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Filosofa de la mente
Programa

Objetivo: Presentar claramente los problemas filosficos respecto a la mente humana, as como identificar, reconstruir y criticar las soluciones y argumentos en juego. I. Introduccin II. El problema ontolgico 1. El dualismo 2. Conductismo filosfico 3. Materialismo reduccionista 4. Funcionalismo 5. Materialismo eliminativo III. El problema semntico 1. La definicin por ostensin interna 2. El conductismo filosfico 3. La tesis terica reticular y la psicologa popular 4. Intencionalidad y actitudes proposicionales IV. El problema epistemolgico 1. El problema de las otras mentes 2. El problema de la autoconsciencia V. El problema metodolgico 1. Idealismo y fenomenologa 2. Conductismo metodolgico 3. Enfoque cognitivo computacional 4. Materialismo metodolgico VI. Inteligencia artificial y neurociencias

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Aspectos a evaluar: 1. Asistencia (Mnima 80%) 2. Participacin y lecturas 3. Exmenes parciales 4. Ensayo final Bibliografa
BAKER, Lynne Rudder, 2009: Non-reductivist materialism, en Beckermann, Ansgar, Sven Walter & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, Oxford-New York, Oxford University Press. (Hay traduccin al espaol.) BECKERMANN, Ansgar, Sven Walter & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), 2009: Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, Oxford-New York, Oxford University Press. BLOCK, Ned, 1990: Inverted Earth, en Tomberlin, James (ed.) Philosophical Perspectives Vol. 4, Ridgeview Publishing Company, Atascadero, Calif. Reimpreso en Block, Ned, Owen Flanagan & Gven Gzeldere (eds.) 1997: The Nature of Consciousness. Philosophical Debates, MIT Press, A Bradford Book, Cambridge, Mass.Londres, Inglaterra. Hay traduccin al espaol en Ezcurdia, Maite & Olbeth Hansberg (eds.) La naturaleza de la experiencia. Vol.1 Sensaciones, UNAM, Mxico, 2003. BLOCK, Ned, Owen Flanagan & Gven Gzeldere (eds.), 1997: The Nature of Consciousness. Philosophical Debates, MIT Press, A Bradford Book, Cambridge, Mass.-Londres, Inglaterra. Block, Ned & Robert Stalnaker, 1999: Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap, en The Philosophical Review 108, pp.1-46. CHALMERS, David J., 1996: The Conscious Mind. In Search of a Fundamental Theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford-New York. (Hay traduccin al espaol.) CHURCHLAND, Paul M., 1988: Matter and Consciousness. (Hay traduccin al espaol.) DAVIDSON, Donald, 1970: Mental Events, en su Essays on Actions and Events, Clarendon Press, Oxford. (Hay traduccin al espaol: Ensayos sobre acciones y sucesos, UNAM-Crtica.) DAVIES, Martin, 1995: The Philosophy of Mind. Grayling, Anthony C. (ed.) Philo sophy 1, Oxford, Oxford University Press. DENNETT, Daniel, 1991: Consciousness Explained, Little, Brown, and Company, Boston-Toronto-Londres. (Hay traduccin al espaol.) DESCARTES, Ren, 1641: Meditaciones Metafsicas. Varias ediciones EZCURDIA, Maite & Olbeth Hansberg (eds.), 2003: La naturaleza de la experiencia. Vol.1 Sensaciones, UNAM, Mxico. GRAYLING, Anthony C. (ed.), 1995: Philosophy 1, Oxford, Oxford University Press. GUTTENPLAN, Samuel (ed.), 1994: The Companion To the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.

