Documentos de Académico
Documentos de Profesional
Documentos de Cultura
+ =
For every architecture, the detected dangerous failure rate and the undetected dangerous
failure rate are given by
( ) DC 1
D DU
= ; !#
! !!
=
For a channel with down time t
CE
resulting from dangerous failures
1 t t
e 1 PFD
CE D CE D
t
CE D
<<
=
since
Hence, for a 1oo1 architecture, the average probability of failure on demand is
( )
CE DD DU G
t PFD + =
B.3.2.2.2 1oo2
This architecture consists of two channels connected in parallel, such that either channel can
process the safety function. Thus there would have to be a dangerous failure in both channels
before a safety function failed on demand. t is assumed that any diagnostic testing would
only report the faults found and would not change any output states or change the output
voting.
DU
t
c1
=
1 _
T + MRT
2
DD
t
c2
= MTTR
D
t
CE
IEC 325/2000
Customer: jose angel alvarado - No. of User(s): 1 - Company: CSIPA CONSULTORIA EN SEGURIDAD INDUSTRILA Y PROTECCION AL AMBIENTE SA DE CV
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61508-6 EC:2010 31
Figure B.5 - 1oo1 reIiabiIity bIock diagram
Figures B.4 and B.5 contain the relevant block diagrams. The dangerous failure rate for the
channel is given by
!! !" !
+ =
Figure B.5 shows that the channel can be considered to comprise of two components, one
with a dangerous failure rate
DU
resulting from undetected failures and the other with a
dangerous failure rate
DD
resulting from detected failures. t is possible to calculate the
channel equivalent mean down time t
CE
, adding the individual down times from both
components, t
c1
and t
c2
, in direct proportion to each component's contribution to the
probability of failure of the channel:
MTTR MRT
2
T
t
D
DD 1
D
DU
CE
+ =
For every architecture, the detected dangerous failure rate and the undetected dangerous
failure rate are given by
( ) DC 1
D DU
= ; !#
! !!
=
For a channel with down time t
CE
resulting from dangerous failures
1 t t
e 1 PFD
CE D CE D
t
CE D
<<
=
since
Hence, for a 1oo1 architecture, the average probability of failure on demand is
( )
CE DD DU G
t PFD + =
B.3.2.2.2 1oo2
This architecture consists of two channels connected in parallel, such that either channel can
process the safety function. Thus there would have to be a dangerous failure in both channels
before a safety function failed on demand. t is assumed that any diagnostic testing would
only report the faults found and would not change any output states or change the output
voting.
DU
t
c1
=
1 _
T + MRT
2
DD
t
c2
= MTTR
D
t
CE
IEC 325/2000
Customer: jose angel alvarado - No. of User(s): 1 - Company: CSIPA CONSULTORIA EN SEGURIDAD INDUSTRILA Y PROTECCION AL AMBIENTE SA DE CV
Order No.: WS-2010-007542 - IMPORTANT: This file is copyright of IEC, Geneva, Switzerland. All rights reserved.
This file is subject to a licence agreement. Enquiries to Email: custserv@iec.ch - Tel.: +41 22 919 02 11
61508-6 EC:2010 31
Figure B.5 - 1oo1 reIiabiIity bIock diagram
Figures B.4 and B.5 contain the relevant block diagrams. The dangerous failure rate for the
channel is given by
!! !" !
+ =
Figure B.5 shows that the channel can be considered to comprise of two components, one
with a dangerous failure rate
DU
resulting from undetected failures and the other with a
dangerous failure rate
DD
resulting from detected failures. t is possible to calculate the
channel equivalent mean down time t
CE
, adding the individual down times from both
components, t
c1
and t
c2
, in direct proportion to each component's contribution to the
probability of failure of the channel:
MTTR MRT
2
T
t
D
DD 1
D
DU
CE
+ =
For every architecture, the detected dangerous failure rate and the undetected dangerous
failure rate are given by
( ) DC 1
D DU
= ; !#
! !!
=
For a channel with down time t
CE
resulting from dangerous failures
1 t t
e 1 PFD
CE D CE D
t
CE D
<<
=
since
Hence, for a 1oo1 architecture, the average probability of failure on demand is
( )
CE DD DU G
t PFD + =
B.3.2.2.2 1oo2
This architecture consists of two channels connected in parallel, such that either channel can
process the safety function. Thus there would have to be a dangerous failure in both channels
before a safety function failed on demand. t is assumed that any diagnostic testing would
only report the faults found and would not change any output states or change the output
voting.
