Brecha de Suwałki

Brecha de Suwałki
Primer plano de Suwałki Gap (frontera

entre Lituania y Polonia resaltada en
naranja)
Mapa de Europa, con los países de la

OTAN en azul intenso, los países de la
OTSC en amarillo y la frontera polaco-
lituana resaltada en rojo.
La brecha de Suwałki , también conocida
como corredor de Suwałki [a] [b] (
[suˈvawkʲi] ⓘ ), es un área escasamente
poblada alrededorde la
fronteraentreLituaniayPolonia, y se centra
en el camino más corto entreBielorrusiay
elenclaveruso delÓblast de Kaliningradoen
el lado polaco de la frontera. Estepunto de
estrangulamientoque lleva el nombre de la
ciudad polaca deSuwałkiha adquirido una
gran importancia estratégica y militar
desde que Polonia y losestados bálticosse
unieron a laOrganización del Tratado del
Atlántico Norte(OTAN).
La frontera entre Polonia y Lituania se
formó después del Acuerdo de Suwałki de
1920, pero tuvo poca importancia en el
período de entreguerras , ya que en ese
momento las tierras polacas se extendían
más hacia el noreste, mientras que
durante la Guerra Fría , Lituania era parte
de la Unión Soviética y La Polonia
comunista pertenecía a la alianza del
Pacto de Varsovia liderada por los
soviéticos . La disolución de la Unión
Soviética y el Pacto de Varsovia
endurecieron las fronteras que cortan la
ruta terrestre más corta entre Kaliningrado
(territorio ruso aislado del continente ) y
Bielorrusia (aliado de Rusia).
Cuando los Estados bálticos y Polonia
finalmente se unieron a la OTAN, este
estrecho tramo fronterizo entre Polonia y
Lituania se convirtió en una vulnerabilidad
para el bloque militar porque, si estallara
un hipotético conflicto militar entre Rusia y
Bielorrusia por un lado y la OTAN por el
otro, la captura de la franja de tierra de 65
kilómetros (40 millas) de largo entre el
Óblast de Kaliningrado de Rusia y
Bielorrusia probablemente pondría en
peligro los intentos de la OTAN de
defender los estados bálticos. Los
temores de la OTAN sobre la brecha de
Suwałki se intensificaron después de
2014, cuando Rusia anexó Crimea y lanzó
la guerra en Donbas , y aumentaron aún
más después de que Rusia invadió Ucrania
en febrero de 2022. Estas preocupaciones
llevaron a la alianza a aumentar su
presencia militar en la zona y a una carrera
armamentista. fue desencadenado por
estos acontecimientos.
Tanto Rusia como los países de la Unión

Europea también vieron un gran interés en
los usos civiles de la brecha. En la década
de 1990 y principios de la de 2000, Rusia
intentó negociar un corredor
extraterritorial para conectar su enclave
del Óblast de Kaliningrado con Grodno en
Bielorrusia, pero Polonia, Lituania y la UE
no dieron su consentimiento. El
movimiento de mercancías a través de la
brecha se vio interrumpido en el verano de
2022, durante la invasión rusa de Ucrania ,
cuando Lituania y la Unión Europea
introdujeron restricciones de tránsito a los
vehículos rusos como parte de sus
sanciones . La carretera Via Baltica , un
vínculo vital que conecta Finlandia y los
estados bálticos con el resto de la Unión
Europea, pasa por la zona y, en agosto de
2023, está en construcción con la nueva
autopista S61 en Polonia y la autopista A5
en Lituania en proceso de mejora. a una
carretera dividida .
Fondo
La brecha de Suwałki es una región

escasamente poblada en la esquina
noreste de Polonia, en el voivodato de
Podlaquia . Esta zona montañosa, una de
las más frías de Polonia , [1] está situada
en los márgenes occidentales de la llanura
de Europa del Este . Está atravesado por
numerosos valles fluviales y lagos
profundos (como Hańcza y Wigry ), y sus
vastas extensiones están cubiertas por
espesos bosques (incluido el bosque
primitivo de Augustów ) y marismas ,
como las del Parque Nacional de Biebrza .
[2] [3] Al oeste se encuentra otro distrito de
lagos conocido como Masuria . La zona
está relativamente poco desarrollada: hay
poca industria además de las
instalaciones relacionadas con la
silvicultura , la red de carreteras es escasa
y el gran aeropuerto más cercano se
encuentra a varios cientos de kilómetros
de distancia; [3] [4] sólo dos carreteras
principales (con al menos un carril en
cada dirección) y una línea ferroviaria
unen Polonia con Lituania. [5] [6] El área es
hogar de algunas minorías étnicas,
particularmente ucranianos , lituanos
(cerca de la frontera con Lituania ) y rusos
, pero los rusos no son muy numerosos en
el lado polaco. [2] [7]
Polonia y Lituania obtuvieron su

independencia después de la Primera
Guerra Mundial y comenzaron a luchar
para establecer el control sobre todo el
terreno que pudieran controlar
militarmente. Si bien Lituania reclamó
Suwałki y Vilnius , de mayoría polaca ,
finalmente no logró controlar ambas. Se
acordó que Suwałki fuera parte de Polonia
como resultado del Acuerdo de Suwałki ,
mientras que Vilna fue capturada por
Polonia en una operación de bandera falsa
conocida como el motín de Żeligowski . [8]
En el período de entreguerras , la región de
Suwałki era una protuberancia de Polonia
en los alrededores de Lituania y Prusia
Oriental (parte de Alemania ), en lugar de
una brecha, y jugó poca importancia
estratégica. [3]
El trípode Rusia-Lituania-Polonia
cerca de Vištytis (fotografiado desde
el lado polaco) marca el extremo
noroeste de la brecha de Suwałki.
Rusia está a la izquierda y Lituania a
la derecha.
Después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial ,

