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 THE MONARCHOMACHS.

THEORIES OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY.

W HEN in I564 Calvin,the last of the quartette of great

Reformers which includedLuther,Zwingliand Me-
lanchthon,passedaway,theconditions and influenceswereclearly
discernible
whichwereto givecharacter to thedramatichistory
of WesternEuropeduringthenexthalf-century - theperiodof
widespread civiland international warfarein whichdifferencein
religiouscreedmarkedtheline of divisionbetweenthecombat-
ants. PhilipII, wellsettledas successorof CharlesV in Spain
and theNetherlands, was manifesting hispurposeto ruleas abso-
lute sovereign throughout all his possessionsand to crushProt-
estantism wherever it existed. In England,Franceand Scotland
threewomen,despiteJohnKnox's franticdemonstration of the
iniquityofsucha thing,'heldthereinsofpoliticalpower- Eliza-
beth,persecuting Calvinistsas wellas Catholics,yetalreadythe
mainstayof Protestantism againstPhiiip;Catherinede' Medici,
Catholicif anythingby conviction, but whollyMachiavellian in
heremployment of religionto aid herin wieldingtheauthority
whichrestednominally in herweak and incapableson,Charles
IX; and finally,Mary, Queen of Scots,a passionateFrench
girl,struggling by girlishmethods - with" owlingsand tears,"
as JohnKnox describedit- to assertfor herselfsome small
measureof the rightsof a sovereign againstthe violentnobles
and thegrimPresbyterians who deniedto hereitherpoliticalor
religious
independence.
In Spain and in Englandtherewas no civilwar duringthe
periodwe are considering.Philipand Elizabethalikeknewhow
to assertand enhancea monarchic authority thatshouldbe se-
cure againstresistance.Absolutismin each case restedupon
nationalfeeling:theSpaniardssubmitted to Philipthrough pride
in the greatness of his power,and theEnglishsupported Eliza-
1 See his First Blast of the Trumpet against the MonstrousRegiment of
Women.
277
278 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [VOL.XIX.

beth throughfear of this same power. Autocracywas an undis-

puted factin both countries,and by virtueof thiscondition,amid
all the literaryactivitythat characterizedthe period,politicalthe-
ory,as is usual in a time of absolutism,receivedpracticallyno
attentionin England and Spain.' Quite different was the case
in France, Scotlandand the Netherlands. In each of theselands
civil war was chronicduringthe last halfof the sixteenthcentury,
and fromeach arose strikingcontributions to politicalphilosophy.
Though thesewars were rathermore politicalthan religiousin
origin,theybecame in theirdevelopmentdistinctly affairsof creed,
and in each case the resultturnedupon the demarcationbetween
Protestantand Catholic. Thus beforethe end of the sixteenth
centurythe teachingsof Luther and Calvin, despite the pacific
leanings of the Reformersthemselves,had by force of circum-
stancesbecome a decisivefactorin the politicaltransformations of
the chief powers of Europe. Protestantism in consequence as-
sumed a militantaspect,and out of the turmoildevelopedtheories
of Christianduty in the state that bore littleresemblanceto the
ancient ideals of passive obedience to establishedauthority. To
explain the proceedingsand the triumphsof the French,the Scot-
tish and the Dutch Calvinists,a thoroughand aggressiveover-
hauling of politicaldogma was required,and to some of the chief
worksby whichthiswas effected our attentionwillnow be directed.

The Vindicia contraTyrannos.

The controversialliteraturewhichwas producedin France by
the religiouswars included many violent anti-monarchicworks
by Catholic as well as by Protestantwriters. The latterfound
their chief inspirationin the affairof St. Bartholomew's,the
formerin the abandonmentof the League and the assassination
of the Guises by Henry III. So far, however,as philosophical
foundationand generalprincipleswereconcerned,theCatholicand
the Protestantdebaters were substantiallyon common ground.
Both alike justifiedresistanceto a French king on the general
principlethatundercertaincircumstancesa kingbecame a tyrant
1 Mariana, whose workis consideredbelow,wrotejust at the end of the reign
of Philip II; and moreover,Mariana's workwas conspicuouslyexceptional. For
jurisprudence,however,thisperiodwas mostgloriousin Spain.
No. 2.] THE MONARCHOMACHS. 279

and hencean outlaw,and on theparticularprinciple

thatunder
the Frenchconstitution
the monarchwas subjectto prettywell-
definedlimitations.Amongtheearliestand mostinfluential
dem-
onstrations
ofboththeseprinciples
werethetwoHuguenotworks:
Franco-Gallia,
by thedistinguished
juristFrancisHotoman,and
Vindicie contraTyrannos,publishedunderthepseudonymof Ste-
phanusJuniusBrutus,and written probablyby eitherHubert
Languetor Duplessis-Mornay.To theseworks,and especially
thelatter,ourattention
maybe confined.'
The Franco-Gallia,publishedin I574,2 limiteditselfpractically
to thedemonstration thatFrancewas never,in its constitutional
origins,an absolutemonarchy, but that,on thecontrary, a gen-
eral assemblyof the nationhad exercisedthe highestpolitical
powersthroughout theearlyhistoryoftheFranksand duringthe
Merovingian, theCarolingianand laterperiods. Hotoman'shis-
toricalerudition was verygreat,and he massedwithpowerful
effectthequotationsthathe gathered fromtheancientchronicles
to showthatkingswerechosenand deposed,legislation was en-
acted,and all themostimportant politicalbusiness
wastransacted
in the annualpubliccouncilof the Franco-Gallican state. But
theworkdid notgo intothefieldof generalpoliticaltheoryand
affectedthedevelopment of thatsystemof thought onlyby sug-
gestingand illustratingthe applicabilityof the historicalmethod
to the questionsat issue.
Of an entirelydifferentcharacter was the VindicicecontraTy-
rannos, or The Groundsof Rights against Tyrants.! This em-
bodied a mostcomprehensive treatmentof the foundationof mon-
archic authority,and presentedfromthe Protestantpointof view
a doctrinewhichradicallytransformed the attitudethat had been
taken under the instructionof the leading Reformers. The work
is systematicas well as comprehensive, and the styleexhibitsthat
I Prominentamong the Catholic anti-monarchic worksin France were: Bou-
cher, De iusta Henrici III abdicatione; Rossaeus, De iusta reipublicieChristi-
ane in reges impios et hxreticos auctoritate. See Janet,Histoirede la science
politique,vol. ii, pp. 82 et seq.; Treumann,Die Monarchomachen;Hallam, Liter-
ature of Europe, vol. ii, ch. iv.
2 I have used an English translationpublishedin London, I738.
' Published in Latin in numerouseditions. I have used thatof I595, annexed
to a Latin versionof Machiavelli's Prince.
280 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [VOL. XIX.

