Relationship between political orientation and socio

economic status in Chilean political culture: a

*
political psychology approach
Andrés Haye
Héctor Carvacho
Roberto González
Jorge Manzi
**

Carolina Segovia
***

Abstract: Based on a longitudinal study about political culture in Chile, we discuss the paradoxical evidence
found in the literature suggesting, on one hand, that the more pro-democratic and anti-authoritarian political attitudes are
expected to be observed in higher economic level groups and, on the other hand, more conservative and anti-egalitarian
attitudes are expected to be observed in dominant groups. We found that the pattern of political attitudes
(authoritarianism, support to democracy, conservatism, and nationalism) is similar among right wingers of high economic
status, left wingers of low economic status, and centrists of middle economic status. Instead, individuals whose political
standing is incongruent with their socio economic group, show a pattern of political attitudes different from the
predominant pattern. We conclude that the paradox can be solved explaining the pattern of political attitudes of a social
group as a function of the adjustment of its political identity to its socio economic condition.
Key words: ideology, political attitudes, social class, political identity, Chile.

Relación entre orientación política y condición socioeconómica

en la cultura política chilena: una aproximación desde la psicología política
Resumen: A partir de un estudio longitudinal sobre cultura política en chilenos, discutimos la paradojal evidencia
encontrada en la literatura que plantea que, por un lado, las actitudes políticas más pro-democráticas y anti-autoritarias se
observarían en sectores sociales acomodados y, por otro lado, las actitudes más pro-conservadoras y anti-igualitaristas se
observarían en grupos sociales dominantes. Nuestros datos muestran que el patrón de actitudes políticas (autoritarismo,
apoyo a la democracia, conservadurismo y nacionalismo) es similar entre personas de derecha de estrato alto, izquierda de
estrato bajo, y centro de estrato medio. En cambio, quienes manifiestan una orientación política incongruente con su
condición socioeconómica presentan actitudes políticas diferenciadas del patrón predominante. Concluimos que la
paradoja puede resolverse explicando el patrón de actitudes políticas de un grupo en función del (des)ajuste de la
orientación política a sus condiciones socioeconómicas.
Palabras clave: ideología, actitudes políticas, clase social, identidad política, Chile.

Received: 13.05.2009 Accepted: 10.06.2009

***

Introduction
Since Marx began to use the ideology notion in the broad sense it has until today, very much has been
written on this topic in diverse social sciences fields. In very general terms, this notion refers to the problem
of complex, if not dark relations between ideas and beliefs a community supports and its life social statuses.
Sociology, history, philosophy, esthetics, political science, psychoanalysis and social psychology have
entered upon multiple ideology problems aspects, without such problems reaching clear theoretical resolution,
and they have analyzed different contemporary world ambiences using the ideology notion without being
provided up to today with a precise agreed use of the concept. It speaks at the same time how evasive and
difficult this concept is, as well as its heuristic power to stimulate the reflection and investigation in these
diverse social sciences fields.
 In the use Marx gives to the ideology concept, this is understood, in the modern society’s historical
frame, as the conscience social production which psychological compliance allows, under certain
circumstances, to keep hidden flaws and proper contradictions of the same social process which generates it,
the capitalism (Larraín 2007, Marx and Engels 1845/1974). Among the notion central features, it is necessary
to emphasize on one hand that the ideology fulfills the social reality receiving action and, on another, it is
anchored in the psychological means of representation and action. This false call conscience function would
differ from the clergy trick theories, which were present in the debate before Marx, since in the ideology case
the hiding is not a consequence of a deliberate trick but of a production system of the functional conscience to
the maintaining and development of the current social order (Lenk 1974). The conscience production system
notion remits to the individuals’ socialization in certain ways of perceiving and arranging the world, and in
particular values through which judge and hierarchy the experience, as well as to act with sense in the world.
This anchoring of the hiding operation in the subjective configuration of individuals would depend on a social
organization of socialization practices that remain institutionalized, for example, in the family and school
instances (Althusser 1997).

Both ideas, the hiding function and the ideology psychological anchoring, have been discussed
extensively in the last 150 years (see for example Adorno and Horkheimer 1969, Althusser 1997, Jost 2006,
Jost et al. 2009, Jost et al. 2008, Knight 2006, Larraín 2008, Lenk 1974); along this article will be themed
specially from the evidence we have found in a study on political culture done in Santiago, Chile. On one
hand, the ideology hiding function will be entered upon in terms of the relation observed in the study between
the positions people take in front of diverse political world aspects and its socio economic existence
conditions. In this sense, this article brings the study results with a specific focus in the crossing between
political culture and socio economic level.

On the other hand, the psychological ideology anchoring examination will be based on the study object
definition: the psychological individuals’ dispositions. The methodological approach of this investigation
involves an approach to the representation forms and the action sense especially in terms of people’s political
attitudes. The attitude notion (see Eagly and Chaiken 1993) integrates the cognitive (representation) and
motivational (action) dimensions in the form of evaluation position captures of individuals against situations
or world elements, in this case, politic (see for example Robinson et al. 1999). Especially, the political
attitudes notion refers to individuals widespread psychological tendencies, that is to say, to inclinations
towards one or another position attitude against structural or relatively stable aspects of the political world (in
contrast with punctual or contingent aspects), as the favorable / unfavorable disposal to authoritarian relations
to support order (authoritarianism, see Altemeyer 1998, Feldman 2003), the positive / negative disposition
against institutions of the political world (like support, confidence, etc., see Citrin and Muste 1993, Segovia et
al. 2008), or the social promotion / resistance disposition to change (conservatism, Jost et al. 2003a).
Operationally, attitudes are understood from multiple position attitudes records regarding statements that
affirm something about some of the politician world aspects. This way, the present article registers in the
tradition of social-political psychology (for example, Adorno et al. 1950, Jost et al. 2009), especially in the
perspective to understand the political group culture as the joint of political attitudes of the individuals who
compose it (Almond and Verba 1965, Pye and Verba 1965, Jost et al 2009).

In social psychology, the most influential ideology definition is the one presented by Adorno and his
collaborators (1950). For them ideology is an organization of opinions, attitudes and values, a way of thinking
about man and society. Several of the most important authors in the area (Billig 1984, Jost 2006, Kerlinger
1984) have based their own works on this definition. We equally follow this perspective, but we will assume
the following conceptual distinctions for this article.

