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Observatorio

Geopolítica y Comunicación en Asia Central y el Cáucaso

GORBACHOV COMPRA UNA PUBLICACIÓN MUY CRÍTICA CON PUTIN


Junio 2006 Mijaíl Gorbachov ha comprado, junto con el diputado Alexandr
Lébedev, el 49% de las acciones del bisemanario Nóvaya Gazeta,
la publicación más crítica al actual régimen de Vladímir Putin.

Fuente: www.elpais.es
Continúa en página 3

JOURNALISTS, ACTIVISTS AWARDED FOR THEIR WORK IN CHECHNYA

The human rights watchdog Amnesty International today presented


two Russian human rights activists/journalists with an award for
their work in Chechnya and elsewhere in the North Caucasus.
Fuente: www.iwpr.net
Continúa en página 4

DEALING WITH HIZB-UT-TAHRIR

The heavy-handed tactics that governments in Central Asia have


deployed against Hizb-ut Tahrir are not competing with the
sophisticated approach the Islamic movement is using to win
support from disaffected groups across the region.
Fuente: www.iwpr.net
Continúa en página 10

WEEKLY NEWS BRIEF ON TURKMENISTAN (June 16 - June 22, 2006)

Resumen semanal de noticias elaborado por el “Proyecto


Turkmenistán”, sección del Central Eurasia Project (Open Society
Institute).

Fuente: www.eurasianet.org
Continúa en página 14

ÍNDICE

-Medios de comunicación...p.3
-Política interior...p.10
-Relaciones internacionales...p.16
-Sociedad ...p.28

Grupo de investigación en Comunicación, Política y Cambio Social


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Observatorio
Geopolítica y Comunicación en Asia Central y el Cáucaso

El Observatorio de Geopolítica y Comunicación en


Asia Central y el Cáucaso es un proyecto que se encuadra
dentro de la línea de “Historia de la propaganda y análisis de la
comunicación política” del Grupo Interdisciplinario de
Estudios en Comunicación, Política y Cambio Social
(COMPOLITICAS), y tiene como principal objetivo el
estudio, investigación y difusión de los principales fenómenos
políticos y comunicacionales que tienen lugar en ese espacio
geográfico.

El Observatorio es, asimismo, un foro de debate que,


con sede en la Facultad de Comunicación de la Universidad de
Sevilla, pretende discutir y dar a conocer, especialmente en lo
que a los aspectos comunicacionales se refiere, una zona del
mundo muy poco estudiada en la Universidad española.

Esta inquietud investigadora está en consonancia con la


convicción de que es necesario aportar nuevos elementos para
la confección de una verdadera historia de la comunicación
“universal”, que se aparte del eurocentrismo que normalmente
aqueja a la disciplina. Para ello, el Observatorio se acerca a la
región de Asia Central y el Cáucaso con una mirada
multidisciplinar que incluye el interés por su historia, cultura,
religión, desarrollo político-social, relaciones internacionales,
etc., imprescindible para comprender la evolución histórica de
las diferentes formas de comunicación en este lugar del mundo.

Si bien resulta complejo definir con precisión el espacio


al que llamamos Asia Central y el Cáucaso, el Observatorio se
interesa especialmente por el espacio ex – soviético de esta
región, que incluye a una parte de la Federación Rusa y a países
como Armenia, Azerbaiyán, Georgia, Kazajstán, Turkmenistán,
Uzbekistán, Kirguizstán y Tayikistán.

Una de las principales formas de difusión de las


actividades del Observatorio es la edición de este boletín
mensual de noticias sobre Asia Central y el Cáucaso.

Boletín junio 2006 elaborado por


Miguel Vázquez Liñán

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Medios de comunicación

Titulares

El ex presidente Gorbachov anuncia la


compra de una publicación muy crítica con Putin
El País (08/06/2006)

Russia: Journalists, Activists Awarded


For Their Work In Chechnya
Radio Free Europe (27/06/2006)

Press Under Threat In The North Caucasus


Institute for War & Peace Reporting (08/06/2006)

Título El ex presidente Gorbachov anuncia la compra de una publicación muy


crítica con Putin
Subtítulo ---
Entradilla ---
Autor Rodrigo Fernández (Moscú)
Fecha 08/06/2006
publicación
Traducción ---
Títulos
Traducción ---
Entradilla
Cuerpo de El ex presidente de la Unión Soviética, Mijaíl Gorbachov, ha comprado,
texto junto con el diputado Alexandr Lébedev, el 49% de las acciones del
bisemanario Nóvaya Gazeta, la publicación más crítica al actual régimen de
Vladímir Putin. El anuncio Gorbachov lo hizo ayer, durante el último día de
labores del 59 Congreso de la Asociación Mundial de Periódicos y del 13
Foro Mundial de Directores de periódicos.

"Surge la pregunta de si Nóvaya Gazeta conservará su actual perfil. Nuestra


respuesta es sencilla: el paquete de control (51%) continúa en manos de la
redacción. Estamos de acuerdo con ella en que debe conservar su potencial
creativo y su pluralismo de opiniones. Nosotros no la utilizaremos para
nuestras necesidades corporativas", puntualizó Gorbachov durante su
encuentro con los directores de periódicos. Poco después, en una
conferencia de prensa Gorbachov señaló que el objetivo es conseguir que
Nóvaya Gazeta salga primero tres veces a la semana y luego todos los días.
Dmitri Murátov, director de Nóvaya Gazeta, aseguró que continuará con la
política que la ha caracterizado. "Lo principal para nosotros es el periodismo
de investigación. Queremos saberlo todo sobre la corrupción", dijo. Al
mismo tiempo, advirtió que en el periódico "cambiará todo, salvo la gente".
Murátov reconoció que con Nóvaya Gazeta "Gorbachov se ha comprado un
gran dolor de cabeza", ya que sus periodistas "dicen lo que piensan".
Nóvaya Gazeta ha mantenido una línea de oposición férrea al régimen de

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Putin.

Otras negociaciones
Mientras tanto, otro diario de oposición, el prestigioso Kommersant, podría
ser comprado por Millhouse, una compañía creada por el multimillonario
Román Abramóvich, el dueño del Chelsea que es conocido, además, por ser
un fiel aliado del Kremlin. El director comercial de Kommersant confirmó
que ha habido negociaciones con Millhouse, mientras que el director general
desmintió la noticia. El diario pertenecía a Borís Berezovski, el oligarca
exiliado en el Reino Unido, pero a principios de año entregó sus acciones a
su socio Badri Patarkatsishvili. Los analistas concuerdan en que si se
confirma la compra de Kommersant por Abramóvich, ésta no estaría dictada
por causas económicas sino que tendría motivos políticos: lograr que una
persona leal al régimen tome el control de la línea editorial del periódico.
Entre los platos fuertes del encuentro moscovita -donde el director adjunto
de EL PAÍS Xavier Vidal-Folch fue elegido vicepresidente del Foro
Mundial de Directores de periódicos- figuraron, además de la reunión con
Gorbachov, la comida con Dmitri Medvédev, posible sucesor de Putin en
2008; el desayuno con el diputado liberal de oposición Vladímir Rizhkov, y
la polémica sobre las caricaturas de Mahoma aparecidas el pasado
septiembre en un diario danés, con la participación de los responsables del
Jyllands-Postten que decidieron publicarlas.

Medio El País
Enlace http://www.elpais.es/articulo/sociedad/ex/presidente/Gorbachov/anuncia/co
mpra/publicacion/critica/Putin/elpporint/20060608elpepisoc_15/Tes/
Fecha consulta 08/06/2006
Género period. Noticia
Observaciones ---

Título Russia: Journalists, Activists Awarded For Their Work In Chechnya


Subtítulo ---
Entradilla PRAGUE, June 27, 2006 (RFE/RL) -- The human rights watchdog Amnesty
International today presented two Russian human rights activists/journalists
with an award for their work in Chechnya and elsewhere in the North
Caucasus.
Autor Valentinas Mite
Fecha 27/06/2006
publicación
Traducción ---
Títulos
Traducción ---
Entradilla
Cuerpo de The Journalism Under Threat prize was awarded during a ceremony in
texto London to Stanislav Dmitriyevsky and Oksana Chelysheva, both
representing the Russian-Chechen Friendship Society.

