Documentos de Académico
Documentos de Profesional
Documentos de Cultura
Q Saco 7
Q Saco 7
Lo anterior no sucede (ni se pretende que suceda) con todas las mane-
tes signos lógicos que interese tematizar. Es un lugar común a todos los
totalidad de los principios que cada lógica convalida para cada uno de
(P.�.l) A� (B�A)
(P.�.2) �A � (A�B)
tóteles, dada la época en que le tocó vivir, nunca conoció la lógica con-
temporánea.
una gran mayoría del enorme espectro de lógicas que pueblan la lógica
43
CARLOS AlCHOURRÓN
vantes:
1) ¿Por qué no hay una única lógica, por lo menos para cada uno
toma de que se ha deslizado algo falso en las lógicas que las padecen?
3) La buscada correlación entre las lógicas desarrolladas con rela-
es verdad que no hay lógica que no esté afectada por alguna disonanciayuntos.
Lo anterior no sucede (ni se pretende que suceda) con todas las mane-
tes signos lógicos que interese tematizar. Es un lugar común a todos los
totalidad de los principios que cada lógica convalida para cada uno de
(P.�.l) A� (B�A)
(P.�.2) �A � (A�B)
que aceptar los dos condicionales anteriores por el sólo hecho de que Aris-
tóteles, dada la época en que le tocó vivir, nunca conoció la lógica con-
temporánea.
una gran mayoría del enorme espectro de lógicas que pueblan la lógica
43
CARLOS AlCHOURRÓN
vantes:
1) ¿Por qué no hay una única lógica, por lo menos para cada uno
toma de que se ha deslizado algo falso en las lógicas que las padecen?
es verdad que no hay lógica que no esté afectada por alguna disonanciayuntos.
Lo anterior no sucede (ni se pretende que suceda) con todas las mane-
tes signos lógicos que interese tematizar. Es un lugar común a todos los
enfoques de la lógica que la apreciación intuitiva requiere considerar la
totalidad de los principios que cada lógica convalida para cada uno de
(P.�.l) A� (B�A)
(P.�.2) �A � (A�B)
que aceptar los dos condicionales anteriores por el sólo hecho de que Aris-
tóteles, dada la época en que le tocó vivir, nunca conoció la lógica con-
temporánea.
una gran mayoría del enorme espectro de lógicas que pueblan la lógica
43
CARLOS AlCHOURRÓN
vantes:
1) ¿Por qué no hay una única lógica, por lo menos para cada uno
toma de que se ha deslizado algo falso en las lógicas que las padecen?
es verdad que no hay lógica que no esté afectada por alguna disonanciayuntos.
Lo anterior no sucede (ni se pretende que suceda) con todas las mane-
tes signos lógicos que interese tematizar. Es un lugar común a todos los
totalidad de los principios que cada lógica convalida para cada uno de
(P.�.l) A� (B�A)
(P.�.2) �A � (A�B)
que aceptar los dos condicionales anteriores por el sólo hecho de que Aris-
tóteles, dada la época en que le tocó vivir, nunca conoció la lógica con-
temporánea.
una gran mayoría del enorme espectro de lógicas que pueblan la lógica
43
CARLOS AlCHOURRÓN
1) ¿Por qué no hay una única lógica, por lo menos para cada uno
toma de que se ha deslizado algo falso en las lógicas que las padecen?
es verdad que no hay lógica que no esté afectada por alguna disonanciayuntos.
Lo anterior no sucede (ni se pretende que suceda) con todas las mane-
tes signos lógicos que interese tematizar. Es un lugar común a todos los
totalidad de los principios que cada lógica convalida para cada uno de
(P.�.l) A� (B�A)
(P.�.2) �A � (A�B)
(que la implicación material comparte con la implicación intuicionista)
que aceptar los dos condicionales anteriores por el sólo hecho de que Aris-
tóteles, dada la época en que le tocó vivir, nunca conoció la lógica con-
temporánea.
43
CARLOS AlCHOURRÓN
vantes:
1) ¿Por qué no hay una única lógica, por lo menos para cada uno
toma de que se ha deslizado algo falso en las lógicas que las padecen?
es verdad que no hay lógica que no esté afectada por alguna disonanciayuntos.
Lo anterior no sucede (ni se pretende que suceda) con todas las mane-
tes signos lógicos que interese tematizar. Es un lugar común a todos los
totalidad de los principios que cada lógica convalida para cada uno de
(P.�.l) A� (B�A)
(P.�.2) �A � (A�B)
que aceptar los dos condicionales anteriores por el sólo hecho de que Aris-
tóteles, dada la época en que le tocó vivir, nunca conoció la lógica con-
temporánea.
una gran mayoría del enorme espectro de lógicas que pueblan la lógica
43
CARLOS AlCHOURRÓN
vantes:
1) ¿Por qué no hay una única lógica, por lo menos para cada uno
es verdad que no hay lógica que no esté afectada por alguna disonanciayuntos.
Lo anterior no sucede (ni se pretende que suceda) con todas las mane-
tes signos lógicos que interese tematizar. Es un lugar común a todos los
totalidad de los principios que cada lógica convalida para cada uno de
(P.�.l) A� (B�A)
(P.�.2) �A � (A�B)
que aceptar los dos condicionales anteriores por el sólo hecho de que Aris-
tóteles, dada la época en que le tocó vivir, nunca conoció la lógica con-
temporánea.
una gran mayoría del enorme espectro de lógicas que pueblan la lógica
43
CARLOS AlCHOURRÓN
contemporánea. Sin embargo, es dable reconocer que muchas lógicas han
vantes:
1) ¿Por qué no hay una única lógica, por lo menos para cada uno
toma de que se ha deslizado algo falso en las lógicas que las padecen?
es verdad que no hay lógica que no esté afectada por alguna disonanciayuntos.
Lo anterior no sucede (ni se pretende que suceda) con todas las mane-
tes signos lógicos que interese tematizar. Es un lugar común a todos los
enfoques de la lógica que la apreciación intuitiva requiere considerar la
totalidad de los principios que cada lógica convalida para cada uno de
(P.�.l) A� (B�A)
(P.�.2) �A � (A�B)
que aceptar los dos condicionales anteriores por el sólo hecho de que Aris-
tóteles, dada la época en que le tocó vivir, nunca conoció la lógica con-
temporánea.
Dar la satisfacción a estos desacuerdos intuitivos entre las lógicas
una gran mayoría del enorme espectro de lógicas que pueblan la lógica
43
CARLOS AlCHOURRÓN
vantes:
1) ¿Por qué no hay una única lógica, por lo menos para cada uno
toma de que se ha deslizado algo falso en las lógicas que las padecen?
es verdad que no hay lógica que no esté afectada por alguna disonanciayuntos.
Lo anterior no sucede (ni se pretende que suceda) con todas las mane-
tes signos lógicos que interese tematizar. Es un lugar común a todos los
totalidad de los principios que cada lógica convalida para cada uno de
(P.�.l) A� (B�A)
(P.�.2) �A � (A�B)
que aceptar los dos condicionales anteriores por el sólo hecho de que Aris-
tóteles, dada la época en que le tocó vivir, nunca conoció la lógica con-
temporánea.
una gran mayoría del enorme espectro de lógicas que pueblan la lógica
43
CARLOS AlCHOURRÓN
vantes:
1) ¿Por qué no hay una única lógica, por lo menos para cada uno
toma de que se ha deslizado algo falso en las lógicas que las padecen?
es verdad que no hay lógica que no esté afectada por alguna disonanciayuntos.
Lo anterior no sucede (ni se pretende que suceda) con todas las mane-
tes signos lógicos que interese tematizar. Es un lugar común a todos los
totalidad de los principios que cada lógica convalida para cada uno de
(P.�.l) A� (B�A)
(P.�.2) �A � (A�B)
que aceptar los dos condicionales anteriores por el sólo hecho de que Aris-
tóteles, dada la época en que le tocó vivir, nunca conoció la lógica con-
temporánea.
43
CARLOS AlCHOURRÓN
vantes:
1) ¿Por qué no hay una única lógica, por lo menos para cada uno
toma de que se ha deslizado algo falso en las lógicas que las padecen?
es verdad que no hay lógica que no esté afectada por alguna disonanciayuntos.
Lo anterior no sucede (ni se pretende que suceda) con todas las mane-
tes signos lógicos que interese tematizar. Es un lugar común a todos los
totalidad de los principios que cada lógica convalida para cada uno de
(P.�.l) A� (B�A)
(P.�.2) �A � (A�B)
que aceptar los dos condicionales anteriores por el sólo hecho de que Aris-
tóteles, dada la época en que le tocó vivir, nunca conoció la lógica con-
temporánea.
una gran mayoría del enorme espectro de lógicas que pueblan la lógica
43
CARLOS AlCHOURRÓN
vantes:
1) ¿Por qué no hay una única lógica, por lo menos para cada uno
toma de que se ha deslizado algo falso en las lógicas que las padecen?
es verdad que no hay lógica que no esté afectada por alguna disonancia
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He recognized, too, that there has surely to be some escape from the
nothing at all about Lord Hailsham himself but merely about the
bewailing the loss of his sons in 'Joseph is not and Simeon is not.'16
say that Jacob in uttering those words was not talking about Joseph
and Simeon but about the use of their names.'l? Similar examples are
the report of God saying to Moses 'I am who am'18 {i.e., 'I am he who
sitions as embedding both 'Joseph is' and 'Simeon is,' and deals with
suggests that the biblical authors were no less mistaken in their un-
derstanding of their own language than they were about the origins
Society 55 (1954-55), reprinted in his God and the Soul (London: Routledge
19. John 8:58. King James version. Recall from earlier in the chapter
that the value of this and the earlier example lies not in their accuracy as
translations, but in the quality of the English in which the translations are
expressed.
that they were no less likely to be ignorant of the former than they
about the Big Bang theory, nor even about philosophical logic. It de-
the individuals Simeon and Joseph and saying something about their
names. Had they been so afflicted they could hardly have written the
Old Testament.
uses of 'Lord Hailsham exists' are not about Lord Hailsham might
well hesitate to say the same about the so-called embedded occur-
rences of that proposition. I refer to those that occur in propositions
like 'Lord Hailsham no longer exists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never
stood as 'It is no longer the case that (Lord Hailsham exists)' and the
latter as 'It might never have been the case that (Lord Hailsham ex-
about Lord Hailsham: neither of them is about his name. But surely
their being about Lord Hailsham can stem only from the presence of
'Lord Hailsham exists' within them. Here, then, are some apparently
ists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never have existed' are 'propositions
which genuinely say something about a real man': they are 'not propo-
sitions about names nor are the properties they ascribe properties
of classes or concepts.'22 What he denies, however, is that the some-
other true of him after his death. Hence his claim that 'Lord Hail-
tion such that one of them can be truly predicated of Lord Hailsham
as 'It might have been the case that it was not always the case that
occur within the brackets, as in 'It might have been the case that it
was always the case that (Lord Hailsham does not exist).' As in the
earlier case, this move, too, relies precariously on denying any dis-
tempt to present a fact about Lord Hailsham without his being a con-
this does not imply that there is any fact having a nonexistent Lord
but only if they are understood as being about one of Lord Hail-
mother. About it he notes that 'there may be other things which are in this
the world to say something about Lord Hailsham are, mira bile dictu,
saying nothing at all about him, but only about the instantiation of
eral and singular existential propositions alike. It is, first, that the
tails that the propositions are not about individuals at all, but
a name.
of him. On the contrary, 'exists' is in effectis numerous' and 'Lord Hailsham is not none' make
no sense at all.