las cercanías de Königsberg (rebautizada
como Kaliningrado poco después de la
guerra) fueron incorporadas como parte
de la SFSR rusa , parte de la Unión
Soviética , y se convirtieron en un área
cerrada durante la mayor parte de la era
soviética ; [9] Lituania se convirtió en una
república de la Unión dentro de la URSS,
mientras que Polonia quedó bajo la esfera
de influencia soviética y se unió al Pacto
de Varsovia . Hasta la disolución de la
Unión Soviética , el único vecino oriental y
septentrional de Polonia era la URSS, por
lo que, como en el período de
entreguerras, la región importaba poco en
términos militares. [5] [10] Esto cambió
después de 1991, cuando el Óblast de
Kaliningrado se convirtió en un semi-
exclave de Rusia, intercalado entre Polonia
y Lituania, los cuales son vecinos de
Bielorrusia pero ninguno tiene frontera con
la parte "continental" de Rusia. Los
vecinos del Óblast de Kaliningrado
ingresaron a la Unión Europea y a la
Organización del Tratado del Atlántico
Norte (OTAN), pero al mismo tiempo, sólo
65 km (40 millas) de territorio polaco
separan dos áreas de la rival Organización
del Tratado de Seguridad Colectiva (OTSC)
y la Unión. Estado , los cuales incluyen a
Rusia y Bielorrusia. [6] El ex presidente
estonio Toomas Hendrik Ilves afirma
haber ideado el nombre "Suwałki Gap"
antes de su reunión con Ursula von der
Leyen , entonces ministra de Defensa de
Alemania , en abril de 2015 para resaltar la
vulnerabilidad de la zona. para los estados
bálticos. [11]
Interés civil
corredor ruso
The first time a special corridor between

Kaliningrad and Belarus (planned to go via
Poland) was discussed was during a 1990
meeting between Yuri Shemonov, a senior
official in Kaliningrad Oblast, and Nikolai
Ryzhkov and Mikhail Gorbachev, Premier
and President of the Soviet Union,
respectively. While Ryzhkov was
supportive of the idea, Gorbachev vetoed
the proposal, urging the other two men to
"stop spreading panic".[12]
After the Soviet Union fell apart,

Kaliningrad was cut off from Russia, thus
the Russians sought to secure a land
transit route from the exclave to mainland
Russia through Belarus. After some initial
preparations, including signing a treaty
which obliged Poland and Russia to open
a border crossing near Gołdap, the
Russian government announced their
intention to build a special
"communication corridor" between the
checkpoint and Grodno in Belarus,
justifying the decision by the region's close
economic ties with the country. Russia,
which communicated the idea to the
Polish side in 1994, additionally sought to
bypass Lithuania, with which it had
strained diplomatic relations.[13] Initially,
the idea sparked little interest,[13] but
extensive discussions came in 1996, when
Boris Yeltsin, President of Russia, declared
he would negotiate with the Polish side to
seek permission to build a motorway,
citing high transit costs via Lithuania.[14]
The top Polish government officials

rejected the proposal.[15] Among the main
reasons was the fact that among Poles,
the proposal sounded too much like the
German request for an extraterritorial link
through the Polish Corridor just prior to its
1939 invasion of Poland, and was thus
seen as unacceptable.[16][17] This feeling
was amplified by the persistent usage of
the word "corridor" among Russian
officials.[18][19] Aleksander Kwaśniewski,
then-president of Poland, sounded
concerns about the environmental impact
of the investment,[14] while some
politicians from the then-ruling coalition
(SLD-PSL) argued that the corridor would
cause a deterioration of diplomatic
relations between Poland and
Lithuania.[13][20] There have been reports
that Suwałki Voivodeship started talks
about the corridor to alleviate its economic
problems and even signed an agreement
with Grodno Region authorities to promote
its construction via a border crossing in
Lipszczany,[12][20] but Cezary Cieślukowski,
then-voivode of Suwałki who was seen by
the media as supportive of the idea,
denied having ever endorsed the proposal,
and no proof for that (such as plans or
cost estimates) was found in an internal
party investigation.[13] When GDDKiA, the
Polish agency responsible for the
maintenance of main roads, updated its
plans for the expressway network in 1996,
the proposed link was nowhere to be
found.[21]
The topic returned in 2001–2002 when

Poland and Lithuania were negotiating
accession to the European Union. Russian
citizens in Kaliningrad were facing the
prospect of having to use passports and
apply for visas to cross the border of the
new EU member states, which sparked
outrage in the Russian press. Therefore,
Russia suggested that the European
Commission grant a right to a 12-hour free
transit for the citizens of the oblast
through special corridors in Poland and
Lithuania, but this proposal was
rejected.[22] Another proposal, with sealed
trains, also failed to gain traction; it was
ultimately agreed to introduce special
permits for Russian citizens travelling
to/from Kaliningrad Oblast for transit
through Lithuania (but not Poland),[19]
known as Facilitated Rail Transit
Document (FRTD) and a Facilitated Transit
Document (FTD) for rail and road trips,
respectively.[23]
Kaliningrad Oblast has since been

generally supplied by freight trains
transiting through Lithuania. However, on
17 June 2022, in retaliation for Russia's
invasion of Ukraine, Lithuania started
blocking supplies of sanctioned items to
the enclave via road or rail, citing EU's
sanction guidance.[24] That guidance was
then clarified in a way that exempted rail
traffic from the restrictions so long as the
volume of deliveries remained within prior
consumption volumes,[25] but then Šiaulių
bankas, the bank servicing the transit
payments, announced it would refuse to
accept ruble payments from 15 August
and any payments from Russian entities
from 1 September.[26] Transit remains
possible via payments to other banks but,
in September 2022, was expected to
become more burdensome as payments
for each freight service will be processed
separately to comply with Lithuanian anti-
fraud regulator's guidance.[27]
EU civilian infrastructure
State of construction of expressway

