Luego escribe que ni el geómetra ni el aritmético se preocupan por examinar si los

principios de los cuales s

It is in B 19 that we eventually find Aristotle's implicit attempt
to confute, proleptically, the Pyrrhonists. (On los cuales
se valen son verdaderos o falsos. En
consecuencia, cabe interpretar que cuando dice que el filósofo debe de dar cuenta de
los principios, a la luz de lo que dice sobre los matemáticos, el Estagirita se refiere a
que éste (el filósofo) debe examinar si son verdaderos o falsos. Lo anterior da una idea
de la generalidad de la investigación filosófica tradicional195, ya que, si la filosofía se
pregunta por la legitimidad de los fundamentos, y esta pregunta es lógicamente anterior
a la de si estamos justificados en creer otras proposiciones que no son básicas,
entonces el filósofo, según Aristóteles interpretado del modo propuesto, debe investigar
de manera general si tenemos fundamentos legítimos para nuestras pretensiones de
validez.

la metafísica también estudiaría lógica, sip o rlógica entendemos el studio del razzonamiento correcto,
los principios vendrían a ser los principios del razonamiento correcto

Then either (i) you ground P1 on P2, P2 on P3, . .. , Pn on

Pn+1, ... , where each P1 is distinct from each of its predecessors; or (ii)
you ground P1 on P2, P2 on P3, . .. , Pn on Pn+l, .. . , where Pn+l is
identical with one of its predecessors; or (iii) you ground P1 on P2 , P2 on
P3, .. . , Pn on Pn+l, where Pn+l is ungrounded. is an infinite regress, and we cannot grasp
an infinite sequence of propositions; (ii) is circular, and circular argumentation
is always vicious; (iii) ends in b are assertion, and bare assertion
establishes nothing. Thus the Pyrrhonists follow Aristotle in rejecting
possibilities (i) and (ii);
one group concludes
that knowledge is impossible; a second group denies that demonstrative
knowledge yields a vicious regress; the third group denies that ali knowledge
is demonstrative.

It is in B 19 that we eventually find Aristotle's implicit attempt

to confute, proleptically, the Pyrrhonists. (On A 3 see also IRWIN (1988),
125-33.)
A 3 see also IRWIN (1988),
125-33.) anterior a la de si estamos justificados en

creer otras proposiciones que no son básicas, entonces el filósofo, según Aristóteles
interpretado del modo propuesto, debe investigar de manera general si tenemos
fundamentos legítimos para nuestras pretensiones de validez.

la metafísica también estudiaría lógica, sip o rlógica entendemos el studio del razzonamiento correcto,
los principios vendrían a ser los principios del razonamiento correcto

Then either (i) you ground P1 on P2, P2 on P3, . .. , Pn on

Pn+1, ... , where each P1 is distinct from each of its predecessors; or (ii)
you ground P1 on P2, P2 on P3, . .. , Pn on Pn+l, .. . , where Pn+l is
identical with one of its predecessors; or (iii) you ground P1 on P2 , P2 on
P3, .. . , Pn on Pn+l, where Pn+l is ungrounded. is an infinite regress, and we cannot grasp
an infinite sequence of propositions; (ii) is circular, and circular argumentation
is always vicious; (iii) ends in bare assertion, and bare assertion
establishes nothing. Thus the Pyrrhonists follow Aristotle in rejecting
possibilities (i) and (ii);
one group concludes
that knowledge is impossible; a second group denies that demonstrative
knowledge yields a vicious regress; the third group denies that ali knowledge
is demonstrative.

It is in B 19 that we eventually find Aristotle's implicit attempt

to confute, proleptically, the Pyrrhonists. (On A 3 see also IRWIN (1988),
125-33.)
are assertion, and bare assertion
establishes nothing. Thus the Pyrrhonists follow Aristotle in rejecting
possibilities (i) and (ii);
one group concludes
that knowledge is impossible; a second group denies that demonstrative
knowledge yields a vicious regress; the third group denies that ali knowledge
is demonstrative.
are assertion, and bare assertion
establishes nothing. Thus the Pyrrhonists follow Aristotle in rejecting
possibilities (i) and (ii);
one group concludes
that knowledge is impossible; a second group denies that demonstrative
knowledge yields a vicious regress; the third group denies that ali knowledge
is demonstrative.

