Carl A.

Brasseaux
Michael J. Leblanc

Franco-indian diplomacy in the Mississippi Valley, 1754-1763 :

prelude to Pontiac's uprising ?
In: Journal de la Société des Américanistes. Tome 68, 1982. pp. 59-70.

Citer ce document / Cite this document :

Brasseaux Carl A., Leblanc Michael J. Franco-indian diplomacy in the Mississippi Valley, 1754-1763 : prelude to Pontiac's
uprising ?. In: Journal de la Société des Américanistes. Tome 68, 1982. pp. 59-70.

doi : 10.3406/jsa.1982.2209

http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/jsa_0037-9174_1982_num_68_1_2209
Resumen
Diplomacia franco-india en el valle del Mississippi, 1 754-1 763 : ¿ preludio al subleva- miento de
Pontiac ? Como la guarnición colonial generalmente se componía de desertores de otras unidades
francesas, el mantenimiento de las alianzas franco-indias era de una importancia capital para la
seguridad militar de la Louisiana en el siglo XVIII. Louis Billouart de Kerlérec, gobernador de la
Louisiana de 1752 a 1763, estaba muy consciente de la importancia militar de los indígenas aliados de
Francia y, por consiguiente, al comienzo de la Guerra de Siete Años, proponia la mobilización de tribus
en una guerrilla contra los Ingleses. Pero el Maréchal Montcalm se opusó con buen éxito a su plan y el
proyecto se quedó durmiendo hasta la capitulación del Canada, en 1760. Inquieto рог esa derrota, el
gobierno francés cambió su decisión dando órdenes para una gran ofensiva frente a las incursiones
inglesas en el área de los Appalaches y el Mississippi. Atrasada por falta de provisiones y de armas,
así como por la ineficacia de ia burocracía y las dificultades de las comunicaciones fronterizas franco-
americanas, la ofensiva se inició poco antes del « Traité de Paris » — 1763. No obstante ésto, la acción
fue un éxito al principio ; estimulados por la victoria, los indígenas, bajo la dirección de Pontiac,
siguieron la ofensiva a pesar de la oposición de los ofîciales franceses, después del fin de las
hostilidades.

Abstract
Franco-Indian diplomacy in the Mississippi Valley, 1754-1763 : prelude to Pontiac's uprising ? As the
colonial garrison was usually staffed by deserters from other French units, maintenance of Franco-
Indian alliances was of vital importance to Louisiana's security during the eighteenth century. Louis
Billouart de Kerlérec, who governed Louisiana from 1752 to 1763, was acutely aware of the military
significance of France's Indian allies and thus, with the outset of the Seven Years' War in 1756, he
proposed the mobilization of the tribes in a guerilla war against the British. Because of Field Marshall
Montcalm's opposition, however, Kerlérec's plan lay dormant until the fall of Canada in 1760. Shaken by
the loss of Canada, the French government reversed its position and ordered a large-scale Indian
offensive against English encroachments in the trans-Mississippi area. Plagued by French bureaucratic
inefficiency, supply shortages, and primitive means of communication in Franco-American frontier,
however, the campaign began only weeks before the Treaty of Paris. The offensive, nevertheless,
enjoyed remarkable initial success, and spurred by their victories, the Indians resolved to continue the
campaign, despite the opposition of French colonial officials, after the cessation of hostilities.

Résumé
Carl A. BRASSEAUX et Michael J. LEBLANC. Diplomatie franco-indienne dans la vallée du Mississippi,
1 754-1 763 : prélude au soulèvement de Pontiac ? Comme la garnison coloniale était généralement
composée de déserteurs d'autres unités françaises, le maintien des alliances franco-indiennes était
d'une importance capitale pour la sécurité militaire de la Louisiane pendant le XVIIIe siècle. Louis
Billouart de Kerlérec, gouverneur de la Louisiane de 1752 à 1763, était conscient de l'importance
militaire des indiens alliés à la France et, en conséquence, il proposa au début de la Guerre de Sept
Ans la mobilisation des tribus en vue d'une guérilla contre les Anglais. Mais le Maréchal Montcalm
s'opposa avec succès à ce plan et le projet de Kerlérec resta en sommeil jusqu'à la capitulation du
Canada en 1760. Inquiet de cette défaite, le gouvernement français revint sur sa décision, donnant des
ordres pour une grande offensive contre les incursions anglaises dans la région entre les Appalaches et
le Mississippi. Retardée par un manque de provisions et d'armes, comme par l'inefficacité de la
bureaucratie et les difficultés de communication frontalière, l'offensive commença peu avant le Traité de
Paris — 1763. Néanmoins la campagne fut un succès dès le début : encouragés par la victoire, les
indiens dirigés par Pontiac ont maintenu l'offensive face à l'opposition des officiels français, après
même la fin des hostilités.
 FRANCO-INDIAN DIPLOMACY

IN THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY

1754-1763 : PRELUDE TO PONTIAC'S UPRISING?

*
by Carl A. BRASSEAUX and Michael J. LEBLANC

For over a century, the historiography of Pontiac's rebellion has borne a markedly
pro-British stamp, a manifestation of Anglo-American historians' excessive reliance upon
British archival resources. This pro-British bias has influenced scholars' treatment of the
factors contributing to the Indian uprising, prompting them to attribute the insurrection
to only the most immediate causes particularized in numerous reports by British soldiers
and sympathisers 1 . Francis Parkman, for example, ascribed the uprising in the territory
ceded to the termination of French economic aid to Indians residing in the territory
ceded to Britain in the Treaty of Paris (1763), the English trader's disdain for the pro-
French redmen, and the Indians' fear of British encroachment upon their lands 2 .
Thus influenced, American historians have long mistakenly supposed that the trans-
Appalachian Indians spontaneously formed an intertribal alliance only after the Treaty
of Paris (1763) and the ensuing British attempt to occupy Illinois. French sources, howe
ver, reveal that in the waning moments of the Seven Years' War, Louisiana's governor,
Louis Billouart de Kerlérec, revitalized France's extensive, but crumbling Indian alliances
and subsequently mobilized the redmen in a massive campaign against English encroach
ments into French territory. Though the offensive was crippled by supply shortages and
suddenly terminated by the cessation of Franco-Indian hostilities, the intertribal ties
forged by Kerlérec persisted, thus laying the foundation for Pontiac's «uprising».
The abortive French offensive of 1762-1763 represented a dramatic shift in French
military strategy. During the first four years of the Seven Years' War (1756-1763), the
French Court viewed Louisiana as a latent element in its North American military strategy.
As a consequence, the colony was ill-equipped and undermanned, forcing the provincial
administration, under the command of Governor Louis Billouart de Kerlérec, to wage
purely defensive warfare against Louisiana's more populous British neighbors with the
assistance of France's Indian allies 3 . Kerlérec, however, viewed the colony's military
inertia as a major hindrance to the French-North American war effort. Asearly as 1756, he
requested supplies to unite the colony's crucial Indian allies into a formidable force capable
of attacking the English seaboard colonies, thus relieving the enemy's siege of Canada4.
60 SOCIÉTÉ DES AMÉRICANISTES