S61 in Poland, as of 22 May 2022
(green: open; red: under construction)
A strategic communication artery, known

in the international E-road network as E67
or as Via Baltica (expressway S61 on the
Polish side and A5 highway on the
Lithuanian part), passes through the
Suwałki Gap.[28] It is part of the North Sea-
Baltic Corridor (previously the Baltic-
Adriatic Corridor),[29] one of the core
routes of the Trans-European Transport
Network (TEN-T) that connects Finland
and the Baltic states with the rest of
Europe.[30] As of August 2023, the Polish
expressway is mostly completed or under
active construction; the opening of most
of the yet-unopened segments is expected
by 2023, and the road is planned to be
finished by 2025.[31][32] On the Lithuanian
side, the preexisting A5 highway is being
upgraded to a divided highway with grade-
separated junctions, with the design
contracts awarded in 2020–2021. The
section of the motorway close to the
Suwałki Gap is expected to be completed
by late 2025.[33]
Planned Rail Baltic line
The Suwałki Gap also serves as an

important constraint on civilian airspace
since the 2022 Russian invasion of
Ukraine began. Due to the sanctions
against Russia and Belarus, the closure of
civilian airspace by Belarus, and then
retaliatory sanctions by Russia, the only
feasible way for civilian planes to fly from
the Baltic states or Finland south is
through the Suwałki Gap. It is also the
route for the only land based high voltage
line (the LitPol Link) and the only railway
(single-track, non-electrified) linking the
Baltic states with the rest of the European
Union. The rail line only reaches Kaunas,
as Lithuania and Poland operate different
track gauges - the railways in the Baltic
states still use the Russian gauge, while
the vast majority of Polish rolling stock is
adapted to the standard gauge common in
Europe.[34] The Rail Baltica project is
underway to improve the existing
connection and lay a new standard gauge
trunk line running across the Baltic States
from Kaunas to Tallinn and eventually
underneath the Gulf of Finland to Helsinki,
however its first sections are expected to
become operational only after 2028. The
Gas Interconnection Poland–Lithuania is
the only terrestrial link between the Baltic
and Finnish natural gas pipeline system
and that of the rest of the European Union
(the reason it was recognized as a Project
of Common Interest by EU authorities),
was opened on 1 May 2022.[35]
Consideraciones militares
History
Frontlines on 18 February 1915,

during the Second Battle of the
Masurian Lakes, waged in the Suwałki
Gap area
NATO armoured vehicles seen going

through the former Budzisko-Kalvarija
border crossing into Lithuania as part
of Operation Dragoon Ride, 2015
Long before the Suwałki Gap became of

concern to NATO, several army battles or
operations occurred on the terrain. For
example, during Napoleon's war in Russia,
part of his army, which crossed into the
country from the Duchy of Warsaw, used
the Suwałki Gap as a launching pad for the
invasion and, by the beginning of 1813,
when the remnants of his army retreated, it
crossed the gap from Kaunas towards
Warsaw. Both battles of the Masurian
Lakes during World War I passed or were
directly waged on the territory. During the
invasion of Poland, which started World
War II, most of the action skirted the area,
while in 1944, the Red Army simply
advanced into East Prussia and no major
battle occurred in the area.[6]
Poland and Lithuania joined the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1999 and
2004, respectively. On the one hand, this
meant that the Kaliningrad exclave was
surrounded by NATO states, but on the
other, this created a choke point for the
military alliance as all troops supplied by
land must pass through the Suwałki Gap.
In the event of its capture, the Baltic states
would be surrounded by Russia, Russian-
controlled territories, and Belarus, a
Russian ally.[36] Even if Belarus or Russia
are not physically present in the corridor, it
is narrow enough for the short-range
rockets stationed in either country to
target any military supplies coming
through the corridor, while alternative
routes of delivery, i.e. by sea or air, are also
threatened by the anti-air and anti-ship
missiles stationed in Kaliningrad
Oblast.[37][38] Due to its strategic
importance for NATO and the Baltic states,
it has been described as one of NATO's
hot spots,[2] its "Achilles' heel"[39] and
dubbed the modern version of the Fulda
Gap.[40][41][42][43]
Initially, this vulnerability was of relatively

little concern as, throughout most of the
1990s, Russia was stuck in a deep
depression, which necessitated large-
scale cuts to the country's military
budget.[17] Even though the army was of
significant size, it was poorly equipped and
had low military capabilities.[44]
Additionally, Russia–NATO relations were
more cordial then, as Russia was not
openly hostile to NATO, which was
affirmed while signing the 1997 Founding
Act, and it was thought that Russia would
eventually become a pacifist democracy,
decreasing its military and nuclear
presence.[45][c] NATO's commitment not to
build any permanent bases beyond the
Oder river therefore seemed
reasonable.[40]
Tanks crossing a water obstacle on
the Hozha training ground, Grodno
Oblast, Belarus, 30 km (19 mi) from
the Suwałki gap, during the 2020
Slavic Brotherhood exercises
Multiple rocket launchers during

