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The baseline forecast sees growth slowing from 6.1% last year to 3.2% in 2022, a
decline of 0.4 percentage points from the April 2022 edition of the World Economic
Outlook (WEO). Lower growth earlier in the year, the loss of household purchasing
power and tighter monetary policy led to a downward revision of 1.4 percentage
points in the United States. In China, new confinements and a worsening real
estate crisis forced a downward revision of 1.1 percentage points in growth, with
significant global repercussions. In Europe, meanwhile, the significant downgrades
reflect the repercussions of the war in Ukraine and the tightening of monetary
policy. Global inflation has been revised upwards due to food and energy prices
and persistent supply-demand imbalances, and is expected to stand at 6.6% in
advanced economies and 9.5% in emerging market and developing economies
this year, upward revisions of 0.9 and 0.8 percentage points, respectively. In 2023,
disinflationary monetary policy is expected to start to bite and global output growth
is expected to be only 2.9%.
Risks to the outlook are overwhelmingly on the downside. The war in Ukraine
could paralyse Russian gas imports into Europe; inflation may be harder to reduce
than expected, either because labour markets are tighter than expected or
because inflation expectations are de-anchored; the tightening of global financial
conditions could cause debt overhangs in emerging market and developing
economies; new outbreaks of COVID-19 and confinements, as well as a worsening
of the crisis in the real estate sector, could further inhibit growth in China; and
geopolitical fragmentation could hamper global trade and cooperation. An
alternative scenario, in which risks materialise, inflation rises further and global
growth slows to 2.6% and 2.0% in 2022 and 2023, respectively, would put growth
in the bottom 10% of performance since 1970.
Tal vez el aspecto más complejo de la inflación de oferta es que su “cura”, por
decirlo de alguna forma, no está tan al alcance de la mano. Cuando se padece de
inflación de demanda se sabe que debe enfriarse la actividad económica, por
ejemplo, a través de la política monetaria con subida de los tipos de interés. En
cambio, con la inflación de oferta se plantea un dilema que suele dejar a los
ejecutores de política económica en una disyuntiva compleja: si toman medidas
para retraer la demanda agregada, y combatir la inflación, podrían poner en riesgo
de recesión a la economía, en este caso el riesgo sería debilitar la recuperación
global.
Se espera que la inflación baje de forma moderada en este año y más claramente
en el próximo, conforme los factores de oferta que provocaron el rebote
desaparezcan. Pero entre medias, tenemos la incógnita sobre en qué medida
tendrán que ayudar los bancos centrales a reconducir la inflación. Actuar a tiempo
contra la inflación evita males mayores, hacerlo demasiado pronto también es
costoso. Encontrar el momento
Perhaps the most complex aspect of supply-side inflation is that its "cure", so to
speak, is not so readily available. When suffering from demand-pull inflation, it is
known that economic activity must be cooled, for example through monetary policy
by raising interest rates. Supply-side inflation, on the other hand, poses a dilemma
that often leaves policymakers with a complex choice: if they take measures to
curb aggregate demand and combat inflation, they could put the economy at risk of
recession, in this case the risk would be to weaken the overall recovery.
Inflation is expected to come down moderately this year and more sharply next
year as the supply factors that caused the rebound fade. But in between, there is
the question of how much central banks will have to help bring inflation back on
track. Acting early against inflation avoids greater evils, acting too early is also
costly. Finding the right time
Según el reporte que la autoridad hizo público, luego de Bolivia, a junio de este
año, Ecuador tiene una tasa de inflación de 2,2%, Perú de 4,4%, Brasil 4,8%,
seguido de Paraguay 6,0%, Uruguay 6,0%, Chile 6,1%, Colombia 6,5%,
Venezuela 23,9% y Argentina 29,3%.
In its bi-weekly electronic bulletin of 07 July, the Bolivian Institute of Foreign Trade
(IBCE), with data from the National Statistics Institute (INE), reported that
cumulative inflation in the first half of 2022 in Bolivia was 1.18%. The categories
with the highest inflation were:
Education with 4.34%; furniture, household goods and services with 2.67%; and,
food and non-alcoholic beverages with 2.31%; while that indicator was negative in
the transport (1.04%), alcoholic beverages and tobacco (-0.97%) and
communications (-0.53%) sectors.
Price increases were recorded mainly in the capital cities and conurbations of
Tarija (1.8 per cent), Potosí (1.56 per cent) and Cochabamba (1.37 per cent).
Al contrario de lo que sucede con las monedas de los países vecinos, sujetas a
veces a fuertes variaciones en el tipo de cambio, la moneda nacional de
Bolivia tiene un tipo de cambio fijo respecto al dólar estadounidense
determinado por el gobierno socialista de Evo Morales hace ya más de 10 años
(US$1 = 6,96 bolivianos).
inflación
But the current minister of economy and finance, Marcelo Montenegro, told BBC
Mundo that "the key element" that explains Bolivia's low relative inflation is that
"agricultural production has increased a lot, especially tomatoes and onions, which
is allowing us to have elements that moderate and mitigate inflationary elements".
Desdolarización
Aumento de la oferta
Como al fin de cuentas toda escasez ‒ya sea generada por exceso de demanda,
oferta insuficiente, especulación o acaparamiento‒ se traduce en inflación, el
Gobierno boliviano siempre apostó, y mucho, por la producción:
Tributarias
y
A sabiendas que la inflación también está causada por la evasión fiscal,
implementaron políticas para disminuirla:
De-dollarisation
- As soon as Evo Morales began to govern he bet heavily and generated a loss for
speculators betting in dollars: he "appreciated" the currency, from 8 to 7 pesos to
the dollar (currently, it remains at this value). It broke the dollar's upward inertia
and sent the signal that those who bet on the dollar do not always win.
- It made it more expensive to use the dollar to save, widening the exchange rate
differential between buying and selling, penalising the habit of buying dollars
monthly to save, while offering a slightly higher real interest rate to those saving in
pesos.
o The use of the dollar for lending became more expensive, increasing to 66.5 %
the reserve requirement that banks must have for each dollar deposited, while the
reserve requirement for peso deposits was lowered to 11 %.
- Tax on the sale of foreign currency (0.7 %) aimed at foreign currency sales
transactions in exchange houses and financial institutions.
Increasing supply
Since in the end all shortages - whether generated by excess demand, insufficient
supply, speculation or hoarding - translate into inflation, the Bolivian government
always bet heavily on production:
- Public investment: Since 2006 (with the Añez hiatus) Bolivia was one of the
countries with the highest public investment in the continent, betting that greater
public investment in infrastructure would attract more private investment (crowd-in
rather than the crowding-out predicted by economists in the global north).
- Direct public participation in production and supply:
It also supplies flour to bakers and other sectors at fair prices in exchange for a
price support commitment.
o Manufacture of strategic inputs. Public plant for the production of urea (fertilisers)
to boost agricultural production.
Taxes
Knowing that inflation is also caused by tax evasion, they implemented policies to
reduce it:
- Tax policy. Effective VAT refund of 5 % of the invoice value and 20 million pbp
were refunded.
- Law 1448 on facilities for compliance with tax obligations, which extends the
deadline for effective repentance.