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HILL, Christopher S., 1997: Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility and the Mind -Body Problem, en Philosophical Studies 87, pp. 61-85. HILL, Christopher S. & Brian P. McLaughlin, 1999: There Are Fewer Things in Reality Than Are Dreamt of in Chalmerss Philosophy, en Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LIX, pp.445-454. JACKSON, Frank, 1982: Epiphenomenal Qualia, en The Philosophical Quarterly 32, pp. 127-36. KIM, Jaegwon, 2003a: Supervenience, Emergence, Realization, Reduction. Loux, Michael J. and Dean Zimmerman (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, Oxford-New York, Oxford University Press, 2003. KIM, Jaegwon, 2003b: Blocking Causal Drainage and other Maintenance Chores with Mental Causation, en Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXIV (Hay traduccin al espaol) KIM, Jaegwon, 2005: Physicalism, or Something Near Enough, Princeton University Press, Princeton. KRIPKE, Saul, 1980: Namimg and Necessity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. (Hay traduccin al espaol.) KRIPKE, Saul, 1971: Identity and Necessity, en Munitz, Milton K. (ed.)Identity and Individuation, New York University Press, New York. LEPORE, Ernest & LOEWER, Barry, 1987: Mind Matters, en Journal of Philosophy LXXXVII, pp. 630-642. LEVINE, James, 1983: Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap, en Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64, pp. 354-361. LEVINE, James, 1998: Conceivability and the Metaphysics of Mind, en NOS 32, pp. 449-480. LEWIS, David, 1990: What Experience Teaches, en Block, Ned, Owen Flanagan & Gven Gzeldere (eds.) 1997: The Nature of Consciousness. Philosophical Debates, MIT Press, A Bradford Book, Cambridge, Mass.Londres, Inglaterra. (Hay traduccin al espaol.) LOAR, Brian, 1997: Phenomenal States, en Block, Ned, Owen Flanagan & Gven Gzeldere (eds.) 1997: The Nature of Consciousness. Philosophical Debates, MIT Press, A Bradford Book, Cambridge, Mass.-Londres, Inglaterra. LOAR, Brian, 1999: David Chalmerss The Conscious Mind, en Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LIX, pp.465-472. LOCKE, John, 1690: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Hay traduccin al espaol: Ensayo sobre el entendimiento humano, traduccin del ingls de Edmundo OGorman, FCE, Mxico, 1956. LOUX, Michael J. and Dean Zimmerman (eds.), 2003: The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, Oxford-New York, Oxford University Press. MACKIE, John L., 1976: Themes from Locke. Oxford, Oxford University Press. (Hay traduccin al espaol.) MACKIE, John, 1979: Mind, Brain, & Causation, en Midwest Studies in Philosophy Volume IV: Studies in Metaphysics, pp. 19-29. MCGINN, Colin, 2003: What Constitutes the Mind-Body Problem?, en Philosophical Issues 13, pp. 148-162.

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NAGEL, Thomas, 1974: What is it Like to Be a Bat?, en Philosophical Review 84, pp. 435-450. Reimpreso en Block, Ned, Owen Flanagan & Gven Gzeldere (eds.) 1997: The Nature of Consciousness. Philosophical Debates, MIT Press, A Bradford Book, Cambridge, Mass.- Londres, Inglaterra. (Hay traduccin al espaol en Ezcurdia, Maite & Olbeth Hansberg (eds.) La naturaleza de la experiencia. Vol.1 Sensaciones, UNAM, Mxico, 2003. SHOEMAKER, Sidney, 1981: The Inverted Spectrum, en The Journal of Philosophy 74, pp. 357 -381. Reimpreso en Block, Ned, Owen Flanagan & Gven Gzeldere (eds.) 1997: The Nature of Consciousness. Philosophical Debates, MIT Press, A Bradford Book, Cambridge, Mass.-Londres, Inglaterra. STURGEON, Scott, 1994: The Epistemic View of Subjectivity, en Journal of Philo sophy 91, pp. 221-235. VAN GULINCK, Robert, 1997: Understanding the Phenomenal Mind: Are We Just Armadillos? Part I, en Block, Ned, Owen Flanagan & Gven Gzeldere (eds.) 1997: The Nature of Consciousness. Philosophical Debates, MIT Press, A Bradford Book, Cambridge, Mass.-Londres, Inglaterra. VAN GULICK, Robert, 2001: Reduction, Emergence and Other Recent Options on the Mind/Body Problem, en Journal of Consciousness Studies 8, pp. 1-34. WILSON, Margaret Dauler, 1983: Descartes. Routledge and Kegan Paul, Londres. Hay traduccin al espaol. YABLO, Stephen, 1987: Identity, Essence & Indiscernibility, en Journal of Philosophy LXXXIV, pp. 293-314. YABLO, Stephen, 1999: Concepts and Consciousness, en Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LIX, pp.455-463. YABLO, Stephen, 2000: Textbook Kripkeanism and the Open Texture of Concepts, en Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81, pp. 98-122.

Profr. Vctor Hugo Gutirrez Luna profevix@gmail.com Unidad Acadmica de Filosofa