Estudios de Psicología / Studies in Psychology, 2017

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02109395.2016.1268392

Body, culture and cognition: avoiding reductionist temptations /

Cuerpo, cultura y cognición: sorteando las tentaciones
reduccionistas
Eduardo Martí

Universidad de Barcelona
(Received 1 April 2016; accepted 6 September 2016)

Abstract: The article considers two postulates of Piaget’s epistemology (anti-

reductionism and developmental perspective) to analyse three influential
perspectives on cognition: nativist, sociocultural and situated cognition.
Based on this analysis, we propose two cognitive processes (explicitation
and implicitation) that can explain cognitive change from the most elementary
and embodied knowledge to more sophisticated and cultural ones. Some
empirical examples concerning external representations that support this pro-
posal are discussed.
Keywords: cognition; anti-reducctionism; external representations;
explicitation; implicitation

Resumen: En el artículo se consideran dos postulados de la epistemología de

Piaget (el anti-reduccionismo y el punto de vista evolutivo) para analizar tres
perspectivas influyentes sobre cognición: la innatista, la sociocultural y la de
la cognición situada. En base a este análisis, se proponen dos procesos
cognitivos (de explicitación y de implicitación) que pueden explicar la
transformación de conocimientos, de los más elementales y ligados al cuerpo
a los más elaborados y relacionados con la cultura. Se aportan algunos datos
empíricos sobre el estudios de los sistemas externos de representación que
sustentan dicha propuesta
Palabras clave: cognición; anti-reduccionismo; representaciones externas;
explicitación; implicitación

This paper aims to analyse the link between biology and culture as presented in
recent proposals on cognition. We adopt certain Piagetian postulates as a base
(criticism of reductionist explanations and developmental perspective of the study
of cognition), allowing us to critically analyse three influential traditions in the
study of cognition: nativist and sociocultural perspectives and one which advo-
cates a new definition of cognition (situated cognition). Focusing on the study of

English version: pp. 1–14 / Versión en español: pp. 14–27

References / Referencias: pp. 27–29
Translated from Spanish / Traducción del español: Liza D’Arcy
Author’s Address / Correspondencia con el autor: Facultad de Psicología, Universidad de
Barcelona, Passeig de la Vall d’Hebron, 171, Barcelona, España. E-mail: emarti@ub.edu

© 2017 Fundacion Infancia y Aprendizaje

2 E. Martí

external representations, our proposal focuses on the cognitive processes of

explicitation and implicitation of knowledge that seeks to avert certain problems
that arise with these perspectives and which provides specificity to individual
cognitive functioning.

Piaget: interdisciplinarity, anti-reductionism and developmental outlook

One of the cornerstones of Piaget’s epistemology was interdisciplinarity. The
dialogue between disciplines (psychology, biology, sociology, logic, mathematics,
physics) was a constant in Piaget’s theoretical proposals (Piaget, 1950, 1965,
1967). His fundamental thesis, which explains the need for an interdisciplinary
approach, lies in the fact that knowledge is constant interaction between a subject
(whose actions have biological and physical components) and an object
(immersed in the materiality of the physical and social world); this interaction is
capable of creating, throughout its development, increasingly abstract mathema-
tical and logical knowledge, developed from elementary knowledge associated
with the body. For Piaget, this need to include contributions from different
disciplines to understand human cognition is inseparable from his defence of
the specificity of psychological functioning. For this, he fought any attempt to
reduce the explanation of human cognition to either exclusively biological or
social components.
Piaget opposed both the nativist and empiricist theories that dominated much
of the psychological explanations of his time. He proposed a third way, genetic
epistemology, which rests on two fundamental postulates. The first postulate
argued that cognition could not be explained by appealing to pre-existing biolo-
gical components nor by appealing to direct learning (through perception or
imitation) of existing structures in the outside world. For Piaget, knowledge was
the result of the constant interaction between the subject and the object (Piaget,
1967). His second postulate highlighted the temporal dimension, very present in
the psychology of the early twentieth century and in authors such as Freud,
Baldwin or Vygotsky (Martí, in press): cognition can only be understood if a
developmental perspective is adopted (‘genetic’ in Piaget’s words). These two
postulates — a process of interaction between the subject and object from which
emerge knowledge as well as the genetic dimension, fundamental to understand-
ing the nature of cognition — shaped Piaget’s (1980) constructivist theory.
For many readers, Piaget’s proposals may seem obsolete in the complex and
varied panorama of twenty-first-century psychology. It is true that many theore-
tical and empirical studies have noted Piaget’s limitations in explaining cognition
in its different manifestations. We believe, however, that some general postulates
from his epistemological proposal (specifically his anti-reductionism and his
defence of a developmental view in the explanation of psychology) are very
relevant and can serve to question some of the theoretical proposals that have
been successfully extended in contemporary psychology which emerge from
contact between different disciplines: psychology and biology on the one hand,
and psychology and social sciences on the other.
 Body, culture and cognition / Cuerpo, cultura y cognición 3

