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The role of subjective concerns and characteristics of the

moral issue in moral considerations
Autor: M.S. Singer
Fecha: Nov. 1, 1998
From: British Journal of Psychology(Vol. 89, Issue 4.)
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Tipo de documento: Article
Length: 7.694 words

Texto completo:
Literatures of both moral philosophy and moral psychology contribute to ethical inquiry (Waterman, 1988). This paper aims to provide
further empirical data pertaining to ethical decision processes. Three research questions are addressed: (1) What is the role of
positive or negative personal feelings towards parties to a moral issue in judgments about the ethicality of that issue? (2) In moral
deliberations, what are the relative weights accorded to various aspects of the moral issue ? and (3) What is the empirical relationship
between judgments of ethicality and judgments of fairness? The theoretical framework employed in the design of the study is that of
the moral intensity model (Jones, 1991) in applied ethics.

The moral intensity model contends that ethical decisions are primarily contingent upon the characteristics of the moral issue. In
making ethical judgments, individuals evaluate the intensity of the characteristics of the issue. The overall intensity of a moral issue is
determined collectively by the magnitude of consequence of the moral act; the degree of social consensus that the moral act is
immoral; the likelihood that the act would take effect; the temporal immediacy of the effect of the act for the target person; the
proximity or feelings of closeness to the target person; as well as the concentration of the effect. The model further posits that the
perceived overall intensity of the moral issue would influence issue recognition, moral judgments, moral intent as well as the
engagement of a moral act.

Several issue dimensions in the model appear to correspond closely to various constituents of morality. The notion of consequence in
the teleological models of morality features prominently in the Jones model where the consequence of a moral issue is said to be
evaluated from several angles: its size (i.e. magnitude of consequence), its probability (i.e. likelihood of consequence) and its
nearness in time (i.e. temporal immediacy). This emphasis on the consequence of a moral issue in ethical judgments also
corresponds to the Piagetian concept of severity of consequence in moral development (e.g. Piaget, 1932, 1965).

The inclusion of the social consensus dimension gives credence to the importance of social influence on individuals' moral
judgments. In philosophical theories of ethics, the status accorded to social influences on morality varies greatly. While ethical
absolutists imply that universal moral rules are immune to social influences, ethical relativists claim that what constitutes morality is
society or culture specific. The significance of social influence on morality is also explicit in most models of moral psychology: in
Hogan's (1973) ethics of social responsibility, morality consists of 'socially responsible rule-following' (Waterman, 1988). In Kohlberg's
(1976) notion of conventional morality, the primary motivation for morality is a desire to conform, and the main moral consideration is
socially agreed-upon rules. Further, in the interactional models of ethics (Haan, 1983; Rossouw, 1994), the social consensus notion
most explicitly features in the dialogue process by which moral solutions are to be reached.

The inclusion of the proximity (i.e. feelings of nearness) issue dimension in the Jones model deserves special attention. The model's
contention here is that the degree of feelings of closeness to the target person of a moral act would affect perceived intensity of that
act, and hence the judgment of its ethicality. Although proximity is defined in terms of either social, cultural, physical or psychological
nearness in the model, it is the social psychological aspect (i.e. friendship, liking or personal concerns) that was addressed in this
study. This is because the role of subjective feelings or concerns for others in morality has been at the core of the debate over
whether morality has a care or justice focus. Traditional theories of ethics place morality strictly within the domain of pure reason and
intellect to the exclusion of any influence of subjective feelings. Noting the inadequacies of that perspective, some theorists (e.g.
Flanagan, 1982; Kagan, 1984) have more recently argued for a significant role of subjective personal feelings in morality. The idea of
concerns for others is central to Gilligan's (1982, 1986) 'care-based morality' Kitwood's (1990) 'psychology of moral life' and Forsyth's
(1980, 1992) personal moral philosophy of 'idealism'. In all these contexts, concerns for others refer to an intrinsic aspect of human
behaviour in that people are fundamentally concerned about the welfare of other fellow beings, although some theorists believe that
such concerns extend beyond social or biological boundaries (e.g. Lerner, 1977, 1982; Singer, 1981) and others argue otherwise
(e.g. Tyler & Lind, 1990).

