G.R. No.

L-27952 February 15, 1982

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS, Administratrix, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors- appellants.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

The main issue in this appeal is the manner of partitioning the testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez among the principal beneficiaries, namely: his
widow Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez; his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez; and his companion Wanda de Wrobleski.
The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French who lives in Paris, while the companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in
Spain. Moreover, the testator provided for substitutions.
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to
probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate. In due
time she submitted an inventory of the estate as follows:
INVENTARIO
Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de un te
rreno, con sus mejoras y edificaciones, situadoen
la Escolta, Manila............................................................. P500,000.00
Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de dos
parcelas de terreno situadas en Antipolo, Rizal................... 658.34
Cuatrocientos noventa y uno (491) acciones
de la 'Central Azucarera de la Carlota a P17.00
por accion ................................................................................8,347.00
Diez mil ochocientos seize (10,806) acciones
de la 'Central Luzon Milling Co.', disuelta y en
liquidacion a P0.15 por accion ..............................................1,620.90
Cuenta de Ahorros en el Philippine Trust
Co.............................................................................................. 2,350.73
TOTAL.............................................................. P512,976.97
MENOS:
Deuda al Banco de las Islas Filipinas, garan-
tizada con prenda de las acciones de La Carlota ......... P 5,000,00
VALOR LIQUIDO........................................... P507,976.97
The testamentary dispositions are as follows:
A.—En nuda propiedad, a D. Roberto y D. Jorge Ramirez, ambas menores de edad, residentes en Manila, I.F., calle 'Alright, No.
1818, Malate, hijos de su sobrino D. Jose Ma. Ramirez, con sustitucion vulgar a favor de sus respectivos descendientes, y, en su
defecto, con sustitucion vulgar reciprocal entre ambos.
El precedente legado en nuda propiedad de la participacion indivisa de la finca Santa Cruz Building, lo ordena el testador a favor
de los legatarios nombrados, en atencion a que dicha propiedad fue creacion del querido padre del otorgante y por ser aquellos
continuadores del apellido Ramirez,
B.—Y en usufructo a saber: —
a. En cuanto a una tercera parte, a favor de la esposa del testador, Da. Marcelle Ramirez, domiciliada en IE PECO, calle del
General Gallieni No. 33, Seine Francia, con sustitucion vulgar u fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda de Wrobleski, de Palma de
Mallorca, Son Rapina Avenida de los Reyes 13,
b.—Y en cuanto a las dos terceras partes restantes, a favor de la nombrada Da. Wanda de Nrobleski con sustitucion vulgar v
fideicomisaria a saber:—
En cuanto a la mitad de dichas dos terceras partes, a favor de D. Juan Pablo Jankowski, de Son Rapina Palma de Mallorca; y
encuanto a la mitad restante, a favor de su sobrino, D. Horace V. Ramirez, San Luis Building, Florida St. Ermita, Manila, I.F.
A pesar de las sustituciones fideiconiisarias precedentemente ordinadas, las usufiructuarias nombradas conjuntamente con los
nudo propietarios, podran en cualquier memento vender a tercero los bienes objeto delegado, sin intervencion alguna de los
titulares fideicomisaarios.
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part
shall go to the widow 'en pleno dominio" in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en
nuda propriedad." Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a
usufruct in favor of Wanda.
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that the provisions for vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with
respect to the widow's usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez, with respect to Wanda's usufruct are invalid because
the first heirs Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator; (b) that the provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are also invalid because the first
heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code; (c) that the grant of a
usufruct over real property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who is an alien, violates Section 5, Article III of the Philippine
Constitution; and that (d) the proposed partition of the testator's interest in the Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building between the widow Marcelle and the
appellants, violates the testator's express win to give this property to them Nonetheless, the lower court approved the project of partition in its order
dated May 3, 1967. It is this order which Jorge and Roberto have appealed to this Court.
1. The widow's legitime.
The appellant's do not question the legality of giving Marcelle one-half of the estate in full ownership. They admit that the testator's dispositions
impaired his widow's legitime. Indeed, under Art. 900 of the Civil Code "If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to
one-half of the hereditary estate." And since Marcelle alone survived the deceased, she is entitled to one-half of his estate over which he could
impose no burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever. (Art. 904, par. 2, Civil Code.)
It is the one-third usufruct over the free portion which the appellants question and justifiably so. It appears that the court a quo approved the usufruct
in favor of Marcelle because the testament provides for a usufruct in her favor of one-third of the estate. The court a quo erred for Marcelle who is
entitled to one-half of the estate "en pleno dominio" as her legitime and which is more than what she is given under the will is not entitled to have any
additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more than her legitime will run counter to the testator's intention for as stated above his dispositions
even impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.
2. The substitutions.
It may be useful to recall that "Substitution is the appoint- judgment of another heir so that he may enter into the inheritance in default of the heir
originally instituted." (Art. 857, Civil Code. And that there are several kinds of substitutions, namely: simple or common, brief or compendious,
reciprocal, and fideicommissary (Art. 858, Civil Code.) According to Tolentino, "Although the Code enumerates four classes, there are really only
two principal classes of substitutions: the simple and the fideicommissary. The others are merely variations of these two." (111 Civil Code, p. 185
[1973].)
The simple or vulgar is that provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 859. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute the heir or heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs
should die before him, or should not wish, or should be incapacitated to accept the inheritance.
A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it refers, shall comprise the three mentioned in the preceding
paragraph, unless the testator has otherwise provided.
The fideicommissary substitution is described in the Civil Code as follows:
ART. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation
to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect, provided such
substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted, and provided further that the fiduciary or first heir
and the second heir are living at time of the death of the testator.
It will be noted that the testator provided for a vulgar substitution in respect of the legacies of Roberto and Jorge Ramirez, the appellants, thus: con
sustitucion vulgar a favor de sus respectivos descendientes, y, en su defecto, con substitution vulgar reciprocal entre ambos.
The appellants do not question the legality of the substitution so provided. The appellants question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria a favor de
Da. Wanda de Wrobleski" in connection with the one-third usufruct over the estate given to the widow Marcelle However, this question has become
moot because as We have ruled above, the widow is not entitled to any usufruct.
The appellants also question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria in connection with Wanda's usufruct over two thirds of the estate in favor of Juan
Pablo Jankowski and Horace v. Ramirez.
They allege that the substitution in its vulgar aspect as void because Wanda survived the testator or stated differently because she did not predecease
the testator. But dying before the testator is not the only case for vulgar substitution for it also includes refusal or incapacity to accept the inheritance
as provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code, supra. Hence, the vulgar substitution is valid.
As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the appellants are correct in their claim that it is void for the following reasons:
(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code
validates a fideicommissary substitution "provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted."
What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by Tolentino as follows:
Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas construe "degree" as designation, substitution, or transmission. The Supreme Court of Spain has
decidedly adopted this construction. From this point of view, there can be only one tranmission or substitution, and the substitute
need not be related to the first heir. Manresa, Morell and Sanchez Roman, however, construe the word "degree" as generation,
and the present Code has obviously followed this interpretation. by providing that the substitution shall not go beyond one degree
"from the heir originally instituted." The Code thus clearly indicates that the second heir must be related to and be one generation
from the first heir.
From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent of the first heir. These are the only relatives
who are one generation or degree from the fiduciary (Op. cit., pp. 193-194.)
(b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact,
the appellee admits "that the testator contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary substitution when he permits the properties subject of the
usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and the naked owners." (Brief, p. 26.)
3. The usufruct of Wanda.
The appellants claim that the usufruct over real properties of the estate in favor of Wanda is void because it violates the constitutional prohibition
against the acquisition of lands by aliens.
The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows:
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. (Art. XIII.)
The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the ground that the Constitution covers not only succession by operation of law
but also testamentary succession. We are of the opinion that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not
extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent the
prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land.
This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of Wanda because a usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title to the land in the
usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered distributed as follows:
One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;
One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a
simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez.
The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court a quo. No special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., De Castro, Ericta and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Aquino J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-17587 September 12, 1967

PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION, representing the estate of JUSTINA SANTOS Y CANON FAUSTINO, deceased, plaintiff-
appellant,
vs.
LUI SHE in her own behalf and as administratrix of the intestate estate of Wong Heng, deceased, defendant-appellant.
Nicanor S. Sison for plaintiff-appellant.
Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta for defendant-appellant.