The increasing interest in nativism and the danger of biological reductionism

One reaction to the dominance of behaviourist psychology during the mid-
twentieth century was the strengthening of the nativist thesis which became
very popular, especially as an answer to the nature of cognition. This rise of the
nativist explanation coincided with methodological advances in the study of
babies (experimental studies could increasingly be carried out at earlier ages)
and technical studies into brain activity (neuroimaging and electrophysiological
studies). It is also important to note that this nativist tendency favoured a change
of perspective in considering the architecture of the mind, conceived increasingly
as a set of specific domains rather than as a general information processor (see, for
example, Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994).
Advances in knowledge of early cognition have been spectacular from this
perspective and gave a much more accurate picture of babies’ cognitive skills
(Rochat, 2012). However, this search for the origins of knowledge has two major
drawbacks. On the one hand, and from a developmental perspective, there is no
absolute origin, as any of the skills a baby has, regardless of when it was
developed, is the result of an even earlier development (whether ontogenetic or
phylogenetic). Thus, the focus should not be on defining the origin of a behaviour
but on explaining the process of change (how has that behaviour emerged and
what will its subsequent development be). This position that we are defending
contrasts with the desire — that many studies with a nativist perspective have —
to find the origins of ontogenesis in order to identify an absolute starting point,
and thus prove that behaviour is prepared from the beginning (and not a result of
learning).
The second drawback is the fact that, in many cases, the skills that the baby
shows in their first months of life are not differentiated from the skills that will
transform with age. The intention of these authors is to show that, from the
beginning, the essence of behaviour is already present and it is assumed that,
over time, these skills will extended further or other superimposed elements like
bricks in a building (Spelke, 2000) will be added to them. It is true that some
authors call this starting point ‘core cognition’ (Carey, 2008) and they try to
differentiate it from further development. But this does not prevent fundamental
conceptual — not only perceptive — characteristics from being attributed to this
cognitive core, shared with more developed behaviours. Studies into the concept
of number are, in this sense, a good example.
Some authors argue that babies understand the concept of number from the
first months of life (Carey, 2008, p. 5). To our knowledge, this skill should not be
confused with the concept of number that a child aged 2–3 has, when they
incorporate semiotic mediators in their knowledge of the numeric field. Nor
with the concept of number which usually comes later (at roughly age six),
which is based on an understanding of the numerical invariants of sets (Martí &
Scheuer, 2015). It is undeniable that babies, from their first months, present a set
of skills associated with the discrimination of small amounts and that some of
these skills are shared with other animals (see, for example, an excellent summary
of these publications by Rodríguez & Scheuer, 2015). However, considering the
4 E. Martí

eminently symbolic nature of the concept of number and given that, despite these
initial skills, children go on to have serious difficulty solving simple tasks with
sets of very few items, it seems inappropriate to attribute these initial skills to a
fully numerical significance (see also the critique by Nunes & Bryant, 1996; or
Rodríguez & Scheuer, 2015).
Authors who advocate a nativist vision also often offer a static picture of
human functioning (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). We think the following is appropri-
ate and necessary if we are to take a genuinely developmental stance: (1) explore
in more detail the cognitive peculiarity of each of these skills that appear
throughout different stages while highlighting the aspects that differentiate them;
and (2) explain the relationship between different knowledge through some sort of
explanatory mechanism that accounts for the transition from one to another. The
focus must change from exploring the origins of cognition, reducing complex
behaviours to basic ones, to focusing on the process of change that results in
increasingly complex knowledge.

