Documentos de Académico
Documentos de Profesional
Documentos de Cultura
16.
¿Qué es la tradición?
BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE*
65
BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE
2 Cf. J. PIEPER, Über den Begriff der Tradition, Westdeutcher, Köln 1958, 11.
3 Cf. W. KASPER, Tradition als theologisches Erkennisprinzip, in: W. LÖSER, K. LEHMANN,
M. LUTZBACHMANN (dirs.), Dogmengeschichte und katholische Theologie, Echter,
Würzburg 1985, 379.
4 Cf. S. WIEDENHOFER, Grundprobleme des theologischen Traditionsbegriffs: Zeitschrift für
katholische Theologie 112 (1990) 18-29. El autor es profesor y director de un grupo de
investigación interdisciplinar sobre los procesos de la tradición en la Universidad de
Frankfurt.
5 Cf. ID., Zum gegenwärtigen Stand von Traditionstheorie und Tradiciónstheologie:
Theologische Revue 93 (1997) 443-468.
6 Cf. La serie, S. WIEDENHOFER (dir.), Studies in tradition theory, estudiará el tema. Ver B.
SCHOPPELREICH, Zeichen und Zeugnis: Zum sakramentalen Verständnis kirchlicher
Tradition, Lit, Münster, 2000. Cf. también J. DRUMM, Tradition (Theologie-und
dogmengeschictlich, Systematisch-theologisch), in: Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche,
2001. Una obra reciente en inglés es D. BROWN, Tradition and Imagination: Revelation
and Change, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1999.
66
¿Qué es la tradición?
hechos por este Concilio, y los esfuerzos en los debates que siguieron para
refinar más la noción.
La clave hermenéutica en la interpretación del significado de la tradición es
la relación sujeto-objeto, un tema que es tratado en la literatura,
particularmente en el artículo de Kasper. Según Charles Taylor, en la
trasformación hacia la modernidad, se dio en el pensamiento occidental un
importante cambio, que este autor describe como el distanciamiento entre
sujeto y objeto7. El cambio esencial se da en la explicación del conocer y el
desear de un modo marcadamente diferente. Antes de esta trasformación, el
verdadero conocimiento y la verdadera valoración provenían de nuestra
correcta conexión con la realidad, esto es, del significado que las cosas tienen
ónticamente8.
El pensamiento de santo Tomás, en general, pertenece a este esquema 9. En
particular, el esquema ontológico en el cual todos los entes creados participan
en la verdad y bondad de Dios, está reflejado en su tratamiento de la doctrina
apostólica y términos relacionados. Hay una verdad divina; Dios hace
manifiesta esta verdad en la historia con el propósito de traer a la existencia
una congregatio de creyentes, una activa comunión en la verdad que ya ha
comenzado en la integración de todo en una única economía de revelación y
salvación. Esta verdad alcanza el fin al que está ordenado por Dios solo
cuando es asimilado por los creyentes, y llega a ser en ellos un principio activo
de unidad. La comunidad de fe es así formada como comunidad por un
conocimiento compartido y auténtico de la revelación divina, la cual está
presente en la Escritura. La verdad divina, que es una, se manifiesta en las
Escrituras, y en la comunidad que es la Iglesia. Por lo tanto, la autoridad de la
Escritura y la autoridad de la Iglesia están basadas ambas en una y misma
manifestación divina de la verdad 10. O, podríamos decir, las Escrituras y la
autoridad de la Iglesia participan de la verdad divina como autoridad 11. En este
7 Cf. C. TAYLOR, Sources of the Self, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1989, 186.
8 Cf. Ibídem.
9 Cf. R. CAMPBELL, Truth and Historicity, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1992, 129.
10 Cf. É. MÉNARD, La Tradition: révélation - écriture - église selon saint Thomas d’Aquin,
Desclée, Montreal 1964, 148-151.
11 Cf. Y. CONGAR, La Tradition et les traditions: II. Essai historique, Fayard, Paris 1960,
126.
67
BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE
68
¿Qué es la tradición?
