23/11/2020 ANÁLISIS - Cinco conclusiones militares clave de la guerra entre Azerbaiyán y Armenia

ANÁLISIS , PRIMERA LÍNEA DE AZERBAIYÁN

ANÁLISIS - Cinco conclusiones militares clave de la guerra entre

Azerbaiyán y Armenia
La guerra en curso muestra que el cálculo geoestratégico militar tradicional sigue siendo relevante, y que las
capacidades de guerra convencionales para limpiar, mantener y negar territorio siguen siendo cruciales.
Dr. Can Kasapoglu | 30.10.2020

Dr. Can Kasapoglu

El escritor es el director del Programa de Investigación de Seguridad y Defensa del think-tank EDAM, con sede en Estambul.

ESTANBUL

A medida que el ejército azerbaiyano avanza para recuperar los territorios nacionales ocupados por los armenios, la guerra en curso ofrece
lecciones invaluables para la comunidad estratégica y militar global. A continuación, enumeré cinco observaciones principales para comprender
el futuro de la guerra en el contexto del conflicto que se desarrolla en el Alto Karabaj, también conocido como Nagorno Karabaj.

Lección 1: Sin sensores adecuados, cobertura de guerra electrónica y armamento contra drones, las unidades terrestres tradicionales están en
problemas.

La primera lección que mostraron los enfrentamientos entre Azerbaiyán y Armenia es la vulnerabilidad de las unidades terrestres tradicionales --
formaciones blindadas, mecanizadas y motorizadas-- frente al armamento y conceptos avanzados de guerra con drones. En el momento de
redactar este informe, las publicaciones de inteligencia de código abierto [1] documentaron unas 175 pérdidas principales de batalla de las
fuerzas de ocupación armenias en Nagorno Karabaj.

Los enfrentamientos en curso mostraron que, si bien la era de los tanques aún no ha terminado, los tanques de batalla principales, junto con
otras plataformas tradicionales de guerra terrestre, serían objetivos fáciles para los sistemas aéreos no tripulados (UAS) a menos que estén
acompañados de una composición orgánica de dispositivos móviles cortos. defensas aéreas de rango, activos de guerra electrónica y sistemas
anti-UAS.

Lección 2: La integración del apoyo de fuego terrestre y los drones cobra gran importancia en la guerra moderna

Siria ha funcionado como un laboratorio de guerra del siglo XXI. Todos los actores involucrados, desde la coalición anti-Daesh liderada por
Estados Unidos hasta la Guardia Revolucionaria iraní y el Hezbolá libanés, han demostrado, probado y aprendido sobre nuevas capacidades
militares en el campo de batalla sirio. Turquía y Rusia son las dos naciones que desarrollaron 'complejos de artillería y drones' durante sus
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23/11/2020 ANÁLISIS - Cinco conclusiones militares clave de la guerra entre Azerbaiyán y Armenia

expediciones a Siria.

El ejército turco, especialmente durante la Operación Spring Shield dirigida a los despliegues en el norte del Ejército Árabe Sirio a principios de
2020, ha utilizado sus drones para ejecutar misiones de inteligencia, vigilancia, adquisición de objetivos y reconocimiento (ISTAR) para el obús
Firtina de clase 155 mm y múltiples -sistemas de lanzamiento de cohetes. Además, los drones turcos también se utilizaron para tareas de
evaluación de daños de batalla para monitorear los efectos de las salvas de artillería y cohetes. Asimismo, habiendo asimilado las lecciones del
campo de batalla sirio, las Fuerzas Armadas de la Federación Rusa ahora integran los drones Orlan-10 [2] a la artillería de clase 152 mm.

Las Fuerzas Armadas de Azerbaiyán mostraron otro ejemplo más de los complejos de apoyo de fuego con base en tierra y drones. En muchos
enfrentamientos, incluidos los enfrentamientos nocturnos, los sistemas de artillería y cohetes de Azerbaiyán lucharon en estrecha coordinación
[3] con los recursos de la guerra con drones.

En general, estamos siendo testigos de una tendencia creciente a combinar sistemas aéreos no tripulados con incendios indirectos en las guerras
contemporáneas.

Lección 3: La disuasión intraguerra gana importancia

Overwhelmed by the Azerbaijani offensive, the Armenian side has resorted to targeting Azerbaijan’s population centers and critical national
infrastructure with ballistic missiles. In my previous writings for Anadolu Agency [4], I have analyzed the international legal aspect of Armenian
missile campaign which is tantamount to a textbook war crime.

Apart from the legal aspect, the military-strategic dimension of the Armenian forces’ ballistic missile and heavy rocket use during the war
deserves attention, highlighting the vital concept of “intra-war deterrence”.

Intra-war deterrence is, briefly, about controlling the escalation patterns [5] within an ongoing conflict. It incorporates tacit or explicit bargaining
with respect to thresholds and limits of an ongoing conflict. Unlike traditional deterrence theories, intra-war deterrence functions within an
ongoing war.

Overwhelmed by Azerbaijan’s technological superiority in the battlefield, the Armenia has resorted to ballistic missile and heavy multiple-launch
rocket systems (MLRS) salvos, targeting Azerbaijan’s major population centers. More importantly, the Russian-manufactured SS-26 Iskander
ballistic missiles in the Armenian arsenal [6] makes the situation even more dangerous. Overall, the ongoing war showed that intra-war
deterrence, and strategic weapons pertaining to this crucial concept, will keep dominating battlefields in the coming years.