The temptation to explain psychological phenomena with sociocultural

dimensions
As Piaget said, reductionism does not only include trying to explain psychology
with biological explanations, but also those explanations that reduce psychology
to sociocultural components. Reductionist positions, in this case, are not as clear
as nativist positions, but, to our knowledge, certain ideas advanced in socio-
cultural studies which originated in the work of Vygotsky do not clearly differ-
entiate psychological and sociocultural elements. Despite the diversity of
contributions of developmental psychology from a sociocultural perspective
based on the Vygotskian tradition (see, for example, Overton, 2006, pp. 65–8),
we would like to highlight three aspects that seem fundamental in this tradition
that lead to problems related to a reductionist tendency: the social origins of
cognition, the separation between natural and cultural development and the
primacy of language in the definition of the nature of cognition.
According to Vygotsky and many of his followers, the origin of conscious
activity is to be found in the external conditions of life and not the internal mental
functioning of the individual. Hence it defends that the social dimension of
consciousness is primary and that the individual dimension of consciousness is
secondary and derivative (Rogoff, 1993, p. 38; Vygotsky, 1979, p. 30; Wertsch,
1991, p. 13). This assumption, based on the Vygotskian concept of ‘internaliza-
tion’, which reflects the idea of transition from interpsychological to intrapsycho-
logical functioning (Vygotsky, 1931/1995; Wertsch, 1988, p. 78) supports most of
the studies on cognition from the sociocultural perspective.
In the absence of an accurate characterization of how and at what stage the
internalization process occurs and of what the individual’s constructive role in this
process is (Martí, 1996), this social and cultural imprint on cognition does not
seem to be a proposal that clearly explains the linkage between the interpsycho-
logical and intrapsychological, and so reduces the latter to the former. In addition,
 Body, culture and cognition / Cuerpo, cultura y cognición 5

this thesis leads to a paradox: if individual cognition of a person is understood to

be the result of the internalization of social life and its arrangement, how should
we conceive the nature of the subject’s cognition that was initially capable of such
internalization? Or put another way, how did this social life, the starting point of
internalization, originate? (Martí, 1996; Sinha, 1992).
Another one of Vygotsky’s central ideas, also present in many of his followers’
work, is the distinction between two lines of development: the natural line
(biological) and the cultural line. For Vygotsky, both lines are clearly separated
in phylogeny: the evolutionary process that gave rise to Homo sapiens on the one
hand, and the historical development ‘by which primitive man becomes a cultur-
alized being’ on the other (Vygotsky, 1931/1995, p. 29). For Vygotsky and his
followers, both lines correspond to two types of psychological functions, elemen-
tary and higher (Wertsch, 1988, p. 41). The first, determined by biological
changes, are not mediated by signs; the second would be those that incorporate
signs from the participation of others. As noted by Wertsch, for Vygotsky natural
and cultural forces operate independently in the early stages of ontogenesis. Or
put another way, in early childhood, before language, the natural course of
development operates in certain isolation until it begins to integrate the cultural
line, through semiotic mediation (Wertsch, 1988, pp. 60–1).
This distinction between the two lines of development at both the phylogenetic
and ontogenetic levels presents a number of problems. At the phylogenetic level,
it is difficult to establish a clear separation between the progress of behaviour
caused solely by genetic mutations and the progress influenced by environmental
factors. It is true, as noted in many studies, that the cognitive evolution of the
genus Homo prior to the Neolithic Revolution (which are known as hunter-
gatherers and include Homo sapiens) was mainly the result of biological changes,
while advances in cognition, from the discovery of agriculture and the emergence
of writing, are mainly due to developments linked to new social and cultural
possibilities (Donald, 1991). But this difference should not hide the importance of
constant interdependence between genetic and environmental systems (what is
known as epigenetics), which casts doubt on net differentiations between biolo-
gical and psychological developments (Gottlieb, Wahlsten, & Lickliter, 2006).
In addition, at an ontogenetic level, the thesis regarding a distinction between
the two lines of development also raises some doubts (see, for example,
Rodríguez & Moro, 1999, pp. 37–41). One of the most obvious is accepting
that early development prior to language is a development caused exclusively by
biological factors, something difficult to sustain with the extensive studies on
early cognitive development that highlight the importance of social interaction
(Kaye, 1982; Rodríguez, 2006).
The third aspect is related to the primacy of language. Semiotic mediation
plays a key role in Vygotsky’s proposals and sociocultural psychology. In his
writings, Vygotsky notes a broad set of semiotic mediators (from gestures to
notations) that can sustain higher psychological functions (Vygotsky, 1931/
1995). But it is clear that among all these possibilities, language plays a central
role in most of his theoretical and empirical work (Bronckart, 2012; Rodríguez &
6 E. Martí

