Boletín Noviembre 2006

Observatorio
Geopolítica y Comunicación en Asia Central y el Cáucaso
NORTH CAUCASES JOURNALISTS FEEL THE HEAT
Following the murder in October of independent journalist Anna

Noviembre 2006
Politkovskaya, who had written more than anyone about human
rights abuses in the Russian North Caucasus, journalists in the
region itself have felt increasingly threatened and isolated.
Fuente: www.iwpr.net
Continúa en página 3
LA DIFÍCIL OPOSICIÓN AL KREMLIN
El Gobierno ruso impulsa cambios legales para controlar las

elecciones presidenciales de 2008.
Fuente: www.elpais.com
PHILLIP KNIGHTLEY: IGNORE THE CONSPIRACIES. SPIES NEVER FORGIVE

A TRAITOR
Alexander Litvinenko's death is unlikely to be solved for

months. There are as many theories about who killed the former
KGB officer as there are reporters working on the story.
Fuente: http://comment.independent.co.uk
SPIRIT OF COOPERATION DOMINATES TURKIC SUMMIT
The presidents of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey

took the first steps toward the creation of a Turkic
commonwealth, giving an enthusiastic endorsement to efforts
aimed at strengthening energy and security ties.
Fuente: www.eurasianet.org
ÍNDICE
-Medios de comunicación...p.3
-Política interior...p.10
-Relaciones internacionales...p.16
Grupo de investigación en Comunicación, Política y Cambio Social

http://www.observatorio-eurasia.blogspot.com/
Observatorio
El Observatorio de Geopolítica y Comunicación en Asia Central y

el Cáucaso es un proyecto que se encuadra dentro de la línea de
“Historia de la propaganda y análisis de la comunicación
política” del Grupo Interdisciplinario de Estudios en
Comunicación, Política y Cambio Social (COMPOLITICAS), y tiene
como principal objetivo el estudio, investigación y difusión de
los principales fenómenos políticos y comunicacionales que
tienen lugar en ese espacio geográfico
Boletín correspondiente al mes de

noviembre 2006.
Coordinador del número:
Miguel Vázquez Liñán

http://alojamientos.us.es/cico/index.htm- 2 -
Observatorio
Medios de comunicación
Titulares
North Caucases journalists feel the heat

IWPR (16/11/2006)
Uzbek media outlets «missed» another Kyrgyz revolution

Fergana.ru (13/11/2006)
Título North Caucases journalists feel the heat

Subtítulo Independent press chooses silence in face of threats
Entradilla ---
Autor Dana Tsei in Cherkessk and Nalchik
Fecha 16/11/2006
publicación
Traducción ---
Títulos
Traducción ---
Entradilla
Cuerpo de Following the murder in October of independent journalist Anna
texto Politkovskaya, who had written more than anyone about human rights
abuses in the Russian North Caucasus, journalists in the region itself have
felt increasingly threatened and isolated.
Recently, Politkovsakya had reportedly intensively from the western North

Caucasus republic of Kabardino-Balkaria. A week after her death, a local
journalist there was warned by the security services, "If they give us the
order to rub out journalists, you will be one of the first.
A second journalist was told by a middle-ranking police officer, "We have

people who don't like journalists very much. And even those who have
sworn to kill you personally.
An editor in the republic was also telephoned by a criminal investigator and

asked about contacts with and visits by Politkovskaya. The editor was told
this was not an official interrogation, merely "information collection".
Faced with these kinds of threats, journalists in the region are not
surprisingly afraid and exercising self-censorship in what they say and write.
An editor in Cherkessk, capital of the neighbouring republic of Karachai-

Cherkessia, formerly well known for his outspoken commentary on the local
authorities, said he had recently been visited by people close to the
president. "I have children, but for these people killing someone is as easy as
having breakfast. I can't change anything even if I lay down my life for this.
So I will keep silent and do what they say," he said.
Karachai-Cherkessia has a particularly bad record on press freedom. In

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recent years, journalists Vladimir Panov and Yan Svider have been brutally
beaten, as has a camera crew from a local independent television channel.
Opposition media editor Keram Semyonov was murdered. The father of
journalist Murat Gukhemukhov lost an eye after he was attacked - he had
been warned by telephone the day before that he would be "punished" for
his son's articles.
Government control of the media is so tight that it sometimes leads to comic

situations.
At the beginning of November a park and palace of culture were opened in

the regional town of Khabez. The palace of culture had a large amount of
money lavished on it and is one of the finest such buildings in the North
Caucasus.
The event was covered by all the regional media and even by journalists
from Chechnya. However, not a word was said about it on official television
in Karachai-Cherkessia. In private, the journalists said they had been banned
from reporting on the ceremony because of a local political quarrel.
In Kabardino-Balkaria, journalists are fighting with the local bureaucracy.

Radio reporter Murtaz Pachev is taking his own bosses to court, after the
republic's state broadcasting company pulled his programme off the air. The
reason was that Pachev read out jokes about the president, Arsen Kanokov,
on the air.
The joke consisted of two questions and answers. "Why has the process of
forming a government in Kabardino-Balkaria dragged out so long? Because
the Kanokov family is too small and there are a lot of posts in the
government." And, "How do you assess the situation with corruption in
Kabardino-Balkaria? Answer: Corruption is impossible because all the
officials are relatives and no one takes bribes from his relatives."
The day after Pachev read out the jokes, broadcasting chief Ruslan
Zhanimov shut down his programme and then sacked Pachev himself.
Zhanimov said that he was afraid that offended officials might sue the radio
station. Yet Zhanimov, a veteran of the previous regime, failed to
appreaciate that his actions were tarnishing the image of Kanokov, who has
strived to present himself as a reformer and democrat.
The incident was widely discussed and written about in the newspapers.
Valery Khatazhukov, who runs a human rights centre in Nalchik, held a
special press conference to defend the programme and its presenter.
Khatazhukov himself had been harassed as a reporter and public figure

under the previous administration of President Valery Kokov. "Pachev's
programme was one of the sources of information which fully corresponded
to the course chosen by the new president towards openness and
transparency of the authorities, to the formation of civic society," he said.
"I am sure that the presidential administration had nothing to do with this
illegal act. We appealed to the president in this regard and it turned out that
Kanokov did not even know about the programme or about its closure."