The Canadian governor, Pierre-François de Vaudreuil, agreed with Kerlérec's plan for
mobilizing the native Americans, but argued for a defensive posture in their use. The
commander of French-Canadian military forces, Field Marshall Louis Joseph de Montcalm,
disagreed with Vaudreuil and Kerlérec and subsequently persuaded the French govern
mentto give European troops and tactics military priority. Largely as a result of this
decision, Canada fell to the British in 1759 5.
The loss of Canada impressed the French Court with the grim realities of warfare on
the North American Continent. Moreover, England's victory in Canada gave her an upper
hand in the periodic negotiations between. European powers. In order to preserve her
meager bargaining power, France had to forestall additional territorial losses, especially
in Louisiana 6. As a consequence, French strategists belatedly adopted Kerlérec's military
scheme, which was succinctly delineated in Louis XVs instructions to the chevalier de
Jumilhac, a veteran French infantryman who was appointed commander of Louisiana's
troops and militia in mid-January 1762 7. Having thus approved a guerilla campaign
against the Anglo-Americans in early 1762, the French government shipped a sizable
contingent of troops, and a substantial shipment of trade goods to maintain and extend
the Franco-Indian alliance in Louisiana 8.
Upon arrival of these reinforcements and the badly needed supplies, Kerlérec dispatched
couriers throughout the trans-Appalachian region to notify his allies of France's determin
ation to continue the war and to encourage them «to redouble their hostilities ... against
the English» 9. Acting in compliance with Kerlérec's dispatches ordering the commence
ment of guerilla warfare against the British, the French allies, especially the Northern
Illinois tribes led by Pontiac, a staunch French ally, attacked and captured every British
outpost along Louisiana's northern defensive perimeter — except for Duquesne and
Detroit — during the spring and summer of 1763 10. In late fall, however, these Indians
were notified of the cessation of hostilities and they reluctantly sued for peace.
The overwhelming number of tribes participating in Pontiac's uprising were members
of the Franco-Indian alliance, which Kerlérec had miraculously maintained since the outset
of the Seven Years' War despite shortages of trade goods and Britain's unrelenting efforts to
undermine Franco-Indian unity 11. England's campaign to subvert French-Indian relations
began in 1755, which the British unsuccessfully attempted to bring the Choctaw tribe, a
traditional French ally 12, into their sphere of influence through economic inducements,
and attempted to establish two forts among the neighboring Abihka Indians 13. Once the
Choctaws had entered the English camp, they were to turn on the French and destroy
their southeastern flank 14.
This English campaign gained momentum in 1757 and 1758 as Governor Kerlérec
attempted to combat Anglo-American encroachment with only scant supplies and «des
bonnes paroles» 15. As a consequence, when French trade goods arrived in early 1759,
Louisiana's security was in jeopardy ; succumbing to lucrative British trade offers, the
Choctaw had agreed to attack the Poste des Alibamons, Fort Tombekbé, Mobile, and
New Orleans during the following spring in conjunction with an English amphibious
assault upon Louisiana's capital and second leading port 16. The distribution of the newly
arrived French goods among the Choctaw in 1759, which coincided with the finalization
of Anglo-Choctaw preparation for the invasion of the French Gulf Coast, temporarily
thwarted British plans 17. The pattern of English frontier diplomacy, however, was
repeated during the following year : British traders were reported among the Choctaw
 FRANCO-INDIAN DIPLOMACY IN THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY 61

in 1759. The French countered this threat to their hegemony over the disputed tribe by
the customary practice of distributing presents during the spring of 1760; but, later that
spring, the English renewed their efforts to subvert the Franco-Choctaw ties 18.
To counter British inroads among their Indian allies, the French utilized their growing
influence over the Cherokees 19, a powerful English ally, to create a disruptive diversion
and thus maintain their tenuous alliance with the Choctaw tribe 20. Despite preemptive
English gifts and rewards offered for French scalps by the governors of Carolina and
Virginia in 1755, the Cherokee offered the French an alliance in 1756 21. Subsequent
British efforts to disrupt this alliance were thwarted by several Alibamu, Kawati, and
Loup 22 chieftains who acted as French envoys among the Cherokees 23. The strength of
this alliance was bolstered in 1760, by the Cherokees' decision to declare war on the
Chickasaw 24, Britain's most powerful ally in the Lower Mississipi Valley, and the
formalization of the Franco-Cherokee union during the Grand Chef des Cherakis' visit to
New Orleans 2S.
In the Illinois district, which, after the fall of Canada, had become the keystone to
Louisiana's northern defense perimeter, Kerlérec strengthened the Franco-Indian alliance
by encouraging friendly tribes to migrate from English-occupied Canada into French-held
territory. For example, Piot de Belestre, commandant at Detroit, convened a «council»
of Huron, Pottawattomee, Sauk, and Ottawa 26 chieftains and elders on November 28,
1760, the eve of the arrival of British occupational forces 27, and urged them to avoid
«slavery» and «destruction» at the hands of the English by relocating in Illinois28.
Convinced of the expedience of Belestre's advice, these Indians in turn urged numerous
neighboring tribes to join them in their forthcoming southward migration.
Fully cognizant that the loyalty of the new Indian allies was contingent upon the
colony's ability to provide them sufficient military supplies. Kerlérec dispatched two
milliers 29 of gunpowder to Fort Chartres 30 in Illinois for distribution to the Cherokees
and the pro- French tribes in the Illinois district 31. These supplies were urgently needed
by the Cherokee, who, during the summer of 1761, destroyed Fort Loudon Place 32, an
English military installation in present-day Tennessee, killing or capturing the entire
garrison 33. The arms shipment, however, seriously depleted the colony's meager munitions
reserves, restricting Kerlérec's ability to arm his allies and thus jeopardizing Franco-Indian
unity 34.
The dearth of supplies in Louisiana was due in large measure to blockading British naval
units operating near Cabo San Antonio, Cuba, as well as to Louisiana's low position on
France's scale of colonial priorities, especially during the Canadian military campaigns 35.
In early spring 1757, Kerlérec dispatched a ship to Spanish Pensacola and St. Domingue
in an unsuccessful attempt to procure sulphur and saltpeter, essential to the production
of gunpowder 37. In addition, in early May, the St. Jean, a French merchantman, was
dispatched to Vera Cruz, Mexico, for gunpowder; although the vessel subsequently
returned with a large cargo, most of the imported gunpowder was defective 38.
Louisiana's chronic munitions shortages persisted even after the arrival of a small
French convoy in April 1758 39. The continuing dearth of supplies, however, must be
also attributed in some measure to malfeasance on the part of the newly appointed
ordonnateur 40, Vincent de Rochemore. Shortly after his arrival at New Orleans aboard
the convoy, Rochemore clashed with Governor Kerlérec over the ordonnateurs manage
ment of Louisiana's administration. For example, the unscrupulous French bureaucrat
62 SOCIÉTÉ DES AMÉRICANISTES