Moro, 1999). This primacy of language in explaining the nature of cognition

poses at least two problems.
On the one hand, it is a position that ignores the decisive influence of semiotic
mediators that are of a different complexity and nature (such as gestures and all
variety of external representations — drawings, numerical notations, maps,
graphs, etc.) in cognitive development. Therefore, the relationship between these
systems of signs — from the most basic that appear before language (such as
gestures), to the most complex (such as mathematical notation) which involve a
significant degree of abstraction and complexity — are not taken into account
(Martí, 2012). On the other hand, by focusing on an elaborate form of very
particular and complex cognition (which is expressed through language), this
perspective neglects other forms of elementary cognition (which are not expressed
through language) and does not address how the transition is made between them
or the link between conscious cognition, expressed through language, and other
less explicit forms of cognition.
For all these reasons, and although Vygotsky distanced himself from both
biological and cultural reductionism (Wertsch, 1988, pp. 59–60), many studies
inspired by socioculturalism pose a series of questions about the specificity of
psychological functioning.

Overcoming reductionist explanations: situated cognition

Many of the theoretical approaches taken by psychologists who study human
cognition and its development are based on a clear separation between the
biological substrate (the brain), cognitive functioning (the mind) and the environ-
ment. Recently, and partially to circumvent some of the reductionist limitations
associated with these approaches, studies proposing a new definition of cognition
have proliferated. Instead of conceiving it as an inner product, associated with its
biological substrate and radically different from the environment, cognition is
conceived to be a situated activity, extended beyond the physical limits of the
human brain (Clark, 2008; Clark & Chalmers, 1998). From this perspective, many
cognitive processes make sense when considering elements that are external to the
brain, whether it is the body or aspects of the physical and social environment.
There are many contributions, all theoretically diverse, committed to this new
concept of cognition. Terms such as embodied, enactive, distributed, embedded or
extended mind are some of the most commonly used (see, for example, Robbins
& Aydede, 2009 for a classification of different studies). We will not go further
than two aspects that seem particularly relevant to our purpose in this paper: the
role of the body and external systems of representation in cognition.

The body and cognition

In developmental psychology, there is a long tradition of European studies that
highlight the importance of the body, gestures and actions in cognition. Piaget’s
work was, in this sense, pioneering in showing that cognitive development is
 Body, culture and cognition / Cuerpo, cultura y cognición 7

