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Quarterly
Consider organized anarchies. These are ventions of necessity. The third property is
organizations-or decision situations-char- fluid participation. Participants vary in the
acterized by three general properties.' The amount of time and effort they devote to
first is problematic preferences. In the organi- different domains; involvement varies from
zation it is difficult to impute a set of prefer- one time to another. As a result, the bounda-
ences to the decision situation that satisfies ries of the organization are uncertain and
the standard consistency requirements for a changing; the audiences and decision makers
theory of choice. The organization operates for any particular kind of choice change
on the basis of a variety of inconsistent and capriciously.
ill-defined preferences. It can be described These properties of organized anarchy
better as a loose collection of ideas than as a have been identified often in studies of orga-
coherent structure; it discovers preferences nizations. They are characteristic of any or-
through action more than it acts on the basis ganization in part-part of the time. They are
of preferences. particularly conspicuous in public, edu-
The second property is unclear technology. cational, and illegitimate organizations. A
Although the organization manages to sur- theory of organized anarchy will describe a
vive and even produce, its own processes are portion of almost any organization's activities,
not understood by its members. It operates but will not describe all of them.
on the basis of simple trial-and-error proce- To build on current behavioral theories of
dures, the residue of learning from the acci- organizations in order to accomodate the con-
dents of past experience, and pragmatic in- cept of organized anarchy, two major phe-
nomena critical to an understanding of an-
1 We are indebted to Nancy Block, Hilary Cohen, archy must be investigated. The first is the
and James Glenn for computational, editorial, and
manner in which organizations make choices
intellectual help; to the Institute of Sociology, Uni-
versity of Bergen, and the Institute of Organization
without consistent, shared goals. Situations
and Industrial Sociology, Copenhagen School of Eco- of decision making under goal ambiguity are
nomics, for institutional hospitality and useful dis- common in complex organizations. Often
cussions of organizational behavior; and to the Ford problems are resolved without recourse to
Foundation for the financial support that made our
explicit bargaining or to an explicit price sys-
collaboration feasible. We also wish to acknowledge
the helpful comments and suggestions of S0ren
tem market-two common processes for de-
Christensen, James S. Coleman, Harald Enderud, cision making in the absence of consensus.
Ka're Rommetveit, and William H. Starbuck. The second phenomenon is the way members
of an organization are activated. This entails viewed conveniently as vehicles for solving
the question of how occasional members be- well-defined problems or structures within
come active and how attention is directed which conflict is resolved through bargaining,
toward, or away from, a decision. It is impor- they also provide sets of procedures through
tant to understand the attention patterns which participants arrive at an interpretation
within an organization, since not everyone is of what they are doing and what they have
attending to everything all of the time. done while in the process of doing it. From
Additional concepts are also needed in a this point of view, an organization is a collec-
normative theory of organizations dealing tion of choices looking for problems, issues
with organized anarchies. First, a normative and feelings looking for decision situations
theory of intelligent decision making under in which they might be aired, solutions look-
ambiguous circumstances (namely, in situa- ing for issues to which they might be the
tions in which goals are unclear or unknown)answer, and decision makers looking for
should be developed. Can we provide some work.
meaning for intelligence which does not de- Such a view of organizational choice fo-
pend on relating current action to known cuses attention on the way the meaning of a
goals? Second, a normative theory of atten- choice changes over time. It calls attention
tion is needed. Participants within an organi- to the strategic effects of timing, through the
zation are constrained by the amount of time introduction of choices and problems, the
they can devote to the various things de- time pattern of available energy, and the im-
manding attention. Since variations in behav- pact of organizational structure.
ior in organized anarchies are due largely to To understand processes within organiza-
questions of who is attending to what, deci- tions, one can view a choice opportunity as a
sions concerning the allocation of attention garbage can into which various kinds of
are prime ones. Third, organized anarchies problems and solutions are dumped by par-
require a revised theory of management. Sig- ticipants as they are generated. The mix of
nificant parts of contemporary theories of garbage in a single can depends on the mix
management introduce mechanisms for con- of cans available, on the labels attached to
trol and coordination which assume the exis- the alternative cans, on what garbage is cur-
tence of well-defined goals and a well-definedrently being produced, and on the speed
technology, as well as substantial participant with which garbage is collected and removed
involvement in the affairs of the organization. from the scene.