He recognized, too, that there has surely to be some escape from the
paradox that he took to arise if 'exists' were a first-level predicate.
nothing at all about Lord Hailsham himself but merely about the
bewailing the loss of his sons in 'Joseph is not and Simeon is not.'16
say that Jacob in uttering those words was not talking about Joseph
and Simeon but about the use of their names.'l? Similar examples are
the report of God saying to Moses 'I am who am'18 {i.e., 'I am he who
sitions as embedding both 'Joseph is' and 'Simeon is,' and deals with
derstanding of their own language than they were about the origins
Society 55 (1954-55), reprinted in his God and the Soul (London: Routledge
19. John 8:58. King James version. Recall from earlier in the chapter
that the value of this and the earlier example lies not in their accuracy as
translations, but in the quality of the English in which the translations are
expressed.
that they were no less likely to be ignorant of the former than they
about the Big Bang theory, nor even about philosophical logic. It de-
the individuals Simeon and Joseph and saying something about their
names. Had they been so afflicted they could hardly have written the
Old Testament.
uses of 'Lord Hailsham exists' are not about Lord Hailsham might
well hesitate to say the same about the so-called embedded occur-
like 'Lord Hailsham no longer exists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never
stood as 'It is no longer the case that (Lord Hailsham exists)' and the
latter as 'It might never have been the case that (Lord Hailsham ex-
about Lord Hailsham: neither of them is about his name. But surely
their being about Lord Hailsham can stem only from the presence of
'Lord Hailsham exists' within them. Here, then, are some apparently
ists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never have existed' are 'propositions
which genuinely say something about a real man': they are 'not propo-
sitions about names nor are the properties they ascribe properties
predicables, one being true of Lord Hailsham before he died and the
other true of him after his death. Hence his claim that 'Lord Hail-
tion such that one of them can be truly predicated of Lord Hailsham
and the other truly predicated of someone at the present moment.'24
as 'It might have been the case that it was not always the case that
occur within the brackets, as in 'It might have been the case that it
was always the case that (Lord Hailsham does not exist).' As in the
earlier case, this move, too, relies precariously on denying any dis-
tempt to present a fact about Lord Hailsham without his being a con-
the case that nothing at all ever possessed this property.'25 Obviously,
this does not imply that there is any fact having a nonexistent Lord
but only if they are understood as being about one of Lord Hail-
mother. About it he notes that 'there may be other things which are in this
the world to say something about Lord Hailsham are, mira bile dictu,
saying nothing at all about him, but only about the instantiation of
To sum up. Williams makes basically the same point about gen-
eral and singular existential propositions alike. It is, first, that the
tails that the propositions are not about individuals at all, but
a name.
of him. On the contrary, 'exists' is in effectis numerous' and 'Lord Hailsham is not none' make
no sense at all.
He recognized, too, that there has surely to be some escape from the
nothing at all about Lord Hailsham himself but merely about the
bewailing the loss of his sons in 'Joseph is not and Simeon is not.'16
say that Jacob in uttering those words was not talking about Joseph
and Simeon but about the use of their names.'l? Similar examples are
the report of God saying to Moses 'I am who am'18 {i.e., 'I am he who
sitions as embedding both 'Joseph is' and 'Simeon is,' and deals with
suggests that the biblical authors were no less mistaken in their un-
derstanding of their own language than they were about the origins
Society 55 (1954-55), reprinted in his God and the Soul (London: Routledge
that the value of this and the earlier example lies not in their accuracy as
translations, but in the quality of the English in which the translations are
expressed.
that they were no less likely to be ignorant of the former than they
about the Big Bang theory, nor even about philosophical logic. It de-
the individuals Simeon and Joseph and saying something about their
names. Had they been so afflicted they could hardly have written the
Old Testament.
uses of 'Lord Hailsham exists' are not about Lord Hailsham might
well hesitate to say the same about the so-called embedded occur-
like 'Lord Hailsham no longer exists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never
stood as 'It is no longer the case that (Lord Hailsham exists)' and the
latter as 'It might never have been the case that (Lord Hailsham ex-
about Lord Hailsham: neither of them is about his name. But surely
their being about Lord Hailsham can stem only from the presence of
'Lord Hailsham exists' within them. Here, then, are some apparently
which genuinely say something about a real man': they are 'not propo-
sitions about names nor are the properties they ascribe properties
predicables, one being true of Lord Hailsham before he died and the
other true of him after his death. Hence his claim that 'Lord Hail-
tion such that one of them can be truly predicated of Lord Hailsham
as 'It might have been the case that it was not always the case that
occur within the brackets, as in 'It might have been the case that it
was always the case that (Lord Hailsham does not exist).' As in the
earlier case, this move, too, relies precariously on denying any dis-
tempt to present a fact about Lord Hailsham without his being a con-
the case that nothing at all ever possessed this property.'25 Obviously,
this does not imply that there is any fact having a nonexistent Lord
but only if they are understood as being about one of Lord Hail-
mother. About it he notes that 'there may be other things which are in this
the world to say something about Lord Hailsham are, mira bile dictu,
saying nothing at all about him, but only about the instantiation of
To sum up. Williams makes basically the same point about gen-
eral and singular existential propositions alike. It is, first, that the
tails that the propositions are not about individuals at all, but
a name.
of him. On the contrary, 'exists' is in effectis numerous' and 'Lord Hailsham is not none' make
no sense at all.
He recognized, too, that there has surely to be some escape from the
nothing at all about Lord Hailsham himself but merely about the
bewailing the loss of his sons in 'Joseph is not and Simeon is not.'16
say that Jacob in uttering those words was not talking about Joseph
and Simeon but about the use of their names.'l? Similar examples are
the report of God saying to Moses 'I am who am'18 {i.e., 'I am he who
sitions as embedding both 'Joseph is' and 'Simeon is,' and deals with
suggests that the biblical authors were no less mistaken in their un-
derstanding of their own language than they were about the origins
Society 55 (1954-55), reprinted in his God and the Soul (London: Routledge
19. John 8:58. King James version. Recall from earlier in the chapter
that the value of this and the earlier example lies not in their accuracy as
translations, but in the quality of the English in which the translations are
expressed.
that they were no less likely to be ignorant of the former than they
about the Big Bang theory, nor even about philosophical logic. It de-
the individuals Simeon and Joseph and saying something about their
names. Had they been so afflicted they could hardly have written the
Old Testament.
uses of 'Lord Hailsham exists' are not about Lord Hailsham might
well hesitate to say the same about the so-called embedded occur-
like 'Lord Hailsham no longer exists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never
have existed,' to mention but a couple. The former might be under-
stood as 'It is no longer the case that (Lord Hailsham exists)' and the
latter as 'It might never have been the case that (Lord Hailsham ex-
about Lord Hailsham: neither of them is about his name. But surely
their being about Lord Hailsham can stem only from the presence of
'Lord Hailsham exists' within them. Here, then, are some apparently
ists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never have existed' are 'propositions
which genuinely say something about a real man': they are 'not propo-
sitions about names nor are the properties they ascribe properties
predicables, one being true of Lord Hailsham before he died and the
other true of him after his death. Hence his claim that 'Lord Hail-
sham no longer exists' is to be understood simply as the denial that
tion such that one of them can be truly predicated of Lord Hailsham
as 'It might have been the case that it was not always the case that
occur within the brackets, as in 'It might have been the case that it
was always the case that (Lord Hailsham does not exist).' As in the
earlier case, this move, too, relies precariously on denying any dis-
tempt to present a fact about Lord Hailsham without his being a con-
the case that nothing at all ever possessed this property.'25 Obviously,
this does not imply that there is any fact having a nonexistent Lord
but only if they are understood as being about one of Lord Hail-
mother. About it he notes that 'there may be other things which are in this
the world to say something about Lord Hailsham are, mira bile dictu,
saying nothing at all about him, but only about the instantiation of
To sum up. Williams makes basically the same point about gen-
eral and singular existential propositions alike. It is, first, that the
negative ones do seem to generate a paradox and, second, that the
tails that the propositions are not about individuals at all, but
a name.
of him. On the contrary, 'exists' is in effectis numerous' and 'Lord Hailsham is not none' make
no sense at all.