However, the degree to which a person possesses such concerns and its consequences for morality vary in each theory. In Gilligan's
theory, concerns for others is related to gender group status (i.e. the ethics of care features predominantly in female rather than male
morality). In Forsyth's theory, the degree of concern for others defines the individual differences dimension of idealism. The morality
of people who are highly 'idealistic' are more likely to have a care focus. In the moral intensity model (Jones, 1991), the degree of
concerns is contingent upon the feelings of proximity or closeness to the target (or victim) of the moral issue. In the context of this
model, the present study examined the question of whether feelings of greater proximity are indeed associated with a care-focused
morality.

In exploring this research question, the study looked at whether and how people's feelings, both positive and negative, for others
known to them might affect their moral judgments. Existing research related to care-focused morality has only investigated the effect
of positive feelings (concerns) for others in general. No study has yet systematically examined the effect of both types of feelings (i.e.
'liking' and 'dislike') on moral judgments concerning people known to us. Answers to this research question may have significant
academic-theoretical as well as real-life practical implications.

This question was examined in the present paper by appealing to the notion of scope of justice in the recent social justice literature
(Lind & Tyler, 1988; Opotow, 1988). In that literature, scope of justice refers to the extent to which an individual extends his/her
justice concerns to another person and is typically operationalized in terms of personal friendship and similarity in attitudes (e.g.
Brockner, 1990). The notion therefore embraces both friendship and a concern for justice. People included within an individual's
scope of justice tend to be those for whom the person has positive feelings and great concerns; whereas the opposite typically holds
true for those outside a person's scope of justice.

The justice notion has a further theoretical implications for the Jones model. While the model has identified several key
characteristics of a moral issue upon which ethical decisions are said to be contingent, it has, however, ignored one other essential
feature: the issue's perceived fairness. Given the philosophical link between justice and ethics explicit in the deontological models
(see Brandt, 1959; Velasquez, 1982) and Rawls' (1971) definition of justice in terms of fairness, it is then logical to add fairness as an
additional issue dimension to those identified in the Jones model. This therefore leads to an extension of the model's prediction:
moral judgments would involve an evaluation of the intensity of not only the issue dimensions as defined in the Jones (1991) model,
but also the fairness dimension of the moral issue.

Using this extended framework, specific predictions concerning moral judgments are made with reference to whether the person
known to the judge (the person making the moral judgment) is a 'friend' (positive feelings) or a 'non-friend' (negative feelings), and in
relation to whether this person is the moral agent (i.e. the decision maker) or the target (i.e. victim or beneficiary) of the moral issue at
stake. As people basically want to maintain 'cognitive consonance' (e.g. Festinger, 1957), a morally questionable decision made by a
friend is likely to arouse more dissonance than when it is made by a non-friend. One way to reduce the dissonance appears to be to
de-emphasize the 'wrongness' of that decision and to perceive it in a less negative light. This leads to the first specific prediction: A
'morally questionable decision' made by a moral agent would be judged as less negative when the agent is within rather than outside
the judge's scope of justice. In the context of the extended moral intensity model, a less negative judgment of a moral issue would
mean that the issue is judged as having lower moral intensity on the various issue characteristics, including fairness, and also as
being less unethical.

With reference to a target person being harmed by a moral agent, balance theory (e.g. Brockner, 1990; Heider, 1958) is relevant in
predicting the most likely ways of achieving 'harmonious' relationships among the three parties (i.e. the observer, the moral agent and
the target). Compared with a non-friend, when a friend of the observer is harmed by a moral agent, the balance can best be achieved
by the observer reacting more negatively towards the moral agent and this includes judging the decision as more unethical. In a
similar vein, when a non-friend receives undue favours from a moral agent, the best balance can also be achieved by the observer
reacting negatively towards the agent and his/her decision. Accordingly, this leads to the second prediction: Scope of justice
regarding the target person is likely to interact with the consequence of the decision in affecting moral judgments: when a decision
has harmful consequences for a target person who is within the judge's scope of justice, the decision would be perceived as more
negative. Conversely, the decision would be seen as less negative when it has beneficial consequences for such a target (a friend).
These predictions concerning the scope of justice effect regarding the target person were also tested in the present study.

In addition to the scope of justice effects on moral judgments, two more research questions were posed in this study. First, in the
intensity evaluation process, what are the relative weights given to various issue dimensions? In other words, are considerations of
certain characteristics of the moral issue more essential in the judgment of its ethicality? In the extended version of the moral intensity
model, different issue dimensions have been shown to correspond closely to various aspects of morality. Accordingly, answers to this
research question may shed light on the relative importance individuals accord the various constituents of morality in their moral
decisions. Second, is there a significant empirical link between judgments of ethicality and judgments of fairness? As noted earlier,
moral philosophers in the deontological tradition maintain that justice is an integral part of morality. As these normative theories of
ethics can be used as epistemological frameworks for guiding empirical research, the present study ascertains whether
considerations of fairness are also an essential or integral part of people's actual moral judgments.