The two head the Russian-Chechen Friendship Society, a nongovernmental


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organization that disseminates information about the human rights situation


in Chechnya and legally defends the interests of victims of the Chechen war.

High-Pressure Work

Dmitriyevsky tells RFE/RL that although the organization continues its work
despite pressure from the authorities.
"You go to Chechnya and meet just another powerless human being who
needs help and it is difficult to stop helping."

"We are producing news items about the human rights situation in the
Chechen Republic," Dmitriyevsky said. "We produce them almost on a daily
basis. In the near future we plan to resume publication of the newspaper
'Pravozashita' ['Rights Protection']."

The Russian-Chechen Friendship Society is based in Nizhny Novgorod and


has branch offices in Chechnya (Grozny) and the neighboring republic of
Ingushetia (Nazran). Since its founding in 2000 it has become a mouthpiece
of criticism against human rights violations in Chechnya and surrounding
areas.

Dimitriyevsky, who is also the editor in chief of "Pravozashita," attracted the


attention of authorities last September when the newspaper published an
appeal for peace by the leader of Chechnya's separatist leader at the time,
Aslan Maskhadov, and by his representative, Akhmed Zakayev.

For publishing the appeals, Dimitriyevsky was charged by prosecutors in


Nizhny Novgorod with "inciting hatred or enmity on the basis of ethnicity
and religion."

The Russian-Chechen Friendship Society was not shut down, but the fallout
resulted in the suspension of the publication of "Pravozachita" and state tax
authorities continue to investigate the organization for possible financial
violations.

Threats And Intimidation

Reconstruction work under way at the former Press House in the Chechen
capital, Grozny (ITAR-TASS)And Dimitriyevsky and Chelysheva have
encountered other problems resulting from their work -- including several
anonymous death threats.

Chelysheva says sometimes defending human rights in Chechnya seems like


an impossible mission in Russia. But she also says the importance of the
NGO's work provides her with ample motivation to carry on.

"You go to Chechnya and meet just another powerless human being who
needs help and it is difficult to stop helping," Chelysheva said. "Yes, I want
to rest. We are all human; we need normal life; we need positive impressions
-- but so far we cannot afford them."

Chelysheva says she receives encouragement from telephone calls and letters
from throughout Russia in which people express their thanks for the work
carried out by the organization.
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"Amnesty International believes that these two people's lives are actually at
risk."
Neil Durkin, a spokesman for Amnesty International in London, tells
RFE/RL that Dmitriyevsky and Chelysheva were awarded the Journalism
Under Threat prize because of their courage.

"Stanislav and Oksana have been presented with this award from Amnesty
because we consider that their work for the Russian-Chechen [Friendship
Society] information agency, which of course they run, to be particularly
important and dangerous work in effect now in modern-day Russia," Durkin
said.

Ambitious Award

Noting that Dmitriyevsky and Chelysheva have received death threats


because of their work, Durkin expresses hope that the award might provide
some sort of support and cover for them as they work to bring attention to
the human right situation in Chechnya.

Oksana Chelysheva after receiving her award (AI)"Amnesty International


believes that these two people's lives are actually at risk," Durkin said. "If we
can present an award to journalists and it gives them an extra degree of
safety and public recognition, then that is indeed what we are trying to do."

Durkin says the reward is not about money and involves no financial benefit.
Rather, he says, it is a tribute to activists and journalists working in
dangerous places throughout the world.

Last year, the award was presented to Guatemalan journalist Marielos


Monzon for her reporting on the human rights situation in Guatemala.
Medio Radio Free Europe
Enlace http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/06/7041f503-ca1d-4587-9be1-
c5ba280f980e.html
Fecha 29/06/2006
consulta
Género Noticia
period.
Observaciones ---

Título Press Under Threat In The North Caucasus


Subtítulo The difficulties of working as an independent journalist in the Russian
Caucasus.
Entradilla ---
Autor Fatima Tlisova in Istanbul
Fecha 08/06/2006
publicación
Traducción ---

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Títulos
Traducción ---
Entradilla
Cuerpo de In each of the republics of the North Caucasus in which I have worked, I
texto have to communicate with the authorities, law enforcement agencies and
different circles of society. On the basis of this experience, I have to confirm
with regret - freedom of speech as well as the independent press are in their
infancy in the region. An analysis of the mass media present on the market
shows there are no independent media outlets with the exception of three or
four regional newspapers.

There is no denying that in the North Caucasian republics not only the
government media, but also newspapers and internet sites are published that
reflect public life from points of view different from the official position of
local government. But, as a rule, these comparatively independent media
outlets are financed by different opposition groups and reflect points of view
that very often misrepresent the true picture.

As the North Caucasian republics are geographically small, the information


about ownership of the media is not a secret for the large proportion of the
public. So information in this kind of newspapers is received with a high
degree of scepticism and very often with distrust. These journalists can’t be
considered free and independent. The press is far from identifying itself as a
free and influential part of the society. On the whole, a journalist in the North
Caucasus is perceived by the society as a worker in the service sector, for
example, as a waiter. Unfortunately, journalists themselves very often
consent to this state of affairs.

Why is this happening in modern Russia, a state which declares its adherence
to democratic principles? There are a lot of reasons, they are quite visible,
but analysis of them requires much more time than this brief report allows.
I’ll say briefly: on the one hand the authorities are interested in shutting
down all information and this is because the government has something to
hide. Outrageous violation of human rights, corruption and crimes by the
military are daily occurrences. On the other hand, the level of journalistic
professionalism is very low. Reporters mostly depend on their editors, who
in their turn depend on the government and the groups that finance them. The
level of censorship in such a system is extremely high.

I’d like to speak in more detail about the methods which are used to fight
against the independent press. In Moscow, the problem of an un-compliant
media is solved with relatively civilised methods. In the North Caucasus, the
same methods are used in a nastier and rougher manner. This is easily
explained: the Caucasus is objectively speaking a zone of tension. These
objective realities often serve as a very convenient disguise for a crackdown
by the authorities not only on the independent press but also on citizens in
general. The fact that Moscow pays the local authorities generously for their
loyalty and ignores all kinds of abuses of power towards the local population
makes things even worse. The authorities and law enforcement agencies are
not afraid to openly persecute difficult journalists. Potential publicity and
scandals do not deter them.

How does the pressure on mass media occur? The first and most popular

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method which I have already mentioned is censorship. Censorship deprives a


journalist of the opportunity to make public important facts and documents.
Insubordination as a rule leads to dismissal. This was how the Ossetian
journalist Luiza Orazayeva was treated. Luiza, who is one of the most
courageous and honest journalists in the Caucasus, remained unemployed for
many years because of her principled stand and her integrity.

Bribery is another commonly used weapons against the independent press.


And it is also very effective because of regional journalists? low salaries. The
isolation of journalists and their limited access to information are used very
successfully. For example in Ingushetia, the president of the republic Murat
Zyazikov regularly interferes in the hiring and firing of journalists.
As a result, we, I mean Regnum news agency, cannot find a correspondent,
because we refuse to take the ones offered to us by Zyazikov’s press service,
and other journalists are so intimidated that they refuse to work with us under
various pretexts. Unfortunately, we have to put up with it because we cannot
provide security for our reporters.

The security services have more sophisticated ways of dealing with the
independent press. For example, they discredit a difficult media outlet or a
journalist by publishing compromising information in a loyal publication.
There are a lot of examples of this. For instance, in one such publication a
well known journalist and human rights activist from Kabardino-Balkaria
Valery Khatazhukov was accused of working for western security services
and getting sponsorship from them.