Zapad 2021 exercises on the Obuz-
Lesnaya military base near
Baranavichy, Belarus
A German Army soldier directs a

tank out of water. This activity was
part of the 2017 Iron Wolf exercises
in Lithuania
Escalation of tensions
The qualitative and quantitative

improvement in armaments started with
the rule of Vladimir Putin.[44] Short-range
(500 km [310 mi]) Iskander missiles,
capable of carrying nuclear warheads,
were installed in 2018.[47][48] Additional
installations were deployed in the late
2010s, including more area denial
weapons, such as K-300P Bastion-P and P-
800 Oniks anti-ship missiles and S-400
anti-air missiles.[49][50][38]
In general, the importance of the corridor

among the Western nations is said to have
been initially underestimated due to the
fact that Western countries sought to
normalise relations with Russia.[6] Most of
NATO's activities therefore concentrated
on drills and exercises rather than
deterrence.[51] The shift in policy occurred
gradually after Russia's aggression in
Ukraine, which started in 2014.[37][52][53]
After the 2014 Wales summit and then the
2016 Warsaw summit, NATO members
agreed on more military presence in the
eastern member states of the Alliance,
which came to fruition as the NATO
Enhanced Forward Presence.[54][55] In
2018, the Polish side proposed to station a
permanent armoured division in the
Bydgoszcz-Toruń area (dubbed "Fort
Trump") with up to US$2 billion in financial
support,[53] but NATO did not agree to it as
it was afraid it would potentially run afoul
of the 1997 Founding Act, which, among
other things, constrains NATO's ability to
build permanent bases next to the Suwałki
Gap.[56][57]
While the permanent military base

ultimately did not appear, the military
situation around the region has been
steadily escalating, and deterrence tactics
seem only to have increased the
concentration of firepower on both
sides.[7] Several military drills, including
Zapad 2017, Zapad 2021 and the Union
Resolve 2022 exercises in Belarus and
Kaliningrad Oblast and others that were
unexpected,[7] and NATO's 2017 Iron Wolf
exercises in Lithuania as well as some of
the annual Operation Saber Strike
operations,[58] occurred in areas close to
the Suwałki Gap.
The Russian forces did not leave Belarus

after the 2022 exercises and invaded
Ukraine from the north in February and
March that year. As the war on NATO's
eastern border unraveled, NATO
dispatched more troops to its eastern
flank,[59][60] though its representatives said
it would not establish permanent presence
on its eastern borders.[61] The situation
around the area further intensified
following Lithuania's declaration on
banning the transit of sanctioned goods
through its territory.[62] As the security
situation rapidly worsened, the Lithuanian
and Icelandic ministers of foreign affairs
said that Russia had effectively repudiated
the 1997 agreement,[63] which was also
indirectly suggested by Mircea Geoană,
NATO's Deputy Secretary General.[64]
Current standing of forces
NATO and its member states
As of spring 2022, units closest to the

Suwałki Gap that belong to NATO or to its
member states included:
900 German soldiers[65] together with

Czech, Norwegian and Dutch troops,
totalling about 1,600 personnel,
alongside the Mechanised Infantry
Brigade Iron Wolf, dispatched in a NATO
multinational division in Rukla on the
Lithuanian side, 140 km (87 mi) from the
border.[66] The brigade is armed with
Leopard 2 tanks, Marder infantry
fighting vehicles, and PzH-2000 self-
propelled howitzers.[67] A subunit of the
Iron Wolf brigade, the Grand Duchess
Birutė Mechanized Uhlan Battalion, is
stationed in Alytus, 60 km (37 mi) from
the Polish-Lithuanian border.
Additionally, the military base in
Rūdninkai, which is 35 km (22 mi) south
of Vilnius and about 125 km (78 mi)
from the Suwałki Gap, was ordered to be
reactivated as a matter of urgency after
the Seimas passed a bill to that
effect.[68] The base was reopened on 2
June 2022 and is capable of holding
3000 soldiers.[69]
An American battalion-sized group (800
people) from the 185th Infantry
Regiment (as of mid-2022) together with
the Polish 15th Mechanised Brigade as
well as 400 British Royal Dragoons and
some Romanian and Croatian troops.
These troops are stationed near the
Polish towns of Orzysz and Bemowo
Piskie, about the same distance from
the border as Rukla.[70][71] The forces are
armed with American M1 Abrams and
Polish modified T-72 tanks, Stryker, M3
Bradley and Polish BWP-1 infantry
fighting vehicles, Croatian M-92 rockets
and Romanian air defence
systems.[34][67] Brigades in both
countries operate on a rotational basis.
The Polish and Lithuanian host brigades
signed an agreement for mutual
cooperation in 2020, but, unlike with the
operations with foreign forces, these are
not subordinate to NATO
command;[72][73]
The 14th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment,
under Polish command, garrisoned in
Suwałki and armed with Israeli Spike-LR
missiles. The regiment was briefly
degraded to a squadron as its
equipment was outdated.[34] Some other
forces in the area under Polish
command include an artillery regiment
in Węgorzewo, a mechanised brigade in
Giżycko and an anti-air unit in Gołdap.[39]
Up to 40,000 troops within NATO
Response Force, activated on 25
February 2022 following Russia's
invasion in Ukraine, which are available
on short notice.[74]
In June 2022, Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary

General of NATO, pledged more weapons
and troops to the Baltic States,
augmenting NATO's presence to a brigade
in each of the Baltic states and Poland
(3,000-5,000 troops in each country), while
the NATO Response Force will be
increased to 300,000 troops.[75]
Russia and Belarus
Kaliningrad Oblast is a very heavily

militarized area subordinate to the
command of the Western Military
District.[76] Until the 2022 Russian invasion
of Ukraine, the Western MD hosted the
best equipment and army forces at
Russian disposal.[77] In 1997–2010, the
whole oblast was organised as a special
region under a unified command of all
forces dispatched there. Kaliningrad is the
headquarters of the Baltic Fleet and the
headquarters of the 11th Army Corps
(Russian Navy), which has ample air
defence capabilities and whose divisions
have undergone extensive modernisation
in the late 2010s. According to Konrad
Muzyka, who authored a detailed study on
the district's forces, the units stationed in
Kaliningrad permit medium-intensity
combat in the area without support from
the Russian mainland. The town of Gusev,
in the eastern part of the oblast, just 50 km
(31 mi) from the Vištytis tripoint, hosts the
79th Motor Rifle Brigade (BMP-2s and
2S19 Msta self-propelled howitzers) and
the 11th Tank Regiment (90 tanks, of
which most are T-72B1s at least 23 are the
more recent T-72B3s).[78][79] Missile units
are stationed on the Chernyakhovsk air
base (Iskander missile launchers), while
the majority of air defence units (Smerch
and BM-27 Uragan multiple rocket
launchers) are located in the vicinity of
Kaliningrad.[77] Kaliningrad also hosts
capabilities to conduct electronic
warfare,[77] in which the Russian forces
have both inherited much experience from
the Soviet times and earned it during
hybrid warfare operations such as in
Donbas.[80]
Russia has not officially confirmed