based on the baby’s sensorimotor actions (Piaget, 1936). His contribution seems
essential to the extent that he proposed a relationship between different levels of
cognition, sustained by actions (sensorimotor first, then internalized). However,
for Piaget the key to understanding cognition lies in the general properties of the
coordination between these actions, not in the particularity of such actions. Or put
another way, Piaget highlights the action schemes and its relationships, but he
understates the importance of particularity and materiality of those actions.
Wallon, contrary to Piaget, showed the importance of rhythm, of the postures
and particularities of gestures (muscular functioning, movement) in understanding
emotions and the development of mental activity (Wallon, 1942). Although his
proposals have been forgotten, especially in American psychology, he is another
pioneer in perceiving the importance of the body in the development of cognition,
which has begun to resurface in recent decades (see, for example, Rodríguez,
2006, pp. 28–30).
In recent years, and under the terms ‘embodiment’ and ‘embodied cogni-
tion’, studies showing the importance of the body in many aspects of cognition
have proliferated (see, for example, the review by Pozo, 2001, pp. 111–23).
The concept of ‘embodiment’ was presented by Merleau Ponty, precisely as an
attempt to go beyond a reductionist explanation of behaviour based on biology
or sociocultural determinants (Merleau Ponty, 1942, cited in Overton, 2006,
p. 48). From this perspective, behaviour arises from a subject closely related to
their abilities and physical restrictions and, from this base, relates and acts with
and on the environment (Robbins & Aydede, 2009). The areas of psychology
that have been studied from such a perspective recently are many and varied
(emotions, memory, problem solving, conceptual knowledge, language, etc.).
We would now like to explore studies addressing the relationship between two
realities that are often seen as distant and even antagonistic: the body and
mathematical knowledge.
The role of the body in mathematical knowledge has been approached by
different authors in recent decades. They defend the idea that mathematics should
not be regarded as only abstract and decontextualized knowledge, but as being
strongly linked to everyday experiences in which the physical and sensory
experience of the body plays a central role. A good example of this type of
approach can be found in work by Lakoff and Núñez (2000), who extend the
pioneering work by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) on the importance of metaphors
rooted in the body in cognition. According to these authors, many mathematical
ideas take on meaning in everyday experiences in which the body plays an
important role. For example, some images, such as ‘container schema’, closely
associated with everyday experiences, enable an immediate understanding of
topological concepts such as ‘in’, ‘out’ and ‘limits’ that play an important role
in mathematical ideas such as Boolean logic (Lakoff & Núñez, 2000). Other
images, such as those associated with spatial relationships such as ‘up’, ‘down’,
‘front’ or ‘behind’ are everyday knowledge directly related to the body and play a
key role in concepts such as orientation (orientation of a movement, angles,
rotations, etc.). Similarly, some basic metaphors such as ‘add’, ‘remove’ or
8 E. Martí

‘group’, associated with actions and daily gestures, can grant intuitive meaning to
mathematical operations such as addition or subtraction.
Unlike these studies, which mainly analyse language and metaphors, other
recent studies show how the movement of the body (in its rhythmic and kines-
thetic aspects) may be at the core of certain mathematical knowledge. In a case
study by Bautista and Roth (2012), for example, the rhythm in the movements of
manipulation that a nine-year-old student makes when he explores the character-
istics of a complex geometric body is argued to be a key indicator of a series of
geometric knowledge. As these authors note, rhythm is geometric thinking in
movement and allows the subject to objectify certain geometric properties of the
figures he is manipulating (Bautista & Roth, 2012, p. 101).
The perspective of embodied cognition has the merit of re-introducing the
sensorimotor experience as the core of cognition. Thus, it moves away from a
biological reductionism that conceives the brain and behaviour to be two split
entities. At the same time, it recovers the importance of everyday experience and
intuitive knowledge as elements that are fundamental to understand the develop-
ment of more complex ideas. Another important contribution of this perspective is
that it facilitates understanding how the subject attributes meaning to many
complex concepts (such as mathematical concepts). By linking these concepts to
everyday intuitions (such as in the case of metaphors) or implicit knowledge
mediated by the body (such as in the case of rhythm), ideas, no matter how
complex they are, rest on an experiential basis that gives them meaning. Finally,
highlighting how different aspects related to the characteristics of gestures and
body movements reveal implicit knowledge offers an interesting opportunity to
study not only explicit knowledge expressed through language, but also the
knowledge that subjects are not aware they are conscious of but which are
objectified in their movements.
However, we believe that, with rare exceptions (see, for example, Thelen,
2000), most of the studies that fall within the field of embodied cognition lack an
developmental perspective. They are studies that seek bodily origins of knowl-
edge (similar to those that seek the innate core of knowledge), but which do not
address how knowledge changes with development. For this reason, analysing the
relationships between types of knowledge and the transition from one type of
knowledge to another seems necessary (for example, the transition from bodily
knowledge of an implicit nature on the characteristics of a geometric figure to
explicit knowledge, where the same figure is explained by the subject through
words, drawings or gestures). Because of a lack of this developmental outlook,
these studies do not elucidate how the subject constructs knowledge — neither the
most elementary, basic and implicit knowledge, nor the most elaborate, explicit
and shared.