same glowingqualitywhichmarkedthe expressionin St. Bernard,

some centuriesearlier,of the best traitsof the Gallic tempera-
mentthroughthe mediumof the Latin language exquisitelyhan-
dled.
The Vindiciae answers four questions,of which the firstis:
Whethersubjectsare bound to obey a princewho enjoinswhat is
contraryto thelaw of God? To thisa negativeansweris obvious,
based on the positiveinjunctionof the Scriptures,on the incidents
of the procedurethroughwhich Saul was set up as king over
on the analogyof the feudalrelationship,
Israel, and, incidentally,
under which a vassal is bound to obey the superiorratherthan
the inferiorlord in case theircommands are in conflict.' This
answer is no different fromthatwhich had been givenby Luther
and Calvin.
The second questionis not of the rightto disobey,but of the
rightto resist:Whetherit is lawful,and if so, to whom,in what
manner,and to what extent,to resista princewho is violatingthe
law of God and layingwaste the church?2 The answer to this
question presentsformallyand completelythe theoryof contract
as determining the reciprocalrightsand duties of God, king and
people, and presentsthetheoryinisuch formas to exhibitperfectly
thetwo sourcesofthiscelebrateddoctrineof politics- Old Testa-
menthistoryand the Roman law.
It is assumed at the outset,in the long familiarmanner,that
the relationof God to the people of Israel mustbe acceptedas the
type of his relationto everyChristianpeople. But the control-
ling principlein the Old Dispensationwas covenantor contract
(jwdus). God chose Israel as his peculiar people and they on
theirpart agreed to maintainhis exclusiveworship.' When roy-
alty was set up this covenantwas confirmedand renewed. On
I "Reges omnes Dei vassallos esse, omninostatuenduinest . . . Si Deus est

dominisuperiorisloco,rex vassalli,quis non dominopotiusquam vassallo obedien-

dum pronunciet? Si Deus hoc praecipit,rex contra, quis regi adversus Deum
obsequiumdenegantemrebellemiudicet? . . . ergonon modo non tenemurobedire
regi,contralegemDei quid imperanti,verumetiam-siobedianus, rebellessumus."
2 "An liceat resistereprincipi legem Dei violantiet ecclesiam Dei vastandi:

quibus, quomodo et quatenus?"

8 This contractwas made by Israel at Ebal and Gerizim. Deut. Xi, 29 and
xxviiet seq.; Joshua,xxiv.
No. 2.] THE MONARCHOMACHS. 28I

this occasion the installationof monarchyinvolvedtwo distinct

contracts.' The firstwas that in which God, on the one hand,
and the people and king on the other,engaged to maintainthe
ancient relationof the chosen people, as the churchof God; the
second was thatto whichthe kingand the people weretheparties,
the formeragreeingto rule justlyand the latterto obey him. It
is underthe firstof thesetwo contractsthatthe rightof resistance
to an impious prince is manifest. King and people are co-con-
tractorsto maintaintheworshipof God; each, therefore, is respon-
sible for the fulfillmentof the and
obligation, each is authorized
to restrainthe otherfromviolatingit, since the innocentparty
would participatein the penaltyforsuch violation. The author
of the Vindiciac elucidates the situationby copious referencesto
the Roman law, and feels no incongruity in construingthe rela-
tion of man to his Creatorin termsof the rules of the market-
place.2 In the Old Testament historyabundant instances are
found in which the kings enforcedupon the people conformity
to theirpledgeto maintaintheworshipof God, and quite as many,
on the otherhand, in which the people constrainedthe kings to
keep the covenant,or deposed themforthe failureto do so.
But the rightof the people thus demonstrated,to resista king
who is deviatingfromhis dutyto God, is not to be recognizedas
pertainingto the masses in general. Action can be taken only
by the magistratesor the asse.mbliesin whom the power of the
II Kings, xi; II Chron. xxiii.
2 The contract,he explains, is like that in whicha creditoris secured by the
joint and severalobligationsof two or moredebtors. " VideturDeus fecissequod
in dubiis nominibuscreditoresfaceresolent,ut plures in eandem summamobli-
gentur." The factthat the people is a partyto the covenantis evidencethat the
people is notregardedby God as in that servile conditionto whichthe courtiers
assign it; for accordingto the Digest a slave is incapable of contracting. But
perha'ps the most interestinginstance of the author's preoccupationwith the
Roman law is to be found in his commentson the death of Saul. The king's
destructionis explained,of course, as the penaltyof his failureto keep the cove-
nant withGod. But why,the author asks, was his army,i.e. the people, also
destroyed? It must have been because of their joint responsibility with him.
For God would not avenge the sins of a kingon his people, or of a fatheron
the son. "Acerbum est, aiunt iurisconsulti,parentis scelera filiorumpenis lui.
Alieni sceleris quemquam pcenas pati iura non sinunt." That is, the author,
in following he iurisconsulti,forgetsGod's own words,"visiting the iniquity
of the fathersupon the childrenunto the thirdand fourthgeneration."
282 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [VOL. XIX.

people is organized. The multitudeas a whole, "that monster

with countlessheads," is incapable of action; but in everywell-
organized realm there are princes,peers, patricians,nobles,etc.,
normallyconstitutingan assemblywhose functionis to see to
the safetyof the state and the church. Private citizenshave no
rightof resistancesave in supportof the magnates,or by virtue
of a special mandate fromGod.' The maintenanceof religion,
thus,is assignedto the estatesof the realm,and the referencethat
the author makes to the deeds and doctrinesof Constanceand
Basel indicateswith sufficient clearnessboth the source and the
conservativecharacterof his theory.
The thirdquestion propounded in the Vindicie concernsthe
rightof resistanceon otherthan religiousgrounds: Whetherand
to what extentit is lawfulto resista princewho is oppressingand
destroyingthe state?2 The answer embodies a complete and
systematicdemonstration of popular sovereignty by divine right.
Royalty,the argumentruns, is merelyan institutionof conven-
ience forthe benefitof the people. God sanctionsit to this end.
A king neverreignsin his own right;he is chosenby God and is
installedby the consentof the people.3 The historyof the Israel-
ites, of the ancientGreeks and Romans and of the Frenchmon-
archy is shown to establish this principle. "No one is born a
king; no kingcan existperse or can reignwithouta people. But
on the contrary, a people can existperse and is priorto thekingin
time." Even where,as in France, the kingshipis hereditary, the
fundamentalfactis thatthe choice of a kingis voluntarily limited
by the people to a singlefamily.4 That the essentialfunctionof
royaltyis to provideforthe welfareof the people, is obviousfrom
the nature of things. It is clear at the outsetthat men who are
by nature free,impatientof subjectionand born ratherto com-
I But the claim to a special mandatemustbe mostcarefullyestablishedin order
to justifyaction by a privatecitizen: "privatosni extraordinemad id munusvo-
catos evidenterappareat, suapte auctoritateanna se capere nullo jure posse."
2 "An
et quatenus principirempublicamaut opprimentiaut perdentiresistere
liceat? Item quibus id et quomodo et quo iure permissumsit?"
3 The whole argumentconsistsin a formalproofthat "electionemregistribui
Deo, constitutionem populo."
4 "Qui vero ex ea stirpeproximisunt non tam reges nascunturquam fiunt;
non tam regesquam regumcandidatihabentur."
No. 2.] THE MONARCHOMACHS. 283

