Documentos de Académico
Documentos de Profesional
Documentos de Cultura
• Problema de la inducción
• Eliminación del psicologismo
• Contrastación deductiva de teorías
• El problema de la demarcación
• La experiencia como método
• Falsabilidad como criterio de la demarcación
• El problema de la base empírica
• Objetividad científica y convicción subjetiva
Conjeturas
• Tres concepciones [canónicas] sobre el
conocimiento humano [científico]
(todavía no hablamos de paradigmas)
• La verdad, la racionalidad y el desarrollo
[progreso] del conocimiento científico
LA LÓGICA
CONJETURAS
Glosario
• Neopositivista/positivista: Círculo de Viena y revival del mismo
a.k.a. Concepción Heredada (esencialistas e instrumentalistas)
• Dialéctica: Diálogo razonado.
• Esencialista: E. Clásico cree en conocimiento científico =
conocimiento por causas (explicación de hechos y exp. Causal)
Esencialista Neop. Asume que significado viene de
correspondencia de enunciados con realidad (verdadera).
• Instrumentalista: conocimiento por práctica, las explicaciones
siempre son ad hoc. Si se investiga es para conseguir
herramientas útiles al contex. No existe criterio v/f. Significado
depende únicamente de la teoría. ¿Realidad?, ¿cómo se declama
o se come eso? La realidad no existe para ellos.
• Filosofía analítica: No está claro si es un intento por adquirir
una clase especial de conocimiento empirico i.e. conocimiento
sobre el uso lingüístico, o si los filófofos analistas están
persiguiendo verdades necesarias –con un método diversodel
de los métodos metafísicos tradicionales– o si, como Schlick
sugirió, una actividad de esclarecimiento de los significados que
no concluye en la aserción de proposiciones definitivamente
“filosóficas” (Arthur Pap)
• Verdad y verosmililtud: The concept of likeliness to truth, like
that of truth itself is fundamental to a realist conception of
inquiry. To demonstrate this we need only make two rather
modest realist assumptions:
the truth doctrine (the aim of an inquiry, as an inquiry, is the
truth of some matter) and the progress doctrine (that one false
theory may realise this aim better than another). Together this
yield the conclusion that a false theory may be more truthlike, or
closer to the truth, than another. It is not only a requirement of a
particular philosophical outlook, it is as deeply embedded in
common sense as the concept of truth. Everyone seems to be
capable of grading various propositions, in different
(hypothetical) situations, according to their closeness to the
truth in those situations. And (if my experience is anything to go
by) there is remarkable unanimity on these pretheoretical
judgments. This is not proof…
• …that there is a single coherent concept underlying these
judgments. The whole point of engaging in philosophical
analysis is to make this claim plausible. But this low-level,
uncontroversial judgments provide us with our grip on the
concept (if indeed there is a coherent concept) and any
adeauqte philosophical account of the concept must not
violate them. Or rather (recognising that even philosophers do
not traffic in pure truth and that some false philosophical
theories are closer to the truth than others) an account of
truthlikeliness is better (other thing being equal) the better it
accords with low-level, uncontriversial judgments on simple
cases.
• Popper propone la verosimilitud como piedra angular
de su teoría del conocimiento y somete dicho concepto
a análisis, siempre en la medida en que éste último
funcionase adecuadamente dentro de dicha teoría. Así,
la fuerza lógica (logical strength) o grado de contenido
(degree of content), jugaba un papel fundamental en su
análisis, quizá el más importante. […] the quest was on
for an account according to with logical strength, sheer
logical improbability, would be intimately tied to
degrees of truthlikeness. (Graham Oddie, 1954)
• Explanatory Power is the quality of a theory that gives us some
deeper understanding of what's going on in a physical system.
For example, knowing about atomic electron orbitals allows us
to make sense of the periodic table and chemical interactions. It
gives us ways to develop other theories.
• Predictive Power is the ability of a given theory to allow us to
make predictions about the natural world. We know that
Newtonian gravity is an approximation (to General Relativity, at
the very least), but it's very good at predicting where the planets
in our solar system will be. This is really a flat-out practical
consideration - if a theory can't make predictions, it's not very
useful (and some would argue it's not even science).
• Conocimiento básico: “Al discutir un problema […]siempre
aceptamos como carentes de problemas a cosas de todo tipo:
constituyen, por el momento y para la discusión de ese
problema particular, nuestro conocimiento básico […]casi toda
la totalidad del mismo que usamos constantemente en
cualquier discusión informal permanecerá, por razones
prácticas, necesariamente induscutido. Comenzar desde cero
puede conducir al fracaso del debate crítico. […]la aceptación
de este a priori es riesgosa y siempre abierta a la crítica. Nunca
podemos estar seguros de que ponemos en duda la parte que
lo merece; pero puesto que no buscamos la certeza, esto no
importa.” (Popper, 1963)
Panorama general
• “For Popper accordingly, the growth of human knowledge
proceeds from our problems and from our attempts to solve
them. These attempts involve the formulation of theories
which, if they are to explain anomalies which exist with
respect to earlier theories, must go beyond existing knowledge
and therefore require a leap of the imagination. For this
reason, Popper places special emphasis on the role played by
the independent creative imagination in the formulation of
theory. The centrality and priority of problems in Popper’s
account of science is paramount, and it is this which leads him
to characterize scientists as ‘problem-solvers’….
• …Further, since the scientist begins with problems rather
than with observations or ‘bare facts’, Popper argues that
the only logical technique which is an integral part of
scientific method is that of the deductive testing of
theories which are not themselves the product of any
logical operation. In this deductive procedure conclusions
are inferred from a tentative hypothesis. These
conclusions are then compared with one another and
with other relevant statements to determine whether
they falsify or corroborate the hypothesis…
• …Such conclusions are not directly compared
with the facts, Popper stresses, simply
because there are no ‘pure’ facts available; all
observation-statements are theory-laden, and
are as much a function of purely subjective
factors (interests, expectations, wishes, etc.)
as they are a function of what is objectively
real…
• …Scientific theories, for him, are not inductively inferred from
experience, nor is scientific experimentation carried out with a
view to verifying or finally establishing the truth of theories;
rather, all knowledge is provisional, conjectural, hypothetical—
we can never finally prove our scientific theories, we can
merely (provisionally) confirm or (conclusively) refute them;
hence at any given time we have to choose between the
potentially infinite number of theories which will explain the
set of phenomena under investigation. Faced with this choice,
we can only eliminate those theories which are demonstrably
false, and rationally choose between the remaining, unfalsified
theories…
• …Hence Popper’s emphasis on the importance of
the critical spirit to science—for him critical thinking
is the very essence of rationality. For it is only by
critical thought that we can eliminate false theories,
and determine which of the remaining theories is
the best available one, in the sense of possessing
the highest level of explanatory force and predictive
power. It is precisely this kind of critical thinking
which is conspicuous by its absence in contemporary
Marxism and in psychoanalysis.” (Stanford online)
Concepción Heredada (fisicalista)
• Teorías científicas axiomatizadas tienen:
1. Estructura lógico-matemática
2. Elementos teóricos específicos de teoría
3. Componente observacional