substituted bills of credit for French currency, which increased the colony's rate of
inflation; rescinded land grants made by previous ordonnateurs in order to award them
to his friends; had «suspicious partnerships» with awardees of public works projects;
regulated Louisiana's financial affairs by appointing his brother-in-law to the offices of
treasurer and comptroller ; and sold Indian trade goods to «diverses personnes» (members
of his growing clique) in order to repurchase the same articles, whenever the redmen
demanded supplies, at inflated prices of 500 to 600 percent 41. The growing animosity
between the governor and ordonnateur reached a climax during the spring of 1759,
when Rochemore seized the cargo of the Texel, a cartel ship owned by a Jamaican Jew,
David Dias-Arias, on the grounds that English imports were banned by royal decree as
well as several Superior Council ordinances. The Texel affair, which was initially resolved
in the governor's favor, gave rise to intensified factional animosity within Louisiana's
government 42.
Louisiana's intragovemmental feuding prevented Kerlérec from effectively using the
colony's resources, which were controlled by Rochemore and his friends, to effectively
cope with his Indian allies' logistic problems. Moreover, the French government failed to
provide Louisiana sufficient war materials and trade goods between 1759 and 1762;
therefore, Kerlérec was unable to provide adequate amounts of gunpowder and presents
to the members of the alliance43. As a consequence, by early December 1761, the
Illinois, Choctaw, and Cherokee tribes threatened to abandon the French,' prompting
Governor Kerlérec to intensify his appeals to the French war ministry for immediate
military assistance 44.
Kerlérec's requests reached the attention of Duke Etienne-François de Choiseul-
Stainville, the newly appointed minister of war and marine. Realizing the necessity for
maintaining the statu quo in Louisiana in order to preserve a viable bargaining position
at the peace negotiations, Choiseul engaged François Lavaud fils, a Bordeaux merchant,
in November 1761 to transport French troops and Swiss mercenaries, medical and military
supplies, and, most importantly, Indian trade goods to New Orleans 4S . Four merchant
men equipped by Lavaud subsequently departed Bordeaux and arrived at Louisiana's
capital on April 27, 1762, after an eventful crossing in which one of the vessels, the Due
de Fronsac, was seized by British men of war 46.
Kerlérec could scarcely contain his joy at seeing the relief expedition, whose arrival
coincided with the visitation of a large Choctaw delegation. Hoping to impress them
with France's military might and determination to continue the war Louisiana's chief
executive reviewed the reinforcements in the Indians' presence, telling them «that His
Majesty was moved by their zeal to protect them from the slavery with which they are
threatened. These statements had the desired effect» 47. In addition, Kerlérec dispatched
couriers to the Choctaw, Alibamu, Creek and Cherokee nations, informing them of the
convoy's arrival and Spain's declaration of war against Britain in order to boost their
sagging morale 48. In addition, he directed €mon fidèle Chef du Loup», who served as
his agent among the Cherokee, to send six Cherokee chieftains and as many elders and
distringuished as possible to New Orleans to confer with the governor about a major
campaign against English positions west of the Appalachian Mountains 49. Similar directives
were subsequently sent to Sieur de Lantagnac, who was apparently a French military
advisor among the Cherokee, and Chevalier de Lanoue, commander of the Alibamon
district.
 FRANCO-INDIAN DIPLOMACY IN THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY 63