In the spirit of the Cold War, representatives of practically all the foreign-
backed media working in the North Caucasus have been called Western
spies. This accusation has been made of the coordinator of the respected
London based Institute for War and Peace Reporting, IWPR, Valery
Dzutsev, living in Vladikavkaz. I was named a leader of Muslim community
in Nalchik in one such publication and my parents’ house was subsequently
searched.
They said they were looking for a cache of weapons.

Criminal prosecution and physical violence have also been employed against
journalists. A terrible incident happened a week ago. In Cherkessk, the father
of our reporter in Karachai?Cherkessia, Murat Gukemukhov, was beaten up.
As a consequence, seventy-year-old Muhamed Gukemuhov underwent two
operations and lost an eye. Muhamed Gukemukhov is the son of a well-
known Circassian scholar, a respected person in the society. This attack can
be connected only to his son’s professional activities. They tried to bribe
Murat first and then threatened him. Police have launched an enquiry into the
assault, but we are sure that the real motives and the people behind the attack
will never be made public.

Every journalist, working honestly and impartially in the North Caucasus, is


aware of danger he expose himself and his relatives to. But an honest press is
the only mirror in which people of the world can see a real unadorned picture
of what is happening in the North Caucasus. As a citizen and a journalist, I
want to tell the public that all kinds of pressure has been put on me, efforts
have been made to defame my name through criminal prosecution. This is
connected only to my professional activities and my personal opinions. I
represent the long-suffering Adyg (Circassian) nation.
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I must call things by their true names. The Adyg people were subject to
genocide. Discrimination is going on now and it is the basis for Russia’s
destructive nationality politics in the North Caucasus. The October rebellion
in Nalchik was a manifestation of protest against this policy. The Russian
government tries to represent the Nalchik revolt to the world community as
an act of terrorism and the rebels as terrorists, but this does not correspond
with reality. The refusal to hand over the bodies of those killed during the
rebellion and tortured to death afterwards in police cells is a crime against
the law of humanity and humanism. This is my personal civil position and I
am sure it is the opinion of every sensible person.

As the participants of the conference were informed before my speech, I


came here from Hamburg, where I had been invited by the Gerd Bucerius
Foundation, which supports independent press in the Eastern Europe. My
programme in Germany included visiting different newspapers, magazines
and educational institutions training professional journalists. The director of
the journalism school, Professor Christoph Fasel, said that after his
journalistic investigations many well-known German politicians had
resigned.

I listened to his words with both bitterness and hope. With bitterness,
because in the North Caucasus it is not politicians and officials who are
unmasked and then punished and dismissed, but the journalist that unmasked
him. And with hope, because freedom of conscience, freedom of opinion and
speech, democratic principles are ancient components of the mentality of
Caucasian peoples.

This article is based on a speech given by Fatima Tlisova - editor-in-chief for


Regnum news agency in the North Caucasus, based in Nalchik - to an
international conference on the North Caucasus in Istanbul on May 21, 2006:

Pictures of her receiving her award in Hamburg last month from the Gerd
Bucerius Foundation in Circassian national dress can be seen at
http://www.regnum.ru/news/kab-balk/644550.html
Medio Institute for War & Peace Reporting
Enlace http://www.iwpr.net/?p=crs&s=f&o=321509&apc_state=henpcrs
Fecha 28/06/2006
consulta
Género Reportaje
period.
Observaciones ---

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Política interior

Titulares
Dealing With Hizb-ut-Tahrir
Institute for War & Peace Reporting (16/06/06)

Weekly News Brief on Turkmenistan


Turkmenistan Project

Título Dealing With Hizb-ut-Tahrir


Subtítulo Repressive policies from Central Asia governments have done nothing to
curb the rise of the banned Islamic party
Entradilla The heavy-handed tactics that governments in Central Asia have deployed
against Hizb-ut Tahrir are not competing with the sophisticated approach the
Islamic movement is using to win support from disaffected groups across the
region.
Autor Saule Mukhametrakhimova
Fecha 16/06/06
publicación
Traducción ---
Títulos
Traducción ---
Entradilla
Cuerpo de It is understandable why Central Asian leaders regard a group that aims to
texto overthrow secular governments and establish an Islamic state as a danger.
However, the response - harsh treatment of suspected Hizb-ut-Tahrir
members - far exceeds the real threat they pose.

Comparative figures in Kyrgyzstan - which has the most publicly visible


Hizb-ut-Tahrir community in the region and probably the second largest
membership after Uzbekistan - show that 10,000 people there have been
converted by Christian Protestant missionaries while only an estimated 3,000
have joined the Islamic movement.

It is difficult to establish exact numbers of the group’s total membership in


Central Asia. Most estimates vary between 15,000 and 20,000, with Hizb-ut-
Tahrir activists quoting the upper end and human rights activists and
observers citing the lower end of the range.

The Central Asian governments bundle Hizb-ut-Tahrir together with al-


Qaeda and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan as a terrorist organisation,
and it is banned across the region. As a result, thousands of suspected party
members have been put behind bars. Accused of attempting to topple
governments, they have received sentences to up to 15 years of
imprisonment in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan for crimes including possession
of material such as leaflets and video cassettes. Tashkent has accused Hizb-
ut-Tahrir of involvement in an outbreak of violence in 2004 that left 47
people dead.
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Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan, which until recently took a more lenient


approach, have increasingly been following the Uzbek lead and carrying out
their own crackdowns.

Hizb-ut-Tahrir, which originated in the Middle East in the Fifties, advocates


the creation of a caliphate, or idealised Islamic state.

The movement spread to Central Asia in the early Nineties following the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Its first foothold was in Uzbekistan, where it
won the biggest following, and it spread from there into neighbouring
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakstan.

Hizb-ut-Tahrir activists convey their message in simple terms: poverty and


inequality can be addressed once corrupt governments are replaced with the
rule of Sharia or Islamic law.

Most in Central Asia would not want to see Sharia become a reality.
Although the majority of people in the region consider themselves Muslims,
they strongly favour a secular state. Afghanistan’s experience with an
Islamic state under Taleban rule in 1996-2001 serves as a good illustration of
what can happen when a radical group imposes on others its vision of the
ideal society.

Yet there is widespread support for the criticism that Hizb-ut-Tahrir levels
against corruption, inequality and the repression of devout Muslims. The call
for social justice strikes a chord with hundreds of thousands of people in
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan who have been forced to become migrant workers
abroad because of unemployment at home, as well as impoverished people in
the provincial towns and villages of Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan.

The authorities’ inability to deal with Hizb-ut-Tahrir is attributable to a


combination of factors. As Yevgeni Zhovtis, the director of the Kazakstan
Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law, explains, there is no political
will to acknowledge the cause-and-effect relationship between the failure of
governments’ social policies, corruption and religious repression and Hizb-
ut-Tahrir’s widening social appeal.

Moreover, there is no real understanding of Hizb-ut-Tahrir’s sophisticated


approach to winning hearts and minds, or of its ability to alter its modus
operandi to suit the prevailing political climate.

“There is a lack of experts able to lead an informed debate,” concludes


Zhovtis.

The authoritarian Central Asian regimes thus employ the only method of
dealing with dissent that they know: banning the organisation and cracking
down on its members.

Some observers also point out that governments use the threat of Hizb-ut-
Tahrir as a convenient excuse to justify their policy of repressing opponents
and controlling the rise of political Islam in their states.

The spillover of Hizb-ut-Tahrir’s activities from Uzbekistan to neighbouring


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countries at the end of the Nineties is a direct consequence of the harsh


policies pursued by the authorities in Tashkent. The Hizb-ut-Tahrir ideology
was carried by members who were forced to leave the country and find
refuge within ethnic Uzbek communities in neighbouring states.