Political culture, ideology, political attitudes

We will name political culture the organization of beliefs and evaluations as regards the political
world, on which are supported social practices opened in that political world in a certain society, and which is
different from the organization of beliefs and evaluations of another society according to its specific social
history and its political world characteristics. This way, Chileans political culture will be the way in which
predominantly are organized visions and political preferences between Chileans in a relatively stable way
through time. This theoretical definition, therefore, implies that operationally it is important to identify beliefs
and relatively deep or permanent evaluations, in contrast with contingent elements. This concept of political
culture, therefore, denotes something very similar to the ideology concept earlier quoted: "organization of
opinions, attitudes and values». Nevertheless, it is about a level of different description. The political culture
notion implies that it is common to group members. Nevertheless, typically the political world is an object of
controversies structured in a systematical way concerning particular ideological orientations (Billig et al.
1988). The political culture ideological character takes root exactly in the differentiation of beliefs and
evaluations inside the society. Certainly in a political culture typically are a few principles completely shared
between society members, but such principles acquire an ideological value (and possibly of false conscience)
only from the alternative values point of view which can come from other societies or epochs, as well as
being imagined from the denial or reflective modification of the own principles commonly presupposed.

Here we understand ideology as a specific orientation of beliefs and evaluations inside a society
constituted by its difference with other orientations inside the same society. For example, this distinction will
be used to identify particular movements of certain groups to the interior of the Chilean political culture
which, differing like a majority or, alternatively, differing from the majority, establish particular ways of
ideologically manifest, following a specific political attitudes configuration pattern that will be discussed
towards the end of the article. The ideological configuration of a group would be, then, the common profile of
political attitudes members of such group show. In this sense, an ideology is the attitudes pattern common to a
group from the point of view of its difference politically relevant with other patterns. A political culture
differentiates ideologically according to dimensions (like for example authoritarianism, liberalism,
conservatism, nationalism, etc.) which are relevant for the structure of social practices tied to a certain
political world. Hence, between two ideological groups, for example one pro democratic and another anti
democratic, the democracy support dimension constitutes a common structural aspect of political culture and
at the same time a relevant factor of ideological differentiation.

Finally, at a more concrete level, we will do a distinction between political orientation and ideological
configuration. We understand the first one like the subject position in terms of oppositions as for example left
/ right, liberal / conservative, democracy / authoritarianism, pro/anti government, etc., that is to say of
widespread symbolic polarities. In this study we have operated on the political orientation of people as their
self positioning in a left - right dimension, which is more extensively used in the investigation (Jost 2006) and
the one that turns out to be more familiar to the language of Chilean political culture (Colomer and Escatel
2005, Navia 2004, 2005, 2007, Ortega 2003). In this sense, the political orientation can be hoped to serve like
an abstract summary of ideology, or ideological configuration, as soon as particular way of multiple political
attitudes organization, as are the authoritarian dispositions, the democracy support level, the grade of social
resistance to change, the confidence towards particular political institutions, etc., that in their set endure a
complexity and level multiplicity the political orientation does not have (Jost et to. 2009). If the political
orientation is or not a good group ideology summary in a certain political culture, it is an empirical question
that has been entered upon in diverse contexts and with multiple means (Colomer and Escatel 2005, Jost
2006, Jost et al. 2009, Knight 1999).1

Ideology and socio economic condition

The relation between ideology and economic access level, as well as the position in the economic
structure, has been raised very early in the social sciences discussion. In the Marxist tradition, this relation
becomes relevant in Lukács and Althusser´s works. The first one influenced by Lenin's work, raises a neutral
ideology concept, differing from Marx's expositions (Larraín, 2008) which do not imply conscience being
always and necessarily false or concealing. For Lúkacs, ideology is identified by the concept of class
conscience, which can be psychological, when it corresponds to psychologically explicable ideas people have
on their life situation; or assigned, when it corresponds to own reactions to a particular position in the process
of production (Lukács, 1969). Althusser (1997) proposes that ideology appears like certain world
representation which ties men with their existence conditions and to men between themselves; the ideology is
present in all man’s activities and it would be only intelligible through its structure, since it would differ in
different existing social formations, for example social classes.
 In social psychology Adorno et al. (1950) proposed the authoritarian personality was more common in
the hard-working class. This relation has been studied for a long time, being certain consensus on the fact that
people from minor income and minor educational level have major authoritarianism levels (Napier and Jost
2008, Schuman et al. 1992). This situation is seen reflected in a major support to the authorities (Carlin 2006).
Nevertheless, there is no consensus in the reasons that explain this situation. The influential work of Lipset
(Lipset 1960, Lipset and Raab 1978) on the “working class authoritarianism” suggests the intolerance
concentrates especially on the economically disadvantageous groups. This work is checked in detail by Napier
and Jost (2008) in view of the system justification theory. The system justification theory searches to
overcome the previously proposed by the group identity theories (Tajfel and Turner 1986) and of the social
domination (Pratto, Sidanius and Levin 2006, Sidanius 1993, Sidanius and Pratto 1999). According to the
system justification theory, people not only have favorable attitudes towards their own group, but also
towards the existing social system and statu quo (Jost and Hunyady, 2002; 2005; Jost, Banaji, and Nosek,
2004). This would happen, at least partly, because an ideological reason exists to justify the existing social
order. This ideological reason would drive to open favor for the exo group, over the own group, and the
inferiority internalization of disadvantageous groups, which would be evident principally in a non conscious
or implicit level; and that this is stronger into the social order disadvantageous groups (op cit). As hypotheses
they argue an explanation for this can be the adaptive aptitudes development to settle, go internally and
rationalize the environmental keys, especially those which make change difficult or disable. (Jost, Banaji and
Nosek 2004).

Additionally, the same Jost has found a positive interrelation between the right political orientation and
income (Carney et al. 2008), and that income is a right- wing predictor, although weaker than religiosity,
authoritarianism (conventionality and moral absolutism), the intolerance and economic conservatism (Napier
and Jost 2008); these finds are unstable with the evidence indicated previously.

