Documentos de Académico
Documentos de Profesional
Documentos de Cultura
Fuente: www.elpais.es
Continúa en página 3
Fuente: www.eurasianet.org
Continúa en página 14
ÍNDICE
-Medios de comunicación...p.3
-Política interior...p.10
-Relaciones internacionales...p.16
-Sociedad ...p.28
Medios de comunicación
Titulares
Putin.
Otras negociaciones
Mientras tanto, otro diario de oposición, el prestigioso Kommersant, podría
ser comprado por Millhouse, una compañía creada por el multimillonario
Román Abramóvich, el dueño del Chelsea que es conocido, además, por ser
un fiel aliado del Kremlin. El director comercial de Kommersant confirmó
que ha habido negociaciones con Millhouse, mientras que el director general
desmintió la noticia. El diario pertenecía a Borís Berezovski, el oligarca
exiliado en el Reino Unido, pero a principios de año entregó sus acciones a
su socio Badri Patarkatsishvili. Los analistas concuerdan en que si se
confirma la compra de Kommersant por Abramóvich, ésta no estaría dictada
por causas económicas sino que tendría motivos políticos: lograr que una
persona leal al régimen tome el control de la línea editorial del periódico.
Entre los platos fuertes del encuentro moscovita -donde el director adjunto
de EL PAÍS Xavier Vidal-Folch fue elegido vicepresidente del Foro
Mundial de Directores de periódicos- figuraron, además de la reunión con
Gorbachov, la comida con Dmitri Medvédev, posible sucesor de Putin en
2008; el desayuno con el diputado liberal de oposición Vladímir Rizhkov, y
la polémica sobre las caricaturas de Mahoma aparecidas el pasado
septiembre en un diario danés, con la participación de los responsables del
Jyllands-Postten que decidieron publicarlas.
Medio El País
Enlace http://www.elpais.es/articulo/sociedad/ex/presidente/Gorbachov/anuncia/co
mpra/publicacion/critica/Putin/elpporint/20060608elpepisoc_15/Tes/
Fecha consulta 08/06/2006
Género period. Noticia
Observaciones ---
High-Pressure Work
Dmitriyevsky tells RFE/RL that although the organization continues its work
despite pressure from the authorities.
"You go to Chechnya and meet just another powerless human being who
needs help and it is difficult to stop helping."
"We are producing news items about the human rights situation in the
Chechen Republic," Dmitriyevsky said. "We produce them almost on a daily
basis. In the near future we plan to resume publication of the newspaper
'Pravozashita' ['Rights Protection']."
The Russian-Chechen Friendship Society was not shut down, but the fallout
resulted in the suspension of the publication of "Pravozachita" and state tax
authorities continue to investigate the organization for possible financial
violations.
Reconstruction work under way at the former Press House in the Chechen
capital, Grozny (ITAR-TASS)And Dimitriyevsky and Chelysheva have
encountered other problems resulting from their work -- including several
anonymous death threats.
"You go to Chechnya and meet just another powerless human being who
needs help and it is difficult to stop helping," Chelysheva said. "Yes, I want
to rest. We are all human; we need normal life; we need positive impressions
-- but so far we cannot afford them."
Chelysheva says she receives encouragement from telephone calls and letters
from throughout Russia in which people express their thanks for the work
carried out by the organization.
Grupo de investigación en Comunicación, Política y Cambio Social
www.us.es/cico
- 5 -
Observatorio
Geopolítica y Comunicación en Asia Central y el Cáucaso
"Amnesty International believes that these two people's lives are actually at
risk."
Neil Durkin, a spokesman for Amnesty International in London, tells
RFE/RL that Dmitriyevsky and Chelysheva were awarded the Journalism
Under Threat prize because of their courage.
"Stanislav and Oksana have been presented with this award from Amnesty
because we consider that their work for the Russian-Chechen [Friendship
Society] information agency, which of course they run, to be particularly
important and dangerous work in effect now in modern-day Russia," Durkin
said.
Ambitious Award
Durkin says the reward is not about money and involves no financial benefit.
