Documentos de Académico
Documentos de Profesional
Documentos de Cultura
Sesión 1: Los modelos y la filosofía de la ciencia: una panorámica general desde las
concepciones sintácticas y semánticas a las actuales concepciones pragmáticas
1) Mäki, U. (2009) Realistic Realism About Unrealistic Models, in: The Oxford
Handbook of Philosophy of Economics, Harold Kincaid and Don Ross (eds), New
York: Oxford University Press, pp. 68-98
2) Knuuttila T. (2009), “Isolating representations versus credible constructions?
Economic modelling in theory and practice” en Erkenntnis, Vol. 70, No. 1 ED.
Springer
1) Rodrik, D. (2015) Economics Rules: The Rights And Wrongs of The Dismal Science,
New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Ch. 1, pp. 9-44
2) Mäki, U. (2018) Rights And Wrongs of Economic Modelling: Refining Rodrik, in:
Journal of Economic Methodology
3) Rodrik, D. (2018) Second Thoughts on Economics Rules, (working paper).
1) Morgan M. (2014) “What if? Models, fact and fiction in economics” en Journal of
the British Academy, 2, 2 The British Academy
2) Cartwright, N. (2008) Models: Fables, and Parables, in: Insights (Durham Institute of
Advanced Study) 1, No. 11.
3) Aydinonat, E. (2018) The Diversity of Models as a Means to Better Explanations in
Economics, (working paper).
1
Sesión 5: Modelos en economía e ideología
1) Arrow, K. (1963) Social Choice And Individual Values, New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2nd Ed., Ch. 1, 2, pp. 1-21.
2) Hausman, D. & McPherson, M. (2006) Social Choice Theory, in: Economic Analysis,
Moral Philosophy, And Public Policy, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2nd,
Ed., Ch. 13, pp. 217-233.
1) Sen, A. (1995) Rationality And Social Choice, American Economic Review, Vol. 85,
No. 1, pp. 1-24.
2) Arrow, K. (1994) Methodological Individualism And Social Knowledge, American
Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 2, pp. 1-9.
2
1) Lapavitsas, Costas. (2015) Social Norms And Institutions in The Capitalist Economy,
in: Social Foundations of Markets, Money And Credit, London: Routledge, Ch. 5, pp.
91-111.
2) González, Jorge. (1998) Arrow: La Elección, los Valores y la Ideología de Mercado,
en: Cuadernos de Economía, Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Vol. 7, No.
28, pp. 27-41.
1) Strasnick, S. (1976) Social Choice Theory And The Derivation of Rawls’ Difference
Principle, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 73, No. 4, pp. 85-99.
2) Hammond, P. (1976) Equity, Arrow’s Conditions and Rawls’ Difference Principle,
Econometrica, Vol. 44, No. 4, pp. 793-804.
1) Sandel, M. (2012). How Markets Crowd Out Morals. Boston Review, 37, 12.
2) Sternberg, E. (2013). What Money Can Buy: Michael Sandel's intuitions of injustice
and inferiority. Economic Affairs, 33(3): 391-399.
3) Choat Simon (2018). Everything for Sale? Neoliberalism and the Limits of Michael
Sandel’s Philosophical Critique of Markets. New Political Science Vol. 40
3
1) Bowles, S., & Polania-Reyes, S. (2012). Economic incentives and social preferences:
substitutes or complements?. Journal of Economic Literature, 50(2): 368-425.
2) Gneezy, U., Meier, S., & Rey-Biel, P. (2011). When and why incentives (don't) work
to modify behavior. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(4): 191-210.
1) Bowles Samuel (2016), The Moral Economy: Why Good Incentives are No Substitute
for Good Citizens, Yale University
2) Sunstein, C. R. (2016). The ethics of influence: Government in the age of behavioral
science. Cambridge University Press.
1) Atiq, E. H. (2013). Why motives matter: Reframing the crowding out effect of legal
incentives. Yale LJ, 123, 1070.
2) Bicchieri, C. (2016). Norms in the wild: How to diagnose, measure, and change
social norms. Oxford University Press.