884940

research-article2019
WAFXXX10.1177/0043820019884940World AffairsAnthony R. Brunello

The measure of
machiavelli?
Fear, Love, Hatred, and Trump

Anthony R. Brunello
Eckerd College

The rise of populist leaders like Trump certainly raises issues of leadership and ef-
fectiveness. The current populist moment may be one of “Cultural Backlash,” but
there is also merit in resurrecting and assessing the work of Niccolò Machiavelli in
evaluating Trump’s leadership and success. Would Machiavelli, with his emphasis
on a “success ethic” and a studied moral indifference, rate Trump to be a “great
prince?” This article analyzes Machiavelli’s role and contemporary relevance as
well as what he might say about a leader like Donald Trump. Machiavelli offers
one insight into a style of leader that exposes the dangers of ignorance allied with
self-interest in a nationalist pose. Also, we can visualize (with Machiavelli’s help)
a modern reconsideration of the dimensions of love, hate, and fear in 21st century
leadership—especially among national populist leaders. This matters politically to
us all.

Keywords: President Trump, Political Theory, Machiavelli, Leadership,

Populism, Presidential Success, Lion and Fox, Fear and Love in Politics,
The Prince, Nationalism, United States, The American Republic.

La medida de maquiavelo:
Temor, Amor, Odio Y Trump
El ascenso de líderes populistas como Trump ciertamente pone en evidencia asuntos
de liderazgo y efectividad. El actual momento populista podría se una “reacción
cultural,” pero también hay mérito en resucitar y evaluar del trabajo de Nicolás
Maquiavelo para entender el liderazgo y éxito de Trump. ¿Podría Maquiavelo, con

324    WO R L D A F FA I R S
 Anthony R. Br unello

su énfasis en “la ética del éxito” y una estudiosa tasa de la indiferencia moral habil-
itar a Trump para convertirse en “un gran príncipe”? Este artículo analiza tanto
el papel y la relevancia contemporánea de Maquiavelo, así como lo que podría este
haber dicho sobre un líder como Donald Trump. Maquiavelo ofrece una perspectiva
sobre un estilo de liderazgo que expone los peligros de la alianza del autointerés con
una posición nacionalista. También podemos visualizar (con la ayuda de Maquia-
velo) una reconsideración moderna de las dimensiones del amor, odio y temor en el
liderazgo del siglo 21—especialmente entre líderes nacionales populistas. Esto nos
concierne a todos políticamente.

Palabras clave: Presidente Donald Trump, Teoría política, Nicolás Ma-

quiavelo, Liderazgo, Populismo, Éxito presidencial, El León y la Zorra,
Temor y amor en la política, El príncipe, Nacionalismo, Estados Unidos
de América.

马基雅维利的”衡量”？恐惧、爱、仇恨与特朗普

诸如特朗普总统这样的民粹主义领袖的崛起，一定会引起与领导力和效
果有关的问题 。 当前的民粹主义时刻可能是一次” 文化反弹” ， 尽管如
此 ， 在评价特朗普总统的领导力和成功之举时， 重新使用尼科洛·马基
雅维利（Niccolò Machiavelli）的著作并予以评估，仍然是有价值的。基
于马基雅维利所强调的”成功道德”、和其研究过的道德冷漠，他会把特
朗普总统归类为一个”强大的君主”吗？本文分析了马基雅维利的影响、
其与当代的相关性 、 以及他对像唐纳德·特朗普总统这样的领袖可能会
作出的评价。马基雅维利提供了一种见解，即领袖将无知的危险暴露出
来，而这种无知又与民族主义式的自身利益相辅相成。我们还在马基雅
维利的启发下，对二十一世纪领导力（尤其源于国家民粹主义领袖）中
的爱、仇恨、恐惧等方面进行了重新衡量。这在政治上对所有人都具有
重要性。

关键词： 特朗普总统，政治理论，马基雅维利，领导力，民粹主义，
总统的成功之举，狮子与狐狸，政治中的畏与爱，《君主论》
，民族主义，
美国，美利坚共和国.

T he U.S. Constitution (1788) was born in a predemocratic age

and survived into a postaristocratic history (Ellis 2015). The American
Republic straddled two eras as the nation emerged from the 18th century

W I N T E R 2 0 1 9     325
 The measure of machiavelli?

and continues searching even now for that “more perfect Union” Abra-
ham Lincoln alluded to in 1861 in his First Inaugural Address. In the 21st
century, America finds itself governed by a demagogic, populist, and
nationalist leader. In 2016, President Donald J. Trump defied conven-
tional wisdom and the odds to become the 45th U.S. president. A self-
proclaimed billionaire born to privilege, Trump represents a populist
version of the “common people” in America—predominantly white,
working, and middle class, and tonally nationalist, male, and angry. Pick-
ing up the trail originally opened by the Tea Party Movement, Trump’s
angry brand mixes race, religion, prejudice, and nativism in a potent
political brew (Brunello 2014). President Trump (2017) said the follow-
ing in his Inaugural Address in January 2017:

But for too many of our citizens a different reality exists. Mothers and
children trapped in poverty in our inner cities, rusted out factories
scattered like tombstones across the landscape of our nation, an educa-
tion system flush with cash but which leaves our young and beautiful
students deprived of all knowledge. And the crime, and the gangs, and
the drugs that have stolen too many lives and robbed our country of
so much unrealized potential. This American carnage stops right here
and stops right now.

This dark tableau painted a picture of an America lost and in decay.

In Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American
Right, Arlie Russell Hochschild (2016, 139) studied the simmering anger
inspired by feelings of being left behind that she encountered among
“Tea Party” followers in Louisiana:

Blacks, women, immigrants, refugees, brown pelicans—all have cut

ahead of you in line. But it’s people like you who have made this coun-
try great. You feel uneasy. It has to be said: the line cutters irritate you.
They are violating rules of fairness. You resent them, and you feel it’s
right that you do. So do your friends. Fox commentators reflect your
feelings, for your deep story is also the Fox News deep story.

Trump captured the energy of these fears. With the help of new social
media and the rules of the Constitution, Trump gained a narrow victory
in 2016, winning the Electoral College while losing the national popular
vote (Singer and Brooking 2018). Cultural anxiety, shaped by Trump
into messages of anger and victimization (aimed at Hochschild’s “line
cutters”), spawned the passions behind Trump’s success.

