Documentos de Académico
Documentos de Profesional
Documentos de Cultura
SSRN Id1974138
SSRN Id1974138
Claudia Álvarez
Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, Barcelona, España
Universidad de Medellín, Medellín, Colombia
claudiapatricia.alvarez@uab.es
David Urbano**
Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, Barcelona, España
david.urbano@uab.es
A B STRACT RESUMEN
The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the En este trabajo se analiza la influencia de los factores
influence of environmental factors on entrepreneur- del entorno sobre la actividad emprendedora, cen-
ial activity, focusing on Latin America, and using trado especialmente en Latinoamérica y usando el
the institutional approach as theoretical framework. enfoque institucional como marco teórico. A partir
Through a panel data model with information from de un modelo de datos de panel y con información
the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor and Doing del Global Entrepreneurship Monitor y Doing Busi-
Business, we demonstrate that informal institutions, ness, se demuestra que instituciones informales como
such as political stability, control of corruption and la estabilidad política, el control de la corrupción y
role models are related to the entrepreneurial activ- los modelos de referencia, están relacionadas con la
ity. Likewise, contrary to the expected results, formal actividad emprendedora. Así mismo, contrario a lo
institutions, such as procedures and time for start- esperado, las instituciones formales como los pro-
ing a new business, and business and entrepreneurial cedimientos, el tiempo para crear una empresa y las
skills, do not have a significant influence on entrepre- habilidades emprendedoras, no tienen una influencia
neurship in Latin American countries. significativa sobre el emprendimiento en América
Latina.
Key words: Entrepreneurship, entrepreneurial activ- Palabras clave: emprendimiento, actividad emprende-
ity, institutional economics, Global Entrepreneurship dora, teoría económica institucional, Global Entrepre-
Monitor (GEM), Latin America. neurship Monitor (GEM), América Latina.
* The authors acknowledge the financial support from Projects ECO2010-16760 (Spanish Ministry of Science and Innova-
tion) and 2005SGR00858 (Catalan Government Department for Universities, Research and Information Society).
** Corresponding author.
positive relationships with private invest- Hypothesis 1: Political stability has a U-shaped
ment, entrepreneurial activity, and economic relationship with entrepreneurial activity.
growth. Johnson, Kaufmann, McMillan and Hypothesis 1a: Political stability has a lower influ-
Woodruff (2002) analyzed entrepreneurship in ence on entrepreneurship in Latin American
post-communist countries, and found in con- countries than in developed countries.
trast that extralegal payments (bribes) and the Hypothesis 2: Control of corruption has a
inefficiency of the courts inhibit entrepreneur- U-shaped relationship with entrepreneurial
ial activity more than the lack of financing. activity.
Then, we deduce that corruption and political Hypothesis 2a: Control of corruption has a
instability, as well as other deficiencies in the lower influence on entrepreneurship in Latin
governance of a country, increase transaction American countries than in developed coun-
costs while limiting the income. Therefore, tries.
control of corruption and political stability Another informal factor considered in this
would increase the likelihood of future entre- paper is role models. Role models are also very
preneurs capturing a greater share of the rev- relevant institutions in the decision to start
enue they generate, increase the reliability of a business (Krueger, 1993; Shapero & Sokol,
cash flows, and thus motivate higher levels of 1982). People who have socialized among
entrepreneurial activity. entrepreneurs are used to perceiving a lower
Countries with less political stability and level of uncertainty and have more confidence
lower levels of control of corruption are in low in their role as entrepreneurs (Bandura, 1978)
stages of economic development and in turn and a higher likelihood of starting a new busi-
have higher rates of entrepreneurship, espe- ness venture (Davidsson & Honig, 2003).
