Documentos de Académico
Documentos de Profesional
Documentos de Cultura
18 - Normas Subjetivas y Objetivas
18 - Normas Subjetivas y Objetivas
18.
STEPHEN T. REHRAUER*
101
STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
102
Norma subjetiva y objetiva: la fuerza de la experiencia personal
4 William James, haciéndose eco de la carta de Santiago, propuso estos criterios para
distinguir la verdad de la gracia religiosa: “The roots of a man’s virtue are inaccessible to
us. No appearances whatever are infallible proofs of grace. Our practice is the only sure
evidence, even to ourselves, that we are genuinely Christians”. W. JAMES, Varieties of
Religious Experience, Penguin, New York 1902, 20.
103
STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
5 Cf. J. MARCH, A primer on decision making: How decisions happen, The Free Press,
New York 1994, 100-102.
6 Cada una de estas perspectivas es válida, pero su alcance queda limitado por los límites
del paradigma subyacente. “The formal, value-based models have the advantage of rigor,
which facilitates the derivation of testable implications. However, value-based models are
difficult to apply to complex, real world decisions, and they often fail to capture significant
aspects of people’s deliberations. An explanation of choice based on reasons, on the other
hand, is essentially qualitative in nature and typically vague. Furthermore, almost anything
can be counted as a ‘reason,’ so that every decision may be rationalized after the fact”. E.
SHAFIR - I. SIMONSON - A. TVERSKY, Reason-based choice, en: D. KAHNEMAN - A. TVERSKY
(eds.), Choices, values and frameworks, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2000, 599.
7 J. MARCH, o. c., 102.
8 Este extremo aparece con bastante claridad en J. REST - D. NARVAEZ - M. BEBEAU - S.
THOMA, Postconventional moral thinking: A neo-Kohlbergian approach. Lawrence
Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ 1999, 177-180. Estos autores proceden a una revisión del modelo
de desarrollo moral de Kohlberg y reconocen que tanto la heteronomía como la
autonomía, tanto el proceso de construcción cognitiva de significados del juicio individual
como el poder formativo de la ideología cultural, ambos simultáneamente concurren en la
producción del pensamiento moral.
104
Norma subjetiva y objetiva: la fuerza de la experiencia personal
9 La forma primigenia de esta teoría fue presentada en: L. AJZEN - M. FISHBEIN, Attitudinal
and normative variables as predictors of specific behavior: The Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology 27 (1973) 41-57. Su formulación madura apareció en: L. AJZEN - M.
FISHBEIN, Understanding attitudes and predicting social behavior, Prentice-Hall, Englewood
Cliffs 1980. De ese mismo año data también la publicación de M. FISHBEIN, A theory of
reasoned action: Some applications and implications en: E. HOWE - M. PAGE (eds.),
Nebraska symposium on motivation 27, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln 1980, 65-116.
10 Cf. A. EAGLY - S. CHAIKEN, The psychology of attitudes, Harcourt, New York, 173.
105
STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
11 Ver L. AJZEN - M. FISHBEIN, Understanding attitudes and predicting social behavior, 82-
86.
106
Norma subjetiva y objetiva: la fuerza de la experiencia personal
107
STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
15 J. MARCH, o. c., 9.
16 Cf. P. ZIMBARDO - M. LIEPPE, o. c., 54.
17 Ver B. LONERGAN, Insight, Harper and Row, New York 1978, 191-192, para una
descripción filosófica de los orígenes de esta característica de la conciencia respecto al
razonamiento práctico, característica que él denomina Scotosis.
18 Cf. P. ZIMBARDO - M. LIEPPE, o. c., 201-206.
19 La literatura psicológica se refiere a este vigoroso vínculo entre actitudes y valores
como “compromiso del yo” (ego Involvement). Ver: M. SHERIF - C. HOVLAND, Social
judgment: Assimilation and contrast effects in communication and attitude change, Yale
University Press, New Haven 1961.
108
Norma subjetiva y objetiva: la fuerza de la experiencia personal
109
STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
23 Ver J. RATEY, A user’s guide to the brain, Vintage, New York 2002, 296-305.
24 F. DE WAAL, Good natured: The origins of right and wrong in humans and other animals,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1996, 88.