69
agente es el Magisterio20, no hay mención aquí de un sentido “subjetivo” de
tradición. Además, como era el caso con el estilo objetivista de la teología, a los
elementos objetivos se concedía un valor por referencia a una voluntad
externa, fundamentalmente la voluntad de Dios, y luego la voluntad de la
autoridad eclesiástica. Así la tradición vino a significar un cuerpo objetivo de
doctrina o instituciones impuesto por la autoridad de la Iglesia. En efecto,
algunas veces se identificaba la tradición simplemente con la enseñanza
autorizada de la Iglesia, o el magisterio 21. Scheeben sostuvo que lo autoritativo
subyacente a la enseñanza de la fe es, en el sentido propio, Tradición 22.
También reconoció, sin embargo, un papel para toda la Iglesia, esto es, de
todos los miembros de la Iglesia, que puede y debe, a su modo particular,
participar en la comunicación de la enseñanza. Pero la presentación
autoritativa de la enseñanza es un oficio de la autoridad, que se encuentra
tanto dentro como por encima de la Iglesia.
El Modernismo puede considerarse como una reacción contra la posición
objetivista. Sin embargo, el mismo modernismo todavía aceptaba la separación
entre sujeto y objeto, solo que ahora hacía del sujeto separado, en particular la
experiencia interior de ese sujeto, la fuente de la verdad 23. Sugiero que a una
teoría de este tipo, que dio un lugar de honor al sujeto separado, pueda
llamarse la teoría “subjetivista”.
En su crítica fuertemente polémica del Modernismo, Louis Billot presenta
una instancia paradigmática del modelo objetivista. Para Billot, las verdades
que son comunicadas por la tradición, que es tradición en el sentido “objetivo”,
son el objeto de la fe, pero es necesaria la proclamación oficial de estas
verdades por la autoridad eclesiástica para hacerlas obligatorias como la regla
de la fe. Ésta última constituye la tradición en el sentido formal. Así, en esta
72
¿Qué es la tradición?
73
BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE
sino que es historia 34. Kasper interpreta el proyecto hegeliano como una
empresa que vincula las dos nociones de tradición, la vieja y la nueva, en una
síntesis mayor. Al delinear una respuesta a esta nueva concepción de la
verdad, Kasper ofrece una explicación de cómo la verdad y con ella la
autoridad, pueden ser encontradas en la tradición 35. Emerge en este punto el
tema de la relación entre sujeto y objeto, el cual, como se ha argumentado
previamente, es una importante clave para comprender cómo la tradición fue
interpretada dentro de la historia de la teología.
El proceso de descubrir la verdad en la tradición requiere la actividad del
sujeto. Según Kasper, no poseemos el contenido de la tradición como objeto,
sino sólo a través de la mediación de nuestro conocer subjetivo, el cual es en sí
mismo un elemento esencial en el proceso de transmisión 36. Sin embargo, este
conocimiento subjetivo no está vacío de contenido. Es el contenido el que
engendra el acto de conocer, y el que lo determina como un acto de conocer
algo. Así, el punto clave de la teoría de Kasper de la verdad en la tradición es la
unidad del acto (de conocer) y el ser (contenido) 37. El acto es la comunicación
(el actus tradendi) a través del cual el contenido (el traditum) es conocido. La
unidad acto-ser se despliega como un proceso en el cual tradición e
interpretación se pertenecen inseparablemente. Finalmente, la comunidad es el
sujeto de esta transmisión y vive comprometiéndose con ella. Aunque el
pensamiento de Hegel nos ayuda a entender el proceso de la comunicación, tal
como éste tiene lugar en la historia, la noción hegeliana de verdad como
producto de la historia no puede ser aceptada38.
Después de proponer una explicación del significado de la tradición en
sentido general, el autor ofrece una interpretación específicamente cristiana. La
teología debe arrancar de la verdad divina manifestada en Jesús 39. La tradición
cristiana tiene una orientación escatológica; el acontecimiento de Jesucristo es
la "plenitud del tiempo”. Sin embargo, este evento no es un final sin futuro, sino
74
¿Qué es la tradición?
más bien el definitivo nuevo comienzo. La tradición, por lo tanto, está orientada
hacia la plenitud que está por llegar 40. Entre los varios testigos de la tradición se
incluyen aquellos que son “oficiales”, pero también el testimonio de la vida
cristiana cotidiana, especialmente la de los santos. Pero, por importantes que
sean estos testigos, no son idénticos a la tradición en sí; sólo son la
actualización de esa tradición por vía de signo-sacramento 41. Podríamos llamar
a esto, con Kasper, la estructura sacramental, o cuasi-sacramental de la
tradición42.