He recognized, too, that there has surely to be some escape from the
nothing at all about Lord Hailsham himself but merely about the
name 'Lord Hailsham,' namely, that it has been used to designate a
bewailing the loss of his sons in 'Joseph is not and Simeon is not.'16
say that Jacob in uttering those words was not talking about Joseph
and Simeon but about the use of their names.'l? Similar examples are
the report of God saying to Moses 'I am who am'18 {i.e., 'I am he who
sitions as embedding both 'Joseph is' and 'Simeon is,' and deals with
suggests that the biblical authors were no less mistaken in their un-
derstanding of their own language than they were about the origins
14. C. J. F. Williams, Being, Identity, and Truth, 34.
Society 55 (1954-55), reprinted in his God and the Soul (London: Routledge
19. John 8:58. King James version. Recall from earlier in the chapter
that the value of this and the earlier example lies not in their accuracy as
translations, but in the quality of the English in which the translations are
expressed.
that they were no less likely to be ignorant of the former than they
were of the latter. No one could expect them to know anything
about the Big Bang theory, nor even about philosophical logic. It de-
the individuals Simeon and Joseph and saying something about their
names. Had they been so afflicted they could hardly have written the
Old Testament.
uses of 'Lord Hailsham exists' are not about Lord Hailsham might
well hesitate to say the same about the so-called embedded occur-
like 'Lord Hailsham no longer exists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never
stood as 'It is no longer the case that (Lord Hailsham exists)' and the
latter as 'It might never have been the case that (Lord Hailsham ex-
about Lord Hailsham: neither of them is about his name. But surely
their being about Lord Hailsham can stem only from the presence of
'Lord Hailsham exists' within them. Here, then, are some apparently
ists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never have existed' are 'propositions
which genuinely say something about a real man': they are 'not propo-
sitions about names nor are the properties they ascribe properties
predicables, one being true of Lord Hailsham before he died and the
other true of him after his death. Hence his claim that 'Lord Hail-
tion such that one of them can be truly predicated of Lord Hailsham
as 'It might have been the case that it was not always the case that
occur within the brackets, as in 'It might have been the case that it
was always the case that (Lord Hailsham does not exist).' As in the
earlier case, this move, too, relies precariously on denying any dis-
tempt to present a fact about Lord Hailsham without his being a con-
the case that nothing at all ever possessed this property.'25 Obviously,
this does not imply that there is any fact having a nonexistent Lord
but only if they are understood as being about one of Lord Hail-
mother. About it he notes that 'there may be other things which are in this
way essential to my mother's existence.'
the world to say something about Lord Hailsham are, mira bile dictu,
saying nothing at all about him, but only about the instantiation of
To sum up. Williams makes basically the same point about gen-
eral and singular existential propositions alike. It is, first, that the
a name.
of him. On the contrary, 'exists' is in effectis numerous' and 'Lord Hailsham is not none' make
no sense at all.
He recognized, too, that there has surely to be some escape from the
nothing at all about Lord Hailsham himself but merely about the
bewailing the loss of his sons in 'Joseph is not and Simeon is not.'16
say that Jacob in uttering those words was not talking about Joseph
and Simeon but about the use of their names.'l? Similar examples are
the report of God saying to Moses 'I am who am'18 {i.e., 'I am he who
sitions as embedding both 'Joseph is' and 'Simeon is,' and deals with
suggests that the biblical authors were no less mistaken in their un-
derstanding of their own language than they were about the origins
Society 55 (1954-55), reprinted in his God and the Soul (London: Routledge
19. John 8:58. King James version. Recall from earlier in the chapter
that the value of this and the earlier example lies not in their accuracy as
translations, but in the quality of the English in which the translations are
expressed.
that they were no less likely to be ignorant of the former than they
about the Big Bang theory, nor even about philosophical logic. It de-
the individuals Simeon and Joseph and saying something about their
names. Had they been so afflicted they could hardly have written the
Old Testament.
uses of 'Lord Hailsham exists' are not about Lord Hailsham might
well hesitate to say the same about the so-called embedded occur-
like 'Lord Hailsham no longer exists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never
stood as 'It is no longer the case that (Lord Hailsham exists)' and the
latter as 'It might never have been the case that (Lord Hailsham ex-
about Lord Hailsham: neither of them is about his name. But surely
their being about Lord Hailsham can stem only from the presence of
'Lord Hailsham exists' within them. Here, then, are some apparently
ists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never have existed' are 'propositions
which genuinely say something about a real man': they are 'not propo-
21. C. J. F. Williams, Being, Identity, and Truth, 36.
sitions about names nor are the properties they ascribe properties
predicables, one being true of Lord Hailsham before he died and the
other true of him after his death. Hence his claim that 'Lord Hail-
tion such that one of them can be truly predicated of Lord Hailsham
as 'It might have been the case that it was not always the case that
occur within the brackets, as in 'It might have been the case that it
was always the case that (Lord Hailsham does not exist).' As in the
earlier case, this move, too, relies precariously on denying any dis-
tempt to present a fact about Lord Hailsham without his being a con-
the case that nothing at all ever possessed this property.'25 Obviously,
this does not imply that there is any fact having a nonexistent Lord
but only if they are understood as being about one of Lord Hail-
mother. About it he notes that 'there may be other things which are in this
the world to say something about Lord Hailsham are, mira bile dictu,
saying nothing at all about him, but only about the instantiation of
To sum up. Williams makes basically the same point about gen-
eral and singular existential propositions alike. It is, first, that the
tails that the propositions are not about individuals at all, but
a name.
• In embedded singular existential propositions 'Lord Hailsham'
of him. On the contrary, 'exists' is in effectis numerous' and 'Lord Hailsham is not none' make
no sense at all.
He recognized, too, that there has surely to be some escape from the
nothing at all about Lord Hailsham himself but merely about the
bewailing the loss of his sons in 'Joseph is not and Simeon is not.'16
say that Jacob in uttering those words was not talking about Joseph
and Simeon but about the use of their names.'l? Similar examples are
the report of God saying to Moses 'I am who am'18 {i.e., 'I am he who
suggests that the biblical authors were no less mistaken in their un-
derstanding of their own language than they were about the origins
Society 55 (1954-55), reprinted in his God and the Soul (London: Routledge
19. John 8:58. King James version. Recall from earlier in the chapter
that the value of this and the earlier example lies not in their accuracy as
translations, but in the quality of the English in which the translations are
expressed.
that they were no less likely to be ignorant of the former than they
about the Big Bang theory, nor even about philosophical logic. It de-
the individuals Simeon and Joseph and saying something about their
names. Had they been so afflicted they could hardly have written the
Old Testament.
uses of 'Lord Hailsham exists' are not about Lord Hailsham might
well hesitate to say the same about the so-called embedded occur-
like 'Lord Hailsham no longer exists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never
stood as 'It is no longer the case that (Lord Hailsham exists)' and the
latter as 'It might never have been the case that (Lord Hailsham ex-
about Lord Hailsham: neither of them is about his name. But surely
their being about Lord Hailsham can stem only from the presence of
'Lord Hailsham exists' within them. Here, then, are some apparently
ists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never have existed' are 'propositions
which genuinely say something about a real man': they are 'not propo-
sitions about names nor are the properties they ascribe properties
predicables, one being true of Lord Hailsham before he died and the
other true of him after his death. Hence his claim that 'Lord Hail-
tion such that one of them can be truly predicated of Lord Hailsham
as 'It might have been the case that it was not always the case that
(Lord Hailsham exists).' He maintains, rather, that the 'not' has to
occur within the brackets, as in 'It might have been the case that it
was always the case that (Lord Hailsham does not exist).' As in the
earlier case, this move, too, relies precariously on denying any dis-
tempt to present a fact about Lord Hailsham without his being a con-
the case that nothing at all ever possessed this property.'25 Obviously,
this does not imply that there is any fact having a nonexistent Lord
but only if they are understood as being about one of Lord Hail-
sham's properties rather than about Lord Hailsham himself. In that
mother. About it he notes that 'there may be other things which are in this
the world to say something about Lord Hailsham are, mira bile dictu,
saying nothing at all about him, but only about the instantiation of
To sum up. Williams makes basically the same point about gen-
eral and singular existential propositions alike. It is, first, that the
tails that the propositions are not about individuals at all, but
a name.
of him. On the contrary, 'exists' is in effectis numerous' and 'Lord Hailsham is not none' make
no sense at all.
He recognized, too, that there has surely to be some escape from the
nothing at all about Lord Hailsham himself but merely about the
bewailing the loss of his sons in 'Joseph is not and Simeon is not.'16
say that Jacob in uttering those words was not talking about Joseph
and Simeon but about the use of their names.'l? Similar examples are
the report of God saying to Moses 'I am who am'18 {i.e., 'I am he who
sitions as embedding both 'Joseph is' and 'Simeon is,' and deals with
suggests that the biblical authors were no less mistaken in their un-
derstanding of their own language than they were about the origins
Society 55 (1954-55), reprinted in his God and the Soul (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1969), 42-64.
19. John 8:58. King James version. Recall from earlier in the chapter
that the value of this and the earlier example lies not in their accuracy as
translations, but in the quality of the English in which the translations are
expressed.
that they were no less likely to be ignorant of the former than they
about the Big Bang theory, nor even about philosophical logic. It de-
fies credulity, however, to suggest that they were equally ignorant of
the individuals Simeon and Joseph and saying something about their
names. Had they been so afflicted they could hardly have written the
Old Testament.
uses of 'Lord Hailsham exists' are not about Lord Hailsham might
well hesitate to say the same about the so-called embedded occur-
like 'Lord Hailsham no longer exists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never
stood as 'It is no longer the case that (Lord Hailsham exists)' and the
latter as 'It might never have been the case that (Lord Hailsham ex-
about Lord Hailsham: neither of them is about his name. But surely
their being about Lord Hailsham can stem only from the presence of
'Lord Hailsham exists' within them. Here, then, are some apparently
incontestable examples of 'Lord Hailsham exists' being about a per-
ists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never have existed' are 'propositions
which genuinely say something about a real man': they are 'not propo-
sitions about names nor are the properties they ascribe properties
predicables, one being true of Lord Hailsham before he died and the
other true of him after his death. Hence his claim that 'Lord Hail-
tion such that one of them can be truly predicated of Lord Hailsham
as 'It might have been the case that it was not always the case that
occur within the brackets, as in 'It might have been the case that it
was always the case that (Lord Hailsham does not exist).' As in the
earlier case, this move, too, relies precariously on denying any dis-
tempt to present a fact about Lord Hailsham without his being a con-
the case that nothing at all ever possessed this property.'25 Obviously,
this does not imply that there is any fact having a nonexistent Lord
but only if they are understood as being about one of Lord Hail-
mother. About it he notes that 'there may be other things which are in this
the world to say something about Lord Hailsham are, mira bile dictu,
saying nothing at all about him, but only about the instantiation of
To sum up. Williams makes basically the same point about gen-
eral and singular existential propositions alike. It is, first, that the
tails that the propositions are not about individuals at all, but
a name.
of him. On the contrary, 'exists' is in effectis numerous' and 'Lord Hailsham is not none' make
no sense at all.