In other words, the investigation offers us an ambiguous picture. On one hand, the most pro-
democratic and more anti-authoritarian political attitudes would be observed in wealthier social sectors, since
they are the product of a more sophisticated process of education, which allows people to develop more
elaborated attitudes (Adorno et al. 1950, Jost et al. 2003, Kemmelmeier 2008, Michaud et al. 2009). This
thesis, nevertheless, does not sufficiently take into consideration the ideological differences to the interior of
the same socio economic sector. On other hand, the most pro-conservative attitudes and more anti-
equalitarian would observe in domineering social groups, interested in the maintenance of power and
economic access hierarchies( see for example Sidanius and Pratto 1999), while the opposite would happen in
oppressed or low social status groups, more favorable to the promotion of social change in pursuit of equality.
This second thesis, which prediction is completely opposite to the first one, neither takes into consideration
the ideological differences to the interior of the same socio economic sector. In both cases a simple relation is
established between ideological and socio economic position. The present article enters upon this relation
problem between the ideological position and the economic people’s position, with the hypothesis of which
this is a complex relation, which does not allow explaining people’s ideological configuration as linear
function of its socio economic condition. In particular, in the article we advocate, with empirical evidence, for
a model that centers on ideological differences to the interior of a same socio economic sector and which
allows bringing together in a coherent way two theses present in literature, even seeming contradictory. In
brief, in this study we have analyzed people’s ideological configuration in terms of those political attitudes
which have been especially linked to this discussion on ideological and economic position, namely:
authoritarianism, support to democratic systems, conservatism and nationalism.

The investigation
Design and sample
To investigate into Chilean’s political culture we have done a longitudinal study with three
measurements for the same subjects, separated by intervals of approximately 14 months. The sample was
stratified by age group and level of economic access. We distinguish three socio economic levels
characterized by their income and life standard, which might qualify in:
 - High level: familiar income higher than $ 2.000.000 (U$3,250) monthly approximately,
corresponding to the 10 % superior population (Planning Department, Government of Chile 2006).

- Middle level: familiar income between $ 450.000 (U$750) and $ 2.000.000 (U$3,250) monthly
approximately, corresponding to 50 % of the population (op. cit.).

- Low level: familiar income less than $ 450.000 (U$750) monthly approximately, corresponding to 40
% of the population (op. cit.).

The design included different age groups because there have been demonstrated ideological
differences associated with cohorts of age (Alwin and Krosnick 1991). There is a well placed perspective on
the narrow relation between belonging to an age group socialized under specific conditions and its ideological
configuration (Duncan and Agronick 1995, Schuman and Scott 1989, Sears 1990, Steward and Healy 1989).
Complementarily, in the political socialization field, as well as in investigations developed from the life cycle
theory, it coincides in defining the late adolescence stage or early adulthood as the most decisive period to
outline opinions, attitudes and orientations concerning the political matter (Sears and Levy 2003, Steward and
Healy 1989). This way for example, there is a high consensus in the association between becoming older and
adopting more conservative political attitudes (Glenn 1974, Ross 1989), situation that has already been
observed in Chile (Luna 2008).

To distinguish age groups we base on the hypothesis of which political socialization contexts might
form relevant ideological differences between groups (for example in Mcdevitt and Chaffee 2002, also see
Dawson and Prewitt 1969, Jennings and Niemi 1981); we define three age groups:

- Older: 53 - 63 years, which were 18 years before the military coup of 1973, having been politically
socialized during the democratic governments before to the military coup (Frei Montalva and Allende´s
presidencies).

- Adults: 36 - 43 years, these reached 18 before the return to democracy, and would have actively
taken part in the plebiscite that led to it (Toro 2008).

- Young people: 20 - 27 years, which reached 18 around Michelle Bachelet´s 2005 presidential
election and whose political socialization has mainly occur inside a post-dictatorial democratic government.

We design a mixed sampling, in which we select randomly a set of Big Santiago’s areas segmented by
socio economic level2. For every area we assigned randomly up to 5 subjects in accordance with quotas by
sex and age. We intentionally over represented the high level socio economic group to guarantee sample sizes
equivalents for each group, to allow inter group comparability. The contact was done in the subjects
domiciles, by poll researchers specially qualified for such effects.

In the first measurement, done the second semester of 2005, we poll 996 valid cases, being 27 % of
them from high socio economic level, 37 % middle, and 36 % low. 52 % of the cases were women and 48 %
men. 33 % corresponded to the major age group, 33 % to the adult group and 34 % to the young one. This
measurement was done 4 months before the first round of the 2005 presidential election.

The second measurement was done the second semester of 2006. In it we re-contact 695 participants
polled the previous year. Additionally, we contact 146 subjects to replace the sample loss. The sample
composition is equivalent in terms of the socio economical, sex and age participants´ level.

The third measurement was done the first semester of 2008 and re-contacted 663 subjects. Of these,
494 were polled in three measurements, 73 in the first and third measurement, and 96 subjects in the second
and third measurement; the sample composition also was kept for this measurement.

The sample loss for subjects which took part in all the measurements is 50,4 % between the year 1 and
3. The subjects which took part in at least two measurements correspond to 37,2 %, while 13,2 % of the
subjects took part in just one measurement.
 In the introduction it was raised that the political culture is a relatively stable organization of attitudes
regarding the political world in a certain society. It is important to consider the relative stability of the relation
between such elements through a temporary window, since otherwise it cannot be empirically differentiated
the own political culture from those attitudes and contingent opinions, which are more superficial from the
ideology notion point of view and are, for the same, more variable in time. This has been, in fact, the main
reason of the longitudinal design of the present study, in which we have covered a temporary window of three
years and a half. This way, to characterize Chileans political culture we will identify the interrelation pattern
of some of these attitudinal elements predominantly through three measurements.

Measures of ideological positioning and political attitudes

Political orientation
To estimate the participants´ political orientation we have asked them every measurement year to be
positioned in a scale from 1 to 9, where 1 is left, 5 is center and 9 is right. Jost (2006) and Knight (1999) have
showed this is a valid and reliable way of measuring the identification with the left and right political
orientations.

Results throw a 5,16 average in the first measurement, 5,07 in the second one, and 5,14 in the third
one, without being significant statistics differences between these measurements (F = 2,768; p <0,05), what
shows the self positioning stability in time. This stability, together with the high interrelation between the
three political orientation measurements (see Picture 1), testify about the reliability of this measurement.