It is in B 19 that we eventually find Aristotle's implicit attempt

to confute, proleptically, the Pyrrhonists. (On A 3 see also IRWIN (1988),
125-33.)
A 3 see also IRWIN (1988),
125-33.)

la metafísica también estudiaría lógica, sip o rlógica entendemos el studio del razzonamiento correcto,
los principios vendrían a ser los principios del razonamiento correcto

Then either (i) you ground P1 on P2, P2 on P3, . .. , Pn on

Pn+1, ... , where each P1 is distinct from each of its predecessors; or (ii)
you ground P1 on P2, P2 on P3, . .. , Pn on Pn+l, .. . , where Pn+l is
identical with one of its predecessors; or (iii) you ground P1 on P2 , P2 on
P3, .. . los cuales se valen son verdaderos o falsos. En consecuencia, cabe interpretar
que cuando dice que el filósofo debe de dar cuenta de los principios, a la luz de lo que
dice sobre los matemáticos, el Estagirita se refiere a que éste (el filósofo) debe examinar
si son verdaderos o falsos. Lo anterior da una idea de la generalidad de la investigación
filosófica tradicional195, ya que, si la filosofía se pregunta por la legitimidad de los
fundamentos, y esta pregunta es lógicamente anterior a la de si estamos justificados en
creer otras proposiciones que no son básicas, entonces el filósofo, según Aristóteles
interpretado del modo propuesto, debe investigar de manera general si tenemos
fundamentos legítimos para nuestras pretensiones de validez.

la metafísica también estudiaría lógica, sip o rlógica entendemos el studio del razzonamiento correcto,
los principios vendrían a ser los principios del razonamiento correcto

Then either (i) you ground P1 on P2, P2 on P3, . .. , Pn on

Pn+1, ... , where each P1 is distinct from each of its predecessors; or (ii)
you ground P1 on P2, P2 on P3, . .. , Pn on Pn+l, .. . , where Pn+l is
identical with one of its predecessors; or (iii) you ground P1 on P2 , P2 on
P3, .. . , Pn on Pn+l, where Pn+l is ungrounded. is an infinite regress, and we cannot grasp
an infinite sequence of propositions; (ii) is circular, and circular argumentation
is always vicious; (iii) ends in bare assertion, and bare assertion
establishes nothing. Thus the Pyrrhonists follow Aristotle in rejecting
possibilities (i) and (ii);
one
that knowledge is impossible; a second group denies that demonstrative
knowledge yields a vicious regress; the third group denies that ali knowledge
is demonstrative.

It is in B 19 that we eventually find Aristotle's implicit attempt

to confute, proleptically, the Pyrrhonists. (On A 3 see also IRWIN (1988),
125-33.)
125-33.)
la metafísica también estudiaría lógica, sip o rlógica entendemos el studio del razzonamiento correcto,
los principios vendrían a ser los principios del razonamiento correcto

Then either (i) you ground P1 on P2, P2 on P3, . .. , Pn on

Pn+1, ... , where each P1 is distinct from each of its predecessors; or (ii)
you ground P1 on P2, P2 on P3, . .. , Pn on Pn+l, .. . , where Pn+l is
identical with one of its predecessors; or (iii) you ground P1 on P2 , P2 on
P3, .. . los cuales se valen son verdaderos o falsos. En consecuencia, cabe interpretar
que cuando dice que el filósofo debe de dar cuenta de los principios, a la luz de lo que
dice sobre los matemáticos, el Estagirita se refiere a que éste (el filósofo) debe examinar
si son verdaderos o falsos. Lo anterior da una idea de la generalidad de la investigación
filosófica tradicional195, ya que, si la filosofía se pregunta por la legitimidad de los
fundamentos, y esta pregunta es lógicamente anterior a la de si estamos justificados en
creer otras proposiciones que no son básicas, entonces el filósofo, según Aristóteles
interpretado del modo propuesto, debe investigar de manera general si tenemos
fundamentos legítimos para nuestras pretensiones de validez.

la metafísica también estudiaría lógica, sip o rlógica entendemos el studio del razzonamiento correcto,
los principios vendrían a ser los principios del razonamiento correcto

Then either (i) you ground P1 on P2, P2 on P3, . .. , Pn on

Pn+1, ... , where each P1 is distinct from each of its predecessors; or (ii)
you ground P1 on P2, P2 on P3, . .. , Pn on Pn+l, .. . , where Pn+l is
identical with one of its predecessors; or (iii) you ground P1 on P2 , P2 on
P3, .. . , Pn on Pn+l, where Pn+l is ungrounded. is an infinite regress, and we cannot grasp
an infinite sequence of propositions; (ii) is circular, and circular argumentation
is always vicious; (iii) ends in bare assertion, and bare assertion
establishes nothing. Thus the Pyrrhonists follow Aristotle in rejecting
possibilities (i) and (ii);
one group concludes
that knowledge is impossible; a second group denies that demonstrative
knowledge yields a vicious regress; the third group denies that ali knowledge
is demonstrative.