Rather, he says, it is a tribute to activists and journalists working in
dangerous places throughout the world.
Títulos
Traducción ---
Entradilla
Cuerpo de In each of the republics of the North Caucasus in which I have worked, I
texto have to communicate with the authorities, law enforcement agencies and
different circles of society. On the basis of this experience, I have to confirm
with regret - freedom of speech as well as the independent press are in their
infancy in the region. An analysis of the mass media present on the market
shows there are no independent media outlets with the exception of three or
four regional newspapers.
There is no denying that in the North Caucasian republics not only the
government media, but also newspapers and internet sites are published that
reflect public life from points of view different from the official position of
local government. But, as a rule, these comparatively independent media
outlets are financed by different opposition groups and reflect points of view
that very often misrepresent the true picture.
Why is this happening in modern Russia, a state which declares its adherence
to democratic principles? There are a lot of reasons, they are quite visible,
but analysis of them requires much more time than this brief report allows.
I’ll say briefly: on the one hand the authorities are interested in shutting
down all information and this is because the government has something to
hide. Outrageous violation of human rights, corruption and crimes by the
military are daily occurrences. On the other hand, the level of journalistic
professionalism is very low. Reporters mostly depend on their editors, who
in their turn depend on the government and the groups that finance them. The
level of censorship in such a system is extremely high.
I’d like to speak in more detail about the methods which are used to fight
against the independent press. In Moscow, the problem of an un-compliant
media is solved with relatively civilised methods. In the North Caucasus, the
same methods are used in a nastier and rougher manner. This is easily
explained: the Caucasus is objectively speaking a zone of tension. These
objective realities often serve as a very convenient disguise for a crackdown
by the authorities not only on the independent press but also on citizens in
general. The fact that Moscow pays the local authorities generously for their
loyalty and ignores all kinds of abuses of power towards the local population
makes things even worse. The authorities and law enforcement agencies are
not afraid to openly persecute difficult journalists. Potential publicity and
scandals do not deter them.
How does the pressure on mass media occur? The first and most popular
The security services have more sophisticated ways of dealing with the
independent press. For example, they discredit a difficult media outlet or a
journalist by publishing compromising information in a loyal publication.
There are a lot of examples of this. For instance, in one such publication a
well known journalist and human rights activist from Kabardino-Balkaria
Valery Khatazhukov was accused of working for western security services
and getting sponsorship from them.
In the spirit of the Cold War, representatives of practically all the foreign-
backed media working in the North Caucasus have been called Western
spies. This accusation has been made of the coordinator of the respected
London based Institute for War and Peace Reporting, IWPR, Valery
Dzutsev, living in Vladikavkaz. I was named a leader of Muslim community
in Nalchik in one such publication and my parents’ house was subsequently
searched.
They said they were looking for a cache of weapons.
Criminal prosecution and physical violence have also been employed against
journalists. A terrible incident happened a week ago. In Cherkessk, the father
of our reporter in Karachai?Cherkessia, Murat Gukemukhov, was beaten up.
As a consequence, seventy-year-old Muhamed Gukemuhov underwent two
operations and lost an eye. Muhamed Gukemukhov is the son of a well-
known Circassian scholar, a respected person in the society. This attack can
be connected only to his son’s professional activities. They tried to bribe
Murat first and then threatened him. Police have launched an enquiry into the
assault, but we are sure that the real motives and the people behind the attack
will never be made public.
I must call things by their true names. The Adyg people were subject to
genocide. Discrimination is going on now and it is the basis for Russia’s
destructive nationality politics in the North Caucasus. The October rebellion
in Nalchik was a manifestation of protest against this policy. The Russian
government tries to represent the Nalchik revolt to the world community as
an act of terrorism and the rebels as terrorists, but this does not correspond
with reality. The refusal to hand over the bodies of those killed during the
rebellion and tortured to death afterwards in police cells is a crime against
the law of humanity and humanism. This is my personal civil position and I
am sure it is the opinion of every sensible person.
