Contents

Pascual v Pascual-Bautista................................................................................... 1
Bravo v. Bravo-Guerrero....................................................................................... 6
Manuel v. Hon Ferrer.......................................................................................... 14
Chua v CFI of Negros Occidental........................................................................18
Cano v Director of Lands.................................................................................... 22
Lunsod v Ortega................................................................................................. 24
Tuazon v Reyes................................................................................................... 42
Edroso v Sablan.................................................................................................. 43
Riosa v Rocha..................................................................................................... 54
Gonzales v. CFI................................................................................................... 59
Nieva v Alcala..................................................................................................... 68
Florentino v Florentino....................................................................................... 71
Tioco de Papa v Camacho..................................................................................79
Padura v Baldovino MISSING..............................................................................86
78 Phil 413 MISSING........................................................................................... 86
Arroyo v Gerona................................................................................................. 86
Maghirang v. Balcita........................................................................................... 92
Carillo v De Paz.................................................................................................. 95

Pascual v Pascual-Bautista
G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992
OLIVIA
S.
PASCUAL
and
HERMES
S.
PASCUAL, petitioners,
vs.
ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL,
SUSANA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C.
PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO
PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA
PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA
PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S.
PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro Manila, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside: (a)
the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 dated April 29, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 14010
entitled "Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual v. Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista,
Manuel C. Pascual, Jose Pascual, Susana C. Pascual-Bautista, Erlinda C. Pascual,
Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr., et al." which dismissed the petition and in effect affirmed
the decision of the trial court and (b) the resolution dated July 14, 1988 denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural
children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the
decedent Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, petition, p. 17).
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue,
legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children and was survived by
the following:
(a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses;
(b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of the deceased, to
wit:
Esperanza
Manuel
Jose
Susana
Erlinda
Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.

C.

Pascual-Bautista
Pascual
Pascual
Pascual-Bautista
Pascual

C.
C.
C.
C.

(c) Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the deceased, to wit:
Avelino
Isoceles
Loida
Virginia
Nona
Octavio
Geranaia Pascual-Dubert;

Pascual
Pascual
Pascual-Martinez
Pascual-Ner
Pascual-Fernando
Pascual

(d) Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood of the
deceased, to wit:
Olivia
Hermes S. Pascual

S.

Pascual

(e) Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased and
represented by the following:
Dominga
Mamerta
Abraham

M.
P.
S.

Sarmiento,

Pascual
Fugoso
III

Regina
Eleuterio
Domiga
Nelia
Silvestre
Eleuterio
(Rollo, pp. 46-47)

P.
P.

San
P.
M.
M.

Sarmiento-Macaibay
Sarmiento
Diego
Marquez
Pascual
Pascual

Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual,
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162 (CFI of Rizal, Br. XXIII), a Special
Proceeding, Case No. 7554, for administration of the intestate estate of her late
husband (Rollo, p. 47).
On December 18, 1973, Adela soldevilla de Pascual filed a Supplemental Petition to
the Petition for letters of Administration, where she expressly stated that Olivia
Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, pp.
99-101).
On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed an affidavit, to
the effect that of her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the younger full blood brother
of her late husband Don Andres Pascual, to belie the statement made by the
oppositors, that they were are not among the known heirs of the deceased Don
Andres Pascual (Rollo, p. 102).
On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections of the herein petitioners Olivia S.
Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual, although paragraph V of such compromise
agreement provides, to wit:
This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the
above-entitled proceedings until the final determination thereof by the court, or by
another compromise agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia Pascual and Hermes
Pascual as legal heirs of the deceased, Don Andres Pascual. (Rollo, p. 108)
The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the
Manifestation/Motion of the petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual,
manifesting their hereditary rights in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual,
their uncle (Rollo, pp. 111-112).
On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights
(Rollo, pp. 113-114) and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate
Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 116-130).
On December 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court, presided over by Judge Manuel S.
Padolina issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves as it is hereby resolved to
Deny this motion reiterating the hereditary rights of Olivia and Hermes Pascual
(Rollo, p. 136).

On January 13, 1988, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration (Rollo, pp.
515-526). and such motion was denied.
Petitioner appealed their case to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No.
14010 (Rollo, p. 15.).
On Aril 29, 1988, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision the decision
the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 38)
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of said decision and on July 14,
1988, the Court of Appeals issued its resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration (Rollo, p. 42).
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
After all the requirements had been filed, the case was given due course.
The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not Article 992 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural
children from the inheritance of the deceased.
Petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of Article 992 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized and of
the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC (150 SCRA 645 [1987]) because being
acknowledged natural children, their illegitimacy is not due to the subsistence of a
prior marriage when such children were under conception (Rollo, p. 418).
Otherwise stated they say the term "illegitimate" children as provided in Article 992
must be strictly construed to refer only to spurious children (Rollo, p. 419).
On the other hand, private respondents maintain that herein petitioners are within
the prohibition of Article 992 of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Diaz v.
IAC is applicable to them.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Pertinent thereto, Article 992 of the civil Code, provides:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in
the same manner from the illegitimate child.
The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC,
supra, where this Court ruled that:
Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child.
They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the
purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family there

is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate

child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn
hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the
former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees
in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a
blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding
further grounds of resentment.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in holding
that petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession
of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood
brother of their father.
In their memorandum, petitioners insisted that Article 992 in the light of Articles
902 and 989 of the Civil Code allows them (Olivia and Hermes) to represent Eligio
Pascual in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual.
On motion for reconsideration of the decision in Diaz v. IAC, this Court further
elucidated the successional rights of illegitimate children, which squarely answers
the questions raised by the petitioner on this point.
The Court held:
Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights of illegitimate
children, which rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The
descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of
representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should
not
overlook
the
fact
that
the
persons
to
be
represented
are
themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this matter.
The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants
of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be
argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child
is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that
"the grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation."
Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an
illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation which
would set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to the
instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab
intestatobetween the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of
the father or mother. It may not be amiss to state Article 982 is the general rule and
Article 992 the exception.
The rules laid down in Article 982 that "grandchildren and other descendants shall
inherit by right of representation" and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate
children . . . are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to
the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother. (Amicus Curiae's Opinion

by former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12). Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate

Court, 182 SCRA 427; pp. 431-432; [1990]).
Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane
but it is also an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and
phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be
determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean
exactly what is says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The courts
may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words
(Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of
interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law
may be harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42). And even
granting that exceptions may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be
strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly
warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather
than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is established by statute, the court
will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication (Samson v. C.A., 145
SCRA 654 [1986]).
Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.
Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally
placed under one category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as to whether or
not acknowledged natural children should be treated differently, in the negative.
It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX SED LEX).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Bravo v. Bravo-Guerrero
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 152658. July 29, 2005]

LILY ELIZABETH BRAVO-GUERRERO, BEN MAURICIO P. BRAVO,[1] ROLAND P.

BRAVO, JR., OFELIA BRAVO-QUIESTAS, HEIRS OF CORPUSINIA BRAVONIOR namely: GERSON U. NIOR, MARK GERRY B. NIOR, CLIFF
RICHARD B. NIOR, BRYAN B. NIOR, WIDMARK B. NIOR, SHERRY ANNE
B. NIOR, represented by LILY ELIZABETH BRAVO-GUERRERO as their
attorney-in-fact, and HONORABLE FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR.,

Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 139, Makati

City, petitioners, vs. EDWARD P. BRAVO, represented by his attorneyin-fact FATIMA C. BRAVO, respondent, and DAVID B. DIAZ,
JR., intervenor-respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review [2] assailing the Decision[3] of 21
December 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67794. The Court of
Appeals reversed the Decision [4]of 11 May 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch No. 139, in Civil Case No. 97-1379 denying respondents prayer to partition
the subject properties.

Antecedent Facts
Spouses Mauricio Bravo (Mauricio) and Simona [5] Andaya Bravo (Simona) owned
two parcels of land (Properties) measuring 287 and 291 square meters and located
along Evangelista Street, Makati City, Metro Manila. The Properties are registered
under TCT Nos. 58999 and 59000 issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal on 23
May 1958. The Properties contain a large residential dwelling, a smaller house and
other improvements.
Mauricio and Simona had three children - Roland, Cesar and Lily, all surnamed
Bravo. Cesar died without issue. Lily Bravo married David Diaz, and had a son,
David B. Diaz, Jr. (David Jr.). Roland had six children, namely, Lily Elizabeth BravoGuerrero (Elizabeth), Edward Bravo (Edward), Roland Bravo, Jr. (Roland Jr.), Senia
Bravo, Benjamin Mauricio Bravo, and their half-sister, Ofelia Bravo (Ofelia).
Simona executed a General Power of Attorney (GPA) on 17 June 1966 appointing
Mauricio as her attorney-in-fact. In the GPA, Simona authorized Mauricio to
mortgage or otherwise hypothecate, sell, assign and dispose of any and all of my
property, real, personal or mixed, of any kind whatsoever and wheresoever situated,
or any interest therein xxx.[6] Mauricio subsequently mortgaged the Properties to the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) and Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)
for P10,000 and P5,000, respectively.[7]
On 25 October 1970, Mauricio executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Real
Estate Mortgage (Deed of Sale) conveying the Properties to Roland A. Bravo, Ofelia
A. Bravo and Elizabeth Bravo [8] (vendees). The sale was conditioned on the payment
of P1,000 and on the assumption by the vendees of the PNB and DBP mortgages
over the Properties.
As certified by the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, the Deed
of Sale was notarized by Atty. Victorio Q. Guzman on 28 October 1970 and entered

in his Notarial Register.[9] However, the Deed of Sale was not annotated on TCT Nos.
58999 and 59000. Neither was it presented to PNB and DBP. The mortage loans and
the receipts for loan payments issued by PNB and DBP continued to be in Mauricios
name even after his death on 20 November 1973. Simona died in 1977.
On 23 June 1997, Edward, represented by his wife, Fatima Bravo, filed an action
for the judicial partition of the Properties. Edward claimed that he and the other
grandchildren of Mauricio and Simona are co-owners of the Properties by
succession. Despite this, petitioners refused to share with him the possession and
rental income of the Properties. Edward later amended his complaint to include a
prayer to annul the Deed of Sale, which he claimed was merely simulated to
prejudice the other heirs.
In 1999, David Jr., whose parents died in 1944 and who was subsequently raised
by Simona, moved to intervene in the case. David Jr. filed a complaint-inintervention impugning the validity of the Deed of Sale and praying for the partition
of the Properties among the surviving heirs of Mauricio and Simona. The trial court
allowed the intervention in its Order dated 5 May 1999. [10]

The Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court upheld Mauricios sale of the Properties to the vendees. The trial
court ruled that the sale did not prejudice the compulsory heirs, as the Properties
were conveyed for valuable consideration. The trial court also noted that the Deed
of Sale was duly notarized and was in existence for many years without question
about its validity.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision of 11 May 2000 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby DENIES the JUDICIAL
PARTITION of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 58999 and 59000 registered with
the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Dissatisfied, Edward and David Jr. (respondents) filed a joint appeal to the Court
of Appeals.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Citing Article 166 of the Civil Code (Article 166), the Court of Appeals declared
the Deed of Sale void for lack of Simonas consent. The appellate court held that the
GPA executed by Simona in 1966 was not sufficient to authorize Mauricio to sell the
Properties because Article 1878 of the Civil Code (Article 1878) requires a special
power of attorney for such transactions. The appellate court reasoned that the GPA
was executed merely to enable Mauricio to mortgage the Properties, not to sell
them.

The Court of Appeals also found that there was insufficient proof that the
vendees made the mortgage payments on the Properties, since the PNB and DBP
receipts were issued in Mauricios name. The appellate court opined that the rental
income of the Properties, which the vendees never shared with respondents, was
sufficient to cover the mortgage payments to PNB and DBP.
The Court of Appeals declared the Deed of Sale void and ordered the partition of
the Properties in its Decision of 21 December 2001 (CA Decision), as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Metro-Manila,
Branch 13[9] dated 11 May 2000[,] review of which is sought in these
proceedings[,] is REVERSED.
1. The Deed of Sale with Assumption of Real Estate Mortgage (Exh. 4) dated
28 October 1970 is hereby declared null and void;
2. Judicial Partition on the questioned properties is hereby GRANTED in the
following manner:
A. In representation of his deceased mother, LILY BRAVO-DIAZ,
intervenor DAVID DIAZ, JR., is entitled to one-half (1/2) interest of
the subject properties;
B. Plaintiff-appellant EDWARD BRAVO and the rest of the five siblings,
namely: LILY ELIZABETH, EDWARD, ROLAND, JR., SENIA, BENJAMIN
and OFELIA are entitled to one-sixth (1/6) representing the other
half portion of the subject properties;
C. Plaintiff-appellant Edward Bravo, intervenor DAVID DIAZ, JR., SENIA
and BENJAMIN shall reimburse the defendant-appellees LILY
ELIZABETH, OFELIA and ROLAND the sum of One Thousand
(P1,000.00) PESOS representing the consideration paid on the
questioned deed of sale with assumption of mortgage with interest
of six (6) percent per annum effective 28 October 1970 until fully
paid.
SO ORDERED.[12]

The Issues
Petitioners seek a reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, raising these
issues:
1. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY
AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE DEED OF SALE WITH ASSUMPTION OF
MORTGAGE.

2. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE PARTITION OF

THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION.[13]
At the least, petitioners argue that the subject sale is valid as to Mauricios share
in the Properties.
On the other hand, respondents maintain that they are co-owners of the
Properties by succession. Respondents argue that the sale of the conjugal Properties
is void because: (1) Mauricio executed the Deed of Sale without Simonas consent;
and (2) the sale was merely simulated, as shown by the grossly inadequate
consideration Mauricio received for the Properties.
While this case was pending, Leonida Andaya Lolong (Leonida), David Jr.s aunt,
and Atty. Cendaa, respondents counsel, informed the Court that David Jr. died on 14
September 2004. Afterwards, Leonida and Elizabeth wrote separate letters asking
for the resolution of this case. Atty. Cendaa later filed an urgent motion to annotate
attorneys lien on TCT Nos. 58999 and 59000. In its Resolution dated 10 November
2004,[14] the Court noted the notice of David Jr.s death, the letters written by
Leonida and Elizabeth, and granted the motion to annotate attorneys lien on TCT
Nos. 58999 and 59000.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is partly meritorious.
The questions of whether Simona consented to the Deed of Sale and whether
the subject sale was simulated are factual in nature. The rule is factual findings of
the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. However, there are exceptions, such
as when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are
contradictory, or when the evidence on record does not support the factual findings.
[15]
Because these exceptions obtain in the present case, the Court will consider
these issues.

On the Requirement of the Wifes Consent

We hold that the Court of Appeals erred when it declared the Deed of Sale void
based on Article 166, which states:
Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift,
or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot
alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the
wifes consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may
compel her to grant the same.
This article shall not apply to property acquired by the conjugal partnerships before
the effective date of this Code.

Article 166 expressly applies only to properties acquired by the conjugal

partnership after the effectivity of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Civil Code). The
Civil Code came into force on 30 August 1950. [16] Although there is no dispute that
the Properties were conjugal properties of Mauricio and Simona, the records do not
show, and the parties did not stipulate, when the Properties were acquired. [17] Under
Article 1413 of the old Spanish Civil Code, the husband could alienate conjugal
partnership property for valuable consideration without the wifes consent. [18]
Even under the present Civil Code, however, the Deed of Sale is not void. It is
well-settled that contracts alienating conjugal real property without the wifes
consent are merely voidable under the Civil Code that is, binding on the parties
unless annulled by a competent court and not void ab initio.[19]
Article 166 must be read in conjunction with Article 173 of the Civil Code (Article
173). The latter prescribes certain conditions before a sale of conjugal property can
be annulled for lack of the wifes consent, as follows:
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the
transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the
husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any
act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in
the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right,
she or her heirs after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the
value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Code, only the wife can ask to annul a contract that disposes of
conjugal real property without her consent. The wife must file the action for
annulment during the marriage and within ten years from the questioned
transaction. Article 173 is explicit on the remedies available if the wife fails to
exercise this right within the specified period. In such case, the wife or her heirs can
only demand the value of the property provided they prove that the husband
fraudulently alienated the property. Fraud is never presumed, but must be
established by clear and convincing evidence. [20]
Respondents action to annul the Deed of Sale based on Article 166 must fail for
having been filed out of time. The marriage of Mauricio and Simona was dissolved
when Mauricio died in 1973. More than ten years have passed since the execution
of the Deed of Sale.
Further, respondents, who are Simonas heirs, are not the parties who can invoke
Article 166. Article 173 reserves that remedy to the wife alone. Only Simona had the
right to have the sale of the Properties annulled on the ground that Mauricio sold
the Properties without her consent.
Simona, however, did not assail the Deed of Sale during her marriage or even
after Mauricios death. The records are bereft of any indication that Simona
questioned the sale of the Properties at any time. Simona did not even attempt to
take possession of or reside on the Properties after Mauricios death. David Jr., who
was raised by Simona, testified that he and Simona continued to live in Pasay City
after Mauricios death, while her children and other grandchildren resided on the
Properties.[21]

We also agree with the trial court that Simona authorized Mauricio to dispose of
the Properties when she executed the GPA. True, Article 1878 requires a special
power of attorney for an agent to execute a contract that transfers the ownership of
an immovable. However, the Court has clarified that Article 1878 refers to the
nature of the authorization, not to its form.[22]Even if a document is titled as a
general power of attorney, the requirement of a special power of attorney is met if
there is a clear mandate from the principal specifically authorizing the performance
of the act.[23]
In Veloso v. Court of Appeals,[24] the Court explained that a general power of
attorney could contain a special power to sell that satisfies the requirement of
Article 1878, thus:
An examination of the records showed that the assailed power of attorney was valid
and regular on its face. It was notarized and as such, it carries the evidentiary
weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. While it is true that it was
denominated as a general power of attorney, a perusal thereof revealed that it
stated an authority to sell, to wit:
2. To buy or sell, hire or lease, mortgage or otherwise hypothecate lands, tenements
and hereditaments or other forms of real property, more specifically TCT No. 49138,
upon such terms and conditions and under such covenants as my said attorney shall
deem fit and proper.
Thus, there was no need to execute a separate and special power of attorney since
the general power of attorney had expressly authorized the agent or attorney in fact
the power to sell the subject property. The special power of attorney can be
included in the general power when it is specified therein the act or
transaction for which the special power is required. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, Simona expressly authorized Mauricio in the GPA to sell, assign
and dispose of any and all of my property, real, personal or mixed, of any kind
whatsoever and wheresoever situated, or any interest therein xxx as well as to act
as my general representative and agent, with full authority to buy, sell, negotiate
and contract for me and in my behalf. [25]Taken together, these provisions constitute
a clear and specific mandate to Mauricio to sell the Properties. Even if it is called a
general power of attorney, the specific provisions in the GPA are sufficient for the
purposes of Article 1878. These provisions in the GPA likewise indicate that Simona
consented to the sale of the Properties.

Whether the Sale of the Properties was Simulated

or is Void for Gross Inadequacy of Price
We point out that the law on legitime does not bar the disposition of property for
valuable consideration to descendants or compulsory heirs. In a sale, cash of
equivalent value replaces the property taken from the estate. [26] There is no
diminution of the estate but merely a substitution in values. Donations and other

dispositions by gratuitous title, on the other hand, must be included in the

computation of legitimes.[27]
Respondents, however, contend that the sale of the Properties was merely
simulated. As proof, respondents point to the consideration of P1,000 in the Deed of
Sale, which respondents claim is grossly inadequate compared to the actual value
of the Properties.
Simulation of contract and gross inadequacy of price are distinct legal concepts,
with different effects. When the parties to an alleged contract do not really intend to
be bound by it, the contract is simulated and void. [28] A simulated or fictitious
contract has no legal effect whatsoever [29] because there is no real agreement
between the parties.
In contrast, a contract with inadequate consideration may nevertheless embody
a true agreement between the parties. A contract of sale is a consensual contract,
which becomes valid and binding upon the meeting of minds of the parties on the
price and the object of the sale. [30] The concept of a simulated sale is thus
incompatible with inadequacy of price. When the parties agree on a price as the
actual consideration, the sale is not simulated despite the inadequacy of the price.
[31]

Gross inadequacy of price by itself will not result in a void contract. Gross
inadequacy of price does not even affect the validity of a contract of sale, unless it
signifies a defect in the consent or that the parties actually intended a donation or
some other contract.[32] Inadequacy of cause will not invalidate a contract unless
there has been fraud, mistake or undue influence. [33] In this case, respondents have
not proved any of the instances that would invalidate the Deed of Sale.
Respondents even failed to establish that the consideration paid by the vendees
for the Properties was grossly inadequate. As the trial court pointed out, the Deed of
Sale stipulates that, in addition to the payment of P1,000, the vendees should
assume the mortgage loans from PNB and DBP. The consideration for the sale of the
Properties was thus P1,000 in cash and the assumption of the P15,000 mortgage.
Respondents argue that P16,000 is still far below the actual value of the
Properties. To bolster their claim, respondents presented the following: (1) Tax
Declarations No. A-001-00905[34] and A-001-00906[35] for the year 1979, which
placed the assessed value of the Properties at P70,020 and their approximate
market value at P244,290; and (2) a certified copy of the Department of Finances
Department Order No. 62-97[36] dated 6 June 1997 and attached guidelines [37] which
established the zonal value of the properties along Evangelista Street atP15,000 per
square meter.
The subject Deed of Sale, however, was executed in 1970. The valuation of the
Properties in 1979 or 1997 is of little relevance to the issue of whether P16,000 was
a grossly inadequate price to pay for the Properties in 1970. Certainly, there is
nothing surprising in the sharp increase in the value of the Properties nine or
twenty-seven years after the sale, particularly when we consider that the Properties
are located in the City of Makati.
More pertinent are Tax Declarations No. 15812 [38] and No. 15813,[39] both issued
in 1967, presented by petitioners. These tax declarations placed the assessed value
of both Properties at P16,160. Compared to this, the price of P16,000 cannot be

considered grossly inadequate, much less so shocking to the conscience [40] as to

justify the setting aside of the Deed of Sale.
Respondents next contend that the vendees did not make the mortgage
payments on the Properties. Respondents allege that the rents paid by the tenants
leasing portions of the Properties were sufficient to cover the mortgage payments to
DBP and PNB.
Again, this argument does not help respondents cause. Assuming that the
vendees failed to pay the full price stated in the Deed of Sale, such partial failure
would not render the sale void. In Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals,[41] the
Court held:
xxx If there is a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the price, the contract of
sale is valid, despite the manner of payment, or even the breach of that
manner of payment. xxx
It is not the act of payment of price that determines the validity of a contract of
sale. Payment of the price has nothing to do with the perfection of the contract.
Payment of the price goes into the performance of the contract. Failure to pay the
consideration is different from lack of consideration. The former results in a right to
demand the fulfillment or cancellation of the obligation under an existing valid
contract while the latter prevents the existence of a valid contract. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Neither was it shown that the rentals from tenants were sufficient to cover the
mortgage payments. The parties to this case stipulated to only one tenant, a certain
Federico M. Puno, who supposedly leased a room on the Properties for P300 per
month from 1992 to 1994.[42] This is hardly significant, when we consider that the
mortgage was fully paid by 1974. Indeed, the fact that the Properties were
mortgaged to DBP and PNB indicates that the conjugal partnership, or at least
Mauricio, was short of funds.
Petitioners point out that they were duly employed and had the financial
capacity to buy the Properties in 1970. Respondents did not refute this. Petitioners
presented 72 receipts[43]showing the mortgage payments made to PNB and DBP,
and the Release of the Real Estate Mortgage [44] (Mortgage Release) dated 5 April
1974. True, these documents all bear Mauricios name. However, this tends to
support, rather than detract from, petitioner-vendees explanation that they initially
gave the mortgage payments directly to Mauricio, and then later directly to the
banks, without formally advising the bank of the sale. The last 3 mortgage receipts
and the Mortgage Release were all issued in Mauricios name even after his death in
1970. Obviously, Mauricio could not have secured the Mortgage Release and made
these last payments.

Presumption of Regularity and Burden of Proof

The Deed of Sale was notarized and, as certified by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, entered in the notarial books submitted to that court. As a document

acknowledged before a notary public, the Deed of Sale enjoys the presumption of
regularity[45] and due execution.[46] Absent evidence that is clear, convincing and
more than merely preponderant, the presumption must be upheld. [47]
Respondents evidence in this case is not even preponderant. Respondents
allegations, testimony and bare denials cannot prevail over the documentary
evidence presented by petitioners. These documents the Deed of Sale and the GPA
which are both notarized, the receipts, the Mortgage Release and the 1967 tax
declarations over the Properties support petitioners account of the sale.
As the parties challenging the regularity of the Deed of Sale and alleging its
simulation, respondents had the burden of proving these charges. [48] Respondents
failed to discharge this burden. Consequentially, the Deed of Sale stands.

On the Partition of the Property

Nevertheless, this Court finds it proper to grant the partition of the Properties,
subject to modification.
Petitioners have consistently claimed that their father is one of the vendees who
bought the Properties. Vendees Elizabeth and Ofelia both testified that the Roland A.
Bravo in the Deed of Sale is their father, [49] although their brother, Roland Bravo, Jr.,
made some of the mortgage payments. Petitioners counsel, Atty. Paggao, made the
same clarification before the trial court. [50]
As Roland Bravo, Sr. is also the father of respondent Edward Bravo, Edward is
thus a compulsory heir of Roland Bravo, and entitled to a share, along with his
brothers and sisters, in his fathers portion of the Properties. In short, Edward and
petitioners are co-owners of the Properties.
As such, Edward can rightfully ask for the partition of the Properties. Any coowner may demand at any time the partition of the common property unless a coowner has repudiated the co-ownership.[51] This action for partition does not
prescribe and is not subject to laches. [52]
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the Decision of 21 December 2001 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67794. We REINSTATE the Decision of 11 May 2000 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch No. 139, in Civil Case No. 97-137, declaring
VALID the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage dated 28 October 1970, with
the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. We GRANT judicial partition of the subject Properties in the following manner:
a. Petitioner LILY ELIZABETH BRAVO-GUERRERO is entitled to one-third (1/3)
of the Properties;
b. Petitioner OFELIA BRAVO-QUIESTAS is entitled to one-third (1/3) of the
Properties; and
c. The remaining one-third (1/3) portion of the Properties should be divided
equally between the children of ROLAND BRAVO.

2. The other heirs of ROLAND BRAVO must reimburse ROLAND BRAVO, JR. for
whatever expenses the latter incurred in paying for and securing the release
of the mortgage on the Properties.
SO ORDERED.
Davide,
JJ., concur.

Jr.,

C.J.,

(Chairman),

Quisumbing,

Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna,

Manuel v. Hon Ferrer

G.R. No. 117246 August 21, 1995
BENIGNO MANUEL, LIBERATO MANUEL, LORENZO MANUEL, PLACIDA
MANUEL, MADRONA MANUEL, ESPERANZA MANUEL, AGAPITA MANUEL,
BASILISA MANUEL, EMILIA MANUEL and NUMERIANA MANUEL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. NICODEMO T. FERRER, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
37, Lingayen, Pangasinan, MODESTA BALTAZAR and ESTANISLAOA
MANUEL, respondents.

VITUG, J.:
The property involved in this petition for review on certiorari is the inheritance left
by an illegitimate child who died intestate without any surviving descendant or
ascendant.
Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling,
initiated this suit. During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital
affair with one Ursula Bautista. From this relationship, Juan Manuel was born.
Several years passed before Antonio Manuel, his wife Beatriz, and his mistress
Ursula finally crossed the bar on, respectively, 06 August 1960, 05 February 1981
and 04 November 1976.
Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In
consideration of the marriage, a donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land, with
an area of 2,700 square meters, covered by Original Certificate of Title ("OCT") No.
P-20594 was executed in favor of Juan Manuel by Laurenciana Manuel. Two other
parcels of land, covered by OCT P-19902 and Transfer Certificate of Title ("TCT") No.
41134, were later bought by Juan and registered in his name. The couple were not
blessed with a child of their own. Their desire to have one impelled the spouses to
take private respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised her
as their own "daughter".

On 03 June 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of

Sale Con Pacto de Retro (with a 10-year period of redemption) over a one-half (1/2)
portion of his land covered by TCT No. 41134. Juan Manuel died intestate on 21
February 1990. Two years later, or on 04 February 1992, Esperanza Gamba also
passed away.
On 05 March 1992, a month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta executed an
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of land covered
by OCT P-20594, OCT P-19902 and TCT No. 41134 (all still in the name of Juan
Manuel). Following the registration of the document of adjudication with the Office
of the Register of Deeds, the three titles
(OCT P-20594, OCT P-19902 and TCT No. 41134) in the name of Juan Manuel were
canceled and new titles, TCT No. 184223, TCT No. 184224 and TCT No. 184225,
were issued in the name of Modesta Manuel-Baltazar. On 19 October 1992, Modesta
executed in favor of her co-respondent Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Renunciation
and Quitclaim over the unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of the land (now covered
by TCT No. 184225) that was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980 Deed
of Sale Con Pacto de Retro. These acts of Modesta apparently did not sit well with
petitioners. In a complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, the petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid
instruments.
The case, there being no material dispute on the facts, was submitted to the court a
quo for summary judgment.
The trial court, in its now assailed 15th August 1994 decision, dismissed the
complaint holding that petitioners, not being heirs ab intestato of their illegitimate
brother Juan Manuel, were not the real parties-in-interest to institute the suit.
Petitioners were also ordered to jointly and severally (solidarily) pay
(a) respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar the sum of P5,000.00 for moral damages,
P5,000.00 for exemplary damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees and P500.00 for
litigation expenses and (b) Estanislaoa Manuel the sum of P5,000.00 for moral
damages, P5,000.00 for exemplary damages and P500.00 for attorney's fees.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court.
The petition before us raises the following contentions: That
1. THE LOWER COURT (HAS) FAILED TO CONSIDER THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF
ARTICLE 994 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE, AS THE CONTROLLING LAW
APPLICABLE BY VIRTUE OF THE ADMITTED FACTS, AND NOT ARTICLE 992 OF
THE SAME CODE.
2. THE LOWER COURT, IN NOT ANNULLING ALL THE ACTS OF, AND VOIDING
ALL DOCUMENTS EXECUTED BY, RESPONDENT MODESTA BALTAZAR, WHO
ARROGATED UNTO HERSELF THE RIGHTS OF AN HEIR TO THE ESTATE OF
DECEDENT JUAN MANUEL, (HAS) VIRTUALLY GRANTED SAID RESPONDENT THE
STATUS OF AN HEIR MANIFESTLY CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS AND PUBLIC
POLICY.