326    WO R L D A F FA I R S
 Anthony R. Br unello

How would the Italian philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli view the rise
of Trump and his performance in government? Can the philosopher of
political prowess from the Italian Renaissance objectively measure politi-
cal effectiveness today? Like the Framers of the American Republic,
Machiavelli (1469–1527) also straddled two great historical transitions:
the medieval era and the Renaissance. As a voice of the Renaissance, he
was troubled by the inability of Europeans to escape the Middle Ages
and its worldviews (Berlin 1992). The difference between Machiavelli’s
two great political works, The Discourses and The Prince, centered on the
philosopher’s understanding of republics. In The Prince, Machiavelli
evaluated the options a leader might have in being successful over a pre-
viously “self-governing” political culture. In The Discourses, Machiavelli
studied the character of republics as a form of government. Ultimately,
he was consistent despite the clear differences between the two works.
Republics are resilient and difficult to conquer because the people, in
Machiavelli’s view, identify themselves with the nation and state. When
people are allowed to influence the making of their laws and to choose
their leaders (i.e., self-governance), then citizens generate an identity as
authentic stakeholders. As people see themselves reflected in the nation
and state, they view their fates tied to the life of the republic. Republics
have the virtue of “ruling in the name of the people” and not the mon-
arch or feudal caste:

If now we compare a prince who is controlled by laws, and a people that

is untrammeled by them, we shall find more virtue in the people than
in the prince; and if we compare them both freed from such control,
we shall see that the people are guilty of fewer excesses than the prince,
and that the errors of the people are of less importance, and therefore
more easily remedied. For a licentious and mutinous people may easily
be brought back to good conduct by the influence and persuasion of
a good man, but an evil-minded prince is not amenable to such influ-
ences, and therefore there is no remedy against him but cold steel.
(Machiavelli 1950, Discourses, Book 1, chap. 58, 265)

In republics, the state becomes the face of the people. In our times,
even modern dictatorships claim to rule in the name of the people. In fact,
Machiavelli (1950, 266) argued that the common people are more con-
cerned with the public good over the long term. Princes are consumed
too often by short-term and “individual interests”:

The follies which a people commit at the moment of its greatest license
are not what is most to be feared; it is not the immediate evil that may

W I N T E R 2 0 1 9     327
 The measure of machiavelli?

result from them that inspires apprehension, but the fact that such
general confusion might afford the opportunity for a tyrant to seize the
government. (Machiavelli 1950, 265)

How would Machiavelli evaluate today the rise, the rule, and the
future of the Trump presidency, and how would he assess the vitality and
resilience of American values? Can Machiavelli measure the singular fea-
tures of the billionaire populist who is the first Twitter President? Trump
has learned to utilize direct contact with the popular masses through
modern social media. Social media beyond Twitter is a critical tool in the
hands of Trump and his allies (both foreign and domestic) making the
Trump brand of populism viral.
The first part of the following analysis begins with Machiavelli’s The
Prince, followed by a reevaluation of his definition of power and leader-
ship. I close by describing the interplay of hatred, fear, and love in the
politics of social media in the 21st century. Will the measure of Machia-
velli be a guide to our assessment of the American Republic in the time
of Trump?

The Renaissance and The Prince

Machiavelli wrote The Prince in 1513 while in exile at his country
home in San Casciano outside of Florence, Italy. Over 500 years have
passed and this small book has had an enduring influence on Western
political thought. The transformations associated with the European
Renaissance were entangled with the great religious reforms and wars
we now call the Reformation. These political and religious upheavals
filled the 16th century. The Renaissance established a new vision of how
Europeans viewed themselves and others, and the human place in the
cosmos. By the end of the 1300s, the “synthesis” of the Middle Ages and
the medieval Church of Rome had begun to break down (Hale 1992).
The 14th century brought colder temperatures, poor harvests, the
plague, and the Black Death, leading to political, economic, and social
turmoil. It was an age of disruption. Secular rulers in towns and city-states
and emerging nations began to challenge the Church to assert their
own independent political authority. The Renaissance thus sparked a
perspective we today call humanism. Humanism placed the liberal arts
in both art and philosophy in a position of dominance over religion in
the curricula of schools and universities. The place of Faith in the divine
order of things was questioned at its core and challenged by an emphasis
on Human Reason.

328    WO R L D A F FA I R S
 Anthony R. Br unello

Renaissance humanism championed skepticism and objectivity,

which had a high regard for human experience. Philosophy and the
arts emphasized the human will to shape the world. The focus became
the human being in this world. Europeans began to look away from the
heavens and look inward for the sources of truth. Along with this came
cultural change through the aegis of humanistic vision: sculpture, paint-
ing, education, commerce, science, and architecture were liberated
from the more formal and symbolic requirements of the medieval and
Gothic period. We find Machiavelli in this changing world of conflict
and modern visions of the state.

What It Means (or Has Meant) to Be Machiavellian

Many associate Machiavelli’s name with a dark and ruthless vision of
politics. To be “Machiavellian” conventionally has meant that one would
do anything to succeed in the quest for power and wealth (Adams 1992).
Machiavelli is misconceived as a political demon, advising political lead-
ers to embrace the arts of treachery, skullduggery, force, defamation,
and even cruelty to achieve their goals. The truth is that Machiavelli
was far more practical than the popular image describes, and The Prince
reveals this underlying reality (Gilbert 1992). However, as with many
popular images and stereotypes, there is a grain of truth to the under-
standing of what it means to be Machiavellian. For example, people
like Hitler, Mussolini, Saddam Hussein, Stalin, and Richard Nixon are
popularly characterized as Machiavellian types, but it is more likely
that Machiavelli would have been appalled by their leadership. Abra-
ham Lincoln, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Thomas Jefferson are better
Machiavellian archetypes (Burns 1956). Lincoln is an ideal role model
for Machiavelli: a perfect blend of the “lion and the fox” who steered the
Union to victory through force, trickery, patriotism, and virtue (Danoff
2000). Machiavelli’s measures of political behavior offered a worldview
that saves him from being wrongly considered an emissary of Satan
(Brunello 1994).
Machiavelli perceived the political world and the success of a leader
as dependent on two forces: Virtù and Fortuna. Virtù refers to the virtues
or strengths of character a leader needs to survive and, most impor-
tantly, to strengthen the state. Machiavelli (1992, chaps. 6–7, 15–24)
rejected Christian virtues, preferring Republican Rome and the stoicism
he found in Marcus Aurelius. For him, the pagan virtues were masculine
and patriotic. He extolled selfless duty to the state, loyalty and sacrifice,
as well as abstinence and physical strength (Sabine and Thorson 1973).

W I N T E R 2 0 1 9     329
 The measure of machiavelli?

Skill in military affairs was vital, because in Machiavelli’s world, states

were surrounded by predators and potential invaders, usurpers, con-
spiracies, and threats of all sorts (Lucchese 2017).
Machiavelli described the ideal leader using the iconic animal images
of the lion and the fox. A great leader must be strong and ferocious when
required, willing to use force and able to physically overcome foes—like
a lion. The effective leader must also be clever like the fox to avoid
snares and traps, and willing to be devious and crafty (Machiavelli 1992,
chap. 18, 47–49). The fox knows when to retreat, use manipulation of
people and circumstances, and is wise enough to avoid being deceived
or flattered (Machiavelli 1992, chap. 23, 64–65). A successful leader
must at times be like the fox, and at others like the lion. It was a sign of
virtue in a leader to know how and when to employ these skills and to
seize the proper moment.
Despite the value of these virtues, the political world is treacherous
and unpredictable. According to Machiavelli, luck always has a hand in
political affairs and Fortuna—fortune or luck—is an omnipresent force
in the world of politics not always within a leader’s control. There is
good Fortuna and bad Fortuna and it is the task of a leader to recognize
each, turn circumstances to their advantage, and to control as much as
possible the effects of unexpected occurrences and events. Machiavelli
described Fortuna as a raging river that cannot be controlled once it rolls
over its banks, and also as a woman—a feminine image that he used in
a sexist way to describe fortune as emotional, unpredictable, and like
a raw or natural force. Fortuna, no matter how hard we might try, is
not easily tamed by reason, and arrives in many forms: illness, natural
disaster, premature death, chance errors, and implausible circumstances
(Gilbert 1992). Things happen that people cannot foresee, and such are
the vicissitudes of life.
Only the most virtuous and prepared leader is capable of respond-
ing to chance occurrences in politics and has any prospect of surviving
(Machiavelli 1992, chap. 6, 15–18). Machiavelli’s ultimate standard and
ethic is the success ethic, and leaders are measured by whether or not they
succeed. The goal at which all effort must be aimed is success at main-
taining power to preserve the nation and state.