El estudio de J. Bunnenburg sobre la concepción de tradición de Yves
Congar, ofrece un panorama clarificador de las importantes contribuciones de
este autor43. Su obra encarna muchos de los temas que modelaron el análisis
teológico subsiguiente de la tradición, por ejemplo, la perspectiva histórica, el
reconocimiento de la experiencia de la comunidad creyente como fuente, y la
interpretación de la tradición como sacramento 44. Propuso lo que se ha llamado
su “fórmula breve” de tradición: “’Referencia al pasado’; no es exacto. Hay más
bien una presencia del pasado en el presente; una presencia de los eventos
que son constitutivos de la relación religiosa en cada momento del tiempo,
permaneciendo abiertos, situados y constituidos; una presencia del Principio en
todos los momentos de su desarrollo”45. Esto deja entrever una concepción
platónica de la idea intemporal sobre la historia, encarnada en instancias
particulares. Pero Congar vio también la verdad en la tradición como
comunicación interpersonal, últimamente fundada en la comunicación con la
Trinidad46.
A pesar del tenor platónico de algunas de las afirmaciones de Congar, hay
otras que parecen tener un sabor hegeliano: la verdad es escatológica, esto es,
la verdad plena aparece al final del proceso de llegar a ser en el cumplimiento 47;
40 Cf. Ibídem, 394.
41 Cf. Ibídem, 397.
42 Cf. Ibídem.
43 Cf. J. BUNNENBURG, Lebendige Treue zum Ursprung: Das Traditionsverständnis Yves
Congars, Matthias-Grünewald, Mainz 1989.
44 Cf. Y. CONGAR, o. c.,161.
45 Ibídem, 37-38; Cf. J. BUNNENBURG, o. c., 270.
46 Cf. J. BUNNENBURG, o. c., 331; Y. CONGAR, La Parole et le Souffle, Desclée, Paris 1984, 7.
47 Cf. J. BUNNENBURG, o. c., 329.
75
BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE
48 Cf. Ibídem., 332; Y. CONGAR, Die Normen für die Ursprungstreue und Identität der
Kirche in Verlauf ihrer Geschichte: Concilium n. 9 (1973) 156-163, 162.
49 Cf. J. BUNNENBURG, o. c., 330.
50 Cf. J. G. BOEGLIN, La question de la Tradition dans la théologie catholique contemporaine,
Cerf, Paris 1998, 328. C. GEFFRÉ, Le Christianisme au risque de l’interprétation, Cerf, Paris 1983.
51 Cf. J. G. BOEGLIN, o. c., 381.
52 Cf. Ibídem, 325.
53 Cf. B. SCHOPPELREICH, Zeichen und Zeugnis: Zum sakramentalen verständnis
kirchlicher Tradition, Lit, Münster 2000.
76
¿Qué es la tradición?
77
BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE
59 Cf. Ibídem,182.
60 Cf. Una importante fuente aquí es P. ROUSSELOT, (d. 1915); J. E. THIEL, o. c., 174.
61 Cf. B. SCHOPPELREICH, o. c., 113.
62 Cf. J. GALOT, Recensiones: J. G. Boeglin, La question de la tradition dans la théologie
catholique contemporaine: Gregorianum 80 (1999) 189.
63 Cf. B. SCHOPPELREICH, o. c., 188.
64 Cf. J. DRUMM, o. c. (nota 6), 157.
78
¿Qué es la tradición?
79
BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE
80
¿Qué es la tradición?
81
BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE
82
¿Qué es la tradición?
por parte de la gente. En este sentido podemos decir que el compromiso moral
del sujeto (la comunidad) es constitutivo de tradición.