3. TO ENFORCE ONE'S RIGHT WHEN THEY ARE VIOLATED IS NEVER A LEGAL

WRONG. 1
Petitioners argue that they are the legal heirs over one-half of Juan's intestate
estate (while the other half would pertain to Juan's surviving spouse) under the
provision of the last paragraph of Article 994 of the Civil Code, providing thusly:
Art. 994. In default of the father or mother, an illegitimate child shall be
succeeded by his or her surviving spouse, who shall be entitled to the entire
estate.
If the widow or widower should survive with brothers and sisters, nephews
and nieces, she or he shall inherit one-half of the estate, and the latter the
other half. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents, in turn, submit that Article 994 should be read in conjunction with
Article 992 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such
children or relative inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
(Emphasis supplied)
Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the
rules on succession as the "principle of absolute separation between the legitimate
family and the illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in
the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate
relatives, on other hand, although it does not totally disavow such succession in the
direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has
no application, however, on testamentary dispositions.
This "barrier" between the members of the legitimate and illegitimate family in
intestacy is explained by a noted civilist. 2 His thesis:
What is meant by the law when it speaks of brothers and sisters, nephews
and nieces, as legal or intestate heirs of an illegitimate child? It must be
noted that under Art. 992 of the Code, there is a barrier dividing members of
the illegitimate family from members of the legitimate family. It is clear that
by virtue of this barrier, the legitimate brothers and sisters as well as the
children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters,
cannot inherit from the illegitimate child. Consequently, when the law speaks
of"brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces" as legal heirs of an illegitimate
child, it refers to illegitimate brothers and sisters as well as to the children,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Court, too, has had occasions to explain this "iron curtain", firstly, in the early
case of Grey v. Fabie 3 and, then, in the relatively recent cases of Diaz

v. Intermediate Appellate Court 4 and De la Puerta v. Court of Appeals. 5 In Diaz,we

have said:
Article 992 of the New Civil Code . . . prohibits absolutely a succession ab
intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and
relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a
natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of
Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is
presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The
illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family;
the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter
considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it
is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing
but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law
does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of
resentment.
The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the Court in several other
cases. Thus, it has ruled that where the illegitimate child had
half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to the former's
inheritance; 6 that the legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed
from her illegitimate child; 7 that a natural child cannot represent his natural father
in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent; 8 that the natural
daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle who is a legitimate
brother of her natural father; 9 and that an illegitimate child has no right to
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father. 10 Indeed,
the law on succession is animated by a uniform general intent, and thus no part
should be rendered inoperative 11 by, but must always be construed in relation to,
any other part as to produce a harmonious whole. 12
In passing, we might, in easy graphic presentation, collate the order of preference
and concurrence in intestacy expressed in Article 978 through
Article 1014, inclusive, of the Civil Code; viz.:

Order of Preference

(a Legitimate Children and

)

Descendants

Order of Concurrence

(a Legitimate Children and

)

Descendants, Illegitimate

Children and Descendants,

and Surviving Spouse

(b Legitimate Parents and

)

Ascendants

(b Legitimate Parents and

)

Ascendants Illegitimate

Children and Descendants,

and Surviving Spouse

(c) Illegitimate Children and

(c) Illegitimate Children and

Descendants (in the

absence

Descendants and Surviving

of ICDs and LPAs, the

Spouse

Illegitimate Parents)

(d Surviving Spouse
)

(d Surviving Spouse and

)

Illegitimate Parents

(e Brothers and Sisters/

)

Nephews and

(e Brothers and Sisters/

)

Nephews and Nieces

Nieces

(f) Other Collateral Relatives

and Surviving Spouse

(f) Alone

(within the fifth civil degree)

(g State
)

(g Alone
)

In her answer to the complaint, Modesta candidly admitted that she herself is
not an intestate heir of Juan Manuel. She is right. A ward (ampon), without
the benefit of formal (judicial) adoption, is neither a compulsory nor a legal
heir. 13
We must hold, nevertheless, that the complaint of petitioners seeking the
nullity of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Modesta, the three (3)
TCT's issued to her favor, as well as the Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim
in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel, was properly dismissed by the trial court.
Petitioners, not being the real "parties-in-interest" 14 in the case, had neither
the standing nor the cause of action to initiate the complaint.
The Court, however, sees no sufficient reason to sustain the award of
amounts for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation
expenses. An adverse result of a suit in law does not mean that its advocacy
is necessarily so wrongful as to justify an assessment of damages against the
actor. 15
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan
(Branch 37) is AFFIRMED, except insofar as it has awarded moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees and litigation expenses, in
favor of private respondents, which portion is hereby DELETED. No special
pronouncement on costs.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

Chua v CFI of Negros Occidental

G.R. No. L-29901 August 31, 1977

IGNACIO FRIAS CHUA, DOMINADOR CHUA and REMEDIOS CHUA, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH V and
SUSANA DE LA TORRE, in her capacity as Administratrix of the Intestate
Estate of Consolacion de la Torre, respondents.
Dominador G. Abaria and Primitivo Blanca for private respondent.
Rodrigo O. Delfinado for petitioners.

MARTIN, J.:
Petition for review of the decision of the respondent Court which dismissed the
complaint of petitioners in Civil Case No. 7839-A, entitled "Ignacio Frias Chua, et al.
vs. Susana de la Torre, Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la
Torre"
It appears that in the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia S. Militar alias Sy
Quio he sired three children, namely: Ignacio, Lorenzo and Manuel, all surnamed
Frias Chua. When Patricia S. Militar died, Jose Frias Chua contracted a second
marriage with Consolacion de la Torre with whom he had a child by the name of
Juanita Frias Chua. Manuel Frias Chua died without leaving any issue. Then in 1929,
Jose Frias Chua died intestate leaving his widow Consolacion de la Torre and his son
Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage and sons Ignacio Frias Chua and Lorenzo
Frias Chua of his first marriage. In Intestate Proceeding No. 4816, the lower court
issued an order dated January 15, 1931 1 adjudicating, among others, the one-half
(1/2,) portion of Lot No. 399 and the sum of P8,000.00 in favor of Jose Frias Chua's
widow, Consolacion de la Torre, the other half of Lot No. 399 in favor of Juanito Frias
Chua, his son in the second marriage; P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenze Frias chua; and
P1,550.00 in favor of Ignacio Frias, Chua, his sons of the first marriage. By virtue of
said adjudication, Transfer Certificate of Title No. TR-980 (14483) 2 dated April 28,
1932 was issued by the Register of Deeds in the names of Consolacion de la Torre
and Juanito Frias Chua as owners pro-indiviso of Lot No. 399.
On February 27, 1952, Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate
without any issue. After his death, his mother Consolacion de la Torre succeeded to
his pro-indivisio share of Lot No. 399. In a week's time or on March 6, 1952,
Consolacion de la Torre executed a declaration of heirship adjudicating in her favor
the pro-indiviso share of her son Juanito as a result of which Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 31796 covering the whole Lot No. 399 was issued in her name. Then on
March 5, 1966, Consolacion de la Torre died intestate leaving no direct heir either in
the descending or ascending line except her brother and sisters.
In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre", docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 7839A, the petitioners herein, Ignacio Frias Chua, of the first marriage and dominador

and Remedios Chua, the supposed legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias
Chua, also of the first marriage filed the complaint a quo 3 (subseqently segregated
as a distinct suit and docketed as Civil Case No. 7839-A) on May 11, 1966 before the
respondent Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch V, praying that the
one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 399 which formerly belonged to Juanito Frias but
which passed to Consolacion de la Torre upon the latter's death, be declaredas a
reservable property for the reason that the lot in questionn was subject to reserval
troncal pursuant to Article 981 of the New Civil Code, Private respondent as
administratrix of the estate of individually the complaint of petitioners 4
On July 29, 1986, the respondent Court rendered a decision dismissing the
complaint of petitioner. Hence this instant.
The pertinent provision of reserva troncal under the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inheritts from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from
another ascendat, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of
relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line from
which said property came.
Persuant to the foregoing provision, in order that a property may be impressed with
a reservable character the following requisites must exist, to wit: (1) that the
property was acquired by a descendant from an asscendant or from a brother or
sister by gratuitous title; (2) that said descendant died without an issue; (3) that the
property is inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and (4) that there
are relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property
came. 5 In the case before Us, all of the foregoing requisites are present. Thus, as
borne out by the records, Juanoito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate
in 1952; he died withour leaving any issue; his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No.
399 was acquired by his mother, Consolacion de la Torre died, Juannnito Frias Chua
who died intestate had relatives within the third degree. These relatives are Ignacio
Frias Chua and Dominador Chua and Remidios Chua, the suppose legitimate
children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, who are the petitioners herein.
The crux of the problem in instant petition is focused on the first requisit of reserva
troncal whether the property in question was acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from
his father Jose Frias Chua, gratuitously or not. In resolving this point, the respondent
Court said:
It appears from Exh. "3", which is part of Exh. "D", that the property in
question was not acquired by Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias
Chua gratuitously but for a consideration, namely, that the legatees
were to pay the interest and cost and other fees resulting from Civil
Case No. 5300 of this Court. As such it is undeniable that the lot in

question is not subject tot a reserva troncal, under Art. 891 of the New
Civil Code, and as such the plaintiff's complaint must fail.
We are not prepared to sustain the respondent Court's conclusion that the lot in
question is not subject to areserva troncal under Art. 891 of the New Civil Code. It
is, As explained by Manresa which this Court quoted with approval in Cabardo v.
Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, "The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when
the recipient does not give anything in return." It matters not whether the property
transmitted be or be not subject to any prior charges; what is essential is that the
transmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of mere liberality of the person
making it, without imposing any obligation on the part of the recipient; and that the
person receiving the property gives or does nothing in return; or, as ably put by an
eminent Filipino commentator, 6 "the essential thing is that the person who
transmits it does so gratuitously, from pure generosity, without requiring from the
transferee any prestation." It is evident from the record that the transmission of the
property in question to Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage upon the death of
his father Jose Frias Chua was by means of a hereditary succession and therefore
gratuitous. It is true that there is the order (Exh. "D") of the probate Court in
Intestate Proceeding No. 4816 which estates in express terms;
2. Se adjudicada pro el presente a favor de Consolacion de la Torre,
viuda, mayor de edad, y de su hiju, Juanito Frias Chua, menor de edad,
todos residente de San Enrique, Negros Occidental, I.F.,como herederos
del finado Jose Frias Chua Choo, estas propiadades:
14483
La parcela de terrenno concida por Lote No. 399 del Catsatro de la
Carlota, Negros Occidental, de 191.954 metros cuadddrados y cubierto
por el Certificado de Titulo No. 11759, en partes equales proindiviso; por con la obligscion de pagar a las Standard Oil Co. of New
York la deuda de P3971.20, sus intereses, costas y demas gastos
resultantes del asunto civil No. 5300de este jusgado
But the obligation of paying the Standard Oil Co. of New York the amount of
P3,971.20 is imposed upon Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua not
personally by the deceased Jose Frias Chua in his last will and testament but by an
order of the court in the Testate Proceeding No.4816 dated January 15, 1931. As
long as the transmission of the property to the heirs is free from any condition
imposed by the deceased himself and the property is given out of pure generosity,
itg is gratuitous. it does not matter if later the court orders one of the heirs, in this
case Juanito Frias Chua, to pay the Standare oil co. of New York the amount of
P3,971.20. This does not change the gratuitous nature of the transmission of the
property to him. This being the case the lot in question is subject to reserva
troncal under Art, 891 of the New Civil Code.

It is contented that the distribution of the shares of the estate of Jose Frias Chua to
the respondent heirs or legatees was agreed upon by the heirs in their project of
partition based on the last will and testament of Jose Frias Chua. But petitioners
claim that the supposed Last Will and Testament of Jose Frias Chua was never
probated. The fact that the will was not probated was admitted in paragraph 6 of
the respondents' answer. 7 There is nothing mentioned in the decision of the trial
court in Civil Case No. 7839 A which is the subject of the present appeal nor in the
order of January 15, 1931 of the trial court in the Testate Estate Proceeding No.
4816 nor in the private respondent's brief, that the Last Will and Testament of Jose
Frias Chua has ever been probated. With the foregoing, it is easy to deduce that if
the Last Will and Testament has in fact been probated there would have been no
need for the testamentary heirs to prepare a project of partition among themselves.
The very will itself could be made the basis for the adjudication of the estate as in
fact they did in their project of partition with Juanito Frias Chua getting one-half of
Lot 399 by inheritance as a sone of the deceased Jose Frias Chua by the latter's
second marriage.
According to the record, Juanito Frias Chua died on February 27, 1952 without any
issue. After his death his mother Consolation de la Torre succeeded to his one-half
pro-indiviso share of Lot 399. This was, however, subject to the condition that the
property was reservable in character under Art. 891 of the Civil Code in favor of
relatives within the third degree of Jose Frias Chua from whom the property came.
These relatives are the petitioner herein.
It is claimed that the complaint of petitioners to recover the one-half portion of Lot
399 which originally belonged to Juanito Frias Chua has already prescribed when it
was filed on May 11, 1966. We do not believe so. It must be remembered that the
petitioners herein are claiming as reservees did not arise until the time the reservor,
Consolacion de la Torre, died in March 1966. When the petitioners therefore filed
their complaint to recover the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot 399, they were very
much in time to do so.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside. The
petitioners Ignacio Frias Chua, Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua are declared
owners of 1/2 undivided portion of Lot 399; and the Register of Deeds of Negros
Occidental is hereby ordered to cancel. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796
covering Lot No. 399 issued in the name of Consolacion de la Torre and to issue a
new Certificate of Title in the names of Consolacion de la Torre, 1/2 undivided
portion; Ignacio Frias Chua, 1/4 undivided portion; and Dominador Chua and
Remedios Chua, 1/4 undivided portion, of said lot. Without pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Mu;oz Palma, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ.,
concur.

Cano v Director of Lands

G.R. No. L-10701

January 16, 1959

MARIA CANO, applicant-appellee,

vs.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, EUSTAQUIA GUERRERO, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
JOSE FERNANDEZ, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
Ramon C. Fernandez for appellants.
Jose B. Dealca for appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
In an amended decision dated October 9, 1951, issued in Land Registration Case
No. 12, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 2835, the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon decreed the
registration of Lots Nos. 1798 and 1799 of the Juban (Sorsogon) Cadastre, under the
following terms and conditions:
In view of the foregoing, and it appearing that the notices have been duly published
and posted as required by law, and that the title of the applicant to the abovementioned two parcels of land is registrable in law, it is hereby adjudged and
decreed, and with reaffirmation of the order of general default, that the two parcels
of land described in plan SWO-24152, known as Lots Nos. 1798 and 1799 of the
Cadastral Survey of Juban, with their improvements, be registered in the name of
Maria Cano, Filipina, 71 years of age, widow and resident of Juban, province of
Sorsogon, with the understanding that Lot No. 1799 shall be subject to the right
of reservation in favor of Eustaquia Guerrero pursuant to Article 891 of the Civil
code. After this decision shall have become final for lack of appeal therefrom within
the 30-day period from its promulgation, let the corresponding decree issue.
So ordered. (Rec. App. pp. 18-19)
The decision having become final, the decree and the Certificate of Title (No. 0-20)
were issued in the name of Maria Cano, subject to reserva troncal in favor of
Eustaquia Guerrero. In October 1955, counsel for the reserve (reservatorio)
Guerrero filed a motion with the Cadastral Court, alleging the death of the original
registered owner and reservista, Maria Cano, on September 8, 1955, and praying
that the original Certificate of Title be ordered cancelled and a new one issued in
favor of movant Eustaquia Guerrero; and that the Sheriff be ordered to place her in
possession of the property. The motion was opposed by Jose and Teotimo Fernandez,
sons of thereservista Maria Cano, who contended that the application and operation
of the reserva troncal should be ventilated in an ordinary contentious proceeding,
and that the Registration Court did not have jurisdiction to grant the motion.
In view of the recorded reserva in favor of the appellee, as expressly noted in the
final decree of registration, the lower court granted the petition for the issuance of a
new certificate, for the reason that the death of the reservistavested the ownership
of the property in the petitioner as the sole reservatorio troncal.

The oppositors, heirs of the reservista Maria Cano, duly appealed from the order,
insisting that the ownership of the reservatorio can not be decreed in a mere
proceeding under sec. 112 of Act 496, but requires a judicial administration
proceedings, wherein the rights of appellee, as the reservatorio entitled to the
reservable property, are to be declared. In this connection, appellants argue that
the reversion in favor of the reservatorio requires the declaration of the existence of
the following facts:
(1) The property was received by a descendant by gratuitous title from an
ascendant or from a brother or sister;
(2) Said descendant dies without issue;
(3) The property is inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and
(4) The existence of relatives within the third degree belonging the line from which
said property came. (Appellants' Brief, p. 8)
We find the appeal untenable. The requisites enumerated by appellants have
already been declared to exist by the decree of registration wherein the rights of the
appellee as reservatario troncal were expressly recognized:
From the above-quoted agreed stipulation of facts, it is evident that Lot No. 1799
was acquired by the Appellant Maria Cano by inheritance from her deceased
daughter, Lourdes Guerrero who, in turn, inherited the same from her father
Evaristo Guerrero and, hence, falls squarely under the provisions of Article 891 of
the Civil Code; and that each and everyone of the private oppositors are within the
third degree of consaguinity of the decedent Evaristo Guerrero, and who belonging
to the same line from which the property came.
It appears however, from the agreed stipulation of facts that with the exception of
Eustaquia Guerrero, who is the only living daughter of the decedent Evaristo
Guerrero, by his former marriage, all the other oppositors are grandchildren of the
said Evaristo Guerrero by his former marriages. Eustaquia Guerrero, being the
nearest of kin, excludes all the other private oppositors, whose decree of
relationship to the decedent is remoter (Article 962, Civil Code; Director of Lands vs.
Aguas, 62 Phil., 279). (Rec. App. pp. 16-17)
This decree having become final, all persons (appellees included) are bared thereby
from contesting the existence of the constituent elements of the reserva. The only
requisites for the passing of the title from thereservista to the appellee are: (1) the
death of the reservista; and (2) the fact that the reservatario has survived
the reservista. Both facts are admitted, and their existence is nowhere questioned.
The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary rests upon the
assumption that the reservatario will succeed in, or inherit, the reservable property
from the reservista. This is not true. The reservatario is not
thereservista's successor mortis causa nor is the reservable property part of
the reservista's estate; the reservatarioreceives the property as a conditional heir of
the descendant ( prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line of origin
from which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed during the reservista's

lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that there being reservatarios that survive
the reservista, the latter must be deemed to have enjoined no more than a life
interest in the reservable property.
It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of the reservista,
the reservatario nearest to theprepositus (the appellee in this case) becomes,
automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property. As
already stated, that property is no part of the estate of the reservista, and does not
even answer for the debts of the latter. Hence, its acquisition by
the reservatario may be entered in the property records without necessity of estate
proceedings, since the basic requisites therefor appear of record. It is equally well
settled that the reservable property can not be transmitted by a reservista to her or
his own successors mortis causa,(like appellants herein) so long as
a reservatario within the third degree from the prepositus and belonging to the line
whence the property came, is in existence when the reservista dies.
Of course, where the registration decree merely specifies the reservable character
of the property, without determining the identity of the reservatario (as in the case
of Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil., 279) or where several reservatarios dispute
the property among themselves, further proceedings would be unavoidable. But this
is not the case. The rights of the reservataria Eustaquia Guerrero have been
expressly recognized, and it is nowhere claimed that there are other reservatarios of
equal or nearer degree. It is thus apparent that the heirs of the reservista are
merely endeavoring to prolong their enjoyment of the reservable property to the
detriment of the party lawfully entitled thereto.
We find no error in the order appealed from and therefore, the same is affirmed with
costs against appellants in both instances. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion
and Endencia JJ., concur.

Lunsod v Ortega
G.R. No. 14904

September 19, 1921

FRANCISCO
D.
LUNSOD,
ET
vs.
SINFOROSO ORTEGA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Pascual
and
Bernardo
Benito Gimenez Zoboli for appellees.

etc.

Cecilio

AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

for

appellants.

ARAULLO, J.:
On June 3, 1915, Rufina Medel, widow, resident of the municipality of San Pablo,
Province of Laguna, in a public document executed and acknowledged on the same
day before Felix Esconde, notary public for and in said municipality, sold to
Francisco Lunsod, husband of Gabina Peyamonte, for the sum of P2,000 and with
the right to repurchase for two years, three parcel of land planted with coconut

trees, situated in the barrio of Sta. Catalina of said municipality, described in said
document and in the complaint to which reference is hereafter made, it being a
condition of the sale that the vendor could not exercise the right to repurchase until
after the expiration of said two years from the date of the document and that twothirds of the fruits produced by said land would belong to the purchaser and onethird to the vendor, as compensation for the work of cleaning and taking care of the
parcels of land during said period.
On September 19, 1916, Francisco Lunsod filed in the justice of the peace court of
San Pablo a complaint against Sinforoso Ortega and Candido Cariaga, the case
being docketed there as civil case No. 861. In said complaint the description of the
parcels in question was given and the plaintiff alleged that he was the owner of the
three parcels of land mentioned in the aforementioned document and that on or
about June 4, 1916, he was illegally, and by means of strategy and stealth, turned
out of the possession thereof by Sinforoso Ortega and Candido Cariaga, who have
been collecting the fruits, thereby injuring him in the sum of P150. The plaintiff,
therefore, prayed that judgment be rendered against the defendants, ordering them
to deliver the possession to the plaintiff, and compelling them to pay to the plaintiff
the sum of P150, the value of the coconuts taken and the damages occasioned to
the latter, and further, that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining the
defendants from continuing to perform acts of possession upon the land and from
gathering the fruits.
The defendants having answered the complaint, judgment was rendered on October
26, 1916, by the justice of the peace court in favor of the plaintiff, sentencing
Sinforoso Ortega to restore the possession of the property in question to the plaintiff
and to pay the sum of P150, as damages sustained by the latter, with the costs. The
case was dismissed as to the defendant Cariaga. From this judgment an appeal was
taken to the Court of First Instance by the defendant Ortega. In the Court of First
Instance an incidental question was raised by the plaintiff concerning the
irregularity and insufficiency of the bond filed by the defendant for the purpose of
the appeal and it was asked that the appeal be declared improperly taken and
dismissed. This motion was overruled in said court and due exception was taken by
the plaintiff, who thereupon reproduced his complaint in said court against the
defendant Sinforoso Ortega only, but without the allegation that he was the owner
of said parcels, it being only alleged that prior to the month of June, 1916, he was in
the quiet and peaceful possession and enjoyment thereof, and, in addition to what
was alleged in his complaint in the justice of the peace court, that the defendant
Sinforoso Ortega has used force and intimidation in turning him out of said
possession and that until said day, March 9, 1917, said defendant illegally detained
said parcels. The plaintiff prayed that the injunction mentioned in his previous
complaint be issued against the defendant, that he be sentenced to restore the
possession of said three parcels to the plaintiff, and to pay the sum of P150 as
damages and whatever other damages may have been suffered by him from the
month of September, 1916, the date of the filing of the complaint, until the final
disposition of the case, and the costs.

In answer to said complaint, the defendant Ortega denied generally and specifically
each and every allegation thereof, and alleged, as a special defense, that he was in
possession of said parcels because he was, together with his sister Francisca
Ortega, a pro indiviso owner thereof, and that his possession was not obtained
illegally, nor by the means mentioned in the complaint. The defendant, therefore,
prayed that he be absolved from the complaint and the injunction denied.
To this answer the plaintiff filed a reply, denying generally and specifically all the
facts alleged therein, and further stating that said three parcels were his exclusive
property, having acquired them by purchase from Rufina Medel, deceased, the sole
and absolute owner thereof.
Said Rufina Medel having died on April 10, 1916, intestate proceedings, docketed as
case No. 2218, were instituted in the same Court of First Instance of Laguna by
Cipriano Medel, brother of said deceased, for the appointment of an administrator of
the property left by her, and Cipriano Medel himself was appointed administrator.
An inventory of the property of said deceased having been submitted on October
31, 1916, in which the three parcels of land in question were included, with the
statement that they had been sold to Francisco Lunsod with the right to repurchase
for the sum of P2,000, Sinforoso Ortega and Francisca Ortega appeared in said
proceedings and filed a motion asking that said parcels be excluded from the
inventory on the ground that said parcels were their exclusive property and were
then in their exclusive possession, having inherited the same from their first cousin,
Anacleta Ortega, who died in the municipality of San Pablo on or about June 8, 1903.
This petition was opposed by said administrator and denied by the court on
November 25, 1916, reserving to Sinforoso Ortega and Francisca Ortega the right to
institute the proper action against the administrator of the property, on the ground
that the question as to the ownership of those parcels could not be raised in said
proceedings.
By virtue of said resolution, Sinforoso Ortega and Francisca Ortega filed, on the
same day that the order was issued, a complaint in the Court of First Instance,
which was afterwards amended and docketed as case No. 2286, against said
administrator of the estate of Rufina Medel, deceased, and Francisco Lunsod, the
plaintiff in the case for unlawful entry and detainer. It was there alleged that
through inheritance from their deceased father Mariano Ortega and their niece
Anacleta Ortega, deceased, they, Sinforoso Ortega and Francisca Ortega, were the
absolute owners thereof, and had been in possession of said parcels in question;
that the defendants, by common accord, without any legal right, in an attempt to
dispossess them of said parcels, had decided to molest and interrupt them in the
possession and enjoyment thereof. In support of this claim it was alleged that
Francisco Lunsod had presented a criminal complaint against them for theft of
coconuts in the justice of the peace court of San Pablo, which was dismissed, as
appeared from the certained copy attached to the complaint as a part thereof, and
Cipriano Medel had included said parcels of land in the inventory submitted by him,
as administrator of the estate of said deceased in the intestate proceeding No.
2218, and both had filed numberless charges against them for theft of coconuts
all this in addition to the other acts performed by said defendants which restricted

the rights of the plaintiffs as owners of said property from the death of Rufina Medel
on April 10, 1916, who, during her lifetime, had only the usufruct of said parcels.
The plaintiffs pray: (1) That said parcels be excluded by said administrator of the
estate from the inventory; (2) that they, the plaintiffs, be declared the sole owners
of said parcels and the improvements thereon; (3) that a preliminary injunction be
issued and that it be made absolute, enjoining the defendants, their agents or
representatives from disturbing the plaintiffs in their possession and the exercise of
their rights as owners, which they had been exercising upon said parcels, and from
intervening in the gathering of the fruits thereof.
The prayer for the preliminary injunction was denied on the ground that the
question whether or not the death of Rufina Medel gave an end to the usufruct and
possession of said parcels, which apparently were in the possession of the intestate
estate, as they were included in said inventory, would have to be finally determined
in the very case initiated by said complaint; and a demurrer to the complaint having
been presented by the defendants and overruled by the court, the defendants
answered the complaint, denying generally and specifically all the facts alleged
therein, and alleging as special defense, besides those stated as grounds of the
demurer, that one of them, Cipriano Medel, and his sister, Jacoba Medel, acquired
said three parcels of land by inheritance from their deceased sister Rufina Medel,
the same being a property belonging to the intestate estate of said deceased, the
record of which was made an integral part of the answer; that therefore it was
against the law and improper to sue the administrator of said estate before the
debts were paid and the liquidation and adjudication affected by the court; that said
deceased was at any event the sole heir in the direct line of her deceased daughter
Anacleta Ortega, the latter having died before her mother while still young and long
after her father Estanislao Ortega; that there was no will, and as Rufina Medel left
neither legitimate descendants nor ascendants, nor acknowledged or legitimated
children, her brother and sister who survived her, the defendant Cipriano Medel and
the latter's sister Jacoba, succeeded her directly, in all her obligations, rights and
choses in action affecting said three parcels of land, according to said intestate
proceeding No. 2218, and that Rufina Medel, together with her predecessors and
heirs, had been exercising the absolute right of ownership over said parcels and had
been possessing them as owners quietly and peacefully, without any interruption,
for many years until July 4, 1916, when they were usurped by the plaintiffs. As a
counterclaim the defendants also alleged that Rufina Medel in her lifetime, to wit,
on June 3, 1915, sold said three parcels and others with right of repurchase to one
of them the defendant Francisco Lunsod, for the sum of P2,000, as appears in a
public instrument, also made a part of the answer, and that on the same date said
Francisco Lunsod took possession thereof, having been in the quiet and peaceful
possession and enjoyment of the same until the plaintiffs by means of force,
strategy and fraud, illegally deprived them of said possession, said plaintiffs having
been since then gathering the fruits of the lands, notwithstanding the protest and
demands made by said Lunsod, who by reason of said detention had suffered
damages in the sum of P1,140, the value of the coconuts gathered. Said defendants
therefore prayed that they be absolved from the complaint and that the deceased
Rufina Medel be declared to be the sole owner of said three parcels of land, as the

sole intestate heirs of her deceased daughter Anacleta Ortega and successor of the
latter in all her rights and obligations and that Cipriano Medel and his sister Jacoba
were equally intestate heirs with respect to the properties left by the deceased
Rufina and that the acts and contracts executed by the latter should be considered
subsisting; and, finally, that the plaintiffs be sentenced to return said three parcels
to the defendant Francisco Lunsod and to pay P1,440, ad damages caused said
defendant, plus the sum of P90, as the value of the crop for every two months until
said restitution is effected, and that, if the plaintiffs should not pay said sum to the
defendant Lunsod, they be ordered, pending the trial and until final judgment, to
deposit said crop as the average product for every two succeeding months.
In answer to said counterclaim, the plaintiffs denied all the allegation thereof,
setting up as a special defense that the sale of the lands in question with the right
to repurchase, made by Rufina Medel in favor of Francisco Lunsod, was absolutely
null and void because the vendor was not the true and exclusive owner of said
parcels of land at the time of said sale, for which reason it did not have any effect,
and the plaintiffs asked that they be absolved from the counterclaim.
After the institution of intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Rufina Medel, to wit, on November 6, 1916, which was one and one-half
month after the filing by Francisco Lunsod of the complaint for unlawful detainer
and six days after the inventory of the properties left by said deceased had been
made and submitted, the administrator of the estate, Cipriano Medel, and his sister
Jacoba presented in the same Court of First Instance of Laguna an application, which
was later amended, for the registration in their name, in accordance with the Land
Registration Act, of said three parcels with the improvements thereon, described in
the plans attached thereto. In said application it was alleged that they acquired the
absolute title thereof through inheritance from their deceased sister Rufina Medel,
and that said parcels were occupied since the year 1915 by Francisco Lunsod to
whom they had been sold with the right to repurchase by their sister Rufina. The
applicants finally invoked the benefits of chapter 6 of Act No. 926, on the ground
that they had been in continuous, open and peaceful possession of the land for
more than 21 years including that of their predecessors in interest.
The application, which was docketed as case No. 219, was opposed on the one hand
by Francisco Lunsod, and on the other, by Sinforoso Ortega and Francisca Ortega.
The first named person alleged that, the period for the repurchase of said parcels,
stipulated in the document of June 3, 1915, having already expired, without any of
those believing themselves entitled thereto having made use of the right of
redemption, he was the sole and exclusive owner thereof. The last two named
persons, in turn, claimed that they were the absolute owners and were in
possession thereof, having acquired them by inheritance from their deceased father
Mariano Ortega and their deceased niece Anacleta Ortega.
The three civil suits respectively mentioned, to wit, case No. 2322, for unlawful
entry and detainer, case No. 2286, for the recovery of title, and exclusion of the
land from the inventory of the intestate estate of the deceased Rufina Medel and
the issuance of a preliminary injunction against the defendants, and finally case No.
219, that is to say, the proceedings instituted by Cipriano Medel and his sister