Method

Participants and design of the study

Altogether 120 (49 male and 71 female) people from the general public took part in this study. These respondents were recruited
from a large metropolitan city by a female postgraduate psychology student. Thirty-eight respondents were unemployed. The rest of
the respondents were in a variety of employment including teaching, university study, computer programming and public services.
The age range was between 18 and 77 years with a mean of 36 years (SD = 13.32).

The study adopted a 2 x 2 x 3 factorial design with repeated measures on the last factor (i.e. three scenarios). The two non-repeated
factors were scope of justice regarding moral agent (i.e. SJ-agent: high vs. low) and scope of justice regarding target person (i.e. SJ-
target: high vs. low).

Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four levels of the two scope of justice variables. There were 30 respondents in
each cell.

The questionnaire and procedures

The questionnaire consisted of three scenarios of ethical decision making which are similar to those used in a previous research
(Singer, 1996). The three scenarios are presented in the Appendix. Scenario 1 depicted a decision which the moral agent benefited
the target person by allowing the latter to copy an assignment. Scenario 2 depicted a moral agent's decision of breaching a verbal
agreement, which resulted in the target person being harmed financially by the decision. Scenario 3 involved a decision in which the
moral agent made a job offer to a friend who was clearly less qualified than many other job candidates.

Participants were tested individually and each was randomly assigned to one of the four scope-of-justice conditions. The respondent
was then asked by the experimenter (i.e. the female recruiter) to think of two people they knew under that specific experimental
condition. Once the respondent gave two names, the experimenter then briefly described the three scenarios and asked the
respondent whether the scenarios were likely to happen to those people named. In a few cases, the participant commented that it
was difficult for him/her to imagine the person(s) named in the given scenarios. The recruiter then asked the respondent to think of
another person he/she knew who would be suitable for the given scenarios. When the respondent finally decided upon the two
names, the experimenter filled the two names into the appropriate blank spaces throughout the scenarios before giving them to the
respondent to read.

The use of hypothetical scenarios deserves further discussion. A recent comprehensive review of the research using scenarios
reveals that this approach has been an integral part of applied ethics (Weber, 1992). Compared with other approaches to ethics
research, scenarios are less susceptible to the social desirability response-set bias (e.g. Armacost et al., 1990, cited in Weber, 1992).
Several researchers have argued for the importance of 'relevance' and 'realism' in the design of scenarios (e.g. Elm & Weber, 1994;
Fredrickson, 1986) on the grounds that scenarios so perceived by respondents are more likely to elicit a greater extent of involvement
and hence more realistic responses. The unique design used in this study, which required respondents themselves to name people
known to them as characters in the ethical dilemmas, aims to engage respondents more fully than the standard 'non-personal'
scenario approach typically deployed in applied ethics research. Post-experimental comments made by respondents suggest that this
was indeed the case.

Following each scenario, there were 14 items pertaining to respondents' judgments about the decision. The 14 items assessed seven
variables: (1) magnitude of consequence - judgments of the magnitude of the consequence of the decision were assessed by two
items including 'How would you estimate the seriousness of the consequences of (agent's) decision?'; (2) social consensus - the
extent of social consensus of the decision was assessed by two items including 'To what degree do you think that most people would
consider (agent's) decision as unethical?'; (3) likelihood of action and likelihood of consequence - according to Jones (1991), the
'probability of effect' dimension of the moral issue consists of two components; one concerns the likelihood that the moral agent
would actually act out the decision (i.e. likelihood of action), the other concerns the likelihood that the act would actually cause harm
(i.e. likelihood of consequence). The variable likelihood of action was assessed by two items, including 'In your opinion, how much
doubt will (agent) have about the wisdom of his/her decision?' and 'In your opinion, how likely is it that (agent) will change his/her
mind about the decision?'. (4) Temporary immediacy - this moral intensity dimension was assessed by two items, including 'How
likely is it that (agent's) decision will have long-term consequences?'; (5) issue fairness - two items assessed this variable, including
'Overall, how fair do you think (agent's) decision is?'; and (6) overall ethicality - judgments of the overall ethicality of the decision were
assessed by two items, including 'Overall, how unethical do you think (agent's) decision is?'. Respondents made their responses on a
nine-point (1-9) rating scale.