whether it has nuclear warheads in the
exclave, but Iskander missiles are known
to be capable of carrying such
weapons.[81] In 2018, the Federation of
American Scientists published photos
showing a weapons storage facility
northwest of Kaliningrad being upgraded
in a way that enables nuclear weapons
storage.[82] In addition to that, Arvydas
Anušauskas, the Lithuanian minister of
defence, claimed that Russia already has
these in the exclave.[83][84]
Belarus's military command, while formally

independent as a military command of a
sovereign state, has organisationally
aligned itself with the Russian command
and is in many respects wholly or
substantially dependent on Russian
defence institutions and contractors, while
persistent underinvestment in its own
military and deepening ties with its eastern
neighbour left the military with low
offensive capabilities, with the only
feasible role being that of support of the
main Russian forces.[85][86] For instance,
the countries share the air defence
system, including its command.[87] There
are relatively few units on the Belarusian
side - the headquarters of the Western
Operational Command (one of the two in
Belarus) as well as the 6th Mechanised
Brigade is in Grodno (S-300 anti-air
missiles),[88] while air operations may be
conducted from the military air base in
Lida.[86] They have received some Russian
reinforcements ahead of Zapad-2021
exercises, including more S-300 missiles
in Grodno,[89] and in early 2022, when S-
400 missiles were installed in Gomel
Region. In May 2022, Alexander
Lukashenko announced that he had
bought Iskanders and S-400 missiles from
the Russians.[90]
Strategy
Attack
There is broad consensus among Western

military think tanks that any hypothetical
attack on NATO would involve an attempt
to capture the Suwałki Gap and therefore
to surround the Baltic states.[53] The
reasons for the hypothetical attack are
seen not to be primarily the occupation of
the three former Soviet republics by Russia
but to sow distrust in NATO's capabilities,
to discredit the military alliance and to
assert Russia's position as one of the
major military powers.[7][53] A possible
scenario for such a move was voiced by
Igor Korotchenko, a retired Russian colonel
and state TV pundit, who suggested that
the Russians could take over the Suwałki
Gap as well as the Swedish island of
Gotland while jamming NATO's radio
signals, in order to establish effective
military control over all possible supply
routes to the Baltic states.[91]
Despite being shorter, the Polish side of

the Suwałki Gap is unlikely to be used as
the area of main concentration of these
forces, according to these experts. A 2019
Russian paper indicated that the potential
attack cutting off the Baltic states from
NATO could be held north of the Suwałki
Gap, in south-western Lithuania, due to
better efficiencies for the Russian
forces;[92][93] the same route was assumed
in Zapad 2017[3][77] and Zapad 2021[94]
military exercises. This is also an area of
attack deemed more favourable by the
Center for European Policy Analysis
(CEPA)[6] and the Swedish Defence
Research Agency (FOI)[95] papers, as the
terrain is flatter and less forested and thus
easier for heavier troops. Faustyna Klocek
was one of the few proposing that the
attack would lie over Polish territory.[96] A
minority of analysts, including CNA's
Michael Kofman, argue that the Suwałki
Gap's importance has been overestimated,
comparing the gap to a "MacGuffin" (by
itself unimportant but what he argues
could be part of a frontline stretching for
hundreds of kilometres) and arguing that
previous analyses, which were necessarily
limited, relied on a simplified view of the
Russian military and did not sufficiently
analyse its doctrine as a whole.[97]
During the migrant crisis on the eastern

border of NATO and EU, there were
concerns voiced by NATO and Ukrainian
intelligence officials that Belarus would
send migrants to the Suwałki Gap in order
to destabilise the area, which in turn would
give a pretext for Russia to introduce
"peacekeeping" troops.[98] The Polish
government's fear that Russia could
potentially open up a migrant route via
Kaliningrad Oblast culminated in a
decision to build a fence on the border
with the exclave, similar to the one Poland
erected on the Belarusian border the
previous year.[99]
Some of the initial assessments were grim

about the prospect of the Baltic states. In
2016, the RAND Corporation ran
simulations that suggested that with the
NATO forces available at the time and
despite less military presence in the area
than in the Soviet times, an unexpected
attack would have Russian troops enter or
approach Riga and Tallinn in 36–60 hours
from the moment of the invasion. The
think tank attributed the swift advance to
the tactical advantage in the region, easier
logistics for Russian troops, better
maneuverability and an advantage in
heavy equipment on Russia's side.[100][101]
In general, the Russian Armed Forces,
according to NATO's expectations, will try
to overwhelm the Baltic states, cut off its
only land route to the rest of NATO and
force a fait accompli situation before the
Alliance's reinforcements are able to come
by land (air reinforcements are much more
expensive and are vulnerable to surface-to-
air strikes), only to face a dilemma
between surrendering the area to the
invader and directly confronting Russian
troops, potentially escalating the war to a
nuclear conflict.[95] Ben Hodges, a retired
US Army general who served as a high-
ranking NATO commander and who co-
authored a paper published by the CEPA[6]
on the defence of the Suwałki Gap, said in
2018 that the Suwałki Gap was an area
where "many (of) NATO's [...] weaknesses
converge[d]". Following major setbacks in
the Russian invasion of Ukraine, however,
Hodges revised his opinion towards a
more positive tone, saying that NATO was
much better prepared and could hold
control over the area in case of an attack,
particularly since Sweden and Finland
would, in his opinion, likely help NATO
despite at the time not being members of
the alliance.[5] An Estonian MP estimated
that Finland's membership in NATO, for
which the accession protocol was signed
in 2022, would make the security situation
of the Baltic states more tenable thanks to
an alternative corridor lying through the
waters of the Gulf of Finland, which could
be enforced using the relatively robust
Finnish Navy.[102] It was also suggested
that Swedish accession to NATO would
finally grant NATO some strategic depth in
the area and otherwise facilitate the
defence of the Baltic states.[103][104]
There appears to be strong support for