Machiavelli and Practical Realism: The Mechanics of Governing

Machiavelli lived from 1467 to 1527 and was a citizen of the city-state
of Florence, Italy. In 1498, he held a post in Florentine government as a
diplomat until the Medici family took power in 1512—overthrowing the

330    WO R L D A F FA I R S
 Anthony R. Br unello

Republic of Florence for its dynastic family. Afterward, he was arrested,

tortured, and exiled to San Casciano where he wrote The Prince.
The Prince is a condensation of Machiavelli’s thoughts on “rulership.”
The opening “Dedicatory Letter” to Lorenzo di Medici revealed that
Machiavelli had a narrow purpose for the book: it is a long application
for employment to the Medici government of Florence. Machiavelli
hoped his cold analysis of political power for a despotic family could win
favor and employment in the Florentine Court. The Prince was written
with an intense focus on the evil and dangerous times of Renaissance
Italy. Those were vicious days, and the game of politics was violent and
filled with treachery, cruelty, and corruption. Therefore, in The Prince,
Machiavelli says he will not speak of Republics, but rather principali-
ties—how they are won, held, and lost (Hale 1992).
Italian city-states (like Florence) had begun to distance governing
from the Roman Catholic Church, insofar as government utilized church
power and offices rather than the other way around. Civic responsibility
and public welfare was slowly becoming the ideal for legitimacy rather
than divine or ecclesiastical authority. The concept of the modern
nation-state began to emerge. Only as an idea—and only in the contexts
of these city-states—but the nation-state was on the rise along with the
humanism of the Renaissance. Machiavelli sensed a transition moving
away from Church authority toward the power of citizens. Loyalty began
to be pledged to the nation—a common notion today, but revolutionary
in the 14th century (Lucchese 2017).
In The Prince, Machiavelli discussed diplomacy and historical fig-
ures in specific situations, analyzing a leader’s skills in calculation,
manipulation, negotiation, and at times, the use of violence and force.
He assessed the strengths and weaknesses of political situations, and
evidence of shrewdness and cool judgment in evaluating the resources
and temperament of opponents. Machiavelli tended to think in terms
of objective estimates of the limitations on policy, combining common
sense and logic in the measurement of the prospective outcomes of
events and actions (Harris 2010). Machiavelli was a realist. Policy and
leadership is judged by success at accomplishing tasks that lead to the
preservation and expansion of power and security. Almost nowhere does
Machiavelli discuss the acquisition of wealth. His exclusive focus was on
an objective control of power.
Whether a policy is violent, treacherous, or unjust is treated objec-
tively in The Prince. Machiavelli was aware that indifference to cruelty
and other such qualities react upon political success and it was critical

W I N T E R 2 0 1 9     331
 The measure of machiavelli?

that an effective leader manage public impressions. He preferred that

policy be perceived as honorable, fair, and right and said that the success-
ful prince must be the master of “outward seeming and inward being.”
Perceptions are everything in the power game.
If a leader risks failure for the sake of honor or ethical principles,
Machiavelli argued that it would be better to be cruel, faithless, and fear-
some. A good leader cannot risk the state or the loss of power for mere
moral considerations. Some have called this “skillful immorality” but in
fairness, Machiavelli was not immoral. He believed in higher goals, but
in his rush to make a singular point, Machiavelli described an amoral
or a nonmoral appraisal. This appraisal has been called a Machiavellian
principle of “moral indifference.” In today’s world, this is often inter-
preted as being objective or realistic (Bagby 2002). Allied with amorality
was Machiavelli’s view of human nature. In The Prince, he underscored
a weak and selfish definition of human nature, and was convinced that
citizens in principalities, especially in corrupt regimes, are likely to be
disloyal and care only about their self-interest. He answered the famous
question about love or fear based on his understanding of the selfish
nature of human beings. As he famously considered whether a prince
should best be loved or feared, he clearly said it is best to be both. Unfor-
tunately, it is very difficult to accomplish both (Machiavelli 1992, chaps.
17–19, 45–57). It may be that modern times make the ability to control
images and passions more susceptible to generating both love and fear
simultaneously (consider the immediacy and power of the social net-
work in this regard), but holding both together remains daunting.
If one cannot be loved, Machiavelli concluded a leader must be
feared because love and loyalty are impermanent. People are fickle,
and if they stop loving the leader, then they must fear the leader or all
is lost. Without love, it is possible for a leader to become hated—and
hatred above all must be avoided. A leader who is hated but not feared
will surely fail (Machiavelli 1992, chaps. 18–19, 47–57). He believed that
no leader can survive on love alone. Because all leaders may be called
upon, from time to time, to do good by doing evil, there is always risk
that a prince can become hated for doing good things just as easily for
doing bad (Machiavelli 1992, 53). The most effective human motivations
upon which a leader must rely are essentially selfish, and so Machiavelli
argued that the prince must always assume selfish motives on the part of
citizens, allies, and opponents.
By comparison, in The Discourses, Machiavelli (1950) asserts that alli-
ances and treaties with republics are to be trusted far more than those

332    WO R L D A F FA I R S
 Anthony R. Br unello

with individual despots or princes (Book 1, chap. 59, 266–68). Machia-

velli argued in The Discourses that the common people of republics are
less likely to risk ruin by engaging in treacherous actions. In Machia-
velli’s (1950, 266) logic, the people prefer predictability and security as
a rule and are “more likely” to play fair in their alliances. The rational
calculations by citizens of Republics speak to the prospects for higher
virtues and dignity in self-governance, as well as law-abiding behavior,
leading to justice and fair play.
Machiavelli was convinced that governments are founded on the
weakness and insufficiency of the human individual. Government pro-
tects people from the aggression and selfishness of others. Although
this notion sounds cynical, it is not so very far from the rationale of
the Social Contract expressed by John Locke, or the arguments of those
who wrote The Federalist Papers (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay) following
the American Revolution. As Madison observed, if “men were angels,”
governments would not be necessary. In Machiavelli’s view, the state
exists to constrain the selfish motivations and egoism of individuals
(Nelson 1996).