Results

Manipulation checks

The manipulation checks aimed to ensure that the relationship between each respondent and the two people he/she named for use
in the scenarios was indeed appropriate for the corresponding experimental treatment condition (i.e. high vs. low SJ-agent or SJ-
target). To this end, four additional questions were added to the end of the questionnaire. Two of these items assessed the level of
friendship the respondent felt for each of the two people named; the other two items assessed the level of justice concerns the
respondent felt for each person. The mean friendship and justice-concern ratings are presented in Table 1. Each of these means was
compared with the neutral point 5 (on the 10-point rating scale, indicative of being indifferent in terms of friendship or concerns). All
corresponding means associated with conditions of high S J-agent or high S J-target were significantly greater than the neutral point
at p [less than] .01, and all those associated with conditions of low SJ-agent or low S J-target were significantly lower than the neutral
point at p [less than] .01. This indicates that the two people respondents named for the scenarios were indeed 'appropriate' (i.e. in
terms of the level of friendship and justice concerns) for the corresponding treatment condition. The manipulations therefore were
successful.
[TABULAR DATA FOR TABLE 1 OMITTED]

Main analyses

For each respondent, seven scores were computed for each scenario: scores of overall ethicality, issue fairness, magnitude of
consequence, social consensus, likelihood of action, likelihood of consequence and temporal immediacy. Each score was calculated
by summing up respondent ratings for the two items assessing that variable. To check the effect of respondent gender, a preliminary
2 (respondent gender) x 2 (SJ-agent) x 2 (SJ-target) x 3 (scenario) MANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor (scenario)
was performed on all the seven dependent variables. The main effect of respondent gender was non-significant (F(7, 97) = 1.47).
None of the interactions involving respondent gender and the other three variables was found to be significant: respondent gender x
S J-agent (F(7, 97) = 1.49); respondent gender x SJ-target (F(7,97) = 1.19); and respondent gender x scenario (F(7, 97) = .99).
Because of this, it was decided to rerun the MANOVA without that variable. All the three main effects from this new MANOVA were
found to be significant: the SJ-agent effect (F(7,101) = 7.07, p [less than] .01); the SJ-target effect (F(7.101) = 2.68, p [less than] .02);
and the scenario effect (F(14,94) = 9.36, p [less than] .01). In addition, both the SJ-agent x scenario and the SJ-target x scenario
interaction effects were significant at p [less than] .01 level (F(14,94) = 4.13 and 2.52 for the two interactions, respectively). All the
cell means for this overall MANOVA are presented in Table 2.

The findings indicate that respondents' scope of justice regarding either the moral agent or the target person had an overall
significant influence on their judgments of the morally questionable decisions. Moreover, the finding of the significant SJ-agent x
scenario and SJ-target x scenario interactions suggests that these scope of justice effects varied in different scenarios. Given that the
scenarios differed primarily in terms of the consequences of the decision (i.e. benefiting versus harming the target person), the results
suggest that the scope-of-justice effect on moral judgments may indeed be moderated by the type of the consequence of the moral
issue.

Given these results from the overall MANOVA, data from the three scenarios were then analysed separately. For each scenario, 2
(SJ-agent) x 2 (SJ-target) MANOVA was performed on all the seven dependent variables. Results for the two scenarios involving a
decision which benefited the target were different. For scenario 1 (copying assignment), the multivariate F statistic for SJ-agent effect
was significant (F(7,108) = 3.51, p [less than] .01). For scenario 3 (offering job to friend), the multivariate F statistic for SJ-target effect
was significant at p = .056 level (F(7, 107) = 2.05). However, for scenario 2 which depicted a harmful decision for the target person,
both the SJ-agent effect (F(7,106) = 8.48) and the SJ-target effect (F(7,106) = 3.60) were significant at p [less than] .01. All significant
multivariate and univariate F statistics from the three MANOVAs are presented in Table 3. Therefore, these results from each of the
three scenarios have also provided general support for the predictions concerning the scope-of-justice effects on people's moral
judgments.