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"The most terrible legacy that the former regime left us was not the closed
factories or dead collective farms but the huge poisonous fear in people's
hearts," Pachev told IWPR. "Until we overcome that, no reforms will ever
work."
The labour inspectorate to which Pachev appealed upheld his complaint and
told the broadcasting company to revoke its order sacking the journalist. But
the radio programme has not yet been put back on the air and Pachev's
professional position is still unclear.
Medio
Enlace
Fecha consulta 18/11/2006
Género period. Noticia
Observaciones ---
Título Uzbek media outlets «missed» another Kyrgyz revolution

Subtítulo ---
Entradilla The second Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan is over. UN General Secretary
urged Uzbekistan to abandon the practice of torture. Nursultan Nazarbayev
ordered a shift to Roman letters in the Kazakh alphabet. George W. Bush
signed the order to build a wall on the border with Mexico... Different in
their scope and implications, all these significant developments share one
thing in common: they are absolutely neglected by Uzbek media outlets.
Autor Aleksei Volosevich (Ferghana.Ru)
Fecha 13.11.2006 (11:38 msk)
publicación
Traducción ---
Títulos
Traducción ---
Entradilla
Cuerpo de This information blackout is to be attributed to the rigid censorship that puts
texto Uzbekistan in the lower slots of international ratings gauging freedom of
expression. Also importantly, it is to be attributed to the quaint information
policy with regard to what is happening abroad. The policy is quite simple.
Unofficially, all nearby and distant foreign countries are divided into three
categories - good, bad, and neutral. Where the so called good countries are
concerned, Uzbek media outlets are only permitted to make positive reports
on them. With regard to neutral countries, everything goes as long as
religious issues are not raised. Finally, the bad countries - they are not to be
mentioned at all. Exceptions are rare. These countries are only mentioned
when a dignitary from one of them is visiting Uzbekistan or whenever
something truly bad is happening in one of these countries.
It should be noted that the Uzbek Black List does not have anything to do
with the international list of countries of the so called Evil Axis. The Uzbek
leadership (i.e. Islam Karimov) formulated an alternative Evil Axis that
comprises all neighbors of Uzbekistan (namely Kazakhstan, Tajikistan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan). Where these countries are concerned,
Uzbek journalists are only permitted to make negative references to them -

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or never mention them at all. Even whenever the heads of nearby countries
visit Uzbekistan and all government-controlled newspapers dedicate the
front pages to the visit under way, information on the visit is restricted to
lists of treaties and accords signed, trade turnover figures, and hallmarks of
Samarkand (for example) the visitor was shown. Whatever is truly
happening in nearby countries is not something to be found in Uzbek media
outlets. Any mention of the existence of opposition there, mass rallies and
demonstrations, or (on the contrary) corruption and persecution is a taboo.
Ditto information on the living standards that may lead to their comparison
with living standards in Uzbekistan (that means prices, allowances, benefits,
GDP). Pay in nearby countries is a taboo too.
Attitude with regard to Kyrgyzstan, the country in the focus of attention of

the international community for over a year now, is particularly indicative
from this standpoint. Only one Uzbek newspaper summoned the courage to
barely mention the famous Kyrgyz revolution, one of the central events in all
of Central Asia in early 2005. The moment it did, however, its editor
received a call from the presidential administration and was told in no
uncertain terms that no other mention would be tolerated. Uzbek TV-stations
covered the events in Kyrgyzstan with an emphasis on looting in Bishkek, as
though implying that this was what the revolution was essentially about.
What is happening in Kyrgyzstan nowadays is never even mentioned by

Uzbek TV-stations and newspapers. Judging by Uzbek media outlets, there
have never been any mass rallies or actions of the opposition in Kyrgyzstan.
It is actually understandable. Why give the Uzbeks ideas on, say, the
necessity to restrict presidential powers or launch democratic reforms?
Kazakhstan, the best advanced country in Central Asia, is never mentioned
by Uzbek media outlets for a different reason. It is never mentioned
precisely because it is such a success. The two presidents shower each other
with praise and call each other "friends" whenever they meet, but Uzbek TV-
stations and newspapers know better than to mention the "friendly"
neighbor. Average pay in Kazakhstan is estimated at $345, and the national
economy is mushrooming. Were it not for this arrogance on Kazakhstan's
part, things could be different. Even that, however, is not a foregone
conclusion at all. Consider Tajikistan, another neighbor state. As far as the
Uzbek audience is concerned, this country is as good as non-existent. Uzbek
media outlets made only a passing references to the recent presidential
election in Tajikistan where Emomali Rakhmonov was elected for another
term. Judging by the rumors, the information boycott is attributed to there
being no love lost between Karimov and Rakhmonov. This latter regularly
blames his Uzbek counterpart for rebel Colonel Hudoiberduyev's
concealment and for the deaths of Tajik noncombatants on the minefields
along the Tajik-Uzbek border. This is really the only plausible explanation.
On the other hand, Uzbek media outlets stop playing mum's the words in the
periods of conflicts between Uzbekistan and its neighbors. Whenever a
conflict flares up, Uzbek media outlets come up with reports (orchestrated
by the presidential administration, undoubtedly) on how the government of
Kazakhstan or Tajikistan connives with religious extremists or on how much
harm the factory in the Tajik city of Tursunzade does to the environment of
the southern part of Uzbekistan.
As for Turkmenistan, the fifth post-Soviet country of the region, it is a terra

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incognita for the Uzbek population. Uzbek media outlets mention this
particular country only infrequently, usually when a new gas field is opened
there or when Turkmenistan ups gas tariffs.
Save for the neighbors, the Black List includes some other countries. Not
even members of the Commonwealth and other international structures are
an exception. An ally in the anti-Russian GUUAM only three years ago,
Georgia is on the Black List now. It is hardly surprising. The Georgian
should have known better than show the world what happens when the head
of state finagles the outcome of election. Hence the taboo on any mention of
Georgia.
Ukraine is on the Black List too. When the Maidan in Kiev boiled in protest
against the tampering with the outcome of the president election, Uzbek
newspapers were removing articles on the event from the issues to be
printed, acting on direct orders from the presidential administration. Ukraine
was in disfavor for over a year before Uzbekistan began changing its attitude
again and infrequent articles on this country began appearing in newspapers.
Now that Victor Yanukovich came out the winner, more or less exhaustive
articles on Ukraine are published in Uzbek newspapers every now and then.
Nothing good is to be said on the subject of Lithuania, Latvia, or Estonia.

These republics began from approximately the same level fifteen years ago.
These days, they are so far ahead of Uzbekistan in absolutely everything that
any comparison makes the gap all too apparent. That is why Uzbek media
outlets pretend that these Baltic states do not exist.
Attitude toward Russia and the United States, on the other hand, underwent
amazing changes over the last two years. America was like a sacred cow for
Uzbek media outlets barely two years ago. Nothing critical with regard to
this country was permitted - only praise. It is hardly surprising because it
was a period when Karimov was regarded throughout the West as a loyal
ally in the war on international terrorism. Andijan changed everything. Less
than a month later, and the United States was a bitter enemy. Once
groveling, the tone of articles in Uzbek media outlets became hysterical. The
wrathful Uzbek journalistic corps began accusing the United States of
everything, including the Iraqi invasion. The campaign lasted about a year
before it began winding down. These days, Uzbek media outlets do not
mention the United States at all as though it does not exist. The world power
merits only a sporadic mention infrequently in TV and radio news programs.
Some Uzbek newspapers feature updates on the war in Iraq and other related
developments under the heading "International Chronicle".
With Russia, everything is the other way round. Media outlets spent thirteen
years depicting it as an undisguised colonizer, an oppressor, and an Evil
Empire. All of that was implied rather than stated plainly. Only Russian
culture, arts, science, and prominent Russians were to be mentioned in a
positive context.
The first changes in the attitude became noticeable in spring 2004, when
Karimov visited Russia and made it plain on his return to Tashkent that it
was a country to be friends with. The Strategic Partnership Treaty with
Russia was signed in summer that year, and the praise of Russia in Uzbek
media outlets began growing in scope and intensity. It reached its peak last