DU
t
c1
=
1 _
T + MRT
2
DD
t
c2
= MTTR
D
t
CE
IEC 325/2000
Customer: jose angel alvarado - No. of User(s): 1 - Company: CSIPA CONSULTORIA EN SEGURIDAD INDUSTRILA Y PROTECCION AL AMBIENTE SA DE CV
Order No.: WS-2010-007542 - IMPORTANT: This file is copyright of IEC, Geneva, Switzerland. All rights reserved.
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61508-6 EC:2010 31
Figure B.5 - 1oo1 reIiabiIity bIock diagram
Figures B.4 and B.5 contain the relevant block diagrams. The dangerous failure rate for the
channel is given by
!! !" !
+ =
Figure B.5 shows that the channel can be considered to comprise of two components, one
with a dangerous failure rate
DU
resulting from undetected failures and the other with a
dangerous failure rate
DD
resulting from detected failures. t is possible to calculate the
channel equivalent mean down time t
CE
, adding the individual down times from both
components, t
c1
and t
c2
, in direct proportion to each component's contribution to the
probability of failure of the channel:
MTTR MRT
2
T
t
D
DD 1
D
DU
CE
+ =
For every architecture, the detected dangerous failure rate and the undetected dangerous
failure rate are given by
( ) DC 1
D DU
= ; !#
! !!
=
For a channel with down time t
CE
resulting from dangerous failures
1 t t
e 1 PFD
CE D CE D
t
CE D
<<
=
since
Hence, for a 1oo1 architecture, the average probability of failure on demand is
( )
CE DD DU G
t PFD + =
B.3.2.2.2 1oo2
This architecture consists of two channels connected in parallel, such that either channel can
process the safety function. Thus there would have to be a dangerous failure in both channels
before a safety function failed on demand. t is assumed that any diagnostic testing would
only report the faults found and would not change any output states or change the output
voting.
DU
t
c1
=
1 _
T + MRT
2
DD
t
c2
= MTTR
D
t
CE
IEC 325/2000
Customer: jose angel alvarado - No. of User(s): 1 - Company: CSIPA CONSULTORIA EN SEGURIDAD INDUSTRILA Y PROTECCION AL AMBIENTE SA DE CV
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La probabilidad de fallas sobre demanda para la arquitectura 1oo2 queda entonces dada por:
Ecuacin para sistema con arquitectura 2oo2:
La arquitectura 2oo2 consiste en dos canales conectados de forma paralelo, ambos canales deben de demandar a la funcin
de seguridad para que esta se ejecute. Se asume que cualquier diagnostico deber ser reportado y la falla encontrada y no
habr un cambio en el estado final de la votacin de salidas.
Determinacin de la PFDavg# 9
Risk Software S.A. de C.V.
32 61508-6 EC:2010
ChanneI
ChanneI
Diagnostics
1oo2
IEC 326/2000
Figure B.6 - 1oo2 physicaI bIock diagram
Common
cause faiIure
!!
!"
#
$%
!
#
&%
IEC 327/2000
Figure B.7 - 1oo2 reIiabiIity bIock diagram
Figures B.6 and B.7 contain the relevant block diagrams. The value of t
CE
is as given in
B.3.2.2.1, but now it is necessary to also calculate the system equivalent down time t
GE
,
which is given by
MTTR MRT
3
T
t
D
DD 1
D
DU
GE
+ =
The average probability of failure on demand for the architecture is
( ) ( ) ( )
+ + + + = MRT
2
T
MTTR t t 1 1 2 PFD
1
DU DD D GE CE
2
DU DD D G
B.3.2.2.3 2oo2
This architecture consists of two channels connected in parallel so that both channels need to
demand the safety function before it can take place. t is assumed that any diagnostic testing
would only report the faults found and would not change any output states or change the
output voting.
Customer: jose angel alvarado - No. of User(s): 1 - Company: CSIPA CONSULTORIA EN SEGURIDAD INDUSTRILA Y PROTECCION AL AMBIENTE SA DE CV
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32 61508-6 EC:2010
ChanneI
ChanneI
Diagnostics
1oo2
IEC 326/2000
Figure B.6 - 1oo2 physicaI bIock diagram
Common
cause faiIure
!!