Where goals and technology are hazy and Such a theory of organizational decision
participation is fluid, many of the axioms and making must concern itself with a relatively
standard procedures of management collapse.complicated interplay among the generation
This article is directed to a behavioral of problems in an organization, the deploy-
theory of organized anarchy. On the basis of of personnel, the production of solu-
ment
several recent studies, some elaborations and tions, and the opportunities for choice. Al-
modifications of existing theories of choicethough it may be convenient to imagine that
are proposed. A model for describing deci- choice opportunities lead first to the genera-
sion making within organized anarchies is tion of decision alternatives, then to an exam-
developed, and the impact of some aspects ofination of their consequences, then to an
organizational structure on the process of evaluation of those consequences in terms of
choice within such a model is examined. objectives, and finally to a decision, this type
of model is often a poor description of what
THE BASIC IDEAS actually happens. In the garbage can model,
Decision opportunities are fundamentally on the other hand, a decision is an outcome
ambiguous stimuli. This theme runs through (1971), Olsen ( 1970, 1971), and Rommetveit
several recent studies of organizational (1971). The ideas, however, have a broader par-
choice.2 Although organizations can oftenentage.
be In particular, they obviously owe a debt to
Allison (1969), Coleman (1957), Cyert and March
2 We have based the model heavily on seven re- (1963), Lindblom (1965), Long (1958), March
cent studies of univers-ties: Christensen ( 1971), and Simon (1958), Schilling (1968), Thompson
Cohen and March (1972), Enderud (1971), Mood (1967), and Vickers (1965).
or interpretation of several relatively inde- Four basic variables are considered; each is
pendent streams within an organization. a function of time.
Attention is limited here to interrelations A stream of choices. Some fixed number, m,
among four such streams. of choices is assumed. Each choice is charac-
Problems. Problems are the concern of peo- terized by (a) an entry time, the calendar
ple inside and outside the organization. They time at which that choice is activated for de-
might arise over issues of lifestyle; family; cision, and (b) a decision structure, a list of
frustrations of work; careers; group relations participants eligible to participate in making
within the organization; distribution of status, that choice.
jobs, and money; ideology; or current crises A stream of problems. Some number, w, of
of mankind as interpreted by the mass media problems is assumed. Each problem is char-
or the nextdoor neighbor. All of these require acterized by (a) an entry time, the calendar
attention. time at which the problem becomes visible,
Solutions. A solution is somebody's product. (b) an energy requirement, the energy re-
A computer is not just a solution to a problem quired to resolve a choice to which the prob-
in payroll management, discovered when lem is attached (if the solution stream is as
needed. It is an answer actively looking for high as possible), and (c) an access struc-
a question. The creation of need is not a curi- ture, a list of choices to which the problem
osity of the market in consumer products; it has access.
is a general phenomenon of processes of A rate of flow of solutions. The verbal
choice. Despite the dictum that you cannot theory assumes a stream of solutions and a
find the answer until you have formulated matching of specific solutions with specific
the question well, you often do not know problems and choices. A simpler set of
what the question is in organizational prob- assumptions is made and focus is on the
lem solving until you know the answer. rate at which solutions are flowing into
Participants. Participants come and go. the system. It is assumed that either because
Since every entrance is an exit somewhere of variations in the stream of solutions or
else, the distribution of "entrances" depends because of variations in the efficiency of
on the attributes of the choice being left as search procedures within the organization,
much as it does on the attributes of the new different energies are required to solve the
choice. Substantial variation in participation same problem at different times. It is further
stems from other demands on the partici- assumed that these variations are consistent
pants' time (rather than from features of the for different problems. Thus, a solution co-
decision under study). efficient, ranging between 0 and 1, which
Choice opportunities. These are occasions operates on the potential decision energies
when an organization is expected to produce to determine the problem solving output (ef-
behavior that can be called a decision. Op- fective energy) actually realized during any
portunities arise regularly and any organiza- given time period is specified.
tion has ways of declaring an occasion for A stream of energy from participants. It
choice. Contracts must be signed; people is assumed that there is some number, v, of
hired, promoted, or fired; money spent; and participants. Each participant is character-
responsibilities allocated. ized by a time series of energy available for
Although not completely independent of organizational decision making. Thus, in each
each other, each of the streams can be viewed time period, each participant can provide
as independent and exogenous to the system. some specified amount of potential energy to
Attention will be concentrated here on exam- the organization.
ining the consequences of different rates and
Two varieties of organizational segmenta-
patterns of flows in each of the streams and tion are reflected in the model. The first is
different procedures for relating them. the mapping of choices onto decision makers,
THE GARBAGE CAN the decision structure. The decision structure
A simple simulation model can be specified of the organization is described by D, a
in terms of the four streams and a set of v-by-m array in which dij is 1 if the ith
garbage processing assumptions. participant is eligible to participate in the
arranged in a hierarchy such that important complex mix of access rules. Any such com-
problems-those with relatively low numbers bination could be represented by an appro-
-have access to many choices, and impor- priate access array. The three pure structures
tant choices-those with relatively low num- considered here represent three classic alter-
bers-are accessible only to important native approaches to the problem of organiz-
problems. The structure is represented by ing the legitimate access of problems to
the following access array: decision situations.