CASTRO, J.:
Justina Santos y Canon Faustino and her sister Lorenzo were the owners in common of a piece of land in Manila. This parcel, with an area of
2,582.30 square meters, is located on Rizal Avenue and opens into Florentino Torres street at the back and Katubusan street on one side. In it are two
residential houses with entrance on Florentino Torres street and the Hen Wah Restaurant with entrance on Rizal Avenue. The sisters lived in one of
the houses, while Wong Heng, a Chinese, lived with his family in the restaurant. Wong had been a long-time lessee of a portion of the property,
paying a monthly rental of P2,620.
On September 22, 1957 Justina Santos became the owner of the entire property as her sister died with no other heir. Then already well advanced in
years, being at the time 90 years old, blind, crippled and an invalid, she was left with no other relative to live with. Her only companions in the house
were her 17 dogs and 8 maids. Her otherwise dreary existence was brightened now and then by the visits of Wong's four children who had become
the joy of her life. Wong himself was the trusted man to whom she delivered various amounts for safekeeping, including rentals from her property at
the corner of Ongpin and Salazar streets and the rentals which Wong himself paid as lessee of a part of the Rizal Avenue property. Wong also took
care of the payment; in her behalf, of taxes, lawyers' fees, funeral expenses, masses, salaries of maids and security guard, and her household
expenses.
"In grateful acknowledgment of the personal services of the lessee to her," Justina Santos executed on November 15, 1957 a contract of lease (Plff
Exh. 3) in favor of Wong, covering the portion then already leased to him and another portion fronting Florentino Torres street. The lease was for 50
years, although the lessee was given the right to withdraw at any time from the agreement; the monthly rental was P3,120. The contract covered an
area of 1,124 square meters. Ten days later (November 25), the contract was amended (Plff Exh. 4) so as to make it cover the entire property,
including the portion on which the house of Justina Santos stood, at an additional monthly rental of P360. For his part Wong undertook to pay, out of
the rental due from him, an amount not exceeding P1,000 a month for the food of her dogs and the salaries of her maids.
On December 21 she executed another contract (Plff Exh. 7) giving Wong the option to buy the leased premises for P120,000, payable within ten
years at a monthly installment of P1,000. The option, written in Tagalog, imposed on him the obligation to pay for the food of the dogs and the
salaries of the maids in her household, the charge not to exceed P1,800 a month. The option was conditioned on his obtaining Philippine citizenship,
a petition for which was then pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. It appears, however, that this application for naturalization was
withdrawn when it was discovered that he was not a resident of Rizal. On October 28, 1958 she filed a petition to adopt him and his children on the
erroneous belief that adoption would confer on them Philippine citizenship. The error was discovered and the proceedings were abandoned.
On November 18, 1958 she executed two other contracts, one (Plff Exh. 5) extending the term of the lease to 99 years, and another (Plff Exh. 6)
fixing the term of the option of 50 years. Both contracts are written in Tagalog.
In two wills executed on August 24 and 29, 1959 (Def Exhs. 285 & 279), she bade her legatees to respect the contracts she had entered into with
Wong, but in a codicil (Plff Exh. 17) of a later date (November 4, 1959) she appears to have a change of heart. Claiming that the various contracts
were made by her because of machinations and inducements practiced by him, she now directed her executor to secure the annulment of the
contracts.
On November 18 the present action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The complaint alleged that the contracts were obtained by
Wong "through fraud, misrepresentation, inequitable conduct, undue influence and abuse of confidence and trust of and (by) taking advantage of the
helplessness of the plaintiff and were made to circumvent the constitutional provision prohibiting aliens from acquiring lands in the Philippines and
also of the Philippine Naturalization Laws." The court was asked to direct the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel the registration of the contracts
and to order Wong to pay Justina Santos the additional rent of P3,120 a month from November 15, 1957 on the allegation that the reasonable rental
of the leased premises was P6,240 a month.
In his answer, Wong admitted that he enjoyed her trust and confidence as proof of which he volunteered the information that, in addition to the sum
of P3,000 which he said she had delivered to him for safekeeping, another sum of P22,000 had been deposited in a joint account which he had with
one of her maids. But he denied having taken advantage of her trust in order to secure the execution of the contracts in question. As counterclaim he
sought the recovery of P9,210.49 which he said she owed him for advances.
Wong's admission of the receipt of P22,000 and P3,000 was the cue for the filing of an amended complaint. Thus on June 9, 1960, aside from the
nullity of the contracts, the collection of various amounts allegedly delivered on different occasions was sought. These amounts and the dates of their
delivery are P33,724.27 (Nov. 4, 1957); P7,344.42 (Dec. 1, 1957); P10,000 (Dec. 6, 1957); P22,000 and P3,000 (as admitted in his answer). An
accounting of the rentals from the Ongpin and Rizal Avenue properties was also demanded.
In the meantime as a result of a petition for guardianship filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, the Security Bank & Trust Co. was
appointed guardian of the properties of Justina Santos, while Ephraim G. Gochangco was appointed guardian of her person.
In his answer, Wong insisted that the various contracts were freely and voluntarily entered into by the parties. He likewise disclaimed knowledge of
the sum of P33,724.27, admitted receipt of P7,344.42 and P10,000, but contended that these amounts had been spent in accordance with the
instructions of Justina Santos; he expressed readiness to comply with any order that the court might make with respect to the sums of P22,000 in the
bank and P3,000 in his possession.
The case was heard, after which the lower court rendered judgment as follows:
[A]ll the documents mentioned in the first cause of action, with the exception of the first which is the lease contract of 15 November 1957, are
declared null and void; Wong Heng is condemned to pay unto plaintiff thru guardian of her property the sum of P55,554.25 with legal interest from
the date of the filing of the amended complaint; he is also ordered to pay the sum of P3,120.00 for every month of his occupation as lessee under the
document of lease herein sustained, from 15 November 1959, and the moneys he has consigned since then shall be imputed to that; costs against
Wong Heng.
From this judgment both parties appealed directly to this Court. After the case was submitted for decision, both parties died, Wong Heng on October
21, 1962 and Justina Santos on December 28, 1964. Wong was substituted by his wife, Lui She, the other defendant in this case, while Justina Santos
was substituted by the Philippine Banking Corporation.
Justina Santos maintained — now reiterated by the Philippine Banking Corporation — that the lease contract (Plff Exh. 3) should have been annulled
along with the four other contracts (Plff Exhs. 4-7) because it lacks mutuality; because it included a portion which, at the time, was in custodia legis;
because the contract was obtained in violation of the fiduciary relations of the parties; because her consent was obtained through undue influence,
fraud and misrepresentation; and because the lease contract, like the rest of the contracts, is absolutely simulated.
Paragraph 5 of the lease contract states that "The lessee may at any time withdraw from this agreement." It is claimed that this stipulation offends
article 1308 of the Civil Code which provides that "the contract must bind both contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot be left to the
will of one of them."
We have had occasion to delineate the scope and application of article 1308 in the early case of Taylor v. Uy Tieng Piao.1 We said in that case:
Article 1256 [now art. 1308] of the Civil Code in our opinion creates no impediment to the insertion in a contract for personal service of a resolutory
condition permitting the cancellation of the contract by one of the parties. Such a stipulation, as can be readily seen, does not make either the validity
or the fulfillment of the contract dependent upon the will of the party to whom is conceded the privilege of cancellation; for where the contracting
parties have agreed that such option shall exist, the exercise of the option is as much in the fulfillment of the contract as any other act which may
have been the subject of agreement. Indeed, the cancellation of a contract in accordance with conditions agreed upon beforehand is fulfillment.2
And so it was held in Melencio v. Dy Tiao Lay 3 that a "provision in a lease contract that the lessee, at any time before he erected any building on the
land, might rescind the lease, can hardly be regarded as a violation of article 1256 [now art. 1308] of the Civil Code."
The case of Singson Encarnacion v. Baldomar 4 cannot be cited in support of the claim of want of mutuality, because of a difference in factual
setting. In that case, the lessees argued that they could occupy the premises as long as they paid the rent. This is of course untenable, for as this Court
said, "If this defense were to be allowed, so long as defendants elected to continue the lease by continuing the payment of the rentals, the owner
would never be able to discontinue it; conversely, although the owner should desire the lease to continue the lessees could effectively thwart his
purpose if they should prefer to terminate the contract by the simple expedient of stopping payment of the rentals." Here, in contrast, the right of the
lessee to continue the lease or to terminate it is so circumscribed by the term of the contract that it cannot be said that the continuance of the lease
depends upon his will. At any rate, even if no term had been fixed in the agreement, this case would at most justify the fixing of a period 5 but not the
annulment of the contract.
Nor is there merit in the claim that as the portion of the property formerly owned by the sister of Justina Santos was still in the process of settlement
in the probate court at the time it was leased, the lease is invalid as to such portion. Justina Santos became the owner of the entire property upon the
death of her sister Lorenzo on September 22, 1957 by force of article 777 of the Civil Code. Hence, when she leased the property on November 15,
she did so already as owner thereof. As this Court explained in upholding the sale made by an heir of a property under judicial administration:
That the land could not ordinarily be levied upon while in custodia legis does not mean that one of the heirs may not sell the right, interest or
participation which he has or might have in the lands under administration. The ordinary execution of property in custodia legis is prohibited in order
to avoid interference with the possession by the court. But the sale made by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the result of the pending
administration, in no wise stands in the way of such administration.6
It is next contended that the lease contract was obtained by Wong in violation of his fiduciary relationship with Justina Santos, contrary to article
1646, in relation to article 1941 of the Civil Code, which disqualifies "agents (from leasing) the property whose administration or sale may have been
entrusted to them." But Wong was never an agent of Justina Santos. The relationship of the parties, although admittedly close and confidential, did
not amount to an agency so as to bring the case within the prohibition of the law.
Just the same, it is argued that Wong so completely dominated her life and affairs that the contracts express not her will but only his. Counsel for
Justina Santos cites the testimony of Atty. Tomas S. Yumol who said that he prepared the lease contract on the basis of data given to him by Wong
and that she told him that "whatever Mr. Wong wants must be followed."7
The testimony of Atty. Yumol cannot be read out of context in order to warrant a finding that Wong practically dictated the terms of the contract.
What this witness said was:
Q Did you explain carefully to your client, Doña Justina, the contents of this document before she signed it?
A I explained to her each and every one of these conditions and I also told her these conditions were quite onerous for her, I don't really know if I
have expressed my opinion, but I told her that we would rather not execute any contract anymore, but to hold it as it was before, on a verbal month to
month contract of lease.
Q But, she did not follow your advice, and she went with the contract just the same?
A She agreed first . . .
Q Agreed what?
A Agreed with my objectives that it is really onerous and that I was really right, but after that, I was called again by her and she told me to follow the
wishes of Mr. Wong Heng.
xxx xxx xxx
Q So, as far as consent is concerned, you were satisfied that this document was perfectly proper?
xxx xxx xxx
A Your Honor, if I have to express my personal opinion, I would say she is not, because, as I said before, she told me — "Whatever Mr. Wong wants
must be followed."8
Wong might indeed have supplied the data which Atty. Yumol embodied in the lease contract, but to say this is not to detract from the binding force
of the contract. For the contract was fully explained to Justina Santos by her own lawyer. One incident, related by the same witness, makes clear that
she voluntarily consented to the lease contract. This witness said that the original term fixed for the lease was 99 years but that as he doubted the
validity of a lease to an alien for that length of time, he tried to persuade her to enter instead into a lease on a month-to-month basis. She was,
however, firm and unyielding. Instead of heeding the advice of the lawyer, she ordered him, "Just follow Mr. Wong Heng."9 Recounting the incident,