He recognized, too, that there has surely to be some escape from the
nothing at all about Lord Hailsham himself but merely about the
bewailing the loss of his sons in 'Joseph is not and Simeon is not.'16
and Simeon but about the use of their names.'l? Similar examples are
the report of God saying to Moses 'I am who am'18 {i.e., 'I am he who
sitions as embedding both 'Joseph is' and 'Simeon is,' and deals with
suggests that the biblical authors were no less mistaken in their un-
derstanding of their own language than they were about the origins
Society 55 (1954-55), reprinted in his God and the Soul (London: Routledge
19. John 8:58. King James version. Recall from earlier in the chapter
that the value of this and the earlier example lies not in their accuracy as
translations, but in the quality of the English in which the translations are
expressed.
that they were no less likely to be ignorant of the former than they
about the Big Bang theory, nor even about philosophical logic. It de-
the individuals Simeon and Joseph and saying something about their
names. Had they been so afflicted they could hardly have written the
Old Testament.
uses of 'Lord Hailsham exists' are not about Lord Hailsham might
well hesitate to say the same about the so-called embedded occur-
like 'Lord Hailsham no longer exists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never
stood as 'It is no longer the case that (Lord Hailsham exists)' and the
latter as 'It might never have been the case that (Lord Hailsham ex-
about Lord Hailsham: neither of them is about his name. But surely
their being about Lord Hailsham can stem only from the presence of
'Lord Hailsham exists' within them. Here, then, are some apparently
ists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never have existed' are 'propositions
which genuinely say something about a real man': they are 'not propo-
other true of him after his death. Hence his claim that 'Lord Hail-
tion such that one of them can be truly predicated of Lord Hailsham
as 'It might have been the case that it was not always the case that
occur within the brackets, as in 'It might have been the case that it
was always the case that (Lord Hailsham does not exist).' As in the
earlier case, this move, too, relies precariously on denying any dis-
tempt to present a fact about Lord Hailsham without his being a con-
the case that nothing at all ever possessed this property.'25 Obviously,
this does not imply that there is any fact having a nonexistent Lord
but only if they are understood as being about one of Lord Hail-
mother. About it he notes that 'there may be other things which are in this
the world to say something about Lord Hailsham are, mira bile dictu,
saying nothing at all about him, but only about the instantiation of
To sum up. Williams makes basically the same point about gen-
eral and singular existential propositions alike. It is, first, that the
tails that the propositions are not about individuals at all, but
a name.
of him. On the contrary, 'exists' is in effectis numerous' and 'Lord Hailsham is not none' make
no sense at all.
He recognized, too, that there has surely to be some escape from the
nothing at all about Lord Hailsham himself but merely about the
bewailing the loss of his sons in 'Joseph is not and Simeon is not.'16
say that Jacob in uttering those words was not talking about Joseph
and Simeon but about the use of their names.'l? Similar examples are
the report of God saying to Moses 'I am who am'18 {i.e., 'I am he who
sitions as embedding both 'Joseph is' and 'Simeon is,' and deals with
derstanding of their own language than they were about the origins
Society 55 (1954-55), reprinted in his God and the Soul (London: Routledge
19. John 8:58. King James version. Recall from earlier in the chapter
that the value of this and the earlier example lies not in their accuracy as
translations, but in the quality of the English in which the translations are
expressed.
that they were no less likely to be ignorant of the former than they
about the Big Bang theory, nor even about philosophical logic. It de-
the individuals Simeon and Joseph and saying something about their
names. Had they been so afflicted they could hardly have written the
Old Testament.
uses of 'Lord Hailsham exists' are not about Lord Hailsham might
well hesitate to say the same about the so-called embedded occur-
like 'Lord Hailsham no longer exists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never
stood as 'It is no longer the case that (Lord Hailsham exists)' and the
latter as 'It might never have been the case that (Lord Hailsham ex-
about Lord Hailsham: neither of them is about his name. But surely
their being about Lord Hailsham can stem only from the presence of
'Lord Hailsham exists' within them. Here, then, are some apparently
ists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never have existed' are 'propositions
which genuinely say something about a real man': they are 'not propo-
sitions about names nor are the properties they ascribe properties
predicables, one being true of Lord Hailsham before he died and the
other true of him after his death. Hence his claim that 'Lord Hail-
tion such that one of them can be truly predicated of Lord Hailsham
and the other truly predicated of someone at the present moment.'24
as 'It might have been the case that it was not always the case that
occur within the brackets, as in 'It might have been the case that it
was always the case that (Lord Hailsham does not exist).' As in the
earlier case, this move, too, relies precariously on denying any dis-
tempt to present a fact about Lord Hailsham without his being a con-
the case that nothing at all ever possessed this property.'25 Obviously,
this does not imply that there is any fact having a nonexistent Lord
but only if they are understood as being about one of Lord Hail-
mother. About it he notes that 'there may be other things which are in this
the world to say something about Lord Hailsham are, mira bile dictu,
saying nothing at all about him, but only about the instantiation of
To sum up. Williams makes basically the same point about gen-
eral and singular existential propositions alike. It is, first, that the
tails that the propositions are not about individuals at all, but
a name.
of him. On the contrary, 'exists' is in effectis numerous' and 'Lord Hailsham is not none' make
no sense at all.
He recognized, too, that there has surely to be some escape from the
nothing at all about Lord Hailsham himself but merely about the
bewailing the loss of his sons in 'Joseph is not and Simeon is not.'16
say that Jacob in uttering those words was not talking about Joseph
and Simeon but about the use of their names.'l? Similar examples are
the report of God saying to Moses 'I am who am'18 {i.e., 'I am he who
sitions as embedding both 'Joseph is' and 'Simeon is,' and deals with
suggests that the biblical authors were no less mistaken in their un-
derstanding of their own language than they were about the origins
Society 55 (1954-55), reprinted in his God and the Soul (London: Routledge
19. John 8:58. King James version. Recall from earlier in the chapter
that the value of this and the earlier example lies not in their accuracy as
translations, but in the quality of the English in which the translations are
expressed.
that they were no less likely to be ignorant of the former than they
about the Big Bang theory, nor even about philosophical logic. It de-
names. Had they been so afflicted they could hardly have written the
Old Testament.
uses of 'Lord Hailsham exists' are not about Lord Hailsham might
well hesitate to say the same about the so-called embedded occur-
like 'Lord Hailsham no longer exists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never
stood as 'It is no longer the case that (Lord Hailsham exists)' and the
latter as 'It might never have been the case that (Lord Hailsham ex-
about Lord Hailsham: neither of them is about his name. But surely
their being about Lord Hailsham can stem only from the presence of
'Lord Hailsham exists' within them. Here, then, are some apparently
ists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never have existed' are 'propositions
which genuinely say something about a real man': they are 'not propo-
sitions about names nor are the properties they ascribe properties
predicables, one being true of Lord Hailsham before he died and the
other true of him after his death. Hence his claim that 'Lord Hail-
tion such that one of them can be truly predicated of Lord Hailsham
as 'It might have been the case that it was not always the case that
occur within the brackets, as in 'It might have been the case that it
was always the case that (Lord Hailsham does not exist).' As in the
earlier case, this move, too, relies precariously on denying any dis-
tempt to present a fact about Lord Hailsham without his being a con-
the case that nothing at all ever possessed this property.'25 Obviously,
this does not imply that there is any fact having a nonexistent Lord
but only if they are understood as being about one of Lord Hail-
mother. About it he notes that 'there may be other things which are in this
the world to say something about Lord Hailsham are, mira bile dictu,
saying nothing at all about him, but only about the instantiation of
one or other of his properties. 'Lord Hailsham might never have
To sum up. Williams makes basically the same point about gen-
eral and singular existential propositions alike. It is, first, that the
tails that the propositions are not about individuals at all, but
a name.
of him. On the contrary, 'exists' is in effectis numerous' and 'Lord Hailsham is not none' make
no sense at all.
He recognized, too, that there has surely to be some escape from the
nothing at all about Lord Hailsham himself but merely about the
bewailing the loss of his sons in 'Joseph is not and Simeon is not.'16
say that Jacob in uttering those words was not talking about Joseph
and Simeon but about the use of their names.'l? Similar examples are
the report of God saying to Moses 'I am who am'18 {i.e., 'I am he who
is} and Christ's claim 'Before Abraham was, I am.' 19
sitions as embedding both 'Joseph is' and 'Simeon is,' and deals with
suggests that the biblical authors were no less mistaken in their un-
derstanding of their own language than they were about the origins
Society 55 (1954-55), reprinted in his God and the Soul (London: Routledge
19. John 8:58. King James version. Recall from earlier in the chapter
that the value of this and the earlier example lies not in their accuracy as
translations, but in the quality of the English in which the translations are
expressed.
that they were no less likely to be ignorant of the former than they
about the Big Bang theory, nor even about philosophical logic. It de-
the individuals Simeon and Joseph and saying something about their
names. Had they been so afflicted they could hardly have written the
Old Testament.
uses of 'Lord Hailsham exists' are not about Lord Hailsham might
well hesitate to say the same about the so-called embedded occur-
stood as 'It is no longer the case that (Lord Hailsham exists)' and the
latter as 'It might never have been the case that (Lord Hailsham ex-
about Lord Hailsham: neither of them is about his name. But surely
their being about Lord Hailsham can stem only from the presence of
'Lord Hailsham exists' within them. Here, then, are some apparently
ists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never have existed' are 'propositions
which genuinely say something about a real man': they are 'not propo-
sitions about names nor are the properties they ascribe properties
predicables, one being true of Lord Hailsham before he died and the
other true of him after his death. Hence his claim that 'Lord Hail-
tion such that one of them can be truly predicated of Lord Hailsham
as 'It might have been the case that it was not always the case that
occur within the brackets, as in 'It might have been the case that it
was always the case that (Lord Hailsham does not exist).' As in the
earlier case, this move, too, relies precariously on denying any dis-
tempt to present a fact about Lord Hailsham without his being a con-
the case that nothing at all ever possessed this property.'25 Obviously,
this does not imply that there is any fact having a nonexistent Lord
Hailsham as one of its constituents. Consequently, propositions like
but only if they are understood as being about one of Lord Hail-
mother. About it he notes that 'there may be other things which are in this
the world to say something about Lord Hailsham are, mira bile dictu,
saying nothing at all about him, but only about the instantiation of
To sum up. Williams makes basically the same point about gen-
eral and singular existential propositions alike. It is, first, that the
tails that the propositions are not about individuals at all, but
a name.
of him. On the contrary, 'exists' is in effectis numerous' and 'Lord Hailsham is not none' make
no sense at all.
