Documentos de Académico
Documentos de Profesional
Documentos de Cultura
En los últimos años la filosofía de la percepción ha sido una de las áreas que más interés ha
despertado en el mundo anglosajón y en la actualidad existe un complejo debate sobre
diversos problemas filosóficos en torno a la experiencia perceptual. Infortunadamente, en
nuestro departamento apenas se conocen un par de aproximaciones al respecto y los
estudiantes no cuentan con un panorama apropiado de la discusión actual ni de la riqueza
de las distintas posturas teóricas. El seminario pretende entonces brindar una comprensión
panorámica de uno de los ejes centrales de la reflexión filosófica actual sobre la percepción.
El problema que abordaremos es la tensión filosófica que parece presentarse entre la tesis
del realismo directo según la cual la percepción nos brinda un acceso inmediato al mundo
circundante y la existencia de ilusiones y alucinaciones que parecen poner en cuestión la
posibilidad misma de dicho acceso directo. Examinaremos principalmente las teorías de los
datos sensoriales, las teorías del contenido perceptual, y algunas variantes recientes del así
llamado disyuntivismo. La mayor parte de las lecturas del seminario estarán en inglés.
Metodología y evaluación
Bibliografía preliminar
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