Picture 1: Interrelations between Political Orientation measurements

Measurement Measurement Measurement 3

1 2
Measurement Interrelation de 1 0,654 *** 0,659 ***
1 Pearson
N 922 603 477
Interrelation de 1 0,629 ***
Measurement Pearson
2
N 761 473
Interrelation de 1
Measurement Pearson
3
N 585

*** p < 0,001

Authoritarianism
From The Authoritarian Personality publication (Adorno et al. 1950), the authoritarianism has been in
the center of the investigation in political psychology. In this work, is raised that there is a certain personality
configuration which collaborates with the political declarations of extreme intolerance and particularly with
the fascism. This would be the authoritarian personality, and it would be highly related to the right-wing
views and conservatism (Adorno et al. 1950). Adorno´ s expositions have been discussed extensively, for
3
example in Billig (1984, 1986), being until today an object of controversies.
 In our study we understand the authoritarianism as the belief in which the social order is only possible
through the repressive control of citizens by the political authority perceived as legitimate, and consistently
through submission to such authority by citizens.

The concept, therefore, contains two aspects. On one hand, the belief in which a strong political
authority must control the social life to be kept in order through repression (prohibition, criminalization,
discrimination, etc.) of conducts that imply disobedience or not conformity to the authority or the established
norms, if it is necessary by means of open violence. This aspect of political authoritarianism is opposed to
democratic equality values of rights and political tolerance. On the other hand is the belief in which the
corresponding civic attitude is the unconditional obedience to authority, in opposition to a major personal
autonomy. The most popular scales distinguish 3 components: submission, authoritarian aggression, and
conventionality (Altmeyer 1981, 1998, Funke 2005). We consider only the 2 first ones (which have showed
major interrelation and predictive value), since conventionality is also included in the conservatism, which we
will discuss further on.

The authoritarianism measurement was done by a scale composed by 5 items, mainly of the
authoritarian aggression component, with which one had to show the grade of agreement or disagreement in a
format from 1 to 5 points. It presented a high and stable reliability (α1 = 0,71; α2 = 0,76; α3 = 0,76). The
questions are:

- More than parties and political programs, what we need is a leader who solves problems (Latin
barometer).

- Governments must use hard hand whenever there are difficulties (Latin barometer).

- Instead of so much worry about people’s rights, what this country needs is a firm government (RWA,
Altmeyer, 1998).

- In this country judgments delinquents receive are too soft (Radicalism-conservatism Scale, Comrey
and Newmeyer, 1965)

- The real keys for a successful society are obedience and discipline (RWA, Altmeyer 1998).

Support to democracy
Tironi and Agüero (1999), Mainwaring and Torcal (2003) and Luna (2008) have identified the
authoritarianism- democracy axis as the principal element of political differentiation in Chile, or the
adherence or rejection to dictatorship. This situation would be reinforced by the parliamentary election system
which encourages the existence of two blocks, the ones who supported Pinochet military dictatorship (right)
and those ones who opposed (left). According to Toro (2008), comparing the acceptance levels to democracy
at the interior of the continent, Chile would be between the countries at lower support level.

The democracy support was measured by a scale of 3 items, which breaks a question of three
alternatives used in the Latin barometer into three questions of agreement or disagreement from 1 to 5 points.
The scale presented an average and stable reliability (α1 = 0,58; α2 = 0,62; α3 = 0,57). The questions used
were:

- Democracy is preferable to any other form of government.

- In some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one. (Invertid)

- To people like me, we do not care whether there is a democratic or a non democratic government.
(Invertid)
 Conservatism
From what Jost et al. argues (2003a), the conservatism covers two aspects: the resistance to change and
the acceptance of social differences. Nevertheless, in its own review the conservatism is treated like an
ideology, vision or paradigm, in which these two aspects turn out to be articulated in a significant way in
terms of a series of attitudes and beliefs, between which six differ: (A) conventionality: high behavioral and
attitude conformity to conventions (social norms) that are perceived as supported by society and its authorities
(Wilson, 1973); (B) traditionalism: high value of traditions which constitute the historical heredity of society,
particularly of religious traditions (Wilson, 1973); (C) fear of disorder: extreme value of mechanisms that
assure civic order and calmness in social life (Wilson, 1973); (D) naturalism: belief that society has natural
bases which must be recognized and respected, eventually including the belief of certain social differences
having a natural substratum (Muller, 2001); (E) system justification: belief that historical survival of
institutions or social norms is due to the fact that they satisfy some need or function (Muller, 2001); (F) focus
in prevention: preference for the avoidance of risky changes over the promotion of radical ones (Higgins,
1998).

In this study were measured two of the conservatism components: the traditionalism and fear of
disorder. The traditionalism was measured by a scale of 7 questions of 5 points from very disagree to very
agree. The scale reliability was high and stable (α1 = 0,63; α2 = 0,72; α3 = 0,72). The items used were

- This country would have lesser problems if family became stronger. (NES)

- New ideas and life styles are debilitating our society. (NES)

- Our country would be much better if religion were giving more importance. (Radicalism-
conservatism Scale, Comrey and Newmeyer, 1965)

- This country has problems because every day they are trying to change something. (Only years 2 and
3)

- This country would be better if how things were done in the past was more valued. (Only years 2 and
3)

- When things are fine, there is no reason to change them. (Only years 2 and 3)

- The one who lives in this country must respect Chilean society’s norms. (Stellmacher and Petzel
2005)

Fear of disorder was measured by a scale of 5 questions of 5 points from very disagree to very agree.
Its reliability was α1 = 0,61; α2 = 0,75; y α3 = 0,75. The items used were:

- Authorities should worry about making Chile a safe country.

- Public safety is the most important thing for the country’s progress.

- The only way people do not get into troubles is by respecting society’s norms. (Only years 2 and 3)

- While more freedom is given to people, more disorder is in society. (Only years 2 and 3)

- Laws give too much protection to criminals. (Radicalism-conservatism Scale, Comrey and
Newmeyer, 1965) (Only years 2 and 3)

Nationalism
 It is defined as the non reflexive acceptance of national, state and political authorities, combined with
the belief of the own nation superiority (Adorno et al. 1950, Skitk 2005). One hopes that people from the right
and people from low socio economic level there should be higher nationalism levels (Adorn et al. 1950, Billig
1995, Billig and Núñez 1998, Skitk 2005). This variable was measured through a scale of 3 questions with
high reliability (α1 = 0,73; α2 = 0,73; α3 = 0,77)). The questions, which must be answered in a format of 5
points from very disagree to very agree, were:

- Chile must be an economically domineering country in Latin America.

- Neighbor countries would be much better if Chile was influencing them more.

- It is very important for me that Chile is number one in everything it does.