mandthanto obey,have not deliberately chosensubmission to

anotherand renounced thelaw of theirverynature,as it were,
exceptforthesakeofsomegreatadvantage.' TakingfromSeneca
theconception ofa primeval"goldenage," in whichgovernment
was unnecessary and no onewouldhavehad a crownifhe could
have pickedit up in thestreet,theauthorascribestheoriginof
royaltyto the necessity forleadershipthat arosewhen private
property beganto be recognized.2Monarchswereappointedto
determine rightsat homeand to lead armiesabroad; but they
alwaysremainedsubject,in theirpowersand actions,to theend
forwhichtheywerecreated. Such beingthe originalcharacter
ofroyalty, it is easyfortheauthorto prove,as he does at length
in mosteloquentfashion, thatthesweeping claimsofpowermade
by courtiers (aulici nostri)on behalfof kings,especially in refer-
enceto property and taxation,are baseless.'
The trueprincipleon whichto explainthe wholerelationof
kingto peopleis thatof thesecondcontract alreadyreferred to.
This is entereduponbetweentheking,on the one side,and the
magnates, representing thewholepeople,on theother. The form
is thatof the Romanstipulatio,and the peoplehas the partof
stipulator,which,theauthorobserves, is at law themoreadvan-
tageous. The peopleasksofthekingwhether he willreignjustly
and according to law; he answersthathe will. Thereuponthe
peoplepledgesitselftoyieldfaithful obedienceso longas he keeps
his promise. Thus thekingcontracts absolutely, thepeoplecon-
ditionally;hence,thefailureofthekingto fulfill his undertaking
freesthe peopleipso iure fromtheirobligation.This compact
completes therelationship whichis inchoatein thefirstcompact
ofkingand peoplewithGod.
"Primum sane palam est, homines natura liberos,servitutisimpatientes,et
ad imperandummagis quam ad parendumnatos, non nisi magna cuiusdam uti-
litatiscausa imperiumalienumultroelegisse,et sutequasi natura legi, ut alienam
ferrent,renunciasse."
2 "Cum igiturMeum illud et Tuum orbem invasissentac de rerumdominio
intercives, mox vero de finibusinterfinitimos, bella exorirentur. . . reges creati
sunt ut domi ius dicerent,forisvero exercitumducerent."
3 "Statuamus tandem oportet reges patrimoniiregii non proprietarios, non
fructuarios,sed administratores tantumesse. Cumque ita sit, multo sane minus
aut rerumprivatarumcuiusque aut rerumpublicarumque ad singula municipia
pertinentproprietatem usumfructumve sibi tribuereposse."
284 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [VOL. XIX.

In thefirstcovenantorpactpietycomesunderthebond;in thesecond,
justice. In the one the kingpromisesdutifully to obey God; in the
second,justly to rule the people; in the one, provideforthe glory
to
of God, in the other,to maintainthe welfareof the people. In the
firsttheconditionis, if you observemylaw; in thesecond,if you se-
cure to egch his own. Failureto fulfillthe firstpact is punishable
immediately by God; failureto fulfillthe second,legitimately by the
wholepeople,or by themagnatesof the realm(regniproceres), who
have undertaken to watchoverthewholepeople.

That such is the true foundationof all royal governmentsis

evident,the authorholds, fromthe coronationpledges and oaths
that have appeared throughouthistory;I but even withoutthese,
it would be manifestfromnatureitself. Hence the definitionof
tyrannyis easy: the tyrantis he who willfullydisregardsor vio-
lates the contractthroughwhich alone monarchicdominion is
legitimate. The usurper,or tyrantabsque titulo,is an outlaw,
and resistanceto him is the rightof everyone, even the private
citizen,under natural law, under the law of nations and under
civil law. As to the tyrantexercitio,that is, the lawful kingwho
becomesunjust and oppressive,the representatives of the people,
having assured themselvesthat his offensesare not due to igno-
rance, unintentionalerroror mere incompetence,but are willful
and deliberate,must constrainand, if necessary,depose him.
Such is theirduty; theystand towardthe king in the positionof
co-guardian(contutor),to see that he does not violate his obliga-
tionto his ward (pupillus) the people.2 The councilof the realm
is in the state what the generalcouncilis in the church;and as it
has been universallyadmittedthat the general council may de-
pose a pope, even thoughhe claims to be kingof kings,withhow
much betterwarrantmay the council of the realm depose a mon-
arch. But private citizens cannot act in this matter. Resist-
ance to the tyrantexercitiois the rightonly of the whole people,

1 He dwells withspecial unctionon the famousformulaemployedby the Jus-

ticia of Aragon in the installationof the king: "We, who are as good as you and
are morepowerfulthan you, choose you as king,"etc.
2 Here the author'sanxietyto fortify his doctrinewithlegal principlesleads to
a change of base; thereis a considerabledifference betweena stipulatorand a
contutor.
No. 2.] THE MONA RCHOMA CHS. 285

with whom,as contrastedwithindividuals,the governmental

compactis made;and thepopulusuniversus is representedin the
one function as in theotherbythegreatcouncilofthemagnates.
The fourth questiondebatedin the Vindiciacis: Whetherit is
therightand dutyofprincesto interfere in behalfofneighboring
peopleswho are oppressedon accountof adherenceto thetrue
or by anyobvioustyranny?
religion, 1 The answeris affirmative
on bothbranchesof thequestion,and thegroundis, in theone
case theunityof theChristian church,in theothertheunityof
humanity, involving respectivelydutyto God and dutyto one's
neighbor.As thepreceding questionsare designedto justify the
resistanceoftheHuguenots to CharlesIX and HenryIII, so this
is designedtojustify theactionofElizabethofEnglandand some
of the Protestant princesof Germanyin extending aid to the
struggling Huguenots.And as the doctrineof popularsover-
eigntyis theoutcomeof the one undertaking, so an enlightened
viewofinternational solidarity
is strongly
presented in theother.

GeorgeBuchanan.
The chiefcontributionto politicaltheorywhichwas due pri-
marilyto theScottishReformation was Buchanan'sworkOn the
Law of theRealm amongtheScots,2 publishedin I579. John
Knox'sliterary productions
weremultifarious and influentialbut
theyembodiedno systematic treatment of politics. Buchanan,
however, in themonograph named,undertook a scientific
apology
fortheanti-monarchic proceedingsof recenttimes,especiallyin
Scotland,and dedicatedthe work,withgrimPresbyterian satis-
to hisroyalward,theyoungJamesVI. The central
faction, point
of thewholesubject,Buchananassumed,was thedistinction be-
tweenkingand tyrant, and theelaboration of thisdistinctionis
the generalthemeof the work.3 In literaryformas well as in
contentthemonograph reflects
veryfaithfully thehumanistic eru-
ditionof whichtheauthorwas so famousa master.
I "An iure possintaut debeant vicini principesauxilium ferrealiorum princi-

pum subditis,religionispurae causa afflictis

aut manifestatyrannideoppressis?"
2
De iure regni apud Scotos. Appended to his Rerum Scoticarumhistoria,
Aberdeen,I762.
3 Cf. secs. 6 and 7.
286 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [VOL. XIX.