Russia's invasion of the area among the
Russians. A March 2022 survey by a
Ukrainian pollster, which was concealing
its identity while soliciting answers and
which was asking questions using the
Russian government-preferred rhetoric,
reported that a large majority of Russians
could support an invasion of another
country should the "special military
operation", as Russia officially calls the
invasion of Ukraine, succeed, and that the
most support for that invasion (three-
quarters of those who did not abstain from
an answer, and almost half of all
respondents) would be against Poland,
followed by the Baltic states.[105][106]
Defence
While the Suwałki Gap is a choke point,

military analysts suggest that the fact that
the region has abundant thick forests,
streams and lakes means that the
landscape facilitates defence against an
invading force.[2][3][39] Additionally, the soil
in the area makes it very hard to operate
under rainy conditions as off-road areas or
roads without a hard surface become
impassable mud.[2] The Center for
European Policy Analysis paper points out
that the hilly and more forested terrain of
the Polish part of the Suwałki Gap favours
actions on the defensive side, such as
ambushes and holding entrenched
positions;[6] at the same time, low density
of roads that are largely not designed for
carrying heavy cargo means that the few
that remain available for the military may
be easily blocked.[39] The natural defences
largely eliminate the need for additional
military fortifications, and some of them,
such as the one in Bakałarzewo, have been
converted to private museums.[39] On the
other hand, this also means that once
Russia is in possession of the corridor,
which could happen if NATO
reinforcements arrive late, it will be very
hard to eject the Russians from the
area.[107] These reports say that the
conditions are unfavourable for heavy
equipment, particularly in bad weather,
though John R. Deni of the Strategic
Studies Institute argued the terrain was
generally fine for a tank offensive.[108]
The current Polish military doctrine under

Mariusz Błaszczak, the Polish Minister of
Defence (MoD), is to concentrate the units
close to the Russian and Belarusian
borders in order to wage a defensive
campaign in a similar way to the one
Poland was conducting in September
1939.[109] There were two war games
made to verify the scenario. In the first
one, made in 2019, the US Marine Corps
War College modelled a hypothetical
scenario of World War III.[110] The other
one, codenamed Zima-20, was conducted
by the Polish War Studies Academy on
MoD's request in 2020. Most of its
assumptions remain confidential,[111] but it
is known that they include units with yet-
to-be-delivered upgraded equipment that
try to endure 22 days of defence against
an invading force and, similarly to the
American model, the military activities
start in the Suwałki Gap and Poland tries
to defend Eastern Poland at all cost.[112]
Both results were catastrophic: in the
American simulation, Polish units would
incur about 60,000 casualties in the first
day of war, and NATO and Russia would
fare a battle that would prove very bloody
to both sides, losing about half of the
participating forces within 72 hours.[110]
Zima-20's results, which are interpreted
with some dose of caution, showed that by
day 4 of the invasion, the Russians already
advanced to the Vistula river and fighting
in Warsaw was underway, while by day 5,
the Polish ports were rendered unusable
for reinforcements or occupied, the Navy
and the Air Force were obliterated despite
NATO's assistance,[111] while the Polish
units dispatched close to the border could
lose as much as 60-80% of personnel and
materiel.[113][d]
Very few locals are expected to endorse
an invasion, in contrast to what happened
in Crimea in 2014, as the influence of the
Russians in the area is not significant;[7]
that said, Daniel Michalski's survey found
that the region's local population is
inadequately prepared for a hypothetical
military conflict and that the area has next
to no civilians immediately ready to
engage in combat.[115] Regional tensions
are such that some tourists are afraid to
go there, though Andrzej Sęk and retired
Col. Kazimierz Kuczyński say that such
fears are likely unfounded as Russia's
resources are being expended in
Ukraine.[116] Additionally, the Russians may
want to use the historic tensions between
Poland and Lithuania to set them against
each other.[100]
Proposed solutions
NATO's military doctrine assumes that its

member states would have to hold the
invasion for as long as NATO needs to
send reinforcements to the attacked
states, and in the meantime, NATO would
operate on the terrain using tripwire forces
dispatched in the area.[6] There is no
consensus, however, about the right kind
of forces and their mode of deployment
near the Suwałki Gap that would best fit
the doctrine, though the predominant
thought goes that that at least some
forces or money to improve infrastructure
should be sent to Poland.[53]
Among the analysts that took into account