25 Para una breve, pero excelente descripción de las dinámicas sociales y psicológicas
implicadas en la interiorización de las normas morales durante la primera socialización,
ver: P. BERGER - T. LUCKMANN, The social construction of reality, Anchor, New York 1966,
142-143.
26 A. EAGLY - S. CHAIKEN, o. c., 171.
110
Norma subjetiva y objetiva: la fuerza de la experiencia personal
Por esta razón, las normas objetivas relativas a acciones específicas, en las
que está de acuerdo un pequeño número de personas significativas, tendrán
mayor impacto sobre la formación de la norma subjetiva que aquellas otras, en
las que están muy en desacuerdo un gran número de personas desconocidas.
Aunque, normalmente, la mayoría es percibida como poseedora de una
competencia de la que carece el individuo o el pequeño grupo, esta tendencia
se invierte cuando la mayoría es anónima y el pequeño grupo tiene una
relevancia relacional significativa27. La competencia asignada al grupo que
apoya una norma moral objetiva es insuficiente por sí misma para llevar a
efecto la formulación de la norma subjetiva. Quien toma una decisión tiene que
percibir a los otros no sólo como moralmente competentes, sino también como
interesados por su bienestar y relacionados personalmente con él; quien toma
una decisión debe hacer una apuesta personal al aceptar o rechazar la opinión
de los otros. De ahí que una única persona muy próxima a quien toma la
decisión, que ofrece una visión alternativa a la de la norma moral objetiva,
puede ejercer un impacto más duradero y fuerte sobre la formulación de la
norma subjetiva que un grupo institucional, por muy objetiva y racional que sea
su propuesta.
Las normas morales objetivas influyen en la formación de la norma
subjetiva, precisamente porque tienen influjo social normativo. No sólo
proporcionan información clara sobre lo que siente el grupo del que se forma
parte y con el que se tienen lazos de auto-identificación respecto una acción
particular; también motivan al individuo a adoptar abiertamente el estándar
dominante, o la norma del grupo en orden a ganar o evitar la pérdida de la
afinidad, el respeto, la aceptación del grupo normativo, o de las personas
significativas que mantienen estas normas como expresiones válidas de
valores subyacentes28. Así, no es que la norma subjetiva sustituya las normas
objetivas, sino que la norma moral objetiva se convierte en una fuente esencial
de información y formación de la norma subjetiva; pero sólo en la medida en
que se ve asociada con una persona o un grupo importante para nosotros –
aquellos que nos importan–. De cualquier modo, en este último caso la norma
objetiva posibilita la formación de una norma subjetiva, que es percibida como
111
STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
29 Como apunta J. MARCH, o. c., 68: “To make decisions within a logic of appropriateness,
decision makers need to be able to determine what their identities are, what the situation
is, and what action is appropriate for persons such as they in the situation in which they
find themselves. […]. Motivational, cognitive, and organizational factors all play a role in
evoking one identity or rule rather than another. Likewise, since identities and rules rarely
specify everything unambiguously, motivational, cognitive, and organizational. factors play
a role in determining behavior within the identities and rules evoked”.
30 P. ZIMBARDO - M. LIEPPE, o. c., 64.
31 Cf. J. RATEY, o. c., 250-251.
32 J. REST - D. NARVAEZ - M. BEBEAU - S. THOMA, o. c., 156.
112
importan las opiniones y las reacciones de los demás” 33. La realidad es que,
antes de actuar, la gente considera más frecuentemente las normas objetivas y
las reglas, no como expresiones abstractas de verdades morales universales,
sino como un modo de pensar práctico: cómo le van a “ver” los demás, si actúa
o deja de actuar de esa manera. Predicar y enseñar sólo normas morales
objetivas puede ser una manera útil de conformar las actitudes y normas
subjetivas; pero ello nunca podrá suplir una formación cristiana más completa.
114
Norma subjetiva y objetiva: la fuerza de la experiencia personal
36 Cf. R. EISER, Social psychology: Attitudes, cognition and social behaviour, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge 1986, 46-47.
37 Cf. P. ZIMBARDO - M. LIEPPE, o. c., 178.
38 Cf. Ibídem, 197-198.
115
STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
una relación personal, que pueda convertirse en modelo y guía del valor
contenido por la norma objetiva; como una forma de prototipo de
comportamiento39.