Societyand government originate,Buchanan holds,in the effort

of men to escape fromthe primordialstate of nature,when, as
Polybius had describedit, theylived the bestial life,withoutlaw
and without fixed abodes.' The impulse to social life came
partlyfromthe sense of self-interest,2 but rathermorefundamen-
tallyfromthe instinctof associationimplantedby nature,or, bet-
ter, by God. In societythus constitutedthe attributeessential
to continuousexistenceis justice, as in the physical man it is
health. The functionof the king, therefore, is to maintainjus-
tice; and Buchanan throughouthis work recursagain and again
to the Platonic analogyof the truerulerand the skilledphysician.
But experienceteachesmen thatjustice is to be maintainedrather
by laws than by kings; hence it is that the rulers,originallyun-
limited in power, have with the developmentof enlightenment
been always subject to law.3 The makerof the law is the people,
actingthrougha councilof representatives chosenfromall classes,
and the interpreter of the law should be, not the king,but a body
of independentjudges. Nor is the king even to fill the gaps
which are bound to appear in the law fromtimeto time. His
functionin relation to the law is reduced to the minimum;
and yet, Buchanan holds, his task is a most substantial and
difficultone,- namely,to maintain the general morale of the
state by settingto the citizensa highexampleof rationaland vir-
tuous living.4
Having evolved this rathervague and visionaryconceptof the
king,the authorbodies forththe figureof the tyrant,whose char-
acteristicsare expressedwithall therhetoricalfrenzythatclassical
literaturehas renderedconventional.' Essentially,however,the
tyrantis a monarchwho eitherhas obtained his power without
the consentof the people, or has exercisedit otherwisethan in
1 . . "tempus quoddam cum homines in tuguriisatque etiam antris habi-
tarentac sine legibus,sine certissedibus palantes vagarentur." Sec. 8.
2 He notes veryacutelythe dangerof considering as the essential
self-interest
principleof social unity;forit may be adapted as well to the dissolution.asto the
consolidationof a community. C/. sec. 9.
3 "Regum insolentialegumfecitdesiderium."
4 Sec. 39.
6 Cf. the descriptionof thetyrant'slife,with"horror,""metus, ""faces Furi-
arum," "bellum," and all the restof the familiaraccompanimnents.
NO. 2.] THE MONARCHOMACHS. 287

conformity to justice. In the former case he is a mereoutlaw,

an enemyoftheraceand at themercyofeveryone; in thelatter
case he is by thenatureoftheoffice, as setforthabove,liableto
thepeopleforviolation ofthelaw,whichis theexpression ofjus-
tice as conceivedby the givensociety. Buchanancontroverts,
withgreatskill and precision,the arguments drawnfromthe
Scriptures forpassiveobedienceto tyrants.St. Paul's injunction
of submission to the higherpowersis subjectedto an especially
carefulinterpretation, thesubstanceof whichis thattheapostle
was addressing thosewhowere,like theAnabaptists, tendingto
disregardall social and politicalinstitutions,and thatthe com-
mand,therefore, referredto authority in generaland not to the
personswhoat anytimeexercised theauthority.'In viewofthis
construction of theinjunction to obedience, togetherwiththeex-
presscommandof theLord thatthe wickedbe cut offand re-
movedout of the midstof thepeople,Buchanan'sconclusion is
thata tyrant maybe slainwithimpunity.2
The wholebasis of therelationbetweenkingand people,par-
ticularlyin theScottish realm,is summedup, Buchananholds,in
the termsof a contract.A hereditary rightto exerciseroyal
powerhas been grantedby the people,but it is not in human
naturethatsuchpowerbe givenand obediencepledgedwithout
some consideration,3 and the consideration in this case is the
promise toconform tojusticeand law in theexerciseofthepower.
Violationof the termsof the pact by eitherpartydissolvesthe
bondand releasestheotherpartyfromn furtherobligations.But
thekingwhoseconducthas suchan effect and whothuspromotes
thedestruction ofhumansocietybecomesa tyrant and an enemy
of thepeople,and is therefore theobjectofa justwar;and when
sucha warhas oncebegun,it is lawfulnotonlyforthepeopleas
a wholebutevenforindividuals to slaytheenemy.
I Secs. 60-70. Paul, he says, wrotejust what would be writtennow to the
Christianslivingunder the rule of the Turks - to submitto overwhelming force
in the interestof peace, thoughwithoutany implicationthat the Turkish power
is in the truesense legitimate. Sec. 70.
2 Secs. 53-56, 86.
3 "Habet humanus animus sublime quiddam et generosum natura insitumut
neque quicquam est valentiusad con-
neminiparere velit nisi utiliterimnperanti;
tinendamhumanamsocietatemquam beneficiorum vicissitudo." Sec. 55.
288 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [VOL. XIX.

thus,is in last resorta just deviceformaintain-

Tyrannicide,
ing thereignof law amonga people. But beforethislast stage
is reachedtheremustbe somewayin whichthepeoplecan pro-
ceedin seekingto confinethekingto legalpaths. Whoshallcall
himto judgment? Buchanan'sanswer1 to thiscrucialquestion
thedegreeof clearnessattainedin the Vindiciaz.
lacks altogether
It mustbe, he says,thewholepeople,who aloneare above the
law. But whatiftherebe, as is alwaysthecase,a difference of
opinionamongthe people? Then the majoritymustdecide.
But whatifthemajority, fromtimidity or negligenceor venality,
standby theking? Then theymustbe considered bad citizens,
and the decisionmustbe made by the good citizens,who will
alwaysbe on thesideofliberty and decency.
This veryimpotent conclusionexhibitsthe bankruptcy of his
whole theory,as a practicalschemefor judginginstitutions.
The finaljudgmenton theultimateissue in thestateis to rest
withthe"good" citizens;butthereis no criterion fordetermin-
ingwhoare "good" citizensexceptthattheydecidethisissuein
a certainway. Buchananindeedconcedesthebankruptcy ofhis
theory by theremark:"But evenifthewholepeople(totaplebs)
shoulddissentfromproceeding againsttheking,thishas nothing
to do withourdiscussion;forwe are inquiring notwhatwillhap-
pen,butwhatcan justlyhappen."

JohannesAithusius.

The systematic politicaldoctrinewhichembodiesmost dis-

tinctlytheinfluence of conditionsin theNetherlands at theend
of thesixteenth century is thatof Althusius, the Germanjurist.
This philosopher was forthirty-fouryears(I604-38) chiefmagis-
trateof Emden,an imperial cityon thefrontierof thenew Dutch
Republic,and in bothpracticalactivity and doctrinal conviction
he manifested thefullestsympathy withthereligiousand politi-
cal ideals of the peoplewho werejust freeingthemselves from
Spain. His workon politicaltheory, Systematic Politics,illus-