These five political attitudes measurements have been constructed as scales, that is to say like
constructs based on a multiplicity of observable indicators, which in turn are the positioning of every person
in front of items that shape the scale. It grants the measurements major stability. The items scores were
equally divided to give the scale score. Hence, the possible values status of the five scales is from 1 to 5. The
items were codified so that major scores always mean major levels of the attribute.

Results
Chilean political culture general characterization
First of all the averages appear in the political orientation of the socio economic and age groups (see
Table 2). To evaluate the averages differences, we have done a factorial variance analysis with the values of
left - right self position as dependent variable. On one hand, it can be evident that the high socio economic
levels have a major average than others in every year. This difference, statistically significant (p <0,001),
shows high socio economic level people have a more political right orientation than those of other socio
economic groups. On the other hand, between the age groups differences do not appear statistically significant
(p <0,01) in people’s political orientation. Both remarks are constant through the three measurements.

Table 2: Political orientation average by socio economic level and age group.

Meas. 1 N DS Meas. 2 N DS Meas.3 N DS

Socio economic
level***
31 2,15 26 1,78 1,77
Low 4,901 4,901 4,847 203
4 1 3 4 8
33 1,95 32 1,76 1,78
Middle 4,853 4,882 4,799 209
9 6 1 9 6
26 1,89 17 1,67 1,63
High 5,892 5,684 5,896 173
0 0 7 2 9
Age group
32 1,95 27 1,66 1,75
Youngs 5,164 4,985 5,014 213
3 5 3 7 5
29 2,13 22 1,82 1,85
Adults 4,933 5,182 5,269 182
7 6 5 7 9
30 2,07 26 1,86 1,79
Older 5,377 5,073 5,138 189
0 3 2 1 3

*** p < 0,001

Note: According to age group there are only statistically significant differences (p <0,05) in the first measurement, between adult and
older people.

Table 3 shows the sample average in each of the political attitudes included in the study. From these
averages one can affirm in Chilean’s political culture exists moderately high levels (considering that the scale
average point is 3) of authoritarianism, democracy support, traditionalism and nationalism; and high disorder
fear values.

To evaluate time stability of these attitudes, it was done for each of them a variance analysis of
repeated measurements. Since it can be appreciated through the significance indexes in the same Table 3 there
are statistically significant differences between the measurements of authoritarianism, traditionalism and
nationalism; but not in democracy support. All these differences consist on an increase over time, what
indicates a certain sample’s "drift towards right", but it does not turn out to be reflected in the measurement of
political orientation, as it remains suggested by the absence of significant change through the three
measurements of this variable.

Table 3: Political attitudes average in each measurement.

Meas. 1 Meas. 2 Meas. 3

Authoritarianism*** 3,58 3,72 3,85
Support to democracy 3,69 3,68 3,74
Conservatism*** 3,50 3,54 3,69
Fear to disorder 4,12 3,98 4,18
Nationalism*** 3,70 3,79 3,85

*** p < 0,001; *p < 0,05

When comparing these attitudes between age groups, significant statistically differences in variables
related to conservatism (traditionalism and fear of disorder) are found, as it was expected according to
literature and other measurements in Chile. There are also differences in the nationalism. All these differences
indicate the biggest groups are more "right wingers" than the youngest. Nevertheless, in spite of the
differences, the score pattern at the interior of these age groups is similar to that of the whole sample.

Table 4: Political attitudes average by age group.

Youngs Adults Olders

Authoritarianism 3,588 3,695 3,709
Support to democracy 3,753 3,709 3,777
Conservatism*** 3,279 3,602 3,742
Fear of disorder*** 3,953 4,044 4,173
Nationalism** 3,610 3,842 3,808

*** p < 0,001; ** p < 0,01

Finally, when comparing by socio economic level, statistically significant differences are obtained (p
<0,001) in all the variables, as it appears in Table 5. Accordingly with what is suggested by literature, low
socio economic level people have higher totals of authoritarianism, traditionalism, nationalism and fear of
disorder. On the contrary, the support to democracy increases in the highest socio economic levels. As in the
differences case found according to age group, the socio economic level differences neither affect the global
tendencies regarding the scores in this set of attitudes. Nevertheless, in contrast to what it happens with the
age group factor, which generates differences in some of the attitudes and with sizes of small effects, the
socio economic factor produces differences in all the political attitudes and with effect sizes from moderate to
big.

Table 5: Political attitudes average by socio economic level.

Low Middle High

Authoritarianism*** 3,910 3,637 3,446
Support to 3,494 3,792 3,954
democracy***
Conservatism*** 3,734 3,503 3,385
Fear of disorder*** 4,224 4,025 3,921
Nationalism*** 3,927 3,714 3,620

*** p < 0,001

In synthesis, the current Chilean political culture is characterized by a standard nucleus extensively
shared; even inter generational, where coexist a high authoritarianism, support to democracy, traditionalism
and nationalism; and fear of disorder’s very high values. The main differences are attributable to socio
economic levels, both in the political orientation and in the set of political attitudes. Nevertheless, these
differences are paradox, since while in the political orientation the high socio economic level is more from
“right“, at the political attitudes level the low socio economic group turns out to be more from “right“. This
inconsistency forces us to do a more detailed observation of the relation between these variables.

Relation between political orientation and socio economic level

in the Chilean political culture
To explore the relation between socio economic level and political orientation, we have estimated the
averages of each of the political attitudes in nine groups determined by the crossing between these factors. For
that we have identified as from left those participants that self positioned between 1 and 3, from center
between 4 and 6, and from right between 7 and 9. Figure 1 shows the averages patterns for each of the five
studied political attitudes. First of all, it emphasizes certain regularity through the diverse attitudes: in addition
to the effect of the already described socio economic level (Table 5), there is a political orientation effect that
consists on observing major totals of the above mentioned attitudes in the right wingers groups. The pattern is
equivalent but inverse regarding the support to democracy. Secondly, in all the attitudes it is observed that the
extreme averages correspond to the right groups from low socio economic level and from left ones of high
level status. For example, the group that shows major authoritarianism is that from right of low level, while
the minor authoritarianism is in the left of high level. These same groups are those which present extreme
support averages to democracy, but in opposite direction. This systematical pattern, observed on having
considered the crossing between socio economic level and political orientation, suggests that it is important to
analyze the joint effect of such factors to understand the differences in the political attitudes averages.

