologiae,
Ashgate, Aldershot 2006, 192 pp.
In his Aquinas on God, Rudi te Velde,
philosophy professor of the University of
Tilburg (Netherlands), provides insight into
the structural, methodological and system-
atic aspects of Thomas Aquinas’ approach
to God in the Summa theologiae. In the In-
troduction, te Velde states that the aim of his
book is “to expound and explain Thomas’
analysis of the concept of God, with the
accent on the way in which the ‘theological’
and the ‘philosophical’ are hereby inter-
woven” (p. 1) and explains that Thomas’
metaphysical approach to God (as prima
causa) in the Summa is integrated within a
comprehensive treatment of Christian faith.
 Recensioni
Te Velde divides his book into six chap-
ters, summarizing them as follows: Chapter
One introduces the Summa theologiae, its
subject matter, method and composition;
Chapter Two is devoted to the question of
God’s existence and attends especially to
the first argument based on motion; Chapter
Three deals with what God is, namely
Thomas’ understanding of God as self-sub-
sistent being; Chapter Four deals with
Thomas’ analysis of how God can be named
by means of human language and the doc-
trine of analogy; Chapter Five deals with
the notion of creation and Thomas’ meta-
physics of participation; Chapter Six dis-
cusses “the notion of grace and the system-
atic relevance in Thomas’ thought of the
difference between ‘nature’ and ‘grace’”
(p. 6).
In Chapter One, “A Masterpiece of The-
ology: Aims, Method and Composition of
the Summa theologiae”, te Velde recalls
that, for Thomas, thinking about what God
is and what God does “is intrinsically con-
nected with a theological consideration of
the moral practice of human life as directed
towards God, as well as with an inquiry in
the life and deeds of Jesus Christ, who, by
his redemptive action, has opened for man
the access to God” (p. 10). The Summa is
structured accordingly: the First Part of the
Summa “contains the doctrine of God and
of creation, the Second Part deals with the
moral practice of man whose final happi-
ness lies in being united with God, and the
Third Part deals with Christ and his sacra-
ments through which the ultimate unity of
man and God is brought about” (p. 10). In
light of this triadic plan, te Velde holds that
M.-D. Chenu’s hermeneutical perspective
of exitus-reditus is problematic, since, when
a more detailed application of exitus-reditus
is attempted, it tends to obscure and conceal
some of the Summa’s methodical and com-
positional peculiarities and does not appear
to fit in with how Thomas himself accounts
for the divisions and transitions in the text.
In contrast to Chenu’s exitus-reditus
perspective, te Velde proposes the follow-
ing: “The Summa proceeds according to a
linear movement of increasing concretiza-
135
tion in which two main shifts of perspective
occur. First, divine government, with re-
spect to the rational creature, requires a new
perspective in which the focus is on the hu-
man agent who is assisted in his work of
freedom by God’s law and grace; second,
God’s graceful and helping presence to
mankind in his historical reality of damaged
freedom is intensified by God becoming
man in Christ, in which the two agencies of
God and man become united, restoring
from within the damaged freedom of man in
his orientation to God. The three parts of the
Summa do not appear to be organized ac-
cording to the double movement of exitus
and reditus, but rather according to three
agents: God, Man and Christ, respectively”
(p. 18).
After clarifying what Thomas means
by sacra doctrina and how the special na-
ture of this doctrine determines the main di-
vision of the Summa into three parts, te
Velde looks at how philosophy enters into
the project of the Summa and how the status
of sacred doctrine as a scientia ought to be
understood. He explains the interplay be-
tween disciplina and doctrina and the ped-
agogical ordering of sacra doctrina and
that, according to Thomas, sacra doctrina is
a subaltern science: “Its conclusions are
based on principles known by the light of a
superior scientia, namely the scientia of
God and the blessed (that is, those who en-
joy the final vision of God). These princi-
ples, from which the scientia of faith pro-
ceeds, are identified by Thomas as the
articles of faith” (p. 25-26). Sacred doctrine
is based on revelation and as such is distinct
from all the philosophical sciences. On the
one hand, it accepts its principles from God
through revelation and, in this sense, does
not depend on the philosophical sciences,
yet, on the other, “although all the scientia
of sacred doctrine is founded in God him-
self and as such is superior to all the philo-
sophical sciences, we humans need the as-
sistance of philosophy in order to obtain a
clearer understanding of its truths” (p. 28).
