41 - Hacia Una Teología de La Justicia

41. Una teologa de la justicia: A. MacIntyre y J.
Rawls como recursos filosficos

MARTIN MCKEEVER*
Desde el Concilio Vaticano II, y ms particularmente desde la publicacin de Fides et ratio (septiembre, 1998), se ha hablado mucho en crculos teolgicos sobre la relacin entre la filosofa y la teologa. Muchos telogos han tomado en serio la llamada a leer los signos de los tiempos estando atentos a los cambios sociales y culturales. Al mismo tiempo, la teologa se ha beneficiado enormemente de las intuiciones ofrecidas por tan diversas corrientes de pensamiento filosfico como el existencialismo, la hermenutica, la filosofa del lenguaje, el postmodernismo, etc. Sin embargo, hay un campo de la filosofa que ha sido descuidado en esta tendencia laudable: la filosofa poltica. Paradjicamente, sta ha sido una de las reas ms interesantes de debate en la filosofa de los ltimos treinta aos, al menos en el mundo anglosajn. A travs de temas como la libertad y los derechos, la filosofa poltica ha retomado la cuestin perenne de la justicia. El propsito de este trabajo es considerar cmo la tica teolgica puede beneficiarse de un encuentro dialgico ms profundo con la filosofa poltica. Se tratar, ms especficamente, de cmo esta rama de la filosofa ofrece recursos valiosos para la ardua tarea de articular una teologa de la justicia, adecuada a la complejidad del mundo contemporneo.
* * Profesor en la Academia Alfonsiana, Roma.
MARTIN MCKEEVER
Antes de tratar las cuestiones especficamente filosficas, merece la pena repasar brevemente los recursos de que dispone la teologa para afrontar la cuestin de la justicia. Por supuesto, las fuentes clsicas siguen siendo: la Sagrada Escritura, los Padres y lo mejor de la tradicin escolstica, especialmente el pensamiento de Toms de Aquino. Dados los variados contextos histricos de estos textos, los distintos gneros en los cuales estn articulados, y los diferentes presupuestos filosficos y teolgicos sobre los cuales fueron construidos, ninguno de ellos puede aportarnos una teologa de la justicia inmediata para la cultura contempornea. La razn ms obvia es que esta cultura es el producto de procesos histricos desconocidos en el momento en el que circularon estos textos. Particularmente se ha de sealar a la Ilustracin y a su inestimable influencia sobre las nuevas fuerzas sociales, polticas y econmicas, que han estado en funcionamiento desde aquel tiempo. En un contexto cultural as, los recursos teolgicos mencionados necesitan ser complementados por otras fuentes que tengan en cuenta directamente la historia acontecida y la complejidad del contexto global presente. La llamada doctrina social de la Iglesia es un recurso de gran importancia para esta mediacin entre la teologa y la cultura actual, en lo que respecta a cuestiones sociales contemporneas. Una serie de encclicas y otros documentos, desde Rerum Novarum (1891) a Centesimus Annus (1991), forman un cuerpo de literatura en el cual las cuestiones de justicia son estudiadas a la luz de los factores culturales contemporneos, al tiempo que se mantiene el reconocimiento de las fuentes teolgicas clsicas. Estos textos, sin embargo, no pretenden proponer una teologa sistemtica sobre la justicia, al ser esencialmente de naturaleza pastoral. sta ser la tarea de la teologa, y particularmente de la tica teolgica. Por su naturaleza, esta tarea no puede ser simplemente interna a la teologa como ciencia, sino que debe co-implicar otras disciplinas, incluyendo la filosofa poltica. Junto con la llamada teologa poltica de J. B. Metz, en los ltimos 30 40 aos el intento ms serio de articular una teologa de la justicia ha sido, quizs, la teologa de la liberacin. No es ste el lugar para estudiar las concepciones especficas sobre la justicia de esta teologa.
14
Una teologa de la justicia: MacIntyre y Rawls como recursos filosficos Es, sin embargo, importante recordar que, en Medelln (1968), los obispos latinoamericanos asumieron los retos planteados por el Concilio Vaticano II en lo referente a la vida de la Iglesia en las circunstancias concretas de los tiempos. Dado el grado dramtico de injusticia que prevaleca (y an prevalece) en tantos pases latinoamericanos, los obispos sintieron la necesidad de plantearse de nuevo la cuestin de la justicia a la luz de la fe. Con el transcurso del tiempo, se suscitaron cuestiones controvertidas sobre la influencia de la filosofa marxista en algunos telogos que intentaron articular una teologa que tuviera en cuenta la cuestin de la justicia1. Lo que nos interesa aqu, simplemente, es sealar el hecho de que cualquier forma de teologa que trate de afrontar la cuestin de la justicia, tiene necesidad de alguna forma de mediacin filosfica. Ahora bien, si no es Marx dnde se pueden encontrar tales recursos? Entre otras muchas, nos fijaremos aqu en las teoras ticas y polticas de Alasdair MacIntyre y de John Rawls. Ambos han escrito explcitamente sobre la justicia, aunque desde perspectivas muy distintas. La aproximacin que adoptaremos ser la lectura comparativa de textos-clave de ambos autores sobre el tema de la justicia. Como veremos, es precisamente la diferencia de perspectivas entre los dos, lo que resulta ms instructivo para la teologa. Antes de abordar con ms detalle esas teoras, nos sern tiles algunos comentarios introductorios sobre estas diferentes perspectivas. El pensamiento de Alasdair MacIntyre se entiende mejor no como una especfica teora de la justicia, sino ms bien como una tesis ms general sobre teoras de la justicia2. Su obra Justicia de quin?Qu racionalidad? (Whose Justice? Which Rationality = WJWR?) es bsicamente un intento de repudiar la aspiracin de los pensadores de la Ilustracin, como Kant, a producir un sistema de tica universalmente vlido, aduciendo argumentos a los cuales todos los seres racionales deberan asentir necesariamente. La
1
Recurdense los dos documentos de la Congregacin para la Doctrina de la Fe: Instruccin sobre algunos aspectos de la teologa de la liberacin (1984) y Libertad cristiana y Liberacin (1986). Para un informe reciente sobre la teologa de la liberacin desde el punto de vista de sus protagonistas ver: L. C. SUSIN (ed.), El mar se abri. Treinta aos de teologa en Amrica Latina, Sal Terrae, Santander 2001. Para nuestro propsito la obra clave sobre esta cuestin es: A. MACINTYRE, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, Duckworth, London 1988. (La abreviacin WJWR? se usar tambin en estas notas para indicar esta obra).
15
MARTIN MCKEEVER
alternativa propuesta es el reconocimiento de que toda teora tica est por necesidad situada histricamente, y articulada en trminos de una forma especfica de racionalidad, moldeada, en parte al menos, por un contexto histrico particular. El concepto clave usado por MacIntyre al proponer esta tesis es el de tradicin; y usa este trmino para referirse al proceso por el cual una comunidad articula una teora tica y poltica adecuada a su forma de vida3. WJWR? presenta, de hecho, tres tradiciones (representadas por Aristteles, Agustn y Toms de Aquino), junto con un esquema de los comienzos de la tradicin liberal representada por Hume. Al narrar estas tres primeras tradiciones, MacIntyre analiza con esmero la relacin entre las teoras de la justicia y los contextos sociopolticos en los cuales emergen. Su tesis es que el liberalismo, que comienza con la intencin de liberar la vida humana y el pensamiento humano de la tirana de la autoridad y de la tradicin, se ha convertido l mismo en una tradicin4. Reconoce, sin embargo, que el proyecto de estudiar el liberalismo como tradicin, y de analizar la relacin entre las teoras de la justicia propuestas dentro de esa tradicin y los pertinentes contextos sociopolticos, no ha sido an realizado5. Es precisamente esta lacuna la que invita a releer la obra de Rawls sobre la justicia. En 1971 John Rawls public su Teora de la Justicia6 (= TJ), obra que fue reelaborada y refinada en 1996 en su Liberalismo poltico7 (=PL). El primer libro suscit un debate bastante vivo en su tiempo y ha continuado atrayendo la atencin, tanto en el mundo anglfono como en otras partes8. Es ciertamente
3 4 5 6 7 8
MacIntyre usa trminos como: tradicin de investigacin, tradiciones ticas y polticas tradiciones morales, ms o menos como sinnimos. Ver Captulo XVII de WJWR?: Liberalism Transformed into a Tradition, en particular 343-348. Ibdem, 349. J. RAWLS, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.) 1971. (En adelante TJ). ID., Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, New York 1996. (En adelante PL). Ver, entre otras innumerables posibilidades: N. DANIELS (ed.), Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls A Theory of Justice, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1975, 253-282; R. WOLFF, Understanding Rawls. A Reconstruction and Critique of A Theory of Justice, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1977; L. MEYER, John Rawls und die Kommunitaristen. Eine Einfhrung in Rawls Theorie der Gerechtigkeit und die kommunitaristische Kritik am Liberalismus, Knigshausen & Neumann, Wrzburg 1996; M. SANDEL, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 21998; A. KERNOHAN, Liberalism, Equality and Cultural Oppression, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York,
16
uno de los esfuerzos ms serios y mejor conocidos de articulacin de una teora especfica de la justicia, hecho en los ltimos treinta aos. Como tal, junto con el segundo libro, ha jugado un papel importante en una serie de debates abiertos en el rea de la filosofa poltica, ms concretamente el debate entre liberales y comunitarios. La intencin de este trabajo no es ni presentar la teora de la justicia de Rawls ni comentar los interesantes debates que ha suscitado. Sobre ambos temas la literatura es abundante9. Nuestro propsito es ms bien comparar las distintas perspectivas de justicia asumidas por estos dos pensadores a la luz de la particular perspectiva aportada por el concepto de tradicin de MacIntyre. MacIntyre ofrece, en passant, un buen nmero de comentarios generales crticos sobre la teora de la justicia de Rawls10, pero no emprende ninguna discusin detallada de la misma, pues ello quedara fuera del mbito que se propuso en su estudio. La cuestin es si el pensamiento de Rawls sobre justicia y liberalismo poltico puede tomarse como una ejemplificacin contempornea del liberalismo como tradicin, en el sentido que MacIntyre da al trmino. Si es as, podramos preguntarnos, pueden servir las perspectivas contrastantes de estos dos filsofos polticos como recurso en la articulacin de una teologa contempornea de la justicia? Concretamente, nuestra investigacin implica estos tres pasos:

sintetizar la concepcin de tradicin de MacIntyre, ver si Rawls puede ser comprendido como contempornea del liberalismo como tradicin, una ejemplificacin
evaluar la importancia de las diferentes perspectivas de estos dos autores para una teologa contempornea de la justicia.
Melbourne 1998, 48-60.

