AVICENNA’S PSYCHOLOGY OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS LONDON: GEOFFREY CUMBERLEGE 1952CONCERNING THE SOUL ‘The Vegetative Soul Wan the elements are mice together na more harmonious sway, Le n-a more balanced than inthe exes previowly mentioned, oer being® also Come ito existence Sut ofthem duct the powersf the heavenly bos, The st a these are plant, Now some plants are frown om std sd tet aiden part ofthe body bearing the eprtctve el, ss oil others grow ftom pontanenus generation withouees, Since plant nourh themselves they have the fel af ttiton, And because i ofthe nate of plana to grows {fellows that they have the fly of growths Ags dace itisthe nature ofertas plant to reproduce thee sto be reproduced by thei like the have a reproductive acl The reproductive felt is dierent ffom he faely of tuition, for unripe fruits poses the atrive but not the reproductive facalty; just ws they poses the fculy of ‘rowth but not that of reproduction, Simarly, he fcly 2» ot auton ders ro that of growth, Do yo note that decrepit animals have the nutrvefaclly Wt lack that af row? “The mutstive faculty transmits fod and replaces what thas ben disoled withthe faculty of growth crests the Abotance of the main suturlongansin Teng, bret, nd depth, not hapaard but in sch a way tha they ‘each the utmost erection of growth, The tepodetve faculty gives the mater the form othe thing. septs fiom the parent body apart in which faculty deriv fom >» it ovgin nheres and which, when the ater and te Pace which are preparedto receive its activity are presen, Performs its Funethons« Te wl be evident from the foregoing that all vegetable, animal, and human functions are de to facies seer and ‘hove bodily Fanon, and een over and abo the ners it ouAPTER 1 5 After the plant comes the animal, which emerges fom a ‘compound of elements whose organic nature is much nearer to the mean than the previous two and is therefore prepared. to receive the animal soul, having passed through the stage of the vegetable soul. And so the nearer it approaches the mean the greater is its capacity for receiving yet another psychical faculty more refined than the previous one ‘The sou is like a single genus divisible im some way into thee parts. The firs is the vegetable soul, which i the fest ‘entelechy* of a natural body posesing ongans in so far ast is reproduced, grows, and auimilates nourishment. Food is 4 body whose fanetion i isto become similar tothe nature of the body whose fod it is said tobe, and add to that body either in exact proportion or more or les what i disolved. ‘The second isthe animal soul, which i the frst entlechy# ‘of a natural body possessing organs in 20 far as it perecves viduals and moves by volition, “The third is the hurman soul, which is the fist entelechy+ ‘of a natural body possessing organs in so far as it acts By rational choice and rational deduction, and in so far as 1 perceives universal, “The vegetable soul har thre faculties. First the nutritive faculty which transforms another body into body similar ‘0 that in which iti elf prevent, and replaces what has been dissolved. Secondly, the faculty of growth which in- eaves every aspect of the body in which it resides, by length, breath, and depth in proportion to the quantity necessity to make ic atan its perfection in growth, Thirdly, the reproductive faculty whic takes from the body in which it resides a part which is potentially similar to it and acts ‘upon it with the help of ater similar bodies, generating and mixing them so as to render” that part actually similar to the body (C0 which it had been only potently similar). The Animal Soul ‘Tue animal soul, according tothe primary division has two facultes—the motive and the perceptive. The motive faculty6 concentine THe sout again is of two kinds: ther it is motive ins fa ait gives nimple, orn far sits active, Now the mative acl, in'so far at provides the impule, the faculty of pe. tence. When & deiable or pugvantinage impacted tn the imaginaon of which we shal speak before ong. Tt rouse this faulty to movement. Tc ha wo subvisons oe eae the fac of desire which provokes moverent (of the organs) that brags ane near to things imagined To be ‘eceary or wef In the search for pleat, The second Ealled the faculty of anger, which impels the mbject to a ‘movement ofthe iby In onder to repulse things bagind to be harmful or destructive, andthe to overcome thems AS forthe motive fac in ha active capaci, is power whichis astibate through the nerves sd nucle a ts Function to contact the moses and to pl the tendons anu ligament towards the starting-point of the movement, ortoselax them or stretch them so ta they move away rom the waning pont “The perceive faculty can be divided into two parts, the ‘xteral sense and the internal sense. The exer ene te the five or eight semen, One of them i sigh Which a facly located inthe concave nerves pert the ig of the forms of coloured bodies imprint on the vireoes humour. Thse formate tanamited through, actually tearparent mediate plished surfaces The second isthe Sense of heating, whichis faculty located in the neves inside over the surface of the ea-oles i perecivs the form of what wanamitted to by the vibration ef thea Sieh i comprened between two eject, one sing a the other being stuck, the later ofting I retance sot to et up vibration in the sr which prostce tesa. This ‘radon of thea outside reaches he sr whih es modo ies and comprewed inthe cavity ofthe ear, moving in & way simlar to at in which Hie Hcl moved, Ts weaves {ouch that nervy and soe heard “The thd sense is that of sel a fcutyTeaed in the two prtuberanes of the fon part of the bran which resemble the wo nipple of the breast I perce the dour enveyed tot by ile ale, which eer mised withthe cuarren 7 ‘vapour in the air o s imprinted on it though qualitative ‘hunge inthe alr produced by an odorous body “The fourth sere that oat,» fcatyHcted inthe nerves tribe? over the tong, which pereewes the taste disoled from bodies touching and mingling with thesalva contains tn producing & qualitative change Inthe tongue iu. The ith see cat of touch, which ea faculty dit buted over the ene skin and fesh ofthe boy The nerves perecve what touches them and are feted when i tw {ppored othe n quality, and changes ae then wrought in {ar constaion of rare Probably thi fly 1 not one species but a. gems including fur faces which areal dtributed throughout the sin The it of them judges the oppnion between hot Sin cold; the second that between dry and moi the thie that between hard and sf ai the fut that Beaver Tough and smooth. But thelr coestence in the same gan fre the fae impremion that they ate cxenally one, “The forme ofl thesis esc the ogans of ese and > ae imprinted on them, and then the fay of sensation Dera them, Thi tot event in tou, tse sel, nearing. But concerning sgh,» diferent view hs been maintained, for some people have thst that srething ies rom the eer ect the object of igh takers for from withovt~—sod that this constitutes the act o sexing ‘Tey often call the thing which according to tern wes from the oy, light ‘Bot true pilwopers hold the view that when an actually transparent body 8 body which has noon neo ‘ener between the eye and the abject of ight the exterior Term ofthe coloured boy on wich igh falling i tran mite to the pup ofthe ee and vo the eye preven fs “This Warum i sina to the rasmsion of colours by meas of ight being refracted from a coloured thing and fing is clour to atcier body. The remblanee mot Eomplet, however, fo the former ore tke am image in “Te abnor of ee iw that Jn issues from the eye ishown by the following consideration, What emanates is either a body or a non-body. it is not body itis absurd to tribute motion and change of place tot, except figuratively in that there may be a power in the eye which transforms the air and other things i encounters into some sort of quality, So that it may besa that thie quality ‘came out othe eye Likewise it it absurd to hold the view that iti» body, because iso then ether — (2) itil remain intact, iain fom the eye and reaching to the sphere ofthe Gzed stars, In this ease there wll have emerged from the eye, despite it smallness, a conieal body ‘of immense size, which will have compresed the air and ‘repulsed all the heavenly bodies, orf wll have traversed an ‘empty space, Both these views are manifly absurd. Or (2) it will be dispersed, difased and split up. In that eae the percpient animal will of necesity fel something being detached from him and then dispersed and dffised san, Be will perceive the spots where that ray falls to the excusion of the spots where it doesnot fll, so that he will only partly Perceive the body, sensing some points here and there but rising the major part. Or (3) this emanating body is united with the air and the hheavens and becomes one’with them, so that the uniform holes like one organ ofthe animal. Tn this cate the uniform whole in its entirety will possess sensation. This fs 2 most Peculiar change indeed! 