I listened to his words with both bitterness and hope. With bitterness,
because in the North Caucasus it is not politicians and officials who are
unmasked and then punished and dismissed, but the journalist that unmasked
him. And with hope, because freedom of conscience, freedom of opinion and
speech, democratic principles are ancient components of the mentality of
Caucasian peoples.
Pictures of her receiving her award in Hamburg last month from the Gerd
Bucerius Foundation in Circassian national dress can be seen at
http://www.regnum.ru/news/kab-balk/644550.html
Medio Institute for War & Peace Reporting
Enlace http://www.iwpr.net/?p=crs&s=f&o=321509&apc_state=henpcrs
Fecha 28/06/2006
consulta
Género Reportaje
period.
Observaciones ---
Política interior
Titulares
Dealing With Hizb-ut-Tahrir
Institute for War & Peace Reporting (16/06/06)
The movement spread to Central Asia in the early Nineties following the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Its first foothold was in Uzbekistan, where it
won the biggest following, and it spread from there into neighbouring
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakstan.
Most in Central Asia would not want to see Sharia become a reality.
Although the majority of people in the region consider themselves Muslims,
they strongly favour a secular state. Afghanistan’s experience with an
Islamic state under Taleban rule in 1996-2001 serves as a good illustration of
what can happen when a radical group imposes on others its vision of the
ideal society.
Yet there is widespread support for the criticism that Hizb-ut-Tahrir levels
against corruption, inequality and the repression of devout Muslims. The call
for social justice strikes a chord with hundreds of thousands of people in
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan who have been forced to become migrant workers
abroad because of unemployment at home, as well as impoverished people in
the provincial towns and villages of Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan.
The authoritarian Central Asian regimes thus employ the only method of
dealing with dissent that they know: banning the organisation and cracking
down on its members.
Some observers also point out that governments use the threat of Hizb-ut-
Tahrir as a convenient excuse to justify their policy of repressing opponents
and controlling the rise of political Islam in their states.
The crackdown policy does not seem to have had any effect on the party,
which has found ways of surviving through years of harassment and arrests.
Party members claim that their aim is to achieve political change through
peaceful means. But reports on the ground suggest that over the last couple
of years, some splinter groups have emerged that favour more radical action
in response to increasing pressure from regional governments.
All this contributes to the image of Hizb-ut Tahrir as a party that really cares
about the common people, in contrast to the state which appears to have
forgotten about them.
Given the growing disparity between rich and poor in Central Asia, groups
like Hizb-ut-Tahrir have the potential to win plenty more sympathisers.
The accusations brought denials of illegal activity and protest from some
western circles. The French Foreign Ministry said in a June 20 statement that
the accusations against Chargé d’affaires at the French Embassy in
Turkmenistan, Henri Tomassini, are “totally unfounded.” Concern about the
arrests was likely to have been voiced by members of the European
Parliament who arrived in Ashgabat on June 19 on a “fact-finding” trip in
advance of a vote on whether the EU should conclude an agreement granting
Turkmenistan favored trade conditions.
The Turkmen Security Minister also said that during a recent trip to Ukraine
both Amanklychev and Elena Ovezova, who was also arrested this week,
Turkmenistan threatened this week to cut off gas supplies to Russia if state-
controlled gas giant Gazprom fails to agree to the Turkmen Energy
Ministry’s suggested price hike. Turkmen Energy Minister Kurbanmurad
Atayev said in a June 21 statement that Turkmenistan is increasing export
prices from US$65 per 1,000 cubic meters to US$100 per 1,000 cu. m. in
July 2006 and expects Russia to agree to the new price. “If within a month
and a half we don't work out a contract with Gazprom, Turkmenistan will
halt the exports," Atayev said. Gazprom chief Alexei Miller, who was in
Ashgabat for talks on June 19, has, according to a report from The
Associated Press, “categorically refused the offer.”
Medio Eurasianet
Enlace http://www.eurasianet.org/turkmenistan.project/#analysis
Fecha 28/06/2006
consulta
Género Resumen de noticias
period.