He recognized, too, that there has surely to be some escape from the
bewailing the loss of his sons in 'Joseph is not and Simeon is not.'16
say that Jacob in uttering those words was not talking about Joseph
and Simeon but about the use of their names.'l? Similar examples are
the report of God saying to Moses 'I am who am'18 {i.e., 'I am he who
sitions as embedding both 'Joseph is' and 'Simeon is,' and deals with
suggests that the biblical authors were no less mistaken in their un-
derstanding of their own language than they were about the origins
14. C. J. F. Williams, Being, Identity, and Truth, 34.
Society 55 (1954-55), reprinted in his God and the Soul (London: Routledge
19. John 8:58. King James version. Recall from earlier in the chapter
that the value of this and the earlier example lies not in their accuracy as
translations, but in the quality of the English in which the translations are
expressed.
about the Big Bang theory, nor even about philosophical logic. It de-
the individuals Simeon and Joseph and saying something about their
names. Had they been so afflicted they could hardly have written the
Old Testament.
uses of 'Lord Hailsham exists' are not about Lord Hailsham might
well hesitate to say the same about the so-called embedded occur-
like 'Lord Hailsham no longer exists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never
stood as 'It is no longer the case that (Lord Hailsham exists)' and the
latter as 'It might never have been the case that (Lord Hailsham ex-
their being about Lord Hailsham can stem only from the presence of
'Lord Hailsham exists' within them. Here, then, are some apparently
ists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never have existed' are 'propositions
which genuinely say something about a real man': they are 'not propo-
sitions about names nor are the properties they ascribe properties
predicables, one being true of Lord Hailsham before he died and the
other true of him after his death. Hence his claim that 'Lord Hail-
tion such that one of them can be truly predicated of Lord Hailsham
as 'It might have been the case that it was not always the case that
occur within the brackets, as in 'It might have been the case that it
was always the case that (Lord Hailsham does not exist).' As in the
earlier case, this move, too, relies precariously on denying any dis-
tempt to present a fact about Lord Hailsham without his being a con-
the case that nothing at all ever possessed this property.'25 Obviously,
this does not imply that there is any fact having a nonexistent Lord
but only if they are understood as being about one of Lord Hail-
the world to say something about Lord Hailsham are, mira bile dictu,
saying nothing at all about him, but only about the instantiation of
To sum up. Williams makes basically the same point about gen-
eral and singular existential propositions alike. It is, first, that the
tails that the propositions are not about individuals at all, but
a name.
of him. On the contrary, 'exists' is in effectis numerous' and 'Lord Hailsham is not none' make
no sense at all.
He recognized, too, that there has surely to be some escape from the
nothing at all about Lord Hailsham himself but merely about the
bewailing the loss of his sons in 'Joseph is not and Simeon is not.'16
say that Jacob in uttering those words was not talking about Joseph
and Simeon but about the use of their names.'l? Similar examples are
the report of God saying to Moses 'I am who am'18 {i.e., 'I am he who
sitions as embedding both 'Joseph is' and 'Simeon is,' and deals with
suggests that the biblical authors were no less mistaken in their un-
derstanding of their own language than they were about the origins
Society 55 (1954-55), reprinted in his God and the Soul (London: Routledge
19. John 8:58. King James version. Recall from earlier in the chapter
that the value of this and the earlier example lies not in their accuracy as
translations, but in the quality of the English in which the translations are
expressed.
that they were no less likely to be ignorant of the former than they
about the Big Bang theory, nor even about philosophical logic. It de-
the individuals Simeon and Joseph and saying something about their
names. Had they been so afflicted they could hardly have written the
Old Testament.
In leaving this dispute unresolved for the moment, it is worth
uses of 'Lord Hailsham exists' are not about Lord Hailsham might
well hesitate to say the same about the so-called embedded occur-
like 'Lord Hailsham no longer exists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never
stood as 'It is no longer the case that (Lord Hailsham exists)' and the
latter as 'It might never have been the case that (Lord Hailsham ex-
about Lord Hailsham: neither of them is about his name. But surely
their being about Lord Hailsham can stem only from the presence of
'Lord Hailsham exists' within them. Here, then, are some apparently
ists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never have existed' are 'propositions
which genuinely say something about a real man': they are 'not propo-
sitions about names nor are the properties they ascribe properties
predicables, one being true of Lord Hailsham before he died and the
other true of him after his death. Hence his claim that 'Lord Hail-
tion such that one of them can be truly predicated of Lord Hailsham
as 'It might have been the case that it was not always the case that
occur within the brackets, as in 'It might have been the case that it
was always the case that (Lord Hailsham does not exist).' As in the
earlier case, this move, too, relies precariously on denying any dis-
tempt to present a fact about Lord Hailsham without his being a con-
the case that nothing at all ever possessed this property.'25 Obviously,
this does not imply that there is any fact having a nonexistent Lord
but only if they are understood as being about one of Lord Hail-
mother. About it he notes that 'there may be other things which are in this
the world to say something about Lord Hailsham are, mira bile dictu,
saying nothing at all about him, but only about the instantiation of
To sum up. Williams makes basically the same point about gen-
eral and singular existential propositions alike. It is, first, that the
tails that the propositions are not about individuals at all, but
a name.
• In embedded singular existential propositions 'Lord Hailsham'
of him. On the contrary, 'exists' is in effectis numerous' and 'Lord Hailsham is not none' make
no sense at all.
He recognized, too, that there has surely to be some escape from the
nothing at all about Lord Hailsham himself but merely about the
bewailing the loss of his sons in 'Joseph is not and Simeon is not.'16
say that Jacob in uttering those words was not talking about Joseph
and Simeon but about the use of their names.'l? Similar examples are
the report of God saying to Moses 'I am who am'18 {i.e., 'I am he who
sitions as embedding both 'Joseph is' and 'Simeon is,' and deals with
suggests that the biblical authors were no less mistaken in their un-
derstanding of their own language than they were about the origins
Society 55 (1954-55), reprinted in his God and the Soul (London: Routledge
19. John 8:58. King James version. Recall from earlier in the chapter
that the value of this and the earlier example lies not in their accuracy as
translations, but in the quality of the English in which the translations are
expressed.
that they were no less likely to be ignorant of the former than they
about the Big Bang theory, nor even about philosophical logic. It de-
the individuals Simeon and Joseph and saying something about their
names. Had they been so afflicted they could hardly have written the
Old Testament.
uses of 'Lord Hailsham exists' are not about Lord Hailsham might
well hesitate to say the same about the so-called embedded occur-
like 'Lord Hailsham no longer exists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never
latter as 'It might never have been the case that (Lord Hailsham ex-
about Lord Hailsham: neither of them is about his name. But surely
their being about Lord Hailsham can stem only from the presence of
'Lord Hailsham exists' within them. Here, then, are some apparently
ists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never have existed' are 'propositions
which genuinely say something about a real man': they are 'not propo-
sitions about names nor are the properties they ascribe properties
predicables, one being true of Lord Hailsham before he died and the
other true of him after his death. Hence his claim that 'Lord Hail-
tion such that one of them can be truly predicated of Lord Hailsham
occur within the brackets, as in 'It might have been the case that it
was always the case that (Lord Hailsham does not exist).' As in the
earlier case, this move, too, relies precariously on denying any dis-
tempt to present a fact about Lord Hailsham without his being a con-
the case that nothing at all ever possessed this property.'25 Obviously,
this does not imply that there is any fact having a nonexistent Lord
mother. About it he notes that 'there may be other things which are in this
the world to say something about Lord Hailsham are, mira bile dictu,
saying nothing at all about him, but only about the instantiation of
To sum up. Williams makes basically the same point about gen-
eral and singular existential propositions alike. It is, first, that the
tails that the propositions are not about individuals at all, but
a name.
of him. On the contrary, 'exists' is in effectis numerous' and 'Lord Hailsham is not none' make
no sense at all.