1. follows necessarily that if many £76 co-operate, i wll be more powerful. Thus a man when in the company of others would have keener sight than when alone, for many people ean effect a more powerful change than a single person. Again, thir emanating body wil noses sarily be ether simple or composite and its composite nature will also be of a particular kind. Its motion then mst be ther voluntary or natural But we know that this movertent is not voluntary and by choice, although the opening sad closing of the eyelids are voluntary. The only remaiing alterative i that the movement ir natural, But the simple natural movement will be only in one direction, ot im agg and so the composite movement will aso be, according ve ‘the dominant element, only in one diecton, not in many cuapren 1 9 But it isnt wo with this movement according to tho who support the uheory ofthe “suing by “Ain the sensed object in seen trough the base ofthe sonia! emanating body which touches fe and ot too the angle i wil necemarly follow that the tape sed imag ofthe object preted ta ditance wl ao fe Peeepible as wel ast colour This bees the feet Bientsubject comes in contact with it and enompanee ie ‘Bu iit peteived Gough the angle T mean te scion boetween the vitium and the hypothetical cones thes the remotes the object the smaller wil be the angle sad soothe Common section, and eonsoquety the form ioral one ill ao be smaier and wil be 30 perceived Sometimes the angle wil be wo small thatthe bjet wl al to be percioed nd 50 the fom wll no be seen res ‘Afr the second part namely that the emanating sme- thing i ot dy but a acca ora quis chang ing or beng change wil inevitably be more powerdal sth the increas ofthe percpint subject that ene thea atsurdity which we mentioned before wil arse: Ages the air will ether be merely a medivn of ransminion Spee Pent in uel. ici only a medium of tansmiaion a sok Perle, then, as we maintain perception take pace ie the pupil ofthe eye and at outie he But the percent i the tis then the same absuty whieh we hace leds ‘esiont will be epee and wl necenay faley {hat whenever there & commotion o datrhanes inthe Sight wil be distorted with the enewal of change andthe renewed action of the percipien in perclving’one thing after another, just as when ey ‘runs in calm air his per- epson of mite things cone Al this that ght isnot de to something hung fom us towards te eed abject, must therefore be du to something ceehog tovarsufom the sensed objet ince tot not We a of the abject it mast be its form, If his view were net oe fect, the cteton ofthe eye with all its sea and sae and hic espetve shape and sracture mol be non,» CONCERNING THE SOUL, eMAPrER tn * ‘One of the animal internal faculties of perception is the omaPreR 111 faculty of fantasy, ie, snr cmoma, located inthe forepart ofthe font ventricle ofthe brain. Ie reeives all Use forms mena! Sees ‘which are imprinted om the five senses and tranemited¢0 it Tene are some facbties of internal perception which per- from them. Next the faclty of repeesentation located i ceive the form ofthe sensed things, and others which perceive the rear part of the font ventricle of the brain, which pre- the “intention” thereof. Some faculties, again, can. bath ‘he senat communis has received fromm the lnc pereeive and act while others only perceive and do not at. vidual five senses even in the absence ofthe sensed objects, Some posiess primary perception, others secondary percep. Tt should be remembered that receptivity and presen ‘ion. The distinction between the perception of the form aid tion are functions of different faculties For instance, water 1 that ofthe intention is thatthe form i what i perceived both hhas the power of receiving an imprint, but lacks that of ve by the inner soul and the external sense; but the external retaining it. Next is the faculty which i called “sensitive sense perceives it first and then transmits it tothe souk fo magination’ in relation to the animal soul, and ‘rational ‘example, when the sheep pereives the form of the wall ie. Jmagination’ in relation to the human soul "This faculty is its shape, form, and colout. This form is certainly perceived located in the mile ventricle of the brain near the ver by the inner soul ofthe sheep, but iis ist perceived by its form proces, and its Funeton i to combine certain things ‘external sense. As for the intention, ita thing which the with others in the faculty of representation, and to separate foul pezceives from the sensed object without its previously | some things from others a ie choces. Then there it the Inaving been perceived by the external zens, just a the sheep tstimative faculty located in the far end of the ‘middle perceives the intention of harm’ in the wolf, which causes i ventricle of the brain, which perceiver the non-tenible {o fear the wall and to flee fom it, without harm havin ntentions that exist in the individual sensible object, lke been perceived at all by the external sense. Now what is the faculty which judges that the wolf isto be avoided and fiat perceived by the sense and then bythe internal faculties the child iso be loved. Next there i the retentive and recal- is the form, while what only the internal faculties percive leatve faculty located im the rear ventricle of the brain, ‘without the external seme i the intention which retains what the estimative faculty perceives of non ‘The distinction between perception accompanied or wn- Sensible intentions existing in individval sensible object. accompanied by action is thi: i tthe function of certain ‘The relation ofthe retentive to the esimative faculty isthe intemal facultes to combine certain perceived forms and same as that of the ficulty called representation tothe sonar intentions with ethers and to separate some of them from enmais, And its relation to the intentions i the same a that other, 20 that they perceive and als act on what they have of representation to sensed forms. » perceived. Perception unaccompanied by action takes place ‘These, then, ate the faculties of the animal soul. Some se when the form or the intention is merely impriated on the | animals esses all five senses, while others only some of senee organ without the percipient shaving any power to at them. Taste and touch must necesrly be creted in a ‘upon ie a all animals, Yand every animal must epecally have the senee "The distinction between primary and secondary percep- ‘Of touch;” but there are animale which lack the sense of tion is that in the former the peripient faculty sorschow smell, hearing, oF sight directly acquites the form, while in the latter the form i= acquired Unrough another agent which transmit i tthe pereipient facultyconcenvina tite sove ‘The Rational Soul ‘Tus human rational soul i alo divisible int a practical and 8 theoretical faculty, both of which are equivocal called intligence, The practical sty the prmipe of mow ‘ent ofthe human body, which urgsit to individual atoms characterized by deliberation and in accordance with pus osve® considerations. This faulty as certain correspon dence with the animal faculties of appetence imagination, ‘sand estimation, and certain dual characte: nile ‘elatonthip to the animal faculty of appeteRe that ee (ain stats are in i peculiar to man by which ft i sed to quick actions and pasions ch ashame, laughter, weeping; tc. Isrelaionship tothe anal faculty ota tion and estimation is that it use that faculty to deuce Plans concerning transitory things and to deduce amas ro, Finally, ts own dual character i that with the help of the theoretical intligence i forms the ordinary ted coe ‘monly accepted opinions eonceening stons, ar instance, ‘tha fie and tyranny are evil and other sma’ premiaes which, in books of loge, have Been clearly diiaguties from the prey atonal ones This lacy at govern al {he other faculties of the body in accordance wit the laa ‘of another fculty which we shall mention, Wat ahaa sor submit o them but tht they shouldbe subordinated to ix lest pase dipositions arising fom the boy ad deriv from material things should develop ni Paes ps Aisposidons ae called bad morals: But fr from being pase and submisive this faculty must gover the hes bodily > fcalis so that it may have excellent morale eiralio posible to ausibute morals othe bodily faces Butif the later predominate they are inan active sate, whe the practical intligence isin passive one, That the se thing produces moras in both. But ifthe pracdea itl gence predominaty, itis in an active ate whe the bol focules are in'a pase one, and thi moras in he seit sense (even so there would be two dispstion oF ral cnapren ww 2 character); or characteris only one with two different felatonships. If we examine them more closely the reason why morals are atuibuted to thi faculty is hae human, soul, as vail be shown later, i single substae which i felated to two planes—the one higher and the other lower than ite, Te has special faculties which establish the reac ‘ionship between ielf and each plane: the practiesl faculty which the human soul posesier in relation to the lower plane, which isthe body, and its contol and management, and the theoretical facuty in elation to the higher plane, te fiom onhich it pasively receives and acquires intelligible. Te as if our soul has two faces: one turned towards the body, 1d it must not be influenced by any requirements of bodily nature; and the other turned towards the higher principles, and it mus always be ready to receive from what fe Higher Plane and to be influenced by fe So ‘much for the practical fculy, The Theoretical Faclty and Us Deg” ‘Ta function ofthe theoretical faculy is o receive the ims» Dresions of the universal forms abstracted from matte, hese forms are already abstract im themselves, it simply Feoeives them; if not, it makes them immaterial by abstr tion, 20 that no trace whatever of material attachments remains in them. We will explain this Tater. Now this theoretical faculty has diferent relation to these forms. This is because a thing whose function is to receive nother thing is its recipient either potentially or actualy. Poteniality is spoken of in thee different senses fr rat ‘uiecas‘This term may imply absolute potentiality in which yo nothing has yet become actual nor has the instrument of its actualization even been achieved, for instance the capacity of an infant to write, Secondly, it may imply 1 relative Potentality when nothing more than the instrument ofthe cquiiion of actuality has been achieved, For example, an ‘older child who has learn the use ofthe pen and the inet eo x >” CONCERNING THE SOUL and knows the value or meaning ofthe eter dt have the capac of writing. Tardy ay py this capacity then he invuinent hs been perce, and when by meas Df he instrument the capaci as been made complete 20 thatthe agent may exetie