Documentos de Académico
Documentos de Profesional
Documentos de Cultura
FACILIDADES INDUSTRIALES
TECNOLOGIA
INTEGRIDAD
?
MAQUINAS HOMBRE
JAIME MUNOZ
agosto 2003
Evolucion de HSE
•Liderazgo •Liderazgo •Liderazgo
•Vision •Involucramiento •Pertenencia
•Metas explicitas empleados personal
•Sistemas de seguridad • Proceso mejoramiento • Conocimiento
HSE personal peligros
Rata •Pertenencia •Proceso
decrecimiento organizacional comportamiento
de •Crecimiento
accidentalidad cultural
Observacion de tareas
Procedimientos claves
Diseno
Casi accidentes o
eventos menores Revision de peligros en procesos
INCIDENTE
ASPECTOS CLAVES
TODO OBJETIVO
EXPERIENCIA CULTURA
AMBIENTE SISTEMAS
RESPONSABILIDAD
Habilidad para responder ante cualquier situacion diaria
PELIGRO VS RIESGO
Energia almacenada con alta capacidad de lesionar
Insurance
$
Premimum
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
Years
Modelo existente
Utilidad = Ventas – Costos ( operacion +inversiones)
Sugerido
Entrada de Procesos
Productos
diferentes tecnologicos y
esperados
procesos organizacionales
Improve Management
System Performance Estimated Maximum Loss
Recalculate
Increase deductible P (Base) (EML)
Reduce Cap
Insurance business
performance (no control)
Modelo General
Client Insurability Global Strategy .
GOAL
Insurability
Analysis
Integrity
Management PROCESS
Assessment DEVELOPMENT
1
14 2
13 3 WORLD CLASS
DNV Assessment
11 5
10 6
9 7
8
Perfil de riesgos : Perdidas
1.00E+00
estimadas
$ 93 million TOTAL
1.00E-01
$55 million Equipment
Cumulative Frequency of Loss Events
$3 million Inventory
$35 million Production
1.00E-02
1.00E-05
$1,000 $10,000 $100,000 $1,000,000 $10,000,000 $100,000,000 $1,000,000,000
with Costs of at Least
Asset Inventory Downtime TOTAL
SEGURIDAD VS ECONOMIA
Los analfabetas del siglo XXI no seran aquellos que no sepan leer y escribir , sino
los que no puedan aprender , desaprender y volver a aprender.
RIESGO COMO CONCEPTO
COMUNICACION COMPETENCIA
ORGANIZACIONAL
TECNOLOGICO
• CONSCIENCIA • CONOCIMIENTO
• LIDERAZGO • EXPERIENCIA
• PERTENENCIA • ENTRENAMIENTO
• COMPROMISO • TECNOLOGIA
• MADUREZ • MADUREZ
• I-NET /
• BENCHMARKING
AUTOAPRENDIZAJE
• FLEXIBILIDAD • TRABAJO EN EQUIPO
ETAPAS EN EL MANEJO DE LA INTEGRIDAD DE
INSTALACIONES
SCOPE
Estado actual
Optimizacion
Control
Panico
Complacencia
Tiempo
SABE DONDE ESTA EN SU NEGOCIO ?
QUE VIENE?
Integridad mecanica en
Facilidades industriales
No es Es
Define:
• Regulaciones.
• Procedimientos
• Metodos
• Legislacion a aprobar
• Investiga accidentes
• Establece criterios de seguridad operacional
• Inspecciona estos aspectos y su cumplimiento en
plantas.
Claves en OSHA
COMPETENCIA
LA HABILIDAD PARA ASUMIR
RESPONSABILIDADES Y REALIZAR
ACTIVIDADES CON UN ESTANDAR
RECONOCIDO SOBRE UNA BASE
REGULAR.
ES UNA COMBINACION DE
HABILIDADES PRACTICAS Y
PENSAMIENTO CRITICO , EXPERIENCIA
Y CONOCIMIENTO .
Que hay que hacer?