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year, when Putin openly supported Karimov and Uzbek media outlets began
outright fawning. The praise went down some afterwards and stopped being
excessive.
It should be noted here that all these bans and taboos only concern
sociopolitical media outlets. Where entertainment is concerned (media
outlets mostly relying on what may be scavenged in the Internet), there are
no restrictions on the mentioning of this or that country. That is why these
media outlets kept informing their target audiences of Tom Cruise's latest
girlfriends and posterior of Jennifer Lopez even when the relations between
Uzbekistan and the United States were at their all-time low.
The list of the so called good countries includes Japan, South Korea, and
Israel. Local media outlets publish reports on these countries practically
every day, with or without an excuse. They do report every now and then
that Israel runs military operations against the Palestinians and that
casualties in these operations are not restricted to terrorists alone. In other
words, outright criticism of Israel is banned, but an illusion of some
semblance of impartiality is maintained. Japan is a major news-maker for
every newspaper and every day. Which is fairly understandable too. Being
generous with loans, official Tokyo never makes an emphasis on the human
rights angle.
Uzbek media outlets enjoy relative freedom where reports on all other
countries are concerned. Since they are perceived as neutral, these countries
are mentioned by TV-stations and newspapers in Uzbekistan more or less
regularly. Whatever restrictions exist only concern Islamic countries. This is
where Uzbek journalists and reporters walk the thin ice. They are not
supposed to depict life in these countries as fair and unproblematic or the
pristine Uzbek consumers of the media product may fall under the spell of
religious propaganda.
Overestimating efficiency of the information blackout or its actual effect on

the Uzbeks will be a mistake, of course. This is essentially an extension of
the mentality of the Uzbek leader, the man who once ordered a symbol of
independence put up in the central square of Tashkent: a globe with the
borders of Uzbekistan alone etched on its surface.
As for those for whom this emasculated and filtered information is intended,
most of them pay no heed to the lying Uzbek mass media. People watch
Russian TV-stations courtesy of numerous cable TV studios, buy satellite
dishes, and use the Internet. In other words, the Uzbek authorities are bound
to fail in their efforts to keep under the lid information on the revolution in a
neighbor country or on anything else.
Medio Fergana.ru
Enlace http://enews.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=1694
Fecha consulta
Género Noticia
period.
Observaciones ---

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Política interior
Titulares
Escuadrones chechenos en Moscú
El País (21/11/06)
La difícil oposición al Kremlin

El País (20/11/06)
Alphabet Change Sparks Debate

IWPR (10/11/06)
Título Escuadrones chechenos en Moscú

Subtítulo
Entradilla 'Comandos' de Kadírov, el gobernante de Chechenia, están implicados en los
asesinatos de la periodista Politkóvskaya y el militar Baisárov
Autor Pilar Bonet
Fecha 21/11/2006
publicación
Traducción ---
Títulos
Traducción ---
Entradilla
Cuerpo de Varios comandos sometidos a Ramzán Kadírov, el jefe de Gobierno de
texto Chechenia, llegaron a Moscú con la misión de liquidar a tres personas. Dos
de ellas -la periodista Anna Politkóvskaya y el checheno Movladi Baisárov,
el ex comandante del Servicio Federal de Seguridad (SFS) en la república
caucásica- han sido ya asesinadas. La tercera víctima anunciada, el ex alcalde
de Grozni Bislán Gantamírov, aireó estos planes de exterminio el 21 de
octubre, tras la muerte de la periodista y antes de la del comandante, ocurrida
el sábado en el centro de la capital.
La policía rusa colaboró en la segunda muerte, a juzgar tanto por las

informaciones oficiales como por las de Nóvaya Gazeta, donde trabajaba
Politkóvskaya. El 21 de octubre, Gantamírov reveló la conjura a los
periodistas. Uno de los investigadores del asesinato de la periodista asistía a
la conversación y pidió no divulgarla.
Gantamírov reconoció como sicarios a dos chechenos, detenidos unos días

antes con identificaciones policiales y un "equipo de asesino", dos pistolas
con silenciador y un fusil automático, aunque sin licencia de armas. A pesar
de todo esto, los detenidos fueron liberados, a instancias de funcionarios del
SFS y el Ministerio del Interior. El sábado, la muerte de Baisárov fue
presentada oficialmente como una emboscada policial conjunta ruso-
chechena, en la que el comandante habría opuesto "encarnizada resistencia".
Testigos citados por Nóvaya Gazeta señalan, sin embargo, que oyeron un
solo tiro y que el muerto, con camisa blanca, yacía con las piernas y los

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brazos abiertos. Gantamírov dijo que había sabido de la preparación del
asesinato de Politkóvskaya y que había intentado avisar a la periodista. Con
todo, no pudo explicar claramente por qué no se transmitió a tiempo esta
información, afirma el periódico. En una reciente entrevista, Baisárov
profetizó: "Me matarán los funcionarios de la policía chechena y me
acusarán de intentar huir". "Así ha sido", sentenciaba Nóvaya Gazeta.
El comandante muerto dirigió el servicio de seguridad de Ajmát Kadírov, el

presidente de Chechenia asesinado en 2003 y padre de Ramzán. Después, su
destacamento fue integrado en el SFS (subordinado a Moscú) y, en febrero
pasado, disuelto y transferido al Ministerio del Interior de Chechenia. Esta
reestructuración no llegó a realizarse por conflictos internos chechenos.
Baisárov apoyaba al actual presidente de Chechenia, Alú Aljánov, cuyo
puesto ambiciona Kadírov. El comandante buscó refugio en el SFS en
Moscú. Kommersant afirmaba que esta institución lo dejó a la merced de los
comandos que habían venido a por él. El sábado, Baisárov era calificado
como un prófugo de la justicia. Ayer, la versión era mucho más nebulosa y la
fiscalía ha abierto una investigación criminal sobre la muerte del
comandante, que advirtió de los abusos de Kadírov y había declarado su
lealtad a Aljánov.
El presidente de Chechenia dio ayer el pésame a los familiares del muerto.