whenever he wie thot Iaving toler or Soqire "The intention i ll hat elt a inthe cae of the capacity si be peed Uyfascbe who has etched preton in hi at, even hen ent actsly writing. Inthe fine stance ticle echt or material potatality; inthe second, pone enaliy; and inte irae Somctines the cond cme fabs and the third the preton of potentiality ‘Thu te elon of the theoreti faculty 0 the abseaet immaterial forms which we have mentioned i meter of theatre of abot potently thas faaty belong re tout which has not yt reaiaed ny portion of he pen potty belonging: to In th stage ie called the Fhateal inligenc, fecalty that i present in sp india! ofthe human species Ht ale mata se jew of ts semblance to primary matter, which in isch Moc not pose any of the forme bt the substrata fal i Actin eon ot aro rae ly, en onto pene perfone ol Primary itligile whch ae the ure and the nsrument Tie secondary ineligible have been aquired by the Sate potentaly Hythe primary intligbes Yea ‘Reta premises whch sents gen, not trough any roses of Teaming, nor even wth any const nthe Faro the sunjet giving sunt that fe might be jt as oie fr him meine to aban rom dng 2, BSCS ‘Renee belle tha the wheels restr than the art, nd that hing which are eqol to he sme thing ae eal tone anshel,So lng as only ths amount ofthat? fe ben achieved, called ial foi my ao Br caled the acto intligecen ration othe ft poten thlig, bectue the ater cannot actly think Atal teres thisone does when tg orton, Sometimes Ie telnion iv of tne mtu of perce potently, when, der ihe tina inlgie orm, thas lo Required ouarree v % secondary ones except that it does not actually contemplate them oF return to them; it has, at it were, conserved them, so that it can actually contemplate those forms when it will and Knows that it can do #0. Tt is called idles in ct, because itis an intelligence which thinks whenever it wills without needing any further proces of acquisition, although it could be called potenti intelligence in relation to what ‘comes next. Lastly it relation to those forme may be of the nature of absoMfe ‘actuality, as when they are present to it and it actually contemplates and thinks them and alsa knows that idoes so. At this point i becomes the inci eps, ce we shal oon see that the potential intelligence becomes Actual only through an intelligence whichis always actual, and that, when the potential intelligence make some sort of fantact with it, certain forms are actually imprinted on the former from the latter. Such forms are therefore acquired from without. ‘These then are the degres ofthe faculties which are called ‘theoretical intellects. At the stage of the acquited intelligence the animal genus and its human species are perfected, and here human potentiality beeomes at ane withthe fist prin ciples ofall existence. How the Rational Soul Acquires Knowledge ‘Tax acquisition of knowledge, whether from someone else ‘or fom within ones is of various degrees. Some people who acquire knowledge come very near to immediate perception, since their potential intellect which precedes the capacity we hhave mentioned isthe most powerfl. Ifa person can acquire knowledge ftom within himself, this strong capacity i called se “into ero tong ines pple ha they do not teed eat" efor, or inricon and setualzton In over toma contact withthe seve inteligene. Dat th primary Capacity of uch a penon fr his power ha he mht ‘tobe nid to pomes the second capacity ine, sects though he knows everything fom within hms Th the* concensine THE souL highest degree of this capacity. In this state the material intelligence must be called “Divine Spirit. Tt belongs tothe genus of inlets inhabit, but 30 lofty that not all people Share it, Tis not unlikely, ined, that some ofthese actions atebuted tothe "Divine Tateligence’ beeause of their powerful and lofty nature overfiow into the imagination ‘which symbolizes them in senseimagery and words in the ‘way which we have previously indicated. ‘What proves this i the evident fact that the ineligible ‘euths are acquired only when the middle term ofa sylloginn in obtained. ‘This may be done in two. ways: sometimes through intuition, which isa act of mind by which the ind ise immediately perceives the mie term. This power of intuition is quickness of apprehension. But sometimes the riddle term is acquired through intrction, although even the frst peiniples of instruction ae obtained through intul- tion, since all novledge can be reduced ultimately to certain intuitive principles handed down by those who fit accepted them to their students, Tis posible that a man may find the crth within himself, land thatthe syllogien may be effected in his mind without Any teacher. ‘This varies both quantitatively and qualita: tively; quantitatively, because some people posters» greater ‘number of middle terms which they have discovered them selves; and qualitavely, because some people find the term ‘more quickly than others. Now since thee difference are unlimited and always vary in degrees o intensity, and since ther lowest poin is reached in men who are wholly without intuition, a0 their highest point must be reached in people ‘who posses intuition regarding all or most probleme, or in peopl who have intuition inthe shortest posible time-Thus there might bea man whore soul has uch an intense purity and isso firmly linked to the rational principle that he Blazes ‘with intuition, Le. with the receptivity of inepration coming from the active intelligence concerning everything, So the farms of all things contained in the active intelligence are imprinted on his soul ether all at once or erly so, not that he accepts them merely on authority but on account of their logical onder which encompasses all the middle terms, For ‘ cuAPrER vt ” Dele accepted on autharity concerning thote things which are known only’ through their causes poses 0 rational certainty. This is a kind of prophete inspiration, indeed its highest form and the one most fitted to be called Divine Power; and itis the highest human faculty. The Hirt of Fates tshould be seen how some ofthese faculties govern others, ‘You will ind the acquired intellect to be the governor whom all the ret serve. It isthe ultimate goal. The inlet habia serves the iulleta in cet, ai in turn served bythe vo material intellect with al is capacities. The practical intel- lect serves them all, for attachment to the body, as will shorly become clea, exists for the sake of the perfection and punfication of the theoreGcal intellect, and’ the practical Jngellect governs this relationship. Te is served by the faculty of estimation which, in ie turn, i served by two Tuculties fan anterior and a posterior. The posterior conserves what is Drought to by estimation, while the anterior isthe totality of animal faculties. The faculty of representation is served by {wo faculier of different origina” the appetitive faculty se serves it by obeying it, for the representative faculty impels the appettive to movement, and the faculty of imagination serves It by accepting the combination and separation of ie mages. In their turn those two are the governor of two tgroups. The faculty of imagination is served by fenaria or Ses comma, which i tet served by the five senses, while the appettive faulty is served by deste and anger, These last two are served by the motive faculty ditibuted through the muscles. Here the animal faculties come to an end, The animal faculties in thei entirety are served by the Jo vegetable faculties, of which the reproductive i the fst in tank and the highest one. The faculty of growth serves the reproductive, and the muvive faculty serves them both, ‘The four ‘natural’ faculties ‘of digestion, retention, asimi- lation, and excretion'—are subservient to all these. “The digestive faculty is served on the one hand by the retentive And the asimilative, and on the other by the excreive The four physieal qualities serve these, with cold subservient to8 coNcERSING THE s0UL 1 thet, while dryness and moisture serve them both, This isthe Iast degree ofthe faculties. ‘The Difference between Perception by Sense, Imagination, Estimation, and Reason ris probable that all perception is but the abstraction by ‘ the percipient subject of the form of the perceived object in some manner. Th thn, it sa pereeption of some material ‘object, it consist in aomehowe abstracting its form from its matter. But the kinds of abstraction are different and its ‘grades various. This is because, owing wo mater, the material {orm is subject to certain tates and conditions which do not belong to it que form. So sometimes the abrtraction of the form is effected with’ all of some of these attachments, and sometimes it is complete in that the form is abetracted not only from matte but alo from the acidentsit posses. Por example, the form or quidity of man is nature in which all the individuals of the species share equally, while in its Aefntion isa singe unit: although icis merely by accident that i happens to exist in thie or that individual and is thus ‘multiplied. This multiplicity does not belong tot in far 38 it isthe nature of man, for, sf multiplicity were ewental to this nature, then ‘man would not be predicated of what Is ‘numerically one. Again, i the quiddity of man were present in Zaid merely because itis his own quiddity it could not be attributed to “Amr. Consequently, one ofthe accidents which ‘cur to the human quiddity through matter is multiplicity ! and divisbily Tesides thes iti also subject to other accidents, namely, we when itis present in any matter it poretes to. certain degree quantity, quality, place, and positon. All these are accidents foreign to its nature, since if its possesion of this particular mesure or any other particular, measure. of ‘quantity, quality, place, and postion were due to is being ‘man’s nate, all men would equally participate in all these concepts. Ie follows that the qudaity of man