Lantagnac was instructed to expedite the departure of twelve Cherokee chieftains

and elders for New Orleans, to transport Kerlérec's letters to Neyon de Villiers at Fort
Chartres for distribution among French Indian agents «in Illinois», and to encourage the
Cherokees and the French allies in the Illinois district to «redouble their hostilities ...
against the English» 51. Lanoue, on the other hand, was to encourage the chiefs of the
Creek confederacy to visit Kerlérec for the purpose of coordinating their campaigns
against British incursions with those of the Cherokee tribe and the Illinois confederacy.
Upon the finalization of these arrangements, Governor Kerlérec intended to inform the
Spanish governors of Pensacola and Havana of the forthcoming offensive against the
British in order that they might «combine their forces with our own to increase the
various European detachments which would support and inspire our Indian allies» 52.
Kerlérec's scheme of uniting the trans-Appalachian tribes in an offensive against
the British, however, was shattered by Lavaud's fraudulent business practices. Charged
with the responsability of purchasing high quality trade goods for distribution among
Louisiana's allies, the unscrupulous Bordeaux merchant substituted very low-grade
articles for the high quality trade goods stipulated in the government's contract and
illicitly retained the balance. For example, the shipment included :
not one ell of limbourg, [and] no shirts for trade purposes. Those which were sent for
that purpose were useful only for making sacks, as they could hardly be useful for slaves.
There were only 100 livres of vermilion, when there should have been 1500 or 2000 livres ;
very few rifles; a quantity of dourgne, which is unacceptable to the savages, instead
of lim bourgs; and only a few blankets, which were very small and, for the most part,
damaged 53.
As a consequence, Kerlérec was forced to appease his disgruntled allies by giving them
852 shirts intended for the French troops in Louisiana 54.
The supply shortages, however, seriously impaired the colony's ability to mount a
full-scale offensive against the British; nevertheless, appeased by Kerlérec's presents and
encouraged by an apparently revitalized French war effort and the continued circulation
of the governor's orders, the Indians' preparations for the now defunct offensive continued
apace, especially among tribes in the Illinois district 5S.
Of paramount importance to the continued belligerence of the redmen residing in
Illinois was the circulation of Kerlérec's letters, which reported that « Ononteeo [the
French king] was not crushed as the English had reported, but had got upon his legs
again, ... That a French army had landed in Louisiana, and that [Louis XV] would drive
the English out of the country» 56. These circulars, which were distributed among the
French Indian agents and the francophile chieftains north of the Ohio River by Lantagnac,
in late summer 1762, were supplemented by verbal admonishments to «redouble their
hostilities ... against the English» and to join with the Cherokee «to devastate ... all of
the British establishments which are in their vicinity ».
Acting in conformity with these directives, Pontiac, a staunch French ally, sent runners,
carrying war wampum (black beads summoning allies to war), among the tribes in the
Illinois district and successfully solidified and expanded the Franco-Indian alliance in
preparation for the anticipated offensive. At Pontiac's request, the members of the
alliance gathered on April 27, 1763, at the Ecorces River near Detroit 57 ; there, the great
Indian leader addressed the assemblage.
64 SOCIÉTÉ DES AMÉRICANISTES

Holding out a belt of wampum, he told the council that he had received it from their
father [the King of France], in token that he had heard the voice of his red children ; that
his sleep was at an end ; and that his great war canoes would soon sail up the St. Lawrence,
to win back Canada, and wreak vengeance on his enemies. The Indians and their French
brethren would fight once more side by side, as they had always fought ; they would
strike the English as they had struck them many moons ago, when their great army
marched down the Monongahela, and they had shot them from their ambush, like a flock
of pigeons in the woods 59.
Inspired by Pontiac's inflammatory rhetoric, the French allies prepared to strike
against the British outposts fringing the Illinois district during the following month.
The ensuing offensive was devastating for the British; by October 1763, these French
allies had destroyed or captured every British outpost along the northern fringe of the
Illinois district - except Detroit 60.
In late October 1763, however, the offensive was dealt a mortal blow by the same
factor which had contributed to its birth — a change in French military policy. On
October 25, Neyon de Villiers, commandant of the Illinois district, received dispatches
from Jean-Jacques Blaise d'Abbadie, Kerlérec's replacement, informing him of the cessa
tionof hostilities and ordering him to terminate the northern offensive 61.
Although he feared that his efforts to bring peace to the region were doomed to failure
especially in view of the dramatic results of their recent offensive, de Villiers complied
with d'Abbadie's directives. In early October 1763, he dispatched Sieur Debeaujeu to
the <r nations du nord», Sieur Bellerive de St. Ange among the French allies in the Ohio
River Valley, and Sieur de Quindre to the tribes besieging Detroit with his «speeches
(paroles), calumets, and [peace] wampum» 62.
The initial reports from his deputies indicated that de Villier's fears would indeed be
borne out 63. Although a few tribes, such as the Kickapoo and Peanquichis, acquiesced
to the commandant's demands that they cease hostilities with the English, the majority
of the French allies in the upper Mississippi and Ohio valleys, whose bellicosity was
intensified by their initial military successes and the inflammatory prophesies of a
Delaware shaman, remained firm in their resolve to drive the British intruders from their
homeland 64. Nevertheless, fully cognizant that the continued success of their campaign
hinged upon their ability to obtain military supplies from the French, Pontiac dispatched
Chariot Casqué, his trusted emissary to de Villiers in late October with written and verbal
requests for military assistance 65. The French commandant, however, flatly refused,
stating in his written reply «that I cannot give you any of the assistance which you
requested if you do not cease to wage war against the English who have become my
brothers as well as those of the French» 66. A similar request in early November from
emissaries of the Iroquois, Pawnee, and Shawnee war parties besieging Fort Duquesne
received an equally forceful denial 67.
Upon receiving de Villier's correspondance, Pontiac, whose military stores were
virtually exhausted, decided to sue for peace. On October 31, 1763, one day after receiv
ing de Villier's letter, this great Indian leader dispatched the following note to the English
commandant at Detroit :
My brother — my father has sent word that I must sue for peace. I have accepted his
advice. All of our young men have buried their tommahawks. I trust that you will forget
the outrages that have transpired for quite some time; as I will forget your offenses
against myself **®.
 FRANCO-INDIAN DIPLOMACY IN THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY 65

Other French allies in the Ohio Valley, including the Chipewa, Wyandot, and Iroquois,
soon followed suit 69.
De Villier's efforts to pacify the northern tribes were supplemented by d'Abbadie's
efforts to establish peaceful relations between France's former allies in southern trans-
Appalachia 70 and British occupational forces, which arrived at Mobile in early October
1763 71. Later that month, d'Abbadie arrived at that Gulf Coast port to officially transfer
possession of all French territory east of the Mississippi to the British representative, Major
Robert Farmař, and to present presents due since 1 759 to the Choctaw and Alibamon
tribes72. During his two-month sojourn at Mobile, «d'Abbadie did his utmost ... to
engage the Indians to receive» the British and succeeded in establishing a tenuous truce
between the former enemies 73. Although sporadic fighting continued in trans- Appalachia
between the former French allies, especially the Delawares and Shawnees, and the British
until late 1764, the great Franco-Indian guerilla campaign —mistakenly known as Pontiac's
« Conspiracy», had come to an end 74.
Viewed from this perspective, the Native American Uprising of 1763 ceased to be a
«conspiracy» as described by Parkman and Peckham; rather the uprising becomes the
legacy of Franco-American strategy during the Seven Years' War. The use of Native
Americans as viable allies was integrated into a concerted plan of action originating in
1756 with Kerlérec and Vaudreuil. This strategy was rejected by the colonial command
until the loss of Canada in 1759 when ministerial decisions sanctioned implementation
in 1761. The resulting Indian offensive was defeated not by its own merits, but rather
by Lavaud's fraudulent business practices which deprived the French allies of vital supplies
and thus seriously handicapped a portentous campaign. The stage was thus set for the
fruitless uprising that would have been sustained in its early victories by French aid;
and for the regretable diplomatic loss of the New World empire.