Moral Indifference and the Double Standard

Machiavelli’s moral indifference contained a critical view of Chris-
tian virtues and values. Christianity taught people to be servile and to
accept their lot in life for the rewards of paradise. Machiavelli opposed
“turning the other cheek” in politics, and instead valued the secular
and civic virtues of the ancient Romans. Roman virtues taught indepen-
dence, strength, frugality, simplicity, and humble trustworthiness. The
Christian emphasis on a morality of the spirit not only seemed weak to
Machiavelli, but he was sure it was impractical and ambiguous. In peril-
ous times, Christian virtues might be dangerous—though he did not
ignore the practical application of religion in politics, and he was sensi-
tive to the reality that a skillful leader would need to portray a semblance
of piety. After all, true believers are a very dangerous subset of the body
politic. Machiavelli viewed religion as helpful when holding the state and
society together. Christian virtues can limit corruption and sinful behav-
ior, and he believed that it is good to have such notions strong among
the common citizens, if not the rulers (Sabine and Thorson 1973).
The politically expedient perspective led to Machiavelli’s double
standard: the prince or ruler must be above morals and indifferent
to them. Good government requires the ability to move without con-
cern for ethical or moral qualms at times, unless the society is free of

W I N T E R 2 0 1 9     333
 The measure of machiavelli?

corruption (Berlin 1992). For example, republics, he believed, thrived

on rule of law. At the same time, the affairs of state require leaders to
insure that the state is strong. For Machiavelli, in a principality where
corruption was common, there was little time for moral norms. The dou-
ble standard in The Prince was clear: the people should be virtuous, but
rulers must be above morality. Scholars disagree, but this perspective was
not essentially cynical or evil; it was simply political objectivity (Ignatieff
2013). People may want to be wary of a culture of moral indifference or
the double standard. Modern democracy, especially as embodied by the
values in the American Republic and the U.S. Constitution, suggests that
a moral and ethical core is essential to survive and flourish. Machiavelli
chose to minimize this in The Prince, and yet the voice of the patriot who
believed in republican virtues was always lurking in the background.

Machiavellian Principles
Several general principles that provide standards for measurement
are bluntly revealed in The Prince (Brunello 1994):

1. Human Nature is fundamentally egoistic and acquisitive;

2. A central role of a lawgiver is vital to state survival;
3. Popular government and republics are superior to other forms;
4. Noble classes are to be distrusted for their parasitism, parochial-
ism, and selfishness;
5. Mercenary soldiers are dangerous and faithless;
6. And . . . Machiavelli espoused a true national patriotism ahead of
his time.

Machiavelli accepted an assumption of selfish and universal egoism,

and he saw human beings as consumed by competition and conflict.
People always want more: more property, riches, and power—every-
thing. In that respect, he was sure that any government must protect
personal property if it is to survive. Machiavelli’s view of the political
world of his day brought him to this view because moral corruption and
violence were epidemic. “Men always commit the error of not knowing
when to limit their hopes” (Machiavelli 1950, Book 2, 271–72). This is
an incomplete view of human nature, but it is an idea people still believe
and use as a guide in political life (Scott and Zaretsky 2013).
Machiavelli argued for the role of a lawgiver. A healthy nation under
one prince or statesman must have one lawgiver and voice of authority.
In a republic, the legislative authority falls to the people’s representatives.

334    WO R L D A F FA I R S
 Anthony R. Br unello

Machiavelli (1992) believed that civic virtues and moral standards derive
from the law and he had faith in the leadership of a political leader who
applies the arts of politics accordingly (chap. 5, 14). If a stable republic
exists, then the rule of law will naturally guide a society toward common
decency and justice with representative government and citizen support.
The state and law hold people together best, and moral obligations are
ultimately derived from the laws. Therein may lie a cautionary tale for
21st century democracy.
Machiavelli (1992) only inferred his higher regard for republics in
The Prince, but his criticism of aristocratic classes was based on his experi-
ence that nobles get between the people and the state, and operate out
of selfish and parochial interests (chaps. 9–11, 27–33). Nobles pursue
lands and titles without regard for the larger polity. A state that relies on
noble classes will be weak. A strong state relies on the common people
as citizens and strives to forge a direct relationship between the people
and government. A similar logic emerges in the arguments in The Prince
against the employ of mercenaries. Chapters 12 and 13 address these
issues specifically, closing with the famous reflection on Cesare Borgia’s
reputation (Machiavelli 1992, chap. 13, 37–40). Machiavelli insisted that
mercenary armies cannot be trusted. Mercenaries fight for money and
rewards and will retreat at the slightest hint of real danger. Mercenaries
are not loyal to anyone but themselves, and Machiavelli (1992) favored a
citizen army of people willing to die for their country (chap. 12, 33–37).
Republican armies of citizens who make their own laws are more dura-
ble and commodious.
In the conclusion, there is an exhortation to Lorenzo di Medici to
be a great prince and unite all of Italy to be one country (Machiavelli
1992, chap. 26, 69–72). The exhortation is a clarion call to national
patriotism, but the definition of patriotism in Machiavelli is differenti-
ated between “patriotism” and “nationalism.” A nationalism that is tribal
and destructive is exclusive and built on blood and soil notions of prior
rights and ownership. This form of fearful nationalism divides the body
politic, inspiring exploitation, oppression, and scapegoating. Machia-
velli is nearly modern in his knowledge that the best patriot is allied to
the state for higher causes and the ultimate definition lies in the role of
citizens. Citizens can be lawmakers. Citizens are the country. Common
citizens need only be loyal to the laws and the people. When that is so,
a country is made strong. Calling for a prince with the vision to unite
Italy foreshadowed the rise of modern nation states (despite the fact
that Lorenzo de Medici was a fool). Machiavelli would understand the

W I N T E R 2 0 1 9     335
 The measure of machiavelli?

modern spread of nation states with democratic institutions. These have

the advantage of merging the people with the country.
Machiavelli’s ideas remain an enigma. He is characterized as a cynic
but also a patriot, a nationalist, and a democrat. The Machiavelli of The
Prince has become, over 500 years, an unscrupulous panderer to political
despots and moral indifference. The patriot, democrat, and national-
ist are overlooked, while the advisor to the devious, treacherous, and
amoral political animal has staying power. The advice in The Prince has
endured and guided many leaders in politics, statecraft, and the art of
war. Machiavelli wrote with a purpose and an intuitive, inner knowledge
that power—human, personal, political, and public—is a human need,
and is based on perceptions and relationships with others and with his-
tory and society.

Defining Power and Leadership

Power and Leadership are distinct. By definition, the leader is unlike
a power wielder always to the extent that leaders are reflections of the
needs and higher instincts of their followers. Leadership is defined by
the way the motives of leaders are less about their personal needs and
desires and more about the needs and desires of followers under their
leadership. Power wielders tend toward domination of their follow-
ers and increasingly so as their efforts are “all about them,” and their
motives reflect desires and dynamics of their own. Of course, leaders
and power wielders are spawned in similar pools, but the attitudes and
characters, and even the modes of their arrival on the scene are filled
with points of departure. Burns’s (1978, 52) work, Leadership, made the
distinctions clear and established a “Hitler versus Gandhi” continuum.
Hitler was a power wielder. Gandhi provided something more akin to
leadership.
According to Burns (1978, 52–53), political leadership is “ubiquitous
and pervasive”:

This is not to assume that rule by a Hitler or leadership by a Gandhi is

to be seen as different only in degree from, or to be equated conceptu-
ally with, that of a Brown Shirt corporal or village wise man . . . That
power as domination is pervasive in this century of Hitler and Stalin is
obvious, as perhaps it was in every other. Is leadership, as it is defined
in this book? Power lies deep in our origins. It has long been manifest
in animal behavior. In primates domination is by far the most common
trait, but even at this stage . . . there are tendencies toward leadership.
Domination usually takes the form of a clear-cut hierarchy . . . To see

336    WO R L D A F FA I R S
 Anthony R. Br unello

the ubiquity and pervasiveness of power and leadership in the relation-

ships of mother and daughter, teacher and schoolchildren, coach and
athlete, master and apprentice, minister and congregation, sergeant
and rifleman, party chieftain and card-carrying member, propagandist
and believer, is to see power wielders, leaders and followers in continu-
ous interaction in virtually every sphere of human society. This does not
mean that the apparent leader is necessarily or exclusively the “real”
leader or effective leader. Leaders lead in such a way . . . as to anticipate
responses of followers, and followers and leaders may exchange places.
Rulers (power wielders) never exchange places with followers. The
leadership-followership process must be viewed as a totality of interac-
tive roles before we can identify the forces and processes at work and
hence assess the role of leadership in the historical process.