La tradición, como proceso humano asumido por la comunidad cristiana, es
teleológica; tiene sus propios fines. Éstos son, como se ha argumentado: (1) La
comunicación de la vida cristiana, que incluye por supuesto, las creencias que
le dan forma y propósito; (2) La expresión y confirmación de la identidad de la
comunidad y la identidad de su sistema de creencias; esto incluirá la
discriminación entre creencias y prácticas genuinas y falsas y entre los
miembros genuinos de la comunidad y los demás. Podríamos añadir (3) El
fomento de la vida de virtud en la presente comunidad de la Iglesia, que equipa
a sus miembros para trabajar y vivir para los fines de la tradición. Si la tradición,
como realidad humana, no cumple con todos estos fines, simplemente dejará
de existir como tradición.
V. CONCLUSIÓN
83
BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE
84
WHAT IS TRADITION?
Since the Second Vatican Council, there has been ongoing tension within the
Catholic Church concerning the relationship between continuity and change. In the
discussions of doctrinal and moral questions which have arisen in this context,
appeals are frequently made to “tradition” as a basis for normative decisions as to
what must remain unchanged and what may be modified. However despite its
importance, the meaning of this term itself has, as yet, not been adequately
explained 1 This article aims to clarify the notion by investigating how it was used in
certain significant theological texts of the past, how it is employed in some
contemporary literature in the same area, and how it could be more adequately
defined. In the course of the investigation particular attention will also be given to
the way in which these texts treated the moral dimension of tradition. The reason for
this special concern is that, while references to tradition in moral teaching and
moral theology are very frequent, relatively little attention has been given to this
aspect.
The problem of the lack of an adequate account of the notion of tradition is not
new. Writing in 1958, Josef Pieper remarked that it was hard to find a satisfactory,
general explanation of the notion. 2 Walter Kasper acknowledged in 1985 that the
_________________________________________________________________________
_
As a first step in the analysis of the meaning of tradition, I will examine how that
notion was explained by theologians in the past, with special consideration being
given to the period from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century. It was in this period
that theologians sought to deal with “modernity” and in doing so interpreted tradition
in a particular way. It was this way of understanding the term that provided the
2
What is Tradition?
3
BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE
_________________________________________________________________________
_
In this unified way of thinking the tradition ( as we now call it) is inherently related to
the believing community of the Church; it is not separate from and above it. It has,
furthermore, inherent value as a participation in divine truth.
With the loss of this unified vision embracing the subject and the object, the
subject and object are separated, and the latter left without any source of value in
itself; a change often linked to Ockham. 12 The problem is how to supply a source of
value in the now separate object, a role which Ockham attributed to the external will
of God. We can perhaps find the same separation occurring in Ockham’s views of
what he called “the catholic truths,” and which we might now call “tradition.”
According to Congar, for Ockham the Church (subject) is now separated from and
subordinate to the “objective” sources of its faith. 13 The object (tradition), now has
authority as an external entity, imposed on the Church by the divine will. Thus, a
change in ontology is accompanied by a change in the way tradition is understood.
There is a difference between a version of ontology in which a created entity has
no inner significance in itself, so that this must be supplied entirely by an external
source (the will of God), and another version where that entity has some status in
itself, but this is somehow lacking, so that an act of an external will is needed to
render it complete. An example can be found in Suarez’s conception of the
“intrinsic” evil of a moral act. For him, such an act has its status as good or evil,
intrinsically, according to its conformity, or lack of it, with reasonable nature as such.
But this is insufficient to give it its specifically moral status. Morality, for Suarez is
defined in terms of law and obligation. Hence, there is need for a law, originating in
the will of God, to render that act morally obligatory. 14 Similarly a custom, which, in
earlier theology and canon law, had value because of its inherent qualities of
4
What is Tradition?
apostolicity, antiquity and content, now needs the approval of an authority to have
the force of law.15 Analogously, the truths of faith communicated by tradition, need
the approval of authority to become the rule of faith.16 At the most fundamental
ontological level, the relationships between God and humankind need to be given
the status of a normative, legal order by an historical act of the authority of God. 17 A
distinction is needed, therefore, between the objective understanding of tradition
and what I have called the “objectivist” view. In the first case, the object is
considered as inherently related to the subject, or more specifically, tradition is
considered as related to the Church as the community of believers: in the second
case, the object is considered as separated from that community, and imposed on it
by an act of authority. Tradition is, accordingly, now considered as an entity
standing over against the community of believers and imposed on it by Church
authority.