Observaciones ---
Relaciones internacionales
Titulares
Some see the Cold War as an extension of the Great Game, but if anything it
was the collapse of the Soviet Union that brought the game to life again.
Great Game II has some familiar aspects, some utterly new. The main
players are Russia, China, the United States and Iran. As in the 19th century,
ideology plays a secondary role, as the real stakes are gas, oil and strategic
advantage. Unlike the 19th century, the Central Asian states are now
primarily sellers rather than buyers. As always, these states prove adroit at
playing the great powers off one other.
Some observers doubt the existence of any new form of the Great Game. In a
summer 2006 Washington Quarterly article titled "Averting a New Great
Game in Central Asia," Richard Weitz wrote: "Concerns about a renewed
great game are ... exaggerated. The contest for influence in the region does
not directly challenge the vital national interests of China, Russia, or the
United States." The point is not well taken. No vital interests were directly at
stake in the original Great Game either. In fact, Europe needs gas and oil
from Russia and Central Asia more than England ever needed to sell
broadcloth in Bukhara.
Besides, more than energy resources are at issue. The political fate of Central
Asia is at stake. Is there an authoritarian Moscow-Tashkent-Beijing axis
forming? Russia, Uzbekistan and China are all key members of the suddenly
prominent Shanghai Cooperation Organization. All the same, their repressive
natures give these states an inherent instability that makes competition
volatile and dangerous.
The United States now has troops in an arc from the Caucasus to Kyrgyzstan
and has made no secret of its position on Caspian oil and the Baku-Tbilisi-
Cejan pipeline, its ambassador to Azerbaijan, Ross Wilson, saying, "The oil
will never go through Russia."
Closed borders
Turkey and Armenia are neighbours who might as well be a million miles
apart. Diplomatic relations have been frozen for over a decade; their mutual
border is closed. Part of the reason is Turkey's support for the Azeris in their
conflict with Armenia. But the direct dispute is over a matter of history: The
death of hundreds of thousands of Armenians in eastern Turkey during the
dying days of the Ottoman empire. Armenia wants those deaths recognised
as genocide. Turkey refuses to accept that term.
For Armenia and its vast and powerful diaspora, getting recognition from
Ankara is a mission so important, it is almost a way of life. But here inside
Turkey, ethnic Armenians have chosen an uncomfortable silence over
confrontation.
I visited Anush and her brother Vartan in a leafy middle class suburb of
Istanbul. Their apartment was typical of the area, but with the odd design
twists, like knotted dried flowers on the table that reminded me of my trips to
the Caucasus. "Turks still ask me where I come from," Vartan told me, as his
sister brought in the tea. "They seem to have no idea there used to be
hundreds of thousands of us here."
Uneasy existence
Anush and Vartan are just two of some 60,000 ethnic Armenians who still
live in Turkey - a land their ancestors have inhabited for almost 2,000 years.
Grupo de investigación en Comunicación, Política y Cambio Social
www.us.es/cico
- 18 -
Observatorio
Geopolítica y Comunicación en Asia Central y el Cáucaso
Anush's parents barely speak Armenian, because their parents worried they
would stand out and when Armenian militants began assassinating Turkish
diplomats in the 1970s, Turkish Armenian families here made themselves
more invisible still. It is hardly surprising they do not normally voice an
opinion on what happened in 1915. Anush and Vartan are a rare exception
and, even so, I have had to change their names. We know exactly what
happened, Vartan told me. He said his Armenian great grandparents were
forcibly deported south, accused of siding with Russian troops against the
Turks. They handed their children over to Turkish neighbours for safety and
never returned.
There is a similar tragedy behind every Armenian door here, but the local
patriarch has banned his community from discussing it - if they want to keep
their jobs in Armenian churches and schools. "It's fear," Anush told me
simply. There have been some early signs of change here. Last year a
university in Istanbul hosted the first discussion of the genocide claims in
Turkey ever to question the official line. It was hugely controversial but it
happened. And now international pressure on Ankara to re-examine its
position is increasing. Vartan welcomes that but he senses a rise in
aggressive, nationalist feeling in Turkey in response. "If other countries force
this issue, it will be terrible for the Armenian people here," Vartan told me
quietly. "If you plunge a man into boiling water, he will burn," he said, "but
if you increase the heat gently, he could get used to it."