Burns’s work identified the basic relationships that are the basis of
power and leadership. At its core, power is not an object, and is a rela-
tionship derived of perceptions about motives and resources on the
part of both ruler/leaders and followers (Burns 1978; Knutson 1972).
In Jeanne Knutson’s (1972) path-breaking work in political psychol-
ogy, human needs as exemplified in Maslow’s needs hierarchy reveal a
rich understanding that the obsession to collect power as an object is a
critical misunderstanding, and may in effect also be a signal of mental
disease.
First, power in political and social life is not an object. Power is a force
directed toward accomplishing ends or moving people and objects to
desired consequences. As philosopher Bertrand Russell (1938, 18) said,
power is the “production of intended effects.” Even so, this does not
explain what power is and how it evolves in all people. Power is not a
material possession; it is a need. All human beings must have some sense
of their own personal “power.” This means a kind of confidence, and
a sense of their own capabilities to survive, accomplish goals, and take
risks when necessary. This risk taking may be very personal (e.g., the risk
we take when falling in love), or it can be the kind of risk we take when
running for office, going to college, playing a sport, or taking a political
position (Davies 1977). We are willing to take such risks because of an
evolved internal sense we all have of our own personal ability or power.
Second, personal power is also derived from human perceptions and
relationships. For example, all human beings evolve their personal sense
of power based on material and social circumstances, including their
life experiences, their early childhood upbringing, innate faculties, and
accidents of lived experience. In the social and political sense, power

W I N T E R 2 0 1 9     337
 The measure of machiavelli?

must be understood as a relationship or set of relationships, based on the

perceptions of all involved in the process of expressing power. No one
has power over another person unless one perceives that the person in
power has some quality that requires we grant that power.
A basic definition of power relationships begins: Power is A getting B
to do what A desires. The big question is: why does B do what A wants? The
answer to that question offers a richer understanding of power relation-
ships: B does what A desires because B perceives that A has something or some
reason that motivates B to do what A desires. Relationships of power between
people are thus the result of what people perceive. Power is essentially
given to leaders by followers in some way. In summary, power is a rela-
tionship based on perception of people, and these perceptions are built
on motives and resources. The resources and motives people perceive
suggest different types of power. For example, B follows A’s leadership
because B perceives that A

•• is wise and an expert,

•• is fearsome and strong,
•• is heavily armed and threatening,
•• is compassionate,
•• because B wants to be like A,
•• because B loves A,
•• because B perceives that A is persuasive,
•• because B perceives that A will give a reward,
•• because B perceives that A will provide a penalty or punishment,
•• because B perceives that A is authorized by law and legal position and right,
•• because B perceives that A expresses goals in a way that motivates B to fol-
low,
•• because B perceives that A is beautiful or handsome, and so on.

There are many possible combinations for leadership and power

relationships (see Figure 1). A leader is known by the degree to which
the needs of the followers are foremost in their calculus, as character-
ized by Burns (1978). Power wielders are known by the extent to which
their own preferences and desires drive decisions and actions.
A useful understanding of social and political power was articulated
by French and Raven (1959). Figure 2 describes the “five legitimations
of power” as these authors define it. The key in the model is to under-
stand that political and social power is formed from human relationships
grounded in perceptions human beings have about one another. Given

338    WO R L D A F FA I R S
 Anthony R. Br unello

Figure 1.
Leadership and Power Relationships.

the accent on “human perception,” the connection to Machiavelli’s

notion of the role of image and perception in political power is a point
of emphasis. Burns helps by adding the idea that human beings’ per-
ceptions in the power relationships are guided by our expectations and
sense of the motives and potential resources we have as followers, lead-
ers, or power wielders. Power in politics has been misunderstood to be
a material object for centuries. It is common to hear people say that an
associate, a teammate, a politician, or a public figure is motivated to “get
power” as if it were either the goal or an object. It is a cliché to observe,
along with Lord Acton (1887), that “power corrupts, and absolute power
corrupts absolutely,” but the cliché is a misconception.
Power is essential to human life and operates as a tool or an instru-
ment. When or if someone pursues power merely to possess this intan-
gible thing they believe is power, then that is a sickness and illusion.
Power is the actual movement toward objectives. Power is generated
by what people see and believe about each other, and the only mean-
ingful reason to “possess” power (to abuse the conception further) is to
accomplish some end. This accounts for the premium we must place on

W I N T E R 2 0 1 9     339
 The measure of machiavelli?

Figure 2.
Five Legitimations of Power.

Source. Based on French and Raven (1959).

the connections between means and ends in political life. When means
and ends are torn apart, then the pathologies of evil—as Hannah
Arendt (1963) discovered in her coverage of the Eichmann Trial in
Jerusalem—will become manifest. To actually “possess” something called
power is impossible; the pursuit of power for its own sake is a fantasy and
a nightmare.
Ultimately, we know that a person is powerful when we see that they
can move people and events, shape their own lives, and call followers and
colleagues together to support common causes and achieve goals. Had
Gandhi begun one of his famous walks and no one followed, he would
not be remembered as a leader. Followers are necessary for leadership
and power to operate. This is true on the grand stages of politics, and in
our homes between family members, at our parent–teacher association
(PTA) and Little League meetings, and in corporate boardrooms. Power
is an instrument that accomplishes goals and it is a human relationship.
Generating power is essential to calling people to follow, to believe, and
to act.

340    WO R L D A F FA I R S
 Anthony R. Br unello

Measuring Trump by Machiavellian Standards

Following Burns’s (1978) Leadership versus Power Wielding Schema mea-
sure, Donald Trump comes down in the area of Power Wielding. President
Trump is deficient in leadership attributes, but high in Power Wielding.
Many have discussed President Trump’s “narcissistic” tendencies over the
years, but that relies on speculation (Johnston 2017). Woodward (2018),
in Fear: Trump in the White House, offers a portrait of a self-serving man
who lacks intellectual curiosity, is studiously unread and ill informed,
enjoys pitting his staff against one another in interminable internecine
conflicts, seeks to denigrate and attack media and journalism, and is
responsible for inspiring hate, hostility, and racism on a national scale,
for reasons Trump alone understands. Most significant, Woodward
(2018, 357) closes with an observation from President Trump’s former
legal counsel, John Dowd:

But in the man and his presidency Dowd had seen the tragic flaw. In
the political back-and-forth, the evasions, the denials, the tweeting, the
obscuring, crying “Fake News,” the indignation, Trump had one over-
riding problem that Dowd knew but could not bring himself to say to
the president: “You’re a fucking liar.”