This way of dealing with tradition can be seen, for example, in the work of those
theologians who established the theology of tradition which became standard in the
nineteenth century, and remained influential in the twentieth. They used the word
“object”, but they tended to use it in the “objectivist” sense, meaning that which is
handed on, namely doctrine or institution, 18 something to be believed, but lacking
the obligatory status which only Church authority could give it. Some theologians
were aware that there was more to tradition that the objective element; Franzelin,
for example, distinguished the “objective” sense of tradition, that which is
transmitted, from the “active” sense, which refers to the whole process by which the
objective content is transmitted to us. 19 But even in this process the agent is the
15 CONGAR, Essai historique, 237, (on the influence of Suarez). The ontological interpretation is
my own.
16 L. BILLOT, S.J. De immutabilitate traditionis contra modernam heresim evolutionismi, 2nd. ed.
Pontif. Inst. Pii IX, Roma,1907, 19.
17 E.GEMMEKE, Die metaphysik des sittlich Guten bei Franz Suarez, Herder, Freiburg-Basel-
Wien, 1965, 35.
18 J. B. FRANZELIN, S.J. Tractatus de Divina Traditione et Scriptura, 4th. ed. S.C. de
Propoganda Fide, Rome, 1896, 11.
19 FRANZELIN, o. c., Tractatus, 12.
5
BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE
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_
6
What is Tradition?
obligatory as the rule of faith. The latter constitutes tradition in the formal sense.
Thus, in this view, tradition fuses with the magisterium as the proximate and
authentic rule of faith.24
Another philosophical and theological current had begun to emerge in the
nineteenth century. The new movement was represented independently by Möhler,
Blondel and Newman. This may be interpreted as, in part, a recovery of the role of
the subject, namely, of the Church community, and the recognition of the genuine
role of human subjectivity. It was a reaction to and corrective of the hitherto
prevailing objectivist view. It may not be irrelevant that Hegel, with whom Möhler
sought to engage, was reacting against an objective notion of tradition. 25 Möhler in
his Die Einheit der Kirche , while not setting aside the objective element of the
“living preaching” of Christ and the Apostles, gives a significant place to the Spirit,
and to the inner religious life, that is to the place of the subject, than did the
alternative view.26 In a later work, Symbolik, Möhler sought to balance the subjective
element with a clearer recognition of the objective content, and external authority. 27
Blondel saw in tradition the systematic principle which could mediate between
subjectivity and objectivity.28 As is well know Blondel sought to bridge the division
between “extrinsicism” and “historicism.” It could be suggested that the problem has
its roots in the ontological divide described earlier. Tradition, as understood by
“historicism” meant simply the “facts” of history, that is as detached from the
subject, and having no inherent capacity to engage the subject. Behind this there
lies the same family of views, mentioned previously, according to which the object
or world was considered as separate from the subject, and in itself, value neutral. In
the theological, “objectivist” view, tradition was understood as an entity separate
7
BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE
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_
from the experience of subjects, and imposed by external authority. Hence, the faith
appears as quite cut off from historical experience, and this is akin to what Blondel
meant by “extrinsicism.” Blondel’s response was to develop his philosophy of act, in
which both subject and object were related. 29 Thus, he is not only attempting to
solve a religious problem, but the underlying philosophical and cultural divide, which
had so bedevilled western culture. Pierre Rousselot, S.J., an important figure in the
development of “transcendental Thomism,” can be situated on that side of the
theological spectrum which sought to reaffirm the place of the subject, and, from a
location within the subject, to establish a relation to the object. 30 This orientation to
the subject remained a characteristic of the movement.