!"
#
$%
!
#
&%
IEC 327/2000
Figure B.7 - 1oo2 reIiabiIity bIock diagram
Figures B.6 and B.7 contain the relevant block diagrams. The value of t
CE
is as given in
B.3.2.2.1, but now it is necessary to also calculate the system equivalent down time t
GE
,
which is given by
MTTR MRT
3
T
t
D
DD 1
D
DU
GE
+ =
The average probability of failure on demand for the architecture is
( ) ( ) ( )
+ + + + = MRT
2
T
MTTR t t 1 1 2 PFD
1
DU DD D GE CE
2
DU DD D G
B.3.2.2.3 2oo2
This architecture consists of two channels connected in parallel so that both channels need to
demand the safety function before it can take place. t is assumed that any diagnostic testing
would only report the faults found and would not change any output states or change the
output voting.
Customer: jose angel alvarado - No. of User(s): 1 - Company: CSIPA CONSULTORIA EN SEGURIDAD INDUSTRILA Y PROTECCION AL AMBIENTE SA DE CV
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Canal
Diagnosticos
Figura #7
Diagrama de Bloques Fisico 1oo2
1oo2
Canal
!
DU
!
DD
!
D
t
CE
Figura #8
Diagrama de Bloques de Conabilidad 1oo2
Falla de causa
Comun
t
GE
La probabilidad de fallas sobre demanda queda establecida por:
Ecuacin para sistema con arquitectura 1oo2D:
La arquitectura 1oo2D consiste en dos canales conectados en paralelo. Durante la operacin normal, ambos canales deben
de demandar a la funcin de seguridad para que esta se ejecute. En adicin, si los diagnsticos en cada canal detectan una
falla, entonces la votacin de salida es adaptada de tal manera que la operacin contine con el canal que se encuentra ope-
rando sin fallas. Si los diagnsticos encuentran una falla en ambos canales o existe una discrepancia que no es posible loca-
lizar en algn canal, entonces las salidas se sitan en una posicin segura. Para poder detectar una discrepancia entre los
canales, ambos canales debern poder el estado del otro canal de forma independiente. La comparacin o el mecanismo de
transferencia puede que no sea 100% eficiente, por lo tanto K representa la eficiencia de los mecanismos de comparacin o
mecanismo de transferencia.
Determinacin de la PFDavg# 10
Risk Software S.A. de C.V.
Canal
Diagnosticos
Figura #9
Diagrama de Bloques Fisico 2oo2
2oo2
Canal
!
DU
!
DD
!
D
t
CE
Figura #10
Diagrama de Bloques de Conabilidad 2002
!
DU
!
DD
!
D
t
CE
61508-6 EC:2010 33
ChanneI
ChanneI
Diagnostics
2oo2
IEC 328/200
Figure B.8 - 2oo2 physicaI bIock diagram
!! !"
!
#
$%
!! !"
!
#
$%
Figure B.9 - 2oo2 reIiabiIity bIock diagram
Figures B.8 and B.9 contain the relevant block diagrams. The value of t
CE
is as given in
B.3.2.2.1, and the average probability of failure on demand for the architecture is
CE D G
t 2 PFD =
B.3.2.2.4 1oo2D
This architecture consists of two channels connected in parallel. During normal operation,
both channels need to demand the safety function before it can take place. n addition, if the
diagnostic tests in either channel detect a fault then the output voting is adapted so that the
overall output state then follows that given by the other channel. f the diagnostic tests find
faults in both channels or a discrepancy that cannot be allocated to either channel, then the
output goes to the safe state. n order to detect a discrepancy between the channels, either
channel can determine the state of the other channel via a means independent of the other
channel. The channel comparison / switch over mechanism may not be 100 % efficient
therefore K represents the efficiency of this inter-channel comparison / switch mechanism, i.e.
the output may remain on the 2oo2 voting even with one channel detected as faulty.
NOTE The parameter K will need to be determined by an FMEA.