"No puedo decir concretamente quién protagonizó la operación especial de
su detención en Moscú", señaló Aljánov, en una rueda de prensa en Grozni e
insistió en la existencia de una investigación criminal sobre su muerte.
Kadírov ha podido librarse de un rival peligroso en la capital de Rusia con la
cooperación policial rusa. De ser ciertas las acusaciones contra él, Kadírov
no sólo es un peligro para los habitantes de Chechenia, sino para todos los
ciudadanos rusos que se le crucen con mal pie en su camino. Es también un
problema para el Kremlin, que parece haber fracasado en el intento de
reconciliar los intereses entre Aljánov y Kadírov. Moscú está en una
situación delicada, pues todas sus opciones en Chechenia están preñadas de
peligros, incluida la posibilidad de que Kadírov se insubordine y provoque
una nueva oleada de violencia.
Medio El País
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Escuadrones/chechenos/Moscu/elpepuint/20061121elpepiint_17/Tes/
Enlace
Fecha
consulta
Género Noticia
period.
Observaciones ---
Título La difícil oposición al Kremlin

Subtítulo Putin deja atada la sucesión
Entradilla El Gobierno ruso impulsa cambios legales para controlar las elecciones
presidenciales de 2008
Autor Pilar Bonet
Fecha 20/11/2006
publicación
Traducción ---

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Títulos
Traducción ---
Entradilla
Cuerpo de Los responsables políticos de Rusia se preparan con nerviosismo creciente
texto para la sucesión de Vladímir Putin en 2008. Controlarlo todo y no dejar ni
una rendija por la que puedan colarse contrincantes es la idea fija del
Kremlin ante los comicios legislativos de 2007 y los presidenciales que se
celebran al año siguiente. Toda precaución es poca. Mediante el partido
Rusia Unida (RU), la Administración del Kremlin hizo aprobar la semana
pasada en la Duma Estatal (Cámara baja del Parlamento) unas enmiendas
legislativas que ahogarán aún más a la oposición.
Según estas enmiendas, los candidatos no podrán criticar a sus rivales en la

televisión y en la radio ni difundir información "predominantemente"
negativa sobre ellos, es decir, "sólo podrán elogiarse a sí mismos como
ruiseñores", según la comentarista Marina Ózerova. Además, podrán ser
eliminados por faltas administrativas o si han sido condenados por
extremismo, un concepto que puede aplicarse a quienes critican en público a
los funcionarios. El porcentaje de asistencia será menor incluso que el
requerimiento actual del 20% de los votantes como mínimo para que los
comicios sean válidos. Una falta de ortografía en los documentos de los
candidatos podrá servir para eliminarlos de la liza.
"Durante seis años se han aprobado enmiendas a la legislación electoral que

contradicen las normas internacionales y la Constitución y hacen imposibles
las elecciones libres y democráticas en Rusia", afirma el diputado
independiente Vladímir Rizhkov. El sistema, dice, es incluso "peor que el de
Bielorrusia, donde existen partidos de oposición, mientas éstos han sido
prácticamente prohibidos en Rusia".
Rizhkov sabe de lo que habla. Sus intentos de registrar el Partido

Republicano (PR), del que es copresidente, han sido vanos. El partido reunió
64.000 firmas de militantes con sus datos personales, es decir, 14.000 más de
lo necesario, pero el departamento de registro, dependiente del Ministerio de
Justicia, lo vetó, alegando que 16.000 de los firmantes no existían. "Hemos
intentado demandar al ministerio, pero los jueces siempre se ponen de parte
del Gobierno", señala Rizhkov. El Kremlin no descuida las regiones. El
partido liberal Yávloko aspiraba a un buen resultado en unos comicios
recientes en Karelia. Ésa fue la razón para eliminarlo de la liza "por
indicación del gobernador y del representante presidencial", según su
dirigente Grigori Yavlinski. Yávloko no superó el listón del 5% en las
legislativas de 2003. En las de 2007, el listón será del 7%.
Mientras tanto, el Kremlin ha engendrado a Rusia Justa (RJ), un nuevo

partido para encauzar a los partidarios de Putin, que no votan por RU, el
partido mayoritario en la Duma Estatal y el instrumento articulador de la
llamada "vertical del poder". RU y RJ están dirigidas, respectivamente, por
los presidentes de las cámaras parlamentarias, Borís Grizlov y Serguéi
Mirónov, dos petersburgueses leales a Putin. En teoría, se trata de un sistema
bipartidista. En la práctica, es un reparto de papeles entre los representantes
de un solo protagonista. Este sistema artificial creará sus propios
antagonismos, opina el analista Dmitri Furman. Rizhkov discrepa: "Ésta es
una trampa astuta para imitar la lucha política, no para dividir a la élite. El

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Kremlin eliminará el nuevo partido, si ve que escinde a la élite", señala
Rizhkov.
El equipo de Putin actuó "paso a paso" para destruir la democracia en Rusia,

señala Rizhkov. Entre otras cosas, destruyó la cadena de televisión NTV,
prescindió de los gobernadores en el Consejo de la Federación (Cámara alta
o de las regiones), abolió las elecciones de esos mismos gobernadores y
aprobó una ley de extremismo que permite a la Administración librarse de
los políticos incómodos.
La televisión estatal y el canal NTV, dependiente ahora de Gazprom, sirven

para saber "dónde le duele al Kremlin" o al consorcio de gas, pero no para
informarse. Tratamiento privilegiado en estos medios reciben el vicejefe del
Gobierno Dmitri Medvédev y el ministro de Defensa, Serguéi Ivanov. Estos
dos petersburgueses son los dos aspirantes públicos a suceder a Putin, pero
no los únicos. Se barajan otros nombres como Serguéi Sobianin, el duro
siberiano que dirige la Administración del Kremlin y que trata ahora de
abolir las elecciones de los alcaldes; Vladímir Yakunin, el ministro de
Ferrocarriles, que trabajó con Putin en la alcaldía de San Petersburgo; o
Nikolái Pátrushev, que dirige el Servicio Federal de Seguridad.
En las grandes empresas, los petersburgueses se hacen fuertes como Valeri

Gólubev, un ex agente del KGB, que ha pasado a ser vicepresidente del
consorcio, y Alexandr Dyukov, que se ha puesto a la cabeza de Gazprom
Neft, el departamento petrolero de la compañía. Tampoco hay que descartar
las sorpresas, incluido un nuevo mandato de Putin, diga lo que diga él. La
Duma dio curso -y no ha archivado- a una propuesta de modificación
constitucional para que el actual presidente pueda competir de nuevo.
Medio El País
Enlace http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Putin/deja/atada/sucesion/elpporint/20061120elpepiint_4/Tes
Fecha 20/11/2006
consulta
Género Reportaje
period.
Observaciones ---
Título Alphabet Change Sparks Debate

Subtítulo A government proposal to switch to the Latin alphabet has divided opinion in
Kazakstan
Entradilla President Nursultan Nazarbaev has generated a stir in Kazakstan by setting
up a commission to consider whether the Kazak language should be written
in the Latin alphabet rather than Cyrillic, as it is now.
Autor Filip Prokudin in Almaty
Fecha 10/11/06
publicación
Traducción ---
Títulos
Traducción ---
Entradilla
Cuerpo de With the commission not due to report back until March, the issue is already