Figure 1: Marginal averages estimated for political attitudes according

to political orientation and socio economic level
  

On having jointly taken into consideration socio economic level and political orientation, it is observed
for example that left ¬/low, right / high and center / middle are similar in their traditionalism, fear of disorder
and nationalism totals. This attracts attention since it turns out to be unexpected according to literature’s
present theses about the relation between ideological and socio economic position. Remarks of this kind allow
hypothesizing that a key for understanding these political attitudes patterns takes root in analyzing them
according to combinations of political orientation values with economic access levels. In other words, we
raise the hypothesis of an interaction between these factors, in the sense that the relation between political
orientation and political attitudes is not homogeneous through different socio economic levels. Specially, we
will prove the combinations left ¬/low, right / high and center / middle between ideological and socio
economic position offer a similar pattern of political attitudes between themselves and different from those
that show the combinations left / high and right / low. It must be noticed that this hypothesis does not refer to
a standard interaction 4 but to a special interaction which says relation with the congruity grade between the
ideological and socio economic position, in terms of what theoretically one would wait according to the
majority of literature (Levin et al. 1998, Lukács 1969, Sidaius and Pratto 1999; cf. Adorno et al. 1950 and Jost
et al. 2004). For example, in view of the class conscience notion, the most favorable political attitudes to
support the statu quo (right) would be observed in domineering sectors and the most inclined to social change
(left) attitudes would be observed in dominated groups. This way, to the combinations left ¬/low, right / high
and center / middle we will name them operationally coherent, while the combinations left / high and right /
low we will call them incongruous. Those groups which show a political orientation that would favor the
interests waited for its socio economic group are those we call coherent, while those groups which show a
political orientation that would commit an outrage against the interests waited for its socio economic group
are those we call incongruous.

Table 6 shows the subjects amount for each of the nine groups derived from the simple crossing
between socio economic level and political position 5. In the diagonal that goes from Left / low to Right /
High are the called coherent groups, while those which separate from this diagonal are the incongruous ones.
Regarding the subjects amount by cell, it can be appreciated that in all socio economic levels the predominant
group is the center. After the center, in the high level the highest N is the right and in the lowest is the left
(although it is not a big difference). That is to say, most of the subjects congregate in the coherent groups.

Table 6: Number of subjects in the political orientation and socio economic level’s crossing.

Left Center Right

Low 49 172 42
Middle 56 213 52
High 19 94 64

In Table 7 are shown each of the nine groups in the political attitudes averages. For major clarity, we
have presented the averages for each political attitude in standardized score (z), in such a way that the
deviations regarding the zero value can be interpreted as superior (positive) or lower (negative) values to the
sample average. One can notice that, in most of the variables the coherent groups have an average near to 0,
that is to say, similar to the predominant value in the Chilean political culture.

Table 7: Average z score in political attitudes for each crossing

of political orientation at socio economic level.

Authoritaria Support to Conservatis Nationalism Fear of

nism democracy m disorder
Low/left -0,093 0,507 -0,088 -0,018 -0,172
low/center 0,359 -0,294 0,374 0,294 0,362
low/right 0,684 -0,650 0,677 0,437 0,506
middle/left -0,733 0,685 -0,752 -0,472 -0,547
middle/center -0,054 0,001 -0,094 -0,039 -0,038
middle/right 0,188 -0,502 0,220 0,205 0,189
high/left -1,187 1,150 -1,202 -0,669 -1,120
hight/center -0,643 0,531 -0,424 -0,364 -0,419
high/right 0,161 -0,141 0,159 0,063 0,086

Note: in black letters are the coherent groups´ results.

With the purpose of proving this affirmation we have constructed a congruity index to show in detail
of the joint action the socio economic level and the political orientation would have. This congruity index was
constructed with the subtraction of scores in both variables (with the political orientation limited to three
values), so each group was assigned a value (socio economic level less political orientation) as Table 8
indicates. The coherent groups have a value of 0 and form a diagonal that crosses three socio economic levels
and three political orientations. The negative numbers appear as the incongruity happen towards the right in
low socio economic level, while the positive ones as the incongruity occur towards the left in high socio
economic level. It can be warned that in this index while higher the incongruity is, the index value is more
distant to 0.

Table 8: Congruity values assigned to each crossing of political orientation and socio economic level
 Left Center Right
Low 0 -1 -2
Middle 1 0 -1
High 2 1 0

We hypothesized that differences will exist regarding the Chilean political culture (that has an average
of 0 in each of the standardized variables) in those groups presenting major incongruity grade between their
socio economic level and political position, while the coherent groups would have levels in the political
attitudes that would not differ from those of the Chilean political culture in general. In other words, the levels
in the attitudes will be similar to the population average in the coherent groups and different from the
population average in the incongruous ones. In Table 9 are shown the tests results of independent samples
done for all the congruity index levels in each of the political attitudes. There is compared the groups average
presenting certain congruity value with the population average (0) that characterizes the Chilean political
culture. As seen highly and partially incongruous groups (for both sides, positive and negative, with values 2,
1,-1 and-2) show statistically significant differences with the population average in all the variables. On the
contrary, the coherent groups do not present significant differences with the population average. On having
done the analysis disintegrating the coherent groups, this situation persists, that is to say, without caring that
between the coherent groups there is one from the left, one from the center and other from right, there are no
statistically significant differences between these groups (together or separated) and the sample average. In
other words, the coherent groups do not ideologically differ from most of the population; they are aligned
with the predominant political culture.

On the contrary, those incongruous groups are those who present extreme values in most political
attitudes. The low socio economic level and from the right groups are those which present major indexes of
“right-wing views“ in their political attitudes, while those of high socio economic level from left are those
presenting major indexes of “leftism“.

Table 9: Independent samples t tests for each congruity value and sample average
(value 0, since z scores are used)

Congruent
-2 -1 0 1 2
interaction
t gl t gl t gl t gl t gl
Authoritarianis 5,02** 4 5,79** 22 - 32 -** 14 -** 1
m * 1 * 2 0,38 3 7,31 * 9 4,51 * 8
Support to -4,73** 4 -** 22 0,97 32 8,20** 14 7,74** 1
democracy * 1 5,76 * 1 4 * 8 * 8
Conservatism 5,12** 4 5,40** 22 - 32 -** 14 -** 1
* 1 * 2 0,90 3 7,07 * 9 6,90 * 8
Nationalism 3,95** 4 4,58** 22 - 32 -** 14 -* 1
* 1 * 1 0,29 3 4,84 * 9 2,21 8
Fear of 4,33** 4 5,68** 22 - 32 -** 14 -** 1
disorder * 1 * 1 0,67 3 5,26 * 9 4,87 * 8

*** p < 0,001; ** p < 0,01; *p < 0,05

To test the interaction way we have described, based on the arithmetical index of the socio economic
level less political orientation, we construct a series of regressions in which we predict the political attitudes
from the income, the political orientation (in the first step) and congruity index (in the second step). That is to
say, we evaluate in what extent the congruity index allows explaining the changes in political attitudes,
comparing it with the income effects and the political orientation separately.