Diagnostics
Diagnostics
ChanneI
ChanneI
1oo2D
IEC 330/2000
Figure B.10 - 1oo2D physicaI bIock diagram
IEC 329/2000
Customer: jose angel alvarado - No. of User(s): 1 - Company: CSIPA CONSULTORIA EN SEGURIDAD INDUSTRILA Y PROTECCION AL AMBIENTE SA DE CV
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Canal
Diagnosticos
Figura #11
Diagrama de Bloques Fisico 1oo2D
1oo2
D
Canal
Diagnosticos
La relacin de fallas seguras detectadas para cada canal esta dada por:
Aqu los valores de equivalencia de de Tiempo Medio Abajo estn dados por :
La probabilidad de fallas bajo demanda para la arquitectura 1oo2D queda dada por:
Ecuacin para sistema con arquitectura 2oo3:
La arquitectura 2oo3 consiste en tres canales conectados en paralelo con un arreglo de votacin a la salida, aqu el estado de
las salidas no difiere si solo un canal muestra discrepancia con los otros dos canales. Se asume que cualquier diagnostico
deber ser reportado y la falla encontrada y no habr un cambio en el estado final de la votacin de salidas.
Determinacin de la PFDavg# 11
Risk Software S.A. de C.V.
t
CE
Figura #12
Diagrama de Bloques de Conabilidad 1oo2D
Falla de Causa
Comun
t
GE
!
DU
!
DU
!
SD
!
DD
34 61508-6 EC:2010
Common
cause faiIure
!"
!"
!! #!
$%&
$'&
IEC 331/2000
Figure B.11 - 1oo2D reIiabiIity bIock diagram
The detected safe failure rate for every channel is given by
DC
S SD
=
Figures B.10 and B.11 contain the relevant block diagrams. The values of the equivalent
mean down times differ from those given for the other architectures in B.3.2.2 and hence are
labelled t
CE
and t
GE
. Their values are given by
( )
( )
SD DD DU
SD DD
1
DU
CE
MTTR MRT
2
T
' t
+ +
+ +
+
=
MRT
3
T
' t
1
GE
+ =
The average probability of failure on demand for the architecture is
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
+ + + + + = MRT
2
T
' t K 1 2 ' t ' t 1 1 1 2 PFD
1
DU CE DD GE CE SD DD D DU DU G
B.3.2.2.5 2oo3
This architecture consists of three channels connected in parallel with a majority voting
arrangement for the output signals, such that the output state is not changed if only one
channel gives a different result which disagrees with the other two channels.
t is assumed that any diagnostic testing would only report the faults found and would not
change any output states or change the output voting.
Figure B.12 - 2oo3 physicaI bIock diagram
Channel
ChanneI
2oo3 ChanneI
Diagnostics
IEC 332/2000
Customer: jose angel alvarado - No. of User(s): 1 - Company: CSIPA CONSULTORIA EN SEGURIDAD INDUSTRILA Y PROTECCION AL AMBIENTE SA DE CV
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34 61508-6 EC:2010
Common
cause faiIure
!"
!"
!! #!
$%&
$'&
IEC 331/2000
Figure B.11 - 1oo2D reIiabiIity bIock diagram
The detected safe failure rate for every channel is given by
DC
S SD
=
Figures B.10 and B.11 contain the relevant block diagrams. The values of the equivalent
mean down times differ from those given for the other architectures in B.3.2.2 and hence are
labelled t
CE
and t
GE
. Their values are given by
( )
( )
SD DD DU
SD DD
1
DU
CE
MTTR MRT
2
T
' t
+ +
+ +
+
=
MRT
3
T
' t
1
GE
+ =
The average probability of failure on demand for the architecture is
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
+ + + + + = MRT
2
T
' t K 1 2 ' t ' t 1 1 1 2 PFD
1
DU CE DD GE CE SD DD D DU DU G
B.3.2.2.5 2oo3
This architecture consists of three channels connected in parallel with a majority voting
arrangement for the output signals, such that the output state is not changed if only one
channel gives a different result which disagrees with the other two channels.
t is assumed that any diagnostic testing would only report the faults found and would not
change any output states or change the output voting.
Figure B.12 - 2oo3 physicaI bIock diagram
Channel
ChanneI
2oo3 ChanneI
Diagnostics
IEC 332/2000
Customer: jose angel alvarado - No. of User(s): 1 - Company: CSIPA CONSULTORIA EN SEGURIDAD INDUSTRILA Y PROTECCION AL AMBIENTE SA DE CV
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34 61508-6 EC:2010
Common
cause faiIure
!"
!"
!! #!