116
Norma subjetiva y objetiva: la fuerza de la experiencia personal
normas41. Por ello, tenemos también una responsabilidad moral para ayudar en
su interpretación y aplicación.
2. La habilidad del sujeto para ver normas morales objetivas como
normativas y aplicarlas a situaciones dadas está fuertemente influida tanto por
su experiencia personal como por la interpersonal; también va muy ligada al
tipo de relaciones con personas significativas en su vida. Ello indica que es en
sí insuficiente concentrarse fuertemente en la enseñanza oficial de normas
objetivas, claras y correctas. Eso sólo toca una mínima parte de la ecuación de
la intencionalidad: la de la creencia cognitiva. El sujeto personal ha de sentirse
también vinculado a la comunidad significativa de fe, a cuya expresión
compartida pertenecen estas normas, y percatarse de que la norma tiene algo
que ver con su vinculación relacional a esas personas, con las que comparte
valores. La actividad pastoral,pues, no puede ni debe separarse de la enseñanza
moral, como tampoco la enseñanza moral debería ignorar nunca su vinculación
esencial a la actividad pastoral. Si nosotros, como Iglesia o como sus ministros,
fallamos al establecer una relación interpersonal real como comunidad religiosa
con el creyente medio, no deberíamos sorprendernos de tener poca influencia en
la formación de sus actitudes morales y, por ende, en su toma de decisiones y su
comportamiento. Su fracaso moral va unido en parte al fracaso de nuestro
ministerio.
3. Una Teología moral fundamentada en el aprecio de la importancia de las
actitudes y de la normatividad subjetiva, más que minimizar la importancia de
las normas objetivas en favor de una subjetividad exagerada, acentúa ambas
cosas: la necesidad de normas morales objetivas claramente expresadas y la
de su comunicación. Al mismo tiempo, nos recuerda que las personas humanas
son, ante todo, sujetos interpersonales, que como tales interpretan y actúan en
base a normas objetivas recibidas de su entorno social, reforzando así sus
relaciones importantes ya existentes. La norma objetiva percibida como no-
aplicable podría revelar, no tanto una actitud moral desdeñosa o un caso de
disenso, cuanto la carencia para el individuo de relevancia en su relación con la
Iglesia. La trasgresión moral de la norma podría deberse a alguno de los
siguientes motivos: en un momento dado, la pertenencia a la Iglesia no es para
el individuo tan importante como otro factor; uno cree que, si infringe esta
41 Cf. P. ZIMBARDO - M. LIEPPE, o. c., 37.
117
STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
118
Norma subjetiva y objetiva: la fuerza de la experiencia personal
119
STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
120
SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE NORMS:
ATTITUDE THEORY AND THE
NORMATIVE FORCE OF PERSONAL
EXPERIENCE
1 R. GULA, The meaning and limits of moral norms, en: R. HAMEL - K. HIMES (ed.),
Introduction to Christian ethics, Paulist, New York 1989, 470.
STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
2
Subjective and objective norms
conditions under which norms are or are not translated into intentions and the
actions which flow from them. Attention to these more practical questions is not
only valuable for a theologian because they give us a better understanding of
where we are as human beings. We make the claim theologically that grace can
and does transform or “build upon” nature, particularly in the moral arena. One
cannot chart progress or begin to produce any empirical evidence concerning
the objective truth of such a claim without having a base rate from which to
measure such a transformation. Moral psychology’s practical approach not only
reminds us of the importance of demonstrating the practical truth of such a
claim about the transforming effects of grace, 4 but also provides us with a
theoretical measuring rod with which to do so.
The study of the place of values, beliefs and norms in the formulation of
intentions and in the processes of moral decision making continues to be a
favorite area of study in moral psychology. Human decision making is normally
studied from the perspective of one of two paradigms. The first defines decision
making as a process of rationality and intelligence and focuses upon the
potential actor’s deliberation and choice from among alternatives and their
projected consequences. It is highly attuned to the volitional definition of human
action so deeply resonant with our Catholic moral tradition. The second defines
decision making as a value-based process of rule following and tends to
emphasize the coordination of the rules appropriate to action situations in light
of social expectations, roles, and the self-concepts of individual decision
makers.5
4 William James, echoing the letter of St. James, offered this criteria for distinguishing the
truth of religious grace claims: “The roots of a man’s virtue are inaccessible to us. No
appearances whatever are infallible proofs of grace. Our practice is the only sure
evidence, even to ourselves, that we are genuinely Christians.” W. JAMES, Varieties of
Religious Experience, Penguin, New York 1902, 20.