I Secs. 76-S8o.
No. 2.] THE MONARCHOMACHS. 289

tratedby examplesfromSacred and ProfaneHistory,' was pub-

lishedin itscomplete formin i6io, whenthefamiliarity withthe
situation in theNetherlands had produceditsfullesteffect on the
writer'smind.2
The salientfeaturesof Althusius'ssystemare (i) exhaustive
analysisand application of thecontract theoryin theexplanation
of socialand politicalorganization; (2) a clearand precisecon-
ceptionof sovereignty; (3) the ascription of sovereignty exclu-
sivelyand immovably to the people; and (4) a conception of
"people" which is incompatible with any idea of a "state" ex-
ceptthatofa confederacy oflesserorganized units.
Everyspeciesof associatedlife(consociatio) amonghumanbe-
ingshas itsfoundation, Althusius holds,in an agreement or con-
tracttowhichtheindividuals are parties,and involves(i) a body
of rulesin accordancewithwhichthissocietyis to be conducted
and (2) a relationshipof command andobedience amongthemem-
bersfortheadministration of theserules. Humansocietyin its
mostgeneralaspectconsistsofa vastseriesofassociations, rising
withincreasing degrees of complexity from the family, through
thecorporation, the commune, the province, to a climaxin the
state. These variousspeciesofsocialorganization, withall their
infinitesub-classes,are mostdiversein theirpurposes,but all
alikehave thecharacteristic statedabove: in each thegivenend
conditions theadministration ofitsaffairs, and theessenceofthe
corporatelife inheresin the contractby whichthe individual
membersuniteforthe achievement of thatend. Of the public
associations, families unite to form communities, viz., villages,
counties,towns,cities; theseuniteto formprovinces;and the
1 Politica methodicedigesta, exemplis sacris et profanisillustrata. For the
account of Althusius'slife I have followedimplicitlythe exhaustive monograph
of Gierke: JohannesAlthusiusund die Entwicklungder naturrechtlichen Staats-
theorien,Breslau, i88o. And because I have been unable to procurea copy of
Althusius'swork,I have also followedGierke's analysisof its contents. There is
a useful analysis also in Bluntschli,Geschichteder neuerenStaatswissenschaft,
pP.77 et seq.
2 The workwas dedicated to the Estates of Friesland,one of the United Prov-

inces, and in the prefacethe revoltfromSpain is glorifiedas a realizationof the

theoryof the work.
3 Vici, pagi, oppida and civitatesare variousformsof the lower politicalcor-
porations.
290 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [VOL. XIX.

latterin turnunitewith the citiesor one anotherto formthe

highesttype,the state(politia, imperium,regnum,populus, res-
publica). The statehe defines as a generalpublicassociation in
whicha numberof citiesand provinces,combining theirpos-
sessionsand theiractivities, contractto establish, maintainand
defendthe fightsof the realm.' From this it follows -and
Althusius emphasizes thepointagainand again thatthemem-
-
bers of the stateare notat all theindividuals whoresidewithin
its limits,but the lesser corporations(cities and provinces)
through whosecontractual unionit comesintoexistence.
Sovereignty (maiestas)is definedas the supremeand super-
eminent powerof doingwhatpertainsto thespiritual and bodily
welfareofthemembers ofthestate. This powerinheres, by the
verynatureof theassociation, in thepeople- thetotality, that
is, of themembers of thestate. Not each memberis sovereign,
but the membersas an aggregate.Like all the anti-monarchic
writers, Althusiusillustrateshis theoryby thedictumof the Di-
gest: "Whatis owedto a corporation is notowedto itsindividual
members "; 2 and he ascribessovereignty to thecorporation,not
to its members.But forthe purposeof carrying out the func-
tionsof thestatedutiesmaybe distributed amongagentsof the
sovereign, and it is in thiscapacityalone thatkingsand magis-
tratesexerciseauthority.These functionaries, whatevertheir
powerand jurisdiction in referenceto theindividuals,are by the
verynatureofthecasethemselves subject to thepeople a whole.
as
This appearsnot onlyfromthe natureof everyassociation, in
whichthemembers unitefora certainend and necessarily retain
controlover the means to that end, but also fromthe nature of
forall menbeingnaturally
man himself; freeand equal, theex-
ercise of authorityby one over the restmustbe based on the con-
sent of the latter. Sovereign power, therefore,when properly
cannotconceivably
understood, be vestedin any individualor
groupof individualsless than the wholepeople. It cannotbe
I "Universalis publica consociatio,qua civitateset provincik plures ad ius
regni mutua communicationererum et operarum,mutuis viribus et sumptibus
habendum, constituendum,exercendum,et defendendumse obligant." Gierke,
Op. cit., p. 25.
2 "Quod universitati
debetursingulisnon debetur."
No. 2.1 THE MONARCHOMACHS. 29I

conferred upon any one by the people,forit is inextricably in-

volvedin theessentialconditions ofsociallife;so longas thereis
a people,it mustpossesssovereignty. The dutyof everyofficer
of thestate,then,is to submitto and enforce thelaws in which
thewillofthesovereign peopleis embodied.
The officialsofa statefallintotwoclasses: first, whatAlthusius
callsthe" ephors"; second,the" chiefmagistrate " (summus magis-
tratus). Underthe first
head he includes all the variousorders
and estatesin provinces and cities whosefunction it is to act
as a restrainton thechiefmagistrate.These variousbodies,or
individualsendowedwithsimilarpowers,are representatives of
the wholepeopleand are the organs for the expression of the
sovereign will. In defaultof actionby themon any pointtheir
authority devolvesforexerciseupon the assemblyof the whole
people. Under"chiefmagistrate" Althusiussetsforthhis con-
ceptionofroyalauthority.The kingis theexecutive ofthepeople,
to securetheirinterest and safetyby carrying out thelaws. His
relationto thepeopleis thatof agent(mandatarius), and-a con-
tractbetweenhimand thepeopleis perfected through his choice
and coronation.He undertakes to governin conformity to the
fundamental laws of theland,and theyagreeto obeyhim. But
like theauthorof the Vindiciez, Althusiusassignsto thepeople
theadvantageous r6leof stipulator, and maintainsthattheobli-
gationofthekingis absolutewhilethatofthepeopleis onlycon-
ditional.
Fromthisconception of therelationbetweenkingand people
thefamiliarconclusions as to thetyrant follow. Deliberatevio-
lationof the law or dereliction in his dutytransforms the chief
magistrate intothetyrant, releasesthepeoplefromthepledgeof
obedience,and calls intoactiontherightof resistance and depo-
sition whichis dormantso long
1 as the pact is observed. The
exerciseof thisrightin its completeness pertains,however, only
to thepeoplein theirsovereign totality,actingthrough theephors;
privateindividuals maymerelyinterpose a passiveresistance to
unlawfulcommandsand defend themselves in case theirnatural
rightsare assailed. But whileto the ephors,as a body repre-
1 "lus resistentieet exauctorationis."
292 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUlARTERLY. [VOL. XIX.

sentingthesovereign people,pertaintherightand thedutyofre-

sisting,of expellingand of puttingto deaththetyrannical chief
magistrate, to each memberof the confederacy, actingthrough
its particularephors,belongthe rightand the duty,as an ulti-
mate meansof security againsttyranny, of renouncing its con-
nectionwiththe restand of associatingitselfwithsomeother
realm. A breachof the compactout of whichthestatearises,
thus,justifiesnotonlyresistance but also secession;and Althu-
sius regardsthisdoctrine as a sourceof peculiarstrength to the
state,inasmuchas it providesan effective guaranteefor the
observance ofthelaw oftheland.'
The mostcursory viewof thesystemof Althusiusrevealsthat
fromtheconstitution
itis a generalization ofthedecaying German
Empire,withadaptations to therecentconditions in theNether-
lands. Apartfromtheframework of his systemoutlinedabove,
thereis muchofsoundand suggestive politicalsciencein hiswork.
maybe citedhistreatment
As illustrations ofthefunctions andthe
formsof government. The endsof thesocialorganization being
twofold, namely, thespiritual and thesecularwelfare ofthemem-
bers,thefunctions of thegovernment are to correspond.First,
it mustsupervise religion, worship,moralsand education;second,
it mustprescribe generalrulesof social conduct,to be enforced
by penalties,and in additionmustcarryon a widerangeofcon-
creteactivitiesforthepositivepromotion of thegeneralwelfare,
includingsupervision of trade,commerce, coinage,weightsand
measures,the administration of the publicrevenuesand prop-
erty,and theprotection ofthepeoplefrominternal perilsand ex-
ternalforce. Althusiusis a thorough Calvinist,and his scheme
of governmental functions inc'ludesthe maintenance of a state
church, witha schoolsystem underitsdirection, and a far-reach-
ingcensorship ofmorals.
As to theformsof state,he rejectsentirely theancientclassifi-
cationand holds,logicallyenough,thatsinceby theverynature
of the statesovereignty mustbe in the people,therecan be no
morethan one formof state. Government, however,may be
monarchic or polyarchic, accordingas thechiefmagistrate is an