9 1 10
Quizs la discusin ms incisiva pueda encontrarse en: B. BARRY, Justice as Impartiality, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1995, 52-67, 183-188. Ver estas explcitas referencias crticas a Rawls en: 165, 337. Aunque no se le cite no es difcil identificar a Rawls en la siguiente descripcion: Rationality requires, so it has been argued by a number of academic philosophers, that we first divest ourselves of allegiance to any one of the contending theories and also abstract ourselves from all those particularities of social relationship in terms of which we have been accustomed to understand our responsibilities and our interests. WJWR?, 3.
MARTIN MCKEEVER
I. EL
CONCEPTO DE TRADICIN DE
MACINTYRE
El modo en que MacIntyre usa el trmino tradicin slo puede ser entendido adecuadamente en el contexto de su proyecto general. Este proyecto implica el estudio de la compleja relacin entre diferentes teoras (y prcticas) de justicia y diferentes formas de racionalidad. Dada la dificultad de esta empresa sera necio esperar una clara y cristalina definicin del trmino tradicin. Lo que encontramos al comienzo de la obra es, ms bien, una descripcin general: Una tradicin es un argumento extendido a lo largo del tiempo, en el cual ciertos acuerdos fundamentales son definidos y redefinidos en trminos de dos clases de conflicto: el primero con los crticos y enemigos externos de la tradicin, que rechazan todos o al menos partes clave de esos acuerdos fundamentales; y los internos, que son debates interpretativos a travs de los cuales se expresa el significado y la fundamentacin racional de los acuerdos fundamentales, y por cuyo progreso se constituye una tradicin11. Es vital recordar que en WJWR? MacIntyre se entiende a s mismo como narrador ms que como expositor de una teora de la tradicin como tal12. Es posible, sin embargo, extraer de estos relatos narrativos una comprensin ms profunda de este trmino. Una lectura cuidadosa de esta obra sugiere los siguientes rasgos sobresalientes como caractersticas de una tradicin tica13: Una tradicin tica es una articulacin terica de prcticas sociales. La clave para entender el concepto de tradicin de MacIntyre es la relacin entre teora y prctica en la vida moral y en el discurso tico. Una tradicin tica de investigacin sobre lo que es bueno y lo que es justo se desarrolla cuando, a la luz de su experiencia, una comunidad, o algunos de sus miembros, se esfuerza por exponer en trminos tericos la importancia moral de lo que estn haciendo en la prctica. MacIntyre es un filsofo demasiado agudo como para imaginar que este hacer no contiene ya elementos de teora. La cuestin es que, en ciertas encrucijadas histricas, hay necesidad de articular esta teora naciente
1 11 1 12 1 13
Ibdem, 12. Finally, it is crucial that the concept of tradition-constituted and tradition-constitutive rational enquiry cannot be elucidated apart from its exemplifications Ibdem, 10. Tradicin tica se entiende aqu como abreviacin de una tradicin tica y poltica de investigacin.
18
Toward a contemporary theology of justice
de un modo ms sistemtico14. Puesto que las prcticas en cuestin se extienden ms all de las elecciones particulares, se suscita la pregunta sobre la relacin entre poltica y tica en tal tradicin. MacIntyre analiza con esmero la conexin inherente entre ambas. Una tradicin tica requiere estructuras institucionales en las que funcionar. Dada la naturaleza social del ser humano, todos sus proyectos requieren espacios construidos socialmente en los cuales puedan desarrollarse. MacIntyre insiste en aplicar este principio bsico de sociologa al pensamiento tico y poltico. A menudo las teoras ticas han sido tomadas como cuerpos de doctrina flotando en el aire, sin dar el debido reconocimiento a su Sitz im Leben social y poltico. Por ello, en su narracin de las varias tradiciones de investigacin, MacIntyre hace extensas referencias a las estructuras institucionales pertinentes, tales como la polis griega15, la civitas romana16 o la universidad medieval17. Una tradicin tica reconoce algunos textos autorizados selectos como cannicos. Una funcin central de las estructuras institucionales, como las recin mencionadas, es la de asimilar, propagar y producir lo que MacIntyre llama textos cannicos. Este proceso arranca cuando una comunidad siente la necesidad de tematizar sus prcticas y costumbres, particularmente frente a comunidades rivales con prcticas diferentes. En este proceso, ciertos textos son investidos de autoridad, en la medida en que son tenidos como expresiones autorizadas del modo de vida de la comunidad 18. Estos textos juegan un papel particularmente importante en la educacin y formacin de los jvenes, que son integrados en la tradicin viva tanto a travs de las prcticas de la comunidad, como por el estudio de sus textos cannicos. Una tradicin tica se caracteriza por una forma de racionalidad que es a su vez parcialmente producto de las estructuras en las cuales se ha articulado.
1 14
A tradition of enquiry is more than a coherent movement of thought. It is such a movement in the course of which those engaging in that movement become aware of it and of its direction and in self-aware fashion attempt to engage in its debates and to carry its enquiries forward. WJWR?, 326. Ibdem, 9. Ibdem, 149. Ibdem, 167. Ibdem, 354-356.
1 15 1 16 1 17 1 18
19
MARTIN MCKEEVER
Esta ltima caracterstica es la ms difcil y la ms importante en la teora de MacIntyre. Intenta refutar cualquier concepcin de tica y por lo tanto de justicia, en cuanto es una de las preocupaciones claves de la tica, que no reconozca adecuadamente el modo en que los contextos sociales e histricos influencian esa misma teora. Reconocimiento adecuado no significa aqu reconocer slo la influencia de las circunstancias histricas, sino ms bien reconocer estas circunstancias como parcialmente constitutivas de la forma de racionalidad que se encuentra en evidencia. Dicho de otro modo, el concepto de tradicin tica de investigacin de MacIntyre rechaza cualquier pretensin de racionalidad que trascienda de tal modo el contexto de su articulacin, que se convierta en medida neutral para las teoras ticas en competencia 19. En este sentido la misma racionalidad es un concepto con una historia que manifiesta diferentes modos de concebir lo que es la racionalidad20. La alternativa, sin embargo, no es ni el nihilismo ni el relativismo, pues MacIntyre propone un sofisticado proceso por el cual quienes se adhieren a una tradicin hacen un compromiso racional con ella, considerndola como algo superior a otros sistemas rivales, en el sentido de aportar una mejor comprensin de la prctica de la justicia21. Baste este breve resumen de lo que MacIntyre entiende por una tradicin de investigacin. Es innecesario decir que tal concepcin es bastante particular, y debe distinguirse de lo que otros autores (incluido Rawls) quieren decir con el mismo trmino. Para los fines de nuestra lectura comparativa haremos uso simplemente de la concepcin de MacIntyre, sin entrar en el debate, an abierto, sobre sus mritos y limitaciones. Intentaremos ahora aplicar esta concepcin de una tradicin tica al pensamiento de Rawls, para ver si puede ser correctamente considerado como un representante del liberalismo como tradicin.
1 19
it is an illusion to suppose that there is some neutral standing ground, some locus for rationality as such, which can afford rational resources sufficient for enquiry independent of all traditions. Ibdem, 367. Ibdem, 9. Ver la crtica del relativismo y del perspectivismo en: WJWR?, captulo XVIII.
2 20 2 21
20
II. EL PENSAMIENTO MACINTYRE
DE
RAWLS
A LA LUZ DEL CONCEPTO DE TRADICIN DE
Antes de aplicar esta rejilla interpretativa al pensamiento de Rawls, ser quizs til recordar los elementos esenciales de su teora de la justicia y del liberalismo poltico22. El objetivo declarado de la TJ de Rawls es ofrecer una alternativa a las formas de tica utilitaria, que miden la justicia simplemente segn el criterio de la mayor felicidad producida23. La alternativa propuesta es una variante de la idea ilustrada del contrato social, modificada con elementos del deontologismo kantiano. El mtodo usado por Rawls es el famoso velo de la ignorancia, como un punto de partida hipottico, a partir del cual representantes de una sociedad han de elegir una teora de la justicia24. La tesis defendida es que tales representantes elegiran una teora basada en dos principios de justicia 25, e incluiran ciertos privilegios y garantas para los menos privilegiados. Se sale fuera del mbito de este trabajo entrar en los millares de problemas implicados en esta tesis. Como hemos anotado ms arriba, no falta el material disponible en el cual esto es discutido y criticado. Pero antes de proceder a nuestra lectura comparativa debemos hacer notar la relacin entre TJ y PL. Rawls mismo niega que la segunda obra sea una retractacin o, incluso, una revisin sustancial de la primera; afirma que es, ms bien, una ejemplificacin de ciertos aspectos de la teora original a la luz de las crticas recibidas26. Algunos comentaristas antes mencionados piensan que esta aseveracin no es convincente, a la luz del modo en que Rawls repiensa algunas de sus ideas clave en el segundo libro. Es cierto que la tesis
2 22
Es importante notar la particularidad que Rawls hace de la expresin liberalismo poltico. Rawls usa esta expresin no para referirse a la tradicin liberal poltica como tal, sino a su propia concepcin de un orden social justo. What I have attempted to do is to generalize and carry to a higher order of abstraction the traditional theory of the social contract as represented by Locke, Rousseau and Kant. TJ, viii. Para la lectura que hace Rawls del utilitarismo como tradicin ver TJ, 22-26. Ibdem, 11-21. Ibdem, 14. Ver su introduccin a PL passim, en particular las afirmaciones de la pgina xviii: Otherwise these lectures take the structure and content of Theory to remain substantially the same.
2 23
2 24 2 25 2 26
21
MARTIN MCKEEVER
de PL, aunque depende fuertemente de la obra anterior, es ms modesta y restringida. Dada esta compleja relacin, parece mejor considerar ambos libros como representantes del pensamiento de Rawls, pero, en caso de duda, dar una cierta preferencia a PL, por ser el ms reciente. Hechas estas anotaciones, podemos examinar hasta qu punto el pensamiento de Rawls constituye una ejemplificacin de lo que MacIntyre llama una tradicin tica de investigacin. Debera quedar claro que no estamos comparando dos teoras distintas de justicia, sino ms bien la teora de justicia especfica propuesta por Rawls a la luz de la teora ms general sobre la relacin entre justicia y racionalidad propuesta por MacIntyre. Que Rawls mismo se sienta cmodo con la denominacin de liberal poltico es claro, tanto desde el ttulo de su segunda obra como desde sus muchas declaraciones explcitas al respecto. Nuestro inters es ver hasta qu punto su liberalismo corresponde a una tradicin, al modo en que lo entiende MacIntyre. Para este fin, tomaremos simplemente las cuatro caractersticas sugeridas por MacIntyre y veremos cmo se aplican a las dos obras mayores de Rawls.
1. Una tradicin tica es una articulacin terica de prcticas sociales