(1) Effects of SJ-agent on moral judgments

The first research question addressed in the study concerned the effect of the level of friendship and concerns people have for the
decision maker on their moral judgments. Results suggest that this effect may be context dependent: the SJ-agent effect was
significant for scenario 1 and 2, but not for scenario 3. For both scenarios 1 and 2, the specific moral judgment most affected by this
effect concerned ratings of likelihood of action (as indicated by the univariate F statistics in Table 3). An examination of the mean
ratings shows that, for both scenarios, the mean likelihood of action rating was significantly higher under the high, as compared with
the low, SJ-agent condition. Given that higher ratings for this variable mean that the moral agent is more likely either to change
his/her mind, or to have doubts about the decision, the result suggests that for either morally questionable decision (scenario 1 or 2),
[TABULAR DATA FOR TABLE 2 OMITTED] [TABULAR DATA FOR TABLE 3 OMITTED] respondents believed that a 'friend' was
more likely to question the wisdom of his/her decision than a 'non-friend'

For scenario 2, the SJ-agent effect was also significant for the issue fairness ratings. An examination of the mean ratings shows that
both means were below the neutral point 10. This indicates that the decision which harmed the target financially was judged as unfair.
And this same decision was seen as more unfair when it was made by a 'non-friend' (mean = 5.35) than a 'friend' (mean = 6.91). It is
worth noting that, although the SJ-agent effect on the overall ethicality ratings did not reach statistical significance for this scenario,
the finding however was in the same direction as predicted: the decision was considered as more unethical when it was made by a
'non-friend' (14.65) than a 'friend' (13.77). Overall, while these results have only provided limited support for the SJ-agent effect on
moral judgments, the general trend appears to be in the predicted direction.

(2) Effects of SJ-target on moral judgments

In terms of the target person, there were two specific predictions: (1) a morally questionable decision would be judged more
negatively if it harms a target who is a 'friend', as compared with a 'non-friend'; and (2) the reverse was predicted for decisions that
benefited the target person (i.e. more negative if a 'non-friend' receives undue benefits). Results from scenario 2 have provided
support for the first prediction, and those from scenario 3 have supported the second prediction. For both scenarios, the multivariate
statistics for S J-target were significant.

For scenario 2, the univariate statistics show that SJ-agent significantly influenced the issue fairness ratings and the magnitude of
consequence ratings. An examination of the means reveals that the decision was judged as more unfair when it harmed a 'friend'
(mean = 4.99) than when it harmed a 'non-friend' (mean = 7.26). The decision was also seen as 'having more serious consequences'
when it harmed a 'friend' (mean = 14.33) than a 'non-friend' (mean = 12.55).

However, for the decision of a job offer to a friend (scenario 3), SJ-agent significantly affected the ratings of overall ethicality,
magnitude of consequence, likelihood of action as well as likelihood of consequence. An examination of the means reveals that
differences in these ratings were all in the predicted direction: the decision was judged more negatively when a 'non-friend', as
compared with a 'friend', receives the undue benefit. More specifically, when a 'non-friend' was offered the job, the decision was seen
as being more unethical (the mean ethicality ratings were 13.01 vs. 11.39 for the low vs. high SJ-target conditions, respectively), as
having more serious consequences (the mean magnitude of consequence ratings were 12.33 vs. 10.24, respectively), and as having
more harmful consequences for both the firm and the other candidates (the mean likelihood of consequence ratings were 11.36 vs.
8.99, respectively). In addition, respondents also believed that the moral agent would have greater doubts about the wisdom of the
decision when it benefited a 'non-friend' than a 'friend' (the mean likelihood of action ratings were 10.76 vs. 8.78 respectively).

It is worth noting that for scenario 1, although not statistically significant, both the overall ethicality and the issue fairness ratings were
in the predicted direction. This decision, which unduly benefited the target, was also judged as less unethical and less unfair when a
'friend', as compared with a 'non-friend', was the beneficiary. The mean overall ethicality ratings were 13.59 vs. 12.93 for the low vs.
high SJ-target conditions, and the mean issue fairness ratings were 7.89 and 8.76, respectively. Together, results of these two
scenarios (1 and 3) suggest that people in general tend to be less lenient in their moral judgments when a 'non-friend', as compared
with a 'friend', receives identical but undue benefits as a result of a morally questionable decision.

Overall, the present results are consistent with the prediction in suggesting that the SJ-target effect on moral judgments may indeed
be moderated by the type of the consequence the morally questionable decision has for the target person.

(3) Analyses concerning the relative importance of issue dimensions in ethical considerations

A regression analysis was used to explore the relative weights accorded each issue dimension in respondents' ethicality judgments.
The predictors were the issue fairness variable and the five moral intensity variables identified by Jones (1991). The dependent
variable was the overall ethicality score. As the MANOVA main scenario effect was significant, the regression analysis was performed
separately on data for each scenario. Results of these regressions appear in Table 4. These results suggest that social consensus
and issue fairness were consistently the most significant considerations in judgments of the overall ethicality of the moral issue.