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texto generating fierce debate, with some saying it is an important step on the path
to modernising the country and others arguing it is ill-considered and could
cause divisions between the country’s main ethnic groups, and even between
different generations .
Nazarbaev has promised to consider all thearguments for and against the
change before making a decision. However, he points out that Latin script
has already been used by other Turkic-language countries such as Uzbekistan
and Turkmenistan.
If the change is made, it won’t be the first time that Kazaks will have had to
adjust to a new alphabet. In 1929, they switched from Arabic script to a Latin
alphabet devised for all the Soviet Central Asian peoples. This was done for
political reasons, to secularise the region and limit external Muslim
influence; it also followed the example set by Ataturk’s Turkey.
However, in 1940 Roman script was dumped in favour of the current 42-
letter Cyrillic writing system – the Russian alphabet plus nine characters to
deal with sounds peculiar to Kazak.
Abduali Kaidarov, the leading researcher at the Institute of Linguistics,

supports the switch to Latin. He argues that Cyrillic, which the Soviets
justified as a unifying force, in fact divided peoples speaking similar Turkic
languages as each adopted different special letters of their own.
“Latin can unite the culture of all Turkic peoples,” said Kaidarov.
Some Uzbeks and Turkmen might disagree. It is not clear what the new
Kazak alphabet will look like, if it is adopted, but it will almost certainly not
be the one used in the Thirties. Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan
have all devised new and very different Latin-based systems, which leave
their writing systems at least as far apart from each other as they were before.
Kaidarov insists the difficulty of learning a new alphabet and other problems
are being greatly exaggerated, and points out that there will be a long
transitional period to help ease people through the change.
He himself learned both Latin and Cyrillic scripts in his school days, and
says that as children are taught the new alphabet, their parents will pick it up
as they help them with homework.
The director of the National Library, Murat Auezov, shares Kaidarov’s

views, pointing out that many Kazak students are already familiar with the
Latin alphabet through their study of foreign languages. “The Latin script
holds no secrets or mysteries for them,” he said.
Another important argument in favour, he says, in the fact that most

computer technology uses the Latin alphabet.
However, Auezov, the son of the famous writer Mukhtar Auezov, would like
to see Kazaks retain a knowledge of Cyrillic, “because it is a great system of
writing”. Kazakstan retains strong economic and political connections with
Russia, with which it shares a long border.

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Urban Kazaks tend to speak Russian well, sometimes as their first language,
and there is a large ethnic Russian community, plus other minorities who use
the language.
The deputy director of the Centre of Social Problems, Kanat Berentaev,

strongly disagrees that switching from Cyrillic is the way forward. He says
introducing a new alphabet will make just studying Kazak harder for other
ethnic groups. A Russian-speaker learning Kazak via Cyrillic only has to get
to grips with a few extra characters, whereas the new system will be
completely alien.
Berentaev also worries that by moving to a new script, younger Kazaks may
be cut off from the body of cultural and scientific literature written in the
post-1940 Soviet period. “We have encountered this already… when the
Latin script was changed for Cyrillic. Everything written in the old script
turned out to be unwanted and simply disappeared,” he said.
He also doubts the switch will be as straightforward as its advocates suggest.

In Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, he said, teachers and others were confused
by the changes, forcing the authorities to scale back their plans for a swift
move to Latin. As many adults are still unable to read the new alphabets,
governments in those countries have allowed some publications to continue
to use Cyrillic, and even government correspondence has yet to fully convert
to Latin.
In Uzbekistan, the move has proved costly and has eaten into the education
budget, Berentaev says, with school funds going “to reprinting billboards,
signs, new alphabet books…. This money was simply thrown away.”
Poet and translator Auezkhan Kodar points to the possibility of a wall

developing between the different generations that use the two scripts.
Younger people will not have access to literature published in the Soviet
period, while older generations will be cut off from those who have made the
transition.
Political analyst Sabit Jusupov thinks the heated debate is premature, saying
the switch is far from imminent.
“This issue has been raised several times. Just recall the mid-Nineties, when
various forces raised the issue for a number of reasons, and the wave of
public discussion then died away,” he said.
However, Svetlana Poznyakova, a linguist and head of the MediaNet

journalism school, has no doubt that the issue will continue to generate fierce
debate. She thinks the public reaction will be “very negative”.
“This applies both to the Russian-speaking and the Kazak-speaking

populations,” said Poznyakova. “For Russians, Cyrillic is an alphabet they
have used for centuries.”
Filip Prokudin is an independent journalist in Almaty. Marina Korobkina,

who writes for IWPR’s news analysis service NBCentralAsia, contributed to
this report.

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Medio Institute for War and Peace Reporting
Enlace http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=325272&apc_state=henprca
Fecha 15/11/06
consulta
Género Noticia
period.
Observaciones ---

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Relaciones internacionales
Titulares
Phillip Knightley: Ignore the conspiracies. Spies never forgive a traitor

The Independent (26/11/06)
Chistes kazajos
El País (26/11/06)
Spirit of Cooperation Dominates Turkic Summit

Eurasianet.org (20/11/06)
Título Ignore the conspiracies. Spies never forgive a traitor

Subtítulo The FSB has what in police parlance is called 'previous form'
Entradilla Alexander Litvinenko's death is unlikely to be solved for months. There are
as many theories about who killed the former KGB officer as there are
reporters working on the story. For my money, the circumstantial evidence
points to the FSB, who took over the KGB's role and for whom Litvinenko
once worked
Autor Phillip Knightley
Fecha 26/11/2006
publicación
Traducción ---
Títulos
Traducción ---
Entradilla
Cuerpo de Few organisations have access to Polonium-210. It is made in nuclear
texto reactors, and with a half-life of 138 days cannot be stored; it has to be made
to order. It is an almost-perfect murder weapon, although in one sense the
murderer was unlucky. If Litvinenko had not died in London where all the
facilities existed to detect the Polonium-210, the cause might have remained
a mystery. Litvinenko himself was in no doubt. "The bastards got me," he
told a friend.
Old and new defectors rushed to agree, Oleg Gordievsky among them.
President Vladimir Putin, himself a former KGB officer, has vigorously
denied this charge, as has the FSB. But the trouble is spies as a breed find
treachery hard to forgive. And the FSB has what in police parlance is called
"previous form". When it was still the KGB, or the Cheka, or the OGPU or
the NKVD, it became notorious for boldness and ruthlessness in eliminating
"enemies of the state".
In the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, its officers struck frequently at White
Russian émigrés in France. Operating out of the Soviet embassy or "safe
houses", an assassination team would find the target, drive alongside him in
the street, often in daylight, shoot him dead and vanish before the police
could react. The assassination of Leon Trotsky in Mexico in 1940 - an