1 Gierke,op. cit.,p. 35.

No. 2.] THE MONARCHOMACHS. 293

individualoran assembly.Yet,Althusius pointsout,itis scarcely

conceivable thatany purelymonarchic or purelypolyarchicgov-
ernment couldexist;therewillalwaysbe in a monarchy various
councilsand assembliesto sharetheresponsibilitiesof thechief,
just as therewill always be in a polyarchya concentration of
functions in some individualfor actual execution.Hence, he
concludes,everygovernment is normallya mixedform,and the
names monarchy, aristocracy and democracyhave real signifi-
cance onlyas designating the mostimportant elementin each
specificcase.
Juan de Mariana.
Whilethebulkoftheanti-monarchic doctrine oftheperiodwe
are consideringhad its inspirationin the controversiesbetween
Protestant one
subjectsand Catholicrulers, very notable expo-
sitionofthisdoctrine was producedin a kingdom wheretheCath-
olic faithand royalabsolutism had practically undisputed sway,
and by an authorwhowas identified withthe societythatmost
staunchly upheldthe cause of the old worshipagainstthe Re-
formers.I referto theworkoftheSpanishJesuit, Juande Ma-
riana,entitledOn Kingshipand theEducationofa King,' pub-
lishedin I599 and dedicatedto PhilipIII, of Spain. The ex-
tremeviewsembodiedin thisworkas to the limitations upon
royalpowerprobablyrepresent theinfluence of theextensivere-
searchesto whichtheauthorhad longdevotedhimself in connec-
tionwithhis greatHistoryofSpain;2 likeHotoman,in France,
he had been impressed withthe relativelylargepartplayedby
theEstatesin thegrowth ofmonarchy.
In developing his conceptionof theking,Marianastartsfrom
thenaturalstateofmen, which he describeswithsomefullness on
thegenerallinesof Polybius'sidea. In thebeginning menlived
like wild animals,following instinctin theprocurement of food
and thepropagation of theirkind,boundby no law and subject
to no authority.The lifehad its advantages:naturefurnished
foodand drinkand shelter, through fruitsand streamsand caves;

I De rege,et regisinstitutione. I have used the editionof Mainz, 1605.

2 Historie de rebus Hispanie, firstpublishedin I592.
294 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [VOL. XIX.

cheating, avariceand ambition

lying, wereunknown, and thecares
of privateproperty had notmade theirappearance;but,on the
otherhand,man'swantsweregreater and morevariedthanthose
of otheranimalsand at thesame time he was less adaptedthan
they1 to theprotection ofhimself and hisyoungfromthedangers
thatincessantly arose fromboth animateand inanimateforces
aroundhim. It was to overcomethesedisadvantages thatmen
groupedthemselves togetherand submitted to theleadershipof
someone whodisplayedespecialcapacityin promoting theirwel-
fare. This was theoriginofcivilsociety, to
withall itsblessings
therace. The timidity and weaknessof menwerethedivinely
implanted qualitiesthrough whichtherightsofhumanity wereto
be developed.
The earliestand naturalformof government, thus,was the
ruleofone,recognized as thewisestand unrestrained by anything
like law. But therestraints of law weresoon imposed because,
in thefirstplace,thewisdomand impartiality ofthemonarch be-
gan to be questioned, and in thesecondplace,theevilpassions
of men,growing stronger pari passu withtheincreasein knowl-
edge,requiredsomegeneralsystemof restraint.Laws wereat
firstprobablyveryfewand verysimple;but withtimetheyin-
creasedin numberand complexity tillnow,Marianamournfully
observes, "we areas muchburdened bylawsas byvices."3 The
existenceof law,however, by thesideofthepersonalrulerhe re-
gardsas oftheessenceofgovernment, and on thisassumption he
discussesthevariousformsof authority thathave arisenamong
mensincethefirstnaturalmonarchy.Royaltyis, on thewhole,
his preference.Democracyis plausible;but,he pointsout,fol-

1 Mariana dwells especiallyon the helplessnessof the human infantas com-

pared withthe youngof otheranimals. De rege,bk. i, ch. i.
2
"cSic ex multarumrerumindigentia,ex metu et conscientiafragilitatis, iura
humanitatis(per quam hominessumus) et civilissocietas,qua bene beateque vivi-
tur, nata sunt. . . . Omnis hominisratio ex eo maxime pendet, quod nudus
fragilisquenascitur,quod alieno pr2esidioindigetatque alienis opibus adiuvari
opus habet." Ibid. bk. i, ch. i.
8
"Illud etiam fitverisimile,leges initio paucissimas exstitisseeasque paucis
et apertis verbis nulla explicatione eguisse. Legum multitudinemtempus et
malitia invexittantumut iam non minus legibus quam vitiislaboremus." Ibid
bk. i, ch. ii.
No. 2.1 THE MONARCHOMACHS. 295

lowingPliny,wherever poweris in a groupof men,theless wise

partwillalwaysprevail," forthevotesarenotweighed butmerely
counted."1 Monarchy restrainedbylawhas lessevilsandgreater
thantheotherforms. It is likely,however,
efficiency to degen-
erateintotyranny, whichMariana,following regardsas
Aristotle,
consisting in monarchic ruleexercisedforthe good of the ruler
ratherthanthegoodof thesubject. Againstthisspeciesofgov-
ernment Mariana directshis celebrated and veryradicaltheory
of the rightof tyrannicide, underwhichare includedthe less
drasticforms ofresistance.2
The broadgroundson whichhe bases thejustification of re-
sistanceare,first,thesovereignty of thepeople,and second,the
commonsenseof mankind,as exhibitedin history.The royal
power(regia potestas)has itssourcein a grantby thepeople(res-
publica,populus);butin makingthisgrantofcertainrights(iura
potestatis)thepeoplereserves to itselfevengreater namely,
rights,
thoseof taxationand legislation.The peopleis, in otherwords,
above the monarch. Furthermore, thefamiliarexamplesof the
deposition and execution of tyrantsby peoplesin all partsof the
worldtellplainlyofthebeliefthathas universally prevailed,and
thisuniversal beliefis properlyto be taken as thevoice of nature
in our souls.3 Hence the monarchwho is clearlyruiningthestate
isjustlyliabletoremoval bythepeople. Caremustbe takeninthe
processso thatno greaterdisturbance thanis necessary ensue.
The assembly of the peoplemust warn the offender to reform,
and onlyupon his refusalmustproceedto extremities. When,
however, thepeoplethrough its assemblyhas spoken,then,and
nottillthen,maytheprivateindividual justlystaythetyrant.If,
however, is
as likely to be thecase, the assembly is notpermitted
to meetortoact,theprivate citizenis justified thetyrant
in killing
at discretion.4
I . . . "in omni deliberationepars sanior a peiori superabitur; neque enim

suffragiaponderantursed numerantur." Ibid. bk. i, ch. 2. Cf. Pliny, bk. ii,

epist. I 2.
3
This is the contentof book i, chapter6: "An tyrannumopprimerefas est?"
3 "Et est communissensus quasi quedam natursevox mentibus nostris in-
dita, auribus insonans lex, qua a turpihonestumsecernimus."
4 But givinghim poison to drink is an unchristianmethod,of assassination.
It makes the victimin a sense a suicide,and suicide is contraryto divineand nat-
 296 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [VOL. XIX.