Al considerar esta primera caracterstica, es importante notar una cierta ambigedad, por no decir confusin, en el modo en que Rawls concibe la relacin entre tica y poltica. Por un lado, todo su proyecto puede ser descrito como un esfuerzo para ofrecer una alternativa a la tradicin poltica y tica utilitaria, remodelando la teora del contrato social. La ambigedad emerge, particularmente en PL, cuando Rawls, en su definicin de liberalismo poltico, intenta ceir lo poltico como un dominio27 y proponer una concepcin poltica de justicia como independiente28. Su
2 27 2 28
PL, Introduction, xxxviii. A political conception of justice is what I call freestanding [] when it is not presented as derived from, or as part of, any comprehensive doctrine. Ibdem, xliv.
22
propsito es hacer posible que gente con posiciones religiosas, filosficas y morales divergentes puedan convivir en la misma sociedad29. En el curso de la argumentacin, sin embargo, se revela como imposible separar poltica y tica de este modo, y as Rawls se ve forzado a reintroducir continuamente categoras ticas sin explicar cmo stas se relacionan con un dominio que, presuntamente, es puramente poltico. El hecho de que la mayora de las cuestiones que Rawls examina son inherentemente polticas y ticas, hace que todo intento de separarlas de un modo radical est condenado a ser causa de confusin30. Dicho esto, podemos afirmar sin ninguna duda que TJ y PL pueden entenderse precisamente como la articulacin terica de prcticas sociales, es decir, la articulacin de una tradicin de investigacin. En Rawls el trmino que corresponde ms de cerca a la amplia concepcin de prcticas sociales de MacIntyre, es el de co-operacin social31. sta es el conjunto de actividades sociales y de interacciones dentro de una sociedad bien ordenada: trabajo, comercio, administracin, ley, educacin, etc. Justamente, del mismo modo en que Aristteles reflexion sobre el funcionamiento de la polis griega, y Toms de Aquino sobre la vida de la civitas medieval, Rawls est clara y explcitamente considerando las prcticas tpicas de una democracia parlamentaria moderna y liberal. Sobre este fondo es interesante anotar los diferentes enfoques de sus dos libros: mientras TJ haba intentado abordar el funcionamiento total de una sociedad bien ordenada, PL limita su enfoque a los procedimientos del estado moderno.
2. Una tradicin tica requiere estructuras institucionales en las que funcionar

2 29
How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines? Ibdem, Introduction, xx. No son pocos los textos en los que el mismo Rawls reconoce esta inseparabilidad. Citemos slo un ejemplo: Thus, to repeat, the problem of political liberalism is to work out a political conception of political justice for a (liberal) constitutional democratic regime that a plurality of reasonable doctrines, both religious and nonreligious, liberal and nonliberal, may endorse for the right reasons [] a political conception of justice is a normative and moral conception, and so is the domain of the political, as well as all the other political conceptions. Ibdem, Introduction to the Paperback Edition, xli. Para una explicacin de este trmino ver Ibdem, 16.
3 30
3 31
23
MARTIN MCKEEVER
La ambigedad de Rawls, concerniente a la relacin entre poltica y tica, queda ms en evidencia, incluso, cuando se analiza su tratamiento de las estructuras institucionales requeridas por el liberalismo poltico. La primera de estas estructuras es lo que Rawls llama la estructura bsica de la sociedad32. En contraste con la perspectiva expuesta en TJ, en PL Rawls enfoca mucho ms de cerca aquellos elementos que son especficamente polticos y jurdicos33. Secciones enteras de ambos libros estn dedicadas a discusiones sobre varios aspectos de estas instituciones34. Una sociedad que funcione bien requiere estructuras institucionales tan diferentes como el parlamento, el tribunal de justicia, las fuerzas del orden, consejos administrativos, universidades, empresas, asociaciones, la prensa, los lobbies, etc. Para nuestro propsito no es necesario atender a los detalles de estas descripciones y anlisis. La cuestin est en que el liberalismo poltico no es simplemente, o principalmente, una idea o conjunto de ideas en la mente de alguien, sino que est institucionalizada en espacios pblicos construidos socialmente. En este sentido, la obra de Rawls es una ilustracin excelente de la insistencia de MacIntyre en la importancia de las instituciones. Una diferencia importante entre los dos, como veremos mejor ms adelante, es que mientras Rawls piensa que el funcionamiento de estas instituciones puede ser evaluado en trminos polticos, prescindiendo de consideraciones morales derivadas de visiones comprehensivas, MacIntyre insiste en las implicaciones morales de la relacin entre tales instituciones y las formas de racionalidad que encarnan.
3. Una tradicin tica se define en relacin a unos textos cannicos