itself does not omarren vit 0 necenitate any ofthese accidents, which most therfore be cident occurring to on eco of thee mater For the matter with whieh the form fs conjoined har aready been ‘bjt to hem and then sere strat efor em ater Along with thee accidents andi relationship with matter Irth laos is removed the proces of abstraction wl be mle, The fe beeaae sensation cannot dentngle form fom nates completely divorced from material a dfn norcantreain hate after the avene af mater ‘Thue ecn thai cannot eet complete detachment {crm fom matter, but ness the presence of mater ithe form io remain present tit But eh facto representation purifies the sbtracte foe toa bigher depres since tak fom mater in sh say that i does tt ned the presence of ate forthe reece ffm, For, een she he sbcnce or cnration of matter, the for remain inthe representa faculty, {Though even hee itn divested off material scent Sense nether abstracts it completely from mater, not fom the scrident of mate, But representation doe so in the fin imtance but notin the Sond since the fms ta feprecntaon arin th rape, the sume a De sensed foe andthe pose» craie qvanyy and poion eis Impowiblefora orm n representation tobe such at mit the indvsuat of the pect hare ny for aman in ‘presentation resembles Sway 2 parla maa 0m ‘ein, and there might be men relly sxting a well reorsented who ace qitediferent rom thn paras man “he aly of eximaton goes efter than hin stutacton frit setves the tentons wich in hemecves Srenon-mateia although they scien happen oben mater, This beatae shape, colour, pony ey, 0 {otbutes whieh eanot be found excepe in body mater, But good and ev agresble and dhagersle, er ae thensdve noncntcta nes snd ther prc mater Steen. The prt of the being nomsteia eh Ititwere oftheir eoence tobe mater then good and el ‘reable and dingreesble would be incmceeble excep| sien i pga Ih Bt meine they ae | Sree tems pa tn mae Hs et item ae rela haat ily toa pas na es a aeajr ch sis fm me Tse Sonera me po snd ae he a inept trot epee Fora one, Senta fan a wn ne sts appends ai hada ene (Sie par ater taf eam ie Iageonionel by mul si orcnon epee ely eas Ec reir ete aah ot simmer hh wa eb eden ote rm en eh he wl Npeatbesty sien feof ne tht pe na rape how mth” i 1» Meonply sence fos ne ee Siete ao ena wh en ethe et fom’ mate, tanta oh ts | hot mat sim th ata ares Inter rape ink pene ten ps so i ict ime In way he Ino ibe ae, [nie eir-amaton, optton tton tdci dosage SSR ae Shaper we hie Sen Stn ou doe ube ) The Particular is perceived only by the Material, the Universal only by the Non-material ‘Aut, perception of the particular is through a bodily organ. ‘As for the faculty which perceives the individual form, for instance, the external senses which perceive them in a way, not completely divested of oF abstracted from matter and ‘ot at all divorced from material attachments, the quetion ofsch a faculty i quite easy and clear. Theis because theve eorms ate perceptible only slong as their matter is present, 10 and a body can be present only to another body; i eannot be present to what it incorporeal Ithas no relation whatever ‘ofpresence and absence to an immaterial faculty, fora thing Jnpace cannot have relation of presence and absence! te anything non-spatial. Presence does not even occur without 4 certain postion of nearnest and distance of the present ‘object in elation tothe one to which ff presen, and this is not posible when the present object i a body exeept when the object to which it present rao either & body or in a body. And as for the faculty which perceives the individual 2» forms as completely abstracted from matter but not at all abusracted ftom material attachments, lke representation, ial needs a physical organ. For the faculty of representa: tion cannot perceive! without the represented forms being imprinted on a body in such a way that both it and the body share the same imprint. Let us tuppose that the form ine Printed on the faculty of representation isthe form of Za, ‘actly according to his shape, contours, and the position of his limbs in relation to each others which, in the faculty of representation, tare as distinct fromm cach other as they are to >| the external sght® We maintain that these part and sides of hislimbs mast be imprinted on a body and thatthe sides and arts ofhisform must ft into the sides and part ofthat body. "Now from the form of Zaid let us change our example £0 the form ofthe squate bed, which has a definite quantity, postion, and quality, and which has a number of angles ‘Let us suppose that adjacent to ite to angles, ¢ and , there° concennisa THE souL are two other squares each of which is exactly similar to the ‘ther, and that although each lies ona particular side they are nevertheles similar in form. But the totality of these figures is imprinted on the imagination as one individual form. Now the square btimis numerically diferent from the square eagf, and in the imagination ie isated to the ight of ea bok y — it and Sistine fom tin posion.* Either its diference from the other square isatrbtable to the form of squareness oF to some accident peculiar to squarenes other than its form, or to the matter in which this form it imprinted, But this diference is not attributable tothe form of quareness, since ‘we have already suppesed them to be ofthe same shape and ‘equal. Nor isi attributable t9 any accident peculiar toi fisly, because in order to imagine it to be on the right side we need not think that it has a pardeular accident which does not belong to the other figure a8 well” Secondly, because that accident belongs to the imagined figure ether in its own exence or with reference to its externally extent figure, so that ici, a8 it were, a figure abetracted from an external existent which isin this condition, or it belongs to the imagined figure with reference either to the receptive faculty ort its material substratum. Let us now consider every alternative: 1, I is imposible that tis should be one of the accents which belong its essence, ie that it should be among the euarren vitt “ accidents peculiar to it, for in that case it will be ether a ‘constant of a transient accident. 1 cannot be constantly united with its evence for two (4) It were inseparable from its exence it woul alo be inseparable from the other member ofthe species, since the two squares have been supposed to be equal mem bers of the same species, xo that one cannot have & constant accident without the other having i too (6) Again, if the imagined square is in an indivisible faculty, it cannot have an accident to the exclaron of the other which ie exacdy similar to it while their substratum is one indivisible nit, he. the receptive faculty. [Nor can it be a transient accident, for when such an acci« ent disappears, the form of the figure in the imagination should accordingly change, The imagination does not im- gine it by connecting some additional factor with it, but imagines just as itis intel. This isthe reaon why it snot permissible to say that supposition ofthe suppor has added {his condition to it, as may be sid of the same square when itis an object ofthe intellect (at distinguished from imagina- tion). Ths i because the same dificuly wil remai,® and t ill be asked: How was t posible forthe pprer to suppose itn this particular way so that it became distinct from the other, and with what did the supposer operate so that he ‘ould suppose one in this way and the other in that? In the faye of the universal square it becomes posible through 8 factor which the intellect ade cot, namely, the concept ‘fright and left? And "such a concept is correct only the cae of a universal and rational intelligible. But in the cae of this individual figure thie concept cannot be found to the exclsion ofthe other, except on the strength of some factor by which the addition ofthis particular coneept rather than the other is justified. And the imagination does not suppose itso through some condition which it then adds to, bbuttdes so at once jus as it is without suppasiion. Thos the imagination does not imagine this igure a right ad that asfos “ CONCERNING THE s0UL let except through! some condition which is aleady added {o this or that igre. There (Le. i the realm ofthe nelle) the concept of Fight and lelt may be added tothe squate (which hat not already been qualified by any such acident) just ar one universal concept combined with another, Here {in the sphere ofthe imagination) om the other hand, if the square has not already Been qualified by an indivi And defined potion, no concept can be added to ita wards Ts not supposition ‘which gives this parcalar Postion in imagination, Mout ii the previous poseion of {hat postion which renders such a supposition pombe Imagination, infact, bas no concept a al since concept tiveral, so how ean ita the concept tothe aquare? owe ict pation ofthese in eat de tobe fae, me pe {2 Werther maintain that shi datinction cannor belong toi inelation tothe externally extent object of whichis fan image, Because {) Weean often imagine things that do notexstin reality, and there cannot be any sich teatonship with refer ‘nce to what i nomexitent. (0) Ags, if one of the imagined squares has on reaton- ‘hip to a ody and the other has another, this would ‘oe imposible while their subaratum i indivi, since nether of the evo imagined squares has a beter ‘aim to be related to one of the externally existent quate rather than to the othe, unless ome of then peculiarly related to this external body, while the other trot In his ease the subxtrata of one square would beidferent from that ofthe other. The faculty would then be divisible not oft bt because of the dvise Dit ofthat in wih resides; and would Bea bodily facaty and the form would be imprinted on 3 body tis therefore not tue that the two squares in imagination are different because of the diference between the two ‘externally existent squares and with