Mariana is fullyawareof the dangersthatare latentin this

doctrine.He concedesthat it practically leaves to individual
judgment thedecisionas to whoshallbe considered a tyrant and
thusstrikes at therootofall politicalauthority.But stillhe con-
siderstheprinciple on thewholea usefulone. Men are in gen-
eralstrongly disposedto submitto tyranny forthesake of quiet,
and veryfewtyrants get theirdeserts;it is therefore a salutary
restraint uponprincesto inculcatethebeliefthattherightto as-
sassinatethemif theybecomeoppressive belongsto everyone,
and thattheauthority ofthepeopleis abovetheirauthority.1
But thenormalorganization ofmonarchy includesan organof
thepopularwillin theEstatesoftheRealm- thebishops,nobles
and representatives (procuratores) of thecities. This assembly is
whatMariana calls the "state" (respublica) and the "people"
(populus),and its superiority in powerto thekingis established
in a fullexamination oftherelative meritsofabsoluteand limited
monarchy.2The Estatesare theformulator and guarantor ofthe
fundamental law of the land,by whichthe monarchis circum-
scribed. In theircontrolrestall mattersof taxation,of succes-
sion to thethrone,of theestablished religionof thestate. The
prince is in no sense legibussolutus; besides therestraint imposed
by thesefundamental laws,he is.undera divineand naturalobli-
gationto submitto thewillof God, and evento publicopinion
(popularietiamciviumopinione). Mariananaturally dwellssome-
whatinsistently on the supremeimportance of the ecclesiastical
elementin theEstatesand of ecclesiastical interestsin thepolicy
oftheking; buthisemphasison thesepointsis notstronger than
thatof theProtestant whilehis generalattitude
controversialists,
towardabsolutism is entirelyin harmony withtheirs. He mourns
as sincerely overthedeclineof theEstatesin Spainas Hotoman
mournsoverthelikedeclinein France.
ural law. Mariana suggestshowever,that poison would be unobjectionableif it
could be administeredwithoutthe participationof the victimin the procedure,
as, for example, if his clothingcould be saturatedwith some deadly substance
whichwould be absorbedthroughthe skin. For thiscuriousdiscussionsee chap-
ter vii: "An liceat tyrannumvenenooccidere."
1 "Quod caput est, sit principipersuasum totius reipubliceemaiorem quam
ipsius unius auctoritatemesse." De rege,bk. i, ch. vi.
2 Book i, chapterviii: "Reipublice an regismaior potestassit?"
 No. 2.] THE MONA RCHOMA CHS. 297

One book1 oftheDe Regeis devotedto a discussion ofpractical

questionsof policyand administration - of theaims and meth-
ods that shouldprevailin the royalactivity.There is much
soundjudgmentdisplayedin thisdiscussion, and also at times
something ofthatpeculiarqualitywhichgaveMachiavelli a doubt-
fulreputation.The questionas to whether, in thechoiceofoffi-
cers of the state,moralcharactershouldbe a determining con-
sideration,is answeredaffirmatively as to ecclesiasticsand judges
and negatively as to military and minoradministrative positions.
Admirable chapterson taxationand moneyrespectively setforth
soundprinciples of economics, and exhibitthedisastrouseffects
of debasement of the coinage. Poor reliefis treatedat length,
and the functions of the ecclesiastical institutionsin the case of
paupersare rationally defended.The "tramp" questioneven
receives muchattention 2 - a factwhich,takenin connection with
the discussionof analogousquestions,indicatesthatSpain was
in a verydemoralizedconditionfromthe social and economic
pointof view. Mariana'sdiscussionof military policylikewise
suggestsa consciousness of something wrongin Spanishaffairs,
possiblya reflectionofthefailures in theNetherlands and against
England. Apart,however, fromtheparticular references toSpan-
ish affairs,his generaldoctrine is, likethatof Machiavelli,3 that
waris inevitable, thatstanding armiestherefore areindispensable,
and thatthe maintenance of domesticpeace is conditioned on
incessantwarfareabroad. This, then,mustbe theroyalpolicy.
A justcausecan generally be found,butwhether it can be or not,
keep the soldiersbusy withincursions intoforeignlands,with
pillaging ofunrighteous cities,withpurepiracyand brigandage if
necessary, and thusrelievethecitizensof theburdenof support-
ingthem.'

Book iii. The second book treatsof the educationof a prince.

2 Book iii, chapterxiv.
3 Cf. Dunning,Political Theories, Ancientand Mediaval, p 321.
4 "Contendo pacem domesticamdiu stare non posse nisi arma cum externis
exerceantur. Neque enim aut causa iusta deesse potest aut militum[milites?]
otio marcescerepati debemus; sed potius mari terraquepraedas agere,in alienos
fines irrumpere,urbes prxsertimimpiorumdiripiendas militi tradere." Bk. iii,
ch. v.
 298 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [VOL. XIX.

The Machiavellian spiritofwhichthisdoctrine is an example,

is manifest also, thoughin a less brutalform,in thechapteron
thewisdom(prudentia) of theking. The supremeartofroyalty
is to maintainthegoodwillof thesubjects.' Hope and fearare
thechiefmeans. Not so muchactualrewardsand punishments,
buttheexpectation ofthem,is effective.If a subjectseekswhat
it is wrongto give,do notdenyhimso flatly as toextinguish hope.
Let no one leave the royal presencein sadness. Unpleasant
duties.mustbe leftto subordinates; acts of graceshouldbe per-
formed bythekinginperson.2Let populartumults be suppressed
by themostruthlessofficials, and thenvisitupon thelatterthe
severest penaltiesforanydereliction on theirpartthatcan pos-
siblybe discovered;" thusall thewickedness willbe punished and
yet the people will remainwell-disposed towardthe prince."
"Nothing,"says Mariana,"is moreeffective withkingsor sub-
jectsthanself-interest, norcan therebe anylastingcompactsor
friendships save wherethereis hopeof someadvantage." Dis-
simulation, also, is indispensable to a monarch.Yet Mariana
willnotadmitin principle therightofthekingtolie ortodeceive;
only,he willget intoseriousdifficulties unlesshe concealshis
purposesand maintainsa benignant aspectwhenconditions are
mosttroublesome.4
Thesedoctrines in thefieldof politicalethicsgivea toneto Ma-
riana'sworkthatdistinguishes it fromthoseof theProtestant ad-
vocatesof popularsovereignty whomwe have considered.Cal-
vinisticstandardsof morality werenotoriously of a morerigid
and austeretypethanthoseoftheold creed,and Calvinistic the-
orists,whatever was trueoftheirpractice, in generalclungpretty
literallyto the Decalogue in theircode for kings. Mariana's
teachingsmanifest a tendency towardthatlax interpretation of

1 "Debet rex, nisi id nomenexuat, volentibusimperare."