Atty. Yumol declared on cross examination:
Considering her age, ninety (90) years old at the time and her condition, she is a wealthy woman, it is just natural when she said "This is what I want
and this will be done." In particular reference to this contract of lease, when I said "This is not proper," she said — "You just go ahead, you prepare
that, I am the owner, and if there is any illegality, I am the only one that can question the illegality."10
Atty. Yumol further testified that she signed the lease contract in the presence of her close friend, Hermenegilda Lao, and her maid, Natividad Luna,
who was constantly by her side.11 Any of them could have testified on the undue influence that Wong supposedly wielded over Justina Santos, but
neither of them was presented as a witness. The truth is that even after giving his client time to think the matter over, the lawyer could not make her
change her mind. This persuaded the lower court to uphold the validity of the lease contract against the claim that it was procured through undue
influence.
Indeed, the charge of undue influence in this case rests on a mere inference 12 drawn from the fact that Justina Santos could not read (as she was blind)
and did not understand the English language in which the contract is written, but that inference has been overcome by her own evidence.
Nor is there merit in the claim that her consent to the lease contract, as well as to the rest of the contracts in question, was given out of a mistaken
sense of gratitude to Wong who, she was made to believe, had saved her and her sister from a fire that destroyed their house during the liberation of
Manila. For while a witness claimed that the sisters were saved by other persons (the brothers Edilberto and Mariano Sta. Ana)13 it was Justina Santos
herself who, according to her own witness, Benjamin C. Alonzo, said "very emphatically" that she and her sister would have perished in the fire had
it not been for Wong.14 Hence the recital in the deed of conditional option (Plff Exh. 7) that "[I]tong si Wong Heng ang siyang nagligtas sa aming
dalawang magkapatid sa halos ay tiyak na kamatayan", and the equally emphatic avowal of gratitude in the lease contract (Plff Exh. 3).
As it was with the lease contract (Plff Exh. 3), so it was with the rest of the contracts (Plff Exhs. 4-7) — the consent of Justina Santos was given
freely and voluntarily. As Atty. Alonzo, testifying for her, said:
[I]n nearly all documents, it was either Mr. Wong Heng or Judge Torres and/or both. When we had conferences, they used to tell me what the
documents should contain. But, as I said, I would always ask the old woman about them and invariably the old woman used to tell me: "That's okay.
It's all right."15
But the lower court set aside all the contracts, with the exception of the lease contract of November 15, 1957, on the ground that they are contrary to
the expressed wish of Justina Santos and that their considerations are fictitious. Wong stated in his deposition that he did not pay P360 a month for
the additional premises leased to him, because she did not want him to, but the trial court did not believe him. Neither did it believe his statement that
he paid P1,000 as consideration for each of the contracts (namely, the option to buy the leased premises, the extension of the lease to 99 years, and
the fixing of the term of the option at 50 years), but that the amount was returned to him by her for safekeeping. Instead, the court relied on the
testimony of Atty. Alonzo in reaching the conclusion that the contracts are void for want of consideration.
Atty. Alonzo declared that he saw no money paid at the time of the execution of the documents, but his negative testimony does not rule out the
possibility that the considerations were paid at some other time as the contracts in fact recite. What is more, the consideration need not pass from one
party to the other at the time a contract is executed because the promise of one is the consideration for the other. 16
With respect to the lower court's finding that in all probability Justina Santos could not have intended to part with her property while she was alive
nor even to lease it in its entirety as her house was built on it, suffice it to quote the testimony of her own witness and lawyer who prepared the
contracts (Plff Exhs. 4-7) in question, Atty. Alonzo:
The ambition of the old woman, before her death, according to her revelation to me, was to see to it that these properties be enjoyed, even to own
them, by Wong Heng because Doña Justina told me that she did not have any relatives, near or far, and she considered Wong Heng as a son and his
children her grandchildren; especially her consolation in life was when she would hear the children reciting prayers in Tagalog.17
She was very emphatic in the care of the seventeen (17) dogs and of the maids who helped her much, and she told me to see to it that no one could
disturb Wong Heng from those properties. That is why we thought of the ninety-nine (99) years lease; we thought of adoption, believing that thru
adoption Wong Heng might acquire Filipino citizenship; being the adopted child of a Filipino citizen. 18
This is not to say, however, that the contracts (Plff Exhs. 3-7) are valid. For the testimony just quoted, while dispelling doubt as to the intention of
Justina Santos, at the same time gives the clue to what we view as a scheme to circumvent the Constitutional prohibition against the transfer of lands
to aliens. "The illicit purpose then becomes the illegal causa"19 rendering the contracts void.
Taken singly, the contracts show nothing that is necessarily illegal, but considered collectively, they reveal an insidious pattern to subvert by
indirection what the Constitution directly prohibits. To be sure, a lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So is an option giving an alien the
right to buy real property on condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship. As this Court said in Krivenko v. Register of Deeds:20
[A]liens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for residential purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is
temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to remain
here forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire.
But if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise
dispose of his property,21 this to last for 50 years, then it becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner
divests himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land ( jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus fruendi and jus abutendi) but also of the right to
dispose of it ( jus disponendi) — rights the sum total of which make up ownership. It is just as if today the possession is transferred, tomorrow, the
use, the next day, the disposition, and so on, until ultimately all the rights of which ownership is made up are consolidated in an alien. And yet this is
just exactly what the parties in this case did within the space of one year, with the result that Justina Santos' ownership of her property was reduced to
a hollow concept. If this can be done, then the Constitutional ban against alien landholding in the Philippines, as announced in Krivenko v. Register of
Deeds,22 is indeed in grave peril.
It does not follow from what has been said, however, that because the parties are in pari delicto they will be left where they are, without relief. For
one thing, the original parties who were guilty of a violation of the fundamental charter have died and have since been substituted by their
administrators to whom it would be unjust to impute their guilt.23 For another thing, and this is not only cogent but also important, article 1416 of the
Civil Code provides, as an exception to the rule on pari delicto, that "When the agreement is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited, and the
prohibition by law is designed for the protection of the plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby enhanced, recover what he has paid or delivered."
The Constitutional provision that "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines" 24 is an expression of public policy
to conserve lands for the Filipinos. As this Court said in Krivenko:
It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are construing the Constitution as it is and not as we may desire it to
be. Perhaps the effect of our construction is to preclude aliens admitted freely into the Philippines from owning sites where they may build their
homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we will not attempt to compromise it even in the name of amity or equity . . . .
For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands, including residential lands, and,
accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without costs.25
That policy would be defeated and its continued violation sanctioned if, instead of setting the contracts aside and ordering the restoration of the land
to the estate of the deceased Justina Santos, this Court should apply the general rule of pari delicto. To the extent that our ruling in this case conflicts
with that laid down in Rellosa v. Gaw Chee Hun 26 and subsequent similar cases, the latter must be considered as pro tanto qualified.
The claim for increased rentals and attorney's fees, made in behalf of Justina Santos, must be denied for lack of merit.
And what of the various amounts which Wong received in trust from her? It appears that he kept two classes of accounts, one pertaining to amount
which she entrusted to him from time to time, and another pertaining to rentals from the Ongpin property and from the Rizal Avenue property, which
he himself was leasing.
With respect to the first account, the evidence shows that he received P33,724.27 on November 8, 1957 (Plff Exh. 16); P7,354.42 on December 1,
1957 (Plff Exh. 13); P10,000 on December 6, 1957 (Plff Exh. 14) ; and P18,928.50 on August 26, 1959 (Def. Exh. 246), or a total of P70,007.19. He
claims, however, that he settled his accounts and that the last amount of P18,928.50 was in fact payment to him of what in the liquidation was found
to be due to him.
He made disbursements from this account to discharge Justina Santos' obligations for taxes, attorneys' fees, funeral services and security guard
services, but the checks (Def Exhs. 247-278) drawn by him for this purpose amount to only P38,442.84. 27 Besides, if he had really settled his
accounts with her on August 26, 1959, we cannot understand why he still had P22,000 in the bank and P3,000 in his possession, or a total of P25,000.
In his answer, he offered to pay this amount if the court so directed him. On these two grounds, therefore, his claim of liquidation and settlement of
accounts must be rejected.
After subtracting P38,442.84 (expenditures) from P70,007.19 (receipts), there is a difference of P31,564 which, added to the amount of P25,000,
leaves a balance of P56,564.3528 in favor of Justina Santos.
As to the second account, the evidence shows that the monthly income from the Ongpin property until its sale in Rizal Avenue July, 1959 was
P1,000, and that from the Rizal Avenue property, of which Wong was the lessee, was P3,120. Against this account the household expenses and
disbursements for the care of the 17 dogs and the salaries of the 8 maids of Justina Santos were charged. This account is contained in a notebook
(Def. Exh. 6) which shows a balance of P9,210.49 in favor of Wong. But it is claimed that the rental from both the Ongpin and Rizal Avenue
properties was more than enough to pay for her monthly expenses and that, as a matter of fact, there should be a balance in her favor. The lower court
did not allow either party to recover against the other. Said the court:
[T]he documents bear the earmarks of genuineness; the trouble is that they were made only by Francisco Wong and Antonia Matias, nick-named
Toning, — which was the way she signed the loose sheets, and there is no clear proof that Doña Justina had authorized these two to act for her in
such liquidation; on the contrary if the result of that was a deficit as alleged and sought to be there shown, of P9,210.49, that was not what Doña
Justina apparently understood for as the Court understands her statement to the Honorable Judge of the Juvenile Court . . . the reason why she
preferred to stay in her home was because there she did not incur in any debts . . . this being the case, . . . the Court will not adjudicate in favor of
Wong Heng on his counterclaim; on the other hand, while it is claimed that the expenses were much less than the rentals and there in fact should be a
superavit, . . . this Court must concede that daily expenses are not easy to compute, for this reason, the Court faced with the choice of the two
alternatives will choose the middle course which after all is permitted by the rules of proof, Sec. 69, Rule 123 for in the ordinary course of things, a
person will live within his income so that the conclusion of the Court will be that there is neither deficit nor superavit and will let the matter rest here.
Both parties on appeal reiterate their respective claims but we agree with the lower court that both claims should be denied. Aside from the reasons
given by the court, we think that the claim of Justina Santos totalling P37,235, as rentals due to her after deducting various expenses, should be
rejected as the evidence is none too clear about the amounts spent by Wong for food 29 masses30 and salaries of her maids.31 His claim for P9,210.49
must likewise be rejected as his averment of liquidation is belied by his own admission that even as late as 1960 he still had P22,000 in the bank and
P3,000 in his possession.
ACCORDINGLY, the contracts in question (Plff Exhs. 3-7) are annulled and set aside; the land subject-matter of the contracts is ordered returned to
the estate of Justina Santos as represented by the Philippine Banking Corporation; Wong Heng (as substituted by the defendant-appellant Lui She) is
ordered to pay the Philippine Banking Corporation the sum of P56,564.35, with legal interest from the date of the filing of the amended complaint;
and the amounts consigned in court by Wong Heng shall be applied to the payment of rental from November 15, 1959 until the premises shall have
been vacated by his heirs. Costs against the defendant-appellant.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., concurring:

With the able and well-written opinion of Justice Castro, I am in full agreement. The exposition of the facts leaves nothing to be desired and the
statement of the law is notable for its comprehensiveness and clarity. This concurring opinion has been written solely to express what I consider to be
the unfortunate and deplorable consequences of applying the pari delicto concept, as was, to my mind, indiscriminately done, to alien landholding
declared illegal under the Krivenko doctrine in some past decisions.
It is to be remembered that in Krivenko v. The Register of Deeds of Manila,1 this Court over strong dissents held that residential and commercial lots
may be considered agricultural within the meaning of the constitutional provision prohibiting the transfer of any private agricultural land to
individuals, corporations or associations not qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines save in cases of hereditary
succession.
That provision of the Constitution took effect on November 15, 1935 when the Commonwealth Government was established. The interpretation as
set forth in the Krivenko decision was only handed down on November 15, 1947. Prior to that date there were many who were of the opinion that the
phrase agricultural land should be construed strictly and not be made to cover residential and commercial lots. Acting on that belief, several
transactions were entered into transferring such lots to alien vendees by Filipino-vendors.
After the Krivenko decision, some Filipino vendors sought recovery of the lots in question on the ground that the sales were null and void. No
definite ruling was made by this Court until September of 1953, when on the 29th of said month, Rellosa v. Gaw Chee Hun,2 Bautista v. Uy
Isabelo,3 Talento v. Makiki,4 Caoile v. Chiao Peng5 were decided.
Of the four decisions in September, 1953, the most extensive discussion of the question is found in Rellosa v. Gaw Chee Hun, the opinion being
penned by retired Justice Bautista Angelo with the concurrence only of one Justice, Justice Labrador, also retired. Former Chief Justice Paras as well
as the former Justices Tuason and Montemayor concurred in the result. The necessary sixth vote for a decision was given by the then Justice
Bengzon, who had a two-paragraph concurring opinion disagreeing with the main opinion as to the force to be accorded to the two cases, 6 therein
cited. There were two dissenting opinions by former Justices Pablo and Alex Reyes. The doctrine as announced in the Rellosa case is that while the
sale by a Filipino-vendor to an alien-vendee of a residential or a commercial lot is null and void as held in the Krivenko case, still the Filipino-vendor
has no right to recover under a civil law doctrine, the parties being in pari delicto. The only remedy to prevent this continuing violation of the
Constitution which the decision impliedly sanctions by allowing the alien vendees to retain the lots in question is either escheat or reversion. Thus:
"By following either of these remedies, or by approving an implementary law as above suggested, we can enforce the fundamental policy of our
Constitution regarding our natural resources without doing violence to the principle of pari delicto."7
Were the parties really in pari delicto? Had the sale by and between Filipino-vendor and alien-vendee occurred after the decision in
the Krivenko case, then the above view would be correct that both Filipino-vendor and alien-vendee could not be considered as innocent parties
within the contemplation of the law. Both of them should be held equally guilty of evasion of the Constitution.
Since, however, the sales in question took place prior to the Krivenko decision, at a time when the assumption could be honestly entertained that there
was no constitutional prohibition against the sale of commercial or residential lots by Filipino-vendor to alien-vendee, in the absence of a definite
decision by the Supreme Court, it would not be doing violence to reason to free them from the imputation of evading the Constitution. For evidently
evasion implies at the very least knowledge of what is being evaded. The new Civil Code expressly provides: "Mistakes upon a doubtful or difficult
question of law may be the basis of good faith."8
According to the Rellosa opinion, both parties are equally guilty of evasion of the Constitution, based on the broader principle that "both parties are
presumed to know the law." This statement that the sales entered into prior to the Krivenko decision were at that time already vitiated by a guilty
knowledge of the parties may be too extreme a view. It appears to ignore a postulate of a constitutional system, wherein the words of the Constitution
acquire meaning through Supreme Court adjudication.1awphîl.nèt
Reference may be made by way of analogy to a decision adjudging a statute void. Under the orthodox theory of constitutional law, the act having
been found unconstitutional was not a law, conferred no rights, imposed no duty, afforded no protection. 9 As pointed out by former Chief Justice
Hughes though in Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank:10 "It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative
fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, — with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and
particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality
and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination."
After the Krivenko decision, there is no doubt that continued possession by alien-vendee of property acquired before its promulgation is violative of
the Constitution. It is as if an act granting aliens the right to acquire residential and commercial lots were annulled by the Supreme Court as contrary
to the provision of the Constitution prohibiting aliens from acquiring private agricultural land.
The question then as now, therefore, was and is how to divest the alien of such property rights on terms equitable to both parties. That question
should be justly resolved in accordance with the mandates of the Constitution not by a wholesale condemnation of both parties for entering into a
contract at a time when there was no ban as yet arising from the Krivenko decision, which could not have been anticipated. Unfortunately, under
the Rellosa case, it was assumed that the parties, being in pari delicto, would be left in the situation in which they were, neither being in a position to
seek judicial redress.
Would it not have been more in consonance with the Constitution, if instead the decision compelled the restitution of the property by the alien-vendee
to the Filipino-vendor? Krivenko decision held in clear, explicit and unambigous language that: "We are deciding the instant case under section 5 of
Article XIII of the Constitution which is more comprehensive and more absolute in the sense that it prohibits the transfer to aliens of any private
agricultural land including residential land whatever its origin might have been . . . . This prohibition [Rep. Act No. 133] makes no distinction
between private lands that are strictly agricultural and private lands that are residential or commercial. The prohibition embraces the sale of private
lands of any kind in favor of aliens, which is again a clear implementation and a legislative interpretation of the constitutional prohibition. . . . It is
well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are construing the Constitution as it is and not as we may desire it to be.
Perhaps the effect of our construction is to preclude aliens, admitted freely into the Philippines, from owning sites where they may build their homes.
But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we will not attempt to compromise it even in the name of amity or equity."11
Alien-vendee is therefore incapacitated or disqualified to acquire and hold real estate. That incapacity and that disqualification should date from the
adoption of the Constitution on November 15, 1935. That incapacity and that disqualification, however, was made known to Filipino-vendor and to
alien-vendee only upon the promulgation of the Krivenko decision on November 15, 1947. Alien-vendee, therefore, cannot be allowed to continue
owning and exercising acts of ownership over said property, when it is clearly included within the Constitutional prohibition. Alien-vendee should
thus be made to restore the property with its fruits and rents to Filipino-vendor, its previous owner, if it could be shown that in the utmost good faith,
he transferred his title over the same to alien-vendee, upon restitution of the purchase price of course.
The Constitution bars alien-vendees from owning the property in question. By dismissing those suits, the lots remained in alien hands.
Notwithstanding the solution of escheat or reversion offered, they are still at the moment of writing, for the most part in alien hands. There have been
after almost twenty years no proceedings for escheat or reversion.
Yet it is clear that an alien-vendee cannot consistently with the constitutional provision, as interpreted in the Krivenko decision, continue owning and
exercising acts of ownership over the real estate in question. It ought to follow then, if such a continuing violation of the fundamental law is to be put
an end to, that the Filipino-vendor, who in good faith entered into, a contract with an incapacitated person, transferring ownership of a piece of land
after the Constitution went into full force and effect, should, in the light of the ruling in the Krivenko case, be restored to the possession and
ownership thereof, where he has filed the appropriate case or proceeding. Any other construction would defeat the ends and purposes not only of this
particular provision in question but the rest of the Constitution itself.
The Constitution frowns upon the title remaining in the alien-vendees. Restoration of the property upon payment of price received by Filipino vendor
or its reasonable equivalent as fixed by the court is the answer. To give the constitutional provision full force and effect, in consonance with the
dictates of equity and justice, the restoration to Filipino-vendor upon the payment of a price fixed by the court is the better remedy. He thought he
could transfer the property to an alien and did so. After the Krivenko case had made clear that he had no right to sell nor an alien-vendee to purchase
the property in question, the obvious solution would be for him to reacquire the same. That way the Constitution would be given, as it ought to be
given, respect and deference.
It may be said that it is too late at this stage to hope for such a solution, the Rellosa opinion, although originally concurred in by only one justice,
being too firmly imbedded. The writer however sees a welcome sign in the adoption by the Court in this case of the concurring opinion of the then
Justice, later Chief Justice, Bengzon. Had it been followed then, the problem would not be still with us now. Fortunately, it is never too late — not
even in constitutional adjudication.
Footnotes
143 Phil. 873 (1922).
2Id. at 876.