the Suwałki Gap vulnerability in their
reports or opinion pieces, the majority
argued that some form of permanent U.S.
military presence in Poland should exist,
and most of the reports agreed that the
NATO (or American) units should be as
mobile as practically possible.[117] The
Warsaw Institute argued that while it
would be costly to maintain, the military
base proposed by Poland in 2018 would
be an effective deterrent for Russia and
would ensure quick dispatches of U.S.
forces to the Suwałki Gap if needed.[118]
Hunzeker and Lanoszka say that fears
over the bottleneck are exaggerated, as
they also argue is the case of Russian war
against NATO, conclude that nothing
should constrain the Alliance from
attacking Kaliningrad Oblast or Belarus if
the latter engages in the conflict, too.[119]
They advocate for a permanent presence
of U.S. military but with units dispersed all
over Poland instead of one big military
base, and crafted in a way that avoids as
much Russian rebuke as possible.[120]
Another report, by the Strategic Studies
Institute (SSI), also suggested a
permanent presence of one brigade of
NATO troops in each of the Baltic
states.[121] Hodges et al., writing for CEPA,
in principle supported an increased
permanent presence of U.S. forces
(including a divisional headquarters) but
also said that NATO forces must be more
mobile so that Russian troops have no
chance to avoid the tripwire units. The
report also recommended that more effort
should be put into improving transport
capabilities and reducing red tape
between NATO's member states, noting
that defending the Suwałki Gap is a much
different challenge from that of the Cold
War-era Fulda Gap.[6] John R. Deni of the
SSI echoed CEPA paper's arguments and
argued that since Russia deployed a large
contingent of Russian troops together with
modern arms in Belarus just prior to the
beginning of the full-scale war in Ukraine,
NATO should disregard the 1997 Founding
Act and start a dramatic increase of
armaments and troop numbers near the
Suwałki Gap and in the Baltic states.[108]
Some experts argued the opposite, i.e. that

increased NATO presence may be
detrimental for NATO. Nikolai Sokov of the
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation
Studies, writing for the conservative outlet
The National Interest, criticised the
recommendations for ramping up military
presence, arguing that Russia and NATO
should learn to live with their own
vulnerabilities in order to prevent an arms
race.[122] Some people, including Dmitri
Trenin of Carnegie Moscow Center, said
this had already been happening due to
NATO's increased presence in the area.[123]
James J. Coyle of the Atlantic Council
similarly argued that the West should not
escalate by sending more troops to the
immediate vicinity of the Suwałki Gap, but
instead rely on efficient logistics in case of
war.[124] Viljar Veebel and Zdzisław Śliwa,
on the other hand, proposed that NATO
should either deploy as many troops as it
can while not paying attention to Russia's
complaints about that or attempt to
convince them (by escalating elsewhere,
for example) not to reinforce their troops
near the Suwałki Gap using means other
than deterrence.[7]
En ficción
The Suwałki Gap, while of relatively recent

interest, has already gained some interest
in literature. A fictitious account of a
Russia–NATO war, where one of the war
theatres is near the Suwałki Gap, was
written in 2016 by Richard Shirreff, a
retired British general who served for three
years as Deputy Supreme Allied
Commander Europe.[125] Shirreff writes in
the story, which is set in 2017, that Russia
could easily overwhelm the Baltic states
while Western government officials
struggled to find an adequate response.
A crime fiction novel called Suwalki Gap,

authored by René Antoine Fayette in
German, was published in 2017.[126]
Ver también
Russia–NATO relations
Salient (military)
Suwałki Region
Other NATO vulnerabilities:
Focșani Gate
GIUK gap
Fulda Gap
Notas explicatorias
a. The term "Suwałki corridor" (korytarz

suwalski) may refer both to the Suwałki
Gap and the road link between Kaliningrad
Oblast and (Russian ally) Belarus that was
proposed by Russians in the 1990s
b. Also known in other languages as: Polish:

przesmyk suwalski or korytarz suwalski;
Lithuanian: Suvalkų koridorius or Suvalkų
tarpas; Belarusian: сувалкскі калідор,
romanized: suvalkskі kalidor and Russian:
сувалкский коридор,
romanized: suvalkskiy koridor
c. The Founding Act is not a ratified treaty and

therefore is not legally binding.[46]
d. The government officials initially did not

comment on the revelations of the secret
war game, though Błaszczak later denied
that the exercises were unsuccessful and
said that the Polish Armed Forces were
capable of withholding a potential
offensive.[114]
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ould-solve-suwalki-gap-challenge-55347)
28 April 2022.
123. "Russia, NATO Lock Eyes as Rivals Flex
Military Muscle" (https://www.nbcnews.co
m/news/world/why-suwalki-gap-keeps-top-
u-s-general-europe-night-n469471) . NBC
News. Archived (https://web.archive.org/w
eb/20220402101845/https://www.nbcnew
s.com/news/world/why-suwalki-gap-keeps-
top-u-s-general-europe-night-n469471)
31 March 2022.
124. Coyle, James J. (15 April 2018). "Defending
the Baltics is a conundrum" (https://thehill.c
om/opinion/international/382964-defendin
g-the-baltics-is-a-conundrum/) . The Hill.
20402101846/https://thehill.com/opinion/i
nternational/382964-defending-the-baltics-i
s-a-conundrum/) from the original on 2
125. Shirreff, Richard (2016). War With Russia (h
ttps://books.google.com/books?id=yiZ6Cw
AAQBAJ) . London: Coronet. ISBN 978-1-
4736-3226-4. OCLC 976440720 (https://ww
w.worldcat.org/oclc/976440720) . Archived
2358/https://books.google.com/books?id=
yiZ6CwAAQBAJ) from the original on 29
126. Fayette, René Antoine (8 August 2017).