5 J. MARCH, A primer on decision making: How decisions happen, The Free Press, New
York 1994, 100-102.
3
STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
The theory which most clearly attempts to bring together these two
6 Each of these two approaches has value, but is limited in its scope due to the limits of its
underlying paradigm. “The formal, value-based models have the advantage of rigor, which
facilitates the derivation of testable implications. However, value-based models are
difficult to apply to complex, real world decisions, and they often fail to capture significant
aspects of people’s deliberations. An explanation of choice based on reasons, on the
other hand, is essentially qualitative in nature and typically vague. Furthermore, almost
anything can be counted as a ‘reason,’ so that every decision may be rationalized after the
fact.” E. SHAFIR - I. SIMONSON - A. TVERSKY, Reason-based choice, en: D.
KAHNEMAN - A. TVERSKY (ed.), Choices, values and frameworks, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge 2000, 599.
7 J. MARCH, o. c., 102.
8 This point is brought home quite clearly by James Rest and his associates who in their
revision of the Kohlbergian model of moral development recognize that both heteronomy
and autonomy, both the creative cognitive meaning-making process of individual judgment
and the formative power of cultural ideology both simultaneously co-occur to produce
moral thinking. See J. REST - D. NARVAEZ - M. BEBEAU - S. THOMA,
Postconventional moral thinking: A neo-Kohlbergian approach. Lawrence Erlbaum,
Mahwah, NJ 1999, 177-180.
4
Subjective and objective norms
theoretical directions, and which also parallels the twofold moral theological
interest in character and action, is the Theory of Reasoned Action, developed
by Ajzen and Fishbein in the early 1980's and tested extensively over the
course of the following 15 years with quite positive results. 9 This theory should
be of particular interest to moral theology because it limits its scope specifically
to those types of human behavior which moral theology would define as “human
acts.” Rather than being a general theory of human behavior, it is quite
specifically limited to and directed to the understanding of the immediately
proximal sources of volitional agency. 10 According to this theory, intentional
actions are the result of a process of weighting between each the following
concerns:
9 The seminal form of this theory was presented in L. AJZEN - M. FISHBEIN, Attitudinal
and normative variables as predictors of specific behavior: The Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology 27 (1973) 41-57. It’s mature formulation appeared in L. AJZEN AND M.
FISHBEIN, Understanding attitudes and predicting social behavior, Prentice-Hall,
Englewood Cliffs 1980. That same year, M. Fishbein also published A theory of reasoned
action: Some applications and implications en: E. HOWE - M. PAGE (ed.), Nebraska
symposium on motivation 27, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln 1980, 65-116.
10 A. EAGLY - S. CHAIKEN, The psychology of attitudes, Harcourt, New York, 173.
11 See L. AJZEN - M. FISHBEIN, Understanding attitudes and predicting social behavior,
Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs 1980, 82-86.