cially self-employment and necessity entrepre- Carroll and Mosakowski (1987) asserted that
neurship (people who start their own business children with self-employed parents are likely
because other employment options are either to have worked in the family firm at an early
absent or unsatisfactory). As countries move age and, later, started their own business. Scott
forward in economic development and increase and Twomey (1988) proposed that parental role
their levels of political stability and control of models and experience lead to the perception
corruption, the entrepreneurial activity rate of oneself as an entrepreneur. Scherer, Adams,
decreases. However, according to Wennekers Carley & Wiebe (1989) showed that a high per-
et al. (2005), in developed countries with high centage of entrepreneurs had entrepreneurial
political stability and high control of corrup- role models. Van Auken, Fry & Stephens (2006)
tion entrepreneurship also increases, in par- demonstrated that many business owners
ticular opportunity entrepreneurship (people include their children and other young people
who start their own business taking advantage in their businesses and that the interaction and
of an entrepreneurial opportunity). involvement of individuals in a business have
Specifically, Latin American countries are the greatest impact on entrepreneurial inten-
characterized by high rates of unofficial econ- tions. Also, some of the literature that focuses
omy and the entrepreneur would assume the on intentions (Kolvereid, 1996; Krueger, 1993;
payment of bribes and other inefficient market Matthews & Moser, 1995; Scherer et al., 1989;
conditions to be a business cost. Entrepreneurs etc.) suggests that the family background
respond to market imperfections by using vari- affects entrepreneurial intentions. Thus, the
ous gap-filling and, perhaps second-best solu- presence of entrepreneurs with experience and
tions. In extreme cases, where market and successful role models transmit positive mes-
non-market failures are pervasive, entrepre- sages to potential entrepreneurs (Gnyawali &
neurs are pushed out of the formal sector into Fogel, 1994).
the informal sector (Acs & Virgill, 2010). In Latin American countries, with high
Consequently, we propose the following rates of unemployment and underemployment
hypotheses: and a lower level of education of the people,
the possibility of becoming self-employed is a studies have found that policies for increas-
very attractive option. Thus, the availability of ing access to bank credit by lowering capital
entrepreneurial role models would stimulate requirements, the creation of investment com-
other members to start a business. panies, credit with low interest rates, and credit
Therefore: guarantee schemes, all contribute to the pro-
Hypothesis 3: Role models have a positive influ- motion of new businesses (Gnyawali & Fogel,
ence on entrepreneurship. 1994; van Gelderen, Thurik & Bosma, 2005).
Hypothesis 3a: Role models have a higher influ- Again, in the context of Latin America,
ence on entrepreneurship in Latin American which is characterized by higher rates of unof-
countries than in developed countries. ficial economy, entrepreneurs have even fewer
Regarding formal factors, Gnyawali and bank guarantees than in the case of developed
Fogel (1994) found that governmental regula- countries and the access to credit is also more
tion is generally perceived negatively by poten- difficult.
tial entrepreneurs. The literature shows that Therefore:
entrepreneurs may be discouraged from start- Hypothesis 5: Access to bank credit has a posi-
ing a business if they have to follow many rules tive influence on entrepreneurship.
and procedures (Begley, Tan & Schoch, 2005; Hypothesis 5a: Access to bank credit has a lower
Dana, 1990; Young & Welch, 1993). Under influence on entrepreneurship in Latin Amer-
these assumptions, the Doing Business project ican countries than in developed countries.
of the World Bank promotes the reduction of The last formal factor analyzed in this
regulation, since providing simple procedures research is business and entrepreneurial skills.
could stimulate the creation of new businesses. The literature reports that people’s behavior
For example, simplifying the formalities of reg- would be guided by their knowledge and skills.
istration was the most popular reform during Specifically, empirical evidence shows that a
the years 2007 and 2008, implemented in 49 higher level of education has a positive effect on
countries. the likelihood of starting a business (Davids-
However, as mentioned earlier, Latin Ameri- son & Honig, 2003; De Clerq & Arenius, 2006).
can countries have higher rates of unofficial Other studies found that a low level of techni-
economy than high-income countries. In this cal and business skills could prevent motivated
context there is less social and legal pressure on entrepreneurs from starting a new venture
enforcing rules and regulations. Thus, in Latin (Davidsson, 1991; Gnyawali & Fogel, 1994).