Philosophy, te Velde concludes, “is needed
due to the imperfection of the human intel-
lect, ‘which is more easily led (manuduci-
136 Recensioni
tur) by what is known through natural rea-
son to that which is above reason’ (I, q. 1,
a. 5 ad 2)” (p. 28). Te Velde ends the first
chapter with a reflection on the notion of
“manuductio” and the status and mediatory
role of philosophical reason in the exposi-
tion of the doctrine of faith: “Philosophy
does not prove the truth of faith, but it
shows by means of metaphysical reason
that there must be a First Being and a First
Cause in relation to which the statements of
faith have their truth. Without reason’s
manuductio, by which the subject of the
revealed doctrine of faith is given an intel-
ligible determination, the Christian revela-
tion cannot be understood to be what it is
assumed to be: knowledge which is true of
God” (p. 30).
In Chapter Two, “The First Thing to
Know: Does God Exist? On the Five
Ways”, te Velde starts by noting that St.
Thomas’s Five Ways have traditionally
been considered as arguments aiming at a
logically conclusive proof of God’s exis-
tence and rational justification of theistic
belief. In contrast to this position, te Velde
proposes that, in the Summa, the question as
to whether God exists is first and foremost
a matter of finding an access (via) to the in-
telligibility of God. The Five Ways have a
theological context and aim, and are a nec-
essary “first step in the systematic exposi-
tion of the scientia of sacred doctrine inas-
much as they provide the initial access to
the intelligibility of the subject of this sci-
entia” (p. 39). Since the arguments address
the question of how our belief that God ex-
ists may be rationally ascertained in its ref-
erence to objective reality, te Velde first
clarifies the technical meaning of the ques-
tion “An sit?” in Aquinas’ thought and then
discusses the problem of whether and how
God’s existence admits of a demonstration,
given the specific mediatory structure of
logical demonstration. In his exposition, te
Velde explains one of the fundamental
Thomistic theses: the existence of God is
not per se known by the intellect, yet may
be known in a demonstration quia from the
effects: “What we come to know as a result
of a demonstration is ‘that God exists’
(Deum esse), not the existence of God him-
self (esse Dei)” (p. 44). Since the definition
of God’s essence cannot be used as the mid-
dle term in the definition, we have to use the
meaning of the name “God”. Te Velde ar-
gues that the meaning of the name “God”
stems from our knowledge of God’s nature
according to causality, excellence and remo-
tion, for we intend to signify something
which transcends all things, is the principle
of all things and is removed from all things.
With respect to the structure of the First
Way, we see that our reason needs to move
from the philosophical analysis of motion to
the metaphysical plane of a “First Mover”,
which is the principle of all motion in rela-
tion to which the whole order of secondary
movers (nature) receives its ultimate ex-
planation (cf. p. 51). Not every being is
mobile and, therefore, the perspective of
physics must be transcended. In this sense,
the argument of the prima via may be re-
garded as passing over from physics to
metaphysics by way of resolutio: “Resolutio
names the process of reason by which the
composed sensible whole, which is better
known to us, is reduced to its simple prin-
ciples and causes, which are better known
in themselves” (p. 55). Resolutio, then, is
twofold: it is both a reductive process that
occurs within the field of a certain science
and a process which may lead “to a change
in the relationship of thought to the object,
constitutive of a science. […] By way of
resolution the particular object of physics is
resolved into the universal object of meta-
physics” (p. 55).
Chapter Three, “The Heart of the Mat-
ter: What God Is (Not)”, deals with
Thomas’ answer to the question “Quid sit
Deus?”. Due to the limits of our intellect we
cannot know what God is and therefore the
question “quid sit” must be transformed
into inquiry into “what God is not”. To an-
swer the question whether or not “knowing
what God is not” constitutes real knowl-
edge, te Velde sets out to determine the na-
ture of the negative dimension in our
knowledge of God: “For Thomas, the way
of negation in the approach to God is
grounded in causality. The remotio points to
 Recensioni
the fact that God must be separated from all
things insofar as He is the cause of all
things. The via negationis presupposes the
prior affirmation of God as the cause on
which all things depend for their being” (p.