C1
2
(a) Application 3
4
5
6
(i) Pre-Startup Review
7
(b) Definitions T1
8
(k) Hot Work Permits
9
Information
10
11
(l) Management of Change
12
2
(m) Incident Investigation
3
MI STRATEGY POLICY
EQUIPMENT
IDENTIFICATION / LIST.
COVERED AND SAFETY
CRITICAL
QRA / RAM
RISK / RELIABILITY
ANALYSIS
RBI standards or
internal knowledge
RCM
PLANNING
/PROGRAMMING
EXECUTION
KPI
PERFORMANCE AND MoC
DEVIATIONS Fitness For Service
RCFA
AUDIT AND
MANAGEMENT REVIEW
START
IS EQUIPMENT YES
REGULATED BY ANOTHER NOT A CRITICAL
ENTITY OR REGULATION? EQUIPMENT ITEM
NO
IS
EQUIPMENT IN
YES Threshold quantity is shown in the
A PROCESS WITH
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES Process Safety Management Standard
> THRESHOLD
QUANTITY
NO
IS EQUIPMENT OR YES
COMPONENT CONNECTED
TO A COVERED PROCESS?
NO
WOULD
IS EQUIPMENT OR YES FAILURE
COMPONENT ADJACENT LIKELY RESULT IN YES
TO A COVERED PROCESS? A MAJOR ACCIDENT?
NO
NO
IS THE
EQUIP./COMPONENT NO
A PART OF A SAFEGUARD NOT A CRITICAL
SYSTEM FOR COVERED EQUIPMENT ITEM
EQUIPMENT?
YES
M
ASSESS O
N
I
T
DEVELOP O
R
IMPLEMENT
Goals and
Philosophy
Strategy and
Criteria
Revise
Establish / Update
Scope
4
Corrective Actions Plan
1
(e.g. repairs) Activity
3
Evaluation 2
Implementation
(e.g activity results) (do and record)
RISK MATRIX
PROBABILITY
Possibility Possibility
Possibility
Practically Not Likely of of
of Isolated
Impossible To O ccur O ccuring Repeated
Incidents
Sometime Incidents
Once in Once every Once every Once every > Once per
CONSEQUENCE > 25 years 12-25 years 3-12 years 1-3 years year
Sig nificant lo s s
o f co ntainment
Permanent
d is ab ility
>1 0 0 0 b b ls
Limited ab ility
$2 0 0 k-$2 M M Natio nal med ia
B 5 10 15 20 25
to co ntro l
Sig nificant lo s s
o f co ntainment
Lo cal med ia
Ho s p ital s tay >1 0 0 b b ls
Only wo rkp lace
$2 5 k-$2 0 0 k
Partner imag e C 4 8 12 16 20
affected
M ino r lo s s o f
Day-away-fro m- co ntainment M ino r
wo rk-cas e
DAFWC
<1 0 0 b b ls
Only wo rkp lace
$5 k-$2 5 k inho us e
rep o rting
D 2 4 6 8 10
affected
Slig ht lo s s o f
Simp le firs t –aid
treatment cas e
co ntainment
<1 b b l
<$5 k No Imp act
E 1 2 3 4 5
RIESGO VERSUS MANEJABILIDAD
High
3B 4B 5
rt
Medium
ffo
2B 3 for
e
4A
Risk
fit
ne
be
as ing
re
I nc
1 2A 3A
Low
TOP LEVEL
ESTABLISH
SYSTEM
SYSTEM
DOCUMENTS
FILING SYSTEM:
Asset Register
Design data
PLANNING MI equipment
GENERAL
PROCEDURES:
RBI Inspection data
Operational data
Deficiency data
INSPECT Inspection Plans
Repair information
Defect Assessments
ASSESS THE Inspection due dates
WORK
INSTRUCTIONS RESULTS
• Equipment Guidelines
• Activity Procedures (referenced in system manual)
MI System Documents - 1
OVERVIEW DOCUMENTS
• MI-10000 Table of Contents
• MI-10100 Policy
• MI-10200 Mechanical Integrity System Description
• MI-10300 Integrating the Mechanical Integrity
System into Process Safety Management
• MI-10400 Definitions and References
• MI-10500 Determining Mechanical Integrity System Equipment
ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS
IMPLEMENTATION DOCUMENTS
• Everyone is involved
• Maintenance Manager is accountable for execution of
the Mechanical Integrity system
• MI Co-ordinator is responsible for managing the MI
system
• Implementing and sustaining the Mechanical Integrity
system primarily involves:
– Maintenance and Inspection Department Personnel
– Operating personnel
– Engineering personnel
– Stores and Purchasing (Quality Assurance)
An Effective MI Program
An effective MI system requires active participation from
all personnel.