Suwałki Gap (https://books.google.com/bo
oks?id=OxwxDwAAQBAJ) (in German).
tredition. ISBN 978-3-7439-4979-9.
Otras lecturas
Bębenek, Bogusław; Maj, Julian;

Maksimczuk, Aleksander; Sęk, Andrzej;
Soroka, Paweł; Wiszniewska, Marta
(2020). Przesmyk suwalski w warunkach
kryzysu i wojny : aspekty obronne i
administracyjne : konferencja naukowa,
Suwałki, 9-10 maja 2019 roku [Suwałki
Gap in the conditions of crisis and war:
defense and administrative aspects:
scientific conference, Suwałki, May 9–10,
2019] (in Polish). Suwałki: Wydawnictwo
Uczelniane Państwowej Wyższej Szkoły
Zawodowej w Suwałkach. ISBN 978-83-
951182-3-4. OCLC 1241633779 (https://
www.worldcat.org/oclc/1241633779) .
Birnbaum, Michael (24 de junio de
2018). "Si tuvieran que defenderse de la
guerra con Rusia, a los líderes militares
estadounidenses les preocupa no llegar
a tiempo" (https://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/europe/how-us-troops-could
-get-stuck-in-a-traffic-jam-on-their-way-to
-fend-off-war-with-russia/2018/06/24/2
c8ed46e-52cf-11e8-a6d4-ca1d035642c
e_story.html) . El Washington Post .
Rynning, Sten; Schmitt, Olivier;
Theussen, Amelie (2 de marzo de 2021).
Tiempo de guerra: temporalidad y
decadencia del poder militar occidental
(https://books.google.com/books?id=qt
L9DwAAQBAJ) . Prensa de la
Institución Brookings. ISBN 978-0-8157-
3895-4.
Sirutavičius, Vladas; Stanytė -
Toločkienė, Inga (18 de julio de 2003).
"Importancia estratégica del Óblast de
Kaliningrado de la Federación de Rusia"
(https://journals.lka.lt/journal/lasr/articl
e/199) . Revisión estratégica anual de
Lituania . 1 (1): 181–214. doi :
10.47459/lasr.2003.1.9 (https://doi.org/
10.47459%2Flasr.2003.1.9) . ISSN
1648-8024 (https://www.worldcat.org/i
ssn/1648-8024) .
Szymanowski, Karol (2017). "Defensa
aérea en un entorno específico del
istmo de Suwalki" (http://cejsh.icm.edu.
pl/cejsh/element/bwmeta1.element.des
klight-ce578117-2212-4739-bdd0-4bc9f
8db5322) . Seguridad y Defensa . 3 :
25–30. doi : 10.37105/sd.19 (https://do
i.org/10.37105%2Fsd.19) . ISSN 2450-
551X (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/24
50-551X) . S2CID 210787561 (https://a
pi.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:21078
7561) .
Veebel, Viljar (4 de mayo de 2019). "Por
qué sería estratégicamente racional que
Rusia escalara en Kaliningrado y el
corredor de Suwalki" (https://www.tandf
online.com/doi/full/10.1080/01495933.
2019.1606659) . Estrategia Comparada
. 38 (3): 182-197. doi :
10.1080/01495933.2019.1606659 (http
s://doi.org/10.1080%2F01495933.2019.
1606659) . ISSN 0149-5933 (https://w
ww.worldcat.org/issn/0149-5933) .
S2CID 197814562 (https://api.semantic
scholar.org/CorpusID:197814562) .
Zverev, Yuri (2021). "Posibles
direcciones de las operaciones militares
de la OTAN contra la región de
Kaliningrado de la Federación de Rusia
(basadas en materiales de
publicaciones abiertas)" (https://journal.
eurasia.expert/s271332140015330-0-
1/) . Eurasia. Experto (en ruso) (2): 44.
doi : 10.18254/S271332140015330-0 (h
ttps://doi.org/10.18254%2FS271332140
015330-0) . ISSN 2713-3214 (https://w
ww.worldcat.org/issn/2713-3214) .
S2CID 244319068 (https://api.semantic
scholar.org/CorpusID:244319068) .
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Primer plano de Suwałki Gap (frontera

Mapa de Europa, con los países de la

Tanto Rusia como los países de la Unión

La brecha de Suwałki es una región

Polonia y Lituania obtuvieron su

Después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial ,

The first time a special corridor between

After the Soviet Union fell apart,

The top Polish government officials

The topic returned in 2001–2002 when

Kaliningrad Oblast has since been

State of construction of expressway

A strategic communication artery, known

Planned Rail Baltic line

The Suwałki Gap also serves as an

Frontlines on 18 February 1915,

NATO armoured vehicles seen going

Long before the Suwałki Gap became of

Initially, this vulnerability was of relatively

Multiple rocket launchers during

A German Army soldier directs a

The qualitative and quantitative

In general, the importance of the corridor

While the permanent military base

The Russian forces did not leave Belarus

NATO and its member states

As of spring 2022, units closest to the

900 German soldiers[65] together with

In June 2022, Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary

Kaliningrad Oblast is a very heavily

Russia has not officially confirmed

Belarus's military command, while formally

There is broad consensus among Western

Despite being shorter, the Polish side of

During the migrant crisis on the eastern

Some of the initial assessments were grim

There appears to be strong support for

While the Suwałki Gap is a choke point,

The current Polish military doctrine under

NATO's military doctrine assumes that its

Among the analysts that took into account

Some experts argued the opposite, i.e. that

The Suwałki Gap, while of relatively recent

A crime fiction novel called Suwalki Gap,

Other NATO vulnerabilities:

a. The term "Suwałki corridor" (korytarz

b. Also known in other languages as: Polish:

c. The Founding Act is not a ratified treaty and

d. The government officials initially did not

1. Zubek, Adam (14 August 2011). "Suwalski

9. "Kaliningrad profile - Overview" (https://ww

11. Karnitschnig, Matthew (16 June 2022).

15. Bugajski, Janusz (2004). Cold Peace:

20. Klimiuk, Klaus (9 April 2008). "The

25. Brzozowski, Alexandra; Peseckyte, Giedre

27. "Payments for Kaliningrad rail transit still

31. "Mapa autostrad i dróg ekspresowych w

47. "Russia deploys Iskander nuclear-capable

63. "Landsbergis: NATO no longer bound by

70. "Battle Group Poland's Storm Battery fires

72. Frisell, Eva Hagström; Pallin, Krister, eds.

74. "What is NATO's Response Force, and why

76. "Russia adds firepower to Kaliningrad