The relevant documents of Vatican II, in particular the Dogmatic Constitution on
Divine Revelation, (Dei Verbum) show the influence of this second philosophical
and theological current. The tradition of the Church is a goal-directed, or
teleological process aimed at the growth in holiness and faith of the whole
community: ". . .what has been handed down from the apostles includes everything
that helps the people of God to live a holy life and to grow in faith." The document
recognizes the reality of "growth in understanding," indeed the whole process of
transmission is described as one by which, ". . . the church constantly holds its
course towards the fulness of divine truth.” The words are not merely to be fully
understood but fulfilled, that is realized in a way of life. Further, it is clearly stated in
the text that growth, “. . . comes about through contemplation and study by
believers. . . through the intimate understanding of spiritual things which they
experience, and through the preaching of those who, on succeeding to the office of
bishop, receive the true charism of truth.”31
8
What is Tradition?
The language reflects a change from the older objectivist mode of understanding
tradition, which, as has been shown, had difficulty in recognizing an active role of
the subject. This is now affirmed, but, at the same time the individual subject is
closely related to the whole Church, which is itself an active subject. Tradition is not
an object, an entity apart from the Church, but the structured life of the Church. This
might be called the relational-communicative understanding of tradition, as distinct
from both the objectivist and the subjectivist. The issue at stake in the theological
debate on the nature of tradition is, from this point onwards, which of these models
should prevail.
In this section I have selected some authors whose work may be considered
representative of theological endeavors to assimilate and refine the changes
described previously. Walter Kasper frames the debate in these terms: What is
tradition: Is it a fixed body of teaching and disciplines or a living, historical process
of communication? He defines tradition, anthropologically, as: “The experience of
earlier generations, stored in a symbol system that makes human life, as human,
possible, in that it enables us to orientate ourselves in the world, and sustains us in
finding our identity.”32 In periods of crisis, tradition can no longer be taken for
granted as providing the true account of life. On the other hand, life itself is deeper
than any particular tradition, and the human spirit, in its search for truth, transcends
every given tradition.33 The argument here, if I understand it correctly, is that despite
the breakdown of tradition, there remain two constants, life itself and the search for
truth, which make it possible for us to manage this crisis and re-structure the
9
BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE
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_
34 Ibidem, 385.
35 Ibidem, 389.
36 Ibidem, 383.
37 Ibidem, 392.
38 Ibidem, 392.
10
What is Tradition?
this transmission and lives by engaging itself in it. While Hegel’s thought helps us to
understand the process of communication, as this takes place in history, the
Hegelian notion of truth as the product of history cannot be accepted. 39
Having proposed an account of the meaning of tradition in a general sense, the
author then provides it with a specifically Christian, theological interpretation.
Theology must begin with the divine truth manifest in Jesus. 40 Christian tradition has
an eschatological orientation; the event of Jesus Christ is the "fullness of time."
However, this event is not an end with no future, but rather the definitive new
beginning. Tradition, therefore, is oriented towards a fulfilment yet to come. 41 The
various witnesses to the tradition include those which are "official," but also the
testimony of daily Christian living and especially that of the saints. But, however
important they are, these are not identical with the tradition itself. They are only the
making present of that tradition by way of sign-sacrament. 42 We might call this, with
Kasper, the sacramental, or quasi-sacramental structure of the tradition. 43
Johannes Bunnenburg’s study of Yves Congar’s understanding of tradition,
provides a useful overview and clarification of the important contributions of that
author.44 Congar’s work embodies many of the themes which shaped the
subsequent theological analysis of tradition, for example, the historical approach,
the recognition of the experience of the faithful community as a source, and the
interpretation of tradition as sacrament.45 He proposed what has been called his
“short formula” for tradition: “‘Reference to the past,’ is not exact. There is rather a
presence of the past in the present; a presence of the events that are constitutive of
the religious relationship at each moment of time, laid open, situated and
39 Ibidem, 391.
40 Ibidem, 391.
41 Ibidem, 394.
42 Ibidem, 397.
43 Ibidem, 397.
44 J. BUNNENBURG, Lebendige True zum Ursprung : Das Traditionsverständnis Yves Congars,
Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, Mainz: 1989.