[TABULAR DATA FOR TABLE 4 OMITTED]

(4) Analyses concerning the link between ethicality and fairness judgments

Consistently for all three scenarios, the correlation between ratings of issue fairness and overall ethicality suggests a significant link
between the two judgments (r = -.37, -.40, and -.45 for the three scenarios respectively; p [less than] .01). Results of the three
regression analyses reported above provided further evidence on such a link. Having controlled for the effects of the intensity of all
other issue dimensions, issue fairness emerged as a significant predictor of overall ethicality ratings for all the three scenarios ([Beta]
= -.16, -.21 and -.24 for the three scenarios, respectively). This indicates that considerations of fairness are consistently an essential
factor in ethicality judgments.

Discussion

The first research question addressed in this paper concerns the effect of scope of justice on moral judgments. Two sets of
conclusions can be drawn from the present results. First, the scope-of-justice effects are context dependent. Respondents' subjective
concerns for parties to a moral act may have a greater influence on their moral judgments for certain kinds of morally questionable
acts than for others. Second, all the significant effects were in the predicted directions which suggest that (1) positive feelings for the
moral agent are associated with more lenient moral judgments about the questionable decision made by that agent, and (2) positive
feelings for the target person typically result in harsher judgments about the decision when the target suffers from it; but more lenient
judgments when the target derives undue benefits from the decision.

These findings have significant implications for the care versus justice perspective to morality. The literature so far suggests that a
care focus tends to characterize the morality of females (e.g. Gilligan, 1986; Gilligan, Ward & Taylor, 1988), and of people high on the
individual differences dimension of 'idealism' (Forsyth, 1980, 1992). In the context of the present study dealing with morally
questionable decisions, no significant gender difference in orientation to morality was observed. The care influence was evident in
moral judgments whereby one's 'friends' are either the moral agent or the target of a morally questionable act. While these findings
are explicable by the concept of cognitive consonance or consistency (see introduction), the notion of empathy is also relevant to
findings concerning the care effect for the target person. Empathy refers to a vicarious affective or emotional response 'elicited by,
and congruent with, the perceived welfare' of another person (e.g. Batson & Coke, 1981). Research on altruistic behaviour suggests
that the degree of empathy for a 'victim' of a wrongdoing is predictable from perceived similarity or proximity to that victim (e.g.
Hornstein, 1978; Krebs, 1975). The present finding that a moral act was judged as more negative when it harmed a friend could also
be interpreted as resulting from such empathic reactions.

The foregoing analysis thus seems to suggest that morality is likely to take on a care dimension when the need for cognitive
consonance is present or when feelings of empathy are maximized. These 'prerequisites' for a care-focused morality appear to be the
mechanism underlying the present respondents' ethical decisions. Future research could ascertain whether such a mechanism also
underlies related gender differences (e.g. Gilligan et al., 1988) or individual differences in idealism (Forsyth, 1980; Forsyth, 1992). An
affirmative answer to this question would suggest that the care-focused morality is functioning at a more fundamental level than that
defined by gender, individual differences, or even personal friendship and concerns: a morality based on care is driven primarily by
the fundamental need for cognitive consistency and the intrinsic emotion of empathy and compassion.

The results concerning the scope-of-justice effects are also germane to the distinction between ethical absolutism and ethical
relativism. The relativist position has received affirmation from the findings that (1) people's subjective feelings and personal concerns
significantly affected their moral judgments, and (2) such effects depend on the particularities of the moral scenarios. Specifically, the
effects appear to be more pervasive for 'harmful' than 'benign' moral acts: both the multivariate SJ agent and SJ-target effects were
significant for scenario 2, which depicted a moral act having harmful consequences for the target person, but this was not so for the
other two scenarios involving more benign consequences for the targets. However, while these data are consistent with the relativist
perspective to morality, it should be noted that they have no definitive implication for the absolutist position. Given that morality may
represent a hierarchical entity, with higher level rules being 'universally' valid and lower level rules being more subjective to
contextual influences (e.g. Rescher, 1993), the present results can best be seen as having identified such a contextual variable (i.e.
scope of justice regarding the parties to a moral act).