1111111111
1111111111 Decision Structure
0o11111111
Three similar pure types are considered
0o11111111
in the decision structure (the relation be-
00o1111111
tween decision makers and choices).
l001111111
000o111111 Decision structure 0: unsegmented deci-
000o111111 sions. In this structure any decision maker
0000o11111 can participate in any active choice oppor-
A1- =0000111111 tunity. Thus, the structure is represented by
00000o1111 the following array:
00000o1111
oooooo1111 1111111111
oooooo1111 1111111111
ooooooo111 1111111111
ooooooo111 1111111111
0000000011 Do= 1111111111
0000000011 1111111111
0000000001 1111111111
0000000001 1111111111
1111111111
Access structure 2: specialized access. In 1111111111
this structure each problem has access to
only one choice and each choice is accessible Decision structure 1: hierarchical decisions.
to only two problems, that is, choices special- In this structure both decision makers and
ize in the kinds of problems that can be choices are arranged in a hierarchy such that
associated to them. The structure is repre- important choices-low numbered choices-
sented by the following access array: must be made by important decision makers
-low numbered decision makers-and im-
1000000000
portant decision makers can participate in
1000000000
many choices. The structure is represented
0100000000
0100000000
by the following array:
0010000000 1111111111
0010000000 0o11111111
0001000000 o001111111
0001000000 000o111111
0000100000 D1 = 0000111111
A2= 0000100000 ooooo11111
0000010000 0000001111
0000010000 0000000111
0000001000 0000000011
0000001000 0000000001
0000000100
0000000100 Decision structure 2: specialized decisions.
0000000010 In this structure each decision maker is asso-
0000000010
ciated with a single choice and each choice
0000000001
has a single decision maker. Decision makers
0000000001
specialize in the choices to which they attend,
Actual organizations will exhibit a more Thus, we have the following array:
ences which are not necessarily captured by no problems; they having now attached them-
the decision structure. selves to a new choice.
Some choices involve both flight and reso-
Simulation Design lution-some problems leave, the remainder
The simulation design is simple. A Fortran are solved. These have been defined as reso-
version of the garbage can model is given in lution, thus slightly exaggerating the impor-
the appendix, along with documentation and tance of that style. As a result of that
an explanation. The 34 = 81 types of orga- convention, the three styles are mutually
nizational situations obtained by taking the exclusive and exhaustive with respect to any
possible combinations of the values of the one choice. The same organization, however,
four dimensions of an organization (access may use any one of them in different choices.
Thus, the decision style of any particular
structure, decision structure, energy distribu-
tion, and net energy load) are studied here variation of the model can be described by
under the four combinations of choice and specifying the proportion of completed
problem entry times. The result is 324 simula-choices which are made in each of these
tion situations. three ways.
Access structure
Mean Proportion
Mean decision Mean of choices
problem maker decision by flight
activity activity difficulty or oversight
lems to track each other through choices. ample, the effect of overall load, other phe-
Subject to structural restrictions on the track-nomena are much more dependent on the
ing, decision makers work on active problems particular combination of structures involved.
in connection with active choices; both deci- Although high segmentation of access struc-
sion makers and problems tend to move to- ture generally produces slow decision time,
gether from choice to choice. Thus, one for instance, a specialized access structure,
would expect decision makers who have a in combination with an unsegmented decision
feeling that they are always working on the structure, produces quick decisions.
same problems in somewhat different con- Sixth, important problems are more likely
texts, mostly without results. Problems, in to be solved than unimportant ones. Problems
a similar fashion, meet the same people which appear early are more likely to be
wherever they go with the same result. resolved than later ones. Considering only
Fourth, there are some important inter- those cases involving access hierarchy where
connections among three key aspects of the importance is defined for problems, the rela-
efficiency of the decision processes specified. tion between problem importance and order
The first is problem activity, the amount of of arrival is shown in Table 3. The system, in
time unresolved problems are actively at-
tached to choice situations. Problem activity TABLE 3. PROPORTION OF PROBLEMS RE-
is a rough measure of the potential for deci- SOLVED UNDER FOUR CONDITIONS OF CHOICE
sion conflict in the organization. The second AND PROBLEM ENTRY TIMES, BY IMPOR-
aspect is problem latency, the amount of time TANCE OF PROBLEM AND ORDER OF ARRIVAL
problems spend activated but not linked to OF PROBLEM (FOR HIERARCHICAL ACCESS)
choices. The third aspect is decision time,
the persistence of choices. Presumably, a Time of arrival
good organizational structure would keep of problem
choices. Important choices are made by over- what an organization should be. It is a hard
sight and flight. Unimportant choices are charge, to which the process described is a
made by resolution. These differences are partial response.