According to the Washington Post, August 12, 2019, the president had
uttered 12,019 false or misleading statements since his inauguration. It
was asserted in November of 2018 that the president told 83 lies in one
day (Cillizza 2018). Fact-checking organizations claim they are exhausted
by the sheer volume of falsehoods proffered by Donald Trump (Kessler,
Rizzo, and Kelly 2019). The volume of lies easily surpasses Machiavelli’s
advice about the management of public perceptions. Machiavelli speaks
at length about the avoidance of flatterers, and demands a balance
between keeping faith and, of course, strategic deceptions for the suc-
cessful prince. The only reason for engaging in dishonesty would be on
behalf of the state itself. The many deceptions we might associate with
Lincoln or Franklin Roosevelt would be acceptable to Machiavelli as they
were employed in successful policy and security. Lying because you can-
not stop yourself clearly breaks Machiavelli’s rules, and Burns’s standard
for leadership. The level of mendacity engaged in by Trump undermines
democratic values, the rule of law, and a self-governing political culture,
as well as authentic “leadership.”
According to Machiavelli, we may understand a leader’s effectiveness
on two general dimensions: (1) fear/love/hatred and (2) the lion and
the fox. These are Machiavellian standards, but in the time of 21st century

W I N T E R 2 0 1 9     341
 The measure of machiavelli?

social media, the measures and comparisons require recalibration.

According to Singer and Brooking (2018), politics and communications
are operating on a new battlefield, a wholly unique environment for
social conflicts. As they say, the Internet is no longer an adolescent; it is
now a conflict zone and this new field changes how battles are fought.
The battle alters the meaning of war, and all society—all of us—are a
part of this war (Singer and Brooking 2018, 21–22, 51):

Half the world’s population is online, and the other half is quickly fol-
lowing. Hundreds of millions of new internet users are projected to
join this vast digital ecosystem each year . . . As a result the internet is
now inescapable.

The online ecosystem of the social media made young people terror-
ists and members of ISIS from all over the world. The new social media
can liberate and oppress—expand knowledge and help lies and hatred
go instantly viral. Open source intelligence (OSINT) and mass moni-
toring are changing the way we gather and interpret data—for both
good and ill. Singer and Brooking (2018) describe a changing arena
of social media driven conflict, and one aspect has had an immediate
effect: Trump and the American elections of 2016 revealed a new infra-
structure of bots, troll farms, and “sock puppets,” that allowed foreign
governments and media platforms filled with hate and falsity, to have an
explosive effect in American politics.
The use of social media, and in the case of Trump particularly, com-
munication through Twitter, alters the calculus for perceptions. Our
times are called a postfact environment because instant opinion, and
politicized falsehoods—termed black propaganda—have become com-
monplace (Jowett and O’Donnell 2015). Black propaganda, as opposed
to gray and white, is noxious (especially in democracies) because it is
false, comes from unknown sources, cannot be verified, and has a pri-
mary purpose to instigate outrage, pain, anger, conflict, mob reaction,
and even violence. In the battlefield of social media, the easy ubiquity of
black propaganda, while having the power to communicate immediately
to masses of followers, is a game changer:

Those who manipulate this swirling tide, to steer its direction and flow,
can accomplish incredible good. They can free people, expose crimes,
save lives, and seed far-reaching reforms. But they can also accomplish
astonishing evil. They can foment violence, stoke hate, sow falsehoods,
incite wars, and even erode the pillars of democracy itself. (Singer and
Brooking 2018, 23)

342    WO R L D A F FA I R S
 Anthony R. Br unello

The sheer numbers and the speed at which such communications took
place in 2016, in Singer and Brooking’s (2018) research, are astounding.
The new social media redefines Machiavelli’s dimensions and standards.
The technology warps the context, but not the applicability.

Fear/Love/Hatred
Despite the title of Woodward’s (2018) book, the quality of fear in
Trump’s relationships is complicated. According to Johnston (2017),
there are reasons to fear Trump but not necessarily as Machiavelli pre-
scribed. In business, you should fear that Trump will not pay his bills,
honor contracts, and that you may find yourself in litigation. In the
story of how the television show The Apprentice saved Trump’s company
and finances, it is shown how his fortune and image were rescued by
celebrity. Keefe (2019) reveals that Trump’s financial situation and his
public persona were at a very low point. Ultimately, the CEO image pre-
sented in The Apprentice allowed a perception of fear to evolve (“You’re
Fired!”) and yet it was make-believe. Trump has been labeled a bully
(Foer 2019), and bullies do inspire fear, but this is a form of intimidation
Machiavelli would find wasteful and pathetic. Moreover, if this kind of
management misuses the people who work for you, and squanders this
valuable resource while undermining loyalty, as described by Johnston
(2017) and Woodward (2018), then Trump is surely out of Machiavellian
balance.
President Trump is feared due to his capricious nature and uncon-
ventional or unpredictable methods, especially in foreign policy. For
example, the NATO Allies may fear Trump’s moods, attitudes, and
policies that can ruin the alliance. At the same time, it is unlikely that
America’s chief foes (e.g., Russia, North Korea, Iran) actually fear Presi-
dent Trump. Nations may be wary of a man who moves by gut instinct,
but Russia and North Korea likely feel they have Trump under control.
Machiavelli would look unfavorably on the weakening of alliances that
provide multilateral security, strength, and commercial predictability in
a dangerous world. The fear Trump inspires damages national credibility
while unsettling many Americans in a context where the United States is
perhaps the most powerful nation on earth. The measure of Machiavelli
here is certain: the waste of resources while alienating friends and allies
is unacceptable.
Donald Trump may be loved by more than 40 percent of the Ameri-
can people. Loved is used here as a loose term but, based on analysis by
FiveThirtyEight.com (2019), the president has maintained an “Approval

W I N T E R 2 0 1 9     343
 The measure of machiavelli?

Rating” above 40 percent since the 2016 election. On average, he shows

an oscillating 41.6 percent approval rating and a 53.1 percent disap-
proval rating. Thanks to the Trump image, and his way of communicat-
ing through Twitter and large rallies, the audience for “Make America
Great Again” has remained stable. The passionate support of the core
base in Trump is something akin to love while the more modest support
from Republicans generally is self-serving but has remained steady. For
example, no Republican stepped forward to challenge Trump’s nomi-
nation for reelection in 2020. In the 53.1 percent disapproval rating,
we also find something akin to hatred, as well as contempt. Machiavelli
warns mightily against these twin passions. Clearly, there is a problem if
the fear you inspire is muted and partly seen as a character flaw, while
the love you generate is strong but not nearly as advanced as hate and
contempt. If Trump were to be reelected president, Machiavelli would
be dismayed because here would be a republican form of government
failing itself. The new forms of communication change the manner and
effect of the populist demagogue in a republic. The citizens have more
trouble being the steady-state actors Machiavelli predicted they would be
when they are more easily confused, manipulated, and deceived.