Table 10 shows these retrogressions coefficients. It is observed for all attitudes the model gains
predictive power on having incorporated the congruity, or, on having incorporated the congruity changes in
attitudes can be better explained (see F change in Table 10), and in all of them, except in nationalism,
congruity is the best predictor, or, the congruity allows a better explaining than the other two factors
separately can explain the differences in the political attitudes levels.

Table 10: Coefficients of the hierarchic retrogression model which incorporates the congruent
interaction in the second step.

R2 F change β standarized
adjusted
Political
Incomes Congruency
Orientation
Authoritarianism 0,192 25,32 *** -0,116* 0,142 ** -0,300 ***
6
Support to 0,451 26,52 *** 0,064 -0,182 *** 0,307 ***
democracy 5
Conservatism 0,158 24,30 *** -0,063 0,123 * -0,300 ***
3
Nationalism 0,098 4,158* -0,142* 0,179 ** -0,129 *
Fear of disorder 0,131 14,78 *** -0,110* 0,124 * -0,238 ***
3

*** p < 0,001; ** p < 0,01; *p < 0,05

In conclusion, the position in the social structure itself is not enough to explain the people’s ideological
position. The inconsistency between attitudes and political orientation shows up this situation. The interaction
model proposal between the socio economic level and the political orientation based on the congruity between
both, presents favorable evidence, appearing like a better ideological configuration predictor than income or
political orientation separately. To illustrate such model allows giving the information, in Figure 2 are charted
the group authoritarianism averages like congruity levels function, being obtained a homogeneous decrease of
this attitude from the end of negative incongruity (low socio economic level and right orientation), passing by
more coherent groups, up to the end of positive incongruity (high socio economic level and left orientation).
The graphs corresponding to traditionalism averages, fear of disorder and nationalism are very similar, by
which has been chosen not to include them in Figure 2. Inversely, and as it was expected, the averages graphs
of support to the system shows a homogeneous increase of this attitude as we move from the most negative
values to the most positive of the congruity factor. In synthesis, the combination of political orientation and
socio economic level in accordance with this congruity model allows identifying a simple linear order in the
configuration of political attitudes, granting complexity into the relation between such mentioned factors.

Figure 2: Averages in political attitudes according to congruity levels.

 Note: The pattern of traditionalism, fear of disorder and nationalism is equivalent to the one found in authoritarianism.

Discussion
The research allows supporting the majority of Big Santiago’s Chileans endures a shared pattern of
political attitudes, as it was described. The levels of authoritarianism, fear of disorder, etc., are very similar in
different groups, like the high stratum right, the middle stratum center and low stratum left. Most of the
population fits in the above mentioned categories, which we have characterized by the congruity between its
ideological and economic position. This attitude configuration massively shared through society constitutes a
description, partial but theoretically crucial, of the predominant political culture in our environment. Two
questions immediately arise: How do so unlike groups become so similar in their political attitudes? What
happens with the so called incongruous groups that, although they represent a minority of the population, we
have showed endure important deviations regarding the predominant political culture?

The analyses done to answer these questions have systematically entered upon the relations between
three domains: the political orientation (positioning in the left - right axis), the socio economic condition, and
the political attitudes (authoritarianism, support to democracy, etc.). We have shown the relation between
political orientation and people’s socio economic level is characterized by the increase of "right-wing views"
as the socio economic level is higher, as it has been brought up in literature (Carney and others 2008, Napier
and Jost 2008). Also, the relation between the political orientation and the set of political attitudes included in
the research has also shown the expected pattern in accordance with literature. That is to say, in people from
the right the authoritarianism is major (Adorno et al. 1951, Meloen 1993, Stenner 2005), conservatism (in its
fear of disorder and traditionalism dimensions) (Jost et al. 2003a), and nationalism (Adorno et al. 1950, Billig
1995, Billig and Núñez 1998, Skitk 2005), while the support to democracy is bigger in people from left
(Tironi and Agüero 1999, Mainwaring and Torcal 2003, Luna 2008). Finally, the relation between political
attitudes and the socio economic level showed concordant results with the premises of Adorno et al. (1950),
Napier and Jost (2008), Schuman et al. (1992), Lipset (1960) and Lipset and Raab (1978), that is to say, the
authoritarianism and attitudes associated with this one are major in the groups of minor income.

In whole, these results show up a paradox that has not been confronted by literature. This paradox
indicates, as is seen in Figure 3, that in high socio economic levels there are major indexes of attitudes
associated with the left, but there is major identification with the right, while in the low socio economic level
happens the opposite.
 Figure 3: Paradox relation between political orientation, socio economic level and political attitudes.

Note: the relation with authoritarianism is equivalent to the one found with conservatism, fear of disorder and nationalism.

The central argument of the present article consists on offering a model that solves this paradox and
the empirical evidence that sustains it. As it was explained, the inconsistencies in the results are dissolved if
the political orientation and socio economic conditions are considered jointly, combining their possible values
and being rearranged according to the congruity grade between them. This way, the high stratum right, the
low stratum left and the middle stratum center would be the groups presenting a coherent political orientation
with the interests of its socio economic group. Contrary, between the low stratum right and the high stratum
left we describe a maximum incongruity grade between political orientation and interests of its economic
group, although this incongruity has an opposite sense. On having rearranged the level combinations of
political orientation and economic access by means of this congruity idea, we manage to show the groups
differ, from the general population average in the political attitudes, straight from their incongruity level and
direction in which it describes such incongruity. Consequently, what allows realizing the political attitudes
pattern of a group is not its political orientation per se, even less its social extraction per se, but the adjustment
grade of people´ ideological position to their socio economic conditions.