At a practical level, research in organizational psychology has shown that subjective concerns for a person known to us can have
significant consequences for our working life. In a study of a lay-off decision in a work organization, Brockner (1990) found that when
the victims were 'friends' of the survivors of the lay-off, the decision was perceived by these survivors as more unfair. Moreover, these
survivors also became less committed to their organization that made the lay-off decision. In a study of supervisors' performance
appraisal of subordinates, Duarte, Goodson & Klich (1993) showed that leaders tended to give overly inflated performance ratings to
in-group subordinates, and their judgments of the performance of out-group subordinates were more in line with those measured
objectively. By implication then, the present effect of liking or dislike on moral judgments may also have serious consequences for
organizational behaviour and hence an individual's working life.

The second research question concerns the relative importance various aspects of the moral issue are accorded in moral
deliberations. Results here reveal that among all aspects of the issue examined in the study, social consensus was accorded a high
importance in the overall ethicality judgments across all scenarios. This indicates that the most essential consideration of ethicality
resides in the perception of how the moral issue at stake is judged by others in society. In other words, the knowledge or perception
of the social agreement on a moral issue exerts most influence on individual moral judgments. By contrast, relatively little emphasis
was given to the size (i.e. magnitude of consequence), timing (i.e. temporary immediacy), or the likelihood of the consequence of a
moral issue. With the exception of temporary immediacy (only for scenario 2), all these consequence-related aspects of the issue
emerged with non-significant [Beta] weights from the regression analyses. These findings may have significant implications for
theories of morality. Teleological theories of ethics that place an overwhelming emphasis on consequentialism to the exclusion of
social factors may have indeed overlooked a significant consideration when people are actually making ethical decisions. The present
findings have provided strong empirical support for ethical theories, in both modernity and postmodernism, which argue for social
agreement as an essential constituent of moral (e.g. Haan, 1983; Hogan, 1973; Kohlberg, 1976; Rossouw, 1994).

Results of the study also shed light on the empirical link between judgments of ethicality and fairness. Two sets of findings provide
evidence on the link. First, fairness considerations were found to be a consistent and significant predictor of ethicality judgments.
Second, the two types of ratings were highly correlated with each other across all three scenarios. These data thus provide
convergent evidence on an empirical link between ethicality and fairness judgments, which corresponds to the normative-theoretical
link between ethics and justice implicit in the moral philosophical literature. Furthermore, the present results seem to suggest that
respondents had used the two terms, 'ethical' and 'fair', in a similar fashion; a decision that was judged as more (or less) unethical
was also judged as more (or less) unfair. This could be because the present design, using a Likert-type rating in assessing the
degree of ethicality or fairness, tends to induce such a 'nondiscriminatory' or 'global' interpretation of the terms. Other research
methods, such as the repertory grid or discursive analysis (for a critique of this analysis, see Greenwood, 1992), are perhaps needed
to delineate the boundaries between the terms, ethical and fair, as they are deployed in daily language.

Several limitations of the study need to be acknowledged. First, in the context of applying empirical data to normative issues of
morality, the limitations identified by Waterman (1988), including the naturalistic fallacy and the use of a priori assumptions about
morality (i.e. 'the problem of scope'), are all applicable here. Second, the absence of a treatment condition of 'strangers to the
respondent' precludes an analysis of the absolute effects of friendship or scope of justice on judgments of ethicality. Results of such a
comparison would shed further light on the care versus justice perspectives to morality. Third, although the study has shown that
people's moral judgments tend to vary in relation to personal friendship and concerns, it by no means captures the real-world
decision environment in which conflicting cognitions and emotions come into play. Despite the limitations, the findings nonetheless
foster understanding of what morality 'actually is', though not what it 'ought to be'. In the context of the recent call for a combined
effort of the normative-prescriptive and the empirical-descriptive approaches to ethics (e.g. Donaldson, 1994; Etzioni, 1989;
Greenberg & Bies, 1992), the value of such an empirical study lies in its serving 'as a framework for the development of dialogue
between moral philosophers and moral psychologists' (Waterman, 1988, p. 283).

Acknowledgements

The author thanks Anne-Marie Dunnehy for data collection and entry. This research was supported by a research grant from the
University of Canterbury to the author. I am also grateful to the two anonymous reviewers, the action editor and the editor for their
constructive and helpful comments on earlier versions of the manuscript.