observed under both of the choice entry se- At the same time, the details of the out-
quences but are sharpest where important comes clearly depend on features of the orga-
choices enter relatively early. Table 4 shows nizational structure. The same garbage can
operation results in different behavioral
TABLE 4. PROPORTION OF CHOICES THAT ARE symptoms under different levels of load on
MADE BY FLIGHT OR OVERSIGHT UNDER FOUR the system or different designs of the struc-
CONDITIONS OF CHOICE AND PROBLEM ENTRY ture of the organization. Such differences
TIMES, BY TIME OF ARRIVAL AND IMPORTANCE raise the possibility of predicting variations
OF CHOICE (FOR HIERARCHICAL ACCESS OR in decision behavior in different organiza-
DECISION STRUCTURE) tions. One possible example of such use re-
mains to be considered.
Time of arrival of choice
GARBAGE CANS AND UNIVERSITIES
Early, Late,
first 5 last 5 One class of organization which faces de-
cision situations involving unclear goals, un-
Importance High, clear technology, and fluid participants is the
of first 5 0.86 0.65 modem college or university. If the implica-
choice Low,
last 5 0.54 0.60 tions of the model are applicable anywhere,
they are applicable to a university. Although
there is great variation among colleges and
the results. This property of important
universities, both between countries and
choices in a garbage can decision process can
within any country, the model has general
be naturally and directly related to the phe-
relevance to decision making in higher edu-
nomenon in complex organizations of im-
cation.
portant choices which often appear to just
happen. General Implications
Eighth, although a large proportion of the
University decision making frequently does
choices are made, the choice failures that do
not resolve problems. Choices are often made
occur are concentrated among the most im-
portant and least important choices. Choices
by flight or oversight. University decision
processes are sensitive to increases in load.
of intermediate importance are virtually al-
Active decision makers and problems track
ways made. The proportion of choice failures,
one another through a series of choices with-
under conditions of hierarchical access or de-
cision structures is as follows:
out appreciable progress in solving problems.
Important choices are not likely to solve
Three most important choices 0.14 problems.
Four middle choices 0.05
Decisions whose interpretations continu-
Three least important choices 0.12
ally change during the process of resolution
In a broad sense, these features of the appear both in the model and in actual ob-
process provide some clues to how organiza- servations of universities. Problems, choices,
tions survive when they do not know what and decision makers arrange and rearrange
they are doing. Much of the process violates themselves. In the course of these arrange-
standard notions of how decisions ought to ments the meaning of a choice can change
be made. But most of those notions are built several times, if this meaning is understood
on assumptions which cannot be met under as the mix of problems discussed in the con-
the conditions specified. When objectives and text of that choice.
technologies are unclear, organizations are Problems are often solved, but rarely by
charged to discover some alternative decision the choice to which they are first attached. A
procedures which permit them to proceed choice that might, under some circumstances,
without doing extraordinary violence to the be made with little effort becomes an arena
domains of participants or to their model of for many problems. The choice becomes al-
most impossible to make, until the problems solutions are easier to find and the net energy
drift off to another arena. The matching of is reduced. Finally, the comparative attrac-
problems, choices, and decision makers is tiveness and permeability of the organization
partly controlled by attributes of content, to problems affects the energy demands on it.
relevance, and competence; but it is also The more attractive, the more demands. The
quite sensitive to attributes of timing, the more permeable, the more demands. Univer-
particular combinations of current garbage sities with slack and with relatively easy
cans, and the overall load on the system. access, compared to other alternative arenas
for problem carriers, will attract a relatively
Universities and Adversity large number of problems.