reference to them. The clutions left ae that thief due either: cuareen vit 6 to the diferent par ofthe recepive facslty; or {Eto the ferent pars ofthe instrument seth which ee tacit operates Tn ier ease the reult remains that chi form of percep- tion takes place through the bodily mater It appertains fo therecepave acuty, that sel fai only through the Avatty afte matters; and it appetaine to the bly instrument, then this & the very pot we want to prove: “Thus it has een shown thatthe itaginalve pereepion abo takes plac through the body "hs farther ted by he allowing: The imagined form as we imagine ye the form of man, is sometimes the and sometimes smal: Now when thee ig and small foros at imprinted, they must be imprinted on one ad the Same thing ov ona number ofan thing, fri they were imprinted on the later then thei diferene in ize would De tie either to their external originals orto the faculty which ths sbseactel them, orto the two forms themselves, Tt fannot be due to their extemal eiginaly for many ofthe {imagined forms are not derived fom anything at all Noes the ailferene aibutable tothe two forms Hemel, for then they agree in definition and quid and der in ize, thesdterente cannot be atibuted to ther ewenial nature Wis then due tothe teipient, since the form i sometimes inprnted on big parc of iad sometimes on 8 sal one. "Moreover, we cot imagine back and white together the same imagined igre, although we can imagine them in {wo ilerent part ff Now if hese two par were not {isi in pation but Bot imagined forms were imprinted ‘none single indivisible hig as ndependent units at wee, fot ay pars ofthe same thing, we should not be able ois Tinguish between the impose andthe posible of the two {ue The two parts are therefore distinct in postion. “When you hve understood ths as regards Imagination, you wl have understood i as regards the eimative faculty val, which peretver its object ony as atached to che inaidal form of imagination 8 we have shown bbre.6 CONCERNING THE souL The Substratum of Rational Concepts is Immaterial Ws further minain that the mba which athe sabe | ssc often either sis body nr dee Subst na body in sich sway ato bein any atc ancy Feng ino a fom of at by 1 he subaru ofthe ing were a body ofa magaite of ome Kind then that ty which isthe subsea of te form wuld be \ tier indivbl o vie: Le fist ermine wheter \ ‘huh asubmratum an havea pat htt futher ae Tink hss absurd since pia ome otf in ad Jw potion cannot be dsinghed fom the line or the agit of which fis the neh f anything ere be imprinted on it muse be imprinted ons pat tat Une however, the pat dos ote pray bat a ste part of what In alfa quay, oe ca say ta inome tense anything which inherent quant (oe the lin of which the point he nyt Se inher in {ist poim and thus bene asides quantified by fe » Wien this happen aio romsine seid Hedy that an. he sin were ear an cul oe Something would be an ndopcdent luting ea A would have two side: one se conigucus wi ie ine om which it ditingutel and another tie oppose {ot We woul then be separate om the line wl oa he atin other than the pole souhing te Then tat Bit and nt this one would Be the mio teling and we thou have the same problem epeatl adi, He weuld flow rom his that thet or nie rope opts produces ine avew nich weave cbewhee swab Svar ei cea thar that the pons are mt ye Sheed int in by being pt togetier! Teak dear {at the point hat wo pacar and dita! peso We however alld wo part af he srgutt aay fen to show the absurd of thi ew, sed says er (1) a cetain gen pot which i nthe mie of eo Other point separates the, that they doa mes, ouarren tx a Xt, then with primary aoa intaton i llowe thatch of the ob paeanaed by spel pat fhe mile pln wiih touchy and thu te tide point weeld be ded. Thi aud: Or 2) the mile part dent prevent the two depois (© From tung The rae! fom weal en he Sra the peat one ad alte pfs (ter Petaling ey ae oa thi saponin) would be iene ane pont at we have lea sapped Ih pola tobe spaate om the ine, an ere thee bing septate tha nt axe han the play whch tice eparned om he plat Incgrtion Thos tht pie (ch separate tie fom the pat in quion) would ve» dierent Fost sm thiol, Bt we Fave asd supped {Bata he pins hve ene commen poston Te 2 contadeton The view tat he bursty of he incligles ie iome inva part othe by Serer fe, “The remaining ston i that the asburatum of the intlgitier thei subsea 2 body? someting iil Lal ws avppoe an ineligible form in something divble: Aor thutsupposed to subs nsometing somes tow dvb wou ae acldentaly dvb, Then the two part of te form woald be either sina or dsr Ie they are similar, then why isthe synthesis someting Aiferet tom them? For the wholes nichy wafer fom the pares For ite par are crac sm the only fre ce shir ality would make sh increase quam oF in'number and not in form. Bt io, then the nelle fom woul be acetain shape or number, No incligible form, however has shape ot amber, atari the form trol be representational and not intl he follow ingina il carer argent not pone fy thatthe toneep of cach of he two part neue the sane as that Ofte lhe cn part dor ner te Concept ofthe whol neceuy that atthe out we Shoal raerve the concept othe wile fo the ft partone CONCERNING THE souL and not fr both, But iit enters into the concept ofthe whole, is obvious that either ofthese two part alone cannot indicate exactly the Seoncept ofthe complete whale* 1, om the other hand, the two part of the form are dis similar Tet wt seein what sense an Stelligile form ean have Such pars, These dsinilar parts can only be the pats of Ainitoo, vie. genera and diferenac. From Git many Stheurdides would neenarly fallow; for example, every part tthe body’ also potentially vibe dion, a that so the gener nd diferentine mist alo e potentially infinite Iiye i hae been established thatthe genera and exentl differenti of 4 single thing ae. not potentially infinite Furthermore, it snot the supposition of division which pro: duces distinction between the genus andthe diferent; if there were genus ands diferentia necentating a dine tion in the substratum, the diviion would certainly not {depend on supposition, It would neces fllow thatthe ienera and diferente would be actoally ft, ton that een esublshed thatthe genera and diferentiag and part +» of definition ofa single hing ar, inal expect finite they ‘were actualy infiaite, they could not have come together {he body in ths form, fOr it would neces entail single Seay ng cua ea sin, let us auppowe thatthe division takes place in a certain vay and har paced gens on onesie and ifterenia ath te, he manner don hanged won face halen pls alletiferentia onthe one sde andthe Iiner haley om fie other Or gems an diferenta would xchange places, 0 that in our supposition or imagination se the ponton of genus and diferentia would revolve, nd exch fofthem would move in any direction according tothe will ‘fan external pen.” But tis snot the en! for we ean go tm introducing anew division within divion af Sgbuton "Again not every intligble i vile nto simpler ine tells, for certain ntligibles are the simplest and serve SS principles for ether compound ones, They have no gener Sand iferenting, aor are they dvi in quantity or concep itis not posible then, thatthe supposed part of the form should be isa nach way that eck one of them yn euarren tx ” ‘concept, diferent from the whole and the whole is made up oftheir aggregate. If, then, the intelligible form is indivisible, and i doesnot Inher in an indivisible part ofa magnitude, and, at the same time, there must be something in us which receives it itis lear thatthe substratum of the intelligible is a substance hich is nota body, nor a bodily faculty such ae might be subject to the accidents of the body, eg. division. with all the absurdities i involves. Anahr Argument We an prove thi in another way by saying tha ithe tational ely which abrats the flies om 2 dente quantity, ple, poston, and all the other cate fore Let us examine thiiorm oc which ie bscted fom Ptonand aatbow thi ha been flee Ls thicabraton Ith reference tothe knowing subject ei this lg svat from positon ine external cxstence or ft Sencepoal existence in the inteligent® Te marth i Should bes nt exteral exten so thatthe only alters ‘ative i the it sbtaced fom postin and place in te tcitenc in the fntelet. Thin when the intlgble form Somes to eit im the inlet, i doesnt poses pon ‘thre might be indicted an o divide or jected te similar proces theree it ctvot bein body. At ‘then the tty nde fom of things whch ae coe Eepalyindivible are imprinted on avaible mater ‘ving dimension, then eter none’ ofthe supped pas hatany relation tothe unitary ineigbe which ina tnd abrat fom matter ofeach and tery seo he ‘el pars hss relation toi or wre pars have uch Fenton wil thers do nt If one of the par hu lation {oie then the wile (composed a ofthe par) cannot bly have any relation vot either If some par have a Fein tf and the others do on, then the parts ch fave no relation to this ineligible’ do not eater ito ia concep tall But if every suppl part has some Felton toi then ether read we the inligle ws whole or toaparofieHevery supposed pat ofthe mater in whichible inkeres has a relation to the whole of the Intellgible, then the parts are not parts ofthe ineligible, but cach i independently an intligible iwelf; indeed, it would be the ineligible elt. In thi cage the ineligible would be actualy ineligible an infiite number of times in a single ‘moment, If every part has diferent relation to this entity, then the enity at an intelligible must be conceptually ible, This sa contradiction, for we have already apposed to be indivisible. Ifthe relation ofeach partis toa differs se part of the intligible entity, ts divsbility is all the mor Sbvious, except cht iti incancevable. Its clear from this, that the forms imprinted on matter are only the exterior forms of partcular divisible enter and every part of the former is actually oF