75). In I, q. 12, a. 12, we find St. Thomas’
elaborated and refined version of the
Dionysian triplex via according to causality,
remotion and eminence and a summary of
his view of how we can arrive at knowledge
of God. The affirmation of God as cause
was begun earlier in I, q. 2, where Thomas
argues for the existence of God as the first
cause (via causalitatis). In the questions of
the Summa that follow, Thomas seeks to es-
tablish what must necessarily belong to God
as the first cause of all things. Thus, in the
second step, the cause is distinguished from
the effect by way of negation (via remotio-
nis). Finally, we see that the cause possesses
originally and eminently all the perfections
of the effects (via eminentiae). Thomas thus
determines the “mode of being” of the First
Cause of all things by means of remotion
and eminence.
According to te Velde, the two principal
features of the divine mode of being are
simplicitas (q. 3) and perfectio (q. 4). These,
in turn, are presupposed by all the other at-
tributes of the divine essence. Te Velde also
holds that the attribute of simplicitas corre-
sponds to the via remotionis and that of
perfectio to the via eminentiae, arguing that
the attributes of infinity (q. 7), immutability
(q. 9) and unity (q. 11) incorporate a synthe-
sis of the negative aspect of simplicity and
the positive aspect of perfection, but should
be regarded as following immediately upon
simplicity, since they remove limitation,
motion and division from God.
The attributes of goodness (q. 6), divine
omnipresence (q. 8), and eternity (q. 10) fol-
low upon those of perfection (good), infin-
ity (omnipresence) and immutability (eter-
nity). In the final section of the chapter, te
Velde looks at Thomas’ understanding of
God in terms of Ipsum Esse Per Se Subsis-
tens and Thomas’ conception of being as
universal perfection. Te Velde concludes:
“If a reality is completely determined in
identity with its being (ipsum esse subsis-
137
tens), then being must be present in it ac-
cording to its full range of perfection, in-
cluding perfections such as life and intelli-
gence and so on. Thus it appears that in
reducing all things, with respect to their be-
ing, to the first cause, the categorical differ-
ences of being in the sphere of essence are,
so to speak, gathered together in their orig-
inal unity in and as being itself: the simple
being of God contains in itself the perfec-
tion of all things (of all genera)” (p. 89).
In Chapter Four, “Divine Names: On
Human Discourse about God”, te Velde be-
gins by drawing attention to the guiding
principle which states that God manifests
himself in the world through a diversity of
perfections which flow from him into the
created effects. Te Velde prefaces his treat-
ment of the divine names with a brief exam-
ination of the semantic triangle of res – ra-
tio – nomen, of the signification of words
and of the triplex via, as a guideline in the
analysis of how names may be transferred
from creatures to God. Some names signify
God in himself, some names are said
metaphorically of God and some names are
said properly of God. The names of God are
not synonymous since they signify the same
reality under different conceptual aspects.
With this understanding te Velde turns to the
topic of analogy. Names, he writes, are said
analogously of God and creatures – neither
in exactly the same sense nor in a wholly
different sense, but according to some or-
dered relationship between both. To grasp
this point better, te Velde brings up two
topics in which analogy finds an applica-
tion: analogy as applied to the term “being”
and analogy as applied to a certain type of
causality called the “analogical agent”
(agens analogicum).
First, ens is said analogously of the dif-
ferent genera of being and is said of the dif-
ferent categories according to different re-
lations to substance; as well, there are
names which are transgeneric and common
to all things – the transcendentals. In the
analogy of the divine names, the trans-
generic character of being is very important.
The other topic, that of the analogical agent,
concerns a type of causality in which the ef-
138 Recensioni
fect falls short with respect to the perfection
of its cause: “In this case the effect receives
merely a diminished and remote likeness of
its cause – a likeness which cannot be re-
duced to a specific or even generic identity,
but which is merely according to a certain
analogy” (p. 110). Here, analogy is meant to
designate the intelligible connection be-
tween cause and effect and is intrinsically
connected with the notion of participation.
