Hon.

Pedro Pierluisi Urrutia

Gobernador
GOBIERNO DE PUERTO RICO
Hon. Domingo Emanuelli Hernández
Departamento de Justicia Secretario

25 de abril de 2022

A: Domingo Emanuelli Hernández

Secretario

P/C: Thaizza M. Rodríguez Pagán

Ayudante Especial
Oficina del Secretario

De: Lcdo. Guarionex Díaz Martínez

Secretario Auxiliar de Asuntos Monopolísticos

Lcdo. José M. Tous Cardona

Abogado

Noris E. Rodríguez Méndez

Oficial Legal

RE: MEMORIAL EXPLICATIVO SOBRE INICIATIVA PARA CANCELACIÓN

DE DEUDA DE PRÉSTAMOS EDUCATIVOS

En abril del presente año nos fue referida una comunicación escrita de la Oficina de la Secretaria
de Justicia del estado de Nueva York, Letitia James. Se acompaña dicho documento. La fecha
límite para contestar la solicitud presentada corresponde al 29 de abril de 2002. En dicha carta se
hace referencia a una solicitud del estado de Nueva York dirigida al Presidente de los Estados
Unidos de América, Mr. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. para la cancelación de la deuda federal de
préstamos estudiantiles. .

Destacamos que bajo la administración del Presidente Joseph Biden se han ampliado los
programas relacionados con la condonación de deuda de estos préstamos a militares y diversos
sectores profesionales, incluyendo servidores públicos, y profesiones de la salud, entre otros.
Entendemos que esto es cumplimiento con la promesa del Presidente, la cual incluyó la

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cancelación de la suma de diez mil dólares a los deudores, como se menciona en la carta. No
obstante, el compromiso político nunca incluyó la cancelación total de la deuda, que según se
menciona en la carta, y en un reportaje periodístico, es de alrededor de 1.7 trillones de dólares. 1

En lo pertinente hemos de reseñar el programa federal de préstamos estudiantiles está cubierto

por la ley federal conocida como Higher Education Act of 1965.
The Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA; P.L. 89-329, as amended) authorizes
numerous federal aid programs that provide support to both individuals pursuing a
postsecondary education and institutions of higher education (IHEs). Title IV of
the HEA authorizes the federal government’s major student financial aid programs,
which are the primary source of direct federal support to students pursuing
postsecondary education. Titles II, III, and V of the HEA provide institutional aid
and support. Additionally, the HEA authorizes services and support for less-
advantaged students (select Title IV programs), students pursing international
education (Title VI), and students pursuing and institutions offering certain
graduate and professional degrees (Title VII). Finally, the most recently added title
(Title VIII) authorizes more than two dozen other programs that support higher
education; most have never been funded.i

De la lectura del estatuto federal no se desprende expresamente una disposición relacionada con
la condonación general de la deuda de préstamos estudiantiles. Asimismo, existe una
controversia sobre si el Presidente de E.U.A. tiene una autoridad ejecutiva tan amplia como para
eliminar las deudas de dichos préstamos. Esto es así porque el texto del estatuto resulta ser
ambiguo toda vez que las disposiciones del Higher Eduacation Act que confieren al Secretario
de Educación poder para consentir la modificación de cantidades adeudadas en ciertos préstamos
no incluye una autorización en blanco (blanket authorization). Igualmente varios juristas han
analizado esta controversia y han expresados dudas sobre este asunto.2
… This kind of indeterminacy might lead some lawyers to conclude that the courts
should defer to the Secretary’s own interpretation of the language, thus allowing
Cardona to embrace plenary compromise authority.

At least four contextual considerations, however, weigh against this conclusion.

First, Congress has authorized numerous student loan forgiveness programs. These
have been defined in quite explicit and precise terms, limiting the conditions under
which the Secretary is authorized to forgive student loans to various borrower

1
Véase además, entrevista
de la cadena informativa CBS al exsecretario del Departamento de
Educación de la administración de Barack Obama, John King.
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/student-loan-debt-forgiveness-john-king-college/. Actualizado 25 de abril
de 2022.
2
Mark, Colin, May the Executive Branch Forgive Student Loan Debt Without Further Congressional Action? (April
5, 2021). Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary, Spring 2022 (Forthcoming),
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3819989 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3819989.
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characteristics and loan terms. Over the years, Education Secretaries have
occasionally pushed the boundaries of these limits, but they have always under the
assumption that statutory limits are binding. Yet, under the plenary compromise
view, the explicit restrictions in these statutory programs would be treated as
optional because the Secretary of Education purportedly has complete discretion to
ignore any statutory restrictions on loan forgiveness.
Second, there is no direct historical support for the proposition that Congress
intended to grant the Secretary of Education plenary compromise authority when it
initially enacted the statutory language authorizing the Secretary to modify and
release loans. These compromise provisions were adopted back in 1965 when
Congress imported language that it had adopted shortly after World War II to
govern Veteran Administration (VA) loan guaranty programs. In response to quite
reasonable requests for statutory authority to resolve claims administratively rather
than through cooperation with the U.S. Department of Justice, Congress granted
loan compromise authority first to the VA and later to the U.S. Department of
Education.
…
A third challenge to the argument for plenary compromise authority rests with the
U.S. Constitution, which grants Congress both the exclusive power of the purse
under the Appropriations Clause and the exclusive authority to dispose of
government property under the Property Clause. In recognition of Congress’s
prerogatives with respect to federal resources, the courts have demanded that
executive authority to spend federal dollars be explicitly granted to agencies and
not inferred from ambiguous statutes or by implication. In recent years, this
principle has been reaffirmed as being of particular importance in the area of
entitlements, which includes the vast majority of student loans, where Congress
does not regularly revisit spending decisions through annual appropriations.
…

…
The fourth challenge confronting the proponents of plenary compromise authority
stems from the Education Department’s own regulations, which the
agency amended in 2016 to incorporate the FCCA’s standards for loan forgiveness
into the Department’s lending programs. So even if the Secretary were free under
the statute to take a different approach to student loan forgiveness, the Department
would appear to be bound at present by its own regulations imposing limitations
that are inconsistent with plenary compromise authority. Proponents of broad-
based loan forgiveness have assembled arguments as to why these regulations
should not be read to mean what they seem to say. But the presence of these
regulations could complicate the Department’s ability to defend broad-based
forgiveness in court.ii

Por tanto, estos juristas recomiendan al Secretario de Educación no ejercer la iniciativa de una
condonación general de las deudas estudiantiles. Esto resultaría en una impugnación judicial que
conllevaría años de litigio. Ellos recomiendan la aprobación de una reglamentación para que se
atienda este asunto.
i

ii
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No empecé a los planteamientos esbozados por estos juristas, y las preocupación sobre el
impacto fiscal de la cancelación general de la deuda de estos préstamos estudiantiles,
entendemos por tratarse de un asunto que beneficiaría a nuestra comunidad profesional, que han
advenido en dichos compromisos onerosos, recomendamos al Departamento de Justicia que se
una a la petición propuesta por la Secretaria de Justicia los estados de Nueva York, Hawái y
Michigan.

Es menester enfatizar que no se trata de unirse a un litigio, sino a una mera petición para

reparación (right of petition) por parte de los estados mencionados, incluyendo a Puerto Rico.
Queda a discreción del señor Secretario atender nuestra recomendación.