Lion or Fox?
Trump is a bully, happy to insult and demean those he dislikes, fears,
finds threatening, or skirmishes with, but these are not really the attri-
butes of the lion as Machiavelli envisioned. Machiavelli saw the lion as
someone of force, skilled at the military arts, unafraid to employ excru-
ciating violence swiftly and expertly when necessary, but also a fierce
defender of allies, the people, and the nation. Machiavelli’s lion won
battles, punished foes, but tempered ferocity with intelligence. Wolin
(1992) referred to this as the “economy of violence,” and of course, no
well-designed or secure state can long endure wanton bloodshed. For
these reasons, brutal authoritarian regimes are often short lived. Trump
personally avoided military service (Johnston 2017), and although has
endeavored to ingratiate himself to military veterans, he has had some of
his worst moments of bullying against folks normally considered heroes.
The ugly attacks on the deceased Senator John McCain are examples
of this shortsighted behavior (Haberman, Karnis, and Tackett 2019).
Trump may like the image of the CEO who fires people, but he is less a
lion than he is malicious and petty.
Trump does qualify for a certain fox-like craftiness. The details of his
life and tenacious survival in a challenging financial world (although

344    WO R L D A F FA I R S
 Anthony R. Br unello

many of his deepest wounds have been self-inflicted) reveal someone

who has found a way to come out on top (Johnston 2017). At least for
himself, Trump shows an ability to calculate costs, benefits, and hard
choices. He is also not ashamed to play on the dark side—dallying with
criminal figures and shady financial relationships. These tactics buoyed
him through multiple bankruptcies until he landed the television show
The Apprentice and his fortunes turned around. Even so, this kind of “fox-
iness” has little to do with preserving the state, securing the country, and
helping a people to be prosperous. Trump may be a fox, avoiding snares
and injury, but would he sacrifice himself for his country? Machiavelli
has only one answer for that question (Butler 2016).
From Machiavelli’s lion or fox view, the list of leadership errors built
on flaws of character in Trump is long (Albertini 2018). Among a few are
the following: personal greed; lust and sexual promiscuity; faithlessness
to allies, friends, and family; talking too much in public; preferring flat-
terers as advisers; ignorance of military matters; ignorance of diplomacy
and foreign affairs; ignorance of history and philosophy.
Surely, Machiavelli would admire the strengths that have allowed a
man like Trump to survive so many mistakes and personal defects, and
yet in the midst of his considerable acuity at galvanizing his audience,
Trump has garnered all the good luck in the world. In one consider-
able case, the iconic promise to “build a wall that Mexico will pay for”
stands out, because as Machiavelli says in Book 10 of The Prince, walls and
fortifications are more necessary the weaker your city or state is within;
a wealthy city with a good army can defend itself without relying on
outsiders for protection. Of course, in his day, cities needed to be able
to withstand sieges. Artillery, walls, and moats were expected of secure
cities. Even so, there is something even more valuable—a strong and
supportive citizenry:

Thus a prince who has a strong city and does not earn his peoples’ hatred
cannot be attacked, or if he were, that attacker would be driven off to his
own disgrace; because the way things keep changing in this world, it is
almost impossible for a prince with his armies to devote an entire year to
a siege while doing nothing else. (Machiavelli 1992, chap. 10, 31)

The idea that a prince might proclaim false emergencies and waste
his forces sending them to the border for short-term political gain would
be unacceptable. To politicize security would be unthinkable to Machia-
velli, when the best course of action is to encourage a strong, secure, and
confident society. Inspiring false fears does not make a nation stronger.

W I N T E R 2 0 1 9     345
 The measure of machiavelli?

Fortuna and Virtù

The virtues of character that make Trump a survivor are in his single
mindedness, his use of celebrity, his intuitive grasp of an audience and
oddly enough, his lack of empathy. One day, the unsympathetic nature
of his relationships and actions may be catastrophic to Trump, but he has
been able to endure a lot of damage. His White House is under chronic
threat of investigation and indictments. The scandals are historic in scope
and number, including the possibility the Trump team encouraged a
malignant foreign power to help win his election. Moreover, articles of
impeachment are imminent in Fall 2019 as the House of Representatives
uncovered, through a whistle-blower complaint, that President Trump
allegedly misused the power of his office in asking the President of
Ukraine (Zelensky) to dig up dirt on his political rival, Vice President Joe
Biden. In the balance, the Trump administration was withholding essen-
tial military aid to Ukraine for its defense against Russian military aggres-
sion. Questions of national security and the invitation for a foreign nation
to again interfere in American elections are prominent. These accusa-
tions are enough to destroy any American President, but both impeach-
ment and a conviction in the U.S. Senate are not givens. The virtues of
character that have aided Trump’s survival so far will be tested. Trump has
difficulty showing honest empathy for people, even the victims of tragedy,
whether it is a natural disaster, an act of war, or the murder of a journalist
(Ignatius 2016). These combined traits have been helpful in his survival,
but could “turn on a dime.” Loyalty, trust, and sympathy may be in short
supply when needed most, for a self-centered leader who operates as if the
natural laws of political and social life are irrelevant.
Donald Trump was born fortunate. He began in wealth and started
out on top of the economic ladder in America. He has endured count-
less existential threats to his financial empire only to be fortuitously res-
cued by a television entrepreneur—and struck gold. The good fortune
of Trump put him in position to be president. In his campaign, the asym-
metrical style, aided by social media and eventually nourished by Russian
intelligence, WikiLeaks, and the first cyberwar election, combined tech-
nology with his native gifts and sheer good luck. The most fantastic good
fortune for Trump was his inheritance of a recovering economy that was
building momentum at the time of the 2016 election. Trump walked
into a clean house and a strong economy, none of which were of his own
creation. He did not expect to win the 2016 election. The astounding
good fortune of this man is manifested in that revelation alone. Machia-
velli would say that anyone who takes a state by luck in this way will not
hold their power unless they can demonstrate the ability to govern.

346    WO R L D A F FA I R S
 Anthony R. Br unello

Conclusion
Trump’s presidency is not an accident. It is a complex puzzle of good
luck, timing, and clever channeling of fear and anxiety in a formerly
dominant, but now declining, cultural order (Norris and Inglehart 2019).
In spite of the way the modern world has warped and remodeled, the
Machiavellian measures and standards remain relevant today. Machiavelli
would understand President Trump. While he may be ignorant of Ameri-
can politics and government, and many other things, Trump has a native
wisdom about popular culture that carried him to the White House. In the
aftermath, the Trump government is an assault on civil rights and liberties,
in particular the role of a free press. Trump’s nationalism divides Ameri-
cans from one another; Trump fosters white nationalism and racism which,
in the end, it is destructive of authentic patriotism that draws a nation
together in a healthy way. Trump’s presidency has made an assault on the
rule of law and indulges in the kind of willful ignorance that may be the
undoing of everything. Trump’s assault on science and facts led naturally
to a rejection of climate science and the Paris Climate Accord. Trump’s
misunderstanding of foreign affairs as a zero-sum game, and his inflated con-
fidence in the force of his own personality leads him to believe that his per-
sonal touch is superior to multilateral alliances and traditional diplomacy.
Machiavelli would assess the examples of Trump walking away from
a nuclear arms treaty with Iran and his ongoing destabilization of Euro-
pean alliances, and conclude that there exist real causes for alarm. He
would view President Trump to be a selfish, fox-like creature of good for-
tune, ill equipped to be a successful president. The corrosion of repub-
lican institutions domestically while disabling international alliances
with other republics for personal gain and the profit of your enemies is
an appalling error. This does not mean Trump will not be reelected as
president. His eventual failure (from a Machiavellian measure) has little
to do with his personal fortunes, and everything to do with the vitality of
the American Republic when he is done. Despite the changed world of
communication, technology, and social media, Machiavelli can yet be a
measure of political leadership in modern times.