Two characteristics of analogical pred-
ication – the indirect denomination from
something else and the aspect of transcend-
ing of one genus to another – are also of
fundamental importance to understanding
the analogy of divine names: “God is
named indirectly from his creatures insofar
as creatures are related to God as their
cause. The meaning of any name said of
God therefore includes a reference to the
meaning the name had in its application to
creatures. […] When a name derived from
creatures is applied to God, it is used out-
side the genus in which it has its proper
meaning. […] The name is taken from a
certain genus to signify something outside
that genus, according to some relationship
existing between them” (p. 112). God, then,
relates to creatures as standing outside any
genus and as the principle of all genera; it
is this causal connection that grounds the
analogous naming of God from creatures.
The likeness creatures have to God is ac-
cording to a certain analogy. This analogy,
however, is not according to the way in
which two things are related to a third, but
rather according to the way one thing is re-
lated to another. Creatures are like God and
this likeness grounds the possibility of nam-
ing God from creatures. Likeness is always
grounded in a common form and, in the
case of the relationship between creatures
and God, the common form cannot be deter-
mined logically by way of species or by
way of genus, but only by a certain analogy.
In the case of the divine names, analogy im-
plies transcending the categorical sphere of
finite reality as such: creatures are categor-
ically determined and contracted in their
being; God exceeds any categorical limita-
tion as he is identical with his being.
Analogy, te Velde points out, is often
taken to be part of a sort of procedure of ab-
straction and sublimation by which finite
perfections are purged of their material
flaws and defects and then extended to their
ultimate limit in God. In contrast to this, te
Velde argues that: “In the case of the anal-
ogy of divine predication it is the whole of
all categorically distinct things as such (as
being) which is transcended towards some-
thing existing extra omne genus. Analogy,
in this sense, should not be understood as a
sort of transcending movement going be-
yond the particular domain of experience to
yet another particular being of the most
sublime and perfect kind. What has to be
transcended is the ‘physical’ way of consid-
ering reality in its categorical differentiation
and manifold of this and such. […] In pass-
ing over from physics to metaphysics the
particular and differentiated sphere of
essence is reduced to its analogical unity of
being. It is only be considering the whole of
reality as being, it is concrete differentiate
unity, that it can be conceived in its relation-
ship to God as to the first and universal
principle of all being” (p. 117-118).
In Chapter Five: “God’s Proper Action:
On the Causality of Creation”, te Velde
places the triadic structure of the causality
of creation in the forefront: God’s work of
creation “exhibits a threefold structure of
bringing something into existence, in an
ordered way and for the sake of some good.
The basic division between ‘producing’,
‘ordering’ and ‘preserving guiding’ con-
cerns three conceptually different aspects of
the one single act of creation” (p. 125). It is
in the human manner of conceiving God’s
act of creation and our logical division of it
that we see a reference to the manifold
senses of cause: “The aspect of production
is unmistakably associated with the efficient
cause (causa efficens); the distinction refers
to the extrinsic formal cause (causa exem-
plaris), and the couple preservation/gov-
ernment is related to the final cause (causa
finalis)” (p. 125-126).
Regarding creation as producere in esse,
God is thought of as the efficient agent that
makes something other than himself to ex-
 Recensioni
ist. With respect to the other two aspects,
Thomas is guided by two principles: First,
every agent acts through a form (omne
agens agit secundum formam) and second,
every agent acts for the sake of an end
(omne agens agit propter finem). The form
according to which God acts is nothing
other than the one divine essence as con-
ceived under many different aspects, each
of which forms the idea of a particular crea-
ture. The aspect of distinctio, which implies
a multitude of diverse and unequal crea-
tures, is also associated with God’s sapien-
tia, for divine wisdom contains the ideas of
all things in itself. The third aspect of con-
servatio/gubernatio refers to God as the fi-
nal cause of all creatures. God leads things
towards their final goal and perfection,
“which is to become like (assimilatio) the
divine goodness according to the possibili-
ties of each creature’s proper nature” (p.
128). The end to which God’s gubernatio is
directed is nothing other than the essential
goodness which is God himself. “The as-
similatio to God’s goodness happens in two
ways: first insofar as a creature is good in it-
self; second insofar as a creature may cause
something else to be good” (p. 128). God’s
gubernatio corresponds to these two ways
of assimilatio and has a twofold effect: “it
preserves things in the good they have (con-
servatio in bono), and it moves things to-
wards the good (motio ad bonum)” (p. 128).