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icepick in the head - demonstrated how far Soviet intelligence could reach.
When it was considered politically important that a death should remain
unsolved, "defenestration" was the method favoured. The victim plunged to
his death from a high window, leaving the possibility that he fell, jumped or
was pushed - accident, suicide or murder. Poisoning has similar ambivalence.
In 1978, Georgi Markov, a Bulgarian defector, died after a Bulgarian
security service officer fired a ricin-tipped dart into his leg from an umbrella
gun as on Waterloo Bridge. The KGB provided the equipment.
Other techniques remain a mystery. Russian defector Walter Krivitsky, who
had been a Soviet military intelligence "illegal" in western Europe until his
defection to the US in 1937, was found shot dead in his Washington hotel
room in 1941. The door was locked from inside and three suicide notes were
found. But Krivitsky had told friends the KGB was after him and that if he
were to be found dead, then he had been murdered.
But the Russian services are not alone. Frank Olson was a civilian
biochemist working on biological warfare for the US Army. He also had
links with the CIA which felt he was talking too freely. In November 1953
he plunged to death from the 13th floor of a hotel in New York. In 1975, a
congressional inquiry was told the CIA had been experimenting with mind-
bending drugs and, unknown to Olson, he was a guineapig. The CIA said he
had jumped while on the drugs. Olson's son Eric is convinced his father was
murdered to silence him.
In Britain, the MI5 officer David Shayler served seven weeks in jail for
breaking the Official Secrets Act by criticising MI5 and MI6 operations. The
government has pursued the former MI6 officer Richard Tomlinson with
legal actions after he criticised his service and revealed the names of some
officers.
The former FBI agent Robert Hanssen is serving life without parole in a
"supermax" US prison for passing secrets to Moscow, including the names of
CIA agents there. He is allowed no visits, no letters, no phone calls and no
reading matter. Spooks don't like disloyalty. The Russians thought
Litvinenko was disloyal.
Medio
Enlace http://comment.independent.co.uk/commentators/article2016065.ece
Fecha
consulta
Género
period.
Observaciones ---
Título Chistes kazajos

Subtítulo Visita a Londres del presidente Nazarbáyev
Entradilla
Autor Timothy Garton Ash
Fecha 26/11/2006
publicación
Traducción ---
Títulos
Traducción ---
Entradilla

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Cuerpo de Jagshemash, Tony? ¡Jagshemash, Elizabeth! El presidente de Kazajistán,
texto Nursultan Nazarbáyev, cordialmente recibido en Londres esta semana por
Tony Blair y su majestad la reina, ha demostrado tener sentido del humor
suficiente como para aceptar el retrato satírico de su país que aparece en la
película de Sacha Baron Cohen Borat. "Esta película es obra de un cómico,
así que hay que reírse de ella", dijo el afable presidente en una rueda de
prensa conjunta con Tony Blair. El bueno de Nursultan, amigo de Gran
Bretaña, Dick Cheney, BP, Chevron y Shell.
Así, pues, en este espíritu de cordialidad generalizada, contemos unos
cuantos chistes más de kazajos. ¿Conocen el de Serguéi Duvanov, un
periodista kazajo que fue a la cárcel por una acusación -seguramente falsa-
de violar a una niña, después de publicar varios artículos sobre las cuentas
bancarias del presidente Nazarbáyev en Suiza? ¿O el del líder de la
oposición, Zamanbek Nurkadilov, al que encontraron muerto de un disparo
en el suelo de su sala de billar poco antes de las últimas elecciones
presidenciales, que confirmaron al presidente Nazarbáyev en su cargo con
una supuesta mayoría del 91%? ¿O el de Altynbek Sarsenbaiuly, otro líder de
la oposición muerto a tiros en su coche a principios de este año? Unos chistes
estupendos, ¿no creen? Seguro que ellos se han muerto de risa.
Aunque nada de lo que ha dicho Tony Blair les habrá servido para enterarse
de ello, Kazajistán es una dictadura tremendamente corrupta con trayectoria
desoladora en materia de derechos humanos, unos jueces sometidos, unos
medios dominados o intimidados y unas elecciones que -para decirlo
suavemente- no cumplen los criterios del principal organismo europeo de
vigilancia electoral, la Organización para la Seguridad y la Cooperación en
Europa (OSCE). El presidente Nazarbáyev, que fue jefe del Partido
Comunista kazajo y último presidente de la República Socialista Soviética de
Kazajistán, dirige el país desde su independencia, en 1991, y acaba de ser
reelegido hasta 2013. Según algunas informaciones, el sultán Nursultan es
quizá uno de los hombres más ricos del mundo, pero no se ha guardado esa
riqueza; la ha repartido con gran generosidad entre sus familiares inmediatos
y no tan inmediatos, que controlan gran parte de los medios de comunicación
y muchas empresas de propiedad estatal. Después del socialismo en un solo
país, llega el capitalismo en una sola familia.
Me apresuro a añadir (no vaya a ser que un chiste de kazajos resulte ser un
asunto serio) que, por lo que yo sé, no existen pruebas que relacionen
directamente el régimen de Nazarbáyev con ninguna de esas muertes
misteriosas. Ahora bien, lo que sí podemos decir con seguridad, a partir de
numerosas informaciones independientes, es que Kazajistán tiene un clima
general de corrupción, desorden y falta de responsabilidad democrática en el
que es inevitable que ocurra ese tipo de cosas.
Los lectores no tendrán la ingenuidad de preguntarse por qué, entonces, la
alfombra roja en el número 10 y en el palacio de Buckingham. Pero
permítanme añadir unas cuantas cifras a la respuesta que ustedes mismos se
habrán dado. Reservas comprobadas de petróleo: 26.000 millones de barriles.
Reservas comprobadas de gas: 3 billones de metros cúbicos (ambos cálculos
son de 2004, de acuerdo con el último Libro de Datos Mundiales de la CIA).
También son importantes las reservas de cromo, plomo, zinc, cobre, carbón,
hierro, oro y otros minerales en este país inmenso y escasamente poblado,
cuyo extremo occidental está más cerca de Hamburgo que de su extremo
oriental, en la frontera con China.
Gran Bretaña es el segundo inversor extranjero en Kazajistán, después de
Estados Unidos. Y Occidente ha emprendido un nuevo Gran Juego triangular
en el que compite con nuestros rivales tradicionales, Rusia y China, para