5
STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
6
Subjective and objective norms
represent the perceived consequences of the act. But a behavioral belief is not
merely the subjective perception that an act might effectively arrive at desired
consequences. It is also an evaluative judgment that these consequences are
worthy or unworthy of pursuit, and that the act contemplated is a desirable
(value consistent) means of attaining these. “The core of an attitude is a
valuation, which assigns to the entity an affective value that can range from
extremely positive to extremely negative.” 13 Thus, attitude is the end result of a
judgment process combining value choice and consequential practicality, quite
similar in its character to the product of Thomistic practical reasoning. It is an
overall summary evaluation which combines and includes judgments and
feelings concerning the act itself, the values at stake, the behavioral intentions,
and our personal affective responses toward each of these. 14
The objective moral norms present in the shared social world of experience
play an essential role in the formation of moral attitudes. They provide
information to the individual about those consequences that worthy of pursuit,
and those acts which are appropriate means for pursuing these valued
consequences. They inform behavioral belief. Objective norms have an
informational social influence over attitudes and their formation. No individual
possesses complete information about how to act in all situations, or about all
the values at play in a decision setting: “Although decision makers try to be
rational, they are constrained by limited cognitive capabilities and incomplete
information, and thus their actions may be less than completely rational in spite
of their best intentions and efforts.” 15 We all need to look outside of ourselves for
the information we lack. Objective norms of morality, communicated through the
moral systems provided us either by culture or religion offer us a secure source
of information. They enable us not only to approximate our attitudes to those of
others, but they afford us a relative (moral) certitude that our attitudes reflect the
“real” state of affairs, providing us with a sense of moral confidence and
7
STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
competence.16
But objective norms can also provoke growth and change in attitudes. It is
the nature of human minds, that they select and interpret information to make it
fit with established beliefs and attitudes.17 In spite of the best intentions to
remain objective, we selectively gather information in such a way as to support
our already existing attitudes and confirm our beliefs about right and wrong,
about what works or doesn’t work, and about what is worthy as a value and
what is not.18 Our attitudes and our values are tightly linked to our sense of self-
definition.19 Because objective norms not only guide behavior, but also have
accountability as one of their functions, exposure to an objective norm which
challenges the attitude of a person can actually serve to liberate him from this
selective perception tendency, improving his open-mindedness and motivating
the person to see other alternatives. Thus, exposure to objective moral norms
might even be considered an essential aspect of solid attitude formation: “The
trick is to get people to believe that agreement with others is less important than
the goodness or appropriateness of their attitudes or beliefs – qualities that can
and will be evaluated against some objective criterion.” 20 The objective
normativity of a moral system, in both its proactive and inhibitive functionality,
along with the reasonable arguments supporting it, provides such an objective
criterion for self-evaluation.21
8
Subjective and objective norms
Few people would deny that subjective norms of morality exist and guide
human behavior. However, the relationship between subjective and objective
moral norms, and the question about how much force should be given to one
with respect to the other in making decisions about moral matters remains
problematic. On the one hand, overemphasis upon subjective normativity is at
the root of many of the problems we face in dealing with postmodern moral
reasoning. On the other hand, under-emphasis upon subjective normativity
leaves us with the difficult problem of finding a place for moral supererogation.
Even more common and more difficult is that gray realm where subjective and
objective norms are experienced as conflicted. As William James long ago
reminded us, “The practically real world for each one of us, the effective world
of the individual, is the compound world, the physical facts and emotional
values in indistinguishable combination.”22
9
STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
For this reason, objective norms concerning specific actions agreed upon by
a small number of significant others will have a greater impact upon formation of
the subjective norm than will those upon which there is wide disagreement
among larger numbers of unknown persons. While normally the majority has a
perceived competence that an individual or a small group of individuals does
not, this tendency is reversed when the majority is an anonymous one and the
small group is of significant relational relevance. 27 The perceived competence of
the group supporting an objective moral norm is insufficient in and of itself in
effecting formulation of the subjective norm. The decision maker must perceive
these others as not only morally competent, but also as concerned for his well-
being, related to him/her personally, and the decision maker must have a
personal stake in accepting or rejecting their opinion. Conceivably, one lone
individual very close to the decision maker, who provides an alternative view to
that of the objective moral norm, can have a more lasting and powerful impact
25 For a brief but excellent description of the social and psychological dynamics involved in
the internalization of moral norms during first socialization, see P. BERGER - T.
LUCKMANN, The social construction of reality, Anchor, New York 1966, 142-143.
26 A. EAGLY - S. CHAIKEN, o. c., 171.
27 P. ZIMBARDO - M. LIEPPE, o. c., 57-59.
10
Subjective and objective norms
28 Ibidem, 54.
29 As March points out: “To make decisions within a logic of appropriateness, decision
makers need to be able to determine what their identities are, what the situation is, and
what action is appropriate for persons such as they in the situation in which they find
themselves. . . . Motivational, cognitive, and organizational factors all play a role in
evoking one identity or rule rather than another. Likewise, since identities and rules rarely
specify everything unambiguously, motivational, cognitive, and organizational. factors play
a role in determining behavior within the identities and rules evoked. J. MARCH, o. c., 68.