After establishing this triadic structure,
te Velde then looks at the argument for cre-
ation as found in I, q. 44, which considers
the whole of reality in the light of their first
cause according to the pattern of the four
types of causality (efficient, material, for-
mal, final). With respect to each of these,
God is shown to be the first principle of all
things: “God brings all things into exis-
tence, including their matter, and according
to an exemplary form which is not external
to God, and in view of an end which is
nothing other than God’s goodness” (p.
129). The proposition that “every being is
created by God” would not be a problem if
we were able to see the essence of God—
for we would immediately grasp the truth
that all things flow from God’s creative
139
essence. Thomas denies this possibility for
us in this life; hence, in order to argue that
all things proceed from God as from their
(efficient) cause, we must start from the in-
direct and negative understanding of God
on the basis of his effects: “The way God
must be understood by us as the first cause
of all things is expressed by the formula
‘self-subsistent being’. […] Thomas’ task
will now consist in showing how the truth
that every being is caused by God can be
‘deduced’ from this intelligible determina-
tion of the divine essence” (p. 129).
Although the argument of creation ap-
pears at first to be circular, it is in no way a
vicious circle since it proceeds from an in-
direct and negative understanding of God
and not from an a priori definition of God.
Just as our knowledge of God is indirect, so
is our knowledge of creation. After this
premise, te Velde divides the argument for
creation in I, q. 44, a. 1 into five steps: first,
the argument states the need of a reduction:
“Whatever is found in anything by partici-
pation must be caused in it by that to which
it belongs essentially; second, we are re-
minded that God is “self-sufficient being”
and must necessarily be one; third, the iden-
tity of being itself in God is negated with re-
spect to everything that is not God: “All be-
ings other than God are not their own being,
but are beings by participation”; fourth,
creatures are seen to be diversified accord-
ing to the diverse participations in being,
from which results the different degrees of
being; finally, each creature is an ens “in a
different way according to how it differently
relates to the esse it has received from the
First Being” (p. 131-132). After considering
the argument found in article one, te Velde
considers article two, in which Thomas dis-
tinguishes three phases in the development
of the philosophical investigation of being.
The third phase moves from a particular
consideration of being as nature to the uni-
versal consideration of being as being and
the causality of creation. In this step, the
movement of resolutio reaches its conclu-
sion: being is conceived as not depending
on matter and, thus, must be created by the
universal cause of things. Our author con-
140 Recensioni
cludes the chapter looking at creation as
participation – participation as it applies to
the composition of the principles of essence
and esse in creatures and insofar as it under-
lines the total dependency of the creature on
the universal source of being.
In Chapter Six, “A God of Grace: On
Human Freedom and Divine Grace”, te
Velde enters into themes that pertain more
properly to Sacred Theology. Te Velde jus-
tifies the inclusion of the chapter arguing
that grace is an essential feature of Thomas’
metaphysical understanding of God. Grace
presupposes nature and perfects nature.
Man has a connatural end proportioned to
his nature and a supernatural end which ex-
ceeds the faculty of his nature. This obser-
vation leads te Velde to the theme of the
two types of human happiness according to
the duality of nature and grace. He holds
that it is from the perspective of the natural
desire for truth that philosophical happiness
– the earthly contemplation of the divine
cause as knowable from the likeness of cre-
ation – and supernatural happiness – the vi-
sion of God’s essence – are comparable to
each other in terms of imperfect and per-
fect. Since the vision of God’s essence is
beyond the power of any created (intellec-
tual) nature, it can only become “connat-
ural” to a human person if his nature is
perfected to participate in the divine nature.
For this reason, the effect of God’s grace in
the human soul is described in terms of re-
creation and re-generation (cf. I, q. 110, a.
4). Grace, then, is defined as a certain par-
ticipation of the divine nature on the part of
the rational creature. By “communicating a
likeness of his nature, God creates in the
human soul the conditions under which a
mutual relationship of friendship and love
between man and God becomes possible”
(p. 165).