355 Phil. 99 (1930).

477 Phil. 470 (1946).
5Civ. Code, art. 1197.
6Jakosalem vs. Rafols, 73 Phil. 628 (1942).
7T.s.n., pp. 73-74, June 20, 1960.

8T.s.n., pp. 70-71, 73-74, June 20, 1960 (emphasis added).

9T.s.n., pp. 54-55, June 6, 1960.
10T.s.n., p. 86, June 20, 1960 (emphasis added).
11T.s.n., pp. 69-70, June 20, 1960.
12Article 1332 of the Civil Code provides that "When one of the parties is unable to read or if the contract is in a language not understood by him, and

mistake or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the former."
13T.s.n., p. 11, June 21, 1960.
14T.s.n., pp. 119-120, June 20, 1960.
15T.s.n., p. 76, June 6, 1960.
16Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, G.R. L-23002, July 31, 1967; Enriquez de la Cavada v. Diaz, 37 Phil. 982 (1918) ; see also Puato v. Mendoza, 64 Phil. 457

(1937).
17T.s.n., p. 79, June 6, 1960 (emphasis added).
18T.s.n., p. 121, June 20, 1960.
19Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, supra, note 16.
2079 Phil. 461, 480-481 (1947) (emphasis added). The statement in Smith, Bell & Co. v. Register of Deeds, 96 Phil. 53, 61-62 (1954), to the effect that

an alien may lease lands in the Philippines for as long as 99 years under article 1643 of the Civil Code, is obiter as the term of the lease in that case
for 25 years only, renewable for a like period, and the character (whether temporary or permanent) of rights under a 99-year lease was not
considered.
21The contract (Plff Exh. 6) of November 18, 1958 provides that "Sa loob nang nabanggit na panahon limangpung (50) taon na hindi pa ginagamit ni
WONG o kaniyang kaanak ang karapatan nilang bumili, ay ang nabanggit na lupa ay hindi maaring ipagbili, ibigay, isangla, o itali ng MAY-ARI sa
iba" [Within the said period of fifty (50) years during which neither WONG nor any of his children has exercised the option to buy, the said piece of
land cannot be sold, donated, mortgaged or encumbered in favor of other persons by the owner].
22Supra, note 20.
23Cf. Rellosa v. Gaw Chee Hun, 93 Phil. 827, 836 (1953) (Cesar Bengzon, J., concurring) : "Perhaps the innocent spouse of the seller and his

creditors are not barred from raising the issue of invalidity."

24Const. art. XIII sec. 5.
25Supra, note 20, at 480-481.

2693 Phil. 827 (1953).

27 According to the lower court the amount should be P38,422.94, but the difference appears to be the result of an error in addition.
28According to the trial court the amount should be P56,554.25, but the difference appears to be due to the error pointed out in note 27.
29T.s.n., pp. 6-8, July 26, 1960.
30T.s.n., p. 35, July 26, 1960.

31T.s.n., pp. 31-35, July 26, 1960.

FERNANDO, J., concurring:

179 Phil. 461 (1947).
293 Phil. 827.

3
93 Phil. 843.
493 Phil. 855.
593 Phil. 861. See also Arambulo v. Cua So, (1954) 95 Phil. 749; Dinglasan v. Lee Bun Ting, (1956) 99 Phil. 427.
6Bough v. Cantiveros, (1919) 40 Phil. 210 and Perez v. Herranz (1902) 7 Phil. 693.
7At p. 835.

8Art. 526, par. 3. The above provision is merely a reiteration of the doctrine announced in the case of Kasilag v. Rodriguez decided on December 7,

1939 (69 Phil. 217), the pertinent excerpt follows:

"This being the case, the question is whether good faith may be premised upon ignorance of the laws. Manresa, commenting on article 434 in
connection with the preceding article, sustains the affirmative. He says:
"'We do not believe that in real life there are not many cases of good faith founded upon an error of law. When the acquisition appears in a public
document, the capacity of the parties has already been passed upon by competent authority, and even established by appeals taken from final
judgments and administrative remedies against the qualification of registrars, and the possibility of error is remote under such circumstances; but,
unfortunately, private documents and even verbal agreements far exceed public documents in number, and while no one should be ignorant of the
law, the truth is that even we who are called upon to know and apply it fall into error not infrequently. However, a clear, manifest, and truly
unexcusable ignorance is one thing, to which undoubtedly refers article 2, and another and different thing is possible and excusable error arising from
complex legal principle and from the interpretation of conflicting doctrines.
"But even ignorance of the law may be based upon an error of fact, or better still, ignorance of a fact is possible as to the capacity to transmit and as
to the intervention of certain persons, compliance with certain formalities and appreciation of certain acts, and error of law is possible in the
interpretation of doubtful doctrines.'" (Manresa, Commentaries on the Spanish Civil Code, Volume IV, pp. 100, 101 and 102.)
9Norton v. Shelby County, (1886) 118 U.S. 425.
10308 U.S. 731 (1940).
1179 Phil. 461, 480 (1947).

G.R. No. L-30299 August 17, 1972

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and/or THE SOLICITOR GENERAL petitioners,
vs.
WILLIAM H. QUASHA, respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner.
Quasha, Asperilla Blanco, Zafra & Tayag for respondent.