FOOTNOTES

* The authors collaborated in the following manner. Carl A. Brasseaux provided research data
pertaining to French ministerial decisions regarding military operations in Louisiana, events transpiring
in the Illinois district, and Governor d'Abbadie's administration ; Michael J. Leblanc provided research
data regarding French military operations in Louisiana during and after the Seven Years War as well
as the Kerlérec regime. The thesis and its exposition were the result of the authors' collaboration.
Mr. Leblanc acknowledges financial support for the project entitled «Computerization of a Crypto-
logical Methodology», from the National Endowment for the Humanities, Youth Grants in the
Humanities, Washington, D.C. ; and the University of Southwestern Louisiana, Lafayette, Louisiana.
This research project analyzed Governor Kerlerec's historically decoded cryptological system, which
included most of the primary source material utilized by Mr. Leblanc. Dr. John B. Cameron, Jr., served
as project advisor, and offered continuing interest and encouragement. Dr. W.Y. Adams suggested a
valuable style critique which was incorporated into this paper.
1. See Francis PARKMAN, The Conspiracy of Pontiac and the Indian War After the Conquest of
Canada (2 vols ; Boston, 1922), and Howard H. PECKHAM, Pontiac and the Indian Uprising (Princeton,
N.J., 1947).
2. PARKMAN, Conspiracy, I, pp. 180-186.
3. Charles E. GAYARRE, Louisiana : Its History as a French Colony (New York, 1852), pp. 74,
79, 80, 82-84, 89; Marc DE VILLIERS DU TERR AGE, Les dernières années de la Louisiane française
(Paris, 1904), pp. 70-137 ; Emile LAUVRIERE, Histoire de la Louisiane Française, 1673-1939 (Paris,
1940), pp. 387-389, 391-392 ; Alcee FORTIER, A History of Louisiana (4 vols; New York, 1904), I,
pp. 138-140).
66 SOCIÉTÉ DES AMÉRICANISTES

4. GAYARRE, Louisiana, p. 84.

5. For a more detailed treatment of French tacticts, consult WJ. ECCLES, France in America
(New York, 1972), pp. 185-198 ; Henri-Raymond CASGRAIN, éd., Collection des Manuscrits du Maré
chalde Lévis (12 vols; Montréal and Québec, 1889-1895), IV, p. 153 ; VII, p. 591 ; Guy FREGAULT,
Canada : The War of the Conquest, trans, by Margaret M. Cameron (Toronto, 1969), pp. 241-243;
Charles Henry LINCOLN, éd., The Correspondence of William Shirley (2 vols; New York, 1912),
II, pp. 133-134; John MITCHELL, The Contest in America Between Great Britain and France with
Its Consequences and Importance (London, 1757), pp. 118-119, 125-126, 137, 138. For an excellent
account of the fall of Canada, see ECCLES, France in America, pp. 178-208.
6. Royal Mémoire concerning the shipment of trade goods to Louisiana, April 5, 1762. France,
Archives Nationales, Archives des Colonies, Series С 13a (Louisiane : Correspondance générale), volume
43, folio 184. Hereafter cited as AC, С 13a, with volume and folio numbers. For a succinct, though
superficial account of Louisiana's role in the peace négociations, consult E. Wilson LYON's Louisiana
in French Diplomacy (Norman, Okla., 1934), pp. 13-35.
7. The following is an extract from Colonel de Jumilhac's instructions :
The type of warfare to be employed in Louisiana being of a quite different nature from that of
all other countries, His Majesty is pleased to recommend to Sieur Chevalier de Jumilhac, that, upon
his arrival [at New Orleans], he be informed of the operations which Sieur de Kerlérec shall be able
to undertake.
This warfare is less offensive that defensive on the part of the French troops. It is by means of
the savages, to whom the governor provides an officer to command them and a small detachment
of troops, that we wage offensive warfare... in the extremities of the colony. These offensive
campaigns are undertaken principally by the Cherokees.
This type of warfare gives rise to the necessity of veteran officers, who are familiar with the
manners and customs of the different tribes are capable of... inciting them to attack the British or
stopping them at the right moment.
Mémoire to Serve as Sieur de Jumilhac's Instructions, 1762. France, Archives Nationales, Archives des
Colonies, Series В (Louisiane : Correspondance envoyée, ordres du roy), volume 114, folio 154. Here
after cited as AC, B, with volume and folio numbers.
8. This relief expedition included five chartered merchantmen, the Angoumois regiment, sixty
Swiss mercenaries, commanded by Marquis de Hallwyl, twenty cannoniers, medical supplies, uniforms
for the troops in Louisiana, and Indian trade goods. Etienne-François de Choiseul to Louis Billouart
de Kerlérec, April 5, 1762. AC, С 13a, 43 : 184. Choiseul to Sieur Ruis, November 14, 1761. AC,
В 113 : 490. Choiseul to Ruis, November 26, 1761. AC, В 113 : 494. Choiseul to Ruis, November 30,
1761. AC, В ИЗ :495.
9. Kerlérec to Choiseul, June 24, 1762. AC, С 13a, 43 : 79.
10. See PECKHAM, Pontiac, pp. 130-228.
11. Kerlérec 's vast working knowledge of the francophile Indians is evidenced in États des Nations
Sauvages, a mémoire describing over forty-seven tribes in colonial Louisiana. This document includes
population statistics, military strength, histories of European contact, and geographic locations.
Kerlérec to Minister of Marine Berryer, December 1758. AC, С 13a, 40 : 135.
12. The Choc taw tribe resides with the central and southern portions of present-day Mississippi.
The presence of these British traders precipitated an intra-tribal war ; Frederick WEBB HODGE, éd.,
Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico (2 vols ; Washington, D.C., 1912), I, pp. 288-289.
Spelling of tribal names in this article are standardized in accordance with this publication ; see the
section entitled «Synonymy», II, pp. 1021-1178.
13. The Abihka were members of the Creek confederacy, inhabiting the greater portion of present-
day Alabama and Georgia. Handbook of American Indians, I, pp. 362-365.
14. Kerlérec to Minister of Marine Machault d'Arnouville, October 9, 1755. AC, С 13a, 39 : 60-61 ;
Kerlérec to Machault, July 22, 1756. AC, С 13a, 39 : 181-182; Kerlérec to Machault, December 12,
1756. AC, С 13a, 39 : 190.
15. Kerlérec to Machault, January 28, 1757. AC, С 13a, 40 : 27. Kerlérec to Minister of Marine
Peirene de Moras, March 13, 1757. AC, С 13a, 39 : 258.
16. Poste des Alibamons, also known as Fort Toulouse, was located at the confluence of the Cahaba
and Tallapoosa Rivers, near the site of present-day Selma, Alabama. Fort Tombigbee was located near
the confluence of the Tombigbee and Black Warrior Rivers, near the site of present-day Demopolis,
Alabama. VILLIERS DU TERRAGE, Les dernières années, pp. 104-105.
17. Kerlérec to Berryer, May 6, 1759. AC, С 13a, 40 : 51-52.
18. Kerlérec to Berryer, December 8, 1759. AC, С 13a, 41 : 147-148. Kerlérec to Berryer, March 30,
1760. AC, С 13a, 42 : 10-11. Kerlérec to Berryer, June 12, 1760. AC, С 13a, 42 :48.
 FRANCO-INDIAN DIPLOMACY IN THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY 67