11
11
STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
structure our social behavior and predict the reactions to others. Individuals
avoid major personal disasters by looking to others for guidance.” 30 To suggest
that one completely ignore objective moral norms in favor of subjective opinion
would be to fail to understand the true nature of the relationship between
subjectivity and objectivity. The same can be true of the type of disinterested
neo-Kantian deontological focus on purely objective rule-based morality
sometimes offered as a response to the problems of postmodern confusion.
Such a disinterested, purely rational approach to objectivity is inconsistent with
the very nature of the human reasoning process in persons, 31 who are always
subjects in relationship to a socially shared and interpreted objective real world.
“The concept of natural duties covers only part of morality, in contrast to
obligations that are taken on by assuming roles, by contracts, or by promises.” 32
After all, as Frans De Waal cogently reminds us: “Respect for rules and norms
can develop only when the opinions and reactions of others matter.” 33 The point
is that before acting, people more often consider objective norms and rules not
as abstract expressions of universal moral truths, but as a way of practically
thinking about how others will “see” them if they act in this manner or fail to do
so. The preaching and teaching of objective moral norms alone may be a useful
way to inform the development of both attitude and subjective norms, but it can
never become a substitute for their broader Christian formation.
12
Subjective and objective norms
think I should or should not perform this act combined with the strength of my
motivation to comply with their opinion. In the case of attitudes, objective norms
are statements of value which provide reliable and realistic information
concerning both consequences and means to their attainment. In the case of
subjective norms, objective norms convey information about what type of
behavior is appropriate and expected by us of others with whom we share
relationship.
The theory of reasoned action does not suggest that individuals follow this
elaborate fourfold judgment process when deliberating every single decision in
life. It attempts to describe the influences involved in the formation of attitudes
and subjective norms, which once formed tend to have a more or less automatic
influence upon future decisions. In times of serious moral dilemma however, the
lack of information or conflict of values and norms may require of them a
reflection upon and/or revision of attitudes or subjective norms. 34
Due to of their dispositional quality, attitudes once formed are very difficult to
alter. Due to their strong relational grounding, subjective norms are equally
difficult to change. To change one’s attitude requires the admission that her
beliefs have been incorrect, or that his behavior has not been consistent with
authentic values. To alter a subjective norm actually requires displacing the
opinion of a person who is close to him, or substituting one person for another
in the hierarchy of personal friendship and love. Neither of these activities are
easy for human persons. If we add to this the fact that both of these
considerations are grounded firmly in direct personal experience, it is fairly easy
to see how an objective norm which conflicts with any or all of these forces
more often than not will lose out. It is easier to except oneself from the demands
of an objective norm than it is to change what one believes about right and
wrong and the entire sense of self constructed upon a history of acting on these
beliefs. It is easier to trust one’s own direct personal experience about what is
right than it is to trust in an abstract statement formulated and taught by people
one may never have met. It is even more difficult to obey an objective moral
13
13
STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
norm when doing so might mean the alienation or complete loss of a close
friend. Fortunately, the research has demonstrated specific ways in which the
formation of both attitudes and subjective norms can be effectively influenced.
There are specific strategies that work and that do not work.
Studies have shown that when persons with clear and strong attitudes on
topics and behaviors are directly confronted with arguments that contradict their
attitude, they actively discount these arguments and this actually solidifies their
attitude. This is particularly true if the arguments presented in favor of the
alternative position are weak.35 Such an approach prompts them to actively
reflect upon arguments in favor of their own position which refute the weaker
arguments favoring the presented norm, thereby strengthening their conviction
that their position is rationally superior. If we wish to be completely ineffective in
influencing people’s intentionality, the best way to accomplish this is to
denigrate their moral beliefs directly, while at the same time defending our own
normative position on the basis of spurious or weak arguments. 36 Even when
our arguments are cogent and convincing, presentation of the Church’s position
on a topic without affording the opportunity to process our argument, or too
much repetition of complex argumentation can produce thought satiation, or
tedium, prompting the individual to close his mind to what we are saying. 37
14
Subjective and objective norms
A persuasive message (and that is exactly what an objective moral norm is),
is most likely to cause attitude and behavior change if it can shape both beliefs
about its topic and beliefs about what important individuals and social groups
think about the topic and how they behave toward it. This requires of us as
moral educators an awareness of the individual’s level of perceived relationship
to the group which offers the norm--in this case, the Christian community--as
well as the strength of his/her underlying belief system. An effective strategy
might entail presenting the objective norm we wish to persuade them to accept
without presenting specific arguments in its favor, and asking the person to
creatively self-generate possible reasons why someone might conceivably
agree with it, in particular someone that they know and respect. It is also helpful
if the one presenting the position has a relationship of trust and is perceived as
competent with respect to the issues under discussion. More effective still,
almost indispensable, is the provision of a respected person with whom he has
a personal relationship who can model and mentor the desired value expressed
by the objective norm as a form of prototype for behavior. 39
For many today, the primary influence the Church has in moral teaching is
that of moral persuasion. She speaks as an authority offering information. That
is what the objective moral norm is. It is a statement of information with two
possible meanings for one who receives it. It can either be taken as a source of
information about the real state of the moral world. It can also be a
communication of information about what is appropriate behavior for a person
with the Christian identity in a variety of differing situations. In either case,
unless the objective moral norm is appropriated and internalized by the person
facing a decision to act, it lacks any “effective” authority and will have little to no
influence upon the formulation of his intentionality or her moral behavior. Having