'Pseudo-citizens'
Enlace http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2006/06/26/006.html
Fecha 28/06/2006
consulta
Género Noticia
period.
Observaciones ---
RFE/RL: Your post -- deputy assistant secretary -- is more senior than those
occupied by previous U.S. co-chairs of the Minsk Group. Does that mean the
United States is paying more attention to the Karabakh question? Could that
in turn mean that there is a sense the sides are coming closer to resolving this
conflict?
Matthew Bryza: I wouldn't read too much in particular into the fact that you
now have a deputy assistant secretary, rather than someone who wasn't,
doing this. A lot of this just depended on personalities and my own
background. I've been so deeply involved in the region for a long time. It
made sense that I would be the person to pick this up, because it was time for
Ambassador Mann, coincidentally, to move on to his next assignment. So
that's all. I wouldn't read anything more into it. I'm just very happy that I'll be
able to play a more active -- and, in fact, daily -- role on this conflict and
make sure those efforts are integrated with all the other broader things I'm
trying to do in the Caucasus.
"We just don't know where the presidents are right now. We're encouraging
them, we're nudging them by taking a step back. Nudging them to show that
they have this political will."
RFE/RL: Have you noticed any sign that the two sides may be softening
their positions? Did they appear more willing to consider the framework
agreement you're describing during their talks in early June at a Black Sea
summit in Bucharest than they were when they meant for talks in February
with the French president in Rambouillet?
Bryza: Put it this way: At Bucharest, they talked throughout the whole
meeting to each other, really went through the issues in detail, and [they]
haven't issued any negative statements really since. So I'm not sure how to
interpret that. I know what I hope, what the co-chairs hope: The co-chairs
hope that this reflects political will on the part of the presidents to really get
serious about some tough compromises each side will make. I'm not sure if
that's where they are, and the co-chairs talked today about taking a bit of a
pause throughout the summer to find out whether or not the presidents do in
fact have that sort of political will.
RFE/RL: What is the next step for the co-chairs? Are you planning to bring
the presidents together again after the summer?
Grupo de investigación en Comunicación, Política y Cambio Social
www.us.es/cico
- 21 -
Observatorio
Geopolítica y Comunicación en Asia Central y el Cáucaso
Bryza: At this point, as I was saying, the co-chairs have decided to take a
pause throughout the summer. We will reconvene in September, October, to
report back here [to Vienna, the headquarters of the OSCE], I hope. But
we're taking some time off in terms of trying to facilitate meetings between
the presidents. It's really up to the presidents now to decide whether or not
they want to take the politically difficult and challenging decisions that are
critical to bringing the framework agreement home. So we're giving them
some space, and we want them to demonstrate that they really do have the
political will to take these next difficult steps. That doesn't mean we're
quitting the process. That doesn't mean we're walking away from it. I myself
still have to make my first trips in this capacity to Yerevan and Baku, and
you can bet that I'll be encouraging the presidents to take these tough
decisions. And there will be opportunities at major international gatherings
this summer to discuss this issue.
RFE/RL: At the turn of the year, there were a lot of optimistic statements --
from you as well as others -- that the Karabakh conflict could be resolved in
2006. We're now halfway through the year. Are you still optimistic about
2006?
RFE/RL: Russia does not always play what some would consider a
constructive role in the South Caucasus, particularly with regard to the
"frozen conflicts" in the breakaway Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. But Russia has been very cooperative with the United States on
Nagorno-Karabakh. Some Russian officials, like Sergei Ivanov, have
occasionally said there should be no Karabakh resolution imposed from
abroad. But otherwise the relationship has been constructive. How would
you evaluate relations between the United States and Russia with respect to
Karabakh, in particular and the Caucasus, in general?