In establishing connections between the Access structure. The access structure in an
hypothetical attributes of organizational organization would be expected to be af-
structure in the model and some features of fected by deliberate efforts to derive the ad-
contemporary universities, the more detailed vantages of delegation and specialization.
implications of the model can be used to ex- Those efforts, in turn, depend on some gen-
plore features of university decision making. eral characteristics of the organizational sit-
In particular, the model can examine the uation, task, and personnel. For example, the
events associated with one kind of adversity access structure would be expected to be sys-
within organizations, the reduction of orga- tematically related to two features of the
nizational slack. organization: (a) the degree of technical and
Slack is the difference between the re- value heterogeneity, and (b) the amount of
sources of the organization and the combina- organizational slack. Slack, by providing re-
tion of demands made on it. Thus, it is sensi- source buffers between parts of the organiza-
tive to two major factors: (a) money and tion, is essentially a substitute for technical
other resources provided to the organization and value homogeneity. As heterogeneity in-
by the external environment, and (b) the in- creases, holding slack constant, the access
ternal consistency of the demands made on structure shifts from an unsegmented to a
the organization by participants. It is com- specialized to a hierarchical structure. Simi-
monly believed that organizational slack has larly, as slack decreases, holding hetero-
been reduced substantially within American geneity constant, the access structure shifts
colleges and universities over the past few from an unsegmented to a specialized to a
years. The consequences of slack reduction hierarchical structure. The combined picture
in a garbage can decision process can be is shown in Figure 1.
shown by establishing possible relations be-
tween changes in organizational slack and
the key structural variables within the model.
Net energy load. The net energy load is C Hierarchical /
the difference between the energy required access / /
within an organization and the effective < / ~~~~~/
energy available. It is affected by anything o ~ ~~/ /
that alters either the amount of energy avail-
able to the organization or the amount re- / Specialized /
o // access /
quired to find or generate problem solutions.
The energy available to the organization is X / /
partly a function of the overall strength of o / ~//
exit opportunities for decision makers. For
= // Unsegmented
example, when there is a shortage of faculty,be / access
administrators, or students in the market for o /
participants, the net energy load on a univer- = ~/_
sity is heavier than it would be when there is
Organizational slack
no shortage. The energy required to find so-
lutions depends on the flow of possible prob- FIGURE 1. HYPOTHESIZED RELATIONSHIP BE-
lem solutions. For example, when the envi- TWEEN SLACK, HETEROGENEITY, AND THE ACCESS
ronment of the organization is relatively rich,STRUCTURE OF AN ORGANIZATION
&tO0 / -
Important variations in the organizational and unimportant people. The expected re-
variables among these schools can be ex- sults of these shifts are shown by the posi-
pected. Much of that variation is likely to tions of the square symbols in Figure 6.
be within-class variation. Assumptions about At the same time, adversity affects both
these variables, however, can be used to gen- access structure and decision structure. Ad-
erate some assumptions about the predomi- versity can be expected to bring a reduction
nant attributes of the four classes, under con- in slack and an increase in the average inter-
ditions of prosperity. relation among problems. The resulting hy-
Under such conditions a relatively rich pothesized shifts in access and decision struc-
school would be expected to have a light tures are shown in Figures 4 and 5.
energy load, a relatively poor school a mod- Table 5 shows the effects of adversity on
erate energy load. With respect to access the four types of schools according to the
structure, decision structure, and the internal previous assumptions and the garbage can
distribution of energy, the appropriate posi- model. By examining the first stage of adver-
tion of each of the four types of schools is sity, some possible reasons for discontent
marked with a circular symbol on Figures 4, among presidents of large, rich schools can
5, and 6. The result is the pattern of varia- be seen. In relation to other schools they are
tions indicated below: not seriously disadvantaged. The large, rich
With this specification, the garbage can schools have a moderate level of problem
model can be used to predict the differences activity, a moderate level of decision by reso-
expected among the several types of school. lution. In relation to their earlier state, how-
The results are found in Table 5. They sug- ever, large, rich schools are certainly de-
gest that under conditions of prosperity, prived. Problem activity and decision time
overt conflict (problem activity) will be sub- have increased greatly; the proportion of de-
stantially higher in poor schools than in rich cisions which resolve problems has decreased
ones, and decision time will be substantially from 68 percent to 21 percent; administrators
longer. Large, rich schools will be character- are less able to move around from one deci-
ized by a high degree of problem latency. sion to another. In all these terms, the relative
Most decisions will resolve some problems. deprivation of the presidents of large, rich
What happens to this group of schools un- schools is much greater, in the early stages of
der conditions of adversity-when slack is adversity, than that of administrators in other
reduced? According to earlier arguments, schools.
slack could be expected to affect each of the The large, poor schools are in the worst
organizational variables. It first increases net absolute position under adversity. They have
energy load, as resources become shorter and a high level of problem activity, a substantial
thus problems require a larger share of avail- decision time, a low level of decision maker
able energy to solve, but this effect is later mobility, and a low proportion of decisions
compensated by the reduction in market de- being made by resolution. But along most of
mand for personnel and in the relative attrac- these dimensions, the change has been less
tiveness of the school as an arena for prob- for them.