The crackdown policy does not seem to have had any effect on the party,
which has found ways of surviving through years of harassment and arrests.

The thousands of jailed Hizb-ut-Tahrir members stick together even in


Uzbek jails. Solidarity unity gives them a sense of purpose and the courage
to stage protests against harsh prison conditions. This phenomenon was
witnessed by Uzbek journalist and civil society activist, Ruslan Sharipov,
who spent ten months in prison as a result of his human rights activities in
2003.

Jailed Hizb-ut-Tahrir activists in Kazakstan continue their missionary work


inside the prison system, recruiting followers from among the inmates.
Journalist Sergey Duvanov, imprisoned in 2003 for his political writing, has
reported how he observed a Hizb-ut-Tahrir activist in the prison recruit a
group of followers within three weeks.

Party members claim that their aim is to achieve political change through
peaceful means. But reports on the ground suggest that over the last couple
of years, some splinter groups have emerged that favour more radical action
in response to increasing pressure from regional governments.

Hizb-ut-Tahrir is constantly looking for ways to promote itself by attempting


to participate in politics and improving its public outreach.

Last July, Hizb-ut-Tahrir members in southern Kyrgyzstan organised a


campaign to support a candidate in the country’s presidential election. “They
publicly backed a candidate who pledged to represent voters’ interests based
on Islamic values he shares,” said Alisher Saipov, a journalist in southern
Kyrgyzstan who covered the topic extensively. It was the first time the party
had an opportunity to engage politically, a tactic which is central to its
ideology and approach.

This ties in with Hizb-ut-Tahrir’s widely commented-on strategy, which


seems to consist of the following stages: attract new members, build up a
deeply-rooted network within the wider population, infiltrate government to
win supporters among the powers that be, and to prepare the ground for
establishing an Islamic state. This is not to say that political action in
Kyrgyzstan means the party’s campaign is entering another phase.
Nevertheless, an analysis of Hizb-ut Tahrir’s activities since the late
Nineties, when the first trials brought them into the public spotlight, suggests
that its leadership has a clear idea of what it wants and would seize any
available opportunity to further its cause.

In the early days of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, propaganda literature was usually


exchanged among members of the group. Next, party activists targeted big
gatherings so as to spread the word. In Kazakstan, the first reported mass
distribution of leaflets took place during celebrations of the history of the
ancient town of Turkestan in 2000. This tactic was then followed by direct
mailing, where activists place leaflets in people’s post boxes.
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Members are also proactive in getting their message across by initiating


contacts with local media and offering interviews and information. A
personal encounter I had two years ago with Vadim Berestov, a media-savvy
Hizb-ut-Tahrir representative in Shymkent, was a good example of this.
Although wary of the the group’s propaganda, I was surprised to find
Berestov rather friendly and extremely articulate.

Last year, Hizb-ut-Tahrir’s representative in Osh in southern Kyrgyzstan


managed to register a television and radio broadcasting company called Ong
(Consciousness). However, the company ceased broadcasting after just three
days when its partner, the private TV channel Keremet, cancelled the
cooperation agreement. A Hizb-ut-Tahrir spokesman claimed that Keremet
caved in to pressure from the authorities.

Another aspect of Hizb-ut-Tahrir’s activities that has helped gain it more


sympathy is the charitable work it does for vulnerable groups. This system
was initially used to provide support for families of jailed party activists, but
the network was subsequently extended beyond the party’s ranks to the wider
community. Party members would provide support to poor families in
dispute with the authorities over payment of utility bills, help out young
families, and organise free distribution of food during religious holidays.

This now appears to become part of the movement’s policy. According to a


local journalist, the practice resembles the way proselytising Protestant
groups attract new members in Central Asia through free gifts of food,
clothes and sometimes money.

All this contributes to the image of Hizb-ut Tahrir as a party that really cares
about the common people, in contrast to the state which appears to have
forgotten about them.

Given the growing disparity between rich and poor in Central Asia, groups
like Hizb-ut-Tahrir have the potential to win plenty more sympathisers.

Medio Institute for War & Peace Reporting


Enlace http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=321670&apc_state=henprca
Fecha 28/06/2006
consulta
Género Noticia
period.
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Título Weekly News Brief on Turkmenistan


Subtítulo News Analysis
Entradilla ---
Autor Turkmenistan Project
Fecha No aparece
publicación
Traducción ---
Títulos
Traducción ---
Entradilla
Cuerpo de As Turkmenistan commemorated the 14th anniversary of Saparmurat
texto Niyazov’s presidency this week the authoritarian leader gave its biggest gas
importer, Gazprom, an ultimatum and unleashed the most serious crackdown
on peaceful dissent since the attempted coup in November 2002. The arrest
of seven people in the capital between June 16-18 and televised accusations
that a senior French diplomat, a French citizen working at the OSCE Centre
in Ashgabat, and British and French journalists had engaged in ”illegal acts”
including anti-government activity sent ripples of fear throughout the
country and shockwaves in diplomatic circles.

At a June 19 cabinet meeting, Security Minister Geldymukhammed


Asyrmuhammedov alleged that 35-year-old human rights defender
Annakurban Amanklychev was arrested because weapons and ammunition,
which were allegedly to be used in an opposition plot masterminded by
exiled opposition figures, were found in his car. In a June 18 press release,
the Bulgaria-based Turkmenistan Helsinki Foundation reported that
eyewitnesses had seen security officers plant an unidentified parcel in
Amanklychev’s car.

The accusations brought denials of illegal activity and protest from some
western circles. The French Foreign Ministry said in a June 20 statement that
the accusations against Chargé d’affaires at the French Embassy in
Turkmenistan, Henri Tomassini, are “totally unfounded.” Concern about the
arrests was likely to have been voiced by members of the European
Parliament who arrived in Ashgabat on June 19 on a “fact-finding” trip in
advance of a vote on whether the EU should conclude an agreement granting
Turkmenistan favored trade conditions.

Security Minister Asyrmuhammedov said in televised remarks on June 20


that Tomassini and OSCE employee Benjamin Moreau were suspected of
“illegal acts” against Turkmenistan, AFP reported. According to a Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty report, Tomassini has been accused of allegedly
aiding Amanklychev in helping foreign correspondents shoot footage falsely
portraying life in Turkmenistan. ”Tomassini did provide audiovisual
equipment for a Turkmen national,” said French Foreign Ministry
spokesman Jean-Baptiste Mattei. However, “it is not spying equipment, it is
equipment for filming and for making reports about the country, which the
Turkmen authorities ought, instead, to welcome," Mattei said.

The Turkmen Security Minister also said that during a recent trip to Ukraine
both Amanklychev and Elena Ovezova, who was also arrested this week,

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received intelligence training and instruction in the sabotage techniques


recently used in Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, reported RFE/RL. Head of
the Turkmenistan Helsinki Foundation Tajigul Begmedova dismissed the
allegations saying that their trip to Ukraine last summer was for a human
rights training session and in no way could be construed as a threat to
Turkmenistan’s national security.