Bryza: First, let me say you made a statement of fact with which I agree. We
are working quite well with Russia on Karabakh. Our level of cooperation
has not been as significant when it comes to South Ossetia and Abkhazia and
Transdniester. I don't work on Transdniester [a separatist region of
Grupo de investigación en Comunicación, Política y Cambio Social
www.us.es/cico
- 22 -
Observatorio
Geopolítica y Comunicación en Asia Central y el Cáucaso
Moldova], but I was just in Abkhazia and I think there is a lot of room for
much better cooperation -- and I would argue that the Georgian side has
shown a significant amount of goodwill and a readiness to work on
significant confidence-building measures. I would also say the United States
has worked hard to keep the Georgians as constructive and moderate as
possible, and I hope our Russians colleagues and friends will do the same in
terms of encouraging the Abkhaz to be constructive and moderate. I saw
today that [Sergei] Bagapsh, the leader of the authorities of Abkhazia, issued
a rather incendiary statement, threatening to put mines along the Line of
Contact between Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia. That's the last thing that
needs to be happening right now.
We don't see that happening in the case of Karabakh. I leave that to analysts
like yourselves to figure out why that may be. Geographic differences,
perhaps? Where Karabakh is placed? I don't know what the reason is. Maybe
it's because the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan themselves have
demonstrated a commitment to work in a constructive way -- although I
would argue the Georgians have done so as well. But we are working quite
well with the Russians, and especially with the Russian co-chair,
Ambassador Merzlyakov. He's a creative and constructive diplomat whom
I've known for a long time, ever since we worked together on Caspian
energy issues.
Bryza: I think Steve [Mann] is right to say that any time we have an area
that could become a gray area on the map, where nefarious transactions or
transit of goods and materials could transpire because of legal grayness.
That's a potential threat. Where does Karabakh fit into our broad national
security calculus? Well, hopefully there will be a discussion of it at the G8
[summit of the eight leading industrialized nations, to be held in mid-July in
St. Petersburg]. The G8, one could argue, may be the world's most elite
grouping of states and political leaders. So if we have a discussion on
Karabakh at the G8 -- along with a discussion of Abkhazia, South Ossetia,
Transdniester -- that would imply it figures pretty prominently on our
agenda. But we're still working out the agenda of the G8.
Bryza: I don't believe that will be the case. We are working with our
secretary of state -- we have already recommended to her that she raise all of
those conflicts at the ministerial [meeting in Moscow on June 29].
Undersecretary [Nicholas] Burns has already made that suggestion a couple
of times. And so we would like to make sure all of those conflicts are on the
agenda.
Grupo de investigación en Comunicación, Política y Cambio Social
www.us.es/cico
- 23 -
Observatorio
Geopolítica y Comunicación en Asia Central y el Cáucaso
RFE/RL: There is always the lingering possibility that the conflict could
resume. Both sides have made attempts to raise their military budgets. That
is particularly the case with Azerbaijan. How would the international
community react to either side attempting to shift the balance of power away
from the status quo?
RFE/RL: The United States clearly has strategic interests in Azerbaijan, not
least Caspian oil. Does the United States look at the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict in the context of its energy interests?
So that's a long answer to say that of course energy is part of our strategic
calculus. But that's not what's driving us. We're looking for balance. And we
do recognize, however, that, God forbid, if there was a resumption of
conflict [over Karabakh], that that would undermine the entire investment
climate across the Caucasus, all three countries. And we certainly don't want
that.
Bryza: First of all, let's be clear that there are Russian troops in Georgia.