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controlar esos recursos tan vitales. El año pasado, la empresa de Petróleo
Nacional de China compró PetroKazajistán por 4.200 millones de dólares, y
va a construir un oleoducto que llegue hasta China. Mientras tanto, Gran
Bretaña y Estados Unidos intentan convencer al afable sultán Nazarbáyev
para que conecte los yacimientos de petróleo del mar Caspio con un
oleoducto que atraviesa Turquía en dirección Oeste. ¿Hacen falta más
explicaciones? (También se han tenido en cuenta, sobre todo en Washington,
los servicios que podría prestar Kazajistán como aliado en la "guerra contra
el terror", pero seguramente son un aspecto secundario en este caso).
Tal vez piensen que pretendo llegar a la conclusión de que al presidente
Nazarbáyev no debería habérsele dado tal bienvenida en Londres. Los
derechos humanos están antes que el petróleo. Desde luego, eso es lo que
tiendo a pensar instintivamente. Si la situación de los derechos humanos en
Kazajistán sigue empeorando, en lugar de mejorar, es posible que el palacio
de Buckingham recuerde un día esta visita con tanta vergüenza como
seguramente produce -eso espero- el recuerdo de la bienvenida, aún más
espléndida, que se ofreció al presidente Nicolae Ceausescu de Rumania y su
mujer, Elena. La revista satírica británica Private Eye publicó en su día una
portada maravillosa con una fotografía de los Ceausescu junto a la reina y el
príncipe Felipe, vestidos de gala en la cena de Estado, y unos bocadillos de
diálogo en los que se leía que el duque de Edimburgo decía a Elena: "¿Y
tiene algún hobby?", y Elena respondía: "Es un asesino de masas", a lo que
se añadía el comentario de la reina: "Qué interesante".
Sin embargo, quizá se pueda pensar que es una apuesta que merece la pena.
Están en juego grandes intereses nacionales, tanto económicos como
geopolíticos. Según los criterios de la Europa contemporánea, Kazajistán es
una dictadura; en comparación con sus vecinos de Asia central, como
Uzbekistán y Turkmenistán, es el menos malo del grupo. Algunas personas
que visitan el país con frecuencia me dicen que hay señales de que la riqueza
empieza a notarse en la formación incipiente de una clase media con
mentalidad más independiente. Cuanto más nos involucremos, más
posibilidades tendremos de influir, y podemos estar seguros de que ni China
ni Rusia van a imponer ninguna condición relativa a los derechos humanos.
Muchas veces, una política de compromiso constructivo puede ser más eficaz
que el aislamiento para empujar a un régimen autoritario por la vía de la
reforma. Es lo que yo llamo "distensión ofensiva".
Ahora bien, al final de la alfombra roja tiene que haber unos límites muy
claros y es preciso hablar sin tapujos. No debemos fingir, ni ante nosotros
mismos ni ante otros, que Kazajistán es una democracia y un país libre, como
hacíamos con los dictadores amigos de Latinoamérica durante la guerra fría.
Al mismo tiempo que mantenemos las relaciones con el régimen de
Nazarbáyev, debemos apoyar activamente el crecimiento de unos medios de
comunicación independientes, un poder judicial independiente, una sociedad
civil, unos partidos políticos alternativos, etcétera. La distensión ofensiva
siempre tiene dos vías.
Y a veces, sencillamente, tenemos que decir no. Kazajistán, que afirma
pertenecer a Europa porque una parte de su territorio está al oeste del río
Ural, ha venido a Londres a pedir el apoyo británico a su candidatura para
presidir la OSCE en 2009. Sería increíblemente ridículo que un país cuyas
elecciones han estado tan por debajo de los criterios de la OSCE -lo mismo
que su trayectoria en materia de derechos humanos y en cuanto a la
independencia de los medios de comunicación-, pudiera ocupar ese puesto.
Es como si Mel Gibson fuera a presidir Alcohólicos Anónimos, Jack el
Destripador trabajara como consejero matrimonial... o Borat estuviera a

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cargo de garantizar la veracidad en el periodismo.
¿Y qué respuesta ha obtenido el presidente Nazarbáyev de Tony Blair y el
Gobierno británico? He preguntado al Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y lo
que me han dado como contestación oficial es este paño caliente: "A largo
plazo, un presidente kazajo sería beneficioso para todos. Pero es importante
que cualquier futuro presidente personifique los criterios de la Organización
en todas sus dimensiones. Junto con nuestros socios en la UE, seguiremos
discutiendo el asunto con el Gobierno kazajo hasta la reunión ministerial de
la OSCE en Bruselas, este mes de diciembre". ¿Cuántas palabras hacen falta
para decir no? Según el Ministerio de Exteriores británicos, durante una
visita oficial, la respuesta es: 55.
Medio El País
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/panorama/Chistes/kazajos/elpepusocdgm/20061126elpdmgpan_1/Tes/
Enlace
Fecha 26/11/2006
consulta
Género Opinión-Análisis
period.
Observaciones ---
Título Spirit of Cooperation Dominates Turkic Summit

Subtítulo
Entradilla The results of the November 17 summit of the leaders of Turkic-speaking
nations exceeded the expectations of many diplomats and political analysts.
The presidents of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey took the
first steps toward the creation of a Turkic commonwealth, giving an
enthusiastic endorsement to efforts aimed at strengthening energy and
security ties.
Autor Mevlut Katik
Fecha 20/11/06
publicación
Traducción ---
Títulos
Traducción ---
Entradilla
Cuerpo de The four leaders, along with Turkmenistan’s envoy to Turkey, gathered at
texto the Turkish Mediterranean resort city of Antalya for the summit, the eighth
such gathering of its kind, but the first held in five years. [For background
see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Officials from Uzbekistan, who had been
slated to attend, ended up boycotting the event due to a breakdown in
relations with Turkey.
The participants signed a declaration committing the Turkic states to
strengthen economic and transport ties, while stressing “the importance of
the joint fight against terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, drug smuggling, weapons smuggling, human smuggling and
other organize crimes.” The statement also endorsed the concepts of
Turkey’s accession to the European Union, and a peace settlement to the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that leaves the territory under Azerbaijan’s
control.
“We declare that we support peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh

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conflict in accordance with the principle of territorial integrity of Azerbaijan,
and that we will further support fraternal Azerbaijan in this dispute,” Turkish
President Ahmet Necdet Sezer said. [For background see the Eurasia Insight
archive].
The four leaders underlined both the “increasing importance of the Caspian
Basin for the energy security of Europe” and the “strategic importance of the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan [BTC] oil pipeline opening and the [expected]
completion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum [BTE] natural gas pipeline.” They
also stressed the importance of the possible addition of trans-Caspian
transportation routes to both the BTC and the BTE. [For background see the
Eurasia Insight archive]. Sezer stressed in his opening speech the importance
of involving energy-rich Turkmenistan in the summit process, and vowed
that Ankara would work to facilitate energy exports from the Caspian Basin
to Europe via Turkey. Turkic leaders underlined in the Antalya declaration
that “increasing energy cooperation would positively and directly contribute
to economic and political stability” in Eurasia.
Kazakshtani President Nursultan Nazarbayev took observers, and even many
participants, by surprise by proposing the creation of a Turkic parliamentary
assembly. Nazarbayev went on to nominate former Turkish president and
prime minister Suleyman Demirel to serve as the proposed assembly’s first
chairman.
Nazarbayev’s proposal was indicative of his interest in exploring the
feasibility of a full-blown Turkic commonwealth. “We have to discuss it,”
Kazakshtani Foreign Minister Foreign Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev told
EurasiaNet, referring to the commonwealth possibility.
It would appear that Nazarbayev, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and
Kyrgyzstani leader Kurmanbek Bakiyev now see closer cooperation as a way
to leverage the collective influence of “200 million Turks,” as Nazarbayev
put it, in pursit of specific policy aims.
“The problem of one Turkic speaking nation must be the problem of other
Turkic speaking nations,” the Anatolia news agency quoted Aliyev as saying.
Observers interpreted his comments as meaning Turkic states should
collectively push for results in Turkey’s EU accession process and
Azerbaijan’s Karabakh peace talks that are satisfactory to Ankara and Baku
respectively.
If the Turkic states actually opted to coordinate diplomatic action, they might
have the collective muscle to alter the existing equilibrium in many
geopolitical matters. In the case of Turkey’s troubled drive to join the EU,
for example, a Turkic commonwealth could influence Brussels’ decision-
making calculus by playing the energy card, letting it be known that a rebuff
of Ankara could hinder the EU’s access to Central Asian energy supplies.
Kyrgyzstani diplomats also stressed that closer cooperation would enhance
Bishkek’s international profile. Kanat Tursunkulov, a top Kyrgyz Foreign
Ministry official, said President Bakiyev’s attendance at the summit, despite
the “recent troubles” in Bishkek, underscored the Kyrgyz government’s
position that closer cooperation among Turkic states is a top political
priority. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Commenting on the outcome of the summit, a top Turkish diplomat said,
“The era of romantic embracing has ended; the era of concrete cooperation
has started.” Nazarbayev, Aliyev and Bakiyev all quietly expressed a desire
for their respective countries to host to the next Turkic summit. At the same
time, participants emphasized a need to proceed cautiously, seeking to dispel
any impression that they are rushing toward institutionalizing the group.
Beyond the steps toward closer cooperation, the Turkic summit will be