Jacoba Medel for the registration of said three parcels, were jointly tried, by
common consent of the parties; and it was agreed between the parties that the
evidence introduced in case No. 2286, should be considered as evidence in the
other two cases. After said trial the Court of First Instance of Laguna rendered
judgment as follows: In case No. 219, which is the land registration case, it was
declared that Cipriano and Jacoba Medel had no right to a decree of registration and
the application was therefore dismissed, with costs. In the other tow civil cases,
Nos. 2286 and 2322, it was held that the three parcels of land in question belonged
to Sinforoso Ortega and Francisca Ortega, and it was therefore ordered that the
defeated party should pay the costs and that said three parcels should be excluded
from the inventory submitted by Cipriano Medel, administrator of the estate of the
deceased Rufina Medel in civil case No. 2218, the intestate proceeding. To this
judgment the plaintiff Francisco Lunsod and the administrator of the intestate
estate, Cipriano Medel, and his sister Jacoba Medel excepted, and filed a motion for
new trial, which was denied with their exception, and took an appeal by the proper
bill of exceptions, which was transmitted to this court.
In their brief the appellants assign various errors to the judgment of the trial court.
Some of these errors refer to the allowance of the appeal from the judgment
rendered by the justice of the peace court, notwithstanding the alleged irregularity
of the bond filed; to the consequent lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance
to take cognizance of the case on account thereof and for the reason that an
original complaint asking for the issuance of a preliminary injunction as to said three
parcels had been filed, although said complaint had no connection with any other
case pending before said court; and lastly, to the overruling by said court of the
demurrer to said complaint presented by the defendants-appellants. The other
errors relate to the merits of the case.
The defendant Ortega was not sentenced by the justice of the peace in the case for
unlawful entry and detainer to pay any sum as rent in arrears of the land or as the
reasonable value of the use and occupation of the same, for the judgment did not
fix any amount, and the bond filed by him was in the sum of P500, (not P150, for
this was merely the amount which the defendant was sentenced to pay as
damages, and which was, by order of the court dated September 27, 1917,
substituted by P500), to answer to damages and costs, not with only one surety, as
claimed by the appellants, but with two sureties. Therefore said bond was in
accordance with the provisions of section 88 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as
amended by Acts Nos. 1776 and 2588; and the defendant is not obliged, in order to
secure a stay of the execution of said judgment, to make any monthly payment, as
required by Act No. 2588, for the reason that there was in the judgment no order for
the payment of rent in arrears nor for any amount for the use and occupation of
said parcels. The result is that the appeal interposed by the defendant against said
judgment was properly admitted and the Court of First Instance acquired jurisdiction
to take cognizance of said case.
It is not true that the complaint filed by Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega against
Francisco Lunsod and Cipriano Medel, administrator of the intestate estate of the
deceased Rufina Medel, docketed in the Court of First Instance as case No. 2286,

had for its sole object the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against said
defendants, prohibiting them from performing acts of ownership and possession
upon said parcels. Neither is it true that said complaint is not related to any other
original action instituted in said court, fro in the same complaint, as already stated,
allegations were made relative to the title of the plaintiffs to said parcels and to the
acts performed by the defendants violative of plaintiffs' right over said parcels and
of their possession, use and enjoyment thereof; and by virtue of these allegations, it
was prayed not only that the plaintiffs be declared the only owners of said parcels
with the improvements thereon, as though the proper action to recover the title
were instituted, but also that said parcels be excluded and stricken out from the
inventory presented in the intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
said deceased, and, lastly, that said writ of preliminary injunction be issued. It is,
therefore, evident that there is no force in the arguments advanced by the
appellants to show that the trial court committed errors Nos. 4 and 5, assigned in
their brief, in taking cognizance of said action in spite of its lack of jurisdiction, and
in overruling the demurrer to the complaint on the ground that the facts therein
stated did not constitute a cause of action.
Neither does the claim or allegation, made by the appellants, of another action
pending, justify the filing of said demurrer for two reasons: First, in case No. 2322,
instituted by Francisco Lunsod against Sinforoso Ortega and Candido Cariaga in the
justice of the peace court, the only question in issue was as to the actual possession
of said three parcels of land, and, although in said case for unlawful entry and
detainer judgment was rendered by said court in favor of the plaintiff, from which
appeal was taken by the defendant Ortega, said judgment, according to the positive
provisions of section 87 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the repeated doctrines of
this Court, construing said section, is no obstacle to the institution by the same
parties in the Court of First Instance of another action respecting the title to said
real property, nor is it conclusive evidence, in another case between the same
parties, of the facts established therein. Second, with respect to the petition of the
plaintiffs Ortega in case No. 2286, for the recovery of title, and exclusion of said
parcels from the inventory of the intestate estate of the deceased Rufina Medel, on
the ground that the same belong to them in fee simple and they are entitled to the
possession thereof, since the court held in said intestate proceedings that the
question of title to said property was a matter of another action, for it was not
proper to raise it in said proceedings, and the administrator of the intestate did not
appeal from said decision, said ruling became final. Besides, in said motion the
defendant Francisco Lunsod and Jacoba Medel were not parties in said petition while
they were parties defendant, together with Cipriano Medel, in the case for recovery
of title No. 2286. Furthermore, it is an established doctrine of this court that the
mere fact that one of the parties is the executor or administrator of the estate of a
deceased person does not confer upon the probate court, in which the proceedings
for the distribution and settlement of said estate are pending, exclusive jurisdiction
to decide all questions that may arise between said executor or administrator and
third persons as to the title to a specific property (Bauermann vs. Casas. 10 Phil.,
386), which doctrine the trial court undoubtedly had in mind in reserving to the

plaintiffs in said proceedings the right to institute the proper action against the
administrator of the intestate estate with respect to the ownership of said property.
Lastly, neither could the demurrer be sustained on the ground that the plaintiffs had
no capacity to bring such action docketed as case No. 2286, for the recovery of title,
because a plaintiffs lacks capacity to sue in two cases, to wit, when he does not
have the necessary qualifications to appear at the trial, or when he does not have
the character or representation he claims; and, in the present case, it does not
appear from the complaint that the plaintiffs were not in the full exercise of their
civil rights, nor was it necessary that they should first have proved their character
as heirs of their deceased father Mariano Ortega and their deceased niece Anacleta
Ortega, for, it having been alleged that they were absolute owners of the parcels in
question by inheritance from them, this should be, as in fact it was, a matter to be
proved at the trial. If it should be accepted that for this reason the plaintiffs had no
capacity to institute the action, it necessarily follows that the defendants Cipriano
Medel and Jacoba Medel would also lack the capacity to exercise, as they did in their
answer to said complaint, their rights as owners of said parcels by inheritance from
the deceased sister Rufina Medel, or the right to ask for the registration of said
parcels in the registry of property in their name because of their character as such
heirs, as they did in the application docketed as case No. 219, which was presented
when the proceedings relating to the administration of the intestate estate of the
same deceased were not yet terminated, the inventory of the respective properties
was not yet approved, and no declaration had as yet been made in favor of said
defendants.
The questions raised by the parties in the three cases aforesaid by their respective
allegations reduced themselves to one the resolution of which will determine the
appeal interposes by the defendants. This question relates to the title to the three
parcels which were sold with the rights to repurchase by Rufina Medel to Francisco
Lunsod in the documents of June 3, 1915.
Considering the documents in connection with the testimony of the appellees
Ortega, Prudencio Baldovino and Aguedo Reyes, it appears from the evidence
beyond question: (1) That upon the death of Mariano Ortega, resident of the
municipality of San Pablo, Province of Laguna, which took place about 27 years ago,
he left three children, named Sinforoso, Francisca and Estanislao Ortega; (2) that
Estanislao Ortega was married on May 8, 1895, to Rufina Medel and died on
September 26, 1902, leaving a daughter born of said marriage, named Anacleta
Ortega, who also died on June 17, 1903, at the age of six years, she and Estanislao
Ortega having been survived by said Rufina Medel, who died on April 10, 1916.
The plaintiff Sinforoso Ortega presented two witnesses, Prudencio Baldovino and
Aguedo Reyes, who are residents of the same municipality of San Pablo, 65 years
old, and well informed about the three parcels of land in question, situated in the
barrio of Sta. Catalina of said municipality, because the first, for about forty years or
more, and the second, since he could remember, had possessed lands in the same
place besides the latter being an adjoining owner of the third parcel. From their
testimony it also appears that the person whom they first saw in possession of said
three parcels, cleaning and sowing and planting palay and coconut trees upon them

was, according to one of them, Mariano Ortega, father of Sinforoso Ortega,

Francisca Ortega and Estanislao Ortega, said possession having been quiet and
peaceful; that upon the death of Mariano Ortega, he was succeeded in the
possession of said parcels by the three brothers, children of said deceased, named
Sinforoso, Francisca and Estanislao Ortega, who used to help their father in the
cultivation of the land and continued to cultivate it, as was seen by the same
witnesses; that upon the death of Estanislao Ortega, husband of Rufina Medel, the
latter and her brother and sister-in-law Sinforoso and Francisca, respectively, that is
to say, the appellees in this case, continued in possession, aiding one another,
according to Sinforoso Ortega, in the cultivation of the land, and dividing the fruits
collected therefrom between them; that upon the death of Rufina Medel on April 10,
1916, said Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega, and no other, took, or continued in,
possession, according to the second of said witnesses, Aguedo Reyes, one of the
appellees, Sinforoso Ortega being at present, that is to say, at the time the witness
was testifying, in possession of the land, although in the month of October, 1916,
Rufina Medel being already dead, Catalino Alaguilan Segundo collected the coconuts
by order, according to them, of Francisco Lunsod, that is, the plaintiff in the case for
unlawful entry and detainer, No. 2322, but after that event Sinforoso Ortega
continued in possession. The same witnesses Baldovino and Reyes described the
different parcels in their declarations, the first having described the boundaries of
each of the three parcels and stated the number of trees planted on them, and the
second having given the boundaries of the second parcel about which he was
examined, and also stated the number of coconut trees planted thereon, as well as
the fact that Mariano Ortega had a house on said parcel, which was between the
other two parcels; and, finally, the first, who had been cabeza de barangay and
lieutenant of the barrio of Sta. Catalina, as well as the second who, as aforesaid,
possessed lands in that barrio, testified that they did not know that the Medel family
had any land in the same barrio, the last named witness stating that the lands of
the Medel family were in the barrio of San Lorenzo, near that of Sta. Catalina.
Lastly, the attorney for the plaintiffs and appellees Ortega having stated that he still
had two witnesses, named Basilia Balcita, adjoining owner of the third parcel on the
west, and Pantaleon Esconde on the north, and another witness Cirilo Escaba,
adjoining owner of the first parcel on the west, who testify to the same effect as the
witness Aguedo Reyes, the attorney for the appellants accepted their testimony
without objection.
On the other hand, from the evidence offered by the defendants it appears,
according to Francisco Lunsod, that he was in possession of said three parcels since
June, 1915, the date of the deed of sale executed by Rufina Medel in his favor, two
which reference was made in the beginning of this decision, as shown by his having
ordered the collection of the fruits every two months by his overseer, who was
Cipriano Medel; that his watchman on said lands was Catalino Alaguilan Segundo;
that he held said possession until June, 1916, when the land was taken by Sinforoso
Ortega who prohibited his overseer (Lunsod's) from collecting the fruits on the
ground that the property belonged to him (Ortega): that by reason thereof he filed a
complaint in the justice of the peace court for theft, which was dismissed, and
another for forcible entry and detainer; that he collected fruits six times a year,

sometimes personally and sometimes through his overseer, although he could not
exactly say how many times he had been on the land; that he also placed Rufina
Medel herself in charge of that work in her lifetime, she having been succeeded in
the possession by her brother Cipriano; that he knew Rufina Medel to be the true
owner of said parcels, because in the real estate tax declarations, Exhibits 2, 3, and
4, presented by her in the municipality of San Pablo for the purposes of the
payment of the taxes, and introduced at the trial, he saw the name of said Rufina
Medel, the witness identifying the receipt Exhibit 5, also presented by said
defendants, dated May 31, 1917, issued in favor of the same Rufina Medel and
evidencing the payment of the land taxes of 5 parcels of land, two of which,
according to the same document, are situated in said barrio of Sta. Catalina.
Cipriano Medel, testifying as witnesses, declared that he knew that Francisco
Lunsod had property in the barrio of Sta. Catalina because he (Lunsod) had
purchased such property in the year 1915 from his sister Rufina Medel, who before
that year was in possession thereof; that the parcel in the sitio of Ma-ancel in said
barrio was bought by his parents (the witness') from Mariano Ortega, but he did not
then remember the boundaries thereof nor could be say how many coconut trees
there were on the land because he had not seen them; that the other parcel in the
sitio of Duhat was bought by Rufina Medel from one Julio Bajalaldia, deceased, but
the witness does not remember when because Rufina Medel told him only that she
had bought that land; that the other parcel in the sitio of Lacdawen had not been
bought by Rufina Medel from anybody; that the sitio of Ma-ancel is in the barrio of
Sta. Catalina and that the other parcel is in the sitio of Catmon; that since 1915,
when said lands were conveyed to Francisco Lunsod by Rufina Medel the former
took possession thereof, but in the year 1916, Sinforoso Ortega seized (so says the
witness) the possession thereof from the former, prohibiting Lunsod from collecting
the coconuts on the land and from interfering in any way with them on the ground
that he, Ortega, was its owner.
Francisco Baldonado, another witness for the defendants, 28 years old and laborer
by occupation, also stated that he knew that Lunsod had a coconut grove in the
barrio of Sta. Catalina, because he had been several times upon said land since
1915 and had bought coconuts from the overseer, named Cipriano Medel, about
four times, and thrice from Lunsod himself, although it is true that the third time,
which took place in the first days of June, 1916, the purchase was not carried into
effect because Sinforoso Ortega suspended the collection of the fruits, telling them
that if they should not do so they would settle the matter by force. The witness also
declared that he did not remember the boundaries of the land on which the
gathering of the fruits was suspended, nor the number of coconut trees or fruits that
were in the land, and that when the event occurred Francisco Lunsod was not
present.
The parties stipulated that Mateo Ticson would declare in the same terms as the
preceding witness.
Catalino Alaguilan Segundo, a laborer 50 years old, also testifying for the
defendants, stated that he knew that Francisco Lunsod had three parcels of land in
said barrio of Sta. Catalina, municipality of San Pablo, one in the sitio of Lacdawen,

another in Ma-ancel, and the third in Catmon, of which parcels he was the owner
and possessor since 1915 by acquisition from Rufina Medel, who in turn acquired
the land in the sitio of Lacdawen from her father-in-law Mariano Ortega as dowry
when she married, that in the sitio of Ma-ancel by inheritance from her mother (that
of Rufina Medel), and that in the sitio of Catmon, the boundaries of which were
mentioned but not the respective cardinal points, by purchase from Julio Bajalaldia
about twenty years ago, said Medel being then newly married, this fact being also
known to the witness because he had been working with them and Medel had
requested him to gather the coconuts in order to pay to Bajalaldia the price of the
said parcel, and he himself, who was then a laborer working for Rufina Medel,
personally delivered the price of the vendor, the first delivery being for P20 and the
second for P15, without any receipt having been given by Bajalaldia for he stated
that he did not know how to write; that from the time of the possession of Rufina
Medel he himself took care of said land and gathered the coconuts thereon, and
since 1915 Francisco Lunsod put him in charge thereof ordering him to gather the
fruits which he had done six times; that the parcel in Lacdawen was, during the
lifetime of Mariano Ortega, in the latter's possession and they gathered the fruits
thereon; that from the very first time that he knew the parcel in Ma-ancel he saw
Rufina Medel and her husband in possession thereof, the witness also naming the
boundaries but not the respective cardinal points; that the owner of the parcel in
Lacdawen was the father of Sinforoso Ortega and the person taking care of the
three parcels on the date on which he testified was the same Sinforoso Ortega since
June, 1916, when he seized the lands from Francisco Lunsod; and finally that he, the
witness, as the overseer or watchman of Lunsod, had a share of one-fifth in the
fruits gathered on said parcels and was interested in securing the possession of the
land for Lunsod.
The evidence adduced by both parties being considered, we arrive at the conclusion
that there is no reason why we should not give credit to the testimony of the
witnesses for the plaintiffs, relative to the statements in the documents presented
by them, with respect to the relationship between said plaintiffs Sinforoso Ortega
and Francisca Ortega and the deceased Mariano Ortega, Estanislao Ortega and his
daughter, Anacleta Ortega, born of the marriage with Rufina Medel, who also died at
a tender age, one year after her father Estanislao, as well as with respect to the
quiet, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession which they enjoyed since about thirty
years ago of the three parcels in question, first, through Mariano Ortega and later,
upon his death, through his children Sinforoso, Francisca and Estanislao, and upon
the latter's death through Rufina Medel, mother of Anacleta Ortega, together with
her brother and sister-in-law Sinforoso and Francisca, respectively, which possession
was, upon the death of Anacleta, held by said three persons until June 3, 1915,
when the mother of the latter, Rufina Medel, sold said three parcels to Francisco
Lunsod with the right to repurchase. Said witnesses, two of whom are 65 years of
age and adjoining owners with respect to said lands, had shown complete
knowledge of those facts and explained the reasons why they respectively knew
what they had testified to.
On the other hand, while it is true that from the testimony given by the witnesses
for the defendants it appears that they had attempted to prove the sole and

exclusive title of Rufina Medel to said three parcels and her possession thereof as
owner when she sold them on said date, June 3, 1915, to Francisco Lunsod, said
witnesses tracing said possession to an original different from that claimed by the
plaintiffs, yet the following facts must be observed in analyzing said declarations:
(1) Francisco Lunsod himself did not know from whom Rufina Medel acquired said
parcels. He knew that she owned them only from the real estate tax declaration
presented by her in the municipality of San Pablo for the purposes of taxation and
by the real estate tax receipts issued to her on May 31, 1917, on which date she
was already dead, and in which receipt the two parcels situated in the barrio of Sta.
Catalina, municipality of San Pablo, are only vaguely and generally mentioned.
These documents, as may be seen, are not and cannot be considered as evidence of
title, as has repeatedly been held by this court in similar cases. Besides, it must also
be remembered that in 1915 said lands had been placed in the assessment list in
her own name by Rufina Medel after the death of her daughter Anacleta Ortega,
who was the owner thereof, as heir of her deceased father Estanislao Ortega, when,
according to the testimony of the witnesses for the plaintiffs, she and the plaintiffs,
her brother and sister-in-law, were in joint possession of said real property. This fact
also explains why Rufina Medel in June of said year was able to effect the sale of
those three parcels, with the right to repurchase, in favor of Francisco Lunsod as if
she were the lawful and exclusive owner thereof, although with the condition
inserted in the corresponding documents that she, the vendor, would take care and
clean said parcels in consideration of a third party of the coconuts that might be
gathered during the term of the repurchase, a circumstance which may have caused
the Ortega brother, who participated with her in the possession thereof, not to note
that she had conveyed said parcels with pacto de retro to said Lunsod.
(2) Rufina Medel being in charge of the cleaning and watching of said parcels at said
compensation it is strange that Cipriano Medel should also be the overseer of
Lunsod, as stated by the latter, and this is particularly so, because said Cipriano
Medel in his testimony was not asked by the attorney for the defendants on this
point and did not make any statement whatever about it; on the other hand it is not
strange that Catalino Alaguilan Segundo should have declared that he was the
watchman of Lunsod and furthermore, that he participated to the extent of one-fifth
of the fruits collected on said parcels, for the reason that said person, according to
his testimony, had been working for Rufina Medel and had taken care of said parcels
and gathered the fruits thereon since the time of Rufina Medel; the result, therefore,
is that, although it may be true that Rufina Medel on June 3, 1915, had sold the
lands with pacto de retro to Francisco Lunsod, as appears from the document
already mentioned, the testimony of said Alaguilan Segundo does not prove that the
plaintiffs were not, jointly with Rufina Medel, in possession of said parcels on the
date when according to Francisco Lunsod, he was turned out of said possession by
Sinforoso Ortega and this is the more so when it is considered that, according to
Lunsod himself, the person who gathered the coconuts on said parcels was his
representative, Cipriano Medel, and his watchman Alaguilan Segundo, he (Lunsod)
having gone to the land only a few times, which he could not exactly determine,
and that he also left that work to Rufina Medel during her lifetime. It is thus seen
quite clearly why the plaintiffs Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega were completely

ignorant of the fact that Rufina Medel had sold said parcels to Francisco Lunsod, and
were unable to know that said Lunsod claimed to be in possession of said lands.
(3) Cipriano Medel did not remember the boundaries of the parcel in Ma-ancel and
could not state how many coconut trees there were on it, because he had not seen
it although he stated that parcel was purchased from Mariano Ortega by his parents
and sisters Jacoba and Rufina Medel; and as he must have known everything
relative to the three parcels for, according to him and his sister Jacoba, they
inherited them from their other sister, now deceased, Rufina Medel, he mentioned a
parcel in the sitio of Duhat as the parcel by her from Julio Bajalaldia, about which
parcel nothing was said by the other witness Catalino Alaguilan Segundo or appears
in the record, said Alaguilan Segundo having, in turn, stated that what was
purchased by Rufina Medel from Julio Bajalaldia was the parcel in the sitio of
Catmon. The result s that as these two witnesses contradict themselves upon this
point nothing certain is proved as to the acquisition of said parcels; and said
Alaguilan Segundo being, according to his own statement, the overseer of said
parcel of Rufina Medel since the latter was married and prior to the year 1915, he
having succeeded Francisco Lunsod, and having about twenty years ago, as laborer
of Rufina Medel, taken to Julio Bajalaldia the payment of the price of the parcel in
Catmon and having, furthermore, as overseer and watchman of Lunsod with a right
to a share of one-fifth of the fruits, collected six times, as stated by him, the fruit of
the coconut trees planted thereon, it is at the same time strange that he was the
owner of the lands adjoining the parcels in Catmon and Lacdawen about which he
has been examined, not having been asked with respect to the boundaries and
owners of the properties adjoining the land at Ma-ancel.
(4) The same parcel in the sitio of Ma-ancel was, according to Alaguilan Segundo,
acquired by Rufina Medel from her mother through inheritance, which is contrary to
the testimony of Cipriano Medel, who testified, as already stated, that said parcel
was purchased by her parents from Mariano Ortega; and said Alaguilan Segundo
has also said that Rufina Medel acquired the parcel in Lacdawen from her father-inlaw Mariano Ortega as dowry when she married, while Cipriano Medel only stated
that parcel was not purchased by Rufina Medel from anybody but did not state how
she acquired it, notwithstanding that he and his sister Jacoba claimed that they
acquired the ownership thereof by inheritance from their deceased sister Rufina.
(5) Francisco Baldonado being a laborer, as stated by him, it is likewise strange that
he had four times purchased coconuts, gathered on said parcels, from the overseer
Cipriano Medel, and twice from Lunsod himself, that is, six times in all, as if he were
a merchant or business man. It is also doubtful that said witness was present when
Sinforoso Ortega suspended the operation of the collection of the fruits on the first
days of June, 1916, threatening to wound those who were engaged in that work,
because he did not remember the boundaries of the land as to which said
suspension was ordered or the number or coconuts gathered or that of the coconut
trees planted upon the land, and, on the other hand, Cipriano Medel himself in his
testimony did not state anything about his having sold at any time the coconut
gathered on said lands, as overseer of Francisco Lunsod, nor about Sinforoso Ortega
having threatened to injure those who were engaged in the gathering of the fruits;

said witness only stated that in 1916 Ortega seized said parcels from Lunsod,
prohibited the latter from gathering the coconuts on the land or from interfering
with them on the ground that he (Ortega) was their owner, which statement
indicates that Lunsod was present when said prohibition was made, and this is aside
from the fact that what has been stated by Alaguilan Segundo clearly leads to the
inference that he, and not Cipriano Medel, was the person who, as overseer and
watchman of the land of Lunsod, for he was entitled to a share of one-fifth of the
fruits, gathered the coconuts by order of Lunsod himself, an operation which
according to him, was effected about six times, which must be the same occasions
refereed to by the witness Baldonado when, according to him, he bought coconuts
from Cipriano Medel, for according to Lunsod himself he had gathered fruits six
times a year and that year was from June, 1915, when he bought the parcels from
Rufina Medel, to June, 1916, when according to the complaint, he was distributed in
the possession thereof. Alaguilan Segundo also did not state that when Sinforoso
Ortega seized said parcels in June , 1916, from Lunsod, he threatened to attack with
his bolo those who were gathering the fruits, nor did he testify that they were then
engaged in that task.
What has been said constitutes sufficient ground for not giving any credence to the
allegation of the defendants and appellants and the testimony of their witnesses
that said defendants owned and possessed the parcels in question. Upon the same
ground it can also be held that the trial court did not err in finding that the weight of
the evidence markedly preponderates in favor of the theory that the lands in
question passed, through inheritance, upon the death of Mariano Ortega, father of
Sinforoso, Francisca and Estanislao Ortega, to the last named person who, with his
wife Rufina Medel, took possession thereof, and that, therefore said couple having
had a daughter named Anacleta Ortega, who inherited said three parcels upon the
death of her father; upon the death of said daughter on June 17, 1903, said three
parcels of land passed by inheritance to her mother Rufina Medel. To this it must
also be added that it is likewise proven that Rufina Medel continued in possession of
said parcels jointly with the brother and sister of her deceased husband, who are
uncle and aunt, respectively, of her deceased daughter Anacleta, and who are the
appellees Sinforoso Ortega and Francisca Ortega, and that she was in such joint
possession on June 3, 1915, when she sold said parcels with pacto de retro to
Francisco Lunsod who, notwithstanding said sale, was not in possession thereof in
June, 1916, the date when, according to him he was turned out of said possession
by Sinforoso Ortega, by reason of which facts we cannot hold that the acts
indicative of that possession and testified to by Lunsod himself and his witnesses
and the witnesses of the other plaintiffs and appellees were duly proven.
Now, according to article 811 of the Civil Code an ascendant who inherits from a
descendant any property acquired by the latter gratuitously from some other
ascendant, or from a brother or sister is obliged to reserve such property as he may
have acquired by operation of law in favor of the relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which such property came. In the decision rendered in
the case of Edroso vs. Sablan and Sablan (25 Phil., 295), in which the former, as heir
of her son, asked for the registration of certain property classified as reservable, the
application having been opposed by two legitimate uncles in their capacity as heirs

of their nephew entitled to the reservable property, and in which it was at the same
time asked that, in case the application be granted, the reservable character of the
property in their favor be noted, this court, speaking through the illustrious Chief
Justice, Cayetano S. Arellano, now deceased, laid down the following:
ESTATE; DUTY OF ASCENDANT, WHO INHERITS THROUGH A DESCENDANT, TO
RESERVE THE PROPERTY IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW; ARTICLE 811, CIVIL CODE.
Property which an ascendant inherits by operation of law from his descendant and
which was inherited by the latter from another ascendant of his, must be reserved
by the ascendant heir in favor of uncles of the descendant from whom the
inheritance proceeded, who are his father's brother, because they are relatives
within the third degree, if they belong to the line whence the property proceeded
according to the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.
In the case at bar, Rufina Medel inherited by operation of law from her daughter
Anacleta Ortega, who died at the age of six years, the three parcels of land in
question situated in the barrio of Sta. Catalina in the municipality of San Pablo
Province of Laguna, which parcels had been acquired by said Anacleta Ortega
gratuitously, that is to say, also by inheritance from an ascendant, who was her
father Estanislao Ortega, and said three parcels having come from Mariano Ortega,
father of the deceased Estanislao Ortega and the appellees Sinforoso and Francisco
Ortega, who are therefore relatives within the third degree of the child Anacleta
Ortega, daughter of Estanislao Ortega, then according to the provisions of said
article 811, these pieces of land constitute reservable property in favor of said
Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega, uncle and aunt of the descendant's predecessor in
interest with respect to the property.
With respect to the rights and obligations of the person obliged to reserve in
connection with the reservable property mentioned in the same article, the
discussion made by this court in the same decision in quite clear and explicit, to wit:
It must be remembered that absolute title consists of the rights to use, enjoy,
dispose of, and recover. The person who has in himself all these rights has the
absolute or complete ownership of the thing; otherwise, the person who has the
rights to use and enjoy will have the usufruct, and the person who has the rights of
disposal and recovery the direct title. The person who by law, act, or contract is
granted the right of usufruct has the first two rights of using and enjoying, and then
he is said not to have the fee simple that is, the rights of disposal and recovery,
which pertain to another who, after the usufruct expires, will come into full
ownership.
The question set up in the first assignment of error of the appellant's brief is this:
"What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to the
reservation of article 811 of the Civil Code?"
There are not lacking writers who say, only those of a usufructuary, the ultimate
title belonging to the persons in whose favor the reservation is made. If that were
so, the person holding the property could not apply for registration of title, but the
person in whose favor it must be reserved, with the former's consent. This opinion

does not seem to be admissible, although it appears to be supported by decisions of

the supreme court of Spain of May 21, 1861, and June 18, 1880, prior to the Civil
Code, and of June 22, 1895, somewhat subsequent to the enforcement thereof.
Another writer says: "This opinion only looks at two salient points the usufruct
and the fee simple; the remaining features of the arrangement are not perceived,
but become obscured in the presence of that deceptive emphasis which only brings
out two things: that the person holding the property will enjoy it and that he must
keep what he enjoys for other persons." (Manresa, VII, 189.)
In another place he says: "We do not believe that the third opinion can now be
maintained that is, that the surviving spouse (the person obligated by article 968
to make the reservation) can be regarded as a mere usufructuary and the
descendants immediately as the owner; such theory has no serious foundation in
the Code." (Ibid., 238.)
The ascendant who inherits from a descendant, whether by the latter's wish or by
operation of law, acquires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring
absolute ownership. All the attributes of the right of ownership belong to him
exclusively use, enjoyment, disposal, and recovery. This absolute ownership,
which is inherent in the hereditary title, is not altered in the least, if there be no
relatives within the third degree in the line whence the property proceeds or they
die before the ascendant heir who is the possessor and absolute owner of the
property. If there should be relatives within the third degree who belong to the line
whence the property proceeded, then a limitation to that absolute ownership would
arise. The nature and scope of this limitation must be determined with exactness in
order not to vitiate rights that the law wishes to be effective. The opinion which
makes this limitation consists in reducing the ascendant heir to the condition of a
mere usufructuary, depriving him of the right of disposal and recovery, does not
seem to have any support in the law, as it does not have, according to the opinion
that has been expressed in speaking of the rights of the father or mother who has
married again. There is a marked difference between the case where a man's wish
institutes two persons as his heirs, one as usufructuary and the other as owner of
his property, and the case of the ascendant in article 811 or of the father or mother
in article 968. In the first case, there is not the slightest doubt that the title to the
hereditary property resides in the hereditary owner and only he can dispose of and
recover it, while the usufructuary can in no way perform any act of disposal of the
hereditary property (except that he may dispose of the right of usufruct in
accordance with the provisions of article 480 of the Civil Code), or any act of
recovery thereof except the limited one in the form prescribed in article 486 of the
Code itself, because he totally lacks the fee simple. But the ascendant who holds
the property required by article 811 to be reserved, and the father or mother
required by article 968 to reserve the right, can dispose of the property they inherit
itself, the former from his descendant and the latter from his or her child in first
marriage, and recover it from anyone who may unjustly detain it, while the persons
in whose favor the right if required to be reserved in either case cannot perform any
act whatsoever of disposal or of recovery.

Article 975 states explicitly that the father or mother required by article 968 to
reserve the right may dispose of the property itself:
"Alienation of the property required by law to be reserved which may be made by
the surviving spouse after contracting a second marriage shall be valid only if at his
or her death no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage survive,
without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law."
It thus appears that the alienation is valid, although not altogether effective, but
under a condition subsequent, to wit: "If at his or her death no legitimate children or
descendants of the first marriage survive."
If the title did not reside in the person holding the property to be reserved, his
alienation thereof would necessarily be null and void, as executed without a right to
do so and without a right which he could transmit to the acquirer. The law says that
the alienation subsists (to subsist is to continue to exist) "without prejudice to the
provisions of the Mortgage Law." Article 109 of this Law says:
"The possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent that are still
pending may mortgage or alienate it, provided always that he preserve the right of
the parties interested in said conditions by expressly reserving that right in the
registration."
In such case, the child or legitimate descendant of the first marriage in whose favor
the rights is reserved cannot impugn the validity of the alienation so long as the
condition subsequent is pending, that is, so long as the remarried spouse who must
reserve the right is alive, because it might easily happen that the person who must
reserve the right should outlive all the persons in whose favor the right is reserved
and then there would be no reasons for the condition subsequent that they survive
him, and, the object of the law having disappeared, the right required to be
reserved would disappear, and the alienation would not only be valid but also in
every way absolutely effective. Consequently, the alienation is valid when the right
required by law to be reserved to the children is respected; while the effects of the
alienation depend upon a condition, because it will or will not become definite, it will
continue to exist or cease to exist, according to circumstances. This is what the law
establishes with reference to the reservation of article 968, wherein the legislator
expressly directs that the surviving spouse who contracts a second marriage shall
reserve to the children or descendants of the first marriage ownership. Article 811
says nothing more than that the ascendant must make the reservation.
Manresa, with his recognized ability, summarizes the subject under the heading,
"Rights and obligations during the existence of the right required by law to be
reserved," in these words:
"During the whole period between the constitution in legal form of the right required
by law to be reserved and the extinction thereof, the relatives within the third
degree, after the right that in their turn may pertain to them has been assured,
have only an expectation, and therefore they do not even have the capacity to
transmit that expectation to their heirs.