$%&
$'&
IEC 331/2000
Figure B.11 - 1oo2D reIiabiIity bIock diagram
The detected safe failure rate for every channel is given by
DC
S SD
=
Figures B.10 and B.11 contain the relevant block diagrams. The values of the equivalent
mean down times differ from those given for the other architectures in B.3.2.2 and hence are
labelled t
CE
and t
GE
. Their values are given by
( )
( )
SD DD DU
SD DD
1
DU
CE
MTTR MRT
2
T
' t
+ +
+ +
+
=
MRT
3
T
' t
1
GE
+ =
The average probability of failure on demand for the architecture is
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
+ + + + + = MRT
2
T
' t K 1 2 ' t ' t 1 1 1 2 PFD
1
DU CE DD GE CE SD DD D DU DU G
B.3.2.2.5 2oo3
This architecture consists of three channels connected in parallel with a majority voting
arrangement for the output signals, such that the output state is not changed if only one
channel gives a different result which disagrees with the other two channels.
t is assumed that any diagnostic testing would only report the faults found and would not
change any output states or change the output voting.
Figure B.12 - 2oo3 physicaI bIock diagram
Channel
ChanneI
2oo3 ChanneI
Diagnostics
IEC 332/2000
Customer: jose angel alvarado - No. of User(s): 1 - Company: CSIPA CONSULTORIA EN SEGURIDAD INDUSTRILA Y PROTECCION AL AMBIENTE SA DE CV
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Canal
Diagnosticos
Figura #13
Diagrama de Bloques Fisico 2oo3
2oo3 Canal
Canal
La probabilidad de fallas sobre demanda para la arquitectura 2oo3 se establece como:
Ecuacin para sistema con arquitectura 1oo3:
La arquitectura 1oo3 consiste en tres canales conectados en paralelo con un arreglo de votacin de salida de 1oo3, cualquier
falla detectada por diagnsticos ocasionara que el sistema se posicione en falla segura. Se asume que cualquier diagnostico
deber ser reportado y la falla encontrada y no habr un cambio en el estado final de la votacin de salidas.
La probabilidad de fallas sobre demanda para la arquitectura 1oo3 se establece como:
Donde:
Determinacin de la PFDavg# 12
Risk Software S.A. de C.V.
!
D
t
CE
Figura #14
Diagrama de Bloques de Conabilidad 2oo3
Falla de causa
Comun
t
GE
!
DU
!
DD
61508-6 EC:2010 35
Common
cause faiIure
!!
!"
#
$%
!
#
&%
2oo3
IEC 333/2000
Figure B.13 - 2oo3 reIiabiIity bIock diagram
Figures B.12 and B.13 contain the relevant block diagrams. The value of t
CE
is as given in
B.3.2.2.1 and the value of t
GE
is as given in B.3.2.2.2. The average probability of failure on
demand for the architecture is
( ) ( ) ( )
+ + + + = MRT
2
T
MTTR t t 1 1 6 PFD
1
DU DD D GE CE
2
DU DD D G
B.3.2.2.6 1oo3
This architecture consists of three channels connected in parallel with a voting arrangement
for the output signals, such that the output state follows 1oo3 voting.
t is assumed that any diagnostic testing would only report the faults found and would not
change any output states or change the output voting.
The reliability diagram will be the same as for the 2oo3 case but with voting 1oo3. The value
of t
CE
is as given in B.3.2.2.1 and the value of t
GE
is as given in B.3.2.2.2. The average
probability of failure on demand for the architecture is
( ) ( ) ( )
+ + + + = MRT
2
T
MTTR t t t 1 1 6 PFD
1
DU DD D E 2 G GE CE
3
DU DD D G
Where
MTTR MRT
4
T
t
D
DD 1
D
DU
E 2 G
+ =
IEC 332/2000
Customer: jose angel alvarado - No. of User(s): 1 - Company: CSIPA CONSULTORIA EN SEGURIDAD INDUSTRILA Y PROTECCION AL AMBIENTE SA DE CV
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61508-6 EC:2010 35
Common
cause faiIure
!!
!"
#
$%
!