America, several formalities and procedures Thus, individuals might be more inclined to
for starting a business are avoided by entrepre- start a business if they have the necessary skills
neurs. (Arenius & Minniti, 2005; Boyd & Vozikis,
In this way, the following hypotheses are 1994; Chen et al., 1998; Davidsson & Honig,
proposed: 2003; Scott & Twomey, 1988).
Hypothesis 4: Procedures for starting a busi- These arguments could be valid for devel-
ness have a negative influence on entrepre- oped countries characterized by some level of
neurship. innovation. However, as stated before, in Latin
Hypothesis 4a: Procedures for starting a busi- America the educational level of the popula-
ness have a lower influence on entrepreneur- tion is low and the percentage of the unofficial
ship in Latin American countries than in economy is high (OCDE, 2009).
developed countries. Thus, we propose the following hypotheses:
Another important formal institution con- Hypothesis 6: Business and entrepreneurial skills
sidered in the entrepreneurship literature is have a positive influence on entrepreneurship.
financial assistance. In a study of individuals Hypothesis 6a: Business and entrepreneurial
who had business ideas but who had not cre- skills have a lower influence on entrepre-
ated a firm, van Auken (1999) found that finan- neurship in Latin American countries than
cial constraints were the main obstacle. Several in developed countries.
High income
All countries Latin American countries
countries
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1. TEA 9.77 7.06 17.28 7.72 6.42 2.85
2. Political stability (PS) 0.31 0.84 -0.29 0.75 0.80 0.55
1. TEA 2. PS 3. CC 4. RM 5. PC 6. AC 7. BS
1. TEA
2. Political stability (PS) -0.534***
7. Business and entrepreneurial skills -0.184** 0.134* 0.152* -0.051 -0.282*** 0.08
(BS)
8. Per capita income (PI) -0.530*** 0.708*** 0.833*** -0.361*** -0.426*** 0.602*** 0.209*
Model 2
Model 1 Model 3
Latin American
All countries High income countries
countries
Informal institutions
Political stability (PS) -0.189 (0.052)*** -0.282 (0.053)*** 0.001 (0.068)
Control of corruption (CC) 0.051 (0.060) 0.217 (0.08)*** -0.102 (0.087)
Role models (RM) 0.016 (0.003)*** 0.018 (0.006)*** 0.013 (0.004)***
Formal institutions
Procedures (PC) -0.069 (0.031)** 0.057 (0.040) -0.064 (0.039)
Access to credit (AC) 0.001 (0.001) -0.003 (0.001)** -0.000 (0.001)
Business and entrepreneurial skills
(BS) 0.019 (0.028) 0.123 (0.114) 1.094 (0.040)***
Control variable
Per capita income (PI) -0.287 (0.087)*** -0.527 (0.145)*** 0.280 (0.234)
Latin American (LA) 0.686 (0.091)***
As mentioned before, the first model ana- The second model shows the relationship
lyzes the effect of informal (political stability, between informal and formal institutions
control of corruption, and role models) and and entrepreneurial activity in Latin Ameri-
formal institutions (the number of procedures can countries. The results indicate that all the
to start a business, management and admin- informal institutions have a statistically sig-
istration training, and access to bank credit) nificant impact on entrepreneurial activity
on entrepreneurial activity, controlling for per (p<0.001); thus, we confirm the importance of
capita income and including a dummy variable informal institutions to promoting entrepre-
for Latin American countries. The results indi- neurial activity in Latin American countries.