lems. The market effects also reduce the The small rich schools experience a large
differences in market demand for important increase in problem activity, an increase in
Outcome
Deci-
sion
style
propor- Deci-
Organi- tion sion Deci-
Type of school/ zational resolu- Problem Problem maker sion
type of situation type tion activity latency activity time
Large, rich universities
Good times 0200 0.68 0 154 100 0
Bad times, early 1110 0.21 210 23 58 34
Bad times, late 0111 0.65 57 60 66 14
Large, poor universities
Good times 1112 0.38 210 25 66 31
Bad times, early 2112 0.24 248 32 55 38
Bad times, late 1111 0.31 200 30 58 28
Small, rich colleges
Good times 0002 1.0 0 0 100 0
Bad times, early 1002 0 310 0 90 20
Bad times, late 0001 1.0 0 0 100 0
Small, poor colleges
Good times 1221 0.54 158 127 15 83
Bad times, early 2211 0.61 101 148 73 52
Bad times, late 1211 0.62 78 151 76 39
tions in which the preconditions of the gar- The following are ten summary statistics:
bage can process cannot be eliminated. In
1. (KT) Problem persistence, the total
some, such as pure research, or the family,
number of time periods a problem is acti-
they should not be eliminated. The great ad-
vantage of trying to see garbage can phe-
vated and attached to a choice, summed over
all problems.
nomena together as a process is the possibil-
ity that that process can be understood, that
2. (KU) Problem latency, the total num-
ber of time periods a problem is activated,
organizational design and decision making
but not attached to a choice, summed over
can take account of its existence and that, to
all problems.
some extent, it can be managed.
3. (KV) Problem velocity, the total num-
APPENDIX ber of times any problem shifts from one
Version five of the Fortran programchoice to another.
for the
garbage can model reads in entry times for 4. (KW) Problem failures, the total num-
choices, solution coefficients, entry times for ber of problems not solved at the end of the
problems, and two control variables, NA and twenty time periods.
IO. NA controls various combinations of free- 5. (KX) Decision maker velocity, the total
dom of movement for decision makers and number of times any decision maker shifts
problems. All results are based on runs in from one choice to another.
which NA is 1. Comment cards included in 6. (KS) Decision maker inactivity, the
the program describe other possibilities. The total number of time periods a decision maker
latter variable, IO, controls output. At the is not attached to a choice, summed over all
value 1, only summary statistics are printed. decision makers.
At the value 2, full histories of the decision 7. (KY) Choice persistence, the total num-
process are printed for each organizational ber of time periods a choice is activated,
variant. summed over all choices.
8. (KZ) Choice failures, the total number In its current form the program generates
of choices not made by the end of the twenty both the problem access structure and the
time periods. decision structure internally. In order to ex-
9. (XR) Energy reserve, the total amount amine the performance of the model under
of effective energy available to the system other structures, modification of the code or
but not used because decision makers are its elimination in favor of Read statements
not attached to any choice. to take the structures from cards will be
10. (XS) Energy wastage, the total effec- necessary.
tive energy used on choices in excess of that Under IO 2, total output will be about
required to make them at the time they are ninety pages. Running time is about two
made. minutes under a Watfor compiler.