He recognized, too, that there has surely to be some escape from the
nothing at all about Lord Hailsham himself but merely about the
bewailing the loss of his sons in 'Joseph is not and Simeon is not.'16
say that Jacob in uttering those words was not talking about Joseph
and Simeon but about the use of their names.'l? Similar examples are
the report of God saying to Moses 'I am who am'18 {i.e., 'I am he who
sitions as embedding both 'Joseph is' and 'Simeon is,' and deals with
suggests that the biblical authors were no less mistaken in their un-
derstanding of their own language than they were about the origins
19. John 8:58. King James version. Recall from earlier in the chapter
that the value of this and the earlier example lies not in their accuracy as
translations, but in the quality of the English in which the translations are
expressed.
that they were no less likely to be ignorant of the former than they
the individuals Simeon and Joseph and saying something about their
names. Had they been so afflicted they could hardly have written the
Old Testament.
uses of 'Lord Hailsham exists' are not about Lord Hailsham might
well hesitate to say the same about the so-called embedded occur-
like 'Lord Hailsham no longer exists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never
stood as 'It is no longer the case that (Lord Hailsham exists)' and the
latter as 'It might never have been the case that (Lord Hailsham ex-
about Lord Hailsham: neither of them is about his name. But surely
their being about Lord Hailsham can stem only from the presence of
'Lord Hailsham exists' within them. Here, then, are some apparently
incontestable examples of 'Lord Hailsham exists' being about a per-
ists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never have existed' are 'propositions
which genuinely say something about a real man': they are 'not propo-
sitions about names nor are the properties they ascribe properties
predicables, one being true of Lord Hailsham before he died and the
other true of him after his death. Hence his claim that 'Lord Hail-
tion such that one of them can be truly predicated of Lord Hailsham
as 'It might have been the case that it was not always the case that
occur within the brackets, as in 'It might have been the case that it
was always the case that (Lord Hailsham does not exist).' As in the
earlier case, this move, too, relies precariously on denying any dis-
tempt to present a fact about Lord Hailsham without his being a con-
the case that nothing at all ever possessed this property.'25 Obviously,
this does not imply that there is any fact having a nonexistent Lord
but only if they are understood as being about one of Lord Hail-
mother. About it he notes that 'there may be other things which are in this
the world to say something about Lord Hailsham are, mira bile dictu,
saying nothing at all about him, but only about the instantiation of
To sum up. Williams makes basically the same point about gen-
eral and singular existential propositions alike. It is, first, that the
tails that the propositions are not about individuals at all, but
only about properties or kinds.
a name.
of him. On the contrary, 'exists' is in effectis numerous' and 'Lord Hailsham is not none' make
no sense at all.
He recognized, too, that there has surely to be some escape from the
nothing at all about Lord Hailsham himself but merely about the
bewailing the loss of his sons in 'Joseph is not and Simeon is not.'16
He makes the reasonable comment that 'it would be quite absurd to
say that Jacob in uttering those words was not talking about Joseph
and Simeon but about the use of their names.'l? Similar examples are
the report of God saying to Moses 'I am who am'18 {i.e., 'I am he who
sitions as embedding both 'Joseph is' and 'Simeon is,' and deals with
suggests that the biblical authors were no less mistaken in their un-
derstanding of their own language than they were about the origins
Society 55 (1954-55), reprinted in his God and the Soul (London: Routledge
19. John 8:58. King James version. Recall from earlier in the chapter
that the value of this and the earlier example lies not in their accuracy as
translations, but in the quality of the English in which the translations are
expressed.
that they were no less likely to be ignorant of the former than they
about the Big Bang theory, nor even about philosophical logic. It de-
the individuals Simeon and Joseph and saying something about their
names. Had they been so afflicted they could hardly have written the
Old Testament.
uses of 'Lord Hailsham exists' are not about Lord Hailsham might
well hesitate to say the same about the so-called embedded occur-
like 'Lord Hailsham no longer exists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never
stood as 'It is no longer the case that (Lord Hailsham exists)' and the
latter as 'It might never have been the case that (Lord Hailsham ex-
about Lord Hailsham: neither of them is about his name. But surely
their being about Lord Hailsham can stem only from the presence of
'Lord Hailsham exists' within them. Here, then, are some apparently
ists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never have existed' are 'propositions
which genuinely say something about a real man': they are 'not propo-
sitions about names nor are the properties they ascribe properties
predicables, one being true of Lord Hailsham before he died and the
other true of him after his death. Hence his claim that 'Lord Hail-
tion such that one of them can be truly predicated of Lord Hailsham
as 'It might have been the case that it was not always the case that
occur within the brackets, as in 'It might have been the case that it
was always the case that (Lord Hailsham does not exist).' As in the
earlier case, this move, too, relies precariously on denying any dis-
tempt to present a fact about Lord Hailsham without his being a con-
the case that nothing at all ever possessed this property.'25 Obviously,
this does not imply that there is any fact having a nonexistent Lord
but only if they are understood as being about one of Lord Hail-
mother. About it he notes that 'there may be other things which are in this
the world to say something about Lord Hailsham are, mira bile dictu,
saying nothing at all about him, but only about the instantiation of
To sum up. Williams makes basically the same point about gen-
eral and singular existential propositions alike. It is, first, that the
tails that the propositions are not about individuals at all, but
a name.
He recognized, too, that there has surely to be some escape from the
nothing at all about Lord Hailsham himself but merely about the
bewailing the loss of his sons in 'Joseph is not and Simeon is not.'16
say that Jacob in uttering those words was not talking about Joseph
and Simeon but about the use of their names.'l? Similar examples are
the report of God saying to Moses 'I am who am'18 {i.e., 'I am he who
sitions as embedding both 'Joseph is' and 'Simeon is,' and deals with
them in a way to which I shall return shortly. As for the others, he
suggests that the biblical authors were no less mistaken in their un-
derstanding of their own language than they were about the origins
Society 55 (1954-55), reprinted in his God and the Soul (London: Routledge
19. John 8:58. King James version. Recall from earlier in the chapter
that the value of this and the earlier example lies not in their accuracy as
translations, but in the quality of the English in which the translations are
expressed.
that they were no less likely to be ignorant of the former than they
about the Big Bang theory, nor even about philosophical logic. It de-
the individuals Simeon and Joseph and saying something about their
names. Had they been so afflicted they could hardly have written the
Old Testament.
uses of 'Lord Hailsham exists' are not about Lord Hailsham might
well hesitate to say the same about the so-called embedded occur-
like 'Lord Hailsham no longer exists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never
stood as 'It is no longer the case that (Lord Hailsham exists)' and the
latter as 'It might never have been the case that (Lord Hailsham ex-
ists)'; and, as thus understood, 'Lord Hailsham exists' would seem
about Lord Hailsham: neither of them is about his name. But surely
their being about Lord Hailsham can stem only from the presence of
'Lord Hailsham exists' within them. Here, then, are some apparently
ists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never have existed' are 'propositions
which genuinely say something about a real man': they are 'not propo-
sitions about names nor are the properties they ascribe properties
predicables, one being true of Lord Hailsham before he died and the
other true of him after his death. Hence his claim that 'Lord Hail-
as 'It might have been the case that it was not always the case that
occur within the brackets, as in 'It might have been the case that it
was always the case that (Lord Hailsham does not exist).' As in the
earlier case, this move, too, relies precariously on denying any dis-
tempt to present a fact about Lord Hailsham without his being a con-
the case that nothing at all ever possessed this property.'25 Obviously,
this does not imply that there is any fact having a nonexistent Lord
but only if they are understood as being about one of Lord Hail-
mother. About it he notes that 'there may be other things which are in this
the world to say something about Lord Hailsham are, mira bile dictu,
saying nothing at all about him, but only about the instantiation of
To sum up. Williams makes basically the same point about gen-
eral and singular existential propositions alike. It is, first, that the
tails that the propositions are not about individuals at all, but
a name.
of him. On the contrary, 'exists' is in effectis numerous' and 'Lord Hailsham is not none' make
no sense at all.
He recognized, too, that there has surely to be some escape from the
nothing at all about Lord Hailsham himself but merely about the
bewailing the loss of his sons in 'Joseph is not and Simeon is not.'16
say that Jacob in uttering those words was not talking about Joseph
and Simeon but about the use of their names.'l? Similar examples are
the report of God saying to Moses 'I am who am'18 {i.e., 'I am he who
sitions as embedding both 'Joseph is' and 'Simeon is,' and deals with
suggests that the biblical authors were no less mistaken in their un-
derstanding of their own language than they were about the origins
Society 55 (1954-55), reprinted in his God and the Soul (London: Routledge
19. John 8:58. King James version. Recall from earlier in the chapter
that the value of this and the earlier example lies not in their accuracy as
translations, but in the quality of the English in which the translations are
expressed.
that they were no less likely to be ignorant of the former than they
about the Big Bang theory, nor even about philosophical logic. It de-
the individuals Simeon and Joseph and saying something about their
names. Had they been so afflicted they could hardly have written the
Old Testament.
uses of 'Lord Hailsham exists' are not about Lord Hailsham might
well hesitate to say the same about the so-called embedded occur-
like 'Lord Hailsham no longer exists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never
stood as 'It is no longer the case that (Lord Hailsham exists)' and the
latter as 'It might never have been the case that (Lord Hailsham ex-
about Lord Hailsham: neither of them is about his name. But surely
their being about Lord Hailsham can stem only from the presence of
'Lord Hailsham exists' within them. Here, then, are some apparently
ists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never have existed' are 'propositions
which genuinely say something about a real man': they are 'not propo-
sitions about names nor are the properties they ascribe properties
predicables, one being true of Lord Hailsham before he died and the
other true of him after his death. Hence his claim that 'Lord Hail-
tion such that one of them can be truly predicated of Lord Hailsham
as 'It might have been the case that it was not always the case that
occur within the brackets, as in 'It might have been the case that it
was always the case that (Lord Hailsham does not exist).' As in the
earlier case, this move, too, relies precariously on denying any dis-
tempt to present a fact about Lord Hailsham without his being a con-
stituent of that fact.
the case that nothing at all ever possessed this property.'25 Obviously,
this does not imply that there is any fact having a nonexistent Lord
but only if they are understood as being about one of Lord Hail-
mother. About it he notes that 'there may be other things which are in this
the world to say something about Lord Hailsham are, mira bile dictu,
saying nothing at all about him, but only about the instantiation of
To sum up. Williams makes basically the same point about gen-
eral and singular existential propositions alike. It is, first, that the
tails that the propositions are not about individuals at all, but
a name.
of him. On the contrary, 'exists' is in effectis numerous' and 'Lord Hailsham is not none' make
no sense at all.