cate that the political stability, role models, and In this model, R 2 increases with respect to
procedures coefficients are highly significant model 1, indicating that in terms of R 2 it is a
and of the expected sign. The other variables better model, and it explains 82% of the total
are not significant. This model explains 74% of variation of entrepreneurial activity. Model 2
the total variation of entrepreneurial activity. shows that political stability has a significant
The estimated coefficient of the control vari- and negative impact (b = -0.282, p < 0.01) on
able, per capita income, is consistent with the the natural logarithm of entrepreneurial activ-
existing literature, which indicates a negative ity, as proposed in hypothesis 1, while the coef-
and significant correlation between entrepre- ficient of control of corruption is positive and
neurial activity and development level. This significant. Also, the role models variable has a
result could be explained by necessity entrepre- positive and significant (p < 0.01) influence on
neurship, which usually happens in less devel- entrepreneurial activity, in line with the previ-
oped countries (Reynolds, Camp, Bygrave, ous literature reviewed (Krueger, 1993; Scherer
Autio & Hay, 2001). et al., 1989; Shapero & Sokol, 1982; van Auken
et al., 2006; among others). The coefficient of ment and entrepreneurship (Carree et al., 2007;
the control variable, per capita income, is nega- Wennekers & Thurik, 1999; Wennekers et al.,
tive and significant, thus entrepreneurial activ- 2005). Then, in countries with low levels of
ity decreases when per capita income is higher. per capita income, political stability is low and
The third model considers institutions and the economy is characterized by a high level
control variables, for a subsample of high-in- of entrepreneurial activity and the prevalence
come countries. The results show that informal of small businesses. While per capita income
institutions such as political stability and con- and political stability increase, entrepreneurial
trol of corruption are not significant, while the activity decreases.
reference models have a positive and significant Also, hypothesis 2 suggests that control of
influence (p < 0.01) on entrepreneurial activ- corruption has a U-shaped relationship with
ity. Also, formal institutions such as business entrepreneurial activity and hypothesis 2a pro-
and entrepreneurial skills have a positive and poses that control of corruption has a lower
significant relationship with entrepreneurship. influence on entrepreneurship in Latin Ameri-
Thus, in the case of high-income countries, can countries than in developed countries. The
characterized by higher rates of opportunity for results show that the coefficient of control of
entrepreneurship, business and entrepreneurial corruption is positive and significant for Latin
skills encourage entrepreneurial activity, while American countries, but it is not significant in
in Latin American countries this variable is not models 1 and 3. Then, hypotheses 2 and 2a are
significant. Likewise, the positive and signifi- rejected by our data.
cant sign of business and entrepreneurial activ- Hypothesis 3 suggests that role models have
ity would indicate that is not enough to have a positive influence on entrepreneurship. This
the knowledge to start a business; interaction hypothesis is supported by our data, in line with
with role models would also be necessary for a the literature; the presence of entrepreneurs
positive and significant influence on behavior transmits positive messages to potential entre-
entrepreneurship. Also, note that the control preneurs (Gnyawali & Fogel, 1994), increasing
variable, per capita income, is not significant in the rates of entrepreneurial activity. Hypoth-
this sample of countries. Model 3 only explains esis 3a proposes that role models have a higher
52% of the variation in entrepreneurial activity influence on entrepreneurship in Latin Ameri-
in high-income countries. can countries than in developed countries. The
Concerning the hypotheses testing, hypoth- results show that the role models coefficient in
esis 1 proposes a U-shaped relationship between the Latin American model is higher than the
political stability and entrepreneurship and coefficient in high-income countries, support-
hypothesis 1a suggests that political stability ing hypothesis 3a. As it will be explained later,
has a lower influence on entrepreneurial activity while in Latin American countries role models
in Latin American countries than in developed are important for facilitating the entry of new
countries. Models 1 and 2 show that political firms, in high-income countries business and
stability has a negative and significant influence entrepreneurial skills are more relevant.