"The ascendant is in the first place a usufructuary who should use and enjoy the
things according to their nature, in the manner and form already set forth in
commenting upon the articles of the Code referring to use and usufruct.
"But since in addition to being the usufructuary he is, even though conditionally, the
owner in fee simple of the property, he can dispose of it in the manner provided in
article 974 to 976 of the same Code. Doubt arose also on this point, but
the Direccion General of the registries, in an opinion of June 25, 1892, declared that
articles 974 and 975, which are applicable by analogy, for they refer to property
reserved by law, reveal in the clearest manner the attitude of the legislator on this
subject, and the relatives within the third degree ought not to be more privileged in
the right reserved in article 811 than the children in the right reserved by article
975, chiefly for the reason that the right required to be reserved carries with it a
condition subsequent, and the property subject to those conditions can validly be
alienated in accordance with article 109 of the Mortgage Law, such alienation to
continue, pending fulfillment of the condition." (Civil Code, VI, 270.)
Another commentator corroborates the foregoing in every way. He says:
"The ascendant acquires that property with a condition subsequent, to wit, whether
or not there exist at the time of his death relatives within the third degree of the
descendant from whom they inherit in the line whence the property proceeds. If
such relatives exist, they acquire ownership of the property at the death of the
ascendant. If they do not exist, the ascendant can freely dispose thereof. If this is
true, since the possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent can alienate
and encumber it, the ascendant may alienate the property required by law to be
reserved, but he will alienate what he has and nothing more because no one can
give that does not belong to him, and the acquirer will therefore receive a limited
and revocable title. The relatives within the third degree will in their turn have an
expectation to the property while the ascendant lives, an expectation that cannot
be transmitted to their heirs, unless these are also within the third degree. After the
person who is required by law to reserve the right has died, the relatives may
rescind the alienation of the realty required by law to be reserved and they will
acquire it and all the rest that has the same character in complete ownership, in fee
simple, because the condition and the usufruct have been terminated by the death
of the usufructuary." (Morell, Estudios sobre bienes reservables, 304, 305.)
The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve the right has,
beyond any doubt at all, the rights of use and usufruct. He has, moreover, for the
reasons set forth, the legal title and dominion, although under a condition
subsequent. Clearly he has, under an express provision of the law, the right to
dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of his to alienation, although under
a condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one who possesses or
should possess it and have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. In a
word, the legal title and dominion, even though under a condition, reside in him
while he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has been assured, he
can do anything that a genuine owner can do.

On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor the right is
reserved cannot dispose of the property, first because it is in no way, either
actually, constructively, or formally, in their possession; and, moreover, because
they have no title of ownership or of fee simple which they can transmit to another,
on the hypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the right should die
before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they
take their place in the succession of the descendant of whom they are relatives
within the third degree, that is to say, a second contingent place in said legitimate
succession in the fashion of aspirants to a possible future legacy. If any of the
persons in whose favor the right is reserved should, after their rights has been
assured in the registry, dare to dispose of even nothing more than the fee simple of
the property to be reserved his act would be null and void, for, as was definitely
decided in the decision on appeal of December 30, 1897, it is impossible to
determine the part "that might pertain therein to the relative at the time he
exercised the right, because in view of the nature and scope of the right required by
law to be reserved the extent of his right cannot be foreseen, for it may disappear
by his dying before the person required to reserve it, just as it may even become
absolute should that person die."
Careful consideration of the matter forces the conclusion that no act to disposal
inter vivos of the person required by law to reserve the right can be impugned by
him in whose favor it is reserved, because such person has all, absolutely all, the
rights inherent in ownership, except that the legal title is burdened with a condition
that the third party acquirer may ascertain from the registry in order to know that
he is acquiring a title subject to a condition subsequent. In conclusion, it seems to
us that only an act of disposal mortis causa in favor of persons other than relatives
within the third degree of the descendant from whom he got the property to be
reserved must be prohibited to him, because this alone has been the object of the
law: "To prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special accident of
life, property that would otherwise have remained therein." (Decision of December
30, 1897.)
Practically, even in the opinion of those who reduce the person reserving the right
to the condition of a mere usufructuary, the person in whose favor it must be
reserved cannot attack the alienation that may be absolutely made of the property
the law requires to be reserved, in the present case, that which the applicant has
made of the two parcels of land in question to a third party, because the conditional
alienation that is permitted her is equivalent to an alienation of the usufruct, which
is authorized by article 480 of the Civil Code, and, practically, use and enjoyment of
the property required by law to be reserved are all that the person who must
reserve it has during his lifetime, and in alienation the usufruct all the usefulness of
the thing would be transmitted in an incontrovertible manner. The question as to
whether or not she transmits the fee simple is purely academic, sine re, for it is not
real, actual and positive, as is the case of the institution of two heirs, one a
usufructuary and the other the owner, by the express wish of the predecessor in
interest.

If the person whom article 811 requires to reserve the rights has all the rights
inherent in ownership, he can use, enjoy, dispose of and recover it; and if, in
addition to usufructuary, he is in fact and in law the real owner and can alienate it,
although under a condition. . . .
It is, therefore, indisputable, in view of the preceding discussion made in the
decision of this court just cited, that the person obliged to reserve, that is, Rufina
Medel, heir of her daughter Anacleta Ortega, was not only a usufructuary but also
the owner in fee simple of the three parcels of land in question, notwithstanding the
fact that they have the character of reservable property in favor of Sinforoso and
Francisca Ortega, relatives within the third degree of said Anacleta Ortega and
belonging to the line from which such property came, and, in her capacity as such,
she could have, as she did, sold with the right to repurchase on June 3, 1915, said
three parcels to Francisco Lunsod; but it is also indisputable that Rufina Medel
acquired these parcels subject to a resolutory condition, that is to say, her
ownership of said property was subject to said condition, to wit, that there should or
should not exist at the time of her death relatives of Anacleta Ortega from whom
she inherited said property, included within the third degree and belonging to the
line from which said property came, by virtue of which condition said property was
impressed with the reservable character, according to the provision of article 811 of
the Civil Code, and therefore she could not have effected said sale without saving
the rights of the persons entitled to have the property reserved to them, by
securing to the latter the value thereof, according to the provision of article 974 and
975 of the Civil Code in connection with article 109 of the Mortgage Law and in the
manner established in this article, the provisions of the first two articles being
applicable by analogy to reservable property mentioned in article 811 of the Civil
Code to which reference has already been made.
Rufina Medel not having complied with the provisions of said article in effecting the
sale of said parcels in favor of Francisco Lunsod, inasmuch as the document
executed for the purpose was not recorded in the registry of property, and she could
not, therefore, have made in the corresponding record the express reservation of
the right of Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega over said property, and said Rufina
Medel not having even mentioned in said document the fact that said property was
reservable, said alienation is void and can have no effect as against the persons
entitled to have such property reserved, who are Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega.
And Rufina Medel having died on April 10, 1916, leaving as her survivors the
persons already mentioned and entitled to have the property reserved in their favor,
and the condition attached to the title to said parcels having thus been resolved,
said parcels became the absolute and exclusive property of the same persons
entitled to have said property reserved as relatives within the third degree of
Anacleta Ortega and belonging to the line from which said property came.
Rufina Medel not having acquired said parcels before her death in fee simple and
without the limitation which characterizes them as reservable property, for the
reason that Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega, who were entitled to have such parcels
reserved, survived her, it is obvious that the brother and sister of the former,
Cipriano and Jacoba Medel did not, as they claim acquire said parcels by inheritance

from said deceased, and, consequently, they have no right to have said property
registered in the registry of deeds in their name and the opposition to said
registration presented by Francisco Lunsod in said case No. 219 is, therefore,
groundless.
The three parcels referred to not being, therefore property of the conjugal
partnership of the deceased Estanislao Ortega and Rufina Medel, but the separate
and exclusive property of the former, since he acquired them gratuitously from his
father Mariano Ortega, the title thereof passing afterwards to their daughter
Anacleta Ortega, and, upon the latter's death, to Rufina Medel by inheritance from
Anacleta, with the character of reservable property in favor of Sinforoso and
Francisca Ortega, who acquired the absolute title thereto by virtue of said character,
the exclusion, ordered by the court, of said property from the inventory presented
by the administrator Cipriano Medel in the intestate proceedings for the settlement
of the estate of Rufina Medel, case No. 2218, was proper.
With respect to the possession of said parcels claimed by Francisco Lunsod of which,
he alleges, he was deprived by Sinforoso Ortega in June or July, 1916, these facts
were nor proved at the trial, as already stated, but, on the contrary, it was proven
that Rufina Medel continued in said possession in which, in some way or another,
her brother and sister-in-law, Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega, the persons entitled to
have the property reserved in their favor, participated, although Rufina Medel,
according to the document of June 3, 1915, had already sold said parcels to Lunsod
with the right to repurchase, and therefore the remedy prayed for by the latter in
his complaint in the Court of First Instance, which is a reproduction of the one
previously filed in the court of the justice of the peace of San Pablo, and docketed
there as case No. 2322, is improper and groundless.
What has been said knows that the trial court did not commit errors Nos. 6, 8, and 9
assigned by the appellants in their brief; neither did the court below commit the 7th
error, for the judgment appealed from, there are set forth the conclusions arrived at
by the trial judge with respect to the points in issue and which his Honor considered
proved, it being there stated, at the same time, that the preponderance of the
evidence is notably in favor of the theory maintained by the appellees Sinforoso and
Francisca Ortega.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed with the addition
that Sinforoso Ortega is absolved from the complaint filed against him by Francisco
Lunsod on May 9, 1917, and docketed as case No. 2322, for unlawful entry and
detainer; and the opposition of said Lunsod to the application of Cipriano and Jacoba
Medel for registry of deeds is dismissed, and the opposition entered by Sinforoso
and Francisca Ortega to said registration is sustained, with the costs of first instance
as ordered in the judgment appealed from, and the costs of this instance against
the appellants. So ordered.
Johnson, Street, Avancea and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Tuazon v Reyes
G.R. No. L-25039

March 2, 1926

VICENTE
TUAZON, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HERMOGENES REYES, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga,
and ROBERTO SIOCHI,respondents.
Santos
&
Benitez
The
respondent
judge
in
Juan Bernales for the other respondent.

for
his

own

petitioner.
behalf.

OSTRAND, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari upon the following facts: In an action bought
by Roberto Siochi against Petronilo David et al. for the partition of a track of land.
this court in a decision promulgated January 8, 1919, ordered the partition in equal
shares between the plaintiff and the defendant Petronilo David of some 15 hectares
of the land an d the case was ordered returned to the Court of First Instance for
further proceedings in accordance with sections 184 et seq. of the Code of Civil
Procedure.1
Commissioners of partition were thereupon appointed but for reasons which do not
clearly appear, they did not take immediate action in the matter and in the
meantime, Petronilo David obtained Torrens certificates of title for the land in
cadastral case No. 10 of the Province of Pampanga and, on July 30, 1921, sold the
land to the petitioner herein, Vicente Tuazon, the deed containing a recital to the
effect that of the land so sold as area of 7 hectares and 50 ares was in dispute
between the vendor and Roberto Siochi and that the purchaser Vicente Tuazon was
merely subrogated to the rights and obligations of the vendor in relation to said
disputed portion and that said vendor did warrant the title to the same. Thereafter
transfer certificates of title were issued in favor of Vicente Tuazon on March 8, 1923,
but through the negligence of the register of deeds the reservation made in regard
to the land in dispute with Siochi was not entered upon the certificate of title.
Thereafter, on December 26, 1923, Tuazon presented to the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga, a written protest against the partition of the ground that he held
Torrens certificates of title to all the land and by reason of said protest the
Honorable Guillermo Guevara, Judge of that court, after requiring the production in
court of the petitioner's transfer certificates of title, set aside the order of partition
and revoked the appointment of the commissioners in an order dated February 4,
1924. A motion for reconsideration was filed by Siochi and on July 7, 1924, the
herein respondent the Honorable Hermogenes Reyes, then Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga, revoked the order of his predecessor and ordered the
commissioners to execute the partition of the land.
In compliance with the order of Judge Reyes, the commissioners presented their
report adjudicating to Siochi his share of the land in dispute which report was duly
approved by said judge. Tuazon refused to deliver possession to Siochi of the land

awarded the latter and, on April 1, 1925, the respondent judge issued an order
directing that Siochi be placed in possession of the land adjudicated to him.
This action was thereupon brought the petitioner maintaining that not being a party
to the original action his title was not affected by the partition proceedings and that
therefore the order of April 1, 1925, directing that Siochi be placed in possession of
the portion adjudicated to him in said proceeding was beyond the jurisdiction of the
court.
A purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith
holds an indefeasible title to the land and is such was the case here the petitioner's
contention would be perfectly valid. But there the element of good faith is lacking.
The defendant acquired his title while the partition proceedings were pending and
his title is therefore subject to the incidents and results of the pending litigation and
is no better than that of the vendor in whose shoes he now stands. In these
circumstances, the petitioner's transfer certificates of title can afford him no special
protection. The deed under which the title was acquired expressly recites that the
land was in dispute and that as to the disputed portion only the interest of the
vendor was conveyed. In ordering the execution of the judgment of partition the
respondent judge did therefore not exceed his jurisdiction and a writ of certiorari will
not lie.
During the pendency of this action, the respondent Siochi appears to have executed
a deed for the land in question in favor of Rafael and Felipe David who have now
filed a petition for intervention is unnecessary and the petition therefor is denied,
but upon cancellation and the transfer of certificates of title Nos. 617 and 618 now
held by the petitioner Vicente Tuazon and upon presentation to the register of deeds
for the deed executed by Siochi in favor of Rafael and Felipe David, together with a
technical description of the segregated portion of the land approved by the General
Land Registration Office, transfer certificate of the title may be issued direct to said
Rafael and Felipe David in accordance with the deed without previous issuance of
such certificate to Roberto Siochi in the partition proceedings embraces portions of
two cadastral lots, Nos. 4166 and 4173, it will be necessary to subdivide said lots in
conformity with the provisions of section 6 of Act No. 2259.
For the reasons stated the petition for a writ of certiorari is hereby denied with the
costs against the petitioner. The preliminary injunction hereinbefore issued is
dissolved without prejudice to the respondent Siochi's claim for damages suffered
by virtue of the issuance of said injunction. Let transfer certificates of title Nos. 617
and 618 of the registry of deeds of the Province of Pampanga be detached for
cancellation and issuance of new certificates with properly approved technical
description in accordance with the result of the partition proceedings. So ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ.,
concur.

Edroso v Sablan
G.R. No. 6878

September 13, 1913

MARCELINA
EDROSO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
PABLO and BASILIO SABLAN, opponents-appellees.
Francisco
Dominguez
Crispin Oben for appellees.

for

appellant.

ARELLANO, C.J.:
The subject matter of this appeal is the registration of certain property classified as
required by law to be reserved. Marcelina Edroso applied for registration and
issuance of title to two parcels of land situated in the municipality of Pagsanjan,
Province of Laguna, one of 1 hectare 77 ares and 63 centares, and the other 1
hectare 6 ares and 26 centares. Two applications were filed, one for each parcel, but
both were heard and decided in a single judgment.
Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on September 22,
1882. In this marriage they had a son named Pedro, who was born on August 1,
1881, and who at his father's death inherited the two said parcels. Pedro also died
on July 15, 1902, unmarried and without issue and by this decease the two parcels
of land passed through inheritance to his mother, Marcelina Edroso. Hence the
hereditary title whereupon is based the application for registration of her ownership.
Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan that is, two uncles german of Pedro
Sablan appeared in the case to oppose the registration, claiming one of two
things: Either that the registration be denied, "or that if granted to her the right
reserved by law to the opponents be recorded in the registration of each parcel." (B.
of E., 11, 12.)
The Court of Land Registration denied the registration and the application appealed
through a bill of exceptions.
Registration was denied because the trial court held that the parcels of land in
question partake of the nature of property required by law to be reserved and that
in such a case application could only be presented jointly in the names of the
mother and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.
The appellant impugns as erroneous the first idea advanced (second assignment of
error), and denies that the land which are the subject matter of the application are
required by law to be reserved a contention we regard as indefensible.
Facts: (1) The applicant acquired said lands from her descendant Pedro Sablan by
inheritance; (2) Pedro Sablan had acquired them from his ascendant Victoriano
Sablan, likewise by inheritance; (3) Victoriano Sablan had likewise acquired them by
inheritance from his ascendants, Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, they
having been adjudicated to him in the partition of hereditary property had between
him and his brothers. These are admitted facts.

A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without a
valuable consideration [gratuitous title], and it is so characterized in article 968 of
the Civil Code, for he who acquires by inheritance gives nothing in return for what
he receives; and a very definite conclusion of law also is that the uncles german are
within the third degree of blood relationship.
The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired
without a valuable consideration from another ascendant, or from a brother or
sister, is under obligation to reserve what he has acquired by operation of law for
the relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line whence the
property proceeded. (Civil Code, art. 811.)
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels
of land which he had acquired without a valuable consideration that is, by
inheritance from another ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having acquired them by
operation of law, she is obligated to relatives within the third degree and belong to
the line of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands proceeded.
The trial court's ruling that they partake of the nature property required by law to be
reserved is therefore in accordance with the law.
But the appellant contends that it is not proven that the two parcels of land in
question have been acquired by operation of law, and that only property acquired
without a valuable consideration, which is by operation of law, is required by law to
reserved.
The appellees justly argue that this defense was not alleged or discussed in first
instance, but only herein. Certainly, the allegation in first instance was merely that
"Pedro Sablan acquired the property in question in 1882, before the enforcement of
the Civil Code, which establishes the alleged right required by law to be reserved, of
which the opponents speak; hence, prescription of the right of action; and finally,
opponents' renunciation of their right, admitting that it existed and that they had it"
(p. 49).
However that be, it is not superflous to say, although it may be unnecessary, that
the applicant inherited the two parcels of land from her son Pedro, who died
"unmarried and without issue." The trial court so held as a conclusion of fact,
without any objection on the appellant's part. (B. of E., 17, 20.) When Pedro Sablan
died without issue, his mother became his heir by virtue of her right to her son's
legal portion under article 935 of the Civil Code:
In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his
ascendants shall from him, to the exclusion of collaterals.
The contrary could only have occurred if the heiress had demonstrated that any of
these lands had passed into her possession by free disposal in her son's will; but the
case presents no testamentary provision that demonstrate any transfer of property
from the son to the mother, not by operation of law, but by her son's wish. The legal
presumption is that the transfer of the two parcels of land was abintestate or by
operation of law, and not by will or the wish of the predecessor in interest. (Act No.

190, sec. 334, No. 26.) All the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code have
therefore been fully complied with.
If Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal heiress of his
property, all he left at death would not be required by law to be reserved, but only
what he would have perforce left her as the legal portion of a legitimate ascendant.
The legal portion of the parents or ascendants is constituted by one-half of the
hereditary estate of the children and descendants. The latter may unrestrictedly
dispose of the other half, with the exception of what is established in article 836.
(Civil Code, art. 809.)
In such case only the half constituting the legal portion would be required by law to
be reserved, because it is what by operation of law could full to the mother from her
son's inheritance; the other half at free disposal would not have to be reserved. This
is all that article 811 of the Civil Code says.
No error has been incurred in holding that the two parcels of land which are the
subject matter of the application are required by law to be reserved, because the
interested party has not proved that either of them became her inheritance through
the free disposal of her son.
Proof testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress who alleges it. It must be
admitted that a half of Pedro Sablan's inheritance was acquired by his mother by
operation of law. The law provides that the other half is also presumed to be
acquired by operation of law that is, by intestate succession. Otherwise, proof to
offset this presumption must be presented by the interested party, that is, that the
other half was acquired by the man's wish and not by operation of law.
Nor is the third assignments of error admissible that the trial court failed to
sustain the renunciation of the right required by law to be reserved, which the
applicant attributes to the opponents. Such renunciation does not appear in the
case. The appellant deduces it from the fact that the appellees did not contradict
the following statement of hers at the trial:
The day after my brother-in-law Pablo Sablan dies and was buried, his brother came
to my house and said that those rice lands were mine, because we had already
talked about making delivery of them. (p. 91).
The other brother alluded to is Basilio Sablan, as stated on page 92. From the fact
that Basilio Sablan said that the lands belong to the appellant and must be
delivered to her it cannot be deduced that he renounced the right required by law to
be reserved in such lands by virtue of the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code,
for they really belong to her and must be delivered to her.
The fourth assignments of error set up the defense of prescription of the right of
action. The appellant alleges prescription of the opponent's right of action for
requiring fulfillment of the obligation they attribute to her recording in the property
registry the right required by law to be reserved, in accordance with the provisions
of the Mortgage Law; and as such obligation is created by law, it prescribed in the
time fixed in No. 2 of section 43 of Act No. 190. She adds: "Prescription of

the right alleged to the reserved by force of law has not been invoked." (Eight
allegation.)
The appellant does not state in her brief what those provisions of the Mortgage Law
are. Nor did she do so in first instance, where she says only the following, which is
quoted from the record: "I do not refer to the prescription of the right required by
law to be reserved in the property; I refer to the prescription of the right of action of
those who are entitled to the guaranty of that right for seeking that guaranty, for
those who are entitled to that right the Mortgage Law grants a period of time for
recording it in the property registry, if I remember correctly, ninety days, for seeking
entry in the registry; but as they have not exercised that right of action, such right
of action for seeking here that it be recorded has prescribed. The right of action for
requiring that the property be reserved has not prescribed, but the right of action
for guaranteeing in the property registry that this property is required by law to be
reserved" (p. 69 of the record).
The appellees reply: It is true that their right of action has prescribed for requiring
the applicant to constitute the mortgage imposed by the Mortgage Law for
guaranteeing the effectiveness of the required by law to be reserved; but because
that right of action has prescribed, that property has not been divested of its
character of property required by law to be reserved; that it has such character by
virtue of article 8112 of the Civil Code, which went into effect in the Philippine in
December, 1889, and not by virtue of the Mortgage Law, which only went into effect
in the country by law of July 14, 1893; that from December, 1889, to July, 1893,
property which under article 811 of the Civil Code acquired the character of
property reserved by operation of law was such independently of the Mortgage Law,
which did not yet form part of the positive legislation of the country; that although
the Mortgage Law has been in effect in the country since July, 1893, still it has in no
way altered the force of article 811 of the Civil Code, but has operated to reinforce
the same merely by granting the right of action to the persons in whose favor the
right is reserved by operation of law to require of the person holding the property a
guaranty in the form of a mortgage to answer for the enforcement, in due time, of
the right; that to lose the right of action to the guaranty is not to lose the right
itself; that the right reserved is the principal obligation and the mortgage the
accessory obligation, and loss of the accessory does not mean loss of the principal.
(Fifth and sixth allegations.)
The existence of the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land
in question being indisputable, even though it be admitted that the right of action
which the Mortgage Law grants as a guaranty of final enforcement of such right has
prescribed, the only thing to be determined by this appeal is the question raised in
the first assignment of error, that is, how said two parcels of land can and ought to
be registered, not in the property registry newly established by the Mortgage Law,
but in the registry newly organized by Act No. 496. But as the have slipped into the
allegations quoted some rather inexact ideas that further obscure such an intricate
subject as this of the rights required to be reserved in Spanish-Philippine law, a brief
disgression on the most essential points may not be out of place here.

The Mortgage Law of July 14, 1893, to which the appellees allude, is the amended
one of the colonies, not the first enforced in the colonies and consequently in the
Philippines. The preamble of said amended Mortgage Law states:
The Mortgage Law in force in Spain for thirty years went into effect, with the
modifications necessary for its adaptation, in the Antilles on May 1, 1880, and in the
Philippines on December 1, 1889, thus commencing in those regions the renovation
of the law on real property, and consequently of agrarian credit.
The Civil Code went into effect in the Philippines in the same year, 1889, but on the
eight day.
Two kinds of property required by law to be reserved are distinguished in the Civil
Code, as set forth in article 968 thereof, where it says:
Besides the reservation imposed by article 811, the widow or widower contracting a
seconds marriage shall be obliged to set apart for the children and descendants of
the first marriage the ownership of all the property he or she may have required
from the deceased spouse by will, by intestate succession, by gift, or other transfer
without a valuable consideration."
The Mortgage Law of Spain and the first law that went into effect in the Philippines
on December 1, 189, do not contain any provision that can be applied to the right
reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code, for such right is a creation of the Civil
Code. In those laws appear merely the provisions intended to guarantee the
effectiveness of the right in favor of the children of the first marriage when their
father or mother contracts a second marriage. Nevertheless, the holding of the
supreme court of Spain, for the first time set forth in the decision on appeal of
November 8, 1894, has been reiterated:
That while the provisions of articles 977 and 978 of the Civil Code that tend to
secure the right required to be reserved in the property refer especially to the
spouses who contract second or later marriages, they do not thereby cease to be
applicable to the right establishes in article 811, because, aside from the legal
reason, which is the same in both cases, such must be the construction from the
important and conclusive circumstance that said provisions are set forth in the
chapter that deals with inheritances in common, either testate or intestate, and
because article 968, which heads the section that deals in general with property
required by law to be reserved, makes reference to the provisions in article 811; and
it would consequently be contradictory to the principle of the law and of the
common nature of said provisions not to hold them applicable to that right.
Thus it was again stated in a decision on appeal, December 30, 1897, that: "As the
supreme court has already declared, the guaranties that the Code fixes in article
977 and 978 for the rights required by law to the reserved to which said articles
refer, are applicable to the special right dealt with in article 811, because the same
principle exists and because of the general nature of the provisions of the chapter in
which they are found."

From this principle of jurisprudence it is inferred that if from December, 1889, to

July, 1893, a case had occurred of a right required to be reserved by article 811, the
persons entitled to such right would have been able to institute, against the
ascendant who must make the reservation, proceedings for the assurance and
guaranty that article 977 and 978 grant to the children of a first marriage against
their father or mother who has married again. The proceedings for assurance, under
article 977; are: Inventory of the property subject to the right reserved, annotation
in the property registry of such right reserved in the real property and appraisal of
the personal property; and the guaranty, under article 978, is the assurance by
mortgage, in the case of realty, of the value of what is validly alienated.
But since the amended Mortgage Law went into effect by law of July 14, 1893, in the
Philippines this is not only a principle of jurisprudence which may be invoked for the
applicability to the right reserved in article 811 of the remedies of assurance and
guaranty provided for the right reserved in article 968, but there is a positive
provision of said law, which is an advantage over the law of Spain, to wit, article
199, which read thus:
The special mortgage for guaranteeing the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil
Code can only be required by the relatives in whose favor the property is to be
reserved, if they are of age; if minors, it will be require by the person who should
legally represent them. In either case the right of the persons in whose favor the
property must be reserved will be secured by the same requisites as set forth in the
preceding article (relative to the right reserved by article 968 of the Civil Code),
applying to the person obligated to reserve the right the provisions with respect to
the father.
In article 168 of the same law the new subsection 2 is added in connection with
article 199 quoted, so that said article 168 reads as thus:
Legal mortgage is established:
1. . . .
2. In favor of the relatives to whom article 811 of the Civil Code refers, for the
property required to be reserved, upon the property of the person obliged to reserve
it.
This being admitted, and admitted also that both the litigating parties agree that
the period of ninety days fixed for the right of action to the guaranty, that is, to
require the mortgage that guarantees the effectiveness of the right required by law
to be reserved, has prescribed, it is necessary to lay down a principle in this matter.
Now it should by noted that such action has not prescribed, because the period of
ninety days fixed by the Mortgage Law is not for the exercise of the right of action of
the persons entitled to the right reserved, but for the fulfillment of the obligation of
the person who must make the reservation.
Article 191 of the reads thus: "If ninety days pass without the father's instituting in
court the proceeding to which the foregoing article refers, the relatives themselves

may demand fulfillment, etc., . . . applying, according to said article 199, to the
person obligated to reserve the right the provisions with respect to the father."
Article 203 of the regulation for the application of the Mortgage Law says: "In the
case of article 199 of the law the proceedings to which article 190 thereof refers will
be instituted within the ninety days succeeding the date of the date of the
acceptation of the inheritance by the person obligated to reserve the property; after
this period has elapsed, the interested parties may require the institution of such
proceedings, if they are of age; and in any other case, their legal representatives."
Thus it clearly appears that the lapse of the ninety days is not the expiration by
prescription of the period for the right must be reserved, but really the
commencement thereof, enables them to exercise it at any time, since no limits is
set in the law. So, if the annotation of the right required by law to be reserved in the
two parcels of land in question must be made in the property registry of the
Mortgage Law, the persons entitled to it may now institute proceedings to that end,
and an allegation of prescription against the exercise of such right of action cannot
be sustained.
Since the applicant confesses that she does not allege prescription of the right of
action for requiring that the property be reserved, for she explicitly so stated at the
trial, and as the case presents no necessity for the proceedings that should be
instituted in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law, this prescription of
the right of action cannot take place, because such right of action does not exist
with reference to instituting proceedings for annotation in the registry of Act No.
496 of the right to the property required by law to be reserved. It is sufficient, as
was done in the present case, to intervene in the registration proceedings with the
claim set up by the two opponents for recording therein the right reserved in either
parcel of land.
Now comes the main point in the appeal. The trial court denied the registration
because of this finding set forth in its decision:
Absolute title to the two parcels of land undoubtedly belongs to the applicant and
the two uncles of the deceased Pedro Sablan, and the application cannot be made
except in the name of all of them in common. (B. of E., p. 20.)
It must be remembered that absolute title consists of the rights to use, enjoy,
dispose of, and recover. The person who has in himself all these rights has the
absolute or complete ownership of the thing; otherwise, the person who has the
right to use and enjoy will have the usufruct, and the person who has the rights of
disposal and recovery the direct title. The person who by law, act, or contract is
granted the right of usufruct has the first two rights or using an enjoying, and then
he is said not to have the fee simple that is, the rights of disposal and recovery,
which pertain to another who, after the usufruct expires, will come into full
ownership.
The question set up in the first assignment of error of the appellant's brief is this:

What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to the
reservation of article 811 of the Civil Code?
There are not lacking writers who say, only those of a usufructuary, the ultimate
title belonging to the person in whose favor the reservation is made. If that were so,
the person holding the property could not apply for registration of title, but the
person in whose favor it must be reserved, with the former's consent. This opinion
does not seem to be admissible, although it appears to be supported by decisions of
the supreme court of Spain of May 21, 1861, and June 18, 1880, prior to the Civil
Code, and of June 22, 1895, somewhat subsequent to the enforcement thereof.
Another writer says: "This opinion only looks at two salient points the usufruct
and the fee simple; the remaining features of the arrangement are not perceived,
but become obscure in the presence of that deceptive emphasis which only brings
out two things: that the person holding the property will enjoy it and that he must
keep what he enjoys for other persons." (Manresa, VII, 189.)
In another place he says: "We do not believe that the third opinion can now be
maintained that is, that the surviving spouse (the person obliged by article 968 to
make the reservation) can be regarded as a mere usufructuary and the descendants
immediately as the owner; such theory has no serious foundation in the Code."
(Ibid., 238.)
The ascendants who inherits from a descendants, whether by the latter's wish or by
operation of law, requires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring
absolute ownership. All the attributes of the right of ownership belong to him
exclusively use, enjoyment, disposal and recovery. This absolute ownership,
which is inherent in the hereditary title, is not altered in the least, if there be no
relatives within the third degree in the line whence the property proceeds or they
die before the ascendant heir who is the possessor and absolute owner of the
property. If there should be relatives within the third degree who belong to the line
whence the property proceeded, then a limitation to that absolute ownership would
arise. The nature and scope of this limitation must be determined with exactness in
order not to vitiate rights that the law wishes to be effective. The opinion which
makes this limitation consist in reducing the ascendant heir to the condition in of a
mere usufructuary, depriving him of the right of disposal and recovery, does not
seem to have any support in the law, as it does not have, according to the opinion
that he has been expressed in speaking of the rights of the father or mother who
has married again. There is a marked difference between the case where a man's
wish institutes two persons as his heirs, one as usufructuary and the other as owner
of his property, and the case of the ascendant in article 811 or of the father or
mother in article 968. In the first case, there is not the slightest doubt that the title
to the hereditary property resides in the hereditary owner and he can dispose of and
recover it, while the usufructuary can in no way perform any act of disposal of the
hereditary property (except that he may dispose of the right of usufruct in
accordance with the provisions of article 480 of the Civil Code), or any act of
recovery thereof except the limited one in the form prescribed in article 486 of the
Code itself, because he totally lacks the fee simple. But the ascendants who holds
the property required by article 811 to be reserved, and the father of mother

required by article 986 to reserve the right, can dispose of the property they might
itself, the former from his descendant and the latter from his of her child in first
marriage, and recover it from anyone who may unjustly detain it, while the persons
in whose favor the right is required to be reserved in either case cannot perform any
act whatsoever of disposal or of recovery.
Article 975 states explicitly that the father or mother required by article 9687 to
reserve the right may dispose of the property itself:
Alienation of the property required by law to be reserved which may be made by the
surviving spouse aftercontracting a second marriage shall be valid only if at his or
her death no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage survive,
without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage of Law.
It thus appears that the alienation is valid, although not altogether effective, but
under a condition subsequent, to wit: "If at his or her death no legitimate children or
descendants of the first marriage survive."
If the title did not reside in the person holding the property to be reserved, his
alienation thereof would necessarily be null and void, as executed without a right to
do so and without a right which he could transmit to the acquirer. The law says that
the alienation subsists (to subject is to continue to exist) "without prejudice to the
provisions of the Mortgage Law." Article 109 of this Law says:
The possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent that are still
pending may mortgage or alienate it, provided always that he preserve the right of
the parties interested in said conditions by expressly reserving that right in the
registration.
In such case, the child or legitimate descendants of the first marriage in whose
favor the right is reserved cannot impugn the validity of the alienation so long as
the condition subsequent is pending, that is, so long as the remarried spouse who
must reserve the right is alive, because it might easily happen that the person who
must reserve the right should outlive all the person in whose favor the right is
reserved and then there would be no reason for the condition subsequent that they
survive him, and, the object of the law having disappeared, the right required to be
reserved would disappear, and the alienation would not only be valid but also in
very way absolutely effective. Consequently, the alienation is valid when the right
required by law to be reserved to the children is respected; while the effects of the
alienation depend upon a condition, because it will or will not become definite, it will
continue to exist or cease to exist, according to circumstances. This is what the law
establishes with reference to the reservation of article 968, wherein the legislator
expressly directs that the surviving spouse who contracts a second marriage shall
reserve to the children or descendants of the first marriage ownership. Article 811
says nothing more than that the ascendants must make the reservation.
Manresa, with his recognized ability, summarizes the subject under the heading,
"Rights and obligations during the existence of the right required by law to be
reserved," in these words:

During the whole period between the constitution in legal form of the right required
by law to be reserved and the extinction thereof, the relatives within the third
degree, after the right that in their turn may pertain to them has been assured,
have only an expectation, and therefore they do not even have the capacity to
transmit that expectation to their heirs.
The ascendant is in the first place a usufructuary who should use and enjoy the
things according to their nature, in the manner and form already set forth in
commenting upon the article of the Code referring to use and usufruct.
But since in addition to being the usufructuary he is, even though conditionally, the
owner in fee simple of the property, he can dispose of it in the manner provided in
article 974 and 976 of the same Code. Doubt arose also on this point, but
the Direccion General of the registries, in an opinion of June 25, 1892, declared that
articles 974 and 975, which are applicable by analogy, for they refer to property
reserved by law, reveal in the clearest manner the attitude of the legislator on this
subject, and the relatives with the third degree ought not to be more privileged in
the right reserved in article 811 than the children in the right reserved by article
975, chiefly for the reason that the right required to be reserved carries with it a
condition subsequent, and the property subject to those conditions can validly be
alienated in accordance with article 109 of the Mortgage Law, such alienation to
continue, pending fulfillment of the condition." (Civil Code, VI, 270.)
Another commentator corroborates the foregoing in every way. He says:
The ascendants acquires that property with a condition subsequent, to wit, whether
or not there exists at the time of his death relatives within the third degree of the
descendants from whom they inherit in the line whence the property proceeds. If
such relatives exist, they acquire ownership of the property at the death of the
ascendants. If they do not exist, the ascendants can freely dispose thereof. If this is
true, since the possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent can alienate
and encumber it, the ascendants may alienate the property required by law to be
reserved, but he will alienate what he has and nothing more because no one can
give what does not belong to him, and the acquirer will therefore receive a limited
and revocable title. The relatives within the third degree will in their turn have an
expectation to the property while the ascendant lives, an expectation that cannot
be transmitted to their heirs, unless these are also within the third degree. After the
person who is required by law to reserve the right has died, the relatives may
rescind the alienation of the realty required by law to be reserved and they will
complete ownership, in fee simple, because the condition and the usufruct have
been terminated by the death of the usufructuary. (Morell, Estudios sobre bienes
reservable, 304, 305.)
The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve the right has,
beyond any doubt at all, the rights of use and usufruct. He has, moreover, for the
reasons set forth, the legal title and dominion, although under a condition
subsequent. Clearly he has, under an express provision of the law, the right to
dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a
condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one who possesses or

should possess it and have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. In a
word, the legal title and dominion, even though under a condition, reside in him
while he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has been assured, he
can do anything that a genuine owner can do.
On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the right
is reserved cannot dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actually,
constructively or formally, in their possession; and, moreover, because they have no
title of ownership or of the fee simple which they can transmit to another, on the
hypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the right should die before
them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take
their place in the succession of the descendants of whom they are relatives within
the third degree, that it to say, a second contingent place in said legitimate
succession in the fashion of aspirants to a possible future legacy. If any of the
persons in whose favor the right is reserved should, after their rights has been
assured in the registry, dare to dispose of even nothing more than the fee simple of
the property to be reserved his act would be null and void, for, as was definitely
decided in the decision on appeal of December 30, 1897, it is impossible to
determine the part "that might pertain therein to the relative at the time he
exercised the right, because in view of the nature and scope of the right required by
law to be reserved the extent of his right cannot be foreseen, for it may disappear
by his dying before the person required to reserve it, just as may even become
absolute should that person die."
Careful consideration of the matter forces the conclusion that no act of
disposal inter vivos of the person required by law to reserve the right can be
impugned by him in whose favor it is reserved, because such person has all,
absolutely all, the rights inherent in ownership, except that the legal title is
burdened with a condition that the third party acquirer may ascertain from the
registry in order to know that he is acquiring a title subject to a condition
subsequent. In conclusion, it seems to us that only an act of disposal mortis
causa in favor of persons other than relatives within the third degree of the
descendants from whom he got the property to be reserved must be prohibited to
him, because this alone has been the object of the law: "To prevent persons outside
a family from securing, by some special accident of life, property that would
otherwise have remained therein." (Decision of December 30, 1897.)
Practically, even in the opinion of those who reduce the person reserving the right
to the condition of a mere usufructuary, the person in whose favor it must be
reserved cannot attack the alienation that may be absolutely made of the property
the law requires to be reserved, in the present case, that which the appellant has
made of the two parcels of land in question to a third party, because the conditional
alienation that is permitted her is equivalent to an alienation of the usufruct, which
is authorized by article 480 of the Civil Code, and, practically, use and enjoyment of
the property required by law to be reserved are all that the person who must
reserve it has during his lifetime, and in alienating the usufruct all the usefulness of
the thing would be transmitted in an incontrovertible manner. The question as to
whether or not she transmits the fee simple is purely academic, sine re, for it is not

real, actual positive, as is the case of the institution of two heirs, one a usufructuary
and the other the owner, by the express wish of the predecessor in interest.
If the person whom article 811 requires to reserve the right has all the rights
inherent in ownership, he can use, enjoy, dispose of and recover it; and if, in
addition to usufructuary, he is in fact and in law the real owner and can alienate it,
although under a condition, the whole question is reduced to the following terms:
Cannot the heir of the property required by law to reserved, merely because a
condition subsequent is annexed to his right of disposal, himself alone register the
ownership of the property he has inherited, when the persons in whose favor the
reservation must be made degree thereto, provided that the right reserved to them
in the two parcels of land be recorded, as the law provides?
It is well known that the vendee under pacto de retracto acquires all the rights of
the vendor:
The vendee substitutes the vendor in all his rights and actions. (Civil Code, art.
1511.)
If the vendor can register his title, the vendee can also register this same title after
he has once acquired it. This title, however, in its attribute of being disposable, has
a condition subsequent annexed that the alienation the purchaser may make will
be terminated, if the vendor should exercise the right granted him by article 1507,
which says:
Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor reserves to himself the
right to recover the thing sold, with the obligation to comply with article 1518, and
whatever more may have been agreed upon," that is, if he recovers the thing sold
by repaying the vendee the price of the sale and other expenses. Notwithstanding
this condition subsequent, it is a point not at all doubtful now that the vendee may
register his title in the same way as the owner of a thing mortgaged that is to
say, the latter with the consent of his creditor and the former with the consent of
the vendor. He may alienate the thing bought when the acquirer knows by well from
the title entered in the registry that he acquires a title revocable after a fixed
period, a thing much more certain and to be expected than the purely contingent
expectation of the person in whose favor is reserved a right to inherit some day
what another has inherited. The purpose of the law would be defeated in not
applying to the person who must make the reservation the provision therein relative
to the vendee under pacto de retracto, since the argument in his favor is the more
power and conclusive; ubi eadem ratio, eadem legis dispositivo.
Therefore, we reverse the judgment appealed from, and in lieu thereof decide and
declare that the applicant is entitled to register in her own name the two parcels of
land which are the subject matter of the applicants, recording in the registration the
right required by article 811 to be reserved to either or both of the opponents, Pablo
Sablan and Basilio Sablan, should they survive her; without special findings as to
costs.
Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.

Riosa v Rocha
G.R. No. L-23770

February 18, 1926

MAGIN
RIOSA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PABLO ROCHA, MARCELINA CASAS, MARIA CORRAL and CONSOLACION R.
DE CALLEJA, defendants-appellees.
Domingo
Imperial
Mariano Locsin for appellees.

for

appellant

AVANCEA, C.J.:
Maria Corral was united in marriage with the deceased Mariano Riosa, it being her
first and only marriage and during which time she bore him three children named
Santiago, Jose and Severina. The latter died during infancy and the other two
survived their father, Mariano Riosa. Santiago Riosa, no deceased, married
Francisca Villanueva, who bore him two children named Magin and Consolacion
Riosa. Jose Riosa, also deceased, married Marcelina Casas and they had one child
who died before the father, the latter therefore leaving no issue. Mariano Riosa left
a will dividing his property between his two children, Santiago and Jose Riosa, giving
the latter the eleven parcels of land described in the complaint. Upon the death of
Jose Riosa he left a will in which he named his wife, Marcelina Casas, as his only
heir.
On May 16, 1917, the will of Jose Riosa was filed for probate. Notwithstanding the
fact that Marcelina Casas was the only heir named in the will, on account of the
preterition of Maria Corral who, being the mother of Jose Riosa, was his legitimate
heir, I Marcelina Casas and Maria Corral, on the same date of the filing of the will for
probate, entered into a contract by which they divided between themselves the
property left by Jose Riosa, the eleven parcels of land described in the complaint
being assigned to Maria Corral.
On October 26, 1920, Maria Corral sold parcels Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10 and 11 to
Marcelina Casas for the sum of P20,000 in a public instrument which was recorded
in the registry of deeds on November 6, 1920. On November 3, 1920, Marcelina
Casas sold these eight parcels of land to Pablo Rocha for the sum of P60,000 in a
public document which was recorded in the registry of deeds on November 6, 1920.
On September 24, 1921, Pablo Rocha returned parcels No. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 to Maria
Corral stating in the deed executed for the purpose that these parcels of land had
been erroneously included in the sale made by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas.
The Court of first Instance denied the probate of the will of Jose Riosa, but on appeal
this court reversed the decision of the lower court and allowed the will to
probate. 1 The legal proceedings for the probate of the will and the settlement of the
testate estate of Jose Riosa were followed; and, at the time of the partition, Maria
Corral and Marcelina Casas submitted to the court the contract of extrajudicial
partition which they had entered into on May 16, 1917, and which was approved by

the court, by order of November 12, 1920, as though it had been made within the
said testamentary proceedings.
From the foregoing is appears that the eleven parcels of land described in the
complaint were acquired by Jose Riosa, by lucrative title, from his father Mariano
Riosa and that after the death of Jose Riosa, by operation of law, they passed to his
mother Maria Corral. By virtue of article 811 of the Civil Code these eleven parcels
of land are reservable property. It results, furthermore, that parcels 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
7, 8 and 9 still belong in fee simple to Maria Corral, and that parcels 10 and 11 were
successively sold by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas and by the latter to Pablo
Rocha. Lastly, it appears that Magin and Consolacion Riosa are the nearest relatives
within the third degree of the line from which this property came.
This action was brought by Magin Riosa, for whom the property should have been
reserved, against Maria Corral, whose duty it was to reserve it, and against
Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha as purchasers of parcels 10 and 11. Consolacion
Riosa de Calleja who was also bound to make the reservation was included as a
defendant as she refused to join as plaintiff.
The complaint prays that the property therein described be declared reservable
property and that the plaintiffs Jose and Consolacion Riosa be declared reservees;
that this reservation be noted in the registry of deeds; that the sale of parcels 10
and 11 to Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha be declared valid only in so far as it
saves the right of reservation in favor of the plaintiff Magin Riosa and of the
defendant Consolacion Riosa, and that this right of reservation be also noted on the
deeds of sale executed in favor of Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha; that Maria
Corral, Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha give a bond of P50,000, with good and
sufficient sureties, in favor of the reservees as surety for the conservation and
maintenance of the improvements existing on the said reservable property. The
dispositive part of the court's decision reads as follows:
For the foregoing reasons it is held:
1. That the eleven parcels of land described in paragraph 6 of the complaint have
the character of reservable property; 2. That the defendant Maria Corral, being
compelled to make the reservation, must reserve them in favor of the plaintiff Magin
Riosa and the defendant Consolacion Riosa de Calleja in case that either of these
should survive her; 3. That Magin Riosa and Consolacion Riosa de Calleja have the
right, in case that Maria Corral should die before them, to receive the said parcels or
their equivalent.
In virtue whereof, the defendant Maria Corral is ordered: 1. To acknowledge the right
of Magin Riosa and Consolacion Riosa de Calleja to the reservation of the said
parcels of lands described in the complaint, which she shall expressly record in the
registration of said lands in the office of the register of deeds of this province; 2. To
insure the delivery of said parcels of lands, or their equivalent, to Magin Riosa and
Consolacion Riosa de Calleja, should either of them survive her, either by a
mortgage thereon or by a bond in the amount of P30,000, without express
pronouncement as to costs.

The other defendants are absolved from the complaint.

Inasmuch as the reservation from its inception imposes obligations upon the
reservor (reservista) and creates rights in favor of the reservation (reservatarios) it
is of the utmost importance to determine the time when the land acquired the
character of reservable property.
It will be remembered that on May 16, 1917, Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas
entered into a contract of extrajudicial partition of the property left by Jose Riosa, in
which they assigned to Maria Corral, as her legitime, the parcels of land here in
question, and at the same time petitioned for the probate of the will of Jose Riosa
and instituted the testamentary proceeding. In support of the legality of the
extrajudicial partition between Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas the provision of
section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure is invoked, which authorizes the heirs of a
person dying without a will to make a partition without the intervention of the courts
whenever the heirs are all of age and the deceased has left no debts. But this legal
provisions refers expressly to intestate estates and, of course, excludes testate
estates like the one now before us.
When the deceased has left a will the partition of his property must be made in
accordance therewith. According to section 625 of the same Code no will can pass
property until it is probated. And even after being probated it cannot pass any
property if its provisions impair the legitime fixed by law in favor of certain heirs.
Therefore, the probate of the will and the validity of the testamentary provisions
must be passed upon by the court.
For the reasons stated, and without making any express finding as to the efficacy of
the extrajudicial partition made by Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas, we hold that
for the purposes of the reservation and the rights and obligations arising thereunder
in connection with the favored relatives, the property cannot be considered as
having passed to Maria Corral but from the date when the said partition was
approved by the court, that is, on November 12, 1920. In the case of Pavia vs. De la
Rosa (8 Phil., 70), this court laid down the same doctrine in the following language:
The provisions of Act No. 190 (Code of Civil Procedure) have annulled the provisions
of article 1003 and others of the Civil Code with regard to the pure or simple
acceptance of the inheritance of a deceased person or that made with benefit of
inventory and the consequences thereof.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The heir legally succeeds the deceased from whom he derives his right and title, but
only after the liquidation of the estate, the payment of the debts of same, and the
adjudication of the residue of the estate of the deceased, and in the meantime the
only person in charge by law to attend to all claims against the estate of the
deceased debtor is the executor or administrator appointed by a competent court.
As has been indicated, parcels 10 and 11 described in the complaint were first sold
by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas who later sold them to Pablo Rocha. In this
appeal it is urged that Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha, who were absolved by the

court below, be ordered to acknowledge the reservation as to parcels 10 and 11,

acquired by them, and to have the said reservation noted on their titles. This
argument, of course, is useless as to Marcelina Casas for the reason that she
transferred all her rights to Pablo Rocha.
It has been held by jurisprudence that the provisions of the law referred to in article
868 tending to assure the efficacy of the reservation by the surviving spouse are
applicable to the reservation known as "reserva troncal," referred to in article 811,
which is the reservation now under consideration.
In accordance with article 977, Maria Corral, reservor, is obliged to have the
reservation noted in the registry of deeds in accordance with the provisions of the
Mortgage Law which fixes the period of ninety days for accomplishing it (article 199,
in relation with article 191, of the Mortgage Law). According to article 203 of the
General Regulation for the application of the Mortgage Law, this time must be
computed from the acceptance of the inheritance. But as this portion of the Civil
Code, regarding the acceptance of the inheritance, has been repealed, the time, as
has been indicated, must be computed from the adjudication of the property by the
court to the heirs, in line with the decision of this court hereinabove quoted. After
the expiration of this period the reservees may demand compliance with this
obligation.
If Maria Corral had not transferred parcels 10 and 11 to another there would be no
doubt that she could be compelled to cause the reservable character of this
property to be noted in the registry of deeds. This land having been sold to
Marcelina Casas who, in turn, sold it to Pablo Rocha the question arises whether the
latter can be compelled to have this reservation noted on his title. This acquisition
by Pablo Rocha took place when it was the duty of Maria Corral to make the notation
of the reservation in the registry and at the time when the reservees had no right to
compel Maria Corral to make such notation, because this acquisition was made
before the expiration of the period of ninety days from November 12, 1920, the date
of the adjudication by the court, after which the right of the reservees to commence
an action for the fulfillment of the obligation arose. But the land first passed to
Marcelina Casas and later to Pablo Rocha together with the obligation that the law
imposes upon Maria Corral. They could not have acquired a better title than that
held by Maria Corral and if the latter's title was limited by the reservation and the
obligation to note it in the registry of deeds, this same limitation is attached to the
right acquired by Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha.
In the transmission of reservable property the law imposes the reservation as a
resolutory condition for the benefit of the reservees (article 975, Civil Code). The
fact that the resolvable character of the property was not recorded in the registry of
deed at the time that it was acquired by Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha cannot
affect the right of the reservees, for the reason that the transfers were made at the
time when it was the obligation of the reservor to note only such reservation and
the reservees did not them have any right to compel her to fulfill such an obligation.
Marcelina Casas, as well as Pablo Rocha, Knew of the reservable character of the
property when they bought it. They had knowledge of the provisions of the last will

and testament of Mariano Riosa by virtue of which these parcels were transferred to
Jose Riosa. Pablo Rocha was one of the legatees in the will. Marcelina Casas was the
one who entered into the contract of partition with Maria Corral, whereby these
parcels were adjudicated to the latter, as a legitimate heir of Jose Riosa. Pablo
Rocha was the very person who drafted the contracts of sale of these parcels of land
by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas and by the latter to himself. These facts,
together with the relationship existing between Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas
and Pablo Rocha, the former a daughter-in-law and the latter a nephew of Maria
Corral, amply support the conclusion that both of them knew that these parcels of
land had been inherited by Maria Corral, as her legitime from her son Jose Riosa
who had inherited them, by will, from his father Mariano Riosa, and were reservable
property. Wherefore, the duty of Maria Corral of recording the reservable character
of lots 10 and 11 has been transferred to Pablo Rocha and the reservees have an
action against him to compel him to comply with this obligation.
The appellant also claims that the obligation imposed upon Maria Corral of insuring
the return of these parcels of land, or their value, to the reservees by means of a
mortgage or a bond in the amount of P30,000, also applies to Pablo Rocha. The law
does not require that the reservor give this security, the recording of the reservation
in the registry of deeds being sufficient (art. 977 of the Civil Code). There is no
ground for this requirement inasmuch as, the notation once is made, the property
will answer for the efficacy of the reservation. This security for the value of the
property is required by law (art. 978, paragraph 4, of the Civil Code) in the case of a
reservation by the surviving spouse when the property has been sold before
acquiring the reservable character (art 968 of the Civil Code), but is not applicable
to reservation known as reserva troncal (art 811 of the Civil Code). In the case of
Dizon and Dizon vs. Galang (page 601, ante), this court held that:
* * * As already intimated, the provisions of the law tending to give efficacy to a
reservation by the widowed spouse mentioned in article 968 are applicable to
the reserva troncal provided for in article 811. But as these two reservations vary in
some respects, these rules may be applied to the reserva troncal only in so far as
the latter is similar to a reservation by the widowed spouse. In the reserva
troncal the property goes to the reservor as reservable property and it remains so
until the reservation takes place or is extinguished. In a reservation by the widowed
spouse there are two distinct stages, one when the property goes to the widower
without being reservable, and the other when the widower contracts a second
marriage, whereupon the property, which theretofore has been in his possession
free of any encumbrance, becomes reservable. These two stages also affect
differently the transfer that may be made of the property. If the property is sold
during the first stage, before becoming reservable, it is absolutely free and is
transferred to the purchaser unencumbered. But if the sale is made during the
second stage, that is, when the duty to reserve has arisen, the property goes to the
purchaser subject to the reservation, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Mortgage Law. This is the reason why the law provides that should the property be
sold before it becomes reservable, or before the widower contracts another
marriage, he will be compelled to secure the value of the property by a mortgage
upon contracting a new marriage, so that the reservation may not lose its efficacy

and that the rights of those for whom the reservation is made may be assured. This
mortgage is not required by law when the sale is made after the reservation will
follow the property, without prejudice to the contrary provisions of the Mortgage
Law and the rights of innocent purchasers, there being no need to secure the value
of the property since it is liable for the efficacy of the reservation by a widowed
spouse to secure the value of the property sold by the widower, before becoming
reservable are not applicable to the reserva troncal where the property goes to the
ascendant already reservable in character. A sale in the case of reserva
troncal might be analogous to a sale made by the widower after contacting a
second marriage in the case of a reservation by the widowed spouse.
Since Maria Corral did not appeal, we cannot modify the appealed judgment in so
far as it is unfavorable to her. As she has been ordered to record in the registry the
reservable character of the other parcels of land, the subject of this action, the
questions raised by the appellant as to her are decided.
The judgment appealed from is modified and Pablo Rocha is ordered to record in the
registry of deeds the reservable character of parcels 10 11, the subject of this
complaint, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Street Malcolm, Villamor, Strand, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Gonzales v. CFI
G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981
BEATRIZ
L.
GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), BENITO F. LEGARDA,
ROSARIO L. VALDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA, TERESA LEGARDA, JOSE
LEGARDA, BENITO LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y
FERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y
HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, RAMON LEGARDA Y
HERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JAIME LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, CELSO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, MA. TERESA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, JOSE LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ROSARIO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
BENITO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, EDUARDO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD
F. LEGARDA, and the ESTATE OF DONA FILOMENA ROCES DE
LEGARDA, respondents.

AQUINO, J.:1wph1.t
Beatriz Legarda Gonzales appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, dismissing her complaint for partition, accounting, reconveyance and
damages and holding, as not subject to reserve troncal, the properties which her
mother Filomena Races inherited in 1943 from Filomena Legarda (Civil Case No.
73335). The facts are as follows:

Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died [Manila] on
June 17, 1933. He was survived by his widow, Filomena Races, and their seven
children: four daughters named Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three
sons named Benito, Alejandro and Jose.
On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were
partitioned in three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the
heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by
Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her
sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to
herself the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena
Legarda. The said properties consist of the following: 1wph1.t
(a) Savings deposit in the National City Bank of New York with a credit balance of
P3,699.63.
(b) 1,429 shares of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and a 1/7 interest in
certain shares of the San Miguel Brewery, Tuason & Legarda, Ltd., Philippine
Guaranty Company, Insular Life Assurance Company and the Manila Times.
(c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos. 80226, 80237 to 80243 (7 titles),
80260, 80261 and 57512 of the Manila registry of deeds.
1/21st of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 48164, 84714, 48201, 48202, 48205,
48203, 48206, 48160 and 48192 of the Manila registry of deeds;
1/21st of the property described in TCT No. 4475 of the registry of deeds of Rizal,
now Quezon City; 1/14th of the property described in TCT No. 966 of the registry of
deeds of Baguio;
1/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles described in TCT No. 41862 of the
Manila registry of deeds; 1/7th of the lots and improvements at 181 San Rafael
describe in TCT Nos. 50495 and 48161 of the Manila registry of deeds;
1/7th of the property described in TCT No. 48163 of the Manila registry of deeds
(Streets);
l/21st of the properties described in TCT Nos. 48199 and 57551 of the Manila
registry of deeds (Streets and Estero):
2/21st of the property described in TCT No. 13458 of tile registry of deeds of
T0ayabas.
These are the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of the affidavit of
adjudication, Filomena Races succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda
as co-owner of the properties held proindiviso by her other six children.
Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten Identical documents
wherein she disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in

favor of the children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren
in all). The document reads: 1wph1.t
A mis hijos :
Dispongo que se reparta a todos mis nietos hijos de Ben, Mandu y Pepito, los bienes
que he heredado de mi difunta hija Filomena y tambien los acciones de la Destileria
La Rosario' recientemente comprada a los hermanos Values Legarda.
De los bienes de mi hija Filomena se deducira un tote de terreno que yo he 0donada
a las Hijas de Jesus, en Guipit
La case No. 181 San Rafael, la cede a mi hijo Mandu solo la casa; proque ella esta
construida sobre terreno de los hermanos Legarda Races. 1wph1.t
(Sgd.) FILOMENA ROCES LEGARDA
6 Marzo 1953
During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and her six
surviving children partitioned the properties consisting of the one-third share in the
estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which the children inherited in representation of
their father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.
Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to probate as a
holographic will in the order dated July 16, 1968 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila in Special Proceeding No. 70878, Testate Estate of Filomena Races Vda. de
Legarda. The decree of probate was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Legarda vs.
Gonzales, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R, July 30,1976.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix,
filed on May 20, 1968 a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate
the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the
ground that said properties are reservable properties which should be inherited by
Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not by the children of
Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That motion was opposed by the
administrator, Benito F. Legarda.
Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzales filed on June 20, 1968
an ordinary civil action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her
mother's estate for the purpose of securing a declaration that the said properties
are reservable properties which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in her holographic
will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her three daughters and her three sons
(See Paz vs. Madrigal, 100 Phil. 1085).
As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzales. ln this
appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 she contends in her six assignments of error
that the lower court erred in not regarding the properties in question as reservable
properties under article 891 of the Civil Code.
On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their six counter-assignments of error
contend that the lower court erred in not holding that Mrs. Legarda acquired the

estate of her daughter Filomena] Legarda in exchange for her conjugal and
hereditary shares in the estate of her husband Benito Legarda y De la Paz and in not
holding that Mrs. Gonzales waived her right to the reservable properties and that
her claim is barred by estoppel, laches and prescription.
The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to the timeliness of Mrs.
Gonzales' petition for review is a closed matter. This Court in its resolution of
December 16, 1971 denied respondents' motion to dismiss and gave due course to
the petition for review.
In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be raised under
undisputed facts. Since on the basis of the stipulated facts the lower court resolved
only the issue of whether the properties in question are subject to reserva
troncal that is the only legal issue to be resolved in this appeal.
The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees, particularly those involving
factual matters, cannot be resolved in this appeal. As the trial court did not pass
upon those issues, there is no ruling which can be reviewed by this Court.
The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable properties under
article 891 of the Civil Code, formerly article 811, and whether Filomena Races Vda.
de Legarda could dispose of them in his will in favor of her grandchildren to the
exclusion of her six children.
Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis causa what she inherited from her
daughter Filomena to the reservees within the third degree and to bypass the
reservees in the second degree or should that inheritance automatically go to the
reservees in the second degree, the six children of Mrs. Legarda?
As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a question of first
impression. lt was resolved in Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480. Before
discussing the applicability to this case of the doctrine in the Florentino case and
other pertinent rulings, it may be useful to make a brief discourse on the nature
of reserve troncal, also calledlineal, familiar, extraordinaria o semi-troncal.
Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their five briefs in
descanting on the nature of reserve troncal which together with the reserva
viudal and reversion legal, was abolished by the Code Commission to prevent the
decedent's estate from being entailed, to eliminate the uncertainty in ownership
caused by the reservation (which uncertainty impedes the improvement of the
reservable property) and to discourage the confinement of property within a certain
family for generations which situation allegedly leads to economic oligarchy, and is
incompatible with the socialization of ownership.
The Code Commission regarded the reservas as remnants of feudalism which
fomented agrarian unrest. Moreover, the reserves, insofar as they penalize
legitimate relationship, is considered unjust and inequitable.
However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the Code Commission,
restored the reserve troncal, a legal institution which, according to Manresa and
Castan Tobenas has provoked questions and doubts that are difficult to resolve.

Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code, now article
891, which reads: 1wph1.t
ART. 811. El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente bienes que este hubiese
adquirido por titulo lucrative de otro ascendiente, o de un hermano, se halla
obligado a reservas los que hubiere adquirido por ministerio de la ley en favor de
los parientes que eaten dentro del tercer grade y pertenezcan a la linea de donde
los bienes proceden
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the
latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or
sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of
law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to
the line from which said property came.
In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property
from an ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by
another ascendant or is acquired by him by operation of law from the said
descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should reserve the said property for the
benefit of relatives who are within the third degree from the deceased descendant
(prepositus) and who belong to the line from which the said property came.
So, three transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by lucrative title
(inheritance or donation) from an ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased
descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by operation of law (intestate succession
or legitime) from the deceased descendant (causante de la reserve) in favor of
another ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which two transmissions precede the
reservation, and (3) a third transmissions of the same property (in consequence of
the reservation) from the reservor to the reservees (reservatarios) or the relatives
within the third degree from the deceased descendant belonging to the line of the
first ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased descendant (6 Castan Tobenas
Derecho Civil, Part l, 1960, 6th Ed., pp. 198-9).
If there are only two transmissions there is no reserve. Thus, where one Bonifacia
Lacerna died and her properties were inherited by her son, Juan Marbebe, upon the
death of Juan, those lands should be inherited by his half-sister, to the exclusion of
his maternal first cousins. The said lands are not reservable property within the
meaning of article 811 (Lacerna vs. Vda. de Corcino, l l l Phil. 872).
The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1) the ascendant or brother or sister
from whom the property was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous
title, (2) the descendant or prepositus (prepositus) who received the property, (3)
the reservor (reservista) the other ascendant who obtained the property from the
(prepositus) by operation of law and (4) the reserves (reservatario) who is within the
third degree from theprepositus and who belongs to the (line o tronco) from which
the property came and for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.
The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez, 101 Phil.
1098; Chua vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, L-29901, August 31,

1977, 78 SCRA 412). Fourth degree relatives are not included (Jardin vs. Villamayor,
72 Phil. 392).
The rationale of reserve troncal is to avoid "el peligro de que bienes poseidos
secularmente por una familia pasen bruscamente a titulo gratuito a manos extraas
por el azar de los enlaces y muertes prematuras or impeder que, por un azar de la
vide personas extranas a una familia puedan adquirir bienes que sin aquel hubieran
quedado en ella (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 6th Ed., 1980, p. 203;
Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
An illustration of reserve troncal is found in Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295. ln that
case, Pedro Sablan inherited two parcels of land from his father Victorians. Pedro
died in 1902, single and without issue. His mother, Marcelina Edroso, inherited from
him the two parcels of land.
It was held that the land was reservable property in the hands of Marcelina. The
reservees were Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, the paternal uncles of Pedro
Sablan, the prepositus. Marcelina could register the land under the Torrens system
in her name but the fact that the land was reservable property in favor of her two
brothers-in-law, should they survive her, should be noted in the title.
In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot died intestate in 1906. Her one-half
share of a parcel of conjugal land was inherited by her daughter, Juliana Maalac.
When Juliana died intestate in 1920, said one-half share was inherited by her father,
Anacleto Maalac who owned the other one-half portion.
Anacleto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second wife and their six children. lt
was held that the said one-half portion was reservable property in the hands of
Anacleto Maalac and, upon his death, should be inherited by Leona Aglibot and
Evarista Aglibot, sisters of Maria and materna aunts of Juliana Maalac, who
belonged to the line from which said one-half portion came (Aglibot vs. Maalac 114
Phil. 964).
Other illustrations of reserva troncal are found in Florentino vs Florentino, 40 Phil.
480; Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and Deocampo, 41 Phil. 915; Maghirang
and Gutierrez vs. Balcita 46 Phil. 551; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Dizon vs.
Galang, 48 Phil. 601; Riosa vs. Rocha, 48 Phil. 737; Centeno vs. Centeno 52 Phil.
322; Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89; Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil.
279; Fallorfina vs. Abille, CA 39 O.G. 1784.
The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant, or the one
at the end of the line from which the property came and upon whom the property
last revolved by descent. He is called the prepositus(Cabardo vs. Villanueva. 44 Phil.
186, 190).
In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia Abordo inherited property from her mother,
Basilia Cabardo. When Cornelia died, her estate passed to her father, Lorenzo
Abordo. ln his hands, the property was reservable property. Upon the death of
Lorenzo, the person entitled to the property was Rosa Cabardo, a maternal aunt of
Cornelia, who was her nearest relative within the third degree.