Thinking with the help of external representation systems

Work on extended cognition also includes approaches that address the alliances
that the mind may make with the environment (social and physical) and
 Body, culture and cognition / Cuerpo, cultura y cognición 9

especially with powerful representative artefacts. It is a meaning that could be

called ‘distributed cognition’ (see, for example, Salomon, 1993) or, as Robbins
and Aydele propose (2009, p. 7), ‘extended cognition’. Of the various studies
that could be included in this category, we will pause at those that have
analysed how cognition changes when external, permanent and cultural repre-
sentation systems such as writing, mathematic notation, maps or other semiotic
systems are used (see, for example, Martí, 2003, 2012; Martí & Pozo, 2000; for
a detailed characterization of the nature of these representations and their
possible uses).
The use of these types of representations not only extends cognitive ability
(which corresponds to an external memory), but also qualitatively modifies
cognitive activity (which would correspond to an epistemic function of these
systems) (Pérez-Echeverría, Martí, & Pozo, 2010). As noted by Kirsch, activities
that would be inconceivable grounded only in internal representations can be
performed when using these external systems; but what is more interesting is that
the use of these mediators may influence how the problems are solved, creating
new ways to manipulate ideas and new ways of thinking (Kirsch, 2010, p. 442).
Olson’s work (1994) on writing is, among many others, a good example of how
the use of these semiotic mediators profoundly changes our way of thinking and
reasoning.
Understood this way, cognition is transformed through the use of external
representation systems, many of them complex (think of writing or numerical
notation), but relatively new (a few thousand years since their creation) and all
created regardless of structural changes to our biology (Donald, 1991). It is no
wonder, then, that external representation systems are difficult to understand and
use, requiring a strong educational effort to do so (Andersen, Scheuer, Pérez-
Echeverría, & Teubal, 2008).
But as with the studies carried out on embodied cognition, studies examining
how people understand and use different representation systems mostly lack a
developmental perspective. In our opinion, exploring the progressive processes
needed to acquire these systems (according to both age and learning opportu-
nities) is fundamental, as well as the relationships this complex, external and
explicit knowledge has with other more elementary forms of knowledge.
Regarding the first area, there are several developmental and learning studies
in psychology that focus on the process of acquiring some of these systems (see a
summary by Martí, 2003). But what remains absent from most of these studies is
an explanation, from a developmental perspective, of how these elaborate and
complex forms of knowledge are constructed from other forms of prior knowl-
edge. This requires, on the one hand, identifying successive forms of knowledge
that appear at different times of development. Following the approach that we
have proposed in this paper it requires relating embodied cognition, of an implicit
nature, with cognition mediated by external systems of representation (of an
explicit nature). It also requires identifying mechanism of change that elucidates
the transition from one type of cognition to others and the role played by the
subject in this construction.
10 E. Martí