potentially related to every part ofthe Ine A vn thing ch mile tof definition is 2 unity when regarded as a whole. ‘This unity indivisible. So how can the unity, as such, be imprinted on something divisible? Otherwise, the absurdity we have mentioned in the cae ofthe indivisible intelligible would arse. “Again, we have established thatthe supposed intelligiles which it isthe function of the rational Taculty actualy to know ane by one are potentially infinite. Tei also certain that the substratum of something which can encompass thas been demonstrated in Aristotle's Ply, Te is quite i= ponible, then, that the entity which receives inteligibes Should be inherent in a body, or that its action" should be jn a body or through a body. The Rational Faculty doesnot Know through a Physical Organ ‘We maintain tha ifthe rational faculty were toknow through «physical organ, s0 that its peculiar activity would be ine ‘complete except by the we of that phyrical organ, it would recesarily follow that it would not now is own self ao the omarren x 3 fongan, nor its act of knowing. For there ie no ongan between the rational fculty and elf or does one intervene between ‘and is organ of between it andthe fact that it knows, But itdoes know itself and i so-called organ and the fact that it ‘Knows. Iefllows that it knows through itself, not through an ‘organ. Again, its knowledge of is organ it cither due to the latter's form, the same one or a numerically! different one, in which cae thi orm would be both init ain its organ, for due to some other form qualitatively diferent from the form of ts organ, this frm also being Both init and ini organ. If itis due tothe form ofits organ, then this form i always both inthe organ and in it at wel. efllows that it ‘ust always know it organ, for it can know other things nly when thelr forms are received in thae organ. Hut iit due to some form other than that, the difference between things which share a commen definition is either de to the Aliferene of their matter or to the difference between the ‘universal and the individual and between the abtract and that which i present im matter. But in this case there is no such difference between matters for ther matter on, nor “any difference between abstraction and presence in matter, for both are present in matter, nor, finally, any diference between the spciic and the generic, forthe ane form would quire particularity omly through the particular matter and through the accidents to which ii subject due to the matter inwhich exist; and this circumstance isnot peculiar to the fone form to the exclusion ofthe other eis also imposible that its knowledge ofits organ i due to some ineligible form diferent in kind from the form of theorgan. Thisiseven more absurd. For when the intelligible form comes to inher in the recipient substance it confers upon the later a knowledge of the object of which iti the arm orto which ite related, 20 thatthe form ofthe object 1 which iti related isa constituent element ofthis form, But this intelligible form isnot the form ofthis organ, nor ‘even the form of something exentially related to it for the ‘sence of the organ isa substance, while we only abtract land consider the form of itt ewence and the substance in itgelf eannot be related to it. This san important argumenta coNcERNING Tite SoU we prove that inponile dat the pein shold ive an organ® which it waes in the act of perception, "Tiwi why seme preive the extemal objec and nt ile, noe its organ, nor ato perception. Snilatly,representa tion does not represen el nor its at, nr ie organ. Even ATC imagines ir organ i quite fee todo sn any way ks, 20 thatthe image vel not be rlted oa unnue nga, ale sensation bring tothe form of i organ = if that be posible: Tn that ease would only imagine a se Yepresetaonal form taken from unique serie objet snd no other, that fits organ were not tis prtclar one ‘oul not Be able to imagine a Anther Aguet Another convincing prot ofthe ft that he nlc does not ses phat oa that the icles which perce ty means of the impeintng of fos in the onan Gece tthaued through Contino action sine the constant tmovement ftigues she onan and detoys thei compose {ion andthe song impression which tte wt tremendous 1» fore onthe orga of perception weaken them and somes times desis them, 0 that having peeved hem, they anno perceive weaker inpreions sce the stony action Sth penctingimprenion has duced them to pasty. Itisthe sme athe cite fvese since penetrating sensations af great ore, when epested, weaken ad often estoy The dazaling abt on gh or mighty thandriit on he ing The sess ater an xtenely power seman, cane tox perve weak ones! anyone who sca brllat lighe anno pereive afi glow atte same incor even ars wards kee, anyone who hears thundeross ne cannot hear fain snd these time or even aferwary and Anyone who tates someting exccvely sweet cannot ate Anything ess wert strate Bain he case othe rational faculty itis jm the reves, for consnoous thinking aod forming of strong coneetons brings ia greater Powel ad fay of reetng wesker ons sterwarde tit ometimes fete tgued and wen, bec he nelle sce help fom imagination mak se on organ Habe to gue, and cuarrer x 2 sp refises to serve the intellect. IF it were due to another ‘cause, this would invariably happen but, in fact, the intellect Feta it capacity for work in most casea A Third Argument Again, after maturity—after the completion ofthe process ‘ofnatural, physical growth, which takes place near forty o at forty, the faculties of all the pars ofthe body begin to aeray, In most cases, however, this facalty Becomes strong ly after that; if it were one of the bodily faculic, it would necessarily always wane at the ime, but this snot elways 0, so {xcept In certain eas when it encounters certain seca ‘obstacles in most catest does not happen, So it isnot ane of the bodily faculties, Ae Objesion adits Salifactry Ascer ‘The supposition that the soul forgets its intligiblesand its activity ceases both with the lle ofthe ody and with old ‘age, and tha’ this is because it activity is incomplete without the help of the body—this supposition i unnecesary. snd ‘untrue. For now that we have established that the soul thinks by itself itis necesary to seek the explanation of th dlificalty which has caused this doubt, It is poaibte that the two facts, namely, that the soul i active by ieelf and that it nevertheless gives up its activity with theillaes ofthe body and ceases o function, can be combined without any mutual ‘contradiction, this objection isnot ta be taken into account, So we hold that the soul has two sctivties" an acts ‘elation tothe body which is ite government and conta and an activity in relation to itself and is principles, which js intellection, These two activities are s0 opposed to cach ‘other and mutually obsrictive that when the su cecepied With the one it turas away ffom the other, not being abe «easily t combine the two Is functions in respect ofthe boy are perception, imagination, appetite, anger fear, sorrow, and pain. You can know this fr youre from the Tac that hen you begin to occupy yourself with the thinking activity all the aforementioned activities would be suspends unless ‘you overcame the soul and compelled it t9 return to them,conceRsING THE souL ‘This much you would surely concede, that sensation prevents the soul ffom intellectual activity, for when the soul i ene rowed in the sensible, itis diverted from che intelligible, ‘without the intellect ieelf or the intellectual organ being in any way imptired, and you would agree that is cause ithe preoccupation of the soul with one special fonction rather than ancther, This is why the activity of the intellect ceases ‘with ines If the ineligible form were completely set at naught and reduced to nothing because of the organ, the 1» return of the organ to is previous state would necesitate a complete reacquisidon ofthe form. But this is nots, forthe foul often fully regnine ie ineletion of all ite previous objects. This shows, thea, that what it had acquired was in ome manner presen in it, only it was diverted fom i Tis not only this opposition of the two sides ofthe actviy ‘of the soul sehich produces impediments in es fanetions, but feven the multiplicity ofthe actions of the ane side may cate the same thing. Fear diverts the sul from hunger; appetite hinders i from anger, and anger from fexe. The cause i all, se these eas ig the same, namely, the complete absorption of the soul in one thing. ‘Therefore, if thing doesnot exercise its proper activity due to ita preoccupation with something lee,’ it may stl fanetion even when that thing ir present. ‘We could dwell further on this poin, "but itis unnecesary to prolong the digeuson since’ we are satisied® with the conclusion that we have already reached. Thus iis apparent from the principles we have established that the soul is not imprinted in the body, nor inheres int The way oft attach= ment to the body, then, must be the way required by it attracts it © govern and control How the Animal Faculties Assist the Rational Sout We say that the animal faculties ast the rational soul various ways, one of them being that sensation brings to it particulars from which result four intellectual. procese. Firstly, from thes particulars the soul abstract single univere sals by abstracting their concept from their mater, material attachments and accidents by considering the ‘common factors and differences, and by distinguishing the erential, from the accidental, From this the sul gets the fundamental ‘concepts by using the faculties of imagination and extimation, Secondly, the sal finds relations of negation and arn tion between these separate universal. Where this combina- by negation and affirmation is selRevident, it imply accepts it; but where this fe not the case it leaves i tll the discovery of the mile term. ‘Thirdly, it acquires empirical premisss, which consists in