About the Author

Anthony R. Brunello earned his BA from the University of California Davis in 1975
and his MS (1978) and PhD from the University of Oregon in 1983. His research and
teaching is in the area of comparative politics and political theory. He has received the
John M. Bevan Teaching Excellence and Campus Leadership Award and the John Satterfield
Outstanding Mentor Award at Eckerd College.

W I N T E R 2 0 1 9     347
 The measure of machiavelli?

References
Acton, John Dalberg, Lord. 1887. “Acton-Creighton Correspondence,” On Line Library
of Liberty. oll.libertyfund.org
Adams, Robert M. 1992. “The Rise, Proliferation, and Degradation of Machiavellism: An
Outline.” In The Prince, edited by Niccolò Machiavelli, 236–50. New York: W.W. Norton.
Albertini, Stefano. 2018. “Donald Trump: The Anti-Machiavelli.” La Voce di New
York, January 14. https://www.lavocedinewyork.com/en/news/2018/01/14/donald
-trump-the-anti-machiavelli/ (accessed October 1, 2019).
Arendt, Hannah. 1963. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. New York:
Penguin Books.
Bagby, Laurie M. 2002. Political Thought: A Guide to the Classics. Belmont: Wadsworth.
Berlin, Isaiah. 1992. “The Question of Machiavelli.” In The Prince, edited by Niccolò
Machiavelli, 206–35. New York: W.W. Norton.
Brunello, Anthony R. 1994. “Machiavellian Ethics.” In Ready Reference: Ethics, edited by
John K. Roth, 518–519. Hackensack, NJ: Salem Press.
Brunello, Anthony R. 2014. “Politics, Populism and the Democratic Ideal: The Tea
Party and Neo-Libertarianism Forty years in the Making.” Review of History and Politi-
cal Science 2 (2): 199–225.
Burns, James MacGregor. 1956. Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (1882–1940). New York:
Harcourt, Brace.
Burns, James MacGregor. 1978. Leadership. New York: HarperCollins.
Butler, Jack. 2016. “4 Ways Donald Trump Doesn’t Live Up to Machiavelli.” The
Federalist, January 22. https://thefederalist.com/2016/01/22/4-ways-donald-trump
-doesnt-live-up-to-machiavelli/ (accessed August 20, 2019).
Cillizza, Chris. 2018. “Donald Trump Didn’t Tell the Truth 83 Times in 1 Day.” CNN,
November 2. https://edition.cnn.com/2018/11/02/politics/donald-trump-lies
/index.html.
Danoff, Brian F. 2000. “Lincoln, Machiavelli, and American Political Thought.” Presi-
dential Studies Quarterly 30 (2): 290–310.
Davies, James C. 1977. Human Nature in Politics. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Ellis, Joseph J. 2015. The Quartet: Orchestrating the Second American Revolution, 1783-1789.
New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
FiveThirtyEight.com. 2019. “How Unpopular Is Donald Trump?” https://projects
.fivethirtyeight.com/trump-approval-ratings/ (accessed September 21, 2019).
Foer, Franklin. 2019. “Trump’s Classic Bully Move.” The Atlantic, September 25. https://
www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/09/donald-trump-bullied-ukrainian
-president-zelensky/598798/ (accessed September 28, 2019).
French, John R. P., and Bertram Raven. 1959. The Bases of Social Power. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press.
Gilbert, Felix. 1992. “Fortune, Necessity, Virtù.” In The Prince, edited by Niccolò
Machiavelli, 150–55. New York: W.W. Norton.
Haberman, Maggie, Annie Karnis, and Michael Tackett. 2019. “Months after John
McCain’s Death, Trump Keeps Feud with Him Alive.” New York Times, March 20.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/20/us/politics/trump-john-mccain.html.
Hale, J. P. 1992. “The Setting of The Prince 1513-1514.” In The Prince, edited by Niccolò
Machiavelli, 139–49. New York: W.W. Norton.

348    WO R L D A F FA I R S
 Anthony R. Br unello

Harris, Phil. 2010. “Machiavelli and the Global Compass: Ends and Means in Ethics and
Leadership.” Journal of Business Ethics 93:131–38. doi:10.1007/s10551-010-0630-y.
Hochschild, Arlie Russell. 2016. Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the
American Right. New York: New Press.
Ignatieff, Michael. 2013. “Machiavelli Was Right.” The Atlantic, December 12. https://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/12/machiavelli-was-right/354672/
(accessed September 21, 2019).
Ignatius, David. 2016. “Donald Trump Is the American Machiavelli.” The Washington
Post, November 10. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/donald-trump-is
-the-american-machiavelli/2016/11/10/8ebfae16-a794-11e6-ba59-a7d93165c6d4
_story.html (accessed September 21, 2019).
Johnston, David Cay. 2017. The Making of Donald Trump. Brooklyn: Melville House.
Jowett, Garth S., and Victoria O’Donnell. 2015. Propaganda and Persuasion. 6th ed.
Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Keefe, Patrick Radden. 2019. “How Mark Burnett Resurrected Donald Trump as an Icon
of American Success.” Winning: The TV Producer Who Rehabilitated Trump’s Image.
The New Yorker, January 7, 30–43. https://newyorker.com/magazine/2019/01/07
/how-mark-burnett-resurrected-donald-trump-as-an-icon-of-american-success
(accessed September 21, 2019).
Kessler, Glenn, Salvador Rizzo, and Meg Kelly. 2019. “Fact Checker: President Trump
Has Made 12.019 False and Misleading Claims Over 928 Days.” The Washington
Post, August 12. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/08/12/president
-trump-has-made-false-or-misleading-claims-over-days/.
Knutson, Jeane. E. 1972. The Human Basis of the Polity: A Psychological Study of Political
Men. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, Inc.
Lucchese, Filippo Del. 2017. “Machiavelli and Constituent Power: The Revolution-
ary Foundation of Modern Political Thought.” European Journal of Political Theory
16:3–23. doi:10.1177/147488511454491.
Machiavelli, Niccolò. 1950. The Prince and the Discourses. Translated by Max Lerner. New
York: Random House.
Machiavelli, Niccolò. 1992. The Prince. Translated by Robert M. Adams. 2nd ed. New
York: Norton Critical Editions, W.W. Norton.
Nelson, Brian R. 1996. Western Political Thought: From Socrates to the Age of Ideology. 2nd
ed. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. 2019. Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authori-
tarian Populism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Russell, Bertrand. 1938. Power: A New Social Analysis. London: Allen & Unwin.
Sabine, George H., and Thomas L. Thorson. 1973. A History of Political Theory. 4th ed.
New York: Dryden Press.
Scott, John T., and Robert Zaretsky. 2013. “Why Machiavelli Still Matters.” The
New York Times, December 9. https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/10/opinion/why
-machiavelli-matters.html (accessed September 21, 2019).
Singer, P. W., and Emerson T. Brooking. 2018. Like War: The Weaponization of Social
Media. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
Wolin, Sheldon S. 1992. “The Economy of Violence.” In The Prince, edited by Niccolò
Machiavelli, 169–77. New York: W.W. Norton.
Woodward, Bob. 2018. Fear: Trump in the White House. New York: Simon & Schuster.

W I N T E R 2 0 1 9     349
Copyright of World Affairs is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not
be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's
express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for
individual use.