Turkmenistan threatened this week to cut off gas supplies to Russia if state-
controlled gas giant Gazprom fails to agree to the Turkmen Energy
Ministry’s suggested price hike. Turkmen Energy Minister Kurbanmurad
Atayev said in a June 21 statement that Turkmenistan is increasing export
prices from US$65 per 1,000 cubic meters to US$100 per 1,000 cu. m. in
July 2006 and expects Russia to agree to the new price. “If within a month
and a half we don't work out a contract with Gazprom, Turkmenistan will
halt the exports," Atayev said. Gazprom chief Alexei Miller, who was in
Ashgabat for talks on June 19, has, according to a report from The
Associated Press, “categorically refused the offer.”
Medio Eurasianet
Enlace http://www.eurasianet.org/turkmenistan.project/#analysis
Fecha 28/06/2006
consulta
Género Resumen de noticias
period.
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Relaciones internacionales

Titulares

The Great Game, Part II


The Moscow Times (26/06/06)

Fears of Turkey's 'invisible' Armenians


BBC News (22/06/06)

U.S. Says Aliyev, Kocharian Must Show 'Political Will'


Radio Free Europe (23/06/06)

Título The Great Game, Part II


Subtítulo Repressive policies from Central Asia governments have done nothing to
curb the rise of the banned Islamic party
Entradilla It has become fashionable to refer to the current jockeying for influence and
resources in Central Asia as the new Great Game. Is there a "Great Game II"
as there was a World War II? And is that a useful template for understanding
that part of the world today?
Autor Richard Lourie
Fecha 26/06/06
publicación
Traducción ---
Títulos
Traducción ---
Entradilla
Cuerpo de The original Great Game was the rivalry between the Russian and British
texto empires for the markets of Central Asia. There was an overlay of ideology --
bringing Christianity and civilization to the heathen who, then as now,
displayed a proclivity for beheading. But the real issue was whether Central
Asians "shall be clothed with the broadcloth of Russia or of England" and
purchase "implements of steel from St. Petersburg or from Birmingham."
Great Game I began in 1807, when Napoleon proposed a joint attack to Tsar
Alexander I on the jewel of the British Empire, India, and ended in 1907,
when the two sides formally agreed on spheres of influence. That century of
suspicion and deception resulted in some bloodletting, but the two great
powers, though they came close, never went to war with each other

Some see the Cold War as an extension of the Great Game, but if anything it
was the collapse of the Soviet Union that brought the game to life again.
Great Game II has some familiar aspects, some utterly new. The main
players are Russia, China, the United States and Iran. As in the 19th century,
ideology plays a secondary role, as the real stakes are gas, oil and strategic
advantage. Unlike the 19th century, the Central Asian states are now
primarily sellers rather than buyers. As always, these states prove adroit at
playing the great powers off one other.

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The complicated politics of Great Game II -- Turkmen gas is shipped to


Europe through Russian pipelines that pass through Ukrainian territory -- is
magnified by terrorism. Uzbekistan, the Belarus of Central Asia, granted the
United States rights to use an airbase to fight the Taliban and al-Qaida but
withdrew those rights when the United States criticized Uzbekistan for the
still-murky slaughter in Andijan in May 2005. Russia deftly moved to fill the
vacuum. By September Russia and Uzbekistan held joint military exercises
and two months later signed a treaty promising mutual military assistance in
case of aggression.

Some observers doubt the existence of any new form of the Great Game. In a
summer 2006 Washington Quarterly article titled "Averting a New Great
Game in Central Asia," Richard Weitz wrote: "Concerns about a renewed
great game are ... exaggerated. The contest for influence in the region does
not directly challenge the vital national interests of China, Russia, or the
United States." The point is not well taken. No vital interests were directly at
stake in the original Great Game either. In fact, Europe needs gas and oil
from Russia and Central Asia more than England ever needed to sell
broadcloth in Bukhara.

Besides, more than energy resources are at issue. The political fate of Central
Asia is at stake. Is there an authoritarian Moscow-Tashkent-Beijing axis
forming? Russia, Uzbekistan and China are all key members of the suddenly
prominent Shanghai Cooperation Organization. All the same, their repressive
natures give these states an inherent instability that makes competition
volatile and dangerous.

The United States now has troops in an arc from the Caucasus to Kyrgyzstan
and has made no secret of its position on Caspian oil and the Baku-Tbilisi-
Cejan pipeline, its ambassador to Azerbaijan, Ross Wilson, saying, "The oil
will never go through Russia."

Alexander Maryasov, Russia's longtime ambassador to Iran, has said, "As


soon as our economy regains its strength, we will re-establish our old
relations with Central Asia and the southern Caucasus, and reassert our
sphere of influence in that region."

Sounds like rivalry to me. Great or not, the game is afoot.

Richard Lourie is the author of "The Autobiography of Joseph Stalin" and


"Sakharov: A Biography."
Medio The Moscow Times
Enlace http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2006/06/26/006.html
Fecha 28/06/2006
consulta
Género Noticia
period.
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Título Fears of Turkey's 'invisible' Armenians


Subtítulo ---
Entradilla The head of the Armenian Orthodox church is in the middle of a
controversial visit to Istanbul. Karekin II has in the past angered Turks by
accusing them of committing genocide against Armenians at the time of
World War I. Turkey denies the charges of genocide
Autor Sarah Rainsford (Estambul)
Fecha 22/06/06
publicación
Traducción ---
Títulos
Traducción ---
Entradilla
Cuerpo de I thought it was a perfectly simple question. I had gone backstage to
texto interview the conductor of an ethnic Armenian church choir after a rousing
performance at Istanbul University. As the choristers packed up their
manuscripts, we chatted for a while about the music and the conductor was
all smiles. Then I asked his opinion on the conference his choir was singing
at - the snappily labelled "Symposium on New Approaches to Turkish-
Armenian relations". I wondered if he thought the event could help mend
fences. Within seconds, he was edging away from me, apparently deeply
uncomfortable. "I don't want to talk about politics," he pleaded, "we just
came for the music!" It was a telling insight.

Closed borders

Turkey and Armenia are neighbours who might as well be a million miles
apart. Diplomatic relations have been frozen for over a decade; their mutual
border is closed. Part of the reason is Turkey's support for the Azeris in their
conflict with Armenia. But the direct dispute is over a matter of history: The
death of hundreds of thousands of Armenians in eastern Turkey during the
dying days of the Ottoman empire. Armenia wants those deaths recognised
as genocide. Turkey refuses to accept that term.

For Armenia and its vast and powerful diaspora, getting recognition from
Ankara is a mission so important, it is almost a way of life. But here inside
Turkey, ethnic Armenians have chosen an uncomfortable silence over
confrontation.

I visited Anush and her brother Vartan in a leafy middle class suburb of
Istanbul. Their apartment was typical of the area, but with the odd design
twists, like knotted dried flowers on the table that reminded me of my trips to
the Caucasus. "Turks still ask me where I come from," Vartan told me, as his
sister brought in the tea. "They seem to have no idea there used to be
hundreds of thousands of us here."

Uneasy existence

Anush and Vartan are just two of some 60,000 ethnic Armenians who still
live in Turkey - a land their ancestors have inhabited for almost 2,000 years.
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It is an uneasy co-existence. "We've lived with violence ever since I was


born," Anush told me. "Graffiti on our churches, abuse on the streets. I still
think twice in some areas before I say my name openly." For previous
generations life was even tougher.

Anush's parents barely speak Armenian, because their parents worried they
would stand out and when Armenian militants began assassinating Turkish
diplomats in the 1970s, Turkish Armenian families here made themselves
more invisible still. It is hardly surprising they do not normally voice an
opinion on what happened in 1915. Anush and Vartan are a rare exception
and, even so, I have had to change their names. We know exactly what
happened, Vartan told me. He said his Armenian great grandparents were
forcibly deported south, accused of siding with Russian troops against the
Turks. They handed their children over to Turkish neighbours for safety and
never returned.

There is a similar tragedy behind every Armenian door here, but the local
patriarch has banned his community from discussing it - if they want to keep
their jobs in Armenian churches and schools. "It's fear," Anush told me
simply. There have been some early signs of change here. Last year a
university in Istanbul hosted the first discussion of the genocide claims in
Turkey ever to question the official line. It was hugely controversial but it
happened. And now international pressure on Ankara to re-examine its
position is increasing. Vartan welcomes that but he senses a rise in
aggressive, nationalist feeling in Turkey in response. "If other countries force
this issue, it will be terrible for the Armenian people here," Vartan told me
quietly. "If you plunge a man into boiling water, he will burn," he said, "but
if you increase the heat gently, he could get used to it."