#
&%
2oo3
IEC 333/2000
Figure B.13 - 2oo3 reIiabiIity bIock diagram
Figures B.12 and B.13 contain the relevant block diagrams. The value of t
CE
is as given in
B.3.2.2.1 and the value of t
GE
is as given in B.3.2.2.2. The average probability of failure on
demand for the architecture is
( ) ( ) ( )
+ + + + = MRT
2
T
MTTR t t 1 1 6 PFD
1
DU DD D GE CE
2
DU DD D G
B.3.2.2.6 1oo3
This architecture consists of three channels connected in parallel with a voting arrangement
for the output signals, such that the output state follows 1oo3 voting.
t is assumed that any diagnostic testing would only report the faults found and would not
change any output states or change the output voting.
The reliability diagram will be the same as for the 2oo3 case but with voting 1oo3. The value
of t
CE
is as given in B.3.2.2.1 and the value of t
GE
is as given in B.3.2.2.2. The average
probability of failure on demand for the architecture is
( ) ( ) ( )
+ + + + = MRT
2
T
MTTR t t t 1 1 6 PFD
1
DU DD D E 2 G GE CE
3
DU DD D G
Where
MTTR MRT
4
T
t
D
DD 1
D
DU
E 2 G
+ =
IEC 332/2000
Customer: jose angel alvarado - No. of User(s): 1 - Company: CSIPA CONSULTORIA EN SEGURIDAD INDUSTRILA Y PROTECCION AL AMBIENTE SA DE CV
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61508-6 EC:2010 35
Common
cause faiIure
!!
!"
#
$%
!
#
&%
2oo3
IEC 333/2000
Figure B.13 - 2oo3 reIiabiIity bIock diagram
Figures B.12 and B.13 contain the relevant block diagrams. The value of t
CE
is as given in
B.3.2.2.1 and the value of t
GE
is as given in B.3.2.2.2. The average probability of failure on
demand for the architecture is
( ) ( ) ( )
+ + + + = MRT
2
T
MTTR t t 1 1 6 PFD
1
DU DD D GE CE
2
DU DD D G
B.3.2.2.6 1oo3
This architecture consists of three channels connected in parallel with a voting arrangement
for the output signals, such that the output state follows 1oo3 voting.
t is assumed that any diagnostic testing would only report the faults found and would not
change any output states or change the output voting.
The reliability diagram will be the same as for the 2oo3 case but with voting 1oo3. The value
of t
CE
is as given in B.3.2.2.1 and the value of t
GE
is as given in B.3.2.2.2. The average
probability of failure on demand for the architecture is
( ) ( ) ( )
+ + + + = MRT
2
T
MTTR t t t 1 1 6 PFD
1
DU DD D E 2 G GE CE
3
DU DD D G
Where
MTTR MRT
4
T
t
D
DD 1
D
DU
E 2 G
+ =
IEC 332/2000
Customer: jose angel alvarado - No. of User(s): 1 - Company: CSIPA CONSULTORIA EN SEGURIDAD INDUSTRILA Y PROTECCION AL AMBIENTE SA DE CV
Order No.: WS-2010-007542 - IMPORTANT: This file is copyright of IEC, Geneva, Switzerland. All rights reserved.
This file is subject to a licence agreement. Enquiries to Email: custserv@iec.ch - Tel.: +41 22 919 02 11
Cuantificacin del Efecto de las Fallas de Causa Comn:
Los clculos de PFDavg debern incorporar el efecto que causan las fallas de causa comn en los sistemas redundantes, en
la seguridad funcional es comn utilizar la metodologa de factor Beta (") para determinar la falla de causa comn. en un arti-
culo tcnico posterior describiremos como se determina este factor.
El efecto final en la ecuacin de PFDavg del factor de causa comn se representa con la siguiente ecuacin:
PFDFCC# = ( PFDa x PFDb x..... PFDn ) + (& x PFDPeor)
Donde:
PFD a.....n representa la probabilidad de falla sobre demanda del dispositivo a al n.
PFDPeor representa la probabilidad de fallas sobre demanda del dispositivo mas dbil o peor.
Beta (") representa el factor de falla comn.
6. Arquitecturas Redundantes
Arquitecturas de sistemas redundantes para Diagramas de Bloques.
Determinacin de la PFDavg# 13
Risk Software S.A. de C.V.
Figura #15 2oo2
A E B
FALLA DE
CAUSA
COMUN
S
A
E
B
FALLA DE
CAUSA
COMUN
S
Figura #16 1oo2
Determinacin de la PFDavg# 14
Risk Software S.A. de C.V.