APPENDIX TABLE: FORTRAN PROGRAM FOR GARBAGE CAN MODEL, VERSION FIVE
C
C
C SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR EACH VARIANT
C CQL 1: KZ: TOTAL DECISIONS NOT MADE
C COL 2: KY: TOTAL NUMBER ACTIVE CHOICE PERIODS
C COL 3: KX: TOTAL NUMBER CHANGES BY DECISION MAKERS
C COL 4: KW: TOTAL PROBLEMS NOT SOLVED
C COL 5: KV: TOTAL NUMBER CHANGFS BY PROBLEMS
C COL 6: KU: TOTAL NUMBER LATENT PROBLEM PERIODS
C COL 7: KT: TOTAL NUMBER ATTACHED PROBLEM PERIODS
C COL 8: KS: TOTAL NUMBER PERIODS DMKRS RESTING
C COL 9: XR: TOTAL AMOUNT OF UNUSED ENEQGY
J A( I . J)=O
IF(JA&EO.I) GO ro 532
IF(JA.EQ.2) GO TO 534
JIAC .J)=t
GO TO 550
532 IF I ( I-Jb.GT.( 12)) GO TO 550
JIA I .AJ)=1
GO TO 550
534 IF(I.NE.(2*J)) GO TO 550
JIA( I .JJ)=
JI A( I-I , J)=1
550 CONTINUE
560 CONTINUE
DO 590 1=I.NDM
DO 580 J=.NTP
XEA( I .J)-0.55
I F (JFE Qo I )GO TO 580
X X A= I
IIF(JE.EO.O)GO TO 570
XEA( I .J)=( 1I1 O-XXA)/1o0-
GO TO 580
570 XEA( I .J)=XXA/1O.O
580 CONTINUE
590 CONTINUE
C *** FINISH READ INITIALIZATION
DO 994 LT=I.NTP
1006 FOPMATC2X.6HCHOICE.2X,13.2X.6HACTIVE
C CHOICE ACTIVATION
DO 101 1-I.NCH
IF(ICH(I){NE-LT)GO TO 101
ICS( I )=1
101 CONTINUE
C PROD. ACTIVATION
DO 110 J=1.NPR
IF(JET(J).NE.LT)GO TO 110
JPS( J)=1
110 CONTINUF
C FIND MOST ATTRACTIVE CHOICE FOR PROBLEM J
00 120 J-l.NPR
IF (JPS(J).NEaI) GO TO 120
IF(NA.EQ.2)GO TO 125
IF(NA.EQ.4)GO TO 125
GO TO 126
125 IF(JF(J).NE.O)GO TO 127
126 S=10C0000
00 121 I=1.NCH
IF (ICS(I).NE.I) GO TO 121
IF(JIA(JI).EQ.0)GO TO 121
IF(JF(J).E.0)GO TO 122
IF(JF(J)*EO.I)GO TO 122
IF((xERP(J)*XERC(1)-XEE(1)).GE.S)GO TO 121
GO TO 123
122 IF((XERC(I)-XEE(I)).GE.S)GO TO 121
S=XERC( I )-XEE( I)
GO TO 124
123 S=XERP( J)+XERC( I )-XEE( I)
124 JFF(J)=I
121 CONTINUE
GO TO 120
127 JFF(J)=JF(J)
120 CONTINUE
DO 130 J=1NPR
131 JF( J)=JFF( J)
130 JFF(J)=O
LTT=LT-1
IF(LTEQ 1 )LTT=1
C FIND MOST ATTRACTIVE CHOICE FOR DMKR K
00 140 K=INDM
IF(NAoEOQ3)GO TO 145
IF(NA.EQa.) GO TO 145
GO TO 146
IF(NA.EQ.3)GO TO 261
IF(NA*EQ.4)GO TO 261
GO TO 299
261 D0 262 K=1-NDM
IF(KDC(K).NE.I)GO TO 262
KDCW( K) =
262 CONTINUE
299 CONTINUE
DO 200 I=I.NCH
200 KADC(LT.I)=ICS(I)
DO 210 K=1.NDM
KaBBC( LT K )=KDC( K)
IF(KOCW(K).EQ.O)GO TO 210
KDC( K )=O
210 KDCW(K)=O
DO 220 J-1.NPR
KCBC( LT . J )=JF( J )
IF(JPS(J).EQ.o) GO TO 230
IF(JPS(J)EQo.l) GO TO 220
KC5C( LT. J )-1000
GO TO 220
230 KCBC(LTJ)=-I
220 CONTINUE
994 CONTINUE
C FINISH TIME PERIOD LOOP. BEGIN ACCUMULATION OF 10 SUMMARY STATISTICS.
KZ=O
KY=O
KX=O
KW=O
KV=O
KU=O
KT=o
DO 310 1=1lNTP
DO 320 J=1.NCH
IF(KABC(I.J)*NE.I)GO TO 320
KY=KY+I
IF(I.NE.NTP)GO TO 320
KZ=KZ+
320 CONTINUE
310 CONTINUE
00 330 1=2.NTP
D0 340 J=1.NDM
IF(K89C(l*J).EQ.K5BC(I-t J))GO TO 340
KX =KX*
340 CONTINUE
330 CONTINUE
D0 350 l=2.NTP
00 360 J-1.NPR
IF(KCDC(IJ).*E-O .)G0 TO 351
IF(KC9C(IJ)EQ*.-1) GO TO 360
IF(KC9C(IJ).EQ.1000) GO TO 352
KT-KT+ 1
GO TO 360
351 KU=KU+I
GO TO 360
352 IF(I.NE.NTP)G0 TO 360
KW=KW+ l
360 CONTINUE
350 CONTINUE
KW=NPR-KW
DO 370 1t2.NTP
00 380 J=1.NPR
IF(KCBC(I.J).EQ.KCBC(I-I.J))GO TO 380
KV=KV+I
380 CONTINUE
370 CONTINUE
C BEGIN WRITEOUT OF MATERIALS FOR THIS ORGANIZATIONAL VARIANT.