19. The Cherokee tribe inhabited the southern Allegheny Mountains in southwestern Virginia,
western Carolina, South Carolina, northern Georgia, eastern Tennessee, and northeastern Alabama.
Handbook of American Indians, I, pp. 245-249.
20. Kerlérec to Berryer, June 12, 1760. AC, С 13a, 42 : 48-49.
21. Kerlérec to Machault, October 9, 1755. AC, С 13a, 39 : 60-61. Kerlérec to Machault, Decemb
er 12, 1756. AC, С 13a, 39 : 190-191.
22. The Alibamu tribe inhabited southern Alabama. The Kawati were members of the Creek
confederacy. Unfortunately for modern scholars, the French called three tribes «Loups» : the Mahi-
cans, the Skidis, and the Delewares. It is possible, however, that Kerlérec, in referring to «mon fidèle
chef de Guerre du Loup», was referring to « Chief Wolfe », a prominent Deleware chieftain. Handbook
of American Indians, I, pp. 43-44, 385-387, 786-789; II, pp. 586-587. PEC KH AM, Pontiac and the
Indian Uprising, pp. 166, 213.
23. Kerlérec to Machault, July 22, 1756. AC, С 13a, 39 : 181. Kerlérec to Machault, October 21,
1757. AC, С 13a, 39 : 277. Kerlérec to Machault, August 12, 1758. AC, С 13a, 40 : 31. Kerlérec to
Berryer, June 12, 1760. AC, С 13a, 42 : 49-51. Kerlérec to Berryer, June 8, 1761. AC, С 13a, 42 :
217. Kerlérec to Choiseul, April 28, 1762. AC, С 13a, 43 : 30-31.
24. Kerlérec to Berryer, June 12, 1760. AC, С 13a, 42 : 49. The Chickasaws resided in northern
Mississippi. Handbook of American Indians, I, pp. 260-262.
25. Kerlérec to Berryer, July 12, 1761. AC, С 13a, 42 : 229.
26. The Hurons, Pottawattomees, Sauks, and Ottowas resided in the Great Lakes region. Handbook
of American Indians, I, pp. 584-591 ; II, pp. 167-171, 289-293, 471-489.
27. The British were allowed to occupy Detroit under the terms of the capitulation of the Canadian
government in 1759.
28. Piquote de Belestre to Choiseul, June 16, 1762. France, Archives Nationales, Archives des
Colonies, Series С lia (Canada : Correspondance générale, lettres reçues des Colonies), volume 105,
folios 358-358VO. Hereafter cited as АС, С 1 la, with volume and folio numbers.
29. A millier is a thousand weight.
30. Fort Chartres was located near the confluence of the Kaskaskia and Mississippi Rivers. VILLIERS
DU TERRAGE, Les dernières années, p. 181.
31. Kerlérec to Berryer, June 8, 1761. AC, С 13a, 42 : 203-204.
32. Fort Loudon was located at the confluence of the Hawkins and Little Tennessee Rivers ; see
James TUSLOW ADAMS, éd., Atlas of American History (New York, 1943), p. 59.
33. Kerlérec to Berryer, March 1, 1761. AC, С 13a, 42 : 203-204.
34. At the time of the Illinois arms shipment, Louisiana's total gunpowder reserves included only
nine miliers, six of which were damaged. Kerlérec to Berryer, June 8, 1761. AC, С 13a, 42 : 218.
35. Lalanne to Machault, March 22, 1755. France, Archives Nationales, Archives des Colonies,
Series С 9 (St. Domingue : Correspondance générale), volume 97, folio non-paginated. Kerlérec to
Machault, October 21, 1757. AC, С 13a, 39 : 277.
36. Kerlérec to Berryer, December 21, 1760. AC, С 13a, 42 : 85 ; Kerlérec to Berryer, June 8, 1761.
AC, С 13a, 42 : 219-220 ; Kerlérec to Choiseul, April 28, 1762. AC, С 13a, 43 : 32.
37. Kerlérec and Bobe Descloseaux to Peirene, May 12, 1757. AC, С 13a, 39 : 246.
38. Ibid. Kerlérec to Peirene, August 28, 1757. AC, С 13a, 40 : 34-35; Kerlérec and Descloseaux
to Peirene, September 10, 1757. AC, С 13a, 39 : 247-248 ; Kerlérec to Choiseul, December 15, 1761.
AC, С 13a, 42 :267.
39. The convoy, which consisted of L'Opale, La Fortune, and La Fidèle, carried Ordonnateur
Vincent de Rochemore, Louisiana's chief administrator, forty-five Swiss troups; twenty-two recruits,
two military officers ; and much damaged cargo. VILLIERS DU TERRAGE, Les dernières années,
pp. 76, 88 ; GAYARRE, Louisiana, p. 84 ; LAUVRIERE, Histoire, p. 393.
40. The commissaire-ordonnateur in Louisiana served as the colony's administrative chief, who
administered justice and regulated the colony's commerce, finances, internal improvements, royal ware
houses, and police. For the best treatment of the office and its evolution, consult Carl A. BRASSEAUX,
L'Officier de Plume : Denis-Nicolas Foucault, Commissaire-Ordonnateur of French Louisiana, 1762-
1769 (Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Southwestern Louisiana, Lafayette, Louisiana, 1975).
41. VILLIERS DU TERRAGE, Les dernières années, p. 91; GAYARRE, Louisiana, pp. 85-86;
Kerlérec to Berryer, December 8, 1759. AC, С 13a, 41 : 148-149.
42. François-Xavier MARTIN, The History of Louisiana from the Earliest Period (New Orleans,
1963), pp. 190-191; VILLIERS DU TERRAGE, Les dernières années, pp. 92-98; LAUVRIERE,
Histoire, pp. 393-394.
43. Kerlérec to Berryer, March 30, 1760. AC, С 13a, 42 : 10-1 1 ; Kerlérec to Berryer, June 12, 1760.
AC.C 13a, 42 : 48-53; Kerlérec to Choiseul, December 15, 1761. AC,C 1 3a, 42 : 267; Kerlérec to Chois
eul, February 10, 1762. AC, С 13a, 43 : 25;Kerlérec to Choiseul, April28, 1762. AC,C 13a, 43 :30-31.
68 SOCIÉTÉ DES AMÉRICANISTES