He recognized, too, that there has surely to be some escape from the
nothing at all about Lord Hailsham himself but merely about the
bewailing the loss of his sons in 'Joseph is not and Simeon is not.'16
say that Jacob in uttering those words was not talking about Joseph
and Simeon but about the use of their names.'l? Similar examples are
the report of God saying to Moses 'I am who am'18 {i.e., 'I am he who
sitions as embedding both 'Joseph is' and 'Simeon is,' and deals with
suggests that the biblical authors were no less mistaken in their un-
derstanding of their own language than they were about the origins
Society 55 (1954-55), reprinted in his God and the Soul (London: Routledge
19. John 8:58. King James version. Recall from earlier in the chapter
that the value of this and the earlier example lies not in their accuracy as
translations, but in the quality of the English in which the translations are
expressed.
that they were no less likely to be ignorant of the former than they
about the Big Bang theory, nor even about philosophical logic. It de-
the individuals Simeon and Joseph and saying something about their
names. Had they been so afflicted they could hardly have written the
Old Testament.
uses of 'Lord Hailsham exists' are not about Lord Hailsham might
well hesitate to say the same about the so-called embedded occur-
stood as 'It is no longer the case that (Lord Hailsham exists)' and the
latter as 'It might never have been the case that (Lord Hailsham ex-
about Lord Hailsham: neither of them is about his name. But surely
their being about Lord Hailsham can stem only from the presence of
'Lord Hailsham exists' within them. Here, then, are some apparently
ists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never have existed' are 'propositions
which genuinely say something about a real man': they are 'not propo-
sitions about names nor are the properties they ascribe properties
of classes or concepts.'22 What he denies, however, is that the some-
predicables, one being true of Lord Hailsham before he died and the
other true of him after his death. Hence his claim that 'Lord Hail-
tion such that one of them can be truly predicated of Lord Hailsham
as 'It might have been the case that it was not always the case that
occur within the brackets, as in 'It might have been the case that it
was always the case that (Lord Hailsham does not exist).' As in the
earlier case, this move, too, relies precariously on denying any dis-
tempt to present a fact about Lord Hailsham without his being a con-
the case that nothing at all ever possessed this property.'25 Obviously,
this does not imply that there is any fact having a nonexistent Lord
but only if they are understood as being about one of Lord Hail-
mother. About it he notes that 'there may be other things which are in this
the world to say something about Lord Hailsham are, mira bile dictu,
saying nothing at all about him, but only about the instantiation of
eral and singular existential propositions alike. It is, first, that the
tails that the propositions are not about individuals at all, but
a name.
of him. On the contrary, 'exists' is in effectis numerous' and 'Lord Hailsham is not none' make
no sense at all.
He recognized, too, that there has surely to be some escape from the
nothing at all about Lord Hailsham himself but merely about the
bewailing the loss of his sons in 'Joseph is not and Simeon is not.'16
say that Jacob in uttering those words was not talking about Joseph
and Simeon but about the use of their names.'l? Similar examples are
the report of God saying to Moses 'I am who am'18 {i.e., 'I am he who
sitions as embedding both 'Joseph is' and 'Simeon is,' and deals with
suggests that the biblical authors were no less mistaken in their un-
derstanding of their own language than they were about the origins
Society 55 (1954-55), reprinted in his God and the Soul (London: Routledge
19. John 8:58. King James version. Recall from earlier in the chapter
that the value of this and the earlier example lies not in their accuracy as
translations, but in the quality of the English in which the translations are
expressed.
about the Big Bang theory, nor even about philosophical logic. It de-
the individuals Simeon and Joseph and saying something about their
names. Had they been so afflicted they could hardly have written the
Old Testament.
uses of 'Lord Hailsham exists' are not about Lord Hailsham might
well hesitate to say the same about the so-called embedded occur-
like 'Lord Hailsham no longer exists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never
stood as 'It is no longer the case that (Lord Hailsham exists)' and the
latter as 'It might never have been the case that (Lord Hailsham ex-
about Lord Hailsham: neither of them is about his name. But surely
their being about Lord Hailsham can stem only from the presence of
'Lord Hailsham exists' within them. Here, then, are some apparently
ists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never have existed' are 'propositions
which genuinely say something about a real man': they are 'not propo-
sitions about names nor are the properties they ascribe properties
predicables, one being true of Lord Hailsham before he died and the
other true of him after his death. Hence his claim that 'Lord Hail-
tion such that one of them can be truly predicated of Lord Hailsham
as 'It might have been the case that it was not always the case that
occur within the brackets, as in 'It might have been the case that it
was always the case that (Lord Hailsham does not exist).' As in the
earlier case, this move, too, relies precariously on denying any dis-
tinction between internal and external negation. By allowing only in-
tempt to present a fact about Lord Hailsham without his being a con-
the case that nothing at all ever possessed this property.'25 Obviously,
this does not imply that there is any fact having a nonexistent Lord
but only if they are understood as being about one of Lord Hail-
mother. About it he notes that 'there may be other things which are in this
the world to say something about Lord Hailsham are, mira bile dictu,
saying nothing at all about him, but only about the instantiation of
To sum up. Williams makes basically the same point about gen-
eral and singular existential propositions alike. It is, first, that the
tails that the propositions are not about individuals at all, but
a name.
of him. On the contrary, 'exists' is in effectis numerous' and 'Lord Hailsham is not none' make
no sense at all.
He recognized, too, that there has surely to be some escape from the
nothing at all about Lord Hailsham himself but merely about the
bewailing the loss of his sons in 'Joseph is not and Simeon is not.'16
say that Jacob in uttering those words was not talking about Joseph
and Simeon but about the use of their names.'l? Similar examples are
the report of God saying to Moses 'I am who am'18 {i.e., 'I am he who
sitions as embedding both 'Joseph is' and 'Simeon is,' and deals with
suggests that the biblical authors were no less mistaken in their un-
derstanding of their own language than they were about the origins
Society 55 (1954-55), reprinted in his God and the Soul (London: Routledge
19. John 8:58. King James version. Recall from earlier in the chapter
that the value of this and the earlier example lies not in their accuracy as
translations, but in the quality of the English in which the translations are
expressed.
that they were no less likely to be ignorant of the former than they
about the Big Bang theory, nor even about philosophical logic. It de-
the individuals Simeon and Joseph and saying something about their
names. Had they been so afflicted they could hardly have written the
Old Testament.
uses of 'Lord Hailsham exists' are not about Lord Hailsham might
well hesitate to say the same about the so-called embedded occur-
like 'Lord Hailsham no longer exists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never
stood as 'It is no longer the case that (Lord Hailsham exists)' and the
latter as 'It might never have been the case that (Lord Hailsham ex-
about Lord Hailsham: neither of them is about his name. But surely
their being about Lord Hailsham can stem only from the presence of
'Lord Hailsham exists' within them. Here, then, are some apparently
ists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never have existed' are 'propositions
which genuinely say something about a real man': they are 'not propo-
sitions about names nor are the properties they ascribe properties
predicables, one being true of Lord Hailsham before he died and the
other true of him after his death. Hence his claim that 'Lord Hail-
tion such that one of them can be truly predicated of Lord Hailsham
as 'It might have been the case that it was not always the case that
occur within the brackets, as in 'It might have been the case that it
was always the case that (Lord Hailsham does not exist).' As in the
earlier case, this move, too, relies precariously on denying any dis-
tempt to present a fact about Lord Hailsham without his being a con-
the case that nothing at all ever possessed this property.'25 Obviously,
this does not imply that there is any fact having a nonexistent Lord
but only if they are understood as being about one of Lord Hail-
mother. About it he notes that 'there may be other things which are in this
the world to say something about Lord Hailsham are, mira bile dictu,
saying nothing at all about him, but only about the instantiation of
To sum up. Williams makes basically the same point about gen-
eral and singular existential propositions alike. It is, first, that the
tails that the propositions are not about individuals at all, but
of him. On the contrary, 'exists' is in effectis numerous' and 'Lord Hailsham is not none' make
no sense at all.
He recognized, too, that there has surely to be some escape from the
nothing at all about Lord Hailsham himself but merely about the
bewailing the loss of his sons in 'Joseph is not and Simeon is not.'16
say that Jacob in uttering those words was not talking about Joseph
and Simeon but about the use of their names.'l? Similar examples are
the report of God saying to Moses 'I am who am'18 {i.e., 'I am he who
sitions as embedding both 'Joseph is' and 'Simeon is,' and deals with
suggests that the biblical authors were no less mistaken in their un-
derstanding of their own language than they were about the origins
Society 55 (1954-55), reprinted in his God and the Soul (London: Routledge
19. John 8:58. King James version. Recall from earlier in the chapter
that the value of this and the earlier example lies not in their accuracy as
translations, but in the quality of the English in which the translations are
expressed.
that they were no less likely to be ignorant of the former than they
about the Big Bang theory, nor even about philosophical logic. It de-
the individuals Simeon and Joseph and saying something about their
names. Had they been so afflicted they could hardly have written the
Old Testament.
uses of 'Lord Hailsham exists' are not about Lord Hailsham might
well hesitate to say the same about the so-called embedded occur-
like 'Lord Hailsham no longer exists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never
have existed,' to mention but a couple. The former might be under-
stood as 'It is no longer the case that (Lord Hailsham exists)' and the
latter as 'It might never have been the case that (Lord Hailsham ex-
about Lord Hailsham: neither of them is about his name. But surely
their being about Lord Hailsham can stem only from the presence of
'Lord Hailsham exists' within them. Here, then, are some apparently
ists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never have existed' are 'propositions
which genuinely say something about a real man': they are 'not propo-
sitions about names nor are the properties they ascribe properties
predicables, one being true of Lord Hailsham before he died and the
other true of him after his death. Hence his claim that 'Lord Hail-
tion such that one of them can be truly predicated of Lord Hailsham
as 'It might have been the case that it was not always the case that
occur within the brackets, as in 'It might have been the case that it
was always the case that (Lord Hailsham does not exist).' As in the
earlier case, this move, too, relies precariously on denying any dis-
tempt to present a fact about Lord Hailsham without his being a con-
the case that nothing at all ever possessed this property.'25 Obviously,
this does not imply that there is any fact having a nonexistent Lord
mother. About it he notes that 'there may be other things which are in this
the world to say something about Lord Hailsham are, mira bile dictu,
saying nothing at all about him, but only about the instantiation of
To sum up. Williams makes basically the same point about gen-
eral and singular existential propositions alike. It is, first, that the
negative ones do seem to generate a paradox and, second, that the
tails that the propositions are not about individuals at all, but
a name.
of him. On the contrary, 'exists' is in effectis numerous' and 'Lord Hailsham is not none' make
no sense at all.