It is in B 19 that we eventually find Aristotle's implicit attempt

to confute, proleptically, the Pyrrhonists. (On A 3 see also IRWIN (1988),
125-33.)
are assertion, and bare assertion
establishes nothing. Thus the Pyrrhonists follow Aristotle in rejecting
possibilities (i) and (ii);
one group concludes
that knowledge is impossible; a second group denies that demonstrative
knowledge yields a vicious regress; the third group denies that ali knowledge
is demonstrative.
are assertion, and bare assertion
establishes nothing. Thus the Pyrrhonists follow Aristotle in rejecting
possibilities (i) and (ii);
one group concludes
that knowledge is impossible; a second group denies that demonstrative
knowledge yields a vicious regress; the third group denies that ali knowledge
is demonstrative.
It is in B 19 that we eventually find Aristotle's implicit attempt
to confute, proleptically, the Pyrrhonists. (On A 3 see also IRWIN (1988),
125-33.)
A 3 see also IRWIN (1988),
125-33.)

la metafísica también estudiaría lógica, sip o rlógica entendemos el studio del razzonamiento correcto,
los principios vendrían a ser los principios del razonamiento correcto

Then either (i) you ground P1 on P2, P2 on P3, . .. , Pn on

Pn+1, ... , where each P1 is distinct from each of its predecessors; or (ii)
you ground P1 on P2, P2 on P3, . .. , Pn on Pn+l, .. . , where Pn+l is
identical with one of its predecessors; or (iii) you ground P1 on P2 , P2 on
P3, .. . los cuales se valen son verdaderos o falsos. En consecuencia, cabe interpretar
que cuando dice que el filósofo debe de dar cuenta de los principios, a la luz de lo que
dice sobre los matemáticos, el Estagirita se refiere a que éste (el filósofo) debe examinar
si son verdaderos o falsos. Lo anterior da una idea de la generalidad de la investigación
filosófica tradicional195, ya que, si la filosofía se pregunta por la legitimidad de los
fundamentos, y esta pregunta es lógicamente anterior a la de si estamos justificados en
creer otras proposiciones que no son básicas, entonces el filósofo, según Aristóteles
interpretado del modo propuesto, debe investigar de manera general si tenemos
fundamentos legítimos para nuestras pretensiones de validez.

la metafísica también estudiaría lógica, sip o rlógica entendemos el studio del razzonamiento correcto,
los principios vendrían a ser los principios del razonamiento correcto

Then either (i) you ground P1 on P2, P2 on P3, . .. , Pn on

Pn+1, ... , where each P1 is distinct from each of its predecessors; or (ii)
you ground P1 on P2, P2 on P3, . .. , Pn on Pn+l, .. . , where Pn+l is
identical with one of its predecessors; or (iii) you ground P1 on P2 , P2 on
P3, .. . , Pn on Pn+l, where Pn+l is ungrounded. is an infinite regress, and we cannot grasp
an infinite sequence of propositions; (ii) is circular, and circular argumentation
is always vicious; (iii) ends in bare assertion, and bare assertion
establishes nothing. Thus the Pyrrhonists follow Aristotle in rejecting
possibilities (i) and (ii);
one
that knowledge is impossible; a second group denies that demonstrative
knowledge yields a vicious regress; the third group denies that ali knowledge
is demonstrative.

It is in B 19 that we eventually find Aristotle's implicit attempt

to confute, proleptically, the Pyrrhonists. (On A 3 see also IRWIN (1988),
125-33.)
125-33.)

la metafísica también estudiaría lógica, sip o rlógica entendemos el studio del razzonamiento correcto,
los principios vendrían a ser los principios del razonamiento correcto
Then either (i) you ground P1 on P2, P2 on P3, . .. , Pn on
Pn+1, ... , where each P1 is distinct from each of its predecessors; or (ii)
you ground P1 on P2, P2 on P3, . .. , Pn on Pn+l, .. . , where Pn+l is
identical with one of its predecessors; or (iii) you ground P1 on P2 , P2 on
P3, .. . los cuales se valen son verdaderos o falsos. En consecuencia, cabe interpretar
que cuando dice que el filósofo debe de dar cuenta de los principios, a la luz de lo que
dice sobre los matemáticos, el Estagirita se refiere a que éste (el filósofo) debe examinar
si son verdaderos o falsos. Lo anterior da una idea de la generalidad de la investigación
filosófica tradicional195, ya que, si la filosofía se pregunta por la legitimidad de los
fundamentos, y esta pregunta es lógicamente anterior a la de si estamos justificados en
creer otras proposiciones que no son básicas, entonces el filósofo, según Aristóteles
interpretado del modo propuesto, debe investigar de manera general si tenemos
fundamentos legítimos para nuestras pretensiones de validez.