The processes of explicitation and implicitation as mechanisms of cognitive

change
Some authors have suggested theoretical models that elucidate the successive
stages of cognitive development throughout development. The proposal of suc-
cessive types of knowledge put forward by Rivière (2003) is interesting to the
extent that he articulates the role of biology and education without adopting a
reductionist position. Rivière proposes four types of ‘mental functions’ (which he
calls functions type 1, 2, 3 and 4) that differ according to certain dimensions
including the phylogenetic age, degree of biological determinism, ontogenetic
priority, symbolic character, attentional demand, dependence of consciousness and
flexibility (Rivière, 2003, p. 236). While the functions of type 1 (for example, the
brightness constancy of visual perception) and 2 (for example, the notion of a
permanent object) are shared with other species, the functions of type 3 (such as
language) and especially type 4 (such as the ability to multiply or any external
systems of representation that we have mentioned above) depend on complex
social interactions that are part of our culture. It is important to note that, for
Rivière, type 4 functions involve the massive incorporation of cultural instruments
and therefore require explicit educational intervention that is more complex than
the intervention needed by the other functions.
Rivière’s proposal has the merit of establishing a developmental distinction
between different types of knowledge and articulating the role of the biological
and the cultural in human cognitive development. But, to our knowledge, the
proposal has two limitations. On the one hand, he does not address the process of
building knowledge within the same type of functions, especially the more
complex, type 4 functions. Taking the example of numerical notation (a type 4
function), how children acquire the ability to interpret, produce and use increas-
ingly complex and elaborate notations, a slow and progressive process, needs to
be explained (Tolchinsky, 2003). On the other hand, the proposal lacks a mechan-
ism of change that explains the transition from one type of knowledge to another,
although it is true that when analysing symbolic capacity and language (type 3
functions), Rivière does propose a specific mechanism called ‘semiotic suspen-
sion’ (Rivière, 2003, pp. 238–41).
Without disregarding the need to identify mechanisms of change that pertain to
specific domains of knowledge (such as the one proposed by Rivière to elucidate
symbolic capacity), we believe it is also necessary to identify mechanisms of a
general nature that elucidate the construction process of knowledge of different
complexity, and one which can associate the most basic knowledge related to the
body with more explicit and elaborate knowledge such as that related to external
systems of representation.
To our knowledge, the representational redescription hypothesis put forward
by Karmiloff-Smith (1992) is an interesting proposal that is genuinely develop-
mental and circumvents certain limitations of nativist models. Interest in the
Karmiloff-Smith hypothesis is mainly because it includes a proposal for a general
mechanism (representational redescription) that accounts for the transition of
implicit and automatic knowledge to more explicit, conscious and flexible
 Body, culture and cognition / Cuerpo, cultura y cognición 11

knowledge. For example, in the numerical environment, Karmiloff-Smith notes

that the procedures babies (and other animals) use to store representations related
to numerosity are the starting point of an implicit knowledge responsible for
processing quantitative information. Thanks to the mechanism of redescription,
such knowledge is increasingly accessible to consciousness. Thus, principles such
as ordinality or one-to-one correspondence that the child applies implicitly, and
procedurally when she counts, are progressively abstracted, redescribed and
represented in a new format. But as Karmiloff-Smith suggests, at first, this
knowledge, although it may be applied to certain situations (for example to
solve conservation tasks), can still not be made explicit externally. Only later,
and again because of a new redescription, does this knowledge evolve into a new
format that can be expressed through language or other specific symbols
(Karmiloff-Smith, 1992, pp. 109–10).
Unlike Piaget, the Karmiloff-Smith hypothesis does not assume that there are
general development stages corresponding to age for all types of knowledge;
rather, it consists of a model of phases: redescription can be applied to any
particular domain of knowledge throughout development (ontogeny) or during a
process of new learning, both for children and adults (microgenesis) (Karmiloff-
Smith, 1992, p. 18).
The Karmiloff-Smith proposal seems valuable insofar as it provides a plausible
explanation for changes of knowledge, from the most bodily knowledge, implicit
in nature and linked to biology, to the most explicit, accessible to consciousness
and which can be expressed and shared through sign systems such as language or
any other kind of external representation. The model suggests that this step is
progressive; it is conducted in recurring phases with the redescription mechanism.
Unlike most studies in cognitive psychology that propose a dichotomous distinc-
tion between implicit and explicit knowledge (see, for example, Kirsh, 1992,
2010), the Karmiloff-Smith model has the advantage of averting implicit-
explicit dualism and especially of proposing an explanatory mechanism of
change.
However, one limitation of this model is that the change of knowledge has
only one direction (from implicit to explicit knowledge) and neglects other
directions of change that we also believe are fundamental and which occur in
many development and learning processes: the step from explicit knowledge to
less explicit knowledge, a mechanism that, based on studies by Pozo (2008,
p. 314) we will call ‘implicitation’. Implicitation occurs when knowledge
becomes represented in a more compact manner that is more procedural and
less accessible to consciousness. This process would be the reverse of that
described by Karmiloff-Smith. Basically, there are two situations in which this
mechanism occurs: either during development or during a learning process.
The first situation corresponds to the process of knowledge automation.
According to this process, knowledge that is initially controlled consciously
(and expressed through language, gestures or other semiotic means) becomes
executed automatically with repetition and learning. There are countless examples
that elucidate this change which have been extensively studied in cognitive
12 E. Martí