'Pseudo-citizens'

Unlike the Kurds, Turkey's Armenian population is an officially recognised


minority with certain rights and privileges. But despite that - and despite
their silence - Turkish Armenians seem like pseudo-citizens. Anush told me
that in one school text book Armenians are still described as separatists with
an eye on Turkish land. History books carry the official view of 1915, of
course, with the Armenians exiled as traitors. And even now, in Armenian
schools here, ethnic Armenians are banned from teaching certain "strategic"
subjects - geography, sociology, morality, history. As we talked into the
warm evening, and glasses of tea gave way to Armenian cognac, I began to
understand the price people like that choir master pay to live in peace in
Turkey.

To many Armenians abroad their silence is a sort of treachery. For Anush,


Vartan and the others it is about protecting a fragile peace. But it is all built
on the shakiest of foundations. "I am positive. I do have hopes for Turkey,"
Anush told me as I put on my shoes to go. "But I don't remember ever
feeling truly comfortable living here. Always at the back of my mind is the
thought that one day I may be forced to leave."

From Our Own Correspondent was broadcast on Thursday, 22 June, 2006 at


1100 BST on BBC Radio 4.
Medio BBC
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Enlace http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2006/06/26/006.html
Fecha 28/06/2006
consulta
Género Noticia
period.
Observaciones ---

Título U.S. Says Aliyev, Kocharian Must Show 'Political Will'


Subtítulo ---
Entradilla PRAGUE, June 23, 2006 (RFE/RL) -- Matthew Bryza, the U.S. deputy
assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, recently gained
a second job title: he has replaced Steven Mann as the U.S. co-chair of the
Minsk Group tasked by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) with moderating negotiations between Armenia and
Azerbaijan over the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Autor RFE/RL
Fecha 23/06/2006
publicación
Traducción ---
Títulos
Traducción ---
Entradilla
Cuerpo de
texto Bryza spoke on June 22 with
RFE/RL Armenian Service
head Harry Tamrazian and
RFE/RL Azerbaijani Service
correspondent Kenan Aliyev
about the prospects for a
resolution of the Karabakh
conflict, Russia's role in the
South Caucasus, and
America's strategic priorities
in the region.

RFE/RL: Your post -- deputy assistant secretary -- is more senior than those
occupied by previous U.S. co-chairs of the Minsk Group. Does that mean the
United States is paying more attention to the Karabakh question? Could that
in turn mean that there is a sense the sides are coming closer to resolving this
conflict?

Matthew Bryza: I wouldn't read too much in particular into the fact that you
now have a deputy assistant secretary, rather than someone who wasn't,
doing this. A lot of this just depended on personalities and my own
background. I've been so deeply involved in the region for a long time. It
made sense that I would be the person to pick this up, because it was time for
Ambassador Mann, coincidentally, to move on to his next assignment. So
that's all. I wouldn't read anything more into it. I'm just very happy that I'll be

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able to play a more active -- and, in fact, daily -- role on this conflict and
make sure those efforts are integrated with all the other broader things I'm
trying to do in the Caucasus.
"We just don't know where the presidents are right now. We're encouraging
them, we're nudging them by taking a step back. Nudging them to show that
they have this political will."

RFE/RL: You have said in recent statements that there is a framework on


the table that makes an agreement on Karabakh possible. You have also said
that next year the political calendar will be more complicated in Armenia,
and therefore the presidents should do something this year while there is still
a window of opportunity. First of all, what kind of framework is that? And
do you still believe there is room for a resolution this year? Some experts say
the issue is already very complicated today, even before we get into the
elections next year.

Bryza: It is complicated today. We see how complicated the situation is


based upon the fact that the presidents haven't gotten to the point where
they've agreed to this framework that's on the table. That gets back to the
first part of your question. What we have is a framework agreement, as we
described today here at the OSCE -- as Ambassador Mann did, and
Ambassador [Yury] Merzlyakov [the Russian co-chair] and Bernard [Fassier,
the French co-chair] as well -- we have a framework agreement that would
call for the removal, or the withdrawal, of Armenian troops from those
territories in Azerbaijan where they currently are. That's on the one side. On
the other side we have a normalization of Armenia's ties -- economic,
diplomatic -- and other features having to do with peacekeepers and
international economic assistance to the Karabakh region, and economic
development. So there's a package proposal on the table that, in the end,
would involve as well a vote at some point on the future status of Karabakh.
So that's kind of the basic outline of the proposal on the table, and we would
very much encourage the presidents to accept this framework. Which
requires a lot of political courage, which I've said publicly before.

A Breakthrough This Year?

RFE/RL: Have you noticed any sign that the two sides may be softening
their positions? Did they appear more willing to consider the framework
agreement you're describing during their talks in early June at a Black Sea
summit in Bucharest than they were when they meant for talks in February
with the French president in Rambouillet?

Bryza: Put it this way: At Bucharest, they talked throughout the whole
meeting to each other, really went through the issues in detail, and [they]
haven't issued any negative statements really since. So I'm not sure how to
interpret that. I know what I hope, what the co-chairs hope: The co-chairs
hope that this reflects political will on the part of the presidents to really get
serious about some tough compromises each side will make. I'm not sure if
that's where they are, and the co-chairs talked today about taking a bit of a
pause throughout the summer to find out whether or not the presidents do in
fact have that sort of political will.

RFE/RL: What is the next step for the co-chairs? Are you planning to bring
the presidents together again after the summer?
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Bryza: At this point, as I was saying, the co-chairs have decided to take a
pause throughout the summer. We will reconvene in September, October, to
report back here [to Vienna, the headquarters of the OSCE], I hope. But
we're taking some time off in terms of trying to facilitate meetings between
the presidents. It's really up to the presidents now to decide whether or not
they want to take the politically difficult and challenging decisions that are
critical to bringing the framework agreement home. So we're giving them
some space, and we want them to demonstrate that they really do have the
political will to take these next difficult steps. That doesn't mean we're
quitting the process. That doesn't mean we're walking away from it. I myself
still have to make my first trips in this capacity to Yerevan and Baku, and
you can bet that I'll be encouraging the presidents to take these tough
decisions. And there will be opportunities at major international gatherings
this summer to discuss this issue.

RFE/RL: At the turn of the year, there were a lot of optimistic statements --
from you as well as others -- that the Karabakh conflict could be resolved in
2006. We're now halfway through the year. Are you still optimistic about
2006?

Bryza: I don't know. My optimism, if you look carefully at my statements,


was about the fact that there is a framework on the table that provides a
workable foundation for a just and lasting settlement. I was optimistic that
the Minsk Group negotiators had gotten the two presidents as close as they
could get to an agreement without the presidents taking some very difficult
decisions and making some very difficult compromises. We are still in that
same place. I don't know if that's optimistic or pessimistic. But the Minsk
Group itself has decided that there's no sense in us trying to arrange another
round of presidential meetings or trying to broker an agreement, because we
have taken the process as far as we can, and all that's left to do is for the
presidents to make these tough decision. Is that pessimistic? I don't know if it
is. It depends on what the presidents themselves decide to do next. If they
decide that they simply don't have the political will to keep going, well, that's
a pessimistic outcome. But we just don't know where the presidents are right
now. We're encouraging them, we're nudging them by taking a step back.
Nudging them to show that they have this political will.

Russia's Role In The South Caucasus

RFE/RL: Russia does not always play what some would consider a
constructive role in the South Caucasus, particularly with regard to the
"frozen conflicts" in the breakaway Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. But Russia has been very cooperative with the United States on
Nagorno-Karabakh. Some Russian officials, like Sergei Ivanov, have
occasionally said there should be no Karabakh resolution imposed from
abroad. But otherwise the relationship has been constructive. How would
you evaluate relations between the United States and Russia with respect to
Karabakh, in particular and the Caucasus, in general?