In this brief summary, I hope to have
conveyed both the depth and clarity of te
Velde’s exposition. The title of the Ashgate
series of studies is actually a little mislead-
ing as it makes one naturally expect a book
on Aquinas’ philosophical theology. While
te Velde acknowledges that one can develop
such a philosophical theology using ele-
ments and arguments from the First Part of
the Summa, he limits himself rather to ex-
plaining Thomas’ metaphysics as it is inte-
grated within the sacra doctrina based on
divine revelation. This focus has both its ad-
vantages and drawbacks. Advantageous is
the attention given to the Summa’s structure
and method. Understanding these better
constitutes te Velde’s primary goal. Such at-
tention allows us to get into the way
Thomas thinks and brings us beyond com-
mentaries that sometimes tend to obscure
what Thomas states succinctly and clearly.
In this sense, te Velde’s book contributes
greatly to the effort of those who would at-
tempt to construct a philosophical theology
by pulling elements and arguments from
the Summa.
Te Velde’s explanations of resolutio as
a method within a science and as a way of
passing from physics to metaphysics and
his explanation of the role of the middle
term in the demonstration of God’s exis-
tence, the triplex via in our knowledge of
what God is (not), the analogy of divine
names in connection with God as extra
omne genus and principle of certain genera
and the triadic structure of the treatise on
creation are very welcome and insightful
contributions. One is left with the impres-
sion that there is a great deal of scholarship
and remarkable breadth of understanding
behind each chapter.
As for the possible drawbacks to te
Velde’s choice in topics and approach, I
was surprised not find a chapter dedicated
to God’s intellect and will, themes which
are found in the Summa and integral to its
treatise on God. An open question remains
that of how the via remotionis and via em-
inentiae are applied in the argumentation
for the existence and object of God’s intel-
lect and will.
Secondly, te Velde’s treatment of dis-
tinctio and conservatio/gubernatio could
have been more extensive. In particular,
one notes the absence of a more in-depth
explanation of the role of the divine ideas in
terms of exemplary causality and the role of
final causality in divine governance. As
well, no mention is made of the problems
 Recensioni 141

surrounding passive creation as a relation in Finally, in Chapter Five, our author in-
the creature. corporates his understanding of the real dis-
Thirdly, te Velde does not explicitly ad- tinction and the notion of participation from
dress what the Summa presupposes and his earlier work, Participation and Sub-
while he recognizes that there are two the- stantiality (E.J. Brill, 1995). His point about
ologies (philosophical theology as meta- esse being limited “to” a determinate
physics and Sacred Theology), this does essence and not “by” an essence is insight-
not appear to be a driving principle in his ful, yet may in the end be a semantic dis-
exposition and interpretation of the meta- tinction that refers to the same role of the
physics integrated in the theology proper to essence when it is considered as a constitu-
the Summa theologiae. Some of his argu- tive principle of created being. In the end,
ments could be bolstered by referring to however – and I think the reader will agree
the fact that metaphysics as philosophical – these points do not take away significantly
theology does not consider God as its genus from the benefit one receives from reading
subiectum, but rather as the cause of its and reflecting on te Velde’s fine work.
genus subiectum: ens in quantum est ens.
Fourthly, if the reader is not aware that Jason A. Mitchell, L.C.
te Velde’s affirmations are in large part lim-
ited to the Summa theologiae, some affirma-
tions could easily be taken out of context
and misunderstood. Take, for example, the
affirmation found in Chapter Two: “The
Five Ways do not constitute a sort of natural
theology apart from and preceding the the-
ological exposition of faith” (p. 47). This, I
would argue, is true insofar as the Five
Ways form part of the Summa theologiae.
However, if we take into account the devel-
opment of the different arguments for the
existence of God in Thomas’ thought and
their role in other works such as the Summa
contra Gentiles, the theological contextual-
ization does not appear to be essential to the
Five Ways and does not hinder in any way
their use in “natural theology”.
Also, in Chapter Two, te Velde could
have addressed the question about the struc-
ture of the Five Ways taken together and
why there are five ways instead of just one.
I suggest that the triadic structure of effi-
cient, exemplary and final causality is once
again applicable. In Chapter Three, te
Velde’s position on the role of the via remo-
tionis and via eminentiae could be modified
to account for the fact that “perfection”
could also be seen as a “negation of lack”
(cf. In V Metaph., lect. 18, n. 1040) and,
therefore, could be said to fall within the via
remotionis along with the other four major
divine attributes.