psychology through the opposition of controlled and automatic processes (see the
summary by Pozo, 2008, pp. 264–9). For example, in the field of numerical
knowledge, automation of counting is a good example of implicitation: if, at first,
children (often with adult help) have to control, think and sometimes verbalize
what they must do in order to correctly count a set of elements, with practice this
activity becomes automatic (how to count becomes implicit) (Gelman & Gallistel,
1978).
The second situation corresponds to the transition of one knowledge with
differentiated components that are directly accessible to consciousness to others
that are more compact and require that the subject makes inferences to detect
those different components. This second situation is very present during the
process of building complex knowledge such as external systems of representa-
tion. Generally, to the extent that in many of these systems their components have
been compacted to optimize the presentation of information, during the learning
process the subject must make some of this information implicit to achieve a
proper representational format.
Still regarding the numerical, it is known that a significant step in the
historical construction of the decimal number system was to move from
additive notational systems which explicitly showed the different components
of a number (an example would be a notation of 4 of 100, 7 of 10 and 6 of 1
for the number 476) to systems, such as the decimal, that hide some of this
information which must now be inferred to understand (say, to understand the
meaning of the notation 476) (Martí, 2003). We must note, incidentally, that
while the verbal system makes part of the information explicit, the written
system is more compact. It is no wonder then that children (or adults) who
have to learn the written number system encounter difficulties in handling this
type of notation and that some of these difficulties arise from the need to ‘make
implicit’ part of the information. Some examples of writing proposed by
children, such as writing the number 476 as 400706, highlight these difficulties
that are associated with the need to make certain information implicit (Scheuer,
Sinclair, de Rivas, & Tièche Christinat, 2000). At the same time, these same
children may have trouble interpreting a given notation and will be required to
infer some of the information that remains hidden in the notation, and so to
make it explicit.
Another example we have been able to analyse (Martí, Garcia-Mila, Gabucio,
& Konstantinidou, 2011) occurs frequently in the construction of tables. One of
the interesting features of tables is that their information is arranged compactly
into columns and rows. Each column and each row includes the same type of
information, whose nature is usually written in the table’s headers and margins.
Usually, when the construction of a table begins, the subjects repeat this informa-
tion when they start a new row (or column), instead of writing it only once in the
margin or header. This repetition of information that is not strictly necessary
seems to be an indication of the difficulty learners have in making this informa-
tion implicit in order to make the representation more compact. At the same time,
it is interesting to note that these same students may have difficulty in inferring
 Body, culture and cognition / Cuerpo, cultura y cognición 13

information from the table that is not explicit (Gabucio, Martí, Enfedaque,
Gilabert, & Konstantinidou, 2010).
Other results we found in our work on the acquisition and use of external
representations (Martí, 1996, 2003, 2012; Pérez-Echevarría et al., 2010) have
convinced us of the need to consider both directions in the transition of knowl-
edge (explicitation and implicitation) to elucidate both the interpretation and
production processes of these systems of representation throughout development
but also during the learning process. The refinement achieved by many of these
systems, numerical as well as those such as maps, graphs and many others, are not
understood without implicitation mechanisms that have progressively optimized
and condensed the information. It is thus not surprising that when these systems
have to be acquired, there is a need for the double process of explicitation (more
present when it comes to interpreting them) and implicitation (more present when
producing them) of some information.

Concluding remarks
The proposal for a dual process of explicitation and implicitation of knowledge
falls under the search for explanatory models that elucidate cognitive change
dynamically (both at an ontogenetic and microgenetic level). Or put another
way, one that integrates a developmental dimension, often absent in the proposals
of cognitive psychologists who have turned their backs on fundamental authors
such as Piaget or Vygotsky. Our proposal must be understood as an attempt to
reconcile the dualism of biology and culture, avoiding reductionist solutions. For
this reason, throughout this article we have insisted, basing ourselves on some of
Piaget’s basic ideas, on the need to find explanatory mechanisms of cognitive
change specific to individual functioning (psychological level).
The proposal that we have presented is still incipient and needs to be furthered
and nuanced, especially in the direction of implicitation processes. We are also
aware that we need new data that may provide more empirical support to both the
analysis of learning processes and developmental processes.