45 CONGAR, La Tradition et les traditions: II Essai theologique, Fayard, Paris, 1963, 161.
11
BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE
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_
46 See CONGAR, Essai theologique, 37-38. “‘Référence du présent au passé,’ n’est pas très
exacte. Il y a bien plutôt présence du passé dans le présent, présence des événements
constitutifs du rapport religieux à chaque moment du temps par eux ouvert, situé et constitué;
présence du Principe à tout son dévelopment.” Cf. BUNNENBURG, Lebendige True, 270.
47 BUNNENBURG, o. c., 331. CONGAR, La Parole et le Souffle, Paris: 1984, 7.
48 BUNNENBURG, o. c. , 329.
49 BUNNENBURG, o. c., 332. CONGAR, Die Normen für die Ursprungstreue und Identität der
Kirche in Verlauf ihrer Geschichte, Concilium (German) 9 (1973) 156-163, 162.
50 BUNNENBURG, o. c., 330.
51 J. G. BOEGLIN, La question de la Tradition dans la théologie catholique contemporaine, Les
Éditions du Cerf, Paris 1998, 328. C. GEFFRÉ, Le Christianisme au risque de l’interprétation
Éditions du Cerf, Paris, 1983.
12
What is Tradition?
tradition, but only via a summary of the “political theology” of John.Baptist Metz. 52
The analysis of the truth of tradition takes some account of Heideggerian thought
on temporality.53 Barbara Schoppelreich provides an account of the rich and varied
treatment of the theme in contemporary German theological literature, 54 and in
particular the interpretation of tradition as sacramental.
The idea of tradition as sacrament, already proposed by earlier theologians, has
been further developed by Siegfried Wiedenhofer. To say that tradition is a
sacrament, indicates that the historical handing on of the beliefs and the way of life,
is not merely the passing on of objects, but that the process embodies the active
presence of the Gospel and the time-transcending activity of the saving act of Jesus
Christ. It is through the witness or testimony of men and women that the reality of
God is made present and active. That is, tradition is a purposeful or teleological
reality; it is aimed at the salvation of human beings, and in this sense can be said to
be the transmission of life. Tradition is the transmission of life and salvation, and on
the basis of this purpose, true and false tradition can be distinguished. 55 Thus truth
in tradition has a practical orientation. The subject-object relationship is a crucial
element in giving an account of tradition: in respect to this theme, this work
acknowledges the important contribution of the sociology of knowledge developed
by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann.56
A recent study by John E. Thiel takes quite a different approach; it might be said
that we are presented here with an interpretation of tradition in terms of a post-
modern epistemological theory. 57 The specific focus of Thiel’s study is stated in the
subtitle of his work: Continuity and Development in Catholic Faith. This is, of course
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the epistemological problem, which gave rise to the theories of development; but
Theil’s solution is original. He distinguishes four “senses” of tradition, as an
hermeneutical device capable of accounting for continuity and change. As a
philosophical partner in dialogue, Theil chooses the “tradition of American
pragmatism,”58 although this has, in fact, a very limited role in his argument. While
the author does not develop the theological interpretation of tradition at the length
frequently found in European writing, he sees the tradition as manifesting “. . . how
the Spirit moves in history.”59 In his analysis of the truth of tradition, Thiel
counterposes the objective truth of the Spirit, with the “yearning,” which drives the
searcher for truth through the interpretation of the different senses of tradition.
Faithfulness to the Spirit is the only measure of the truthfulness of discernment;
there may be individual or regionally communal beliefs which qualify as true, but
these do not become tradition until they are judged so by the whole Church. This
yearning is identified as the sensus fidei.60 The truth of tradition is discerned in the
meeting of this yearning and the objective Spirit, as displayed in the various levels
of interpretation, from the level of dogmatic definition, to the more particular and
tentative.61 As in the European literature, the fundamental problem is the
relationship between subject and object.
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What is Tradition?