A E B
FALLA DE
CAUSA
COMUN
S C
Figura #18 1oo3
A
E
B
FALLA DE
CAUSA
COMUN
S
Figura #17 2oo3
A
C
B
C
Arquitecturas de sistemas redundantes para Arboles de Falla. Bloques OR (Se Suman). Bloques AND (Se Multiplican)
Determinacin de la PFDavg# 15
Risk Software S.A. de C.V.
A B
O
R
FCC
Salida
O
R
Figura #19 2oo2
A
A
N
D
B
O
R
FCC
Salida
Figura #20 1oo2
A
A
N
D
O
R
B A
A
N
D
C B
A
N
D
C
O
R
FCC
Salida
Figura #21 2oo3
A
N
D
A B C
O
R
FCC
Salida
Figura #22 1oo3
7. Ejemplos de Determinacin de PFDavg.
Podemos modelar la PFDavg de un sistema utilizando diagramas de bloques utilizando en las siguientes simplificaciones:
# Cadenas en paralelo se Multiplican.
# Cadenas en serie se Suman.
Ejemplo:
Considere el siguiente sistema de proteccin de presin a la entrada de una plataforma marina que maneja grandes
volmenes de gas natural, una sobre presin podra generar un gran impacto ocasionando ruptura de la tubera y generando
una fuga mayor que podra incluso generar un gran fuego o explosin:
PT-9002A
D PT-9002B
PT-9002C
FALLA DE
CAUSA
COMUN
TMR
SVA
SVB
FALLA DE
CAUSA
COMUN
ESDV H
ENTRADAS LOGICA SALIDAS
Considere
Arquitectura
2oo3
Determinacin de la PFDavg# 16
Risk Software S.A. de C.V.
Se cuenta con los siguientes datos:
Valores PT (FIT) TMR (FIT) Solenoide (FIT) Vlvula Corte (FIT)
!sd 396 71 0
!su 440 0 1401
!dd 52 99 0
!du 69 1 765
SFF 92.8% ---- ----
TI 1 ao 1 ao 1 ao
MTTR 8 hr 8 hr 8 hr
" 5% 5% ----
PFDavg 2.5 x 10-
4
Problema: Dibujar el diagrama de bloques para el sistema y calcular el valor de PFDavg para el sistema:
ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 - Part 2 ! 24 !
If systematic errors (functional failures) are to be included in the calculations, separate values for each
sub-system, if available, may be used in the equations above. An alternate approach is to use a single
value for functional failure for the entire SIF and add this term as shown in Equation 1a in 5.1.6.
NOTE Systematic failures are rarely modeled for SIF Verification calculations due to the difficulty in assessing the failure modes
and effects and the lack of failure rate data for various types of systematic failure. However, these failures are extremely important
and can result in significant impact to the SIF performance. For this reason, ANSI/ISA-84.01-1996, IEC 61508, and IEC 61511
provide a lifecycle process that incorporates design and installation concepts, validation and testing criteria, and management of
change. This lifecycle process is intended to support the reduction in the systematic failures. SIL Verification is therefore
predominantly concerned with assessing the SIS performance related to random failures.
The simplified equations without the terms for multiple failures during repair, common cause and
systematic errors reduce to the following for use in the procedures outlined in 5.1.1 through 5.1.4.
1oo1
(Eq. No. 3a) PFD
TI
avg
DU
= " #
2
1oo2
(Eq. No. 4a)
( )
[ ]
PFD
TI
avg
DU
=
" #
2
2
3
1oo3
(Eq. No. 5a)
( )
[ ]
PFD
TI
avg
DU
=
" #
3
3
4
2oo2
(Eq. No. 6a) PFD TI
avg
DU
= " #
2oo3
(Eq. No. 7a) ( ) PFD TI
avg
DU
= " #
2
2
2oo4
(Eq. No. 8a) ( ) ( )
3
3
TI PFD
DU
avg
" = #
5.1.6 Combining components PFDs to obtain SIF PFD
avg
Once the sensor, final element, logic solver, and power supply (if applicable) portions are evaluated, the
overall PFD
avg
for the SIF being evaluated is obtained by summing the individual components. The result
is the PFD
avg
for the SIF for the event being protected against.