44. Kerlérec to Веггуег, July 12, 1761. АС, С 13а, 42 : 229-230 ; Kerlérec to Choiseul, February 10,
1762. AC, С 13a, 43 :25.
45. In addition to the Angoumois regiment, sixty Swiss mercenaries, twenty cannoniers, and several
colonial officials, this expedition transported uniforms for approximately 1 ,000 men, sixty measures
of gunpowder, four cases of medicaments, and trade goods, such as vermilion and blankets. Choiseul
to Ruis, November 14, 1761. AC, В 113 : 490; Choiseul to Ruis, November 30, 1761. AC, В 113 :
496; Choiseul to Ruis, December 14, 1761. AC, В 113 : 497; Choiseul to Sieur Daubigny, December 22,
1761. AC, В 1 13 : 499 ; Royal mémoire concerning the shipment of merchandise to Louisiana. April 5,
1762. AC, С 13a, 43 : 184. Choiseul to Kerlérec, January 18, 1762. AC, В 114 : 164; Extracts of
Kerlérec and Foucault's letters, 1762. AC, С 13a, 42 : 14-16vo.
46. La Médée, La Fortune and Bien Aimé were the other members of the convoy. Foucault to
Choiseul, June 16, 1762. AC, С 13a, 45 : 105-112. Choiseul to Daubenton, May 2, 1762. AC, В 115 :
162.
47. Kerlérec to Choiseul, June 15, 1762. AC, С 13a, 43 : 33-34. The Angoumois Regiment, which
formed the bulk of the reinforcements, was composed of 400 men.
48. Kerlérec to Choiseul, June 24, 1762. AC, С 13a, 43 : 78-83. Kerlérec to Choiseul, April 28,
1762. AC, С 13a, 43 : 31.
49. Kerlérec to Choiseul, April 28, 1762. AC, С 13a, 43 : 31. Kerlérec 's Cherokee agent was to
«conférer avec eux [the Cherokee] des plus justes mesures que nous pourrions prendre pour couvrir
les Illinois et harceler et dévaster par leurs fréquentes incursions tous les établissements anglais qui sont
à leur proximité». Kerlérec to Choiseul, June 24, 1762. АС, С 13а, 43 : 79-80.
50. Lantagnac was a Cherokee and English captive between 1746 and 1755. His captors, however,
permitted him to trade with the Alibamons. In 1756, he escaped to New Orleans during one of these
trading expeditions. VILLIERS DU TERRAGE, Les dernières années, p. 70.
51. Kerlérec to Choiseul, June 24, 1762. AC, С 13a, 43 : 79-81.
52. Ibid.
53. Extracts of Kerlérec and Foucault's letters, 1762. AC, С 13a, 43 : 14-14vo. See also, Foucault
to Choiseul, June 20, 1762. AC, С 13a, 43 : 1 13-1 14. Foucault to Choiseul, June 20, 1762. AC, С 13a,
43 : 116-117. Kerlérec to Choiseul, June 24, 1762. AC, С 13a, 43 : 78-83.
54. Foucault to Choiseul, June 20, 1762. AC, С 13a, 43 : 1 13-114. Choiseul to Ruis, November 30,
1761. AC, В ИЗ :495.
55. PECKHAM, PoHfiec, pp. 112-114.
56. Thomas MORRIS, Journal of Captain Thomas Morris from Miscellanies in Prose and Verse
(Ann Arbor, University Microfilms, 1966), p. 7.
57. Kerlérec to Choiseul, June 24, 1762. AC, С 13a, 43 : 78-83.
58. PARKMAN, Conspiracy, I, 209.
59. Ibid., p. 211.
60. Mémoire treating Indian affairs in Illinois, October 3, 1763. AC, С На, 105 : 447-448vo.
61. De Villiers complained bitterly that General Jeffery Amherst had not notified him of the
cessation of hostilities and the ratification of the peace treaty — «each in their time» — which would
have allowed him to dismantle the alliance, and thus terminate the offensive ; however, as a result of
Amherst 's negligence, de Villiers reported that «I have every reason to fear that things have been
carried to the point where it will be difficult to appease them [the Indian allies]». Neyon de Villiers
to d'Abbadie, December 1, 1763. AC, С 13a, 43 : 353-355.
62. Ibid.
63. Mémoire treating Indian affairs in Illinois, October 3, 1763. AC, С lia, 105 : 447-448vo.
64. Neyon de Villiers to d'Abbadie, December 1, 1763. AC, С 13a, 43 : 353-355.
65. Deposition of Chariot Casque, October 27, 1763. AC, С lia, 105 : 416-418.
66. Neyon de Villiers to Pontiac, October 1763. AC, С 1 la, 105 : 418vo.
67. Speech of the Iroquois, Loups and Shawnees..., November 9, 1763. AC, С На, 105 : 410.
68. Translation of photocopy of the original manuscript in PECKÁM, Pontiac, p. 236.
69. Ibid., pp. 237-238.
70. The area between the Appalachian Mountains and the Mississipi River.
71. British occupation forces commanded by Major Robert Farmař took possession of Mobile on
October 20. Jean-Jacques-Blaise d'Abbadie, Trials and Tribulations : The Historical Journal of Director-
General d'Abbadie, trans, by Carl A. Brasseaux (unpublished manuscript), p. 10. Procès-verbal of the
cession of Mobile, October 20, 1763. AC, С 13a, 43 : 284-285vo.
72. D'Abbadie harangued the assembled allies on November 1, 1763. D'Abbadie, Trials, p. 10.
73. Narrative of the British attempt to take possession of Illinois by way of the Mississippi River,
1764. France, Archives Nationales, Archives des Colonies, Séries F 3 (Louisiane : Collection Moreau-
St. Méry), volume 25, folio 211.
 FRANCO-INDIAN DIPLOMACY IN THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY 69