Es fascinante observar el uso de las fuentes primarias de la obra de Rawls. Los principales autores en cuestin son Kant, Rousseau, Locke, Mill, Bentham
3 32
For us the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social co-operation. By major institutions I understand the political constitution and the principal economic and social arrangements. Ibdem, 7. La explicacin de este enfoque, considerablemente ms estrecho, en la Introduccin a PL, xl. En particular los captulos II,V y VIII de TJ y Lectures I, IV y VIII de PL.
3 33 3 34
24
y los pioneros de la economa poltica. Si designamos como cannicos a textos investidos de una cierta autoridad, hay poca duda de que Rawls se refiere a tales obras en este sentido, incluso cuando expresa puntos de vista alternativos, o de disenso, sobre detalles particulares35. En su tratamiento de Kant, en particular, es posible observar cmo Rawls se compromete en un proceso que MacIntyre describe (en su descripcin de tradicin) como debate interpretativo dentro de una tradicin. Rawls reconoce su deuda con Kant y aspira a elaborar algunas de sus ideas clave (sobre la persona humana, la distincin entre lo correcto y lo bueno, la universalidad, etc.); al mismo tiempo desea modificar y trasformar el pensamiento de Kant para afrontar mejor las cuestiones particulares de justicia que emergen en las democracias contemporneas. Aparte del uso de estos textos, merece la pena anotar que en PL Rawls tiende a referirse a TJ como un texto ya investido con una cierta autoridad, es decir como un texto cannico. Esto es comprensible teniendo en cuenta cmo varios comentaristas, favorables a Rawls, han tratado TJ en su discusin sobre la justicia. En este sentido, podemos hablar de una tradicin de pensamiento, debate e interaccin en marcha, dentro del liberalismo como tradicin.
4. Una tradicin tica se articula en una forma de racionalidad que se deriva en parte de las estructuras dentro de las cuales se desarrolla
Como hemos visto, el aspecto ms original y controvertido del pensamiento de MacIntyre sobre la tradicin concierne su tesis sobre la relacin entre la formas de racionalidad y las estructuras institucionales en las cuales emergen y operan. Acabamos de ver cmo las estructuras institucionales son un tema dominante en los trabajos de Rawls. Podemos ahora considerar hasta qu punto la forma de racionalidad que se refleja en estas obras, deriva de las estructuras institucionales descritas. A este respecto, Rawls mismo nos ofrece reflexiones explcitas sobre la racionalidad de su argumentacin.
3 35
La referencia ms extensa a Kant est en PL, Lecture III, Political Constructivism 90129.
25
MARTIN MCKEEVER
Desde el comienzo de la discusin en PL, Rawls se coloca a s mismo explcitamente dentro de la tradicin racionalista y liberal, ms especficamente en el distinguido linaje de los pensadores del contrato social. Sin embargo, su tesis sobre la seleccin de principios de justicia detrs del velo de ignorancia, aunque hipottica, es profundamente de naturaleza racionalista. Junto a pensadores como Kant y Rousseau, para Rawls el agente humano se constituye primeramente en trminos de su capacidad para escoger racionalmente y perseguir su bien36. Esto se aplica no slo a decisiones especficas sino a lo que Rawls, siguiendo a Royce, llama planes de vida racionales, es decir, al proyecto general de organizar la propia vida segn las lneas elegidas37. Al explicar el uso de este concepto, Rawls tiene que introducir inevitablemente una concepcin del bien. Y como se coloca a s mismo en una larga lnea de pensadores ticos clsicos, opta por una comprensin del bien como algo ligado inherentemente a lo racional38. Si comparamos esta perspectiva con la de PL, la diferencia ms asombrosa es la concepcin ms estrecha del bien y de lo justo subyacente en la idea de liberalismo poltico. Como hemos anotado ms arriba, la razn de esto es el deseo del autor de defender un sistema poltico en el cual el pluralismo razonable sea la norma39. Para nosotros el punto de inters aqu es el modo en que la forma de racionalidad (secular, liberal, racionalista) es modelada por las estructuras en las cuales esa racionalidad est operando. PL, como texto, se entiende mejor como un intento de articular una teora poltica de la justicia en una forma de
3 36
Since each desires to protect his interests, his capacity to advance his conception of the good, no one has a reason to acquiesce in an enduring loss for himself in order to bring about a greater balance of satisfaction. TJ, 14. Ver TJ, 408-415. Captulo VII de TJ se titula Goodness as rationality. Merece la pena anotar que la extensa lista de autores citados en la pgina 400 sobre an account of the good contiene tanto pensadores liberales como de otras tradiciones. Political liberalism assumes that, for political purposes, a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines is the normal result of the exercise of human reason within the framework of the free institutions of a constitutional democratic regime. PL, Introduction, xviii.
3 37 3 38
3 39
26
racionalidad que se ajusta a las estructuras actuales de los sistemas democrticos contemporneos. Sobre la base de estas indicaciones parece ms que justificado pensar que el pensamiento de Rawls es una ejemplificacin del liberalismo como tradicin. Su relato del liberalismo poltico en particular, manifiesta las caractersticas clave que MacIntyre adscribe a una tradicin de investigacin. Mientras Rawls mismo se identifica bastante abiertamente con la tradicin liberal, la cuestin clave es cmo concibe la relacin entre esa tradicin y su pensamiento sobre la justicia. Sobre esta importante diferencia entre Rawls y MacIntyre en este punto, volveremos ms adelante.
III. RETOS
FILOSFICOS PARA UNA TEOLOGA CONTEMPORNEA
DE LA JUSTICIA
Tras esta lectura comparativa de los dos filsofos, seleccionados desde la particular perspectiva aportada por la idea de una tradicin tica de investigacin, estamos ahora en disposicin de retornar a la cuestin, antes planteada, sobre la importancia de esta comparacin para la teologa de la justicia. Cmo estas dos perspectivas filosficas tan distintas pueden servir como recurso para una teologa contempornea de la justicia? La respuesta a esta cuestin depender en gran medida de cmo se entienda el papel y la tarea de una tal teologa. Un telogo que conciba su tarea como una simple repeticin, en contextos contemporneos, de las verdades sobre justicia reveladas en la Escritura y articuladas en la Tradicin de la Iglesia puede considerar ambos autores como superfluos. Igualmente, un telogo que crea que la tarea de una teologa contempornea de la justicia es, simplemente, articular la experiencia de una fe vivida con y entre los pobres, puede considerar ambos autores como abstractos e irrelevantes. Presumiblemente la gran mayora de los telogos concebirn su tarea como una empresa ms compleja, que implica, al menos, los siguientes elementos: 1) atencin creyente al tema de la justicia en las fuentes clsicas de la Escritura y la Tradicin, 2) informacin sustancial y creble sobre cuestiones de
27
MARTIN MCKEEVER
justicia contemporneas y 3) una visin tica sistemtica que permita una evaluacin de sta ltima a la luz de la primera. Creo que es en trminos de este tercer elemento donde la comparacin entre MacIntyre y Rawls tiene una contribucin vital que hacer. En esta seccin final no intentaremos hacer una lista de las muchas ideas especficas sobre justicia, vlidas e interesantes, que encontramos en ambos autores, y que pueden ser de inters y tiles para un telogo. Nuestro propsito es ms bien considerar cmo las perspectivas contrastantes de los dos pueden ser instructivas para la teologa. Como se ha apuntado antes, MacIntyre propone una tesis sobre teoras de justicia, mientras Rawls propone una teora especfica de la justicia. En este sentido, no estamos comparando cosas iguales. Sin embargo, es posible percibir en los dos relatos, dos aproximaciones a la justicia bastante distintas. Los puntos de contraste que emergen de nuestra lectura comparativa de los textos clave conciernen:

al significado de la Ilustracin a la idea de una tradicin de investigacin a la nocin de formas alternativas de racionalidad.
Analizando ahora estos tres puntos, podemos percibir el reto que suponen para la construccin de una teologa contempornea de la justicia. Por lo que respecta al primero de estos puntos, el contraste es bastante agudo y revelador. Para MacIntyre, la Ilustracin es el lugar de nacimiento de la cultura moderna, liberal y capitalista, una cultura que l considera ticamente descarriada tanto en teora como en la prctica. Para Rawls, la Ilustracin representa un momento de progreso en poltica y tica, un progreso cuya continuidad desea. Mientras MacIntyre argumenta que el liberalismo debe ser criticado a la luz de las anteriores tradiciones de investigacin, Rawls construye una especie de apologa para defender lo que considera las admirables cualidades del sistema liberal prevalente (si bien reconoce sus lmites). De nuestra lectura de ambos autores podemos concluir que, para MacIntyre, Rawls sera un ejemplo de un pensador contemporneo que perpeta los errores clave y las ilusiones de la Ilustracin, concernientes a las reivindicaciones de la razn en teora tica y poltica. 28
Sea cual sea la opcin en este conflicto de opinin, la profundidad de su contraste constituye un gran reto. Cualquier telogo que emprenda la tarea de hacer una teologa contempornea de la justicia debe situarse ante interpretaciones tan diferentes de la Ilustracin y con evaluaciones ticas de la cultura liberal tan diversas surgidas de ella40. La fascinacin y preocupacin que hoy da suscita la globalizacin, no es sino la ltima fase en una historia econmica, social y poltica que se remonta a este periodo histrico. Intentar pensar en trminos ticos y teolgicos sobre la justicia en este contexto global sin reconocer esta historia, es condenarse a la superficialidad. La cuestin es que, como insiste MacIntyre, no es posible una lectura de esta historia desde un punto de vista neutral y objetivo. Los presupuestos filosficos, ticos y teolgicos de cada uno estn ya integrados en la interpretacin que haga de la modernidad, particularmente con respecto a esa escuela de pensamiento que llamamos liberalismo. Uno puede estar de acuerdo o no con la tesis de MacIntyre sobre lo que le ha pasado a la tica desde la Ilustracin, pero lo menos que este pensamiento debera provocar en el telogo es un reto a articular su posicin sobre este asunto. La alternativa sera seguir a Rawls e intentar articular una teologa de la justicia que busque depurar el sistema social y poltico surgido de la Ilustracin, sin cuestionar la validez tica del sistema como tal. En cuanto a la idea de tradicin, el contraste entre los dos pensadores es igualmente instructivo y provocador. Mientras Rawls concibe una forma de liberalismo poltico que pueda abarcar diferentes tradiciones en un arreglo pragmtico, MacIntyre ve el liberalismo como una nueva tradicin, an emergente, que debe ser vista como una alternativa a anteriores tradiciones. De nuevo el telogo se enfrenta aqu con aproximaciones diferentes a la tradicin, y se ve retado a declarar y defender su propia concepcin. Una posibilidad es, siguiendo a Rawls, tomar la tradicin liberal contempornea como dada y buscar construir una teora de la justicia dentro de los presupuestos de esa tradicin. Esta opcin, a menudo toma prestadas de la teora tica y poltica liberal, categoras como libertad, autonoma y derechos,
4 40
Para una discusin general de estos temas ver: M. MCKEEVER, The Ethical Ambivalence of Liberalism: Studia Moralia 35 (1997) 401-425.
29
MARTIN MCKEEVER
sin cuestionarlas, y las usa intentando articular una teora cristiana de la justicia. Otra posibilidad es intentar ignorar (o eliminar!) la Ilustracin y formular una tica cristiana sin tener en cuenta los diversos cambios intelectuales, culturales y sociales que ha producido la modernidad. Una alternativa a ambas posibilidades, sugerida por nuestra lectura de MacIntyre, sera considerar el liberalismo como una tradicin tica de investigacin y entrar en una relacin dialctica con l sobre la base de la adhesin a una tradicin alternativa. Un programa provocador sera identificar, dentro del liberalismo, los retos que ste hace a la tica cristiana y responder integrndolos en la propia tradicin (de forma paralela a como los derechos humanos41 han sido integrados en la Doctrina Social de la Iglesia, por ejemplo). A este respecto, Rawls podra ser visto como un representante contemporneo de una tradicin antigua y eminente. Es esta tradicin la que ha formado la cultura contempornea, y slo comprometindose con ella de este modo puede uno entender y criticar constructivamente esa cultura. Otra ventaja del modo en que MacIntyre entiende la tradicin, desde el punto vista de la teologa, es que este autor comparte algunas de las caractersticas de la ms amplia comprensin cristiana de Tradicin42. La pretensin de autoridad por parte de una tradicin, segn MacIntyre, est construida sobre la base de su propia experiencia interna y sobre la base de un encuentro dialctico con otras tradiciones. Cuestiones importantes emergen aqu con respecto a la autoridad especial que debe ser atribuida a la revelacin divina y a su formulacin en trminos magisteriales. Una teologa contempornea de la justicia necesitar clarificar las relaciones entre las diferentes formas de autoridad. ste es un buen ejemplo de lo que Fides et ratio llama relacin mutuamente fructfera de la filosofa y la teologa. No se trata de que el concepto de tradicin de MacIntyre sirva de alternativa a la
4 41
Para un estudio sobre el lugar de los derechos humanos dentro de la teologa ver: K. HILPERT, Menschenrechte und Theologie, Forschungsbeitrge zur ethischen Dimension der Menschenrechte, Herder, Wien 2001. El concepto de tradicin de MacIntyre es, en parte, el fruto de su reflexin sobre autores cristianos como Newman, de quien se reconoce en gran deuda. WJWR?, 354.
4 42
30
Tradicin de la Iglesia; pero puede servir como recurso que ayude a la Iglesia a entender mejor lo que cree. El tercer reto que emerge de esta lectura comparativa concierne la racionalidad misma. Segn Rawls es posible, ms an, es necesario, tener un concepto independiente de justicia poltica para crear un espacio aceptable para individuos con cosmovisiones diferentes. Contra esto, MacIntyre insiste en que la racionalidad nunca est flotando libremente en el aire sino que est siempre relacionada constitutivamente con la vida cultural y social de una poca dada. Sera un gran error para la teologa contempornea intentar construir una teora de la justicia que compartiera los presupuestos de la Ilustracin, particularmente con respecto a las pretensiones de la razn. Si MacIntyre tiene razn, lo que la tica, incluida la tica teolgica, necesita con ms urgencia es una forma alternativa de racionalidad que se derive de la tradicin viva. sta es precisamente la posibilidad que la tradicin cristiana puede ofrecer: un lugar desde el cual uno pueda ofrecer una crtica de las cuestiones ticas concernientes a la justicia que estn emergiendo en una cultura global, sin compartir de antemano los presupuestos de la racionalidad de esa cultura. Es importante notar a este respecto la insistencia de MacIntyre de que tal respuesta al liberalismo slo es posible si uno se adhiere a la visin (y a la prctica!) de la justicia, dentro de aquella tradicin alternativa de aquellos que narra.
IV. CONCLUSIN
El lugar especial de la justicia dentro de la tica ha sido reconocido, al menos, desde los tiempos de Aristteles. La justicia como concepto tiene una cualidad omniabarcante que provoca que sea asociada ntimamente con otros conceptos clave tales como derecho, verdad, ley y razn. Si esto es verdad para el pensamiento filosfico, es igualmente verdad para la teologa. Por esta razn, cualquier esfuerzo serio para articular una teologa de la justicia implicar tanto las cuestiones tratadas en tica especial, como las cuestiones suscitadas en tica fundamental. Del mismo modo que el liberalismo de los siglos XVIII y XIX molde las teoras ticas y polticas que emergieron en ese 31
MARTIN MCKEEVER
tiempo, podemos estar seguros de que el presente proceso de globalizacin est moldeando las formas de pensamiento tico y poltico de nuestro tiempo. Lo que este trabajo ha pretendido sugerir es que una teologa de la justicia slo podr responder a estas cuestiones si asume los retos que conciernen al liberalismo, la racionalidad y la tradicin, que proponen las obras de filsofos polticos contemporneos como MacIntyre y Rawls.
32
Toward a contemporary theology of justice: Alasdair MacIntryre and John Rawls as philosophical resources
Since the Second Vatican Council, and more particularly since the publication of Fides et ratio (September, 1998), a great deal has been said in theological circles about the relationship between philosophy and theology. Many theologians have taken seriously the call to read the signs of the times by attending closely to contemporary social and cultural change. At the same time, theology itself has benefited enormously from the insights offered by such diverse streams of philosophical thought as existentialism, hermeneutics, the philosophy of language, postmodernism and so forth. It seems to me, however, that one field of philosophy has been somewhat neglected in this laudable trend, namely political philosophy. Ironically, this has been one of the most interesting areas of discussion within philosophy over the last thirty years, at least in the Anglo-Saxon world. Alongside such themes as freedom and rights, political philosophy has taken up the perennial question of justice. The broad purpose of this piece is to consider how theological ethics might benefit from a more profound dialogical encounter with political philosophy. It will be argued, specifically, that this branch of philosophy offers valuable resources for the daunting task of articulating a theology of justice adequate to the complexity of the contemporary world. Before taking up the specifically philosophical issues, it will be worth dwelling briefly on the resources that theology has available in addressing the issue of justice. The classical sources remain, of course, Sacred Scripture, the Fathers and the best of the Scholastic tradition, meaning by this latter primarily the thought of Thomas Aquinas. Given the vastly different historical settings of these texts, the various genre in which they are articulated and the contrasting theological and philosophical presuppositions upon which they build, none of
MARTIN MCKEEVER
these can furnish an unmediated theology of justice for contemporary culture. The most obvious reason is that this culture is the product of historical processes unknown at the time of the articulation of these texts. One thinks particularly of the Enlightenment and the inestimable influence of the new social, political and economic forces that have been at work since that time. In such a cultural setting the classic theological resources mentioned above need to be complemented by other resources which take direct account of the intervening history and the complexity of the present global context. What has come to be known as Catholic Social Teaching is a major resource in undertaking this mediation between theology and contemporary culture as regards contemporary social issues. A range of encyclicals and other documents from Rerum Novarum (1891) to Centesimus Annus (1991) represent a body of literature in which justice issues are addressed in the light of current cultural factors, while taking cognisance of the classical theological sources. These texts do not pretend, however, to propose a theology of justice in any systematic form, being essentially of a pastoral nature. This remains the task of theology and particularly of theological ethics. Of its nature such a task cannot be simply internal to theology as a science but must co-involve other disciplines, including political philosophy. Alongside the so-called political theology of J.B.Metz, the most serious attempt to address the task of articulating a theology of justice in the last 30 or 40 years has perhaps been what we generally refer to as the theology of liberation. This is not the place to study the specific conceptions of justice that one finds in this form of theology. It is none the less important to remember that the Latin American Bishops at Medelln (1968) understood themselves as taking up the challenges posed by the Second Vatican Council concerning the life of the Church in the concrete circumstances of the times. Given the dramatic degree of injustice which prevailed (and still prevails) in so many Latin American countries, the Bishops felt the need to address anew the question of justice in the light of faith. In the course of time controversial questions arose concerning the influence of Marxist philosophy on some theologians who attempted to articulate a theology which would take account of the issue of injustice. 43 What in43
One recalls the two documents issued by the SCDF in 1984 (Instruction on some aspects of the theology of liberation) and 1986 (Christian Freedom and Liberation); for a recent ac-
terests us here is simply the fact that the any form of theology which tries to address the justice question will have need of some form of philosophical mediation. If this is not to be Marx, then where is one to find such resources? Among many possibilities, those to be proposed here are the political and ethical theories of Alasdair MacIntrye and of John Rawls, both of whom have written explicitly about justice, albeit in very different perspectives. The approach to be taken is that of a comparative reading of key texts on justice by these authors. As we shall see presently, it is precisely the difference of approach between the two which is so instructive for theology. Before explaining in more detail the method to be used, some introductory comment on these different approaches to the issue of justice will be useful. Alasdair MacIntryes thought is best understood not as another specific theory of justice but rather as a more general thesis about theories of justice. 44 Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (=WJWR?) is basically an attempt to repudiate the aspiration of Enlightenment thinkers, such as Kant, to produce a universally valid system of ethics by producing arguments to which all rational beings will necessarily assent. The alternative proposed is the recognition that every ethical theory is necessarily historically situated and articulated in terms of some specific form of rationality which is, at least in part, shaped by the particular historical context. The key concept used by MacIntyre in proposing this thesis is that of tradition, using this term to refer to the process by which a community articulates an ethical and political theory adequate to its form of life.45 WJWR? contains, in fact, the narration of three such traditions (represented by Aristotle, Augustine and Thomas Aquinas), along with a sketch of the beginnings of the liberal tradition as represented by Hume. In narrating the first three traditions, MacIntyre is at pains to analyse the relationship between the theories of justice developed and socio-political contexts in which they emerge. His thesis is that liberalism, which set out with the intention of freeing human life and
count of the theology of liberation from the point of view of its protagonists see L.C. SUSIN, (ed.) El mar se abri. Treinta aos de teologa en America Latina, Sal Terrae, Santander 2001.
44
The key work in question for our purposes is: A. MACINTRYE, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, Duckworth, London 1988. (The abbreviation WJWR? will also be used in these notes to indicate this work). MacIntryre uses such terms as tradition of enquiry, ethical and political traditions moral traditions more or less as synonyms.
45
MARTIN MCKEEVER
human thought from the tyranny of authority and tradition, has itself become a tradition.46 He acknowledges, however, that the project of narrating liberalism as a tradition and of analysing the relationship between the theories of justice proposed within that tradition and the pertinent socio-political contexts has not yet been undertaken.47 It is precisely this lacuna which invites a rereading of Rawls work on justice. It is now some thirty years since John Rawls published the first edition of his Theory of Justice48 (= TJ) and almost ten since his elaboration, reworking and refinement of that theory in Political Liberalism49 (=PL). The first book excited quite a lively debate at the time and has continued to attract attention, both in the English-speaking world and elsewhere.50 It is certainly one of the most serious and well-known philosophical efforts at an articulation of a specific theory of justice made in the last thirty years. As such, along with the second book, it has played an important role in a number of on-going debates in the area of political philosophy, most notably that between liberals and communitarians. The purpose of this piece is neither to present yet again Rawls theory of justice nor to comment on the interesting debates it has unleashed. There is no shortage of material already available on these matters.51 Our purpose is rather to compare the different approaches to justice taken by these two thinkers in the particular perspective afforded by MacIntryes concept of tradition. While
46 47 48 49 50
See Chapter XVII of WJWR?: Liberalism Transformed into a Tradition, in particular 343348. Ibidem , 349. A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass. 1971. (TL will also be used in these notes to indicate this work). Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, New York (1993) 1996, ( = John Dewey essays in philosophy no.4). (PL will also be used in these notes to indicate this work). See, among innumerable possibilities: N. DANIELS, (ed.) Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls A Theory of Justice, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1975, 253-282; R.WOLFF, Understanding Rawls, A Reconstruction and Critique of A Theory of Justice, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1977; L. MEYER, John Rawls und die Kommunitaristen. Eine Einfhrung in Rawls Theorie der Gerechtigkeit und die kommunitaristische Kritik am Liberalismus, Knigshausen & Neumann, Wrzburg 1996 (=Epistemata: Reihe Philosophie, Bd. 187); M. SANDEL, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1982) 1998; A. KERNOHAN, Liberalism, Equality and Cultural Oppression, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York, Melbourne 1998, 48-60. Perhaps the most incisive discussion is to be found in B. BARRY, Justice as Impartiality, 52-67, 183-188.
51
MacIntyre offers, en passant, a number of critical general comments on Rawls theory of justice,52 he does not undertake any detailed discussion of it, as this would have been beyond the declared scope of his study. The question arises as to whether the thought of Rawls on justice and political liberalism can be taken as a contemporary exemplification of liberalism as a tradition, in MacIntryes sense of that term. If so, we may ask, how can the contrasting approaches of these two political philosophers serve as resources in the articulation of a contemporary theology of justice? Concretely, the discussion which follows involves three steps: synthesising MacIntryes conception of tradition investigating the idea that Rawls can be understood as a contemporary exemplification of liberalism as a tradition assessing the import of the different approaches of the two authors for a contemporary theology of justice.
I. MACINTRYRES
CONCEPT OF TRADITION
The way in which MacIntrye uses the term tradition can only be adequately understood in the context of his overall project as briefly outlined above. This project involves the study of the complex relationship between different theories (and practices) of justice and different forms of rationality. Given the difficulty of this undertaking it would be foolish to expect a neat, water-tight definition of the term tradition. What we do find at the beginning of the work is this rather general description: A tradition is an argument extended through time in which certain fundamental agreements are defined and redefined in terms of two kinds of conflict: those with critics and enemies external to the tradition who reject all or at least key parts of those fundamental agreements, and those internal, interpretative debates through which the meaning and rationale of the fundamental
52
See such critical explicit references to Rawls at 165, 337; while not actually named, it is not difficult to identify Rawls in the following description: Rationality requires, so it has been argued by a number of academic philosophers, that we first divest ourselves of allegiance to any one of the contending theories and also abstract ourselves from all those particularities of social relationship in terms of which we have been accustomed to understand our responsibilities and our interests. WJWR?, 3.
MARTIN MCKEEVER
agreements come to be expressed and by whose progress a tradition is constituted.53 It is vital to remember that in WJWR? MacIntyre understands himself as narrating these traditions rather than expounding a theory of tradition as such.54 It is possible, nonetheless, to glean from these narrative accounts a deeper understanding of this term. A careful reading of this work suggests the following salient features as characteristic of an ethical tradition55: An ethical tradition is a theoretical articulation of social practices: The key to understanding MacIntryres concept of tradition is the relationship between theory and practice in moral life and in ethical discourse. An ethical tradition of enquiry into what is good and what is just develops when, in the light of its experience, a community, or some of its members, sets about expounding in theoretical terms the moral import of what they are doing in practice. MacIntyre is much too sharp a philosopher to imagine that this doing does not already contain elements of theory. The point is that at certain specific historical junctures there is a need to articulate this nascent theory in a more systematic manner.56 Since the practices in question extend beyond private choices, the question arises as to the relationship between politics and ethics in such a tradition. MacIntrye is at pains to point out the inherent connection between the two. An ethical tradition requires institutional structures in which to function: Given the social nature of the human being, all his\her projects require socially constructed spaces in which they can be developed. MacIntryre insists on applying this basic principal of sociology to political and ethical thought. Too often ethical theories have been taken as free-floating bodies of doctrine, without taking due cognisance of their social and political Sitz im Leben. In his narration of the vari53 54 55 56
Ibidem, 12. Finally, it is crucial that the concept of tradition-constituted and tradition-constitutive rational enquiry cannot be elucidated apart from its exemplifications Ibidem, 10. Ethical tradition is understood here as shorthand for an ethical and political tradition of enquiry. A tradition of enquiry is more than a coherent movement of thought. It is such a movement in the course of which those engaging in that movement become aware of it and of its direction and in self-aware fashion attempt to engage in its debates and to carry its enquiries forward. WJWR, 326.
ous traditions of enquiry MacIntyre therefore makes extensive reference to the pertinent institutional structures such as the Greek polis,57 the Roman civitas58 or the medieval university.59 An ethical tradition recognises selected authoritative texts as canonical: A central function of institutional structures such as those just mentioned is that of assimilating, propagating and producing what MacIntrye calls canonical texts. This process arises when a community feels the need to thematize its practices and customs, particularly in the face of rival communities with different practices. In this process certain texts are invested with an authority in so far as they are held to be authoritative expressions of the way of life of the community. 60 These texts play a particularly important role in the education and formation of the young, who are integrated into the living tradition through both engaging in the practices of the community and studying its canonical texts. An ethical tradition is characterised by a form of rationality which is itself partly the product of the structures in which it is articulated: This last characteristic is the most difficult and the most important in MacIntryes scheme. It attempts to refute any conception of ethics, and hence of justice as a key concern of ethics, which does not take adequate cognisance of the way in which the social and historical context influences that same theory. Adequate cognisance here does not mean merely acknowledging the influence of historical circumstances, but rather acknowledging these as partly constitutive of the form of rationality that is in evidence. Another way of expressing this is to say that MacIntryes concept of an ethical tradition of enquiry rejects any claim to a rationality which so transcends the context of its articulation as to be available as a neutral measure for competing ethical theories.61 In this sense rationality itself
57 58 59 60 61
Ibidem, 9. Ibidem, 149. Ibidem, 167. Ibidem, 354-356. it is an illusion to suppose that there is some neutral standing ground, some locus for rationality as such, which can afford rational resources sufficient for enquiry independent of all traditions. Ibidem, 367.
MARTIN MCKEEVER
is a concept with a history, a history which manifests different ways of conceiving what rationality is.62 The alternative, however, is neither nihilism nor relativism in that MacIntrye proposes a sophisticated process by which those who adhere to a tradition can make a rational commitment to that tradition as superior to rival systems in the sense of affording a better understanding and practice of justice.63 This must suffice as a summary account of what MacIntrye means by a tradition of enquiry. Needless to say such a conception is quite particular and must be distinguished from what other authors (including Rawls) mean by that same term. For the purposes of our comparative reading we will simply make use of MacIntyres conception as given, without entering into the on-going debate about its merits and limitations. As explained above, our next step is to apply this conception of an ethical tradition to the thought of Rawls in order to judge whether he can rightly be considered a representative of liberalism as a tradition.
II. RAWLS
THOUGHT IN THE LIGHT OF
MACINTRYES
CONCEPT OF TRADITION
Before applying this interpretative grid to the thought of Rawls, it will perhaps be useful to recall the essentials of his theory of justice and theory of political liberalism.64 The declared objective of Rawls TJ is to offer an alternative to any form of utilitarian ethics that measures justice simply in accordance with the criterion of the greatest happiness produced.65 The alternative proposed is a variant of the Enlightenment idea of a social contract, modified so as to include elements of Kantian deontologism. The method used by Rawls is the famous veil of ignorance as a hypothetical startingpoint at which representatives of a soci62 63 64
Ibidem, 9. See the critique of relativism and perspectivism in WJWR? Chapter XVIII. It is important to note the particularity of Rawls usage of the phrase political liberalism: this phrase is used by Rawls not to refer to the liberal political tradition as such but to his own conception of a just social order. What I have attempted to do is to generalize and carry to a higher order of abstraction the traditional theory of the social contract as represented by Locke, Rousseau and Kant. TJ, viii. For Rawls reading of utilitarianism as a tradition see TL, 22-26.
65
ety are to choose a theory of justice.66 The thesis defended in this book is that such representatives would choose a theory based on two principles of justice67 and including certain privileges and guarantees for the less advantaged. It is well beyond the scope of this piece to enter into the myriad problems involved in this thesis. As noted above, there is no lack of material available in which it is discussed and critiqued. What we must do before proceeding with our comparative reading is to note the relationship between TJ and PL. Rawls himself denies that the second is a retraction, or even a substantial revision, of the first, claiming that it is rather an exemplification of certain aspects of the original theory in the light of criticisms received. 68 A number of the commentators mentioned have found this claim unconvincing in the light of the way Rawls reconceives some of his key ideas in the second book. It is certain that the thesis of PL, while drawing heavily on the earlier work, is more modest and more restricted. Given this complex relationship it seems best to keep both books in mind as representative of Rawls thought, but to give a certain preference, in cases of doubt, to PL, as the more recent of the two. Having noted these matters we are now in a position to examine to what extent Rawls thought constitutes an exemplification of what MacIntryre calls an ethical tradition of enquiry. It should be clear that we are not here comparing two different theories of justice, but rather the specific theory of justice proposed by Rawls in the light of a more general theory about the relationship between justice and rationality proposed by MacIntrye. That Rawls himself feels at home with the denomination political liberal is clear both from the title of his second work and his many explicit declarations to this effect. Our interest is in seeing to what extent his form of liberalism corresponds to a tradition as understood by MacIntrye. To this end we will simply take the four characteristics suggested by MacIntrye and note how they apply in the two major works of Rawls.
66 67 68
Ibidem, 11-21. Ibidem, 14. See his Introduction to PL passim, in particular the statement on page xviii: Otherwise these lectures take the structure and content of Theory to remain substantially the same.
MARTIN MCKEEVER
1. An ethical tradition is a theoretical articulation of social practices