on entrepreneurial activity5 in all countries (b Hypothesis 4 suggests that the procedures
= 0.189, p < 0.01) and in Latin American coun- for starting a business have a negative influence
tries (b = 0.282, p < 0.01), while this relationship on entrepreneurship. The coefficient in model 1
is not significant in high-income countries. is negative and significant, supporting hypoth-
Thus, hypothesis 1 is supported by the data esis 4; thus, lower procedures for starting a
but hypothesis 1a is rejected. The results show business would be related to higher entrepre-
a U-shaped relationship between political sta- neurial activity. Also, hypothesis 4a proposes
bility and entrepreneurial activity, similar to that the procedures for starting a business
the relationship between economic develop- have a lower influence on entrepreneurship in
Latin American countries than in high-income
5. We use the natural logarithm of entrepreneurial activity
countries. The results in models 2 and 3 show
as the dependent variable to linearize the relationship. that the coefficients are not significant, and are
positive in the case of Latin American coun- corruption, and role models) and formal insti-
tries and negative in the case of high-income tutions (procedures for starting a business,
countries. Thus, our data reject hypothesis 4a. access to bank credit, and business and entre-
This result, which contradicts the assump- preneurial skills) on entrepreneurial activity.
tions of the Doing Business project, could be The research generates three key results. First,
explained by high rates of necessity entrepre- there is evidence of a U-shaped relationship
neurship in these countries, where a high per- between political stability and entrepreneurial
centage of the population are forced to start a activity. A low level of political stability, mea-
business for their livelihood as part of the unof- sured as the probability that the state is subject
ficial economy. Regarding the impact of regula- to violent threats and change, is related to high
tion van Stel, Storey & Thurik (2007) propose rates of entrepreneurial activity in developing
an explanation for the absence of a statistically countries, especially necessity entrepreneur-
significant impact of regulation (in particular ship.
business regulation) on nascent and young Second, in Latin American countries infor-
entrepreneurship. They point out that regula- mal institutions are more important than
tions influence the distribution between official formal institutions. Thus, the promotion of
and unofficial entrepreneurship rather than the entrepreneurship through formal institutions
total amount of entrepreneurship. This issue is such as access to credit, lower procedures,
very relevant in the context of Latin America, and more formal education would have to be
where the percentage of the unofficial economy accompanied by more and better role models,
is much higher than in developed countries. a higher level of political stability, and more
The access to bank credit variable is not sig- control of corruption. These changes imply an
nificant in model 1, rejecting hypothesis 5, and initial decrease in the rates of entrepreneurial
it is negative and significant in the subsample activity, but better quality and sustainability of
of Latin American countries but not significant the newly created businesses.
in the subsample of high-income countries. Finally, the analyzed models to explain
Thus, our data rejected hypothesis 5a. One pos- entrepreneurial activity through institutions
sible explanation for the counterintuitive nega- are quite adequate and robust in the case of
tive sign in Latin American countries could be Latin America, but it is necessary to comple-
related to higher rates of necessity entrepre- ment them and consider better explanation
neurship. variables for high-income countries.
Finally, hypothesis 6 is rejected; business and Regarding future research lines, it is sug-
entrepreneurial skills do not have a significant gested that progress should be made in the char-
influence on entrepreneurship. In contrast, the acterization of entrepreneurial activity and the
data provide strong support for hypothesis 6a factors that determine it, distinguishing oppor-
since the coefficient of business and entrepre- tunity entrepreneurship (starting a business by
neurial skills is not significant in the sample of taking advantage of an entrepreneurial oppor-
Latin American countries while it is positive and tunity) versus necessity (starting a business
significant in the case of high-income countries. because other employment options are either
absent or unsatisfactory). It is also necessary
5. Conclusions to advance in the operationalization of insti-
tutions, for example specifying the variables
In this paper longitudinal panel data (period business and entrepreneurial skills, and access
2004-2009) is used to investigate empirically to credit. Finally, we reaffirm institutional eco-
the relationship between institutions and nomics as an appropriate and robust theoretical
entrepreneurial activity. From an institutional framework for the study of the environmental
approach (North, 1990 and 2005) applied to the factors that influence entrepreneurial activity,
field of entrepreneurship, and using Gnyawali specifically in the context of the GEM project
and Fogel’s (1994) model, we analyze the influ- (Alvarez & Urbano, 2011; Thornton et al., 2011;
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Aceptación artículo: 13/06/2011
Annex 1. Countries