REYES J. B. L., J.:p

This case involves a judicial determination of the scope and duration of the rights acquired by American citizens and corporations controlled by
them, under the Ordinance appended to the Constitution as of 18 September 1946, or the so-called Parity Amendment.
The respondent, William H. Quasha, an American citizen, had acquired by purchase on 26 November 1954 a parcel of land with the permanent
improvements thereon, situated at 22 Molave Place, in Forbes Park, Municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal, with an area of 2,616 sq. m. more or
less, described in and covered by T. C. T. 36862. On 19 March 1968, he filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, docketed as its Civil
Case No. 10732, wherein he (Quasha) averred the acquisition of the real estate aforesaid; that the Republic of the Philippines, through its officials,
claimed that upon expiration of the Parity Amendment on 3 July 1974, rights acquired by citizens of the United States of America shall cease and be
of no further force and effect; that such claims necessarily affect the rights and interest of the plaintiff, and that continued uncertainty as to the status
of plaintiff's property after 3 July 1974 reduces the value thereof, and precludes further improvements being introduced thereon, for which reason
plaintiff Quasha sought a declaration of his rights under the Parity Amendment, said plaintiff contending that the ownership of properties during the
effectivity of the Parity Amendment continues notwithstanding the termination and effectivity of the Amendment.
The then Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo (and later on his successors in office, Felix V. Makasiar and Felix Q. Antonio) contended that the land
acquired by plaintiff constituted private agricultural land and that the acquisition violated section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution of the
Philippines, which prohibits the transfer of private agricultural land to non-Filipinos, except by hereditary succession; and assuming, without
conceding, that Quasha's acquisition was valid, any and all rights by him so acquired "will expire ipso facto and ipso jure at the end of the day on 3
July 1974, if he continued to hold the property until then, and will be subject to escheat or reversion proceedings" by the Republic.
After hearing, the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Judge Pedro A. Revilla presiding) rendered a decision, dated 6 March 1969, in favor of plaintiff,
with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that acquisition by the plaintiff on 26 November 1954 of, the private agricultural land
described in and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 36862 in his name was valid, and that plaintiff has a right to continue in ownership of
the said property even beyond July 3, 1974.
Defendants appealed directly to this Court on questions of law, pleading that the court below erred:
(1) In ruling that under the Parity Amendment American citizens and American owned and/or controlled business enterprises "are also qualified to
acquire private agricultural lands" in the Philippines; and
(2) In ruling that when the Parity Amendment ceases to be effective on 3 July 1974, "what must be considered to end should be the right to acquire
land, and not the right to continue in ownership of land already acquired prior to that time."
As a historical background, requisite to a proper understanding of the issues being litigated, it should be recalled that the Constitution as originally
adopted, contained the following provisions:
Article XIII — CONSERVATION AND UTILIZATION
OF NATURAL RESOURCES
Section 1. All Agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization
shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution.
Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the resources shall be
granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water right for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
Section 2. No private corporation or association may acquire, lease, or hold public agricultural lands in excess of one thousand and twenty-four
hectares, nor may any individual acquire such lands by purchase in excess of one hundred and forty-four hectares, or by lease in excess of one
thousand and twenty-four hectares, or by homestead in excess of twenty-four hectares. Lands adapted to grazing not exceeding two thousand
hectares, may be leased to an individual, private corporation, or association.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
Article XIV — GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 8. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or other entities organized under the laws of the Philippines, sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by
citizens of the Philippines, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. No
franchise or right shall be granted to any individual, firm, or corporation, except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration,
or repeal by the Congress when the public interest so requires.
The nationalistic spirit that pervaded these and other provisions of the Constitution are self-evident and require no further emphasis.
From the Japanese occupation and the reconquest of the Archipelago, the Philippine nation emerged with its industries destroyed and its economy
dislocated. It was described in this Court's opinion in Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Guerrero, et al.,
L-20942, 22 September 1967, 21 SCRA 181, 187, penned by Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in the following terms:
It was fortunate that the Japanese Occupation ended when it did. Liberation was hailed by all, but the problems faced by the legitimate government
were awesome in their immensity. The Philippine treasury was bankrupt and her economy prostrate. There were no dollar-earning export crops to
speak of; commercial operations were paralyzed; and her industries were unable to produce with mills, factories and plants either destroyed or their
machineries obsolete or dismantled. It was a desolate and tragic sight that greeted the victorious American and Filipino troops. Manila, particularly
that portion south of the Pasig, lay in ruins, its public edifices and business buildings lying in a heap of rubble and numberless houses razed to the
ground. It was in fact, next to Warsaw, the most devastated city in the expert opinion of the then General Eisenhower. There was thus a clear need of
help from the United States. American aid was forthcoming but on terms proposed by her government and later on accepted by the Philippines.
The foregoing description is confirmed by the 1945 Report of the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs to the United States Congress:
When the Philippines do become independent next July, they will start on the road to independence with a country whose commerce, trade and
political institutions have been very, very seriously damaged. Years of rebuilding are necessary before the former physical conditions of the islands
can be restored. Factories, homes, government and commercial buildings, roads, bridges, docks, harbors and the like are in need of complete
reconstruction or widespread repairs. It will be quite some while before the Philippine can produce sufficient food with which to sustain themselves.
The internal revenues of the country have been greatly diminished by war. Much of the assessable property basis has been destroyed. Foreign trade
has vanished. Internal commerce is but a faction of what it used to be. Machinery, farming implements, ships, bus and truck lines, inter-island
transportation and communications have been wrecked.
Shortly thereafter, in 1946, the United States 79th Congress enacted Public Law 3721, known as the Philippine Trade Act, authorizing the President
of the United States to enter into an Executive Agreement with the President of the Philippines, which should contain a provision that —
The disposition, exploitation, development, and utilization of all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils,; all forces and sources of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and the operation of
public utilities shall, if open to any person, be open to citizens of the United States and to all forms of business enterprise owned or controlled,
directly or indirectly, by United States citizens.
and that:
The President of the United States is not authorized ... to enter into such executive agreement unless in the agreement the Government of the
Philippines ... will promptly take such steps as are necessary to secure the amendment of the Constitution of the Philippines so as to permit the taking
effect as laws of the Philippines of such part of the provisions of section 1331 ... as is in conflict with such Constitution before such amendment.
The Philippine Congress, by Commonwealth Act No. 733, authorized the President of the Philippines to enter into the Executive Agreement. Said
Act provided, inter alia, the following:
ARTICLE VII
1. The disposition, exploitation, development, and utilization of all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, mineral, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces and sources of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and the operation of
public utilities, shall, if open to any person, be open to citizens of the United States and to all forms of business enterprise owned or controlled,
directly or indirectly, by United States citizens, except that (for the period prior to the amendment of the Constitution of the Philippines referred to in
Paragraph 2 of this Article) the Philippines shall not be required to comply with such part of the foregoing provisions of this sentence as are in
conflict with such Constitution.
2. The Government of the Philippines will promptly take such steps as are necessary to secure the amendment of the constitution of the Philippines so
as to permit the taking effect as laws of the Philippines of such part of the provisions of Paragraph 1 of this Article as is in conflict with such
Constitution before such amendment.
Thus authorized, the Executive Agreement was signed on 4 July 1946, and shortly thereafter the President of the Philippines recommended to the
Philippine Congress the approval of a resolution proposing amendments to the Philippine Constitution pursuant to the Executive Agreement.
Approved by the Congress in joint session, the proposed amendment was submitted to a plebiscite and was ratified in November of 1946. Generally
known as the Parity Amendment, it was in the form of an Ordinance appended to the Philippine Constitution, reading as follows:
Notwithstanding the provision of section one, Article Thirteen, and section eight, Article Fourteen, of the foregoing Constitution, during the
effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into by the President of the Philippines with the President of the United States on the fourth of July,
nineteen hundred and forty-six, pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered Seven hundred and thirty-three, but in no case to extend
beyond the third of July, nineteen hundred and seventy-four, the disposition, exploitation, development, and utilization of all agricultural, timber, and
mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coals, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces and sources of potential energy, and other
natural resources of the Philippines, and the operation of public utilities, shall, if OPEN to any person, be open to citizens of the United States and to
all forms of business enterprise owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United States in the same manner as to and under the
same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines.
A revision of the 1946 Executive Agreement was authorized by the Philippines by Republic Act 1355, enacted in July 1955. The revision was duly
negotiated by representatives of the Philippines and the United States, and a new agreement was concluded on 6 September 1955 to take effect on 1
January 1956, becoming known as the Laurel-Langley Agreement.
This latter agreement, however, has no direct application to the case at bar, since the purchase by herein respondent Quasha of the property in
question was made in 1954, more than one year prior to the effectivity of the Laurel-Langley Agreement..
I
Bearing in mind the legal provisions previously quoted and their background, We turn to the first main issue posed in this appeal: whether under or
by virtue of the so-called Parity Amendment to the Philippine Constitution respondent Quasha could validly acquire ownership of the private
residential land in Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal, which is concededly classified private agricultural land.
Examination of the "Parity Amendment", as ratified, reveals that it only establishes an express exception to two (2) provisions of our Constitution, to
wit: (a) Section 1, Article XIII, re disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain
and other natural resources of the Philippines; and (b) Section 8, Article XIV, regarding operation of public utilities. As originally drafted by the
framers of the Constitution, the privilege to acquire and exploit agricultural lands of the public domain, and other natural resources of the Philippines,
and to operate public utilities, were reserved to Filipinos and entities owned or controlled by them: but the "Parity Amendment" expressly extended
the privilege to citizens of the United States of America and/or to business enterprises owned or controlled by them.
No other provision of our Constitution was referred to by the "Parity Amendment"; nor Section 2 of Article XIII limiting the maximum area of public
agricultural lands that could be held by individuals or corporations or associations; nor Section 5 restricting the transfer or assignment of private
agricultural lands to those qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain (which under the original Section 1 of Article XIII meant Filipinos
exclusively), save in cases of hereditary succession. These sections 2 and 5 were therefore left untouched and allowed to continue in operation as
originally intended by the Constitution's framers.
Respondent Quasha argues that since the amendment permitted United States citizens or entities controlled by them to acquire agricultural lands of
the public domain, then such citizens or entities became entitled to acquire private agricultural land in the Philippines, even without hereditary
succession, since said section 5 of Article XIII only negates the transfer or assignment of private agricultural land to individuals or entities not
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Clearly, this argument of respondent Quasha rests not upon the text of the Constitutional
Amendment but upon a mere inference therefrom. If it was ever intended to create also an exception to section 5 of Article XIII, why was mention
therein made only of Section 1 of Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV and of no other? When the text of the Amendment was submitted for
popular ratification, did the voters understand that three sections of the Constitution were to be modified, when only two sections were therein
mentioned?
A reading of Sections 1 and 4 of Article XIII, as originally drafted by its farmers, leaves no doubt that the policy of the Constitution was to reserve to
Filipinos the disposition, exploitation development or utilization of agricultural lands, public (section 1) or private (section 5), as well as all other
natural resources of the Philippines. The "Parity Amendment" created exceptions to that Constitutional Policy and in consequence to the sovereignty
of the Philippines. By all canons of construction, such exceptions must be given strict interpretation; and this Court has already so ruled
in Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Guerrero, et al., L-20942, 22 September 1967, 21 SCRA 181, per Justice Enrique M. Fernando:
While good faith, no less than adherence to the categorical wording of the Ordinance, requires that all the rights and privileges thus granted to
Americans and business enterprises owned and controlled by them be respected, anything further would not be warranted. Nothing less would suffice
but anything more is not justified.
The basis for the strict interpretation was given by former President of the University of the Philippines, Hon. Vicente G. Sinco (Congressional
Record, House of Representatives, Volume 1, No. 26, page 561):
It should be emphatically stated that the provisions of our Constitution which limit to Filipinos the rights to develop the natural resources and to
operate the public utilities of the Philippines is one of the bulwarks of our national integrity. The Filipino people decided to include it in our
Constitution in order that it may have the stability and permanency that its importance requires. It is written in our Constitution so that it may neither
be the subject of barter nor be impaired in the give and take of politics. With our natural resources, our sources of power and energy, our public
lands, and our public utilities, the material basis of the nation's existence, in the hands of aliens over whom the Philippine Government does not have
complete control, the Filipinos may soon find themselves deprived of their patrimony and living as it were, in a house that no longer belongs to them.
The true extent of the Parity Amendment, as understood by its proponents in the Philippine Congress, was clearly expressed by one of its advocates,
Senator Lorenzo Sumulong:
It is a misconception to believe that under this amendment Americans will be able to acquire all kinds of natural resources of this country, and even
after the expiration of 28 years their acquired rights cannot be divested from them. If we read carefully the language of this amendment which is
taken verbatim from the Provision of the Bell Act, and, which in turn, is taken also verbatim from certain sections of the Constitution, you will find
out that the equality of rights granted under this amendment refers only to two subjects. Firstly, it refers to exploitation of natural resources, and
secondly, it refers to the operation of public utilities. Now, when it comes to exploitation of natural resources, it must be pointed out here that, under
our Constitution and under this amendment, only public agricultural land may be acquired, may be bought, so that on the supposition that we give