In considering this first characteristic, it is important to note a certain ambiguity, not to say confusion, in the way Rawls conceives of the relationship between ethics and politics. On the one hand, as we have seen, his whole project can be described as an effort to produce an alternative to the utilitarian ethical and political tradition by reshaping the theory of the social contract. The ambiguity emerges, particularly in PL, when Rawls attempts to cordon off the political as a domain in his definition of political liberalism 69 and to propose a political conception of justice as freestanding. 70 His purpose in so doing is to make it possible for people with divergent religious, philosophical and moral positions to inhabit the same society.71 In the course of the argument, however, it proves impossible to separate politics and ethics in this fashion and so Rawls is forced to continually reintroduce ethical categories without explaining how they are related to the allegedly purely political domain. The fact is that most of the issues which Rawls examines are inherently both political and ethical and any attempt to separate them in such a radical way is doomed to be a cause of confusion.72 This said, we can affirm without any hesitation that both TJ and PL as texts can be understood precisely as the theoretical articulation of social practices, that is to say as the articulation of a tradition of enquiry. The term in Rawls which most closely corresponds to MacIntryes broad conception of social practices is that of social co-operation.73 This proves to be the ensemble of social
69 70 71
PL, Introduction to the Paperback Edition, xxxviii. A political conception of justice is what I call freestanding [] when it is not presented as derived from, or as part of, any comprehensive doctrine. Ibidem, xliv. How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines? Ibidem, Introduction, xx There is no shortage of texts in which Rawls himself acknowledges this inseparability, to quote but one example: Thus, to repeat, the problem of political liberalism is to work out a political conception of political justice for a (liberal) constitutional democratic regime that a plurality of reasonable doctrines, both religious and nonreligious, liberal and nonliberal, may endorse for the right reasons [] a political conception of justice is a normative and moral conception, and so is the domain of the political, as well as all the other political conceptions. Ibidem, Introduction to the Paperback Edition, xli. For an explanation of the use of this term see Ibidem, 16.
72
73
10
activities and interactions within a well-ordered society: work, commerce, administration, law, education and so on. Just as Aristotle reflected on the functioning of the Greek polis and Thomas Aquinas reflected on the life of the medieval civitas, Rawls is clearly and explicitly considering the practices typical of a modern, liberal parliamentary democracy. On this score it is interesting to note the different focus of the two books: whereas TJ had tried to address the entire functioning of a well-ordered society, PL limits its focus to the procedures of the modern state.
2. An ethical tradition requires institutional structures in which to function