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Appendix: The three scenarios

Scenario 1 (benefiting target: copying assignment)

(Target) is your best friend in the university. The two of you went through school together and remained close friends ever since. You
two share almost every interest and hobby. You spend a great deal of your leisure time together pursuing these interests. One most
important feature of your friendship has been that you both have great concern for the other person's welfare. In the past, if one of
you was treated unjustly or unfairly by others, the other would always come to the rescue and do the best to help.

(Target) is now studying science in the university. You chose to study for an arts degree so you are no longer in the same class as
(target). Since starting university, (target) got to know a classmate named (agent). However, having met (agent) several times, you
realized that you two don't share any common interests or hobbies. You don't particularly like him/her as a person and you are not
particularly concerned about how he/she is getting on.

During the last few months, (target) has been dating a young woman/man in his/her class. Because of this, he/she has been very
much behind in his/her study. (Target) asked (agent) if he/she could copy one of (agent's) assignments for applied maths, as he/she
had not been able to find the time to do it himself/herself. (Agent) agreed to offer the help.

Please answer the following questions, bearing in mind that you are a good friend of (target) and you have great concerns for
him/her. But as far as (agent) is concerned, you don't particularly like him/her, nor are you concerned about how he/she is getting on.

Scenario 2 (harming target: breaching verbal agreement)

You and (target) have been good friends for a long time. The two of you went through school and university together and remained
close friends ever since. You two share similar views on most issues and you also have a lot of common interests. You spend a great
deal of your leisure time together pursuing these interests. One most important feature of your friendship has been that you both have
great concerns for the other's welfare. In the past, when one of you was treated unjustly or unfairly by other people, the other would
always come to the rescue and do the best to help.

(Target) is interested in and is very good at designing women's fashion garments. Through this interest, (target) met (agent), who has
a contract with a large international fashion designer to work on evening wears. You have met (agent) several times. You realized
that you and (agent) don't share any common views or interests. You don't particularly like her/him as a person and you are not
particularly concerned about how she/he is getting on.

Several months ago, (agent) asked (target) to help her/him with a special design assignment which she/he has contracted for a
lucrative commission. (Agent) said if (target) took on and completed half of the assignment, (target) should have half of the
commission. (Target) agreed to take the offer. Since then she/he diligently worked on the design. Three weeks ago, (target)
completed her/his part of the design and showed it to (agent). (Agent) said she/he loved it and suggested some minor alterations.
(Target) made these changes in the design and gave the final product to (agent). However, (target) received a letter from (agent)
yesterday saying that she/he just decided that (target's) design would not fin it with her/his part of the fashion assignment, so she/he
was not going to use (target's) work. As a result, there will be no pay for (target).

Scenario 3 (benefiting target: offering job to friend)

You and (target) are good friends for a long time. A few years ago, you went through the MBA program from Auckland University
together. You two share similar views on most issues and you also have a lot of common interests. You spend a great deal of your
leisure time together pursuing these interests. One most important feature of your friendship has been that you both have great
concerns for the other's welfare. In the past, when one of you was treated unjustly or unfairly by other people, the other would always
come to the rescue and do the best to help.

(Target) always had to struggle throughout his/her study and was unable to find a suitable position after graduation. Since then
(target) has worked on temporary contracts. Through his/her work, (target) met (agent). (Agent) was the brightest guy/girl in school
and at university. He/she has been working successfully as the production manager for a large electronic manufacturing firm. You
have met (agent) on several occasions. You realized that you and (agent) don't share any common views or interests. You don't
particularly like him/her as a person and you are not particularly concerned with how he/she is getting on.

(Agent's) firm recently advertised for a vacancy in his/her section. (Target) applied for it as he/she had been eager to get a permanent
and well-paid position. There were 89 applicants for the vacancy. In terms of overall merit or qualifications (target) was ranked 9 on
the list of the final 10 candidates. Because (agent) wanted to see (target) appointed, he/she did the best lobbying members of the
selection panel for (target). As a result, (target) got offered the job.

Please answer the following questions, bearing in mind that you are a good friend of (target) and you have great concerns for
him/her. But as far as (agent) is concerned, you don't particularly like him/her, nor are you concerned about how he/she is getting on.

Copyright: COPYRIGHT 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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Cita de fuente (MLA 8.a edición)
Singer, M.S. "The role of subjective concerns and characteristics of the moral issue in moral considerations." British Journal of
Psychology, Nov. 1998, p. 663. Gale OneFile: Psychology,
https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A53489984/PPPC?u=unsmar&sid=PPPC&xid=1d296025. Accessed 27 Oct. 2019.
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