Bryza: First, let me say you made a statement of fact with which I agree. We
are working quite well with Russia on Karabakh. Our level of cooperation
has not been as significant when it comes to South Ossetia and Abkhazia and
Transdniester. I don't work on Transdniester [a separatist region of
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Moldova], but I was just in Abkhazia and I think there is a lot of room for
much better cooperation -- and I would argue that the Georgian side has
shown a significant amount of goodwill and a readiness to work on
significant confidence-building measures. I would also say the United States
has worked hard to keep the Georgians as constructive and moderate as
possible, and I hope our Russians colleagues and friends will do the same in
terms of encouraging the Abkhaz to be constructive and moderate. I saw
today that [Sergei] Bagapsh, the leader of the authorities of Abkhazia, issued
a rather incendiary statement, threatening to put mines along the Line of
Contact between Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia. That's the last thing that
needs to be happening right now.

We don't see that happening in the case of Karabakh. I leave that to analysts
like yourselves to figure out why that may be. Geographic differences,
perhaps? Where Karabakh is placed? I don't know what the reason is. Maybe
it's because the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan themselves have
demonstrated a commitment to work in a constructive way -- although I
would argue the Georgians have done so as well. But we are working quite
well with the Russians, and especially with the Russian co-chair,
Ambassador Merzlyakov. He's a creative and constructive diplomat whom
I've known for a long time, ever since we worked together on Caspian
energy issues.

The U.S. Interest In Nagorno-Karabakh

RFE/RL: Your predecessor, Ambassador Mann, said repeatedly that the


terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, created pressure
to resolve the Karabakh conflict in order to put an end to one source of
instability in the region. Even so, high-level involvement on the part of the
United States has not materialized. How does Nagorno-Karabakh fit into
U.S. security interests?

Bryza: I think Steve [Mann] is right to say that any time we have an area
that could become a gray area on the map, where nefarious transactions or
transit of goods and materials could transpire because of legal grayness.
That's a potential threat. Where does Karabakh fit into our broad national
security calculus? Well, hopefully there will be a discussion of it at the G8
[summit of the eight leading industrialized nations, to be held in mid-July in
St. Petersburg]. The G8, one could argue, may be the world's most elite
grouping of states and political leaders. So if we have a discussion on
Karabakh at the G8 -- along with a discussion of Abkhazia, South Ossetia,
Transdniester -- that would imply it figures pretty prominently on our
agenda. But we're still working out the agenda of the G8.

RFE/RL: So it's not yet clear if Karabakh will be included? The


"Washington Post" has reported that the Georgian and Moldovan conflicts
would be discussed, but Karabakh will not be.

Bryza: I don't believe that will be the case. We are working with our
secretary of state -- we have already recommended to her that she raise all of
those conflicts at the ministerial [meeting in Moscow on June 29].
Undersecretary [Nicholas] Burns has already made that suggestion a couple
of times. And so we would like to make sure all of those conflicts are on the
agenda.
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RFE/RL: There is always the lingering possibility that the conflict could
resume. Both sides have made attempts to raise their military budgets. That
is particularly the case with Azerbaijan. How would the international
community react to either side attempting to shift the balance of power away
from the status quo?

Bryza: You've put me in that classic situation of having to answer a


hypothetical question. So I won't answer that question directly. What I will
say is what I've been working on with my friends in the government of
Azerbaijan -- because that's the side where you most often hear those sorts of
threats; that's a fact -- and what I feel the government of Azerbaijan doing as
well is focusing on the positive aspects of Azerbaijan's burgeoning wealth
that's going to come from the energy sector. It's really quite unhelpful to
make statements that imply that this increased wealth is going to lead to
purchases of arms and military threats. It's quite constructive, however, to
talk about how this wealth can open new channels of cooperation, how such
wealth would provide Azerbaijan an opportunity to invest in the well-being
of the region, [how it could] help develop Karabakh, all the territories, create
the opportunities for business, for commerce, and for the ethnic Armenians
and Azeris to come together and get to know each other, and therefore, over
time, to reduce the level of tension and the level of animosity surrounding
the status question of Karabakh. So I guess what I'm saying is there's really
no reason to expect that armed conflict will come out this. It's really unwise
even to talk about it, and we urge the sides not even to think about it.

The United States, The Caucasus, And Oil

RFE/RL: The United States clearly has strategic interests in Azerbaijan, not
least Caspian oil. Does the United States look at the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict in the context of its energy interests?

Bryza: Throughout the Caucasus, we have three sets of strategic interests.


These are valid in all three countries. Yes, we have energy interests, and
we're not embarrassed to say that energy is a strategic interest. We have pure
security interests, or traditional security interests -- meaning fighting
terrorism, fighting proliferation, avoiding military conflict, and restoring (or
preserving, in some cases) the territorial integrity of the states of the region.
What I really mean is, resolving the conflicts, in the case of Georgia, within
Georgia's international boundaries; in the case of Karabakh, our official line
is we support Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. And then we have a third set
of interests: in the internal reform of each country -- democratic and market
economic reform, for all the reasons the [U.S.] president has articulated,
based on our belief that stability only comes from legitimacy. And
legitimacy requires democracy on the political side and prosperity on the
economic side, and you only get both -- democracy and prosperity -- through
serious reform. So all three sets of interests are being pursued by us at any
one time.

"It's diversity we care about -- diversity of supply, which leads to energy


independence."

In Armenia, obviously the significance of energy is not the same as in


Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is a producer. Keep in mind that we Americans will
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consume little if any of that energy produced in Azerbaijan. The energy


produced in Azerbaijan matters in terms of its contribution to global energy
diversity, especially for our European allies. So it's diversity we care about --
diversity of supply, which leads to energy independence. When it comes to
Armenia, energy is similarly important in terms of making sure that Armenia
has independent or multiple sources of energy supply so that it feels
independent, and therefore more stable, and more willing to negotiate in
good faith.

So that's a long answer to say that of course energy is part of our strategic
calculus. But that's not what's driving us. We're looking for balance. And we
do recognize, however, that, God forbid, if there was a resumption of
conflict [over Karabakh], that that would undermine the entire investment
climate across the Caucasus, all three countries. And we certainly don't want
that.

Armenia And Regional Powers

RFE/RL: The relationship between Turkey and Armenia, which is also


crucial to regional stability, is slowly showing signs of improvement. Is the
United States actively engaged in trying to help make ties between Ankara
and Yerevan warmer?

Bryza: We are working, consulting, talking, strategizing with our friends in


both Turkey and in Armenia. When it comes to Armenia, I think it's clear
that the Armenian side is willing and ready to move toward normalization. I
think the same is true in Turkey. Besides just encouraging the sides to get
together and find a common language, I can tell you that what we've tried to
do over the last few years is try to develop this particular framework for
Karabakh that's on the table. Because if the sides are able to implement what
the framework indicates -- meaning, again, the withdrawal from the
territories in Azerbaijan where Armenian troops are present, and then the
normalization of diplomatic and economic relations between Azerbaijan and
Armenia -- then full normalization of Turkish and Armenian relations
follows naturally. Another way to put it is, all of our diplomatic efforts with
regards to Karabakh also aim at normalizing Turkish and Armenian
relations.

RFE/RL: A question on the issue of Russian military bases in Armenia:


Some military hardware was recently moved from Georgia to Armenia.
There are essentially no Russian troops in Georgia and Azerbaijan, but there
is a significant presence in Armenia. How does the United States view that?
Will you ask the Armenian government to ask the Russians to withdraw?