(Eq. No. 1a)
$
%
&
'
(
)
" + + + + =
* * * *
2
TI
PFD
D
F PSi
#
Li Ai Si SIS
PFD PFD PFD PFD
Solucin con Diagramas de Bloques: Lo primero que debemos realizar es calcular los valores de PFDavg para cada
bloque, para esto utilizamos la formula:
1) Para los transmisores tenemos:
PFDavg = (69 x10
-9
x 8760)/2 = 3.02 x10
-6
PFDavg (A x B) = 3.02 x10
-6
x 3.02 x10
-6
= 9.13 x 10
-12
PFDavg (A x C) = 3.02 x10
-6
x 3.02 x10
-6
= 9.13 x 10
-12
PFDavg (B x C) = 3.02 x10
-6
x 3.02 x10
-6
= 9.13 x 10
-12
PFDFCC = (3.02 x10
-6
x 3.02 x10
-6
x 3.02 x10
-6
) + (0.05 x 3.02 x10
-6
) = 1.51 x 10
-07
PFDavg = 3.02 x10
-6
+ 3.02 x10
-6
+ 3.02 x10
-6
= 9.07 x 10
-6
PFDavg tot = 9.07 x 10
-6
+ 1.51 x 10
-07
= 9.21 x 10
-06
2) Para el controlador lgico tenemos PFDavg = 2.5 x 10-
4
Determinacin de la PFDavg# 17
Risk Software S.A. de C.V.
3) Para las Vlvulas Solenoides Tenemos:
PFDavg = (1 x10
-9
x 8760)/2 = 4.38 x10
-6
PFDavg = (4.38 x10
-6
x 4.38 x10
-6
) = 1.91 x 10
-11
PFDFCC = (4.38 x10
-6
x 4.38 x10
-6
) + (0.05 x 4.38 x10
-6
) = 2.19 x 10
-7
PFDavg tot = 1.91 x 10
-11
+ 2.19 x 10
-7
= 2.19 x 10
-7
4) Para la vlvula de corte tenemos
PFDavg = (765 x10
-9
x 8760)/2 = 3.35 x10
-3
El valor de PFDavg para el SIS ser:
PFDavg SIS = 9.21 x 10
-06
+ 2.5 x 10-
4
+ 2.19 x 10
-7
+ 3.35 x10
-3
= 3.61 x10
-3
FRR = 277 SIL2
Determinacin de la PFDavg# 18
Risk Software S.A. de C.V.
Solucin con Arboles de Falla:
A
A
N
D
O
R
B A
A
N
D
C B
A
N
D
C
O
R
FCC
PT
CLP
A
A
N
D
O
R
B
O
R
FCC
SV
FCC SCV
O
R
O
R
O
R
SV
Falla
SIS
3.02 x10
-6
2.5 x 10-
4
4.38 x10
-6
3.35 x10
-3
1.51 x 10
-07
2.19 x 10
-7
9.07 x 10
-6
9.21 x 10
-06
1.91 x 10
-11
2.19 x 10
-7
3.61 x10
-3
2.19 x 10
-7
Los valores mostrados en los eventos iniciales estn dados en PFDavg
Determinacin de la PFDavg# 19
Risk Software S.A. de C.V.
Ejemplo:
Clculos utilizando FTA-Pro de Dyadem
Determinacin de la PFDavg# 20
Risk Software S.A. de C.V.
Resultados al Tiempo: 8760
Falta de disponibilidad 0.007206
Frecuencia: N/A
Tiempo Falta de disponibilidad Falta de disponibilidad
0.00000 0.000000 0.000000
796.36364 0.000657 0.000657
1592.72727 0.001314 0.001314
2389.09091 0.001970 0.001970
3185.45455 0.002626 0.002626
3981.81818 0.003282 0.003282
4778.18182 0.003937 0.003937
5574.54545 0.004592 0.004592
6370.90909 0.005246 0.005246
7167.27273 0.005900 0.005900
7963.63636 0.006553 0.006553
8760.00000 0.007206 0.007206
Total de Tiempo Sistema Parado 30.972005
PFDavg: 0.003536
FRR = 282 SIL=2
Determinacin de la PFDavg# 21
Risk Software S.A. de C.V.
Los comentarios de este documento expresan el punto de vista de:
Victor Machiavelo Salinas
TUV FS Expert ID-141/09
Risk Software SA de CV
victorm@risksoftware.com.mx
www.risksoftware.com,mx
Agradeceremos cualquier comentario.
Determinacin de la PFDavg# 22
Risk Software S.A. de C.V.