74. The British did not extinguish the last flames of resistance until the fall of 1764. See MORRIS,
Journal, and William SMITH, Expedition Against the Ohio Indians,.. (Ann Arbor, University Microf
ilms, 1966).
Pontiac repeatedly attempted to organize a second offensive against the British in 1764 and 1765 ;
success of his efforts was contingent upon his ability to obtain war munitions from the French to
replace their own supplies, which were exhausted in 1763. Thus, although he was successful in tempor
arilyinflaming the Illinois tribe against the English, his inability to obtain arms for his potential
warriors and the influence of the French, who consistently urged their former allies to remain peacef
ul, doomed his efforts to certain failure.
Extracts of de Villier's correspondence, March 13-April 20, 1764. AC, С 13a, 44 : 92-95. D'Abbadie
to Choiseul, April 10, 1764. AC, 13a, 44 : 131-131vo. D'Abbadie, Trials, pp. 41-42. See also, MORRIS,
Journal, and SMITH, Expedition.
A tenuous peace reigned between the British and the former French allies in the Ohio Valley until
the signing of a formal peace treaty at Fort Ontario, New York on July 23, 1 766. PECKHAM, Pontiac,
pp. 288-318.

Carl A. BRASSEAUX et Michael J. LEBLANC. Diplomatie franco-indienne dans la vallée

du Mississippi, 1 754-1 763 : prélude au soulèvement de Pontiac ?

Comme la garnison coloniale était généralement composée de déserteurs d'autres

unités françaises, le maintien des alliances franco-indiennes était d'une importance capi
tale pour la sécurité militaire de la Louisiane pendant le XVIIIe siècle. Louis Billouart
de Kerlérec, gouverneur de la Louisiane de 1752 à 1763, était conscient de l'importance
militaire des indiens alliés à la France et, en conséquence, il proposa au début de la
Guerre de Sept Ans la mobilisation des tribus en vue d'une guérilla contre les Anglais.
Mais le Maréchal Montcalm s'opposa avec succès à ce plan et le projet de Kerlérec resta en
sommeil jusqu'à la capitulation du Canada en 1760. Inquiet de cette défaite, le gouverne
ment français revint sur sa décision, donnant des ordres pour une grande offensive contre les
incursions anglaises dans la région entre les Appalaches et le Mississippi. Retardée par un
manque de provisions et d'armes, comme par l'inefficacité de la bureaucratie et les diffi
cultés de communication frontalière, l'offensive commença peu avant le Traité de Paris
— 1763. Néanmoins la campagne fut un succès dès le début : encouragés par la victoire, les
indiens dirigés par Pontiac ont maintenu l'offensive face à l'opposition des officiels
français, après même la fin des hostilités.

Diplomacia franco-india en el valle del Mississippi, 1 754-1 763 : i preludio al subleva-

miento de Pontiac ?

Como la guarnición colonial generalmente se componia de desertores de otras unidades

francesas, el mantenimiento de las alianzas franco-indias era de una importancia capital
para la seguridad militar de la Louisiana en el siglo XVIII. Louis Billouart de Kerlérec,
gobernador de la Louisiana de 1752 a 1763, estaba muy consciente de la importancia
militar de los indígenas aliados de Francia y, por consiguiente, al comienzo de la Guerra
de Siete Aiïos, proponia la mobilization de tribus en una guerrilla contra los Ingleses.
Pero el Maréchal Montcalm se opusó con buen éxito a su plan y el proyecto se quedó*
durmiendo hasta la capitulación del Canada, en 1760. Inquieto рог esa derrota, el gobierno
francés cambió su decision dando órdenes para una gran ofensiva frente a las incursiones
70 SOCIÉTÉ DES AMÉRICANISTES

inglesas en el area de los Appalaches y el Mississippi. Atrasada por falta de provisiones

y de armas, asi como por la ineficacia de ia burocracia y las dificultades de las comunica-
ciones fronterizas franco-americanas, la ofensiva se inició poco antes del « Traité de Paris »
— 1763. No obstante ésto, la accidn fue un éxito al principio ; estimulados por la victoria,
los indígenas, bajo la direction de Pontiac, siguieron la ofensiva a pesar de la oposicidn de
los ofîciales franceses, después del fin de las hostilidades.

Franco-Indian diplomacy in the Mississippi Valley, 1754-1763 : prelude to Pontiac's

uprising ?

As the colonial garrison was usually staffed by deserters from other French units,
maintenance of Franco-Indian alliances was of vital importance to Louisiana's security
during the eighteenth century. Louis Billouart de Kerlérec, who governed Louisiana
from 1752 to 1763, was acutely aware of the military significance of France's Indian
allies and thus, with the outset of the Seven Years' War in 1756, he proposed the mobil
ization of the tribes in a guerilla war against the British. Because of Field Marshall Mont-
calm's opposition, however, Kerlérec's plan lay dormant until the fall of Canada in 1760.
Shaken by the loss of Canada, the French government reversed its position and ordered
a large-scale Indian offensive against English encroachments in the trans-Mississippi area.
Plagued by French bureaucratic inefficiency, supply shortages, and primitive means of
communication in Franco-American frontier, however, the campaign began only weeks
before the Treaty of Paris. The offensive, nevertheless, enjoyed remarkable initial success,
and spurred by their victories, the Indians resolved to continue the campaign, despite the
opposition of French colonial officials, after the cessation of hostilities.