finding through sene-experiene the necessary attribution of ” 2 postive or negative predicate toa subject, or in finding a contradictory oppasition (e4- man is rational, man it not ‘ational; man is not a nonrational being), or i finding & consequence of a positive or negative conjunction (eg. sit is day itis ligh; iit i not day itt not light); or in nding 2 positive or a negative esjunction without contradictory ‘opposition (eg. either it i day or it ie night; itis neither 2» black noris it white). This relation is valid not sometimes no in half the number ofthe cates but alway, 20 thatthe soul Acquiesces inthe fact that tis ofthe nature! of this predicate te have such-and-auch relation to this subject, or that it ‘of the nature ofthis consequence to follow necesaiy fom this antecedent or to be essentially contrary to #t—not by mere chance. Thus, this would be» belief obtained from senseexperience and from reasoning at well: from sense: experience, because itis observed; from reasoning, because iit were by chance it would not be found always or even in yo ‘most cass. It i just as we judge that scammony’ is, by is nature, a laxative for bil, for we have experience this often and then reasoned that if it were not owing to the nature of ‘xammony but only by chance, this would happen only on certain occasions. In the fourth category are the report to ‘hich the soul gives assent on account of unbroken tnd over. ‘whelming tradition, ‘The soul then requires the help of the body in order to scquite these principles ofconception and judgement. Having6 CONCERNING THE SOUL acquired them it returns to itself i ater that, any of the lower faculties happens to occupy i, this completely diverts it from its proper aciviy. When not so diverted ft ce not reed the lower faculties for its special activity, except fa certain matters wherein i specially needs to tefr once more (© the faculty of imagination for finding a new principle fa addition to what had already been obtained, or for recalling fan image. This happens frequently in the beginning, but seldom afterwards, and when the sul becomes perfect and strong (i. has obtained all the principles it needs for con ception and judgement, it isolates Itself absolutely in ‘action, and the faculties of sensation and imagination and all the other bodily faculties diver it fom its activites For example, aman may need arding animal? and other means ‘of reaching a certain place; but when he has reached it and done his work and feels reluctant) to leave on account of certain events, the very means which he employed to eet ‘here would indirectly prove an impediment: Now, the areas ‘ents we have established to show thatthe substratum ofc * intligibles, i the rational sou nota body, nora faculey in a body, have saved us the trouble of producing further ‘evidence to prove the selfsubsistence of the soul independent of the body, although we can prove it in another way fon its independent activity. Concerning the Temporal Origin of the Sout We say that human souls are ofthe same species and concept fthey existed before the body, they woul either be muldple entities or one single entity. Bu iti impoasbe for them te be ither the one othe other, as willbe shown later, therefore iv is imposible for them to exist before the body. We nowy begin with the explanation ofthe impossibility ofits numerical ‘multiplicity and say that the mutual diference ofthe souls before their attachment] bodies is either duet their quide lity and form; or tothe element and matter which # muldple ‘in space, « particular part of which each matter ecupless or cuarren xit ” to the various times peculiar to every soul when it becomes stent in its matter; or to the causes which divide thelr ‘matter. But their difference is not due to their quiddity of form, since thei form is one, therefore their difference is doe to the recipient ofthe quiddty orto the body to which the quiddity i specifically related. Before ite attachment tothe body the soul isquidlity pure and simple; thus its imponble for one soul to be numerically different from another, or for the quiddity to admit of esentl differentiation, THs holds abyotely true in all cass forthe multiplicity of the species ‘of those things whose esences are pure concepts is only dive to the substrata which receive them and to what is affected by them, oF due only to their times But when they are absolutely separate i. when the categories we have enumere ated are not applicable to them, they cannot be diverse, Tes therefore impossible for them to have any kind of very ‘or multiplicity among them. Thus i i untrue that before ‘hey enter bodies souls have numerically diferent esences Tsay that its also imposible for goul to have numerically fone essence, for when two bodies come into existence two souls also come into existence in them. Then ether (1) these wo souls are two parts ofthe same single sou, fn which cae one single thing which docs not posses any magnitude and bulk would be potentially divisible ‘This is manifestly absurd according to the prineiples cstablshed in physice Or— (@) asoul which is numerically one would bein two bodies. ‘This also does not require much efor to refute, Its thus proved that the sol comes into existence when «vert a body does it tobe wed by it The body which thus ‘comes into being isthe kingdom and instrument of the sul In the very disposition of the subwtance uf the soul which ‘comes into existence together with a certain body a body, ‘that to say, with the appropriate qualities to make it sa, able to receive the soul which takes its origin ffom the frst Principles—there isa natural yearning to occupy iuelf with hat body, to seit contre it and be attracted byt TH yearning binds the soul specially to this body, and torn it away fom other bodies diferent from itin nature ao that theEy conceasine THe s0uL soul does not contact them except through it. Thus when the principle ofits individualiaton, namely, ite peculiar dis Positions, occur to i t becomes an individual, These dis: Positions determine its attachment to that particular body 8nd form the relationship oftheir mutual suitability, although this relationship and its condition may be obscure to ws. The ‘soul achieves its first entelechy through the body; is subse- Rent development, however, dors not depend on the by ve But after their separation from their bodies the souls remain individual owing to the diferent matters in which ‘they had been, and owing othe imes oftheir birth and their different dispositions due t their bodies which necessarily dlfler because oftheir peculiar conditions. The Soul doesnot Die ith the Death of the Body; it is Inooraptble ‘We say that the soul doesnot die with the death of the body and is absolutly incorruptible, Ae forthe former proposition, this is because everything which is corrupted with the core ruption of something else iin some way attached to it And Anything which in some way ix attached to something ese cither coexistent with ior posterior tit in existence or rior toi ths priority being eental and not temporal If, then, the soul isso attached to the body that itis coexistent with and this is not accidental but pertains to it esence, then they are essentially interdependent. Then neither the soul nor the body would be a substance; but in fact they are substances. And if this is an accidental and not an essential 4» attachment, then, with the corruption of the one trim only the accidenial relationship ofthe other term vil be annulled, but its being will not be eoerupted with its corruption. Ifthe soul is x0 attached to the body tha it posterior to it ia ‘existence, then, in that cas, the body will be the cause ofthe Souls existence, Now the causes ae fur 9 ether the body onaprer xin ° isthe ecient cause of the soul and gives it existence, or ite its receptive and material cause—maybe by way of compos- tion a the elements are forthe body or by way of simplicity at bronze is for the statue or the body isthe soul's formal ot final caus. But the body cannot be the soul's ecient eause, for body, as such, does not act) it acts only through ite faculties IF it were to act through its estence, not through its Faculties, every body would act in the same way. Again, the bodily faculties are” all of them either accidents of ‘material forms, and itis imposible that either accidents oF forms eubsiting in matter should produce the being of a selfsubsstng entity independent of matter of that of an Absolute substance, Nor is it posible thatthe body should be the receptive and material cause of the soul, for we have clearly shown and proved chat the soul i in no way ime printed in the body. The body, then, isnot “informed” with {he form of the youl, either by way of simplicity or compos. tion 30 that certain parts of the body are composed. and mixed together a certain way and then the souls imprinted in them. Itis ako imposible thatthe body should be the formal or the final cause ofthe soul, for the reverse isthe more plausible ease. "Thue the atachment of the soul to the body is not the attachment of an effet toa necessary cause. The truths that the body and the temperament are an acidental cause ofthe soul, for when the matter of a body suitable to become the intrument of the soul and its proper subject comes into txistence, the separate cannes bring into being the individal ‘oul, and that is how the soul originates from them. This is bbeetse itis imposible to bring arbitrarily into being diffe~ tent souls without any spectc cause. Besides, the soul does fot admit of numerical mulpliciy, as we have shown. ‘Again, whenever a new hing comes into being, it must be preceded by a mater whichis prepared to receive it or 10 hive a relationship with it, as has Been shown in the other sciences. Again, ian individual soul were to come into being ‘without an instrument through which it acts and attain perfection, ite being would be purpeeeles; but