Rawls ambiguity concerning the relationship between politics and ethics is even more in evidence when we come to consider his treatment of the institutional structures which political liberalism requires. The primary such structure is what Rawls calls the basic structure of society. 74 In contrast to his approach in TJ, in PL Rawls focuses much more narrowly on those elements which are specifically political and juridical.75 Entire sections of both books are dedicated to detailed discussions of various aspects of these institutions.76 In a well-functioning society these include institutional structures as different as the parliament, the law court, the forces of law, administrative councils, universities, enterprises, associations, the press, lobbies and so forth. For our purposes it not necessary to attend to the details of these descriptions and analyses. The point is that political liberalism is not simply or mainly an idea or set of ideas in someones mind, but is institutionalised in public spaces which are socially constructed. In this sense Rawls work is an excellent illustration of MacIntryes insistence on the importance of institutions. A major difference between the two, as we shall see better later, is that while Rawls thinks that the functioning of these institutions can be evaluated in political
74
For us the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social co-operation. By major institutions I understand the political constitution and the principal economic and social arrangements. Ibidem, 7. See his explanation of this considerably narrower focus in the Introduction to PL, xl. See in particular chapters II,V and VIII of TJ and Lectures I, IV and VIII of PL.
75 76
11
MARTIN MCKEEVER
terms, prescinding from moral considerations derived from comprehensive views, MacIntrye insists on the moral implications of the relationship between such institutions and the forms of rationality they incarnate.
3. An ethical tradition defines itself in relation to canonical texts