way to this amendment and on the further supposition that it is approved by our people, let not the mistaken belief be entertained that all kinds of
natural resources may be acquired by Americans because under our Constitution forest lands cannot be bought, mineral lands cannot be bought,
because by explicit provision of the Constitution they belong to the State, they belong to our Government, they belong to our people. That is why we
call them rightly the patrimony of our race. Even if the Americans should so desire, they can have no further privilege than to ask for a lease of
concession of forest lands and mineral lands because it is so commanded in the Constitution. And under the Constitution, such a concession is given
only for a limited period. It can be extended only for 25 years, renewable for another 25. So that with respect to mineral or forest lands, all they can
do is to lease it for 25 years, and after the expiration of the original 25 years they will have to extend it, and I believe it can be extended provided
that it does not exceed 28 years because this agreement is to be effected only as an ordinance and for the express period of 28 years. So that it is my
humble belief that there is nothing to worry about insofar as our forest and mineral lands are concerned.
Now, coming to the operation of public utilities, as every member of the Congress knows, it is also for a limited period, under our Constitution, for a
period not exceeding 50 years. And since this amendment is intended to endure only for 28 years, it is my humble opinion that when Americans try to
operate public utilities they cannot take advantage of the maximum provided in the Constitution but only the 28 years which is expressly provided to
be the life of this amendment.
There remains for us to consider the case of our public agricultural lands. To be sure, they may be bought, and if we pass this amendment, Americans
may buy our public agricultural lands, but the very same Constitution applying even to Filipinos, provides that the sale of public agricultural lands to
a corporation can never exceed one thousand and twenty-four hectares. That is to say, if an American corporation, and American enterprise, should
decide to invest its money in public agricultural lands, it will be limited to the amount of 1,024 hectares, no more than 1,024 hectares' (Emphasis
supplied).
No views contrary to these were ever expressed in the Philippine Legislature during the discussion of the Proposed Amendment to our Constitution,
nor was any reference made to acquisition of private agricultural lands by non-Filipinos except by hereditary succession. On the American side, it is
significant to observe that the draft of the Philippine Trade Act submitted to the House of Representatives by Congressman Bell, provided in the first
Portion of Section 19 the following:
SEC. 19. Notwithstanding any existing provision of the constitution and statutes of the Philippine Government, citizens and corporations of the
United States shall enjoy in the Philippine Islands during the period of the validity of this Act, or any extension thereof by statute or treaty, the same
rights as to property, residence, and occupation as citizens of the Philippine Islands ...
But as finally approved by the United States Congress, the equality as to " property residence and occupation" provided in the bill was eliminated
and Section 341 of the Trade Act limited such parity to the disposition, exploitation, development, and utilization of lands of the public domain, and
other natural resources of the Philippines (V. ante, page 5 of this opinion).
Thus, whether from the Philippine or the American side, the intention was to secure parity for United States citizens, only in two matters: (1)
exploitation, development and utilization of public lands, and other natural resources of the Philippines; and (2) the operation of public utilities. That
and nothing else.
Respondent Quasha avers that as of 1935 when the Constitution was adopted, citizens of the United States were already qualified to acquire public
agricultural lands, so that the literal text of section 5 must be understood as permitting transfer or assignment of private agricultural lands to
Americans even without hereditary succession. Such capacity of United States citizens could exist only during the American sovereignty over the
Islands. For the Constitution of the Philippines was designed to operate even beyond the extinction of the United States sovereignty, when the
Philippines would become fully independent. That is apparent from the provision of the original Ordinance appended to the Constitution as originally
approved and ratified. Section 17 of said Ordinance provided that:
(17) Citizens and corporations of the United States shall enjoy in the Commonwealth of the Philippines all the civil rights of the citizens and
corporations, respectively, thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
The import of paragraph (17) of the Ordinance was confirmed and reenforced by Section 127 of Commonwealth Act 141 (the Public Land Act of
1936) that prescribes:
Sec. 127. During the existence and continuance of the Commonwealth, and before the Republic of the Philippines is established, citizens and
corporations of the United States shall enjoy the same rights granted to citizens and corporations of the Philippines under this Act.
thus clearly evidencing once more that equal rights of citizens and corporations of the United States to acquire agricultural lands of the Philippines
vanished with the advent of the Philippine Republic. Which explains the need of introducing the "Parity Amendment" of 1946.
It is then indubitable that the right of United States citizens and corporations to acquire and exploit private or public lands and other natural resources
of the Philippines was intended to expire when the Commonwealth ended on 4 July 1946. Thereafter, public and private agricultural lands and natural
resources of the Philippines were or became exclusively reserved by our Constitution for Filipino citizens. This situation lasted until the "Parity
Amendment", ratified in November, 1946, once more reopened to United States citizens and business enterprises owned or controlled by them the
lands of the public domain, the natural resources of the Philippines, and the operation of the public utilities, exclusively, but not the acquisition or
exploitation of private agricultural lands, about which not a word is found in the Parity Amendment..Respondent Quasha's pretenses can find no
support in Article VI of the Trade Agreement of 1955, known popularly as the Laurel-Langley Agreement, establishing a sort of reciprocity rights
between citizens of the Philippines and those of the United States, couched in the following terms:
ARTICLE VI
2. The rights provided for in Paragraph I may be exercised, in the case of citizens of the Philippines with respect to natural resources in the United
States which are subject to Federal control or regulations, only through the medium of a corporation organized under the laws of the United States or
one of the States hereof and likewise, in the case of citizens of the United States with respect to natural resources in the public domain in the
Philippines only through the medium of a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines and at least 60% of the capital stock of which is
owned or controlled by citizens of the United States. This provision, however, does not affect the right of citizens of the United States to acquire or
own private agricultural lands in the Philippines or citizens of the Philippines to acquire or own land in the United States which is subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States and not within the jurisdiction of any state and which is not within the public domain. The Philippines reserves the
right to dispose of the public lands in small quantities on especially favorable terms exclusively to actual settlers or other users who are its own
citizens. The United States reserves the right to dispose of its public lands in small quantities on especially favorable terms exclusively to actual
settlers or other users who are its own citizens or aliens who have declared their intention to become citizens. Each party reserves the right to limit
the extent to which aliens may engage in fishing, or engage in enterprises which furnish communications services and air or water transport. The
United States also reserves the right to limit the extent to which aliens may own land in its outlying territories and possessions, but the Philippines
will extend to American nationals who are residents of any of those outlying territories and possessions only the same rights, with respect to,
ownership of lands, which are granted therein to citizens of the Philippines. The rights provided for in this paragraph shall not, however, be exercised
by either party so as to derogate from the rights previously acquired by citizens or corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the
other party.
The words used in Article VI to the effect that —
... This provision does not affect the right of citizen of the United States to acquire or own private agricultural lands in the Philippines, or citizens of
the Philippines to acquire or own land in the United States which is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States ...
must be understood as referring to rights of United States citizens to acquire or own private agricultural lands before the independence of the
Philippines since the obvious purpose of the article was to establish rights of United States and Filipino citizens on a basis of reciprocity. For as
already shown, no such right to acquire or own private agricultural lands in the Philippines has existed since the independent Republic was
established in 1946. The quoted expressions of the Laurel-Langley Agreement could not expand the rights of United States citizens as to public
agricultural lands of the Philippines to private lands, when the Parity Amendment and the Constitution authorize such United States citizens and
business entities only to acquire and exploit agricultural lands of the public domain. If the reopening of only public lands to Americans required a
Constitutional Amendment, how could a mere Trade Agreement, like the Laurel-Langley, by itself enable United States citizens to acquire and
exploit private agricultural lands, a right that ceased to exist since the independence of the Philippines by express prescription of our Constitution?
We turn to the second issue involved in this appeal: On the assumption that respondent Quasha's purchase of the private agricultural land involved is
valid and constitutional, will or will not his rights expire on 3 July 1974?
For the solution of this problem, We again turn to the "Parity Amendment". Under it,
Notwithstanding the provision of section one, Article Thirteen, and section eight, Article Fourteen, of the foregoing Constitution, during the
effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into by the President of the Philippines with the President of the United States on the fourth of July,
nineteen hundred and forty-six, pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered Seven hundred and thirty-three,but in no case to extend
beyond the third of July, nineteen hundred and seventy-four, the disposition, exploitation, development, and utilization of all agricultural, timber, and
mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coals, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces and sources of potential energy, and other
natural resources of the Philippines, and the operation of public utilities, shall, if open to any person, be open to citizens of the United states and to all
forms of business enterprise owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United States in the same manner as to, and under the same
conditions imposed upon, citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines. (Emphasis
supplied)
It is easy to see that all exceptional rights conferred upon United States citizens and business entities owned or controlled by them, under the
Amendment, are subject to one and the same resolutory term or period: they are to last "during the effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered
into on 4 July 1946", "but in no case to extend beyond the, third of July, 1974". None of the privileges conferred by the "Parity Amendment" are
excepted from this resolutory period.
This limitation of time is in conformity with Article X, Section 2, of the Philippine Trade Act of 1946, as embodied in Commonwealth Act No. 733.
It says:
ARTICLE X
2. This Agreement shall have no effect after 3 July 1974. It may be terminated by either the United States or the Philippines at any time, upon not less
than five years' written notice. It the President of the United States or the President of the Philippines determines and proclaims that the other Country
has adopted or applied measures or practices which would operate to nullify or impair any right or obligation provided for in this Agreement, then the
Agreement may be terminated upon not less than six months' written notice.
Respondent Quasha argues that the limitative period set in the "Parity Amendment" should be understood not to be applicable to the disposition, or
correlative acquisition, of alienable agricultural lands of the public domain, since such lands can be acquired in full ownership, in which event, under
Article 428 of the Civil Code of Philippines —
ART, 428. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law.
The owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it.
and that since any period or condition which produces the effect of loss or deprivation of valuable rights is in derogation of due process of law, there
must be "a law which expressly and indubitably limits and extinguishes the ownership of non-citizens over private agricultural lands situated in the
Philippines validly acquired under the law existing at the time of acquisition."
Strangely enough, this argument ignores the provisions of the "Parity Amendment" prescribing that the disposition and exploitation, etc. of
agricultural lands of the public domain are in no case to extend beyond the third of July 1974. This limitation already existed when Quasha in 1954
purchased the Forbes Park property, and the acquisition was subject to it. If the Philippine government can not dispose of its alienable public
agricultural lands beyond that date under the "Parity Amendment", then, logically, the Constitution, as modified by the Amendment, only authorizes
either of two things: (a) alienation or transfer of rights less than ownership or (b) a resoluble ownership that will be extinguished not later than the
specified period. For the Philippine government to dispose of the public agricultural land for an indefinite time would necessarily be in violation of
the Constitution. There is nothing in the Civil Law of this country that is repugnant to the existence of ownership for a limited duration; thus the title
of a "reservista" (ascendant inheriting from a descendant) in reserva troncal, under Article 891 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, is one such
owner, holding title and dominion, although under condition subsequent; he can do anything that a genuine owner can do, until his death supervenes
with "reservataries surviving", i.e., relatives within the third degree (Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 661, 695). In truth,
respondent himself invokes Article 428 of the Civil Code to the effect that "the owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without
other limitations than those established by law". One such limitation is the period fixed on the "Parity Amendment", which forms part of the
Constitution, the highest law of the land. How then can he complain of deprivation of due process?
That the legislature has not yet determined what is to be done with the property when the respondent's rights thereto terminate on 3 July 1974 is
irrelevant to the issues in this case. The law, making power has until that date full power to adopt the apposite measures, and it is expected to do so.
One last point: under the "Parity Amendment" the disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of lands of the public domain, and other
natural resources of the Philippines, and the operation of public utilities are open —
to citizens of the United States and to all forms of business enterprises owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United States
while under the Philippine Constitution (section 1, Article XIII, and section 8, Article XIV) utilization of such lands, natural resources and public
utilities are open to citizens of the Philippines or to —
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens...
It is thus apparent that American business enterprises are more favored than Philippine organization during the period of parity in that, first, they
need not be owned by American citizens up to 60% of their capital; all that is required is that they be controlled by United States citizens, a control
that is attained by ownership of only 51% a of the capital stock; and second, that the control by United States citizens may be direct
or indirect (voting trusts, pyramiding, etc.) which indirect control is not allowed in the case of Philippine nationals.
That Filipinos should be placed under the so-called Parity in a more disadvantageous position than United States citizens in the disposition,
exploitation, development and utilization of the public lands, forests, mines, oils and other natural resources of their own country is certainly rank
injustice and inequity that warrants a most strict interpretation of the "Parity Amendment", in order that the dishonorable inferiority in which
Filipinos find themselves at present in the land of their ancestors should not be prolonged more than is absolutely necessary.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal is hereby reversed and set aside; and judgment is
rendered declaring that, under the "Parity Amendment" to our Constitution, citizens of the United States and corporations and business enterprises
owned or controlled by them can not acquire and own, save in cases of hereditary succession, private agricultural lands in the Philippines and that all
other rights acquired by them under said amendment will expire on 3 July 1974.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio, JJ., took no part.