They have not all withdrawn yet from [military bases at] Akhalkalaki or
Batumi. They are on the way, the heavy equipment is moving. And there will
be Russian troops in the context of the CIS peacekeepers in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia for some time, depending on how the discussions go between
Russia and Georgia. When it comes to the movement of the heavy equipment
from Akhalkalaki to Gyumri [site of a Russian base in Armenia], no, we're
not asking Armenia to press for the removal of those Russian bases. We
didn't ask the Georgians to do that. We respect the sovereignty of our
friends, be they Georgia, Azerbaijan, or Armenia, and it's up to those
Grupo de investigación en Comunicación, Política y Cambio Social
www.us.es/cico
- 25 -
Observatorio
Geopolítica y Comunicación en Asia Central y el Cáucaso
Promoting Democracy
Bryza: Certainly they have the mandate if they build popular support. I think
that's the most important next step. I've been talking about the fact that the
presidents need to take tough decisions. And to get to the tough decision,
they need to prepare their populations for a compromise. That's another way
of saying they either build, or do have, that mandate. You raise a good
question about the legitimacy of a government depending on its elections. I
would argue that the pace of democracy in both of those countries isn't a
disaster. A lot more work needs to be done. But in the case of Azerbaijan's
[parliamentary] elections [in November 2005], there were some significant
improvements in this last round of elections. But they didn't go as far as we
would like.
Bryza: I categorically reject the statement that the United States isn't serious
about democracy in Azerbaijan. As President Bush said in his second
inaugural address, long-term security requires democracy. It's the thirst for
political and economic freedom that is the most powerful motivating factor
in international politics. That really is the source of long-term stability. We
fool ourselves if we think that we can achieve our long-term interests in any
country -- be they energy interests or security interests -- and turn away from
democracy. You talked about September 11. Well, the great lesson we
learned from September 11 is that we were wrong, as the president has said,
for 50 years. We looked at the Middle East and said 'these countries are too
strategically important for us to focus on democracy.'
"Just because Azerbaijan hasn't gone as far as we would like on democracy
doesn't mean we're going to ignore our energy interests or our military
interests."
about three sets of interests. Just because Azerbaijan hasn't gone as far as we
would like on democracy doesn't mean we're going to ignore our energy
interests or our military interests. That's not to say that our energy interests
or our military interests or our counterterrorism interests are driving us to
ignore democracy. I said before, we have to pursue a balance. Why would
we freeze out President Ilham Aliyev from contact with our president forever
because we think he needs to do more on democracy? That doesn't make
sense. Our president made a judgment. His judgment was that we could do
more to elicit democratic reform in Azerbaijan by embracing Ilham Aliyev
right now rather than freezing him out. That's because we do feel the trend
on democracy is positive, even if Azerbaijan hasn't gone as far as we wish.
So, finally, I'd say there is simply no similarity between Lukashenka and
Aliyev. We just don't feel there is at all. Ilham Aliyev, we believe, is
working to modernize the political system of Azerbaijan, to create
democracy in the context of Azerbaijan's culture and traditions -- which the
president said is necessary, because democracy looks different in every
country. That said, they haven't gone far enough. And we will continue to
press President Aliyev -- and his opposition as well -- to behave
constructively, to build and strengthen democratic institutions as we pursue
our full range of interests.
Sociedad
Titular
Voronezh Rolls Out Red Carpet for Turkmenbashi's Book
The Moscow News (26/06/06)
"Can you imagine, we brought 500 copies of the book by our leader, and still
not everyone got one," Maksat Redzhepov, the director of the Voronezh
Turkmen Culture Society, told journalists.
Still, these are precisely the cultural ties that may build strong relations with
a state rich in energy resources. Voronezh region governor Vladimir
Kulakov, in a statement to a Moskovskie Novosti correspondent, said that
the book could help establish stronger economic and trade relations.
Turkmenistan's ambassador to Russia, Halnazar Agahanov, who visited
As for the book itself, Redzhepov told journalists that he hopes the
presentation will allow people to get acquainted with a work that seems to
have gotten some bad press and see for themselves what it has to offer. "My
dear reader! If you are a Turkman, then I think you may recognize yourself
in this portrait," Redzhipov read aloud from the book. "If you are a friend of
Turkmen, then I hope that you come to know their souls better...
Medio The Moscow News
Enlace http://english.mn.ru/english/issue.php?2006-23-4
Fecha consulta 28/06/06
Género Noticia
period.
Observaciones ---