1000 FORMAT(IHI)
1019 FORMAT(2X.'LOAD='.II.' PR.ACC.='.1.' DEC.STR.='*II.' EN.DIST.'.
BI 1 .2X. 'STATS 1-10 ,3X.815, 1 X2F6.2/)
WRITE(6.1019)I8.JA.JDo.JEKZ.KY.KXKW.KV.KU.KT.KS.XR.XS
IF(IflEQ.1) GO TO 995
2000 FORMAT(' CHOICE ACTIVATION HISTORY.34X.'DEC.MAKER ACTIVITY HISTOR
BY',' 20 TIME PERIODSlO CHOICES*,33X.'20 TIME PERIODS,10 DEC. MAKE
CRS '/6 O- INACTIVE. =ACT IVE. 2=MADE * 33X. 'O=I NACTI VE. X=WORHI NG ON CHO
DICE X'//9X,' 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10.3OX,'81 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 100/)
WRI TEA 6.2000 )
2001 FORMAT( 5X.12.3X.I012*25X.I2.3X.10I21
WRITE(6.2001)(LT.(KABC(LTJ).J=1.NCH).LT.( KB8BC(LT.J).J=lNDM),
S LT=1.NTP )
2002 FORMAT(/' PROBLEM HISTORY:ROS=TIMECOLS=PRO8S.. -I=NOT ENTERED.,
BO-UNATTACHEDX=ATT oTO CHoX **=SOLVEDS/ lOX,
C' 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 201/)
WRITE(6. 2002)
2003 FQRMATC20(5X.I2.3X.20( IX.I2)/))
WRITE(6.2003)(LT,(KCBC(LT.J).J=1.NPR).LT=INTP)
WRI TE( 6.1000)
995 CONTINUE
996 CONTINUE
997 CONTINUE
998 CONTINUE
STOP
END
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
12345678901 234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
008.005.006.007.004.009.002.010.003.001
1.000.900.700.300.100. 1OOo300.700.901 00
O. 600.o600.600600.600. 600. 600. 600. 600.60
009.005.008.007.010.003.003.001.007.009
006. 008 .005.002. 004. 002. 00401 0. 006.001
1 2
Lindblom, Charles E.
Michael D. Cohen is an NSF-SSRC post- 1965 The Intelligence of Democracy. New
doctoral fellow at Stanford University; James York: Macmillan.
G. March is David Jacks Professor of Higher Long, Norton
Education, Political Science, and Sociology 1958 "The local community as an ecology
at Stanford University; and Johan P. Olsen of games." American Journal of Sociol-
ogy, 44: 251-261.
is an assistant professor of Political Science
March, James G., and Herbert A. Simon
at the University of Bergen.
1958 Organizations. New York: John Wiley.
Mood, Alexander (ed.)
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1971 More Scholars for the Dollar. New
Allison, Graham T. York: McGraw-Hill, Carnegie Commis-
1969 "Conceptual models and the Cuban sion on the Future of Higher Educa-
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ence Review, 63: 689-718. Olsen, Johan P.
Christensen, Soren 1970 A Study of Choice in an Academic
1971 Institut og laboratorieorganisation pat Organization. Bergen: University of
Danmarks tekniske H0jskole. Copen- Bergen.
hagen: Copenhagen School of Econom- 1971 The Reorganization of Authority in an
ics. Academic Organization. Bergen: Uni-
Cohen, Michael D., and James G. March versity of Bergen.
1972 The American College President. New Rommetveit, Ka're
York: McGraw-Hill, Carnegie Commis- 1971 Framveksten av det medisinske fakul-
sion on the Future of Higher Educa- tet ved Universitetet i Troms0. Bergen:
tion. University of Bergen.
Coleman, James S. Schilling, Warner R.
1957 Community Conflict. Glencoe: Free 1968 "The H-bomb decision: how to decide
Press. without actually choosing." In W. R.
Cyert, Richard M., and James G. March Nelson (ed.), The Politics of Science.
1963 Behavioral Theory of the Firm. Engle- London: Oxford University Press.
wood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. Thompson, James D.
Enderud, Harald 1967 Organizations in Action. New York:
1971 Rektoratet og den centrale administra- McGraw-Hill.
Vickers, Geoffrey
tion pat Danmarks tekniske Hojskole.
Copenhagen: Copenhagen School of 1965 The Art of Judgment. New York: Basic
Economics. Books.