It is fascinating to observe the use of primary sources in Rawls work. The main authors in question are Kant, Rousseau, Locke, Mill, Bentham and the pioneers of political economy. If by canonical in this context we mean texts invested with a certain authority, there is little doubt that Rawls refers to such works in this way, even when he expresses dissent or alternative views on particular details.77 In his treatment of Kant, in particular, it is possible to observe how Rawls is engaged in the process which MacIntrye describes (in his description of a tradition, quoted above) as interpretative debate within a tradition. Rawls acknowledges his debt to Kant and aspires to elaborate on some of his key ideas (on the human person, on the distinction between the right and the good, on universality etc.); at the same time he wishes to modify and transform Kants thought in order to address more effectively the particular issues of justice which emerge in contemporary democracies. Apart from the use of these texts, it is worth noting that in PL Rawls tends to refer to TJ as a text already invested with some authority, in other words as a canonical text. This is understandable in the light of the way various commentators, favourable to Rawls, have treated TJ in their discussion of justice. In this sense we can talk of an on-going tradition of thought, debate and interaction within liberalism as a tradition.
77
The most extensive reference to Kant is in PL, Lecture III, Political Constructivism 90129.
12
4. An ethical tradition is articulated in a form of rationality that is in part derived from the structures within which it develops
As noted above, the most original and controversial aspect of MacIntyres thought on tradition concerns his thesis about the relationship between forms of rationality and the institutional structures in which they emerge and operate. We have just seen how dominant a theme institutional structures is in Rawls works. We may now consider to what extent the form of rationality in evidence in these works derives from the institutional structures described. In this respect Rawls as an author is particularly interesting because he himself offers explicit reflections on the rationality of his argument. From the outset of the discussion in TJ Rawls locates himself explicitly within the rationalist, liberal tradition, more specifically in the distinguished line of social contract thinkers. His thesis concerning the selection of the principles of justice behind the veil of ignorance, while hypothetical, is nonetheless profoundly rationalist in nature. Along with thinkers such as Kant and Rousseau, Rawls construes the human agent primarily in terms of the capacity to rationally choose and pursue his\her good.78 This applies not just to specific decisions but to what Rawls, following Royce, calls rational life plans, that is to say, the overall project of organising ones life along chosen lines. 79 In explaining his use of this concept Rawls inevitably has to introduce a conception of the good. Locating himself in a long line of classical ethical thinkers, he opts for an understanding of the good that is inherently linked to the rational.80 If we compare this approach with that of PL the most striking difference is the narrower conception of the good and the just which underlies the idea of political liberalism. As noted above the reason for this is the authors desire to defend a political system in which reasonable pluralism is the norm.81 The point of interest to us here is the way in which the form of rationality (secular, liberal,
78
Since each desires to protect his interests, his capacity to advance his conception of the good, no one has a reason to acquiesce in an enduring loss for himself in order to bring about a greater balance of satisfaction. TJ, 14. See TJ, 408-415. Chapter VII of TJ is actually entitled Goodness as rationality; it is worth noting that the extensive list of authors cited on page 400 concerning an account of the good contains both liberal thinkers and thinkers from other traditions.
79 80
13
MARTIN MCKEEVER
rationalist) is shaped by the structures in which that rationality is operating. PL as a text can best be understood as an attempt to articulate a political theory of justice in a form of rationality which suits the actual structures of contemporary democratic systems. On the basis of these indications it would seem to be more that justified to think of Rawls thought as an exemplification of liberalism as a tradition. His account of political liberalism, in particular, manifests the key characteristics that MacIntyre ascribes to a tradition of enquiry. While Rawls himself quite openly identifies himself with the liberal tradition, the key question is how he conceives of the relationship between that tradition and his thought on justice. It is to the important difference between Rawls and MacIntrye on this point that we turn in the final section.
III. PHILOSOPHICAL
CHALLENGES FOR A CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY OF JUSTICE
Having completed this comparative reading of the two selected philosophers in the particular perspective afforded by the idea of an ethical tradition of enquiry, we are now in a position to return to the question posed earlier concerning the import of this comparison for a theology of justice. How can these two very different philosophical approaches serve as resources for a contemporary theology of justice? The answer to this question will largely depend upon how one understands the role and task of such a theology. A theologian who conceives of this task simply as the repetition in contemporary contexts of the truths about justice revealed in Scripture and articulated in the Tradition of the Church might consider both authors superfluous. Equally, a theologian who believes that the task of a contemporary theology of justice is simply to articulate an experience of faith lived with and among the poor might consider both authors abstract and irrelevant. Presumably the great majority of theologians will conceive
81
Political liberalism assumes that, for political purposes, a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines is the normal result of the exercise of human reason within the framework of the free institutions of a constitutional democratic regime. PL, Introduction, xviii.
14
of their task as a more complex undertaking which involves at least the following elements: faithful attention to the theme of justice in the classical sources of Scripture and Tradition, substantial and credible information about contemporary justice issues and a systematic ethical vision which permits an evaluation of the latter in the light of the former. It is in terms of this third element that, I believe, the comparison between MacIntyre and Rawls has a vital contribution to make. In this final section we will not attempt to list the many valid and interesting specific ideas about justice to be found in both authors which could be of interest and use to a theologian. Our purpose is rather to consider how the contrasting approaches of the two authors might be instructive for theology. As noted earlier, MacIntyre is proposing a thesis about theories of justice whereas Rawls is proposing an actual theory of justice. In this sense we are not comparing like with like. It is nonetheless possible to perceive in the two accounts two quite distinct approaches to justice. The key points of contrast that emerge from our comparative reading of the key texts concern: i.) the significance of the Enlightenment ii.) the idea of a tradition of enquiry iii.) the notion of alternative forms of rationality. Taking each in turn, we may now consider the challenge it poses to anyone undertaking a contemporary theology of justice. As regards the first of these points, the contrast is quite sharp and telling. For MacIntyre, the Enlightenment is the birth-place of modern, liberal, capitalist culture, a culture which he clearly considers ethically astray both in theory and practice. For Rawls, the Enlightenment represents a moment of progress in politics and ethics, a progress that he aspires to continue. While MacIntrye argues that liberalism must be critiqued in the light of former traditions of enquiry, Rawls composes a kind of apologia for what he considers the admirable qualities of the prevailing liberal system (while acknowledging its limitations). From our reading of both authors we can conclude that, for MacIntrye, Rawls would be an example of a contemporary thinker who perpetuates the key errors and illusions of the Enlightenment concerning the claims of reason in ethical and political theory. Whatever side one tends to favour in this conflict of opinion, the depth of the contrast constitutes a major challenge. Any theologian undertaking a contemporary theology of justice must come to terms with such radically different his15
MARTIN MCKEEVER
torical interpretations of the Enlightenment and such diverse ethical evaluations of the liberal culture which has resulted from it. 82 The current fascination and preoccupation with globalization is but the latest phase in an economic, social and political history which goes back to this historical period. To attempt to think in theological and ethical terms about justice in this global context without taking cognisance of this history is to doom oneself to superficiality. The point is, as MacIntyre insists, that there is no such thing as a reading of this history from a neutral, objective point of view. Ones philosophical, ethical and theological presuppostions will already be built into ones interpretation of modernity, particularly with regard to that school of thought which we call liberalism. One may or may not agree with MacIntryres thesis about what has happened to ethics since the Enlightenment, but the least that his thought should do is to challenge the theologian to articulate his or her position on this underlying issue. The alternative is to follow Rawls and attempt to articulate a theology of justice which seeks to refine the social and political system that has emerged since the Enlightenment, without questioning the ethical validity of that system as such. As regards the idea of tradition, the contrast between the two thinkers is equally instructive and challenging. Whereas Rawls conceives of a form of political liberalism which can contain different traditions in an over-arching pragmatic arrangement, MacIntrye sees liberalism as a new, still-emerging tradition which must be seen as an alternative to former traditions. Here again the theologian is faced with fundamentally different approaches to tradition and is challenged to declare and defend his or her own conception of thereof. One possibility is, like Rawls, to take the contemporary liberal tradition as given and seek to construct a theory of justice within the presuppositions of that tradition. This approach borrows, usually unquestioningly, such categories as freedom, autonomy and rights from liberal ethical and political theory and uses then to attempt to articulate a christian theory of justice. Another possibility is to attempt to ignore (or undo!) the Enlightenment by trying to formulate a christian ethic without taking cognisance of the kinds of intellectual, cultural and social changes that modernity has involved. An alternative to both these possibilities, suggested by our reading of MacIntrye, would be to consider liberalism as itself
82
For a general discussion of this theme see M. MCKEEVER, The Ethical Ambivalence of Liberalism, Studia Moralia (1997) 401-425.
16
an ethical tradition of enquiry and enter into dialectical relations with it on the basis of ones adherence to an alternative tradition. The challenging agenda would then be to identify within liberalism the challenges which it poses to christian ethics and to respond to these by integrating them into ones tradition (along the lines that human rights 83 has been integrated into Catholic Social Teaching, for example). In this respect Rawls might be seen as a contemporary representative of an ancient and eminent tradition. It is this tradition which has formed contemporary culture and only by engaging with it in this way can one understand and constructively critique that culture. Another advantage of MacIntyres understanding of tradition from the point of view of theology is that it shares some characteristics of the broader christian understanding of Tradition.84 The claim to authority on the part of a tradition, on MacIntryes view, is made both on the basis of its own internal experience and on the basis of a dialectical encounter with other traditions. Important questions emerge here with regard to the special authority to be attributed to divine revelation and the expression of this in magisterial terms. A contemporary theology of justice will need to clarify the relations between these different forms of authority. This is a good example of what Fides et ratio calls the mutually fruitful relation of philosophy and theology. There is no question of MacIntyres conception of tradition serving as an alternative to the Tradition of the Church, what it can do is serve as a resource with the help of which the Church can better understand what it believes. The third challenge that emerges from this comparative reading concerns rationality itself. According to Rawls it is possible, indeed it is necessary, to have a freestanding concept of political justice so as to create an acceptable space for individuals with different overall views. Against this, MacIntrye insists that rationality is never free-floating but is always constitutively related to the cultural and social life of a given epoch. The great mistake for a contemporary theology would be to try to produce a theory of justice which shared the presuppositions of the Enlightenment, particularly with regard to the claims of reason. If
83
For a current study of the place of human rights within theology see K. HILPERT., Menschenrechte und Theologie, Forschungsbeitrge zur ethischen Dimension der Menschenrechte, Universittsverlag Freiburg, Schweiz; Herder, Wien 2001. MacIntryres concept of tradition is in part the fruit of his reflection on christian authors such as Newman to whom he acknowldeges a massive debt . WJWR?, 354.
84
17
MARTIN MCKEEVER
MacIntrye is right, what ethics, including theological ethics, most urgently needs is an alternative form of rationality which derives from a living tradition. This is precisely the possibility that the christian tradition can offer: a place to stand from which one can offer a critique of the ethical issues concerning justice emerging in global culture without sharing in advance the presuppositions of the rationality of that culture. It is important to note in this regard MacIntryes insistence that such a response to liberalism is only possible if one adheres to the view (and practice!) of justice within an alternative tradition, such as one of those which he narrates.
IV. CONCLUSION
Since at least the time of Aristotle the special place of justice within ethics has been acknowledged. Justice as a concept has an all-embracing quality that causes it to be intimately associated with such other key ethical concepts as right, truth, law and reason. If this is true of philosophical thought it is equally so of theology. For this reason any serious effort to articulate a theology of justice will involve both the questions treated in special ethics and the questions raised in fundamental ethics. Just as the liberalism of the 18 th and 19th centuries shaped the political and ethical theories which emerged at that time, we can be sure that the current process of globalization is shaping the forms of political and ethical thought in our time. The suggestion of this piece is that a theology of justice will only be capable of responding to these if it takes up the challenges concerning liberalism, rationality and tradition posed in the works of contemporary political philosophers such as MacIntrye and Rawls.
18

41 - Hacia Una Teología de La Justicia

Cargado por

Información del documento

Descripción original:

Título original

Derechos de autor

Formatos disponibles

Compartir este documento

Compartir o incrustar documentos

Opciones para compartir

¿Le pareció útil este documento?

¿Este contenido es inapropiado?

Copyright:

Formatos disponibles

41 - Hacia Una Teología de La Justicia

Cargado por

Copyright:

Formatos disponibles

41. Una teologa de la justicia: A. MacIntyre y J.

Rawls como recursos filosficos

Melbourne 1998, 48-60.

Toward a contemporary theology of justice

Toward a contemporary theology of justice

II. EL PENSAMIENTO MACINTYRE

A LA LUZ DEL CONCEPTO DE TRADICIN DE

1. Una tradicin tica es una articulacin terica de prcticas sociales

Toward a contemporary theology of justice

2. Una tradicin tica requiere estructuras institucionales en las que funcionar

3. Una tradicin tica se define en relacin a unos textos cannicos

Toward a contemporary theology of justice

Toward a contemporary theology of justice

FILOSFICOS PARA UNA TEOLOGA CONTEMPORNEA

Toward a contemporary theology of justice

Toward a contemporary theology of justice

Toward a contemporary theology of justice

Toward a contemporary theology of justice

Toward a contemporary theology of justice

THOUGHT IN THE LIGHT OF

Toward a contemporary theology of justice

1. An ethical tradition is a theoretical articulation of social practices

Toward a contemporary theology of justice

2. An ethical tradition requires institutional structures in which to function

3. An ethical tradition defines itself in relation to canonical texts

Toward a contemporary theology of justice

CHALLENGES FOR A CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY OF JUSTICE

Toward a contemporary theology of justice

Toward a contemporary theology of justice

También podría gustarte