• Personnel performing
• Review new or modified Mechanical Integrity
processes before any activities are familiar with the
site permit procedures and
hazardous chemicals are other safe work practices
introduced
MI Interaction with PSM
Elements
Management
Management Incident
Incident
ofof
Investigation
Investigation
Change
Change
Assurance
AssuranceScheme
Scheme
Κ Corrosion Management Strategy
Audit
Audit
Κ Program Implementation Gap
GapAnalysis
Analysis
Κ Life/Risk Analysis Prioritisation
Prioritisation
Κ Mitigation Action Tracking
Tracking
Κ Program Review Feedback
Feedback
Κ Strategy Review
Infrastructure
Κ BU/Group Business Contact
Κ Risk/Reliability Criteria
Κ Ownership/Leadership
Κ Discipline Integration
Κ Knowledge & Learning
Κ Performance
4/28/2005 75
Impact Manageability
H H
BU
CMAS M M
Plan
L L
L M H L M H
Audit
Audit Prioritisation
Prioritisation
Compare
Compareagainst
againstCMAS
CMAS Impact
Impactassessment
assessment
Gap
GapAnalysis
Analysis Manageability
Manageabilityassessment
assessment
Opportunity
OpportunityDevelopment
Development Action
Actionprioritisation
prioritisation
Assurance
AssurancePlanPlanTracking
Tracking
Prioritise
Prioritiseaction
actionplan
plan
Resourcing
Resourcing&&budgeting
budgeting
Measurement
Measurement&&tracking
tracking
4/28/2005 76
RCAM Value
Throughput Client Business Objectives Productivity
Availability Reliability
Site Specific Objectives
Costs Process Control
Failures Production Systems Errors
Design
Functional Assets Knowledge
Construction Information
Operation Skills
Maintenance Equipment Personnel Experience
Inspection Training
Spare parts Procedures
Turnaround Asset Management Ergonomics
Overhaul Strategies Organization
Replace Environment
RCAM Value
Production Systems
System Functions
Functional Assets
Equipment Personnel
Performance Performance
Design Knowledge
Construction Failure Modes Information
Operation Failure Effects Skills
Maintenance Risk Analysis Experience
Inspection Failure Causes Training
Spare parts Strategy Development Procedures
Turnaround Risk Mitigation Ergonomics
Overhaul Task Optimization Organization
Replace Implementation Environment
FITNESS FOR SERVICE : APTITUD
PARA EL SERVICIO
ANALYSIS - RCFA
FALLA - DEFINICION
DESVIACION NEGATIVA EN EL DESEMPENO DE UNA
EXPECTATIVA OPERACIONAL ESPERADA POR LA UNIDAD
DE NEGOCIOS.
OPERACIONES:
DESVIACION NEGATIVA EN EL DESEMPENO DE LAS
FUNCIONES OPERACIONALES Y CUYA OCURRENCIA AFECTA
O PODRIA AFECTAR SIGNIFICATIVAMENTE LAS
EXPECTATIVAS DE OPERACIONES.