First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not reservees. They
cannot even represent their parents because representation is confined to relatives
within the third degree (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480).
Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more remote subject to
the rule of representation. But the representative should be within the third degree
from the prepositus (Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. illegitimate relationship and
relationship by affinity are excluded.
Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the recipient
gives nothing in return such as donacion and succession (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44
Phil. 186, 189-190, citing 6 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., 195 l, p. 360).
The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the
ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of
relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property
came
(Sienes vs. E Esparcia l l l Phil. 349, 353).
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject
to the resolutory condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor
predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property.
He may alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and
conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferee's rights are revoked upon the
survival of the reservees at the time of the death of the reservor but become
indefeasible when the reservees predecease the reservor. (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111
Phil. 349, 353; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664;
Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480: Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279.)
The reservor's title has been compared with that of the vendee a retro in a pacta de
retro sale or to a fideicomiso conditional.
The reservor's alienation of the reservable property is subject to a resolutory
condition, meaning that if at the time of the reservor's death, there are reservees,
the transferee of the property should deliver it to the reservees. lf there are no
reservees at the time of the reservor's death, the transferee's title would become
absolute. (Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944; Mono
vs. Nequia 93 Phil. 120).
On the other hand, the reserves has only an inchoate, expectant or contingent right.
His expectant right would disappear if he predeceased the reservor. lt would
become absolute should the reservor predecease the reserves.
The reserves cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor but he can
require that the reservable character of the property be recognized by the
purchaser (Riosa vs. Rocha 48 Phil. 737; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295, 312-3;
Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944).

There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservee's right to the reservable
property is illegal for being a contract regarding future inheritance (Velayo Bernardo
vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89, 96).
And there is a dictum that the reservee's right is a real right which he may alienate
and dispose of conditionally. The condition is that the alienation shall transfer
ownership to the vendee only if and when the reserves survives the reservor
(Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353). 1wph1.t
The reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant
(prepositus) said property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had
temporarily and accidentally stayed during the reservista's lifetime. The authorities
are all agreed that there being reservatarios that survive the reservists, the latter
must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a than interest in the reservable
property. (J. J. B. L. Reyes in Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)
Even during the reservista's lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate
acquirers of the property, can already assert the right to prevent the reservista from
doing anything that might frustrate their reversionary right, and, for this purpose,
they can compel the annotation of their right in the registry of property even while
the (reservista) is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs.
Sablan, 25 Phil. 295).
This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural
heirs of the reservista lt is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of
the estate of the reservista who may not dispose of them (it) by will, so long as
there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 226, 237).
The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but from the descendant
(prepositus) of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the
condition that they must survive thereservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI Tomo 2, p.
286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310, cited by J. J.B.L. Reyes in
Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
Hence,
upon
the reservista's death,
the reservatario nearest
to
the prepositus becomes, "automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the
reservable property." (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)
In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably reservable
properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The
reservation became a certainty when at the time of her death the reservees or
relatives within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or
they survived Mrs. Legarda.
So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor, could
convey the reservable properties by will or mortis causa to the reservees within
the third degree (her sixteen grandchildren) to the exclusion of the reservees in
the second degree, her three daughters and three sons. As indicated at the outset,
that issue is already res judicata or cosa juzgada.

We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen
grandchildren the reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter
Filomena because the reservable properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo
vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis
causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the reservor.
As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees inherit the
reservable properties from theprepositus, not from the reservor.
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all
the nearest relatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case
are the six children of Mrs. Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the
reservable property should be given and deprive the other reservees of their share
therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the
reservable properties in favor of the reservees in the third degree and,
consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second degree would be a glaring
violation of article 891. That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.
We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine of Florentino vs.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, a similar case, where it was ruled: 1wph1.t
Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the death of ascendant
(reservista) together with his own property in favor of another of his descendants as
forced heir, forms no part of the latter's lawful inheritance nor of the legitime, for
the reason that, as said property continued to be reservable, the heir receiving the
same as an inheritance from his ascendant has the strict obligation of its delivery to
the relatives, within the third degree, of the predecessor in interest (prepositus),
without prejudicing the right of the heir to an aliquot part of the property, if he has
at the same time the right of a reservatario (reserves).
ln the Florentino case, it appears that Apolonio Florentino II and his second wife
Severina Faz de Leon begot two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III. These two
inherited properties from their father. Upon Apolonio III death in 1891, his properties
were inherited by his mother, Severina, who died in 1908. ln her will, she instituted
her daughter Mercedes as heiress to all her properties, including those coming from
her deceased husband through their son, Apolonio III.
The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II with his first wife Antonia Faz de
Leon and the descendants of the deceased children of his first marriage, sued
Mercedes Florentino for the recovery of their share in the reservable properties,
which Severina de Leon had inherited from Apolonio III which the latter had
inherited from his father Apolonio II and which Severina willed to her daughter
Mercedes.
Plaintiff's theory was that the said properties, as reservable properties, could not be
disposed of in Severina's will in favor of Mercedes only. That theory was sustained
by this Court.

It was held that the said properties, being reservable properties, did not form part
of Severina's estate and could not be inherited from her by her daughter Mercedes
alone.
As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was entitled, as a reserves, to oneseventh of the properties. The other six sevenths portions were adjudicated to the
other six reservees.
Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere, we are bound to follow in this
case the doctrine of theFlorentino case. That doctrine means that as long as during
the reservor's lifetime and upon his death there are relatives within the third degree
of the prepositus regardless of whether those reservees are common descendants
of the reservor and the ascendant from whom the property came, the property
retains its reservable character. The property should go to the nearest reservees.
The reservor cannot, by means of his will, choose the reserves to whom the
reservable property should be awarded.
The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that there is no reserva troncal when the
only relatives within the third degree are the common descendants of the
predeceased ascendant and the ascendant who would be obliged to reserve is
irrelevant and sans binding force in the light of the ruling in the Florentino case.
It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in question are not
reservable properties because only relatives within the third degree from the
paternal line have survived and that when Mrs. Legarda willed the said properties to
her sixteen grandchildren, who are third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda and
who belong to the paternal line, the reason for the reserva troncal has been
satisfied: "to prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special
accident of life, property that would otherwise have remained therein".
That same contention was advanced in the Florentino case where the reservor
willed the reservable properties to her daughter, a full-blood sister of
the prepositus and ignored the other six reservors, the relatives of the half-blood of
the prepositus.
In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the reservable property bequeathed
by the reservor to her daughter does not form part of the reservor's estate nor of
the daughter's estate but should be given to all the seven reservees or nearest
relatives of the prepositus within the third degree.
This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable property to only
one reserves it did not pass into the hands of strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise
true that the heiress of the reservor was only one of the reservees and there is no
reason founded upon law and justice why the other reservees should be deprived of
their shares in the reservable property (pp. 894-5).
Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of
in her will the properties in question even if the disposition is in favor of the
relatives within the third degree from Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by

operation of Article 891, should go to Mrs. Legarda's six children as reservees within
the second degree from Filomena Legarda.
It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but
from the reservor but from the prepositus, of whom the reservees are the
heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that they must survive the reservor
(Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their reservable character due
to the non-existence of third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda at the time of the
death of the reservor, Mrs. Legarda, belonging to the Legarda family, "except thirddegree relatives who pertain to both" the Legarda and Races lines.
That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been extinguished only by the
absence of reservees at the time of Mrs. Legarda's death. Since at the time of her
death, there were (and still are) reservees belonging to the second and third
degrees, the disputed properties did not lose their reservable character. The
disposition of the said properties should be made in accordance with article 891 or
the rule on reserva troncal and not in accordance with the reservor's holographic
will. The said properties did not form part of Mrs. Legarda's estate. (Cane vs.
Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l, 4).
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. lt is hereby
adjudged that the properties inherited by Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda from her
daughter Filomena Legarda, with all the fruits and accessions thereof, are
reservable properties which belong to Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa, Benito, Alejandro and
Jose, all surnamed Legarda y Roces, as reservees. The shares of Rosario L. Valdes
and Benito F. Legarda, who died in 1969 and 1973, respectively, should pertain to
their respective heirs. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Guerrero, Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur.1wph1.t
Justice Concepcion, Jr., is on leave.
Justice Guerrero was designated to sit in the Second Division.

Nieva v Alcala
G.R. No. L-13386

October 27, 1920

SEGUNDA MARIA NIEVA with her husband ANGEL ALCALA, plaintiffsappellants,

vs.
MANUELA ALCALA and JOSE DEOCAMPO, defendants-appellees.
Eduardo
Gutierrez
Felipe Agoncillo for appellees.

Repide

for

appellants.

JOHNSON, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Tayabas, absolving the defendants from all liability under the plaintiff's complaint,
without any finding as to costs.
Juliana Nieva, the alleged natural mother of the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva,
married Francisco Deocampo. Of said marriage Alfeo Deocampo was born.
Julian Nieva died intestate on April 19, 1889, and her said son, Alfeo Deocampo,
inherited from her, ab intestate, the parcels of land described in Paragraphs V and X
of the complaint.
Alfeo Deocampo died intestate and without issue on July 7, 1890. Thereupon the
two parcels of land above-mentioned passed to his father, Francisco Deocampo, by
intestate succession. Thereafter Francisco Deocampo married the herein defendant
Manuela Alcala, of which marriage was born Jose Deocampo, the other defendant
herein.
Francisco Deocampo died on August 15, 1914, whereupon his widow and son, the
defendants herein, took possession of the parcels of land in question, under the
claim that the said son, the defendant Jose Deocampoo (a minor) had inherited the
same, ab intestate, from his deceased father.
On September 30, 1915, the plaintiff herein, claiming to be an acknowledged
natural daughter of the said Juliana Nieva, instituted the present action for the
purposes of recovering from the defendants the parcels of land in question,
particularly described in Paragraphs V and X of the complaint, invoking the
provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.
The lower court held that, even granting, without deciding, that the plaintiff was an
acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva, she was not entitled to the
property here in question because, in its opinion, an illegitimate relative has no right
to the reserva troncal under the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.
The first question presented by this appeal is, whether or not the plaintiff is
an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased Juliana Nieva. It appears from
the record that the said Juliana Nieva, while unmarried, gave birth to the plaintiff on
March 29, 1882, and that the plaintiff was duly baptized as her natural daughter, of
unknown father (Exhibit C, baptismal certificate); that the said Juliana Nieva
nourished and reared her said child, the plaintiff herein; that the plaintiff lived with
her said mother until the latter was married to Francisco Deocampo; that the said
mother treated the plaintiff, and exhibited her publicly, as a legitimate daughter.
(See testimony of Antero Gala, pp. 5-6; Prudencio de la Cuesta, pp. 16-17; and
Mamerto Palabrica, pp. 26-27, sten. notes.)
The foregoing facts, which are not controverted, are analogous to the facts in the
case of Llorente vs. Rodriguez (3 Phil., 697, 699). Under the decision of this court in
that case we are of the opinion and so decide, without rediscussing here the law

and legal principles involved, that the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva is an
acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva. (See also In re estate of Enriquez
and Reyes, 29 Phil., 167.)
The other and more important question presented by this appeal is, whether or not
an illegitimate relative within the third degree is entitled to the reserva
troncal provided for by article 811 of the Civil Code. That article reads as follows:
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by the latter
gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such of the property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the
benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such
property came.
The property here in question was inherited, by operation by law, by Francisco
Deocampo from his son Alfeo Deocampo, who, in turn, had inherited it, in the same
manner, from his mother Juliana Nieva, the natural mother of the plaintiff. The
plaintiff is the natural sister of Alfeo Deocampo, and she belongs to the same line
from which the property in question came. Was Francisco Deocampo obliged by law
to reserve said property for the benefit of the plaintiff, an illegitimate relative within
the third degree of Alfeo Deocampo? If he was, then, upon his death, the plaintiff,
and not his son the defendant Jose Deocampo, was entitled to the said property; if
he was not, the plaintiff's action must fail.1awph!l.net
There can be no question whatever but that, under said article 811 of the Civil
Code, the plaintiff would be entitled to the property in question if she were
a legitimate daughter of Julian Nieva. (Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil., 295.) But in said
article 811 the legislator uses the generic terms "ascendant," "descendant," and
"relatives," without specifying whether or not they have to be legitimate. Does the
legislator, then, refer to legitimate as well as to illegitimate relatives? Counsel for
the appellant, in a lengthy and carefully prepared brief, attempts to maintain the
affirmative.
This question, so far as our investigation shows, has not been decided before by any
court or tribunal. However, eminent commentators on the Spanish Civil Code, who
have devoted their lives to the study and solution of the intricate and difficult
problems that may arise under the provisions of that Code, have dealt with the very
question now before us, and are unanimous in the opinion that the provision of
article 811 of the Civil Code apply only tolegitimate relative. One of such
commentators, undoubtedly the best known of them all, is Manresa. We believe we
can do no better than to adopt his reasons and conclusions, in deciding the question
before us. In determining the persons who are obliged to reserve under article 811,
he says:
Is every ascendant, whether legitimate or not, obliged to reserve? Should the
natural father or grandfather reserve the properties proceeding from the mother or
other natural ascendant? Article 811 does not distinguish; it speaks of the
ascendant, without attaching the qualification of legitimate, and, on the other hand,
the same reason that exists for applying the provision to the natural family exists
for applying it to the legitimate family. Nevertheless, the article in referring to the

ascendant in an indeterminate manner shows that it imposes the obligation to

reserve only upon the legitimate ascendant.
Let us overlook for the moment the question whether the Code recognizes or does
not recognize the existence of the natural family, or whether it admits only the bond
established by acknowledgement between the father or mother who acknowledges
and the acknowledged children. However it may be, it may be stated as an
indisputable truth, that in said Code, the legitimate relationship forms the general
rule and the natural relationship the exception; which is the reason why, as may be
easily seen, the law in many articles speaks only of children or parents, of
ascendants or descendants, and in them reference is of course made of those who
are legitimate; and when it desires to make a provision applicable only to natural
relationship, it does not say father or mother, but natural father or natural mother;
it does not say child, but natural child; it does not speak of ascendants, brothers or
parents in the abstract, but of natural ascendants, natural brothers or natural
parents. (See, for example, articles 294, 302, 809, 810, 846, 935, to 938, 944 and
945 and 946 to 955.)
Articles 809 and 810 themselves speak only of ascendants. Can it in any way be
maintained that they refer to legitimate as well as to natural ascendants? They
evidently establish the legitime of the legitimate ascendants included as forced
heirs in number 2 of article 807. And article 811, and as we will see also article
812, continues to treat of this same legitime. The right of the natural parents and
children in the testamentary succession in wholly included in the eighth section and
is limited to the parents, other ascendants of such class being excluded in articles
807, No. 3, and 846. Therefore, the place which article 811 occupies in the Code of
proof that it refers only to legitimate ascendants. And if there were any doubt, it
disappears upon considering the text of article 938, which states that the provisions
of article 811 applies to intestate succession, which is just established in favor of
the legitimate direct ascending line, the text of articles 939 to 945, which treat of
intestate succession of natural parents, as well as that of articles 840 to 847,
treating of their testamentary succession, which do not allude directly or indirectly
to that provision.
Lastly, the principle which underlies the exception which article 811 creates in the
right to succeed neither admits of any other interpretation. Whether the provision is
due to the desire that the properties should not pass, by reason of new marriage,
out of the family to which they belonged, or is directly derived from the system of
the so-called "reserva troncal," and whether the idea of reservation or that of lineal
rights (troncalidad) predominate the patrimony which is intended to be preserved is
that of the legitimate family. Only to legitimate ascendants and descendants do
article 968 et seq. of the Code refer, arising as they do from the danger of second or
subsequent marriage; only to legitimate parents do the special laws of Navarra,
Aragon, Vizcaya and Catalua concede the right to succeed with respect to lineal
properties (bienes troncales); only to the legitimate ascendants does article 811
impose the duty to reserve.
The convenience of amplifying the precept to natural parents and ascendants may
be raised just as the question whether it would be preferable to suppress it

altogether may be raised; but in the realm of the statute law there is no remedy but
to admit that article 811, the interpretation of which should on the other hand be
strict was drafted by the legislator with respect only to legitimate ascendants.
(Manresa, Codigo Civil, vol. 6, 3d ed., pp. 249-250.)
The same jurist, in determining the persons in whose favor the reservation is
established, says:
Persons in whose favor the reservation is established. This is one of the most
delicate points in the interpretation of article 811. According to this article, the
reservation is established in favor of the parentswho are within the third degree and
belong to the line from which the properties came.
It treats of blood, relationship, which is applicable to questions on succession,
according to articles 915 to 920. It could not be otherwise, because relationship by
affinity is established between each spouse and the family of the other, by
marriage, and to admit it, would be to favor the transmission of the properties of
the family of one spouse to that of the other, which is just what this article intends
to prevent.
It also treats of legitimate relationship. The person obliged to reserve it a legitimate
ascendant who inherits from a descendant property which proceeds from the same
legitimate family, and this being true, there can be no question, because the line
from which the properties proceed must be the line of that family and only in favor
of that line is the reservation established. Furthermore, we have already said, the
object is to protect the patrimony of the legitimate family, following the precedents
of the foral law. And it could not be otherwise. Article 943 denies to legitimate
parents the right to succeed the natural child and viceversa, from which it must be
deduced that natural parents neither have the right to inhering from legitimate
ones; the law in the article cited established a barrier between the two families;
properties of the legitimate family shall never pass by operation of law to the
natural family. (Ibid. pp. 251-252.)
Scvola, after a very extended discussion of this same subject, arrives at the same
conclusion as Manresa. "La reserva del articulo 811 es privilegio de la familia
legitima. (The reservation in article 811 is a privilege of the legitimate family.)"
(See Scvola, Codigo Civil, Vol. 14, pp. 211-224, 3401-305.)
Article 943, above referred to by Manresa, provides as follows:
A natural or legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall
such children or relatives so inherit from the natural or legitimated child.
To hold that the appellant is entitled to the property left by her natural brother,
Alfeo Deocampo, by operation of law, would be a fragrant violate of the express
provision of the foregoing article (943).
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed,
without any finding as to costs. So ordered.

Mapa, C.J., Araullo, Malcolm, Avancea and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Florentino v Florentino
G.R. No. L-14856

November 15, 1919

ENCARNACION
FLORENTINO,
ET
AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MERCEDES FLORENTINO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Ramon Querubin, Simeon Ramos and Orense and Vera for appellants.
Vicente Foz, Jose Singsong Tongson and Angel Encarnacion for appellees.

TORRES, J.:
On January 17, 1918, counsel for Encarnacion (together with her husband Simeon
Serrano), Gabriel, Magdalena, Ramon, Miguel, Victorino, and Antonino of the
surname Florentino; for Miguel Florentino, guardian ad litem of the minor Rosario
Florentino; for Eugenio Singson, the father and guardian ad litem of Emilia, Jesus,
Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores of the surname Singson y Florentino; and for Eugenio
Singson, guardian of the minors Jose and Asuncion Florentino, filed a complaint in
the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, against Mercedes Florentino and her
husband, alleging as follows:
That Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II married the first time Antonia Faz de Leon; that
during the marriage he begot nine children called, Jose, Juan, Maria, Encarnacion,
Isabel, Espirita, Gabriel, Pedro, and Magdalena of the surname Florentino y de Leon;
that on becoming a widower he married the second time Severina Faz de Leon with
whom he had two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III of the surname Florentino y
de Leon; that Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II died on February 13, 1890; that he was
survived by his second wife Severina Faz de Leon and the ten children first above
mentioned; that his eleventh son, Apolonio III, was born on the following 4th of
March 1890.
That of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo's aforementioned eleven children, Juan,
Maria and Isabel died single,without leaving any ascendants or descendants; that
Ramon, Miguel, Victorino, Antonio, and Rosario are the legitimate children of the
deceased Jose Florentino who was one of the children of the deceased Apolonio
Isabelo; that Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores are the legitimate children
of Espirita Florentino, now deceased, and her husband Eugenio Singson; that Jose
and Asuncion are the children of Pedro Florentino, another son of the deceased
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino.
That on January 17 and February 13, 1890, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino executed a
will before the notary public of Ilocos Sur, instituting as his universal heirs his
aforementioned ten children, the posthumos Apolonio III and his widow Severina Faz

de Leon; that he declared, in one of the paragraphs of said will, all his property
should be divided among all of his children of both marriages.
That, in the partition of the said testator's estate, there was given to Apolonio
Florentino III, his posthumos son, the property marked with the letters A, B, C, D, E,
and F in the complaint, a gold rosary, pieces of gold, of silver and of table service,
livestock, palay, some personal property and other objects mentioned in the
complaint.
That Apolonio Florentino III, the posthumos son of the second marriage, died in
1891; that his mother, Severina Faz de Leon, succeeded to all his property
described in the complaint; that the widow, Severina Faz de Leon died on November
18, 1908, leaving a will instituting as her universal heiress her only living daughter,
Mercedes Florentino; that, as such heir, said daughter took possession of all the
property left at the death of her mother, Severina Faz de Leon; that among same is
included the property, described in the complaint, which the said Severina Faz de
Leon inherited from her deceased son, the posthumos Apolonio, as reservable
property; that, as a reservist, the heir of the said Mercedes Florentino deceased had
been gathering for herself alone the fruits of lands described in the complaint; that
each and every one of the parties mentioned in said complaint is entitled to oneseventh of the fruits of the reservable property described therein, either by direct
participation or by representation, in the manner mentioned in paragraph 9 of the
complaint.
That several times the plaintiffs have, in an amicable manner, asked the defendants
to deliver their corresponding part of the reservable property; that without any
justifiable motive the defendants have refused and do refuse to deliver said
property or to pay for its value; that for nine years Mercedes Florentino has been
receiving, as rent for the lands mentioned, 360 bundles of palay at fifty pesos per
bundle and 90 bundles of corn at four pesos per bundle; that thereby the plaintiffs
have suffered damages in the sum of fifteen thousand four hundred and twentyeight pesos and fifty-eight centavos, in addition to three hundred and eight pesos
and fifty-eight centavos for the value of the fruits not gathered, of one thousand
pesos (P1,000) for the unjustifiable retention of the aforementioned reservable
property and for the expenses of this suit. Wherefore they pray it be declared that
all the foregoing property is reservable property; that the plaintiffs had and do have
a right to the same, in the quantity and proportion mentioned in the aforementioned
paragraph 9 of the complaint; that the defendants Mercedes Florentino and her
husband be ordered to deliver to the plaintiffs their share of the property in
question, of the palay and of the corn above mentioned, or their value; and that
they be condemned to pay the plaintiffs the sum of one thousand pesos (P1,000)
together with the costs of this instance.
To the preceding complaint counsel for the defendants demurred, alleging that the
cause of action is based on the obligation of the widow Severina Faz de Leon to
reserve the property she inherited from her deceased son Apolonio Florentino y de
Leon who, in turn, inherited same from his father Apolonio Isabelo Florentino; that,
there being no allegation to the contrary, it is to be presumed that the widow
Severina Faz de Leon did not remarry after the death of this husband nor have any

natural child; that the right claimed by the plaintiffs is not that mentioned in article
968 and the following articles, but that established in article 811 of the Civil Code;
that the object of the provisions of the aforementioned articles is to avoid the
transfer of said reservable property to those extraneous to the family of the owner
thereof; that if the property inherited by the widow Severina Faz de Leon from her
deceased son Apolonio Florentino y Faz de Leon (property which originated from his
father and her husband) has all passed into the hands of the defendant, Mercedes
Florentino y Encarnacion, a daughter of the common ancestor's second marriage
(said Apolonio Isabelo Florentino with the deceased Severina Faz de Leon) it is
evident that the property left at the death of the posthumos son Apolonio Florentino
y Faz de Leon did not pass after the death of his mother Severina, his legitimate
heirs as an ascendant, into the hands of strangers; that said property having been
inherited by Mercedes Florentino y Encarnacion from her mother (Severina), article
811 of the Civil Code is absolutely inapplicable to the present case because, when
the defendant Mercedes, by operation law, entered into and succeeded to, the
possession, of the property lawfully inherited from her mother Severina Faz de Leon,
said property had, while in the possession of her mother, lost the character of
reservable property there being a legitimate daughter of Severina Faz de Leon
with the right to succeed her in all her rights, property and actions; that the
restraints of the law whereby said property may not passed into the possession of
strangers are void, inasmuch as the said widow had no obligation to reserve same,
as Mercedes Florentino is a forced heiress of her mother Severina Faz de Leon; that,
in the present case, there is no property reserved for the plaintiffs since there is a
forced heiress, entitled to the property left by the death of the widow Severina Faz
de Leon who never remarried; that the obligation to reserve is secondary to the
duty of respecting the legitime; that in the instant case, the widow Severina Faz de
Leon was in duty bound to respect the legitime of her daughter Mercedes the
defendant; that her obligation to reserve the property could not be fulfilled to the
prejudice of the legitime which belongs to her forced heiress, citing in support of
these statements the decision of the supreme court of Spain of January 4, 1911;
that, finally, the application of article 811 of the Civil Code in favor of the plaintiffs
would presuppose the exclusion of the defendant from here right to succeed
exclusively to all the property, rights and actions left by her legitimate mother,
although the said defendant has a better right than the plaintiffs; and that there
would be injustice if the property claimed be adjudicated to the plaintiffs, as well as
violation of section 5 of the Jones Law which invalidates any law depriving any
person of an equal protection. Wherefore they prayed that the demurrer be
sustained, with costs against the plaintiffs.
After the hearing of the demurrer, on August 22, 1918, the judge absolved the
defendants from the complaint and condemned the plaintiffs to pay the costs.
Counsel for the plaintiffs excepted to this order, moved to vacate it and to grant
them a new trial; said motion was overruled; the plaintiffs expected thereto and
filed the corresponding bill of exceptions which was allowed, certified and forwarded
to the clerk of this court.

On appeal the trial judge sustained the demurrer of the defendants to the complaint
of the plaintiffs, but, instead of ordering the latter to amend their complaint within
the period prescribed by the rules undoubtedly believing that the plaintiffs could
not alter nor change the facts constituting the cause of action, and that, as both
parties were agreed as to the facts alleged in the complaint as well as in the
demurrer, every question reduced itself to one of the law, already submitted to the
decision of the court the said judge, disregarding the ordinary procedure
established by law, decided the case by absolving the defendants from the
complaint and by condemning the plaintiffs to pay the costs of the instance.
There certainly was no real trial, inasmuch as the defendants, instead of answering
the complaint of the plaintiffs, confined themselves to filing a demurrer based on
the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute a cause of
action. However, the judge preferred to absolve the defendants, thereby making an
end to the cause, instead of dismissing the same, because undoubtedly he believed,
in view of the controversy between the parties, that the arguments adduced to
support the demurrer would be the same which the defendants would allege in their
answer those dealing with a mere question of law which the courts would have to
decide and that, the demurrer having been sustained, if the plaintiffs should
insist they could do no less upon alleging the same facts as those set out in
their complaint and if another demurrer were afterwards set up, he would be
obliged to dismiss said complaint with costs against the plaintiffs in spite of being
undoubtedly convinced in the instant case that the plaintiffs absolutely lack the
right to bring the action stated in their complaint.
Being of the opinion that the emendation of the indicated defects is not necessary
as in this case what has been done does not prejudice the parties the
appellate court will now proceed to decide the suit according to its merits, as found
in the record and to the legal provisions applicable to the question of law in
controversy so that unnecessary delay and greater expense may be avoided,
inasmuch as, even if all the ordinary proceedings be followed, the suit would be
subsequently decided in the manner and terms that it is now decided in the opinion
thoughtfully and conscientiously formed for its determination.
In order to decide whether the plaintiffs are or are not entitled to invoke, in their
favor, the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code, and whether the same article is
applicable to the question of law presented in this suit, it is necessary to determine
whether the property enumerated in paragraph 5 of the complaint is of the nature
of reservable property; and if so, whether in accordance with the provision of the
Civil Code in article 811, Severina Faz de Leon (the widow of the deceased Apolonio
Isabelo Florentino) who inherited said property from her son Apolonio Florentino III
(born after the death of his father Apolonio Isabelo) had the obligation to preserve
and reserve same for the relatives, within the third degree, of her aforementioned
deceased son Apolonio III.
The above mentioned article reads:
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by the latter
gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is obliged to

reserve such of the property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the
benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such
property came.
During the marriage of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II and Severina Faz de Leon two
children were born, namely the defendant Mercedes Florentino and Apolonio
Florentino III (born after the death of his father). At the death of Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino under a will, his eleven children succeeded to the inheritance he left, one
of whom, the posthumos son Apolonio III, was given, as his share, the
aforementioned property enumerated in the complaint. In 1891 the said posthumos
son Apolonio Florentino III died and was succeeded by his legitimate mother
Severina Faz de Leon, who inherited the property he left and who on dying,
November 18, 1908, instituted by will as her sole heiress her surviving daughter,
Mercedes Florentino, the defendant herein, who took possession of all property left
by her father, same constituting the inheritance. Included in said inheritance is the
property, specified in by the posthumos son Apolonio Florentino III from his father
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino, and which, at the death of the said posthumos son, had
in turn been inherited by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon. Even if Severina left in
her will said property, together with her own, to her only daughter and forced
heiress, Mercedes Florentino, nevertheless this property had not lost its reservable
nature inasmuch as it originated from the common ancestor of the litigants,
Apolonio Isabelo; was inherited by his son Apolonio III; was transmitted by same (by
operation of law) to his legitimate mother and ascendant, Severina Faz de Leon.
The posthumos son, Apolonio Florentino III, acquired the property, now claimed by
his brothers, by a lucrative title or by inheritance from his aforementioned
legitimate father, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II. Although said property was
inherited by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon, nevertheless, she was in duty bound,
according to article 811 of the Civil Code, to reserve the property thus acquired for
the benefit of the relatives, within the third degree, of the line from which such
property came.
According to the provisions of law, ascendants do not inherit the reservable
property, but its enjoyment, use or trust, merely for the reason that said law
imposes the obligation to reserve and preserve same for certain designated persons
who, on the death of the said ascendants reservists, (taking into consideration the
nature of the line from which such property came) acquire the ownership of said
property in fact and by operation of law in the same manner as forced heirs
(because they are also such) said property reverts to said line as long as the
aforementioned persons who, from the death of the ascendant-reservists, acquire in
fact the right of reservatarios(person for whom property is reserved), and are
relatives, within the third degree, of the descendant from whom the reservable
property came.
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property, while there are
living, within the third degree, relatives of the latter, is nothing but a life
usufructuary or a fiduciary of the reservable property received. He is, however, the
legitimate owner of his own property which is not reservable property and which
constitutes his legitime, according to article 809 of the Civil Code. But if, afterwards,