2 Both Aristotleand Machiavelli had set forththisdictateof policy.
3 "Sit animo fixum,nulla re tum principestum privatosmoverimagis quam
utilitate: neque ulla firmafoederaputet, nullas amicitias, unde nihil speratur
commodi." Bk. iii, ch. xv.
I "Mentiri et fallere numquam principi concedam; sed nisi consilia tegere
didicerit,omnibusetiam noxilsbenignitatem ostentare,multis swpe difficultatibus
implicabitur." Ibid.
No. 2.] THE MONARCHOMACHS. 299

dutywhichcameto be associatedwiththenameofthesocietyto
theJesuits.
whichhe belonged,

of theAnti-Monarchic
GeneralInfluence Theories.
The theories whichhave just been describedinjectedintopo-
liticalphilosophy and made the centraltopicsof its discussions
conceptswhichdominated thefielduntilwellintothenineteenth
century.The stateof nature,the contractual originof society
and government and the indefeasible sovereignty of the people
becamehenceforth dogmasthatmightor mightnotbe accepted,
but could neverbe ignoredby any seriousthinker on politics.
That theseconcepts wereabsolutely novelat thistimeis ofcourse
nottrue. The literature of antiquityaboundsin allusionsto the
conditionof man priorto any social life,and theseallusions,
broughtprominently beforethe intellectualconsciousness of the
timesthrough therevivalofletters, contributedmuchto promote
discussionof the stateof nature. In like mannerthe idea of
contractand consentas thebasis of politicalauthority owedits
adoptionnotonlyto theclosestudyoftheancientJewishsystem
whichthe Reformation had broughtabout,but also, as shown
particularlyin the VindicizcontraTyrannos and in the writings
ofAlthusius, by theadaptationto politicaldebateofthedoctrines
of the Roman privatelaw. The systemof Marsiglioand Cu-
sanus,whichhad been adoptedfreelyby Lutherand the other
greatReformers in ecclesiastical
polity,was as freelyappliedby
theirsuccessors in politicalquestions. In thespirit, ifnotin the
precisewordsofCusanus,it was laid downthatsinceall menare
by natureequal, theauthority of anyone overanothermustrest
whollyon agreement and consent;and beyondwhereCusanus
had gone,theformand durationof thisagreement and consent
the
werededucedfrom principles of commercial contract.Now
forthe firsttimeexplicitly and withelaboration the maximsof
the Stoic jurists' of Rome weremade the chieffoundation of
speculations aboutthestateand government.
The religious warsat theend of thesixteenth century brought

I Cf. Political Theories,Ancientand Mediaval, pp. 128, 273 et seq.

300 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [VOL. XIX.

fullyintooperationin secularpoliticstheinfluences whichwere

supremein ecclesiastical politicsat thebeginning ofthefifteenth
century.1As Gersonand the conciliarpartysoughtto destroy
the autocracyof the pope and substitute the sovereignty of the
GeneralCouncil,so Languetand Buchananand therestsought
to destroythe autocracyof the kingand substitute the sover-
eigntyof theEstatesof theRealm. For in each of thetheories
describedabove,the" people" to whomsovereignty is ascribedis
interpretedmoreor less precisely to mean the assemblyof the
magnates. As the conciliarpartyhad consciously soughtto es-
tablisha government by thegreatprelates, so theanti-monarchic
partysoughtto establisha government by the secularnobles.
In a largesensethetheory ofpopularsovereignty at thistimewas
notrevolutionary, but reactionary; it presented thefamiliar phe-
nomenonof a philosophy based upon a systemof institutions
thatwas passingaway. For thepracticaldemandof theassail-
ants of monarchy was thatthefeudalaristocracy shouldresume
theswaywhichthemonarchs weretakingfromitshands. The
"sovereignty of thepeople,"as set forthespecially by Althusius,
was whollyopposedto the consolidation thatwas goingon and
thatcould be perfected onlyby the nationalmonarchs.Hence
the theoriesthat we have been considering failedof realization
in theprincipalkingdoms,2 and theabsolutemonarchy continued
itswork. Onlywhena newcontent was putintotheold formula
of "popularsovereignty" was the dogmaproperly adaptableto
revolutionarypropaganda.
In manydetailsof theirtheory theanti-monarchic writersthat
we have noticeddiffered fromone another,and the shadesof
doctrineon a variety ofsubjectsweremanifold.But onefeature
standsout clear and conspicuous in all thetheories, namely,the
idea thatpoliticalauthority is derivedby itspossessor notfroma
divinebutfroma humansource. The construction putbyLuther
and Calvinon the teachingsof the Scriptures in thisrespectis
dropped,and submission to anyparticular ruleras therepresenta-
tiveofGod'swillceasestobe thepresumptive dutyofa Christian.
1 Political Theories, Ancientand Mediaval, pp. 266 et seq.
2
Scotland remaineda constitutionalkingdomand the United Netherlandsan
aristocraticrepublic,but France, Spain and England wereabsolutemonarchies.
No. 2.] THE MONARCHOMACHS. 301

The law and thecontract intervene betweenGod and themon-

arch,and theroyalacts are to be subjectedto thetestof mere
humanreason. On thisgroundthe Protestants now unitewith
theCatholicfollowers of St. Thomasand denyto secularrulers
thatimmediate divineright,and hencethateverextending power,
whichtheearlystagesof theReformation had tendedto insure
to them. Calvinistsand Jesuitsagreein at least the one con-
tention,thatdespotism has no sanctionfromheaven.
But whilethismuchof theanti-monarchic doctrine is clear,
thereis muchvaguenessand conflict in the treatment of many
pointsoftheoretical importance."The people,"whichis at the
basis ofso muchoftheirdisputation, is a somewhat elusivecon-
cept. In one place thetermsignifies theclasseswhichconstitute
theEstatesof theRealm,in anothertheEstatesas organized in
theirassembly, in anothersomething whichtheEstatesrepresent:
butin no case willit be concededthatthepopulation as a whole,
conceivedas a multitude ofindividuals,is to be recognized as an
embodiment of politicalpower. Again,in the idea of the con-
tract,thepartiesare in everycase assumedto be thepeopleand
the king;but onlyAlthusiusgivesany adequateidea as to the
processby whicha peoplecomesto exist.' The contractdealt
withby all therestis, in short,whathas cometo be calledthe
civilorgovernmental contract,as distinctfromthesocialcontract.
It was hardlystrangethatin the stressof controversy something
less thanexacttheoretical analysisshouldhavecharacterized the
thinking of the earnestmenwho werein the heartof thefray.
They soughtand in a measureachievedcertainconcreteends,
but it was leftfora seriesof thinkers who couldbringmoreof
philosophy and lessofpassionto thetask,to formulate withpre-
cisionthe definitionsand thedogmaswhichwereof thehighest
significancein thepoliticaltheory ofthetimes.
WM. A. DUNNING.

1 Mariana startsfromthe isolated man, but the steps by which a numberof

thesebecome a people, capable of expressinga corporatewill,are notindicated.