Lastly, on a separate but important note, during the conflict, Azerbaijan used its drones to hunt down Armenia’s Scud-B mobile ballistic missile
TELARs (transporter-erector-launcher) in at least one skirmish. If Azerbaijan can extend this concept to a more systematic approach, then one can
assume that UAS now have a new battlefield task, destroying road-mobile ballistic missiles before the boost phase.

Lesson 4: Drones make good SEAD assets against low-to-mid-range air defenses

In the Syrian and Libyan battlegrounds, Turkey’s Bayraktar TB-2 drone has made a name for itself --the “Pantsir-hunter”-- due to the successful
kill scorecard of the Russian-manufactured Pantsir short-to-medium range mobile air defense systems. Following the Turkish drone warfare
school’s footsteps, the Azerbaijani military has effectively used UAS, especially Bayraktar TB-2, to hunt down the Armenian air defenses. Of
course, Roketsan-made smart munitions, predominantly MAM-L, played a chief role in the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) campaign.
Only within the first two weeks of the ongoing clashes, the Azerbaijani Armed Forces destroyed [7] some 60 pieces of air defenses, mostly 9K33
OSA and 9K35 Strela systems.

Apart from the game-changer Turkish weaponry, Azerbaijan’s another important source for such arms is Israel. In this respect, the Israeli Harop
loitering munitions --kamikaze drone-- come into the forefront. Differently from other unmanned aerial systems baselines, ‘kamikaze drones’
carry a warhead tipped on the platform. Therefore, instead of weapons release, loitering munitions dive onto their targets. The Israeli Harop line
deserves attention due to two key features. First, it enjoys great autonomy, enabling human on the loop and even human out of the loop
operations. Second, it has anti-radiation capabilities which means the drone can detect and autonomously home onto radar emissions. The latter
characteristic has been sensationally manifested in Azerbaijan’s targeting [8] of the Armenian air defense forces’ Russian-manufactured S-300
strategic SAM (surface-to-air missile) system.

Overall, in the absence of a robust network-centric air defense architecture, and in relatively permissive airspaces, drones proved to be effective
SEAD assets. Without a doubt, most UAS are still easy to shoot down compared to manned aircraft. Thus, one cannot claim that against a robust
adversary, fielding a complex A2 / AD (anti-access / area-denial) capacity backed by electronic warfare and counter-drone echelons, solely relying

on unmanned systems could offer adequate solutions. Drone-based SEAD operations are ideal against adversaries lacking network-centric air
defenses and a complete air-picture.

Lesson 5: Despite the drone age, military-geostrategic calculus still matters

While Azerbaijan’s technological edge and drone warfare have, so far, demonstrated a robust warfighting capability, the offensive campaign has
had to utilize traditional concepts and weaponry to clear and hold the occupied territories. As the Azerbaijani push developed, Baku’s military
planning transformed from a drone-driven, overwhelming war of attrition into a more combined arms warfare effort, pursuing a more balanced
approach.

I f t id O t b iti i t f hi l i d th t [9] lth

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In fact, some mid-October writings, in a premature fashion, claimed that [9] although the Azerbaijani military showcased a good drone warfare
performance, its territorial gains remained limited. Well, at present, the Azerbaijani territorial gains have a very different outlook than mid-
October. The Azerbaijani military captured critical positions, such as the Iranian frontier of its occupied territories, and, at the time of writing, has
been advancing for the geostrategically invaluable Lachin corridor.

All in all, the ongoing war shows that the traditional military-geostrategic calculus is still relevant. Conventional warfighting capabilities to clean,
hold, and deny territory remains crucial. However, considering the aforementioned ‘lesson-1’ and ‘lesson-2’ as to the Armenia – Azerbaijan
conflict, one can safely assume that drones are now an integral part of modern combined arms warfare operational art.

* Opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Anadolu Agency.

[1] https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2020/09/the-fight-for-nagorno-karabakh.html
[2] https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/russia -integra-orlan-10-en-2s5-formaciones-para-aumentar-la-letalidad
[3] https://mod.gov.az/en/news/video-of-artillery-shelling-of-the-enemy-headquarters -e-infraestructura-durante-la-noche-batallas-video-
32762.html
[4] https://www.aa.com.tr/en/analysis/analysis-armenian-missile-forces-committing-serious-war -crime / 2011511
[5] https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1621&context=monographs
[6] https://edam.org.tr/en/military-alert-the-armenian -militar-podría-escalar-el-conflicto-usando-misiles-balísticos-iskander /
[7] https://twitter.com/wwwmodgovaz/status/1313798380003434505
[8] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IaLeYemgLjc
[9] https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/the-second-nagorno-karabakh-war-two-weeks-in/
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Temas relacionados

A2 / AD (anti-acceso / denegación de área) Guerra Azerbaiyán-Armenia Bayraktar TB-2 guerra de drones Nagorno-Karabaj

Sistema SAM (misiles tierra-aire) cálculo militar tradicional sistemas aéreos no tripulados (UAS)

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