all of the relatives, within the third degree, of the descendant (from whom came the
reservable property) die or disappear, the said property becomes free property, by
operation of law, and is thereby converted into the legitime of the ascendant heir
who can transmit it at his death to his legitimate successors or testamentary heirs.
This property has now lost its nature of reservable property, pertaining thereto at
the death of the relatives, called reservatarios, who belonged within the third
degree to the line from which such property came.lawphil.net
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are
relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative,
called reservatario, over the property which the reservista(person holding it subject
to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more remote. The
right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as
a reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives within the third
degree belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right
granted by the Civil Code in article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the
exclusive benefit of designated persons who are the relatives, within the third
degree, of the person from whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives
of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered asreservatarios,
since the law does not recognize them as such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of
one alleging his right asreservatario who is not within the third degree of
relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the part
of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of
nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property came.
These reservatarios have the right to represent their ascendants (fathers and
mothers) who are the brothers of the said deceased person and relatives within the
third degree in accordance with article 811 of the Civil Code.
In this case it is conceded without denial by defendants, that the plaintiffs
Encarnacion, Gabriel and Magdalena are the legitimate children of the first marriage
of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II; that Ramon, Miguel, Ceferino,
Antonio, and Rosario are both grandchildren of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II, and
children of his deceased son, Jose Florentino; that the same have the right to
represent their aforementioned father, Jose Florentino; that Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes,
Caridad, and Dolores are the legitimate children of the deceased Espirita Florentino,
one of the daughters of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II, and represent
the right of their aforementioned mother; and that the other plaintiffs, Jose and
Asuncion, have also the right to represent their legitimate father Pedro Florentino
one of the sons of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II. It is a fact,
admitted by both parties, that the other children of the first marriage of the
deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II died without issue so that this decision does
not deal with them.
There are then seven "reservatarios" who are entitled to the reservable property left
at the death of Apolonio III; the posthumos son of the aforementioned Apolonio
Isabelo II, to wit, his three children of his first marriage Encarnacion, Gabriel,
Magdalena; his three children, Jose, Espirita and Pedro who are represented by their

own twelve children respectively; and Mercedes Florentino, his daughter by a

second marriage. All of the plaintiffs are the relatives of the deceased posthumos
son, Apolonio Florentino III, within the third degree (four of whom being his halfbrothers and the remaining twelve being his nephews as they are the children of his
three half-brothers). As the first four are his relatives within the third degree in their
own right and the other twelve are such by representation, all of them are
indisputably entitled as reservatarios to the property which came from the common
ancestor, Apolonio Isabelo, to Apolonio Florentino III by inheritance during his lifetime, and in turn by inheritance to his legitimate mother, Severina Faz de Leon,
widow of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II.
In spite of the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code already cited, the trial judge
refused to accept the theory of the plaintiffs and, accepting that of the defendants,
absolved the latter from the complaint on the ground that said article is absolutely
inapplicable to the instant case, inasmuch as the defendant Mercedes Florentino
survived her brother, Apolonio III, from whom the reservable property came and her
mother, Severina Faz de Leon, the widow of her father, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino
II; that the defendant Mercedes, being the only daughter of Severina Faz de Leon, is
likewise her forced heiress; that when she inherited the property left at the death of
her mother, together with that which came from her deceased brother Apolonio III,
the fundamental object of article 811 of the Code was thereby complied with,
inasmuch as the danger that the property coming from the same line might fall into
the hands of strangers had been avoided; and that the hope or expectation on the
part of the plaintiffs of the right to acquire the property of the deceased Apolonio III
never did come into existence because there is a forced heiress who is entitled to
such property.
The judgment appealed from is also founded on the theory that article 811 of the
Civil Code does not destroy the system of legitimate succession and that the
pretension of the plaintiffs to apply said article in the instant case would be
permitting the reservable right to reduce and impair the forced legitimate which
exclusively belongs to the defendant Mercedes Florentino, in violation of the precept
of article 813 of the same Code which provides that the testator cannot deprive his
heirs of their legitime, except in the cases expressly determined by law. Neither can
he impose upon it any burden, condition, or substitution of any kind whatsoever,
saving the provisions concerning the usufruct of the surviving spouse, citing the
decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of January 4, 1911.
The principal question submitted to the court for decision consists mainly in
determining whether they property left at the death of Apolonio III, the posthumos
son of Apolonio Isabelo II, was or was not invested with the character of reservable
property when it was received by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon.
The property enumerated by the plaintiffs in paragraph 5 of their complaint came,
without any doubt whatsoever, from the common ancestor Apolonio Isabelo II, and
when, on the death of Apolonio III without issue the same passed by operation of
law into the hands of his legitimate mother, Severina Faz de Leon, it became
reservable property, in accordance with the provision of article 811 of the Code,
with the object that the same should not fall into the possession of persons other

than those comprehended within the order of person other than those
comprehended within the order of succession traced by the law from Apolonio
Isabelo II, the source of said property. If this property was in fact clothed with the
character and condition of reservable property when Severina Faz de Leon inherited
same from her son Apolonio III, she did not thereby acquire the dominion or right of
ownership but only the right of usufruct or of fiduciary with the necessary obligation
to preserve and to deliver or return it as such reservable property to her deceased
son's relatives within the third degree, among whom is her daughter, Mercedes
Florentino.
Reservable property neither comes, nor falls under, the absolute dominion of the
ascendant who inherits and receives same from his descendant, therefore it does
not form part of his own property nor become the legitimate of his forced heirs. It
becomes his own property only in case that all the relatives of his descendant shall
have died (reservista) in which case said reservable property losses such character.
With full right Severina Faz de Leon could have disposed in her will of all her own
property in favor of her only living daughter, Mercedes Florentino, as forced heiress.
But whatever provision there is in her will concerning the reservable property
received from her son Apolonio III, or rather, whatever provision will reduce the
rights of the other reservatarios, the half brothers and nephews of her daughter
Mercedes, is unlawful, null and void, inasmuch as said property is not her own and
she has only the right of usufruct or of fiduciary, with the obligation to preserve and
to deliver same to the reservatarios, one of whom is her own daughter, Mercedes
Florentino.
It cannot reasonably be affirmed, founded upon an express provision of law, that by
operation of law all of the reservable property, received during lifetime by Severina
Faz de Leon from her son, Apolonio III, constitutes or forms parts of the legitime
pertaining to Mercedes Florentino. If said property did not come to be the legitimate
and exclusive property of Severina Faz de Leon, her only legitimate and forced
heiress, the defendant Mercedes, could not inherit all by operation of law and in
accordance with the order of legitimate succession, because the other relatives of
the deceased Apolonio III, within the third degree, as well as herself are entitled to
such reservable property.
For this reason, in no manner can it be claimed that the legitime of Mercedes
Florentino, coming from the inheritance of her mother Severina Faz de Leon, has
been reduced and impaired; and the application of article 811 of the Code to the
instant case in no way prejudices the rights of the defendant Mercedes Florentino,
inasmuch as she is entitled to a part only of the reservable property, there being no
lawful or just reason which serves as real foundation to disregard the right to
Apolonio III's other relatives, within the third degree, to participate in the reservable
property in question. As these relatives are at present living, claiming for it with an
indisputable right, we cannot find any reasonable and lawful motive why their rights
should not be upheld and why they should not be granted equal participation with
the defendant in the litigated property.

The claim that because of Severina Faz de Leon's forced heiress, her daughter
Mercedes, the property received from the deceased son Apolonio III lost the
character, previously held, of reservable property; and that the mother, the said
Severina, therefore, had no further obligation to reserve same for the relatives
within the third degree of the deceased Apolonio III, is evidently erroneous for the
reason that, as has been already stated, the reservable property, left in a will by the
aforementioned Severina to her only daughter Mercedes, does not form part of the
inheritance left by her death nor of the legitimate of the heiress Mercedes. Just
because she has a forced heiress, with a right to her inheritance, does not relieve
Severina of her obligation to reserve the property which she received from her
deceased son, nor did same lose the character of reservable property, held before
the reservatarios received same.
It is true that when Mercedes Florentino, the heiress of the reservista Severina, took
possession of the property in question, same did not pass into the hands of
strangers. But it is likewise true that the said Mercedes is not the only reservataria.
And there is no reason founded upon law and upon the principle of justice why the
otherreservatarios, the other brothers and nephews, relatives within the third
degree in accordance with the precept of article 811 of the Civil Code, should be
deprived of portions of the property which, as reservable property, pertain to them.
From the foregoing it has been shown that the doctrine announced by the Supreme
Court of Spain on January 4, 1911, for the violation of articles 811, 968 and
consequently of the Civil Code is not applicable in the instant case.
Following the provisions of article 813, the Supreme Court of Spain held that the
legitime of the forced heirs cannot be reduced or impaired and said article is
expressly respected in this decision.
However, in spite of the efforts of the appellee to defend their supposed rights, it
has not been shown, upon any legal foundation, that the reservable property
belonged to, and was under the absolute dominion of, the reservista, there being
relatives within the third degree of the person from whom same came; that said
property, upon passing into the hands of the forced heiress of the deceased
reservista, formed part of the legitime of the former; and that the said forced
heiress, in addition to being a reservataria, had an exclusive right to receive all of
said property and to deprive the other reservatarios, her relatives within the third
degree of certain portions thereof.
Concerning the prayer in the complaint relative to the indemnity for damages and
the delivery of the fruits collected, it is not proper to grant the first for there is no
evidence of any damage which can give rise to the obligation of refunding same. As
to the second, the delivery of the fruits produced by the land forming the principal
part of the reservable property, the defendants are undoubtedly in duty bound to
deliver to the plaintiffs six-sevenths of the fruits or rents of the portions of land
claimed in the complaint, in the quantity expressed in paragraph 11 of the same,
from January 17, 1918, the date the complaint was filed; and the remaining seventh
part should go to the defendant Mercedes.

For the foregoing reasons it follows that with the reversal of the order of decision
appealed from we should declare, as we hereby do, that the aforementioned
property, inherited by the deceased Severina Faz de Leon from her son Apolonio
Florentino III, is reservable property; that the plaintiffs, being relatives of the
deceased Apolonio III within the third degree, are entitled to six-sevenths of said
reservable property; that the defendant Mercedes is entitled to the remaining
seventh part thereof; that the latter, together with her husband Angel Encarnacion,
shall deliver to the plaintiffs, jointly, six-sevenths of the fruits or rents, claimed from
said portion of the land and of the quantity claimed, from January 17, 1918, until
fully delivered; and that the indemnity for one thousand pesos (P1,000) prayed for
in the complaint is denied, without special findings as to the costs of both instances.
So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Street, Malcolm and Avancea, JJ., concur.

Tioco de Papa v Camacho

G.R. No. L-28032 September 24, 1986
FRANCISCA TIOCO DE PAPA, MANUEL TIOCO, NICOLAS TIOCO and JANUARIO
PAPA, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
DALISAY
TONGKO
CAMACHO,
PRIMO
TONGKO
and
GODOFREDO
CAMACHO, defendants-appellants.

NARVASA, J.:
This case, which involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva
troncal, was submitted for judgment in the lower court by all the parties on the
following "Stipulation of Facts and Partial Compromise":
1. They stipulate that the defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and the plaintiffs,
Francisco Tioco de Papa, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, are legitimate relatives,
plaintiffs being said defendant's grandaunt and granduncles.
2. They stipulate that plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongo-Camacho have as a
common ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister by the name of Romana
Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great grandfather of defendant. The family
relationship of the parties is as shown in the chart attached hereto as Annex 'A' and
made an integral part of this stipulation.
3. They stipulate that Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously donated four
(4) parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of plaintiffs), which
parcels of land are presently covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. A-64165,

64166 and 64167 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of which are attached
to this stipulation as Annexes 'B', 'B-l', and 'B-2'.
4. They stipulate that Toribia Tioco died intestate in l9l5, survived by her husband,
Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children, Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon
(mother of defendant Dalisay D, Tongko-Camacho) and leaving the afore-mentioned
four (4) parcels of land as the inheritance of her said two children in equal proindiviso shares.
5. They stipulate that in 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his
legitimate children by his wife Marciana Felix (among them plaintiffs) and legitimate
grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. In the partition of his estate, three
(3) parcels of land now covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 16545 and
16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of which are attached hereto as
Annexes 'C' and 'C-l', were adjudicated as the inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco,
but as she had predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco, the said three (3) parcels of
land devolved upon her two legitimate children Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon in
equal pro-indiviso shares.
6. They stipulate that in 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and without
issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share in the seven (7) parcels of land
above-mentioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who
received the said property subject to a reserva troncal which was subsequently
annotated on the Transfer Certificates of Title Annexes 'B', 'B-l', 'B-2', 'C' and 'C-l'.
7. They stipulate that in 1939 Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her rights
and interests in the parcels of land abovementioned were inherited by her only
legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho, subject to the usufructuary
right of her surviving husband, defendant Primo Tongko.
8. They stipulate that on June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died intestate, survived his
only legitimate descendant, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho.
9. The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now owns one-half
(1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned as her inheritance from
her mother, Trinidad Dizon-Tongko.
10. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal advice, the other
half of the said seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned by virtue of the reserva
troncal imposed thereon upon the death of Faustino Dizon and under the laws on
intestate succession; but the plaintiffs, also upon legal advice, oppose her said
claim because they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the one-half pro-indiviso interest in
said parcel of land, which interest was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from Faustino
Dizon, or three-eights (3/8) of the said parcels of land, by virtue of their being also
third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon.
11. The parties hereby agree to submit for judicial determination in this case the
legal issue of whether defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the
whole of the seven (7) parcels of land in question, or whether the plaintiffs, as third
degree relatives of Faustino Dizon are reservatarios (together with said defendant)

of the one-half pro-indiviso share therein which was inherited by Eustacio Dizon
from his son Faustino Dizon, and entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of said one-half proindiviso share, or three eights (3/8) of said seven (7) parcels of land, and, therefore,
to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected by defendant
Dalisay P. Tongko Camacho from the tenants of said parcels of land, minus the
expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the rentals.
12. In view of the fact that the parties are close blood relatives and have acted upon
legal advice in pursuing their respective claims, and in order to restore and preserve
harmony in their family relations, they hereby waive all their claims against each
other for damages (other than legal interest on plaintiffs' sore in the rentals which
this Honorable Court may deem proper to award), attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation which shall be borne by the respective parties. 1
On the basis thereof, the lower Court declared the plaintiffs Francisco Tioco, Manuel
Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, as well as the defendant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho, entitled,
as reservatarios, to one-half of the seven parcels of land in dispute, in equal
proportions, rendering judgment as follows:
... . Resolving, therefore, the legal question submitted by the parties, the court holds
that plaintiffs Francisca Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco are entitled to threefourths (3/4) of one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso shares or three-eights (3/8) of the seven
(7) parcels of land involved in this action. Consequently, they are, likewise, entitled
to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected by the defendant
Dalisay D. Tioco-Camacho from the tenants of the said parcels of land, minus the
expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the rentals.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and inasmuch as the parties expressly waived all their
claims against each other for damages including attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation other than the legal interests on plaintiffs' share in the rentals, the court
renders judgment adjudging the plaintiffs entitled to three-eights (3/8) of the seven
(7) parcels of land described in Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-64165, T-64166, T64167, T-16546 and T-16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila. The defendant
Dalisay D. Tioco-Camacho is hereby ordered to make an accounting of all rents
received by her on the properties involved in this action for the purpose of
determining the legal interests which should be paid to the plaintiffs on their shares
in the rentals of the property in question.
SO ORDERED. 2
Not satisfied, the defendant appealed to this Court.
The issue raised is whether, as contended by the plaintiffs-appellees and ruled by
the lower Court, all relatives of the praepositus within the third degree in the
appropriate line succeed without distinction to the reservable property upon the
death of the reservista, as seems to be implicit in Art. 891 of the Civil Code, which
reads:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the
latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or

sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of

law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to
the line from which said property came. (811),
or, as asserted by the defendant-appellant, the rights of said relatives are subject
to, and should be determined by, the rules on intestate succession.
That question has already been answered in Padura vs. Baldovino, 3 where
the reservatario was survived by eleven nephews and nieces of the praepositus in
the line of origin, four of whole blood and seven of half blood, and the claim was
also made that all eleven were entitled to the reversionary property in equal shares.
This Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, declared the principles of
intestacy to be controlling, and ruled that the nephews and nieces of whole blood
were each entitled to a share double that of each of the nephews and nieces of half
blood in accordance with Article 1006 of the Civil Code. Said the Court:
The issue in this appeal may be formulated as follows: In a case of reserva
troncal, where the onlyreservatarios (reservees) surviving the reservista, and
belonging to the fine of origin, are nephews of the descendant (prepositus), but
some are nephews of the half blood and the others are nephews of the whole blood,
should the reserved properties be apportioned among them equally, or should the
nephews of the whole blood take a share twice as large as that of the nephews of
the half blood?
xxx xxx xxx
The case is one of first impression and has divided the Spanish commentators on
the subject. After mature reflection, we have concluded that the position of the
appellants is correct. The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to
assure the return of the reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging
to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated
into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant (reservista).
xxx xxx xxx
The stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the property has devolved
to the specified relatives of the line of origin. But from this time on, there is no
further occasion for its application. In the relations between one reservatario and
another of the same degree there is no call for applying Art. 891 any longer;
wherefore, the respective share of each in the reversionary property should be
governed by the ordinary rules of intestate succession. In this spirit the
jurisprudence of this Court and that of Spain has resolved that upon the death of
the ascendant reservista, the reservable property should pass, not to all
the reservatarios as a class but only to those nearest in degree to the descendant
(prepositus), excluding those reservatarios of more remote degree (Florentino vs.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 489-490; T.S. 8 Nov. 1894; Dir. Gen. de los Registros, Resol. 20
March 1905). And within the third degree of relationship from the descendant
(prepositus), the right of representation operates in favor of nephews (Florentino vs.
Florentino, supra).

Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession when there are
relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative,
called reservatarios over the property which the reservista (person holding it subject
to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more remote. The
right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a
reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives within the third
degree belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right
granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the
exclusive benefit of designated persons who are within the third degree of the
person from whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth
and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law
does not recognize them as such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of
one alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the third degree of
relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of
reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of
nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property came. ... .
(Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, 489-490) (Emphasis supplied) See also Nieva
and Alcala vs. Alcala and de Ocampo, 41 Phil. 915)
Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary
intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are
entitled to a share double that of brothers and nephews of half blood. If in
determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the
right of representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of double share for
immediate collaterals of the whole blood should be likewise operative.
In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of
relatives reservatarios to whom the property should be returned; but within that
group, the individual right to the property should be decided by the applicable rules
of ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. This
conclusion is strengthened by the circumstance that the reserva being an
exceptional case, its application should be limited to what is strictly needed to
accomplish the purpose of the law. As expressed by Manresa in his Commentaries
(Vol. 6, 6th Ed., p. 250):
... creandose un verdadero estado excepcional del derecho, no debe ampliarse, sino
mas bien restringirse, el alcance del precepto, manteniendo la excepcion mientras
fuere necesaria y estuviese realmente contenida en la disposicion, y aplicando las
reglas generales y fundamentales del Codigo en materia de sucesi6n, en aquehos
extremes no resueltos de un modo expreso, y que quedan fuera de la propia esfera
de accion de la reserva que se crea.
The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of the new Civil Code's
hostility to successional reservas and reversions, as exemplified by the suppression
of the reserva viudal and the reversion legal of the Code of 1889 (Art. 812 and 968980).

Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate

succession, the plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any right thereto because,
as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon (thepraepositus), they are
excluded from the succession by his niece, the defendant-appellant, although they
are related to him within the same degree as the latter. To this effect is Abellana vs.
Ferraris 4 where Arts. 1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code were cited and
applied:
Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy
nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles,
first cousins, etc.) from the succession. This is readily apparent from Articles 1001,
1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that provide as follows:
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitle to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers
and sisters or their children to the other half.
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they
shall inherit in equal shares.
Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and nieces
who are the children of the decedent's brothers and sisters of the full blood, the
former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per stirpes.
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers and
sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces
of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.)
being called to the succession. This was also and more clearly the case under the
Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that immediately preceded the Civil Code now in force
(R.A. 386). Thus, Articles 952 and 954 of the Code of 1889 prescribed as follows:
Art. 952. In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews or nieces, children of
the former, whether of the whole blood or not, the surviving spouse, if not
separated by a final decree of divorce shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased.
Art. 954. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or
sisters, nor a surviving spouse, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the
estate of deceased.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by
reason of the whole blood.
It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and nephews
and nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while other
collaterals succeeded only after the widower or widow. The present Civil Code of the
Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces and
brothers and sisters of the deceased, but without altering the preferred position of
the latter vis a vis the other collaterals.

xxx xxx xxx

We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedent's
uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of
the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed. ...
This conclusion is fortified by the observation, also made in Padura, supra, that as to
the reservable property, thereservatarios do not inherit from the reservista, but
from the descendant praepositus:
... . It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of
the reservista, who may not dispose of it by will, as long as there
are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 237). The latter, therefore, do
not inherit from the reservista, but from the descendant prepositus, of whom
the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they must
survive thereservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI, Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa,
Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310) ... .
To the same effect is Cano vs, Director of Lands 5, where it was ruled that intestacy
proceedings to determine the right of a reservatarioare not necessary where the
final decree of the land court ordering issuance of title in the name of
the reservista over property subject to reserva troncalIdentifies the reservatario and
there are no other claimants to the latter's rights as such:
The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary rests upon the
assumption that thereservatario win succeed in, or inherit, the reservable property
from
the reservista.
This
is
not
true.
The reservatario is
not
the reservista's successor mortis causa nor is the reservable property part of
the reservista's estate; the reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir
of the descendant (prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line of origin
from
which
it
had
temporarily
and
accidentally
strayed
during
the reservista's lifetime.
The
authorities
are
all
agreed
that
there
beingreservatarios that survive the reservista, the matter must be deemed to have
enjoyed no more than a life interest in the reservable property.
It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of
the reservista, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus (the appellee in this case)
becomes, automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable
property. As already stated, that property is no part of the estate of thereservista,
and does not even answer for the debts of the latter. ... .
Had the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus, there is no
doubt that the plaintiffs-appellees would have been excluded by the defendantappellant under the rules of intestate succession. There is no reason why a different
result should obtain simply because "the transmission of the property was delayed
by the interregnum of the reserva;" 6 i.e., the property took a "detour" through an
ascendant-thereby giving rise to the reservation before its transmission to
the reservatario.

Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the defendantappellant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the reversionary
property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower Court is reversed and set aside
and the complaint is dismissed, with costs against the plaintiffs-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
Yap, J., took no part.

Padura v Baldovino MISSING

78 Phil 413 MISSING
Arroyo v Gerona
G.R. No. L-36059

March 31, 1933

In
re Intestate
Estate
of
the
deceased
Concepcion
Gerona.
IGNACIO
ARROYO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
JACOBA GERONA, ET AL., claimants-appellees.
DeWitt, Perkins and Brady, Claro M. Recto, Greenbaum and Opisso and A.P. Seva for
appellant.
Zulueta and Zulueta for appellees.
STREET, J.:
On June 16, 1927, Concepcion Gerona died in Iloilo, leaving neither ascendants nor
descendants. She had suffered from mental alienation from birth, and was at the
time of her death under the guardianship of her uncle, Ignacio Arroyo, her only
relative on her mother's side. On her paternal side her surviving relatives were her
aunts Clara, Ciriaca, Jacoba, and Patricia, sisters of her deceased father, Blas
Gerona, together with Maria G. and Blas G., children of Victor Gerona, a deceased
brother of the aforesaid aunts. Shortly after the death of Concepcion Gerona her
uncle Ignacio secured an order closing the guardianship, and on September 5, 1928,
he instituted intestate proceedings to wind up the estate. On October 8, 1928, he
was declared the owner of all her property and the proceedings were closed.
On July 9, 1929, Jacoba, Patricia, Ciriaca, and Clara Gerona filed a petition in the
cause, asking that two documents, Exhibits A and D, dated respectively June 13,
1913, and September 27, 1928, be annulled, that the order of October 8, 1928,
adjudicating the estate to Ignacio Arroyo, be set aside, and that a judicial
administrator be appointed to administer the estate. The Court of First Instance of
Iloilo, believing that the relief sought could only be obtained in an ordinary civil

action, ruled that it was without jurisdiction over the matter, and dismissed the
petition. From this order the petitioners appealed, and the order dismissing the
petition was here reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
(Arroyo vs. Gerona, 54 Phil., 909.) Upon the return of the record to the lower court
the petitioners filed an amended petition which differed from the original petition
only in the addition of a description of the property. The documents referred to
above, Exhibits A and D, are, first, a contract for the distribution of the properties
left by the parents of Concepcion Gerona, and, secondly, a ratification of the same
contract executed after the death of Concepcion. The effect of said contracts, as
they stand, is to deprive the plaintiffs of further participation in the estate of the
decedent mentioned. Although the issue which lies at the basis of this controversy
is presented in a somewhat anomalous way, the whole question resolves itself in its
essence into a contention over the validity of these agreements.
Concepcion Gerona was the daughter of Blas Gerona and Manuela Arroyo, who died
in 1895 and 1893, respectively. Concepcion had one brother named Salvador, who
died in childhood in 1907, leaving no descendant. Blas Gerona and Manuela Arroyo
left a conjugal estate consisting of various parcels of real property, which are the
principal object of this controversy. Manuela Arroyo also left paraphernal property,
which, however, is not involved in this lawsuit. Blas Gerona left no separate
property. When Salvador Gerona died in 1907, his property vested by law in his
maternal grandmother, Apolonia Lacson, she being then his only living ascendant.
After death of Blas Gerona in 1895, his two orphaned children, Salvador and
Concepcion, passed into the care of their grandmother, Apolonia Lacson; but this
old lady leaned heavily of course upon her son Ignacio, who naturally acquired and
exercised the principal authority in the care of the two minors and of their property.
Indeed, he acted during many of the years succeeding the death of their father as a
guardian appointed by the family council. Later has legal guardian of Concepcion.
Apolonia Lacson apparently had no other property than such as she had acquired by
inheritance from her grandson Salvador; and when she died on December 25, 1921,
the ordinary rules of transmission by descent would have given one-half of this
property to Ignacio Arroyo and one-half to Concepcion Gerona. But before Apolonia
died she had executed a will, which was duly admitted to probate on February 1,
1913, in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. By this will the testatrix gave to
Concepcion Gerona only a one-sixth part of the property derived from Salvador. The
remainder she left to her son Ignacio.
Meanwhile the Gerona kin, captained by Victor Gerona, had become alert to the fact
that they would ultimately have an interest in the property that had pertained to
their deceased brother Blas. The title to that property was now mainly vested in the
demented girl, Concepcion, but it was obvious that she could never personally enjoy
more than so much of the income as was necessary to maintain her in an asylum,
leaving a residue which, in view of her incapacity, could only accumulate for distant
heirs. Now that her grandmother was dead it seemed to the Geronas an opportune
time to urge upon Ignacio Arroyo the taking of some step that would enable them to
enter to some extent into the enjoyment of their part of the estate. Perhaps the
degree, they were joint reservees with Concepcion Gerona, though they were not so

near as she to the source from which the property had come. It is not necessary for
us here to make pronouncement upon that point. Suffice it to say that these heirs,
brother and sisters of Blas Gerona now began to press the desirability of adjusting
the claims of the Gerona heirs. Ignacio Arroyo assented to the proposition, and on
June 13, 1913, about six months after the death of Apolonia Lacson, a contract of
partition, known to the record as Exhibit A, was executed between Ignacio Arroyo on
the one part, and Victor, Jacoba, Clara, Patricia, and Ciriaca Gerona, on the other. In
the execution of this agreement Victor Gerona acted for himself, but his four sisters
were severally represented by their respective attorneys-in-fact. Thus Jacoba
Gerona was represented by her son, Miguel Gemarino, justice of the peace of
Guimbal; Patricia Gerona was represented by Pablo Gemarino, a notary public;
Ciriaca Gerona, by her husband Pedro Gayatao; and Clara Gerona, by her husband
Benito Garingalao.
The purpose of this agreement, as recited therein, was to enable the parties to
arrive at a compromise and amicable settlement regarding the estate left by the
spouses Blas Gerona and Manuela Arroyo and in paragraph 4 it is agreed that
certain parcels of land, thirteen in number, situated in Binalbagan, Isabela, and
Guimbal, and particularly described in an adjoined list, shall appertain to the five
Geronas in common. In paragraph 5 Ignacio Arroyo promises to pay to each of the
Geronas the sum of five hundred pesos, as soon as a certain fund should be paid to
him by the municipality of Iloilo. These sums were duly paid in proper course to
each of them. In addition to the aforesaid obligations Ignacio Arroyo condoned a
debt owing by Victor Gerona, as lessee of theHacienda Manolita, and any debt or
debts owing by the same individual to Ignacio Arroyo in any character. Ignacio
Arroyo furthermore obligated himself to support and care for Concepcion Gerona
with the full dignity of her station and rank. In paragraph 8 of the contract it is
stated that the remainder of the estate pertaining to the spouses Blas Gerona and
Manuela Arroyo, not specified in the inventory attached to the deed, shall belong to
Ignacio Arroyo; "and, therefore, any property, right or interest that the incapacitated
Concepcion Gerona may or might have in and to the estate of said spouses shall
also belong to Ignacio Arroyo after her death, in virtue and in consideration of these
presents and of the obligations by him assumed hereby." Finally, the parties agreed
to renounce any claim that they might severally have against each other, with
reference to the estate which was the subject of division.
Intrinsically considered, the division thus effected had the merit of being exactly
what both the parties desired. This applies even more particularly to the Geronas
than to Ignacio Arroyo. Time, and the changes to be brought about by time, were
destined to give a different complexion to the situation, more especially in the
feature of the contract now to be mentioned. Among the properties which were
assigned to Ignacio Arroyo under this partition were four parcels of farm land
amounting to about 1,350 hectares, located in the barrios of Soledad and Camangcamang, in the municipality of Binalbagan, Occidental Negros. This land really
compromised three or four different parcels, but they were all commonly thought of
as comprising a part of the Hacienda Manolita. This farm had been leased for many
years to Victor Gerona, who had gotten along with indifferent success and in the
course of the time succeeded in piling up an accumulated indebtedness for rent

which remained unpaid in the amount of something like ten thousand pesos when
the contract now under consideration was made. In the course of his experience as
an unsuccessful farmer Victor Gerona had formed the belief that this land was
bewitched, a naive opinion in which Ignacio Arroyo, apparently shared.
Accordingly in the negotiations leading up to the making of this partition, Victor
Gerona insisted that this farm should be assigned to Ignacio Arroyo. Perhaps the
latter may have had a little more discerning eye for possibilities of the future. At any
rate Ignacio yielded to the insistence of the Geronas; and in the course of a few
years, great things occurred in this region, resulting from the fact that the
Binalbagan Sugar Central was built in that municipality, and the resulting
development of sugar lands, including the Manolita property, raised the value of the
farm into the hundreds of thousands of pesos. Nevertheless eighteen years passed
without the Geronas evincing any dissatisfaction with the partition. In the
meanwhile, soon after the contract had been made, the Geronas proceeded to
partition among themselves the property which had thus been assigned to them in
common under the contract; and both the Geronas and Ignacio Arroyo in time
procured Torrens titles to the portions respectively assigned to them.
Considered from a legal point of view the contract Exhibit A exhibits the vital defect
that it was an agreement for the partition of the estate of a living person, made
between those who, in case of death, would be in a position to inherit the estate. It
was not a partition planned by the owner for the purpose of dividing his estate
properly among his living heirs. It was therefore void under the second paragraph of
article 1271 of the Civil Code. In addition to this have the further fact that the living
owner of the estate thus partitioned was a demented woman, to whom at least one
of the contracting parties stood in a fiduciary relation.
There was therefore ample basis for the uneasiness which Ignacio Arroyo began to
manifest in time with respect to the security of the rights assured to him under this
contract. In this connection we find significant an incident that occurred in 1919 in
winding up to the estate of his mother Apolonia Lacson. Arroyo was the
administrator of this estate, but the proceedings had moved along slowly. In 1919
he submitted an inventory of the decedent's estate, and in this inventory the
property that had belonged to Blas Gerona and Manuela Arroyo figured as the
property of said decedent. In this inventory there was assigned to Concepcion
Gerona only that portion of this property which had been bequeathed to her in the
will of Apolonia Lacson, namely, a one-sixth interest. But it will be remembered that
in will of Apolonia Lacson she disposed only of the property which she had acquired
from her grandson Salvador Gerona. In other words the valuable interest which
Concepcion Gerona had inherited from her parents was conducted into the estate of
Apolonia Lacson. By this device half of the property left by Blas Gerona and Manuela
Arroyo was made to disappear apparently from the thought of man.
Then, in order to get the court to approve the settlement based upon the aforesaid
inventory, Arroyo procured one Mauro Ditching to be appointed guardian ad
litem for Concepcion Gerona. Ditching, as such guardian, formally receipted for the
share pertaining to this demented ward, and immediately resigned. Ignacio Arroyo
then qualified as her legal guardian and he continued to discharge this office until