38 Ibidem, 197-198.
39 J. MARCH, o. c., 72.
15
15
STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
said this, I would offer by way of summary and conclusion the following
reflections:
2. The subject’s ability to see objective moral norms as normative, and apply
them in given situations, is heavily influenced by both his personal and
interpersonal experience, and is linked to the nature of his relationships to the
significant others in his life. This would suggest that a strong concentration upon
getting the official teaching of objective norms clear and correct is in itself
insufficient. It only touches one small part of the intentionality equation, that of
cognitive belief. The personal subject must also feel connected to the significant
community of faith whose shared expression these norms are, and see that the
norm has something to do with linking him in relationship to these people by a
sharing of values. Hence, pastoral activity cannot and should not be separated
from moral teaching, nor should moral teaching ever ignore its essential link to
pastoral activity. If we as a Church or as ministers fail in establishing a real
interpersonal relationship as a religious community with the average believer,
we should not be surprised if we have little influence upon the formation of his
16
Subjective and objective norms
moral attitudes, and hence over his moral decision making and behavior. His
moral failure is in part linked to our failure of ministry.
17
17
STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
norms toward those of the shared objective norm it can help him to effectively
approximate his own beliefs and attitudes to the reality of the world. On the
other hand, if social control within the religious community becomes the
overriding factor, or if moral norms are presented from the context of power
without room for cognitive processing, this can harden prior beliefs and attitudes
against that of the objective norm, or worse, can lead to an atrophy of the
person’s ability to make good, deliberate moral decisions, leaving him
vulnerable to contrary forces when the authority of the norm-proclaimer wanes
or passes to another. It is therefore important in dealing with moral education
that we clarify first and foremost what it is that we wish to accomplish for our
people. If we are primarily concerned with moral compliance, in getting people
to do what the objective norm demands, then coercion can be an effective
method for presentation of the Church’s moral teaching, provided that we make
effective use of both punishment and reward argumentation and implement
these for those who violate or obey the objective norms. On the other hand, if
we wish to actually affect people’s moral reasoning processes in such a way
that they actually learn how to arrive at proper moral decisions based upon the
values communicated by moral norms, so that they want to and like doing what
the moral norm specifies and experience a self-realization as followers of Christ
in doing so, then this requires of us that we actually enter into a relationship of
friendship and care with them, with all that this entails. It also requires that we
live what we teach and that we ourselves in presenting the Church’s moral
teaching really do care about them as persons. In other words, requires of us
that our attitude toward morality is that of Christ.
In the best of all possible Christian moral worlds, a perfect harmony between
the subjective norm, personal attitudes and the objectivity of a universalized
morality grounded in the Gospel of Jesus would be the norm. All followers of
Christ would not only hold the proper moral values, believe in the principles and
norms which give expression and validation to them, but would also by holding
and living these, find membership in a community of fellow believers who are of
one heart and mind on these same values. Thus this perfect solidarity of
morality would ground the subjective norm in such a way that the approval or
disapproval of these most important people in our lives would also motivate us
18
Subjective and objective norms
to realize these values more fully in every intentional act, and dread their loss in
the face of any temptation to act not in harmony with them. This is where we are
called–the Kingdom of God.
Stephen T. Rehrauer
19
19