MANTENIMIENTO
DESVIACION NEGATIVA EN EL DESEMPENO ESTABLECIDO
DE LOS EQUIPOS Y SUS COMPONENTES
CAUSA RAIZ - DEFINICION
INGENIERIA
SISTEMAS
MANEJO
SEGURIDAD
LA LA
COMPORTAMIENTO EL SOLUCION SOLUCION
HUMANO INSEGURO ? PROBLEMA ES ES
EXISTE CORRECTA INCORRECTA
TIEMPO
LA LA
EL SOLUCION SOLUCION
PROBLEMA ES ES
NO EXISTE CORRECTA INCORRECTA
METODOLOGIAS EXISTENTES
1. Diagramas de secuencia. NTSB.1970
2. Diagramas multilinear de eventos. Benner.1975.
3. STEP (Sequentially timed events plotting procedure). Benner , 1987.
4. SRAD ( Schematic Report Analysis Diagram). Toft and Turner . 1987.
5. Barrier Analysis . Dew . 1991
6. MORT (Management Oversigth and Risk Tree.W Jhonson. 1960.
7. SRP ( Savannah River Plant ).Paradies. 1988.
8. TAPROOT.Paradies. 1991.
9. HPIP (Human Performance Investigation Process) . Paradies. 1993.
10. CTM ( Causal Tree method).Poulenc. 1983.
11. REASON . Decision systems Inc. 1997.
12. ERCAP (Event Root Cause Analysis Procedure). ENCONET.
13. HPES ( Human Performance Evaluation System.INPO.1992.
14. SCAT ( Systematic Cause Analysis Technique) ILCI. 1985.
15. TOR ( Technic of operations review). 1973.
16. SACA ( Systematic Accident Cause Analysis). Waldran. 1988.
17. AAM ( Accident Anatomy Method). Riso National Laboratory.1970.
18. AEA ( Action Error Analysis ).
19. Hazop. Aiche.
20. AEB ( Accident Evolution and Barrier ).
21. WSA ( Work Safety Analysis ).
22. HRA ( Human Reliability Analysis).
23. HSYS . Paradies . 1993.
24. ASSET ( Assessment of Safety significant event teams). 1991.
25. SOL ( Safety through organizational learning. 1994.
26. PROACT . Latino. 1985.
27. Change Analysis Process . Kepner Tregoe.1976.
QUE TIENEN EN COMUN ?
• Metodo para describir y esquematicamente
representar la secuencia del incidente y las
condiciones contribuyentes.
• Metodo de identificacion de eventos criticos y
condiciones en la secuencia del incidente.
• Metodo para sistematicamente investigar los
aspectos de manejo y organizacionales que
permitieron el incidente.
PORQUE FALLAN LOS METODOS ?
• ASUMEN QUE LOS ENTRENADOS CONOCEN CADA UNO DE LOS
ELEMENTOS DE LA METODOLOGIA.
• SE CENTRAN EN LOS PROCESOS MACROS Y DEJAN PASAR LOS
ASPECTOS DE DETALLE DEL METODO.
• SE ENFOCAN EN LA PROBLEMATICA TECNICA Y DEJAN DE LADO
LOS ASPECTOS HUMANOS Y ORGANIZACIONALES.
• PRESENTAN EL METODO DESCONECTADO DEL RESTO DE
PROCESOS DE MANTENIMIENTO / OPERACION
• SUBVALORAN LAS BARRERAS ORGANIZACIONALES QUE IMPIDEN
LA INTEGRACION DE DISCIPLINAS EN UN ADECUADO MANEJO DE
LA METODOLOGIA.
• NO SE MANEJA COMO UN SISTEMA DE OPTIMIZACION PROACTIVO
SINO COMO UNA ACTIVIDAD REACTIVA PARA SOLUCIONAR
PROBLEMAS EN DONDE REALMENTE NO EXISTEN.
PORQUE FALLAN LOS METODOS ?
LA SOLUCION LA SOLUCION
EL ES ES EL ENTRENAMIENTO NO
PROBLEMA CORRECTA INCORRECTA SE CENTRA EN LA
NO EXISTE IDENTIFICACION DEL
PROBLEMA A
SOLUCIONAR
CATEGORIAS BASICAS DEL
ERROR
1. ESCOGER MAL LOS INTERESADOS
2. SELECCIONAR UNA SERIE DEMASIADO
LIMITADA DE OPCIONES
3. REDACTAR INCORRECTAMENTE EL
PROBLEMA.
4. FIJAR LIMITES O ALCANCE DEMASIADO
ESTRECHO AL PROBLEMA
5. NO PENSAR SISTEMATICMENTE.
Defect Management System
DEFECT
Risk – Cost Model
5488
Design Risk Level
RISK