there is frothing purposelest in nature, Tn truth, when the suitability6 CONCERNING THE SOUL and preparation for such a relationship exist in the insteus ‘ment, it becomes necessary that uch a thing asa soul should inate from the separate case. te the existence ‘of another, the corruption ofthe former does not necesarly, fntal that of the Tater. This happens only where its very being subsists through or in tha thing. Many things orig nating from other things survive the laters corruption; ‘when their being does notsubsistin them, and especially when ve they owe their existence to something other than what wat merely preparatory forthe emanation of their being, And the being of the soul does in fact emanate ftom something Afferent from the body and bodily functions, as we have showin; is source of emanation most be something different from the body. Thus when the soul ower it being to that ‘other thing and only the time of ie realization to the boy, its being would be independent ofthe body which i only 6 Accidental caus; it cannot then be said that they have ‘mutual relationship which would necessitate the body te preceding the woul a its necessary cause Tet us turn to the third division which we mentioned in the beginning, namely, that the attachment ofthe sul to the body might be inthe sense thatthe soul i prior wo the body fn existence. Now in that case the priority will be ether {temporal as well as esental, and so the souls being could ‘0 possibly be attached to the body since it precedes the body in time, oF the priority will be only essential and not temporal, for in time the sou will not be separate from the body. This sort of provty means that when the prior entity se comes into existence, the being ofthe posterior entity must follow from it. Then the prior entity cannot exist i the posterior is supposed to be non-existent. T do not tay that the supposition of the non-existence ofthe posterior neces tates the non-existence ofthe prior, but that the posterior ‘cannot be non-existent except when first something, has naturally happened to the prior which hs made it non. ‘existent, too. Thus i is not the supposition of the non-exie fence of the posterior entity which necesitates the nom eiatenc of the prior, but the supposition ofthe non-existence cuAPrER xttt 6 ior uel, for the posterior can be supposed tbe fonexitent only afer the prior il har cea to ex ‘Tis being so, it flows thatthe cause of nonveistence must cccur in the substance ofthe soul necestating the bodys ‘orruption along with and thatthe bly eatmot be core rupt through a cause special to elt But in fet the eo ‘pion ofthe body does take place through 2 cause spa {ets namely, trough changes ini composition sits temperament Thusitisflseto old that theoal is attached {othebody as een por toi and that at thesame tne the body it indeed corupted though casein el a0 ‘uch relaonhipsutnise between the ew, ‘This being so, all the form of stachment between the ‘nny snd the ou have proved to be fale ant only remains thatthe sal in is being, has a selaonsip wath te bay buts related with other principles which ave no subject ‘hange of compton, ‘Avfor the proponion tht the soul does not admit of comption at all, Tsay that there ts anther conloive reaon for the immortality of the soul. Everything which 2> ‘night be corrupted through sme use has In eel the Potenly of coruption and, before cmrupion, has te Sctulity of penitence Bus ies absurd tata single hing in the ame sense should posts both, the poteniity of ca ‘upton and the actualy of perstence ty potentiality of both these ching, Ths faculty ne beings pyial one must be soul ule Thus the substratum Inv which both dese uae nhere not the whol of ou body, nor any to Organs of our body, nor yet singe orgen into far as isa pal organs a0 the conclaoats hat the combing so $uatum is ou! fuelfo body nsamuch a 1 possess sou, ‘he combining subtatum even in the ater cane relly beng {he soul, which Sul s the principe ofall hse feu. Te isnecesbary tat the sl hould be attached tothe Bat? ‘ngan in which Me takes ity and ot imposible hat an x» organ shouldbe alve without the attachinem a psehicl Taeulty oi or that the fist thing ataced tothe body should ot be his principle ta pots aca. Tis being soy the organ to which ths principle attached mst be the hart This theory of Arte fe oppeel to that of the Divine ato. Thee i, however, a dficly her, for we eee ‘hae there ar vegetative faculties inthe pla butt doesnot ype the pereptve or the rational sh Again, both the ‘egcative and pereepive rule arin the animal but not the ‘ational This showa that each of theses diferent acl, cuarren xv or ‘aving no connexion with the oer To anwer this doubt itrmast be understood that elemental bodes are prevented fiom receiving life by their being in able contradiction ‘The more these bois are set break the abate of contradiction and bring it nearer to the mean, which aw 90 ‘oppoite, the nearer they proach a rcblanee wh e Elo bodies and to that exen they deere to seeing ne Shimating fcuty trom the conoling separate prince The nearer they approach the mea, the more capable ot He they become il they reach the init where its imponble for them to come any pater tothe mean and tore the contradictory extremes any farther, al 0 they eect substance which somehow clalyremblesthe inmate ‘ubetance itself jut ab the heavenly bodies have eceved it and are connected withthe inmateral tbsnce, Then, ‘en the elemental bots have rece th saat, ‘hatver was said to originate in them exclusively trough the separate external soetnce ele te reception tat ne substance may now besaid to onginate in tem Urbugh both these subaances, To istrate ths point with at example frm phys, et ts sippote fie, of rather im, in place ofthe immaterial sstatance and in place of he ving boy a material substance capable of beng afected by fe, say ball In place othe vegetative soul le state uns heating ofthis ballin place ofthe animal sou these Aluminting it ae in place of the human sul the sus nding are in Now we say thatthe postion of salt Jnreaion to re o the sun by which i's capable of being AMfeced may be such that it an be neither aumined hot Kindle by them, bt ean only be ated by them, Bat te Briton in relation tothe source of ight or heat becomes ‘ch that it canbe illuminated and rendered tralucent st well as heated, then in that este illaminaton proccing from the source ofigh towards the ball may al be id te cate ofits heating in aon tothe ute oe the sn heats one though faye But then if he ball as rear capacity fr feciving light ad het and by ite nature combustible om being ated by the powee ‘ays of an Incendiary agent it would be Kindled andthe@, CONCERNING THE sovE “Haine would come into existence as a ‘body which in some sense would resemble the immaterial substance (whic ts ‘ase tthe sun). The that fame would be toga ithe irumaterial substance, the cause of both ileminasos aed heating Ifthe flame alone remained, the heating andthe illumination would alo continue to ex along wih fe although itis posible tha beating alone woul en, oly ‘oth eating and lumination which ease the once (je: the fame) would nt be the source ofthe emabaton of ve the anterior (ie the heating and te iluminaton). Bet ohen nile pet cet Sulncny, hes nae 5p ni be posterior would also be s sure ofthe taney, tthe antrir wold santa bose ee manner the pychicl faculties ae to be conceived from ti, it ao appears that the soul exits with the body and that does no originate fom 8 body but fom a substance wich isa form without body, ‘The Active Intellect s» We say thatthe theoretical faculty in man also comes into actuality from potentiality through the ilumiastion of substance whose nature itis to produce light This s becouse thing does not come into actuality ffom potendaliey by Itself but through something else which gives it aceon ‘The actuality which this substance gives to the potential ‘human intellect isthe intelligible forms." There eats then something which from Sts own substance! confes and rn Drints on the soul the intelligible form, This entity thus hos Iitsesence the intlgble forms, and is thercore cently. 4 an intellect, Iie were a potential intellect, this would inva an infinite egresy whichis absurd and soe sens must stop ‘at something which in is esence i an itllect nd couse se Potential intellects to become actual intellects, This some, {hing isin ite asufcient cause to bring the ether imcloces fom potentiality into actuality; iti termed, in relation to ‘the potential intellects which pass into actuality, nctive cuarren xvt 6 intellect, jst as the material intellect is termed in relation {0 it passive intellect, or imagination is termed in relation to the same a second pase intellect, The intellect which between these two is called the acquired imelect, Tho nae inelet is related to our souls which are potential inline and to the intligibles which are potent imtlligber the same way as the sun is related to our eyes which are Potential percipiens, and to the colours which are the Potential perceptible. For when the influence ofthe su (he the ray) reaches the potential abject of ight they bees actual perceptibles and the eye becomes an actual ercipiene ‘Similarly some power emanates from this active intellect soa Proceeds to the objets of imagination which are poten ‘mtellgibles, and makes them actual intlligbles and the potential intellect an actual intellect. And just as te sun by itself an object of sight and eauses the potential object of ‘sh to become an actual one, similarly this subntancy ese jwlf inteigible and causes other potential intelligible to Decome actual intellgibles. But what iin tell ineligible isin itself an intellect, for wat isin itself ntligble te form abstracted from matter, and especially when itis Stself abstract and not through any ether agent. This cule stance then must needs be etemaly intelligible in hee ce wel as inteligent in elf