He recognized, too, that there has surely to be some escape from the
nothing at all about Lord Hailsham himself but merely about the
bewailing the loss of his sons in 'Joseph is not and Simeon is not.'16
say that Jacob in uttering those words was not talking about Joseph
and Simeon but about the use of their names.'l? Similar examples are
the report of God saying to Moses 'I am who am'18 {i.e., 'I am he who
sitions as embedding both 'Joseph is' and 'Simeon is,' and deals with
suggests that the biblical authors were no less mistaken in their un-
derstanding of their own language than they were about the origins
Society 55 (1954-55), reprinted in his God and the Soul (London: Routledge
19. John 8:58. King James version. Recall from earlier in the chapter
that the value of this and the earlier example lies not in their accuracy as
translations, but in the quality of the English in which the translations are
expressed.
that they were no less likely to be ignorant of the former than they
the individuals Simeon and Joseph and saying something about their
names. Had they been so afflicted they could hardly have written the
Old Testament.
uses of 'Lord Hailsham exists' are not about Lord Hailsham might
well hesitate to say the same about the so-called embedded occur-
like 'Lord Hailsham no longer exists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never
stood as 'It is no longer the case that (Lord Hailsham exists)' and the
latter as 'It might never have been the case that (Lord Hailsham ex-
about Lord Hailsham: neither of them is about his name. But surely
their being about Lord Hailsham can stem only from the presence of
'Lord Hailsham exists' within them. Here, then, are some apparently
ists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never have existed' are 'propositions
which genuinely say something about a real man': they are 'not propo-
sitions about names nor are the properties they ascribe properties
predicables, one being true of Lord Hailsham before he died and the
other true of him after his death. Hence his claim that 'Lord Hail-
tion such that one of them can be truly predicated of Lord Hailsham
as 'It might have been the case that it was not always the case that
occur within the brackets, as in 'It might have been the case that it
was always the case that (Lord Hailsham does not exist).' As in the
earlier case, this move, too, relies precariously on denying any dis-
tempt to present a fact about Lord Hailsham without his being a con-
the case that nothing at all ever possessed this property.'25 Obviously,
this does not imply that there is any fact having a nonexistent Lord
but only if they are understood as being about one of Lord Hail-
mother. About it he notes that 'there may be other things which are in this
the world to say something about Lord Hailsham are, mira bile dictu,
saying nothing at all about him, but only about the instantiation of
To sum up. Williams makes basically the same point about gen-
eral and singular existential propositions alike. It is, first, that the
tails that the propositions are not about individuals at all, but
only about properties or kinds.
a name.
of him. On the contrary, 'exists' is in effectis numerous' and 'Lord Hailsham is not none' make
no sense at all.
He recognized, too, that there has surely to be some escape from the
nothing at all about Lord Hailsham himself but merely about the
say that Jacob in uttering those words was not talking about Joseph
and Simeon but about the use of their names.'l? Similar examples are
the report of God saying to Moses 'I am who am'18 {i.e., 'I am he who
sitions as embedding both 'Joseph is' and 'Simeon is,' and deals with
suggests that the biblical authors were no less mistaken in their un-
derstanding of their own language than they were about the origins
Society 55 (1954-55), reprinted in his God and the Soul (London: Routledge
19. John 8:58. King James version. Recall from earlier in the chapter
that the value of this and the earlier example lies not in their accuracy as
translations, but in the quality of the English in which the translations are
expressed.
20. C. J. F. Williams, What Is Existence? 146.
that they were no less likely to be ignorant of the former than they
about the Big Bang theory, nor even about philosophical logic. It de-
the individuals Simeon and Joseph and saying something about their
names. Had they been so afflicted they could hardly have written the
Old Testament.
well hesitate to say the same about the so-called embedded occur-
like 'Lord Hailsham no longer exists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never
stood as 'It is no longer the case that (Lord Hailsham exists)' and the
latter as 'It might never have been the case that (Lord Hailsham ex-
about Lord Hailsham: neither of them is about his name. But surely
their being about Lord Hailsham can stem only from the presence of
'Lord Hailsham exists' within them. Here, then, are some apparently
ists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never have existed' are 'propositions
which genuinely say something about a real man': they are 'not propo-
sitions about names nor are the properties they ascribe properties
predicables, one being true of Lord Hailsham before he died and the
other true of him after his death. Hence his claim that 'Lord Hail-
tion such that one of them can be truly predicated of Lord Hailsham
as 'It might have been the case that it was not always the case that
occur within the brackets, as in 'It might have been the case that it
was always the case that (Lord Hailsham does not exist).' As in the
earlier case, this move, too, relies precariously on denying any dis-
tempt to present a fact about Lord Hailsham without his being a con-
the case that nothing at all ever possessed this property.'25 Obviously,
this does not imply that there is any fact having a nonexistent Lord
but only if they are understood as being about one of Lord Hail-
mother. About it he notes that 'there may be other things which are in this
the world to say something about Lord Hailsham are, mira bile dictu,
saying nothing at all about him, but only about the instantiation of
To sum up. Williams makes basically the same point about gen-
eral and singular existential propositions alike. It is, first, that the
tails that the propositions are not about individuals at all, but
a name.
of him. On the contrary, 'exists' is in effectis numerous' and 'Lord Hailsham is not none' make
no sense at all.
He recognized, too, that there has surely to be some escape from the
nothing at all about Lord Hailsham himself but merely about the
bewailing the loss of his sons in 'Joseph is not and Simeon is not.'16
say that Jacob in uttering those words was not talking about Joseph
and Simeon but about the use of their names.'l? Similar examples are
the report of God saying to Moses 'I am who am'18 {i.e., 'I am he who
sitions as embedding both 'Joseph is' and 'Simeon is,' and deals with
them in a way to which I shall return shortly. As for the others, he
suggests that the biblical authors were no less mistaken in their un-
derstanding of their own language than they were about the origins
Society 55 (1954-55), reprinted in his God and the Soul (London: Routledge
19. John 8:58. King James version. Recall from earlier in the chapter
that the value of this and the earlier example lies not in their accuracy as
translations, but in the quality of the English in which the translations are
expressed.
that they were no less likely to be ignorant of the former than they
about the Big Bang theory, nor even about philosophical logic. It de-
the individuals Simeon and Joseph and saying something about their
names. Had they been so afflicted they could hardly have written the
Old Testament.
uses of 'Lord Hailsham exists' are not about Lord Hailsham might
well hesitate to say the same about the so-called embedded occur-
like 'Lord Hailsham no longer exists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never
stood as 'It is no longer the case that (Lord Hailsham exists)' and the
latter as 'It might never have been the case that (Lord Hailsham ex-
about Lord Hailsham: neither of them is about his name. But surely
their being about Lord Hailsham can stem only from the presence of
'Lord Hailsham exists' within them. Here, then, are some apparently
ists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never have existed' are 'propositions
which genuinely say something about a real man': they are 'not propo-
sitions about names nor are the properties they ascribe properties
predicables, one being true of Lord Hailsham before he died and the
other true of him after his death. Hence his claim that 'Lord Hail-
tion such that one of them can be truly predicated of Lord Hailsham
as 'It might have been the case that it was not always the case that
was always the case that (Lord Hailsham does not exist).' As in the
earlier case, this move, too, relies precariously on denying any dis-
tempt to present a fact about Lord Hailsham without his being a con-
the case that nothing at all ever possessed this property.'25 Obviously,
this does not imply that there is any fact having a nonexistent Lord
but only if they are understood as being about one of Lord Hail-
mother. About it he notes that 'there may be other things which are in this
the world to say something about Lord Hailsham are, mira bile dictu,
saying nothing at all about him, but only about the instantiation of
To sum up. Williams makes basically the same point about gen-
eral and singular existential propositions alike. It is, first, that the
tails that the propositions are not about individuals at all, but
a name.
of him. On the contrary, 'exists' is in effectis numerous' and 'Lord Hailsham is not none' make
no sense at all.
He recognized, too, that there has surely to be some escape from the
nothing at all about Lord Hailsham himself but merely about the
bewailing the loss of his sons in 'Joseph is not and Simeon is not.'16
say that Jacob in uttering those words was not talking about Joseph
and Simeon but about the use of their names.'l? Similar examples are
the report of God saying to Moses 'I am who am'18 {i.e., 'I am he who
sitions as embedding both 'Joseph is' and 'Simeon is,' and deals with
suggests that the biblical authors were no less mistaken in their un-
derstanding of their own language than they were about the origins
Society 55 (1954-55), reprinted in his God and the Soul (London: Routledge
19. John 8:58. King James version. Recall from earlier in the chapter
that the value of this and the earlier example lies not in their accuracy as
translations, but in the quality of the English in which the translations are
expressed.
that they were no less likely to be ignorant of the former than they
about the Big Bang theory, nor even about philosophical logic. It de-
the individuals Simeon and Joseph and saying something about their
names. Had they been so afflicted they could hardly have written the
Old Testament.
uses of 'Lord Hailsham exists' are not about Lord Hailsham might
well hesitate to say the same about the so-called embedded occur-
like 'Lord Hailsham no longer exists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never
stood as 'It is no longer the case that (Lord Hailsham exists)' and the
latter as 'It might never have been the case that (Lord Hailsham ex-
about Lord Hailsham: neither of them is about his name. But surely
their being about Lord Hailsham can stem only from the presence of
'Lord Hailsham exists' within them. Here, then, are some apparently
ists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never have existed' are 'propositions
which genuinely say something about a real man': they are 'not propo-
sitions about names nor are the properties they ascribe properties
predicables, one being true of Lord Hailsham before he died and the
other true of him after his death. Hence his claim that 'Lord Hail-
tion such that one of them can be truly predicated of Lord Hailsham
as 'It might have been the case that it was not always the case that
occur within the brackets, as in 'It might have been the case that it
was always the case that (Lord Hailsham does not exist).' As in the
earlier case, this move, too, relies precariously on denying any dis-
the case that nothing at all ever possessed this property.'25 Obviously,
this does not imply that there is any fact having a nonexistent Lord
but only if they are understood as being about one of Lord Hail-
mother. About it he notes that 'there may be other things which are in this
saying nothing at all about him, but only about the instantiation of
To sum up. Williams makes basically the same point about gen-
eral and singular existential propositions alike. It is, first, that the
tails that the propositions are not about individuals at all, but
a name.