la metafísica también estudiaría lógica, sip o rlógica entendemos el studio del razzonamiento correcto,
los principios vendrían a ser los principios del razonamiento correcto

Then either (i) you ground P1 on P2, P2 on P3, . .. , Pn on

Pn+1, ... , where each P1 is distinct from each of its predecessors; or (ii)
you ground P1 on P2, P2 on P3, . .. , Pn on Pn+l, .. . , where Pn+l is
identical with one of its predecessors; or (iii) you ground P1 on P2 , P2 on
P3, .. . , Pn on Pn+l, where Pn+l is ungrounded. is an infinite regress, and we cannot grasp
an infinite sequence of propositions; (ii) is circular, and circular argumentation
is always vicious; (iii) ends in bare assertion, and bare assertion
establishes nothing. Thus the Pyrrhonists follow Aristotle in rejecting
possibilities (i) and (ii);
one group concludes
that knowledge is impossible; a second group denies that demonstrative
knowledge yields a vicious regress; the third group denies that ali knowledge
is demonstrative.

It is in B 19 that we eventually find Aristotle's implicit attempt

to confute, proleptically, the Pyrrhonists. (On A 3 see also IRWIN (1988),
125-33.)
are assertion, and bare assertion
establishes nothing. Thus the Pyrrhonists follow Aristotle in rejecting
possibilities (i) and (ii);
one group concludes
that knowledge is impossible; a second group denies that demonstrative
knowledge yields a vicious regress; the third group denies that ali knowledge
is demonstrative.
are assertion, and bare assertion
establishes nothing. Thus the Pyrrhonists follow Aristotle in rejecting
possibilities (i) and (ii);
one group concludes
that knowledge is impossible; a second group denies that demonstrative
knowledge yields a vicious regress; the third group denies that ali knowledge
is demonstrative.

It is in B 19 that we eventually find Aristotle's implicit attempt

to confute, proleptically, the Pyrrhonists. (On A 3 see also IRWIN (1988),
125-33.)
A 3 see also IRWIN (1988),
125-33.)
la metafísica también estudiaría lógica, sip o rlógica entendemos el studio del razzonamiento correcto,
los principios vendrían a ser los principios del razonamiento correcto

Then either (i) you ground P1 on P2, P2 on P3, . .. , Pn on

Pn+1, ... , where each P1 is distinct from each of its predecessors; or (ii)
you ground P1 on P2, P2 on P3, . .. , Pn on Pn+l, .. . , where Pn+l is
identical with one of its predecessors; or (iii) you ground P1 on P2 , P2 on
P3, .. . los cuales se valen son verdaderos o falsos. En consecuencia, cabe interpretar
que cuando dice que el filósofo debe de dar cuenta de los principios, a la luz de lo que
dice sobre los matemáticos, el Estagirita se refiere a que éste (el filósofo) debe examinar
si son verdaderos o falsos. Lo anterior da una idea de la generalidad de la investigación
filosófica tradicional195, ya que, si la filosofía se pregunta por la legitimidad de los
fundamentos, y esta pregunta es lógicamente anterior a la de si estamos justificados en
creer otras proposiciones que no son básicas, entonces el filósofo, según Aristóteles
interpretado del modo propuesto, debe investigar de manera general si tenemos
fundamentos legítimos para nuestras pretensiones de validez.

la metafísica también estudiaría lógica, sip o rlógica entendemos el studio del razzonamiento correcto,
los principios vendrían a ser los principios del razonamiento correcto

Then either (i) you ground P1 on P2, P2 on P3, . .. , Pn on

Pn+1, ... , where each P1 is distinct from each of its predecessors; or (ii)
you ground P1 on P2, P2 on P3, . .. , Pn on Pn+l, .. . , where Pn+l is
identical with one of its predecessors; or (iii) you ground P1 on P2 , P2 on
P3, .. . , Pn on Pn+l, where Pn+l is ungrounded. is an infinite regress, and we cannot grasp
an infinite sequence of propositions; (ii) is circular, and circular argumentation
is always vicious; (iii) ends in bare assertion, and bare assertion
establishes nothing. Thus the Pyrrhonists follow Aristotle in rejecting
possibilities (i) and (ii);
one
that knowledge is impossible; a second group denies that demonstrative
knowledge yields a vicious regress; the third group denies that ali knowledge
is demonstrative.

It is in B 19 that we eventually find Aristotle's implicit attempt

to confute, proleptically, the Pyrrhonists. (On A 3 see also IRWIN (1988),
125-33.)