Interpretation about the ideology’s dynamics

On having coherent groups the same levels in the political attitudes, in every socio economic level
there is a group which adopts the predominant pattern of the political culture. In turn, in high and low classes
appear groups which adopt the extreme levels in these attitudes. In the upper class then coexist a right group
presenting the predominant pattern and a left group showing the extreme levels in the pro-democratic sense,
and in the low class a left group presenting the predominant pattern and a right group showing the extreme
levels in the pro-authoritarian or conservative sense. We suggest interpreting this phenomenon as the state of
ideological differentiation operating inside classes: that is to say, the groups that differ from the predominant
political culture do it regarding the coherent groups of their own class. In upper class, the differentiation
happens towards the left, in reference to the coherent group, the right; while in the low class, the
differentiation happens towards the right, in reference to the coherent group, the left.

The previous thing allow supporting the differentiation in the left - right axis (in Jost´ s sense 2006),
loses its paradox character (in accordance with the exhibited in Figure 3) if it assumes operating at the interior
of the socio economic group, by reference to the coherent group. And, for the same, left and right political
identities must be understood in the context of a socio economic group; for example, it is not the same to be
from the left in the low level than in the high one, since in the first case it adheres to the predominant pattern
and in the second one it differs.
 This way, we must understand the congruity as the adjustment of the political orientation to the
economic conditions. The political orientation involves a capture of ideological position in front of values,
beliefs and predominant attitudinal in the group of reference, or socio economic group. The position placing
can be basically of adherence or distancing to the predominant political culture. The ideological thing,
understood this way, arises specially as the internal differentiation of political culture.

The phenomenon of right positions exacerbated in the low class has been an object of literature
attention, particularly by the system justification theory (Jost and Hunyady 2002, 2005, Jost et al. 2004) and
by some theoretical of the authoritarianism (Lipset 1960, Lipset and Raab 1978, Napier and Jost 2008,
Schuman et al. 1992). Nevertheless, these theories do not realize the opposite phenomenon: the position of the
upper class left, which presents the lowest levels in the same variables in which the low class right presents
the highest levels. In our interpretation two sides of the phenomenon remain explained

False conscience and psychological anchoring of the ideology

The results lead us to speculate the positioning is an answer subjects do according to the place they
occupy into society’s organization. Said otherwise, the ideology concept we propose must be understood like
result of the inseparable relation between the place occupied in social hierarchy and the tendency of those
who occupy this place to justify or refused the hierarchic relation. For this reason, first of all we propose that
it is necessary to enter upon this phenomenon realizing the domination / subordination relations between the
groups and the ideological positioning in front of the above mentioned relation, rescuing this way the concept
of class used early in the discussion on ideology. Secondly, our results support the understanding of false
conscience concept, not like a psychological and cognitive affliction as Jost and Banaji (1994) or Jost et al.
(2008) propose, but like a phenomenon founded on the social reality itself, in particular on social classes
structure(Augoustinos 1999). This concept describes the fact that the majority of Chileans shares in a very
homogeneous way a political culture without caring about differences of political orientation or socio
economic condition.

For the same, although the left low class and the right upper class share the same levels in the attitudes,
the function that fulfills their ideological position is founded on their place in social hierarchy, which is very
different: the same attitude levels allow them differing on one hand to the interior of their respective class
and, on the other, keep the statu quo, whether because it turns out to be favorable to them, in the upper class’s
case, or because they need to justify their own position, in the low class’s case (see Jost et al. 2004). This
way, even being about the same ideological differentiation mechanism, it is expected that contents or
significances of political attitudes be different for these groups.

This phenomenon needs to be studied in major depth, since the mere quantitative observation of the
political attitudes does not realize the underlying ideas joint to the ideological position. Although the attitudes
research has showed to be a fruitful way of coming closer the psychological ideology aspects, going so far as
even realizing its physiological correlates (for example Amodio et al. 2007), the psychological anchoring of
the ideology does not exhaust all the important ideology aspects, in particular the ones anchored in social
relations and speech dynamics (Billig et al. 1988). For the same, we suggest to complement the approach
presented in this article with studies focused in the construction of the ideological speech, particularly in
extreme groups (Billig 2002, Billig et al. 1988; for example Billig 1978).

We also propose, the ideology study must consider being a multilevel approach, as Pettigrew (1998,
2006, 2008) Stellmacher and Petzel (2005) and Wagner et al. (2008) have proposed, which incorporates
samples that represent all socio economic strata, as the evidence suggests it concerning the importance of
class to understand the ideological position. For the same, the results obtained in studies led with university
samples must be observed carefully. Finally, we must rescue the importance of longitudinal designs use that
allows incorporating inter group relations´ temporary dynamics, as suggested by several authors (Pettigrew
and Tropp 2006, van Laar et al. 2008, Pettigrew 2008).

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Notes
* The achievement of this work has been possible thanks to the financing granted to the project FONDECYT N ° 1050887 “Psychosocial
Study of the Political Culture of Three Chileans Generations.”

** Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, Chile. Email: ahaye@uc.cl

*** Public Studies Center, Santiago, Chile

1 The investigation at the base of the present article included an extensive analysis on this matter, which results show the left - right axis
is a valid and informative indicator of relevant ideological differences in the current Chilean political culture: it is a measurement that
shows high stability through time, which allows predicting Chileans opinion in controversial topics of public discussion and sum up both
the differences between the political parties, and the identification with these ones; also, the differences in the political attitudes between
those who qualify in the poles of left and right are consisting with what is shown in literature, being between others the authoritarianism,
conservatism and support to democracy aspects that clearly differ the left of the right (Brunner 1990). For space reasons, these results are
not brought in this article but in another work in preparation.

2 Although the sample is limited to the Big Santiago, in the present article we allude to the current "Chilean" political culture. We admit
that this is an inadequate draft, since it would imply an undue generalization if it was used in strict sense; we use the expression here in
broad sense.

3 A detailed review of the relation between authoritarianism and political orientation can be found in Meloen (1993). The relation
between authoritarianism and political conservatism is checked in detail in Stenner (2005).

4 The standard interaction between political orientation and socio economic level was evaluated by means of variance analysis with
repeated measurements to include the three measurements in the time of each dependent variable. Only with regard to authoritarianism (F
= 2,712) and support to democracy (F = 2,957) are obtained statistically significant results (p <0,05). These two interactions,
nevertheless, are weak, and in its set the analyses do not offer evidence of a systematically interaction between these factors. These
analyses, on the other hand, allow supporting there are systematically two independent main effects, one of political orientation and other
of socio economic level.

5 In this section the used information corresponds to the second measurement, which presents an intermediate situation of what happens
in measurements 1 and 3, regarding the N and behavior in measurements in which there are differences in time.