The recent literature is concerned above all with the process of communication
that tradition entails.62 But, as critics have noted, this has sometimes led them to
neglect the issue of criteria for distinguishing between true and false tradition. 63 Yet
this role of tradition cannot simply be left aside. Schoppelreich recognizes the need
for it, and suggests that the basic indicator of the true tradition is that it leads to life
and salvation.64 But by what criteria could we discern whether or not a tradition
leads to salvation? In relation to the much narrower question of how to differentiated
between what is central and what is more peripheral in tradition, one author
suggests that what we need is a re-working of Melchior Cano’s Loci theologici.65 In a
sense, Thiel’s work might be read as an attempt to deal with the problem of criteria
by developing a new way of understanding the diverse levels or senses of tradition,
and the degree of permanence and openness to change proper to each.
On a more general level, the question of criteria is essentially concerned with the
identity of the tradition, that is, how the genuine form is to be differentiated from
other, false or deficient versions. This, in turn, relates to the sense of identity or self-
hood of the community which is committed to the tradition. At this point, a major
issue emerges: what is the proper order of priorities in the tradition, communication
and the establishment of relationships with others, or the preservation of identity?
We can recall that Kasper proposed that tradition should be understood as a
process of communication, but at the same time described a basic role of tradition
as sustaining our identity as a community. Both are obviously vital, but which has
priority? If identity is the higher value, then it follows that we should be primarily
concerned to preserve structures and teaching formulae unchanged and thus carry
out the identity sustaining function of tradition. That would mean, to use a familiar
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expression, to avoid, above all, confusing the faithful. If, on the other hand,
communication has the first place, we may need to ask what must be changed if the
tradition is to be communicated both within the community and to others.
The judgment as to the relative priority to be given to relationship-
communication and identity, within tradition, is the point of many of our present
debates. This is particularly evident in such issues as the proper relationship
between the Catholic Church and non-Christian religions. Another more homely
example is the instruction to the celebrant at the Eucharist not to leave the
sanctuary to give the members of the congregation the sign of peace. The reason
is, presumably, because to do so would entail an incorrect order of priorities: to
move beyond the sacred zone would endanger (his) identity, for the sake of
communication with the faithful. Those who still accept, at least in some respects,
the objectivist model of tradition and the priority of identity sometimes seem to
argue that a change in doctrine or practice is not acceptable because a change,
precisely because it is a change, will undermine the stable sense of identity enjoyed
by members of the Church community. But, if the suggestion proposed above is
correct, this reflects a questionable order of priorities.
The sustaining of identity is an essential function of tradition as an
anthropological entity. The Christian community took up tradition as the necessary
human vehicle for communicating its doctrine and way of life, but it does not
subordinate this theological goal to the anthropological functions of tradition.
Both sides in the debate, whatever their priorities, would accept that
communication is a constitutive goal of tradition. But this, in the present situation,
presents its own problems. Theologians find themselves facing the double problem
of articulating the tradition of the Church, and also defending tradition itself, that is,
showing that tradition can function as a way of communicating true knowledge. The
Enlightenment suspicion of tradition is still influential. In this context, Hegelian
thought is attractive because it seems to offer a way of overcoming the gap
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What is Tradition?
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change. The mystery of Christ implies a progressive unfolding of the divine plan in
history and so has an affinity with a theory of tradition which accepts change as
positive and necessary.
A most important point is Kasper’s remark that in a situation such as ours, where
the tradition is challenged, tradition can be communicated only in a critical way; we
need a critical theory of tradition. But is such a theory possible? Is not being taken
for granted an essential element of tradition, and would not a continual critique
fracture and dissipate it? We are faced once again with the question of priorities. If
one adopts a theory of tradition which gives primacy to sustaining identity, then any
critique of the present forms of the tradition will be perceived as a threat. A theory
which focuses on communication with others, on the other hand, will require a
critique, both of the views of the others and of one’s own, without which
communication will not be possible.
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What is Tradition?
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gave it form and purpose; (2) The expression and confirmation of the identity of the
community and the identity of its belief system; this will include the discriminating
between genuine and false belief and practice and between genuine members of
the community and others. We could add (3) The fostering of the life of virtue in the
present community of the Church that equips its members to work and live for the
purposes of the tradition. If the tradition, as a human reality, does not fulfil all of
these purposes it will simply cease to exist as a tradition.
V. CONCLUSION
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What is Tradition?
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