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remembered for the public airing of a diplomatic feud between Turkey and
Uzbekistan. Some news reports claimed that Uzbek officials stayed away
from the gathering to protest the final declaration’s wording on the Karabakh
settlement. However, a senior Turkish official said the reason for Tashkent’s
displeasure was Turkey’s decision to join the United States in supporting a
draft measure in UN General Assembly’s Human Rights Council that would
condemn human rights violations in Uzbekistan.
The official was outspoken in his criticism of both Uzbekistan’s rights
behavior and Tashkent’s reaction to Ankara’s vote. “It is time that some
countries learned that democracy and human rights are essential to integrate
into the global system,” he said. “Turkey will persistently work to promote
democracy and human rights for the region`s own benefit.”
Turkey’s decision to vote for the draft Human Rights Council resolution was
“a reflection of our ideals and understanding of the importance of democracy
and respect for human rights,” the official continued. “Turkey has been
criticized for similar reasons [human rights violations] in the past, but we
never turned it into a bilateral issue, and chose to make improvemenst in our
[democracy and human right] records instead.”
Such blunt talk would appear to mark a significant shift in Turkish policy, as
Turkish officials had unitl now avoided open criticism of Uzbek government
action. It may be that Turkey’s desire to meet EU accession criteria,
especially the need to bolster its human rights credentials, is playing a role in
the adoption of a toughter line toward Tashkent. The official also indicated
that Ankara is growing tired of Uzbek President Islam Karimov’s demands.
“They [Uzbek officials] also accuse us of supporting the Uzbek opposition,
citing [the fact that] opposition leader Mohammad Solih freely travels to and
lives in Turkey. Mr. Solih is free to travel anywhere he wants to go, and
travels to Norway, Britain and the United States. Why is Turkey being
singled out?” the official said.
Medio Eurasianet.org
Enlace http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav112006.shtml
Fecha 20/11/06
consulta
Género Noticia
period.
Observaciones Editor’s Note: Mevlut Katik is a London-based journalist and analyst. He
reported this piece from Antalya where the summit took place.


Boletín Noviembre 2006

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Boletín Noviembre 2006

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Observatorio

Geopolítica y Comunicación en Asia Central y el Cáucaso

NORTH CAUCASES JOURNALISTS FEEL THE HEAT

Following the murder in October of independent journalist Anna

LA DIFÍCIL OPOSICIÓN AL KREMLIN

El Gobierno ruso impulsa cambios legales para controlar las

PHILLIP KNIGHTLEY: IGNORE THE CONSPIRACIES. SPIES NEVER FORGIVE

Alexander Litvinenko's death is unlikely to be solved for

SPIRIT OF COOPERATION DOMINATES TURKIC SUMMIT

The presidents of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey

Grupo de investigación en Comunicación, Política y Cambio Social

El Observatorio de Geopolítica y Comunicación en Asia Central y

Boletín correspondiente al mes de

Grupo de investigación en Comunicación, Política y Cambio Social

North Caucases journalists feel the heat

Uzbek media outlets «missed» another Kyrgyz revolution

Título North Caucases journalists feel the heat

Recently, Politkovsakya had reportedly intensively from the western North

A second journalist was told by a middle-ranking police officer, "We have

An editor in the republic was also telephoned by a criminal investigator and

An editor in Cherkessk, capital of the neighbouring republic of Karachai-

Karachai-Cherkessia has a particularly bad record on press freedom. In

Grupo de investigación en Comunicación, Política y Cambio Social

Government control of the media is so tight that it sometimes leads to comic

At the beginning of November a park and palace of culture were opened in

In Kabardino-Balkaria, journalists are fighting with the local bureaucracy.

Khatazhukov himself had been harassed as a reporter and public figure

Grupo de investigación en Comunicación, Política y Cambio Social

Título Uzbek media outlets «missed» another Kyrgyz revolution

Grupo de investigación en Comunicación, Política y Cambio Social

Attitude with regard to Kyrgyzstan, the country in the focus of attention of

What is happening in Kyrgyzstan nowadays is never even mentioned by

As for Turkmenistan, the fifth post-Soviet country of the region, it is a terra

Grupo de investigación en Comunicación, Política y Cambio Social

Nothing good is to be said on the subject of Lithuania, Latvia, or Estonia.

Grupo de investigación en Comunicación, Política y Cambio Social

Overestimating efficiency of the information blackout or its actual effect on

Grupo de investigación en Comunicación, Política y Cambio Social

La difícil oposición al Kremlin

Alphabet Change Sparks Debate

Título Escuadrones chechenos en Moscú

La policía rusa colaboró en la segunda muerte, a juzgar tanto por las

Gantamírov reconoció como sicarios a dos chechenos, detenidos unos días

Grupo de investigación en Comunicación, Política y Cambio Social

El comandante muerto dirigió el servicio de seguridad de Ajmát Kadírov, el

El presidente de Chechenia dio ayer el pésame a los familiares del muerto.

Título La difícil oposición al Kremlin

Grupo de investigación en Comunicación, Política y Cambio Social

Según estas enmiendas, los candidatos no podrán criticar a sus rivales en la

"Durante seis años se han aprobado enmiendas a la legislación electoral que

Rizhkov sabe de lo que habla. Sus intentos de registrar el Partido

Mientras tanto, el Kremlin ha engendrado a Rusia Justa (RJ), un nuevo

Grupo de investigación en Comunicación, Política y Cambio Social

El equipo de Putin actuó "paso a paso" para destruir la democracia en Rusia,

La televisión estatal y el canal NTV, dependiente ahora de Gazprom, sirven

En las grandes empresas, los petersburgueses se hacen fuertes como Valeri

Título Alphabet Change Sparks Debate

Grupo de investigación en Comunicación, Política y Cambio Social

Abduali Kaidarov, the leading researcher at the Institute of Linguistics,

The director of the National Library, Murat Auezov, shares Kaidarov’s

Another important argument in favour, he says, in the fact that most

Grupo de investigación en Comunicación, Política y Cambio Social

The deputy director of the Centre of Social Problems, Kanat Berentaev,