Bryza: First of all, let's be clear that there are Russian troops in Georgia.
They have not all withdrawn yet from [military bases at] Akhalkalaki or
Batumi. They are on the way, the heavy equipment is moving. And there will
be Russian troops in the context of the CIS peacekeepers in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia for some time, depending on how the discussions go between
Russia and Georgia. When it comes to the movement of the heavy equipment
from Akhalkalaki to Gyumri [site of a Russian base in Armenia], no, we're
not asking Armenia to press for the removal of those Russian bases. We
didn't ask the Georgians to do that. We respect the sovereignty of our
friends, be they Georgia, Azerbaijan, or Armenia, and it's up to those
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sovereign governments to take their own decisions. We simply welcome the


fact that Russia and Georgia have agreed mutually that Russian bases will
close down. That was Georgia's expressed ambition. Russia agreed. That's
simply a good thing. But it's not for us to try to encourage the removal of the
bases.

Promoting Democracy

RFE/RL: Neither Azerbaijan nor Armenia have had truly democratic


elections in the past 10 years. So can we say these governments have the
mandate, the popular support, to make the difficult decisions outlined in the
framework agreement?

Bryza: Certainly they have the mandate if they build popular support. I think
that's the most important next step. I've been talking about the fact that the
presidents need to take tough decisions. And to get to the tough decision,
they need to prepare their populations for a compromise. That's another way
of saying they either build, or do have, that mandate. You raise a good
question about the legitimacy of a government depending on its elections. I
would argue that the pace of democracy in both of those countries isn't a
disaster. A lot more work needs to be done. But in the case of Azerbaijan's
[parliamentary] elections [in November 2005], there were some significant
improvements in this last round of elections. But they didn't go as far as we
would like.

RFE/RL: How serious is the United States about promoting democracy in


Azerbaijan? We see your serious efforts in Georgia, and we see the results.
But in Azerbaijan, the international community seriously criticized the
elections, but the United States decided to invite President Ilham Aliyev to
Washington. What makes Aliyev different, for example, from an autocratic
leader like Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka?

Bryza: I categorically reject the statement that the United States isn't serious
about democracy in Azerbaijan. As President Bush said in his second
inaugural address, long-term security requires democracy. It's the thirst for
political and economic freedom that is the most powerful motivating factor
in international politics. That really is the source of long-term stability. We
fool ourselves if we think that we can achieve our long-term interests in any
country -- be they energy interests or security interests -- and turn away from
democracy. You talked about September 11. Well, the great lesson we
learned from September 11 is that we were wrong, as the president has said,
for 50 years. We looked at the Middle East and said 'these countries are too
strategically important for us to focus on democracy.'
"Just because Azerbaijan hasn't gone as far as we would like on democracy
doesn't mean we're going to ignore our energy interests or our military
interests."

So we understand that long-term security and therefore the ability to achieve


our energy interests requires democracy. In Azerbaijan, we have pressed
very hard on democracy. You said the international community was critical
of the Azeri elections -- well, we're part of that community, and our
statements were critical. However, we have to make a judgment at some
point whether or not we think the trend in a country is positive or negative.
And we don't have unidimensional relations with countries, either. I talked
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about three sets of interests. Just because Azerbaijan hasn't gone as far as we
would like on democracy doesn't mean we're going to ignore our energy
interests or our military interests. That's not to say that our energy interests
or our military interests or our counterterrorism interests are driving us to
ignore democracy. I said before, we have to pursue a balance. Why would
we freeze out President Ilham Aliyev from contact with our president forever
because we think he needs to do more on democracy? That doesn't make
sense. Our president made a judgment. His judgment was that we could do
more to elicit democratic reform in Azerbaijan by embracing Ilham Aliyev
right now rather than freezing him out. That's because we do feel the trend
on democracy is positive, even if Azerbaijan hasn't gone as far as we wish.
So, finally, I'd say there is simply no similarity between Lukashenka and
Aliyev. We just don't feel there is at all. Ilham Aliyev, we believe, is
working to modernize the political system of Azerbaijan, to create
democracy in the context of Azerbaijan's culture and traditions -- which the
president said is necessary, because democracy looks different in every
country. That said, they haven't gone far enough. And we will continue to
press President Aliyev -- and his opposition as well -- to behave
constructively, to build and strengthen democratic institutions as we pursue
our full range of interests.

RFE/RL: Ilham Aliyev has been to Washington; Georgian President


Mikheil Saakashvili has been invited to the White House just ahead of the
G8. Are there any plans to invite Armenia's President Robert Kocharian as
well?

Bryza: We obviously don't look at balancing presidential meetings like that,


but there's no reason not to want President Kocharian to come to
Washington. Let me just say I hope we can see a similar series of positive
steps on democratic reform in Armenia as we hope we are starting to see in
Azerbaijan. Maybe we're wrong about Azerbaijan. Maybe we're overly
hopeful. But we think things are moving in a positive direction. And we hope
to see more of that from Armenia. We signaled our support for Armenia,
quite dramatically, with the Millennium Challenge Account [a development
fund set by the United States, whose recipients -- including Armenia -- are
chosen using competitive, reform-based criteria]. That is, in many ways, one
of our highest forms of stating that we seek a partnership with a country, to
help it move forward on democratic reform. So we began that program this
year. When we began it, we issued a letter saying we really had problems
with the way the constitutional referendum was conducted in November
[2005], and we're waiting to see positive changes implemented. So that's
kind of the key to the next steps in our relationship.
Medio Radio Free Europe
Enlace http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/06/36564d4e-f6bd-4d73-b001-
5277c8ec7924.html
Fecha 27/06/2006
consulta
Género Entrevista
period.
Observaciones ---

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Sociedad

Titular
Voronezh Rolls Out Red Carpet for Turkmenbashi's Book
The Moscow News (26/06/06)

Título Voronezh Rolls Out Red Carpet for Turkmenbashi's Book.


Subtítulo ---
Entradilla ---
Autor Elizabeth Swanson
Fecha 26/06/06
publicación
Traducción ---
Títulos
Traducción ---
Entradilla
Cuerpo de City authorities in Voronezh held an unlikely festivity Wednesday in honor
texto of a book by the eccentric Turkmenistan leader, Saparmurat Niyazov, or
Turkmenbashi, as he is known to his people. His work, Ruhnama ("Book of
the Soul"), a historical and "spiritual" guide that has been translated into 25
languages, was presented by the local administration, in partnership with the
Turkmenistan Embassy, in an effort to forge ties with this former Soviet
Central Asian republic.

"Can you imagine, we brought 500 copies of the book by our leader, and still
not everyone got one," Maksat Redzhepov, the director of the Voronezh
Turkmen Culture Society, told journalists.

Held in Voronezh's largest Culture Palace, the presentation also


commemorated the 15th anniversary of Niyazov's election.

Niyazov is notorious in the West as a quirky autocrat, whose regime has


been labeled by some as one of the most repressive in the world. He is
particularly famous for erecting a gold-plated statue of himself atop
Ashgabat's tallest building. His decrees include vast pension cuts and the
closure of all rural libraries and hospitals (the last decision was motivated by
the need for medical specialists in the capital). Ruhnama, meanwhile, is
mandatory reading for every citizen. "Ruhnama is an ethical constitution for
all Turkmen, every citizen should learn it in school, read it at work and at
home, and prison inmates swear on it upon their release," according to a
description in the Public Chamber's press release.

Still, these are precisely the cultural ties that may build strong relations with
a state rich in energy resources. Voronezh region governor Vladimir
Kulakov, in a statement to a Moskovskie Novosti correspondent, said that
the book could help establish stronger economic and trade relations.
Turkmenistan's ambassador to Russia, Halnazar Agahanov, who visited

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Voronezh for the presentation, agreed.

As for the book itself, Redzhepov told journalists that he hopes the
presentation will allow people to get acquainted with a work that seems to
have gotten some bad press and see for themselves what it has to offer. "My
dear reader! If you are a Turkman, then I think you may recognize yourself
in this portrait," Redzhipov read aloud from the book. "If you are a friend of
Turkmen, then I hope that you come to know their souls better...
Medio The Moscow News
Enlace http://english.mn.ru/english/issue.php?2006-23-4
Fecha consulta 28/06/06
Género Noticia
period.
Observaciones ---

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