her death. It will be noted that none of the Geronas were parties to the
consummation of this device, and of course they were not bound by the decree.
Furthermore, the trick was in law ineffectual as against Concepcion Gerona because
of the confidential relations that existed between her and her uncle.
As already stated, Concepcion Gerona died on June 16, 1927, a circumstance which
served to precipitate the controversy which has resulted. To Arroyo the problem
presented was to obtain a ratification or confirmation of the contract Exhibit A. This
matter was accordingly taken up, and on September 27, 1928 the contract (Exhibit
D) was entered into between Arroyo and the Gerona sisters. Victor Gerona being
now dead, his interest in the estate had descended to his two children, Blas G. and
Maria Gerona. This interest, it is important to note, is not involved in the present
lawsuit, as the two heirs mentioned have been content, upon the payment of an
independent consideration, to acquiesce in the contract of June 13, 1913 (Exhibit A).
We are therefore concerned in the situation solely as it affects the Gerona sisters.
When the suggestion for the ratification of the original agreement was first raised
by Ignacio Arroyo the Geronas showed no enthusiasm about the matter; and that
reason was that they feared that Ignacio Arroyo was setting afoot some scheme to
disturb them in the benefits that they had received under the contract Exhibit A.
They were far from being dissatisfied with that contract and were determined to
hold to what they had gotten. Nevertheless, when it was explained to them that
Arroyo was not intending to disturb them in their previously acquired rights, the
agreement Exhibit D was executed.
In this document the Geronas declared that, in their capacity as heirs and next of
kin of the deceased Concepcion Gerona, they ratified in all its part the deed of
compromise and waiver of June 13, 1913 (Exhibit A), and waived in favor Ignacio
Arroyo any right, interest or participation that they had or might had in and to the
estate left by said Concepcion Gerona (par. 4); that to give effect to this waiver they
authorized Attorney Jose Evangelista to state to the court of their name that they
waived, as such heirs of Concepcion Gerona, in favor of Ignacio Arroyo, any right
they might have in the estate of Concepcion Gerona, in conformity with the
renunciation contained in the document Exhibit A, whereby all of the estate of
Concepcion Gerona, not apportioned to the Gerona brothers, had been transferred
to Ignacio Arroyo, whom they likewise authorized to obtain from the court a
pronouncement as to his right to appropriate to himself the said estate of
Concepcion Gerona (par. 5); and that they expressly and specifically waived in favor
of Ignacio Arroyo any right, title or interest which they had or might have in any
other property standing in the name of Concepcion Gerona (par. 6).
Directing our attention to the conditions under which the contract Exhibit D was
executed, we observe that, for appellees, it is contended that this ratification or
confirmation of the original contract Exhibit A was procured by fraudulent
representations; and in this connection it is claimed that the appellant and his
attorney falsely represented to the plaintiffs that the estate of Concepcion Gerona,
which was the subject of that contract, had a value of only eighteen thousand
pesos. We are of the opinion that some such misrepresentation as this was made.
Indeed, in view of the process to which Arroyo had subjected Concepcion's share in

the estate of her parents, namely, of passing it through the testate proceedings of
the estate of Apolonia Lacson, with the apparent result of giving to Concepcion
Gerona only a one-sixth part thereof, it was but natural that the appellant should
have represented that the interest really pertaining to her was of a trivial value. But
whether the Geronas in fact seriously misled by any such misrepresentation is more
questionable. The circumstance that really entitles the Geronas to relief is that
Arroyo had been in confidential relations with Concepcion Gerona, as her uncle and
guardian, and the Geronas were dealing with him in that light, ands as one in whom
they had confidence. It is a well established rule of equity that all dealings with
expectant heirs are presumptively invalid (2 Pom. Eq., 4 ed., sec. 953); also that, if a
person who is placed in a fiduciary relation towards another intentionally conceals a
material fact with the purpose of inducing the other to enter into an agreement,
such concealment is an actual fraud, and the agreement is void without the aid of
any presumption. (2 Pom. Eq., Jur., 4 ed., sec 956.) The Geronas were in no sense
implicated in the fraudulent device by which the property inherited by Concepcion
Gerona from her parents was passed through the estate of Apolonia Lacson. That
device was a fraud perpetrated by Ignacio Arroyo upon his own ward and upon all
who might derive an interest by inheritance from her. The original contract Exhibit
A, as already suggested, was a mere nullity, and the circumstance that in 1919
Ignacio Arroyo dealt with the estate of his niece in the testacy of Apolonia Lacson in
the manner already stated, shows clearly that he placed little reliance that contract.
It insisted for the appellee that, inasmuch as the contract Exhibit A was void, the
ratification of said contract contained in Exhibit D was also a nullity. But this
contention overlooks of fact that, before the deed of ratification was executed,
death had removed Concepcion Gerona from the scene of life. This circumstance
removed the cause of nullity. A null contract cannot of course be ratified as long as
the cause of nullity continues to exist, but when the cause removed the parties are
free to contract as they please. Whether the contract Exhibit D be viewed as a
ratification, confirmation, or as a new contract, the result is the same, namely, that
the Geronas are bound by said contract unless it was vitiated by fraud, actual or
constructive.
Under the circumstances we have no hesitancy in declaring that the appellees are
entitled to relief from said contract, but the extent of the relief which they should
receive presents a question of some difficulty; for we are confronted with a situation
in which, in eager haste to correct one wrong, we might commit another equally
obnoxious to equity and the sense of justice.
The proper key to the solution of the case is found in the circumstance that the
appellees have appealed to us as a court of equity, to be relieved from a contract
which is prima facie binding against them. Under such circumstances the court has
full power to grant relief to the extent necessary to correct the wrong that has been
suffered by the appellees, without permitting them inflict unnecessary damage
upon others. Fortunately the case supplies the proper clue for what we consider the
correct solution of the case.
In considering the significance of the acts done in this case, as affecting the rights
of the respective parties, it is important to bear in mind that we are concerned with

two interests which have different histories, although the threads have at no time
been disentangled from each other. We refer to the different hereditary shares of
the two heirs, Salvador and Concepcion Gerona, in the estates of their deceased
parents. Each of these shares consisted of two elements, one inherited from the
mother Manuela Arroyo, upon her death in 1893, and the other inherited from Blas
Gerona, upon his death in 1895. The property thus inherited by Salvador and
Concepcion was never partitioned, and when Salvador died in 1907 his share was
inherited, as we have already seen, by his grandmother Apolonia Lacson. In the
hands of the latter their property was reservable under article 811 of the Civil Code,
and the interest thus inherited by Apolonia Lacson from Salvador should have been
reserved for Concepcion Gerona. But, as we have already seen, Apolonia Lacson
made a will, and, ignoring the reservable character of the property, devised only an
undivided one-sixth interest therein to Concepcion. This was an infraction of the
rules of descent prejudicial to Concepcion, and it is manifest that the devise was
invalid in so far as it conveyed to Ignacio Arroyo an interest which should have been
inherited by Concepcion. Now, it was shortly after the death of Apolonia Lacson that
the contract Exhibit A, bearing date of June 13, 1913, was executed. In the
execution of this document the contracting parties of course had principally in mind
the facts then affecting their rights, namely, the death of Salvador Gerona and
Apolonia Lacson.
On the other hand, the one-half interest which Concepcion Gerona had inherited
from her parents, Blas Gerona and Manuela Arroyo. remained in her until her death,
unaffected by the death of Salvador Gerona and Apolonia Lacson. Therefore,
bearing in mind it all times that the contract Exhibit A, of June 13, 1913, was a
nullity, it becomes manifest that the appellee stand in a much better position with
respect to the interest which Concepcion acquired by inheritance from her own
parents that they do in respect to the interest which they seek to derive from
Salvador through Apolonia Lacson and Concepcion Gerona. The situation is
undoubtedly somewhat confused because the parties attempted to deal with both
interests in the same contract, and without advertence to the character of the
different rights involved therein; but the difference, when attention is once drawn to
the matter, is quite apparent.
The result is, and so is our opinion, that the appellees can not be permitted to
recover any of the property formerly vested in Salvador Gerona. Good reason for
refusing to permit this recovery is found in the fact that the appellees were active
and efficient agents in the making of the contract by which the estate of the living
Concepcion Gerona was apparently stripped of that property. They were therefore,
as to this interest, equally in wrong with the individual whom they now seek to
despoil of the larger portion of his gain. As to this interest we think that the deed of
ratification or confirmation, Exhibit D, should be held effective.
As to the half interest directly inherited by Concepcion Gerona from the estate of
her deceased parents, the appellees are in a different position. They had no part in
the act of Ignacio Arroyo which he attempted to despoil his demented ward of fivesixths of this interest, that is, by conducting it through the channel of the testate
proceedings of his mother into himself. The non-participation of the appellees in

that act and their evident ignorance of its effects upon their hereditary rights,
clearly entitle them to relief as to this part of the property involved.
In the course of these proceedings the fact has come to light that Ignacio Arroyo in
life transferred a large part of the property which involved in this lawsuit, and as to
which he had acquired Torrens titles, to his son Jose Maria Arroyo. The act by which
any such transfer was made constitutes no obstacle to this proceedings, although
when the administration is under way proper steps will have to be taken to hold the
estate of Ignacio Arroyo liable, if the property itself cannot be reached, for any
responsibility which may be properly fixed upon him or his successors, in conformity
with this decision.
The appealed decision of June 30, 1931, will therefore be affirmed in appointing an
administrator over the estate of Concepcion Gerona, thereby abrogating the
resolution of October 8, 1928 , authorizing the summary distribution of her property.
The amendatory order of July 2, 1931, is also affirmed in so far as it makes a
declaration of nullity concerning the contract Exhibit A, of June 13, 1913. But the
declaration with respect to the document Exhibit D, of the date of September 27,
1928, must be modified to the extent that the appellees are bound thereby, in so far
as relates to the interest formerly vested in Salvador Gerona. In other respects the
declaration of nullity made by the trial court concerning said contract is correct;
and, as thus modified, the appealed judgment is affirmed. So ordered, without
costs.
Villamor, Ostrand, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Vickers, Imperial and Butte, JJ., concur.
Justice Hull participated in this case, but on account of his absence on leave at the
time of the promulgation of the decision, no statement of his conclusions appears
appended to the opinion of the court, but he authorized the undersigned to certify
that he voted to reverse the judgment and dismiss the complaint on the ground that
the contract of September 27, 1928, is valid and should be enforced. STREET, J.

Maghirang v. Balcita
G.R. No. L-22066

December 2, 1924

FRANCISCA MAGHIRANG and SERGIA GUTIERREZ, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
ATILANO BALCITA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
--------------------------------G.R. No. L-22067

December 2, 1924

GREGORIO
vs.
SERGIA GUTIERREZ, opponent-appellant.

EMPALMADO, petitioner-appellee,

Francisco
&
Ramon Diokno for appellees.

Lualhati

for

appellants.

STREET, J.:
By the appeal in civil cause No. 2643 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Sergia
Gutierrez seeks to reverse a decision of said court, whereby two parcels of land
were declared to be the exclusive property of Gregorio Empalmado and of Esteban
Reyes, respectively, free from the claim of Sergia Gutierrez that said lots are held by
said defendants subject to a contingent reservable interest in her favor. Connected
with the action above mentioned is the proceeding in the second appeal, wherein
the trial court declared that the first of the two lots in controversy should be
registered in the name of Gregorio Empalmado, free from the same claim. Because
of the intimate relation between the action instituted in behalf of the appellant,
Sergia Gutierrez, as reservee, and the registration proceeding in which she is
opponent, the two causes were heard together in the trial court and will be here
disposed of in a single opinion.
The basis of the claim put forth by the plaintiff Gutierrez is the same as to both
parcels, but the facts constituting the respective defenses of the two defendants are
different. It will therefore be convenient to state first the points pertaining to the
two parcels in common and then such as pertain especially to the controversy over
each.
It appears that the original owner of both parcels was one Bonifacio Gutierrez, who
died about the year 1902, after having been thrice married. The first wife left no
children, but the second wife left a daughter, Zoila Gutierrez, who intermarried with
Atilano Balcita, one of the defendants herein. To this pair was born a daughter,
Gertrudis Balcita. Zoila Gutierrez predeceased her father; and upon the death of the
latter, the two parcels of land with which we are concerned passed by inheritance
directly from Bonifacio to his granddaughter Gertrudis, then a mere child. Gertrudis
Balcita herself died on December 9, 1912, at the age of 16, leaving no heir except
her father, Atilano Balcita. The plaintiff, Sergia Gutierrez, is a daughter of Bonifacio
Gutierrez by his third wife, one Francisca Maghirang. Sergia was therefore the aunt
of Gertrudis Balcita, on her mother's side, and as reservee under article 811 of the
Civil Code she should succeed to the title of the two parcels which Atilano Balcita
inherited, or should have inherited, from Gertrudis, provided all the conditions
necessary to the assertion of the reservation right are fulfilled.
GUTIERREZ VS. EMPALMADO
Parcel A. In the year 1905 Atilano Balcita sold the parcel A to one Vicente
Almario. As the land belonged to Gertrudis, a lawsuit was instituted in her behalf in
1912 with a view to recovering it. The litigation was compromised by the
reconveyance of the land by Almario to Gertrudis and the payment to him of
P1,200, which was the amount that he had paid for the property. The money
necessary to effect this compromise had to be borrowed by Gertrudis, or those
representing her; and although the point is subject to discussion, the preponderance
of the testimony is to the effect that the money was obtained from Gregorio
Empalmado under an agreement by which Gertrudis Balcita undertook to convey

the land to him for the sum of P2,100. The document, Exhibit B, constituting the
evidence of this agreement is dated November 28, 1912. In addition to the
signature of Gertrudis Balcita, which is questioned, it bears the signature of Atilano
Balcita and two subscribing witnesses. Gertrudis Balcita died of dysentery on
December 9, 1912, and on December 12 thereafter her father, Atilano Balcita,
executed the document Exhibit C, whereby he conveyed, or purported to convey,
the same parcel to Gregorio Empalmado, it being recited that he had inherited the
land from his daughter Gertrudis. Gregorio Empalmado immediately entered into
possession, and he has subsequently maintained possession under claim of
ownership.
For the plaintiff, Gutierrez, it is insisted that the document, Exhibit b, is not
authentic and that the name of Gertrudis Balcita subscribed thereto is a forgery. The
trial judge was of the opinion that the due execution of this instrument had been
proved by a preponderance of the evidence; and although the question is
debatable, and the point not altogether free from doubt, we are of the opinion that
the trial court's conclusion on this point should be affirmed. The two subscribing
witnesses both say that they saw the girl sign the document upon the date stated
therein, and this is corroborated not only by the testimony of Gregorio Empalmado,
who was present at the execution of the instrument, but also by Atilano Balcita
himself. The only testimony to the contrary is that of Sergia Gutierrez, who says that
the girl was too sick for some time prior to her death to admit the possibility of her
having signed the instrument. It is true that the questioned signature appears
somewhat suspicious, but we have not sufficient data upon which to pronounce it a
forgery, considered as a mere question of penmanship. Certainly, the instrument
expresses the agreement that would naturally have been drawn upon under the
proven circumstances which gave rise to the transaction.
Upon the foregoing state of facts the trial judge found as a matter of law that the
title to parcel A passed out of Gertrudis Balcita and became vested in Gregorio
Empalmado before her death; and although Gertrudis was then a minor, the
conveyance was only voidable and not void. Moreover, as his Honor pointed out, the
contract was evidently advantageous to the minor because she thereby obtained
the money necessary to get the property back from Vicente Almario, with the
consequent saving of P900.
These conclusions of the trial court seem to us well founded, and the result is that,
as to this parcel, the inchoate reservable right asserted by Sergia Gutierrez never
came into existence. In this view the conveyance executed by Atilano Balcita a few
days after the death of his daughter Gertrudis operated as a mere quit-claim from
him, as title had already vested in Empalmado under the prior agreement with her.
No error was therefore committed by the trial judge in dismissing the complaint in
case No. 2643 in so far as it affects parcel A and the right of the defendant
Empalmado thereto; nor did his Honor err in ordering the registration of the same
parcel in the name of Empalmado and his wife Felipa Brion, regardless of the
opposition of the plaintiff Gutierrez.
GUTIERREZ VS. REYES

Parcel B. As already stated, this parcel comes from the same source as the parcel
A, that is, from the estate of Bonifacio Gutierrez. With respect to this parcel it
appears that on May 28, 1906, Atilano Balcita, being then in possession and
asserting a claim of ownership, sold the same by a contract of sale with pacto de
retro for the sum of P200 to the defendant Esteban Reyes. In the document
constituting the evidence of this sale Atilano Balcita falsely declared that he was
owner by virtud of having inherited the property from his parents and that he had
been in quiet and pacific possession for fifteen years. Esteban Reyes was a
purchaser for value and bought in belief that the land really belonged to his vendor.
The period for repurchase under this contract was ten years, which passed in 1916
without redemption having been effected. It is not clear whether the purchaser
under this contract entered into possession during the time stipulated for
redemption or not; but it is agreed that, with this exception, the defendant Reyes
had, until the institution of this action on May 10, 1918, exercised actual and
adverse possession, to the exclusion of all other persons.lawphi1.net
Upon the facts above stated the trial judge gave Reyes the benefit of prescription
under the ten years statute (sec. 41, Code of Civ. Proc.) and held that the right of
Sergia Gutierrez, as reservee, had been thereby destroyed.
We are of the opinion that the conclusion thus reached is erroneous. We may accept
the legal proposition that occupancy by Esteban Reyes, pursuant to the contract of
sale with pacto de retro by which he acquired the property, and prior to the
expiration of the period for redemption, may be considered an adverse possession
as against everybody having a prescriptible interest, notwithstanding the existence
of the stipulation for repurchase. As was said by this court in Santos vs. Heirs of
Crisostomo and Tiongson (41 Phil., 342, 352), the insertion of a stipulation for
repurchase by the vendor in a contract of sale does not necessarily create a right
inconsistent with the right of ownership in the purchaser. Such a stipulation is in the
nature of an option, and the possible exercise of its rests upon contingency. It
creates no subsisting right whatever in the property, and so far from being
inconsistent with the idea of full ownership in the purchaser, it really rests upon the
assumption of ownership in him.
But it must be borne in mind that the true owner of this property was Gertrudis
Balcita, a minor, and the period of limitation did not begin to run against her or any
person claiming in her right until the date of her death, which was December 9,
1912. It must furthermore be remembered that the plaintiff does not claim in the
character of an ordinary successor to the rights of Gertrudis Balcita; her claim is
based upon a positive provision of law, which could no operate in any wise until the
death of Gertrudis Balcita, when the reservable character first attached to the
property in question. From this it is obvious that the right of the plaintiff which
even yet is of a purely contingent nature could not be affected by anything that
had occurred prior to the death of Gertrudis Balcita; and as this action was begun in
May, 1918, the ten-year period necessary to confer a complete prescriptive title had
not then elapsed.
What has been said makes it unnecessary to express any opinion upon he more
recondite question whether Sergia Gutierrez really has a prescriptive interest in the

parcel B, but we may observe that the position of the reservee under the Spanish
law is very much like that of the ordinary remainderman at common law, who is
entitled to take after the termination of a particular life estate; and it is generally
accepted doctrine in common law jurisdictions that if the life tenant loses his life
estate by adverse possession the interest of the remainderman is not thereby
destroyed. (17 R. C. L., 982; 21 C. J., 972, 975, 1013.) The reason for the rule is said
to be that, during the existence of the life estate, the remainderman has no right to
possession and consequently cannot bring an action to recover it. (21 C. J., 974.) As
was said by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Webster vs. Pittsburg, etc., Railroad Co.
(15 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1154), "No possession can be deemed adverse to a party who
has not at the time the right of entry and possession."
From what has been said it is apparent that the judgment must be affirmed in so far
as concerns the registration of parcel A in expediente No. 409, G. L. R. O., record No.
14769, and in so far as relates to the dismissal of the complaint against Gregorio
Empalmado in case No. 2643; but the judgment in the same case must be reversed
in so far as relates to parcel B, now in the possession of Esteban Reyes, and it is
hereby declared that said parcel is reservable property and upon the death of
Atilano Balcita will pass to Sergia Gutierrez, if she be then living. Let a certified copy
of this pronouncement be filed with the register of deeds of the Province of Laguna
for record pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 2837 of the Philippine Legislature.
So ordered, without special pronouncement as to costs.
Johnson, Malcolm, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

Carillo v De Paz
GR No. L-22601 October 28, 1966
PRIMA G. CARRILLO and LORENZO Licup, Plaintiffs and appellants,
vs. FRANCISCA SALAK PEACE and ERNESTO BAUTISTA, defendants and
appellees.
Filemon
Cajator
for
Plaintiffs
Tomas Besa for defendants and appellees.

and

appellants.

Bengzon, JP, J .:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac dismissing a
suit to recover ownership and possession of 2/3 of 1/2 of Lot No. 221 of the
Cadastral Survey of Tarlac.
Salak and Petra Garcia Severino Were the owners of Lot No. 221 of the Cadastral
Survey of Tarlac, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 41543, With an area of
1,334 square meters. Petra Garcia died on September 21, 1941. On August 16,

1943, sold to Honoria Severino Salak Salak for P812.00 His portion of Said lot. A
year later, on December 5, 1944, Severino Salak died.
Sometime in January 1945, Honoria Salak and other members of her family died massacred by the Japanese.
As a result, two Were Instituted settlement proceedings in the Court of First Instance
of Tarlac: (1) Special Proceeding No. 3, to settle the estates of Severino Salak and
Petra Garcia and (2) Special Proceeding No. 23, to settle the Salak estates of the
family (parents Simeon Salak and Isabel Carrillo, Adolfo and children, Honoria, and
Ligaya Consuelo).
On September 4, 1946, a Submitted Project of Partition was in Special Proceeding
No. 3, Which the court approved on November 19, 1946. Said project
adjudicated inter alia Lot No. 221, Which was Given thereunder to Francisca Salak
Peace (January / 4 of it in her capacity as heir, and the other 3/4 by purchase and /
or exchange with her co-heirs, Rita Sahagun, Aurea Sahagun and Ernesto
Bautista). From 1946 up to the present Francisca Salak have possessed all of Lot No.
221.
On the other hand, in Special Proceeding No. 23, on February 26, 1948, the court a
quo held Entitled That the heirs to the estates of the family Salak Were Agustina de
Guzman Vda. Carillo (3/4 share) and Ernesto Bautista (1/4 share) Applying the
presumption survivorship [Rule 123, Sec. 69 (ii), now Rule 131, Sec. 5 (jj) of the
Rules of Court] THUS: (1) Salak Simeon died first - His properties Went to the
children Adolfo, Honoria, and Ligaya Consuelo (1/4 each); (2) Honoria, Ligaya
Consuelo and died next - Honoria's and Consuelo's properties Went to Their mother,
Isabel; Those of Ligaya Went to her son, Ernesto Bautista; 1 (3) Isabel died next Went her properties to her son Adolf; and (4) Adolfo died last - His properties Went
To His maternal grandmother, Agustina.Agustina thereby succeeded to the
properties That came by intes-state succession from Honoria Salak and Isabel
Carrillo, Including of Lot No. 221 .
On November 9, 1948, Agustina de Guzman Vda. Carrillo filed an action in the Court
of First Instance of Tarlac (therein docketed as Case No. 351) against the heirs in
Special Proceeding No. 3 to recover of Lot No. 221 as Aforementioned Which hasbeen possessed by Francisca Salak Peace .
On April 24, 1950, Agustina died.
On June 8, 1950 the Court of Appeals Affirmed the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac in Special Proceeding No. 23, and further decreed That the
properties inherited by Agustina de Guzman Vda. Were Carrillo subject to trunk
reservation .
On November 6, 1950, Ernesto Bautista filed a petition in Special Proceeding No. 23
for the execution of the judgment therein. Said petition was Heard on November 10,
1959, after a copy was served on the lawyer of Prima Carrillo, the Latter Being a
party thereto as administratix of the estate of her deceased mother Agustina. Acting

on Said petition, the lower court issued STIs order of November 14, 1950, Which
reads in part:
. . . the Court, in view of the death of the reservist, Doa Agustina de Guzman
Vda. Carrillo, declare all the interest of the Said reservist Doa Agustina de Guzman
Vda. Carrillo as well as That of her heirs in the three-fourths share adjudged to
the reservist , definitely terminated, and That the Reservee, the minor Ernesto
Bautista, is Entitled to the immediate delivery to him of the Said three-fourths share
Declared reserved to him in the decision of the Court of Appeals of June 8,
1950. . . (Record on Appeals, pp. 213-214)
On December 20, 1960, the lower court dismissed Civil Case No. 351. The order of
dismissal reads in part:
By virtue of the existence of third-degree relatives of Adolfo Salak, the portion of Lot
No. 221, inherited by Agustina de Guzman was never released from the reserve, so
as to convert the ownership of Agustina de Guzman into an absolute one. Upon her
death on April 24, 1950, Therefore, the property did not pass by inheritance to her
legal heirs, but rather reverted to the family trunk of the Isabel-Adolfo line. Such
Being the case, the estate of Agustina de Guzman, the plaintiff Present In This case,
you have no cause of action against the defendants.
In resume, the adjudication in Special Proceeding No. 23, Intestate Estate of the late
Simeon Salak and Isabel Carrillo, Which included Lot No. 221, has Become res
judicata Which can not be disturbed in esta case. (Record on Appeal, p. 209)
On April 22, 1963, Carrillo and Lorenzo Licup Prima filed the present suit for
recovery of 2/3 of 1/2 of No. 221 against Francisca Salak Peace and Ernesto
Bautista. 2
On June 20, 1963, defendants Francisco Salak Peace and Ernesto Bautita filed a
motion to dismiss upon the grounds That the cause of action is barred by prior
judgment and by the statute of limitations.
On November 19, 1963, the court a quo dismissed the complaint on the ground
of res judicata , finding the suit barred by the order of delivery dated November 14,
1950 in Special Proceeding No. 23.
Plaintiffs Prima Carrillo and Lorenzo Licup thereupon appealed to Us upon questions
of law.
Several grounds were advanced to support the motion to dismiss: that the cause of
action is barred by prior judgment and by the statute of limitations. , Although the
action was dismissed by the lower court EXPRESSLY upon the ground of res
judicata , it did not totally disregard the defense of prescription. THUS, Said court
pointed out that:
Then the raw Carrillo Being administratrix of the estate of her mother, she is Also
Deemed to Have Been Notified of the petition for execution of judgment in Special
Proceeding No. 23, and of the order of November 14, 1950. As of Then, THEREFORE
Prima Carrillo (even though as administratrix) Ernesto Bautista personally Knew

That Claimed to be the sole Reservee of all the properties inherited by Da.Agustina
from the Salak Family, Which Among Lot No. 221 was in question, but she did not
file any opposition thereto. It was her opportunity to assert her right as Reservee by
opposing the petition or, failing In This, to contest or to ask to be relieved from the
order of November 14, 1950. Instead, she allowed About thirteen (13) years before
she commenced the present action . (Decision, Record on Appeal, pp 214-215;.
Emphasis supplied)
At any rate, This Court can resolve this appeal on the issue of prescription. As ruled
in the cases of Garcia Valdez vs. Soterana Tuazon , 40 Phil. 943 and Relative
v. Castro , 76 Phil. 563 When the trial judge decide a case in behalf of a party on A
Certain ground, the appellate court uphold the decision below May upon some other
point was ignored or erroneously Which DECIDED in behalf of the appellant by the
trial court.
Trunk reservation In This jurisdiction is Treated in Article 891 of the new Civil Code
and Article 811 of the old Civil Code, Which states:
The ascendant WHO His descendant inherits any property from the Latter Which
May Have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or
sister, is Obliged to reserve Such property as I May Have acquired by operation of
law for the benefit of relatives Who are Within the third degree and WHO belong to
the property line from Said Which came.
The trunk reservation Arose - as Been HAD DECIDED finally by the Court of Appeals
in Special Proceeding No. 23 - When Agustina acquired by operation of law all the
properties of her descendant Adolfo (grandson), lowest acquired them by gratuitous
title from another ascendant, Isabel (Adolfo's mother).
ACCORDING TO Manresa, the book is extinguished upon the death of the reservist ,
as it then a full Becomes a right of ownership on the part of the reservatarios , WHO
can bring a suit reivindicatory therefor. Nonetheless, esta right, if not exercised for
Recovering Within the real-time properties, can be lost by prescription:
But extinguished the reservation by the death of a reservist, completely change the
relationships and legal conditions of people and things, as already indicated. The
obligation of book becomes deliver the goods to whom they relate, passing
obligation the deceased's estate must complir reservist and their heirs. And the
right to the reservation becomes the right to full ownership of such property. If the
death of the reservist's condition subsequent to exist within the third degree
relatives belonging to the line where the goods come comple, these relatives from
that moment passes by operation of law the stranglehold of those goods, and,
therefore, the right to claim them and can freely dispose of those or this, and
transmit them to their heirs, since the law does not prohibit. And if it does not
survive the reservist none of these relatives, the obligation is extinguished book,
termination clause that imposed by law have not complido, and by virtue of the
goods to become fluent in the ascendant, and belong to their heritage under
art. 651. And since nothing required by law to the contrary, we have no doubt that
by the very personal nature of any of these rights, which are born with the
extinction of the reserve, belonging to the estate and the heirs are transmitted,

although the cause He has exercised not by itself, except cases of resignation,
incapacity or prescription.
xxx xxx xxx
C) Extinction of booking .-The same conditions for the birth of the reserve are
necessary for their existence.In the absence of one, the reserve death. Three are
therefore the main causes of extinction:
1.a. Ascending Death .-Sea who wants the ultimate destination of the goods under
the conditional nature of the rights that creates the art. 811, it is true that the
reserve, as such, once a company to necida forced her ascendancy until his
death. Dead ancestor, cease all compulsory reservation; lack the taxpayer of
booking.
xxx xxx xxx
In addition to the three causes mentioned, we can expose others noted below.
xxx xxx xxx
And 5th prescription , if the goods are enjoyed by the heirs of ascendancy during
the time and under the conditions set by law as free. (Manresa, Comments Al
Spanish Civil Code , Vol. 6, 1911 Ed., pp. 288-289, 316-318).
Also Scaevola states the view That prescription can
the reservatarios to cut off bookable Their right to the property:

apply

against

f) Prescipcion .-This mode extinguishment of rights has only APPLICATION relatives

of the third degree of descent, because not having accepted the reservation if no
influence, no need to talk about regarding the statute of limitations.
Concerning the relatives entitled to the reservation, it applies the doctrine, because
they can not exercise their right to ignore the death of offspring oppor otherwise.
Given this possibility, we understand that, being a real right on real estate, shall
prescribe thirty (art. 1693) (1), starting from the acceptance of the inheritance by
the ascendant, the right to exercise decisive moment booking (Article
1.969.); passed, then thirty years since the acceptance without relatives favored by
the law have requested the constitution of the reserve, this is extenguira, and
ascendant or their rightful claimants will acquire full ownership of reservable assets
by nature, but they were not subject to any reservation.(Scaevola, Reviewed Civil
Code , Vol. 14, 1944 Ed., p. 360).
Plaintiffs-appellants HEREIN, reservatarios as, Had the right to claim the property
2/3 of 1/2 of Lot No. 221 - from Francisca Salak Peace, WHO has-been Possessing it
in the concept of an owner, from April 24, 1950 When Augustine died. And the Court
of Appeals' decision affirming the existence of core reserves , promulgated on June
8, 1950, rendered it all the more doubtless That HAD Such accrued In Their right
from the time Agustina Please died. It is clear, Therefore, That the right or cause of
action accrued in behalf of the Plaintiffs-reservatarios HEREIN on April 24, 1950.

Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure fixes 10 years as the period of prescription
for actions to recover actual property, Counted from the time the cause of action
accrued. This is the applicable law Because Article 1116 of the New Civil Code
Provides That "Prescription Already running before the effectivity of esta Code
[August 30, 1950] Shall Be Governed by laws with previously in force."
Plaintiffs-appellants' suit HEREIN, Been having only filed on April 22, 1963, or more
than ten (10) years from April 24, 1950, you have prescribed.
And having Reached Such conclusion, We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the
question of Whether the suit is barred Also on the ground of res judicata .
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby Affirmed on the ground
of prescription, With costs against appellants. So ordered.
Concepcion, CJ Reyes, JBL, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro,
JJ., concur. Barrera, J., is on leave.