Footnotes
a Or even much less than a majority of the stock, where the other shares are widely dispersed among many stockholders (Berle & Means, "Modern
Corporations and Private Property", Ch. IV, et. seq.)
G.R. No. L-630 November 15, 1947
ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA, respondent and appellee.
Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha of petitioner-appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Carreon for respondent-appellee.
Marcelino Lontok appeared as amicus curies.
MORAN, C.J.:
Alenxander A. Kriventor alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December of 1941, the registration of which was
interrupted by the war. In May, 1945, he sought to accomplish said registration but was denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground that,
being an alien, he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko then brought the case to the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila
by means of a consulta, and that court rendered judgment sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds, from which Krivenko appealed to this Court.
There is no dispute as to these facts. The real point in issue is whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land.
It is said that the decision of the case on the merits is unnecessary, there being a motion to withdraw the appeal which should have been granted
outright, and reference is made to the ruling laid down by this Court in another case to the effect that a court should not pass upon a constitutional
question if its judgment may be made to rest upon other grounds. There is, we believe, a confusion of ideas in this reasoning. It cannot be denied that
the constitutional question is unavoidable if we choose to decide this case upon the merits. Our judgment cannot to be made to rest upon other
grounds if we have to render any judgment at all. And we cannot avoid our judgment simply because we have to avoid a constitutional question. We
cannot, for instance, grant the motion withdrawing the appeal only because we wish to evade the constitutional; issue. Whether the motion should be,
or should not be, granted, is a question involving different considerations now to be stated.
According to Rule 52, section 4, of the Rules of Court, it is discretionary upon this Court to grant a withdrawal of appeal after the briefs have been
presented. At the time the motion for withdrawal was filed in this case, not only had the briefs been prensented, but the case had already been voted
and the majority decision was being prepared. The motion for withdrawal stated no reason whatsoever, and the Solicitor General was agreeable to it.
While the motion was pending in this Court, came the new circular of the Department of Justice, instructing all register of deeds to accept for
registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens. The herein respondent-appellee was naturally one of the registers of deeds to obey the new
circular, as against his own stand in this case which had been maintained by the trial court and firmly defended in this Court by the Solicitor General.
If we grant the withdrawal, the the result would be that petitioner-appellant Alexander A. Krivenko wins his case, not by a decision of this Court, but
by the decision or circular of the Department of Justice, issued while this case was pending before this Court. Whether or not this is the reason why
appellant seeks the withdrawal of his appeal and why the Solicitor General readily agrees to that withdrawal, is now immaterial. What is material and
indeed very important, is whether or not we should allow interference with the regular and complete exercise by this Court of its constitutional
functions, and whether or not after having held long deliberations and after having reached a clear and positive conviction as to what the
constitutional mandate is, we may still allow our conviction to be silenced, and the constitutional mandate to be ignored or misconceived, with all the
harmful consequences that might be brought upon the national patromony. For it is but natural that the new circular be taken full advantage of by
many, with the circumstance that perhaps the constitutional question may never come up again before this court, because both vendors and vendees
will have no interest but to uphold the validity of their transactions, and very unlikely will the register of deeds venture to disobey the orders of their
superior. Thus, the possibility for this court to voice its conviction in a future case may be remote, with the result that our indifference of today might
signify a permanent offense to the Constitution.
All thse circumstances were thoroughly considered and weighted by this Court for a number of days and the legal result of the last vote was a denial
of the motion withdrawing the appeal. We are thus confronted, at this stage of the proceedings, with our duty, the constitutional question becomes
unavoidable. We shall then proceed to decide that question.
Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitutional is as follows:
Article XIII. — Conservation and utilization of natural resources.
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization
shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inaguration of the Government established uunder this
Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no licence, concession, or lease for the
exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for
another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water
"power" in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
The scope of this constitutional provision, according to its heading and its language, embraces all lands of any kind of the public domain, its purpose
being to establish a permanent and fundamental policy for the conservation and utilization of all natural resources of the Nation. When, therefore,
this provision, with reference to lands of the public domain, makes mention of only agricultural, timber and mineral lands, it means that all lands of
the public domain are classified into said three groups, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral. And this classification finds corroboration in the
circumstance that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, that was the basic classification existing in the public laws and judicial decisions in
the Philippines, and the term "public agricultural lands" under said classification had then acquired a technical meaning that was well-known to the
members of the Constitutional Convention who were mostly members of the legal profession.
As early as 1908, in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175, 182), this Court said that the phrase "agricultural public lands" as
defined in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which phrase is also to be found in several sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926), means "those
public lands acquired from Spain which are neither mineral for timber lands." This definition has been followed in long line of decisions of this
Court. (See Montano vs.Insular Government, 12 Phil., 593; Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, 13 Phil., 159; Ramos vs. Director of Lands,
39 Phil., 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560; Ankron vs. Government of the Philippines, 40 Phil., 10.) And with respect to residential
lands, it has been held that since they are neither mineral nor timber lands, of necessity they must be classified as agricultural. In Ibañez de
Aldecoa vs. Insular Government (13 Phil., 159, 163), this Court said:
Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may be converted into a field, and planted with all kinds of vegetation; for
this reason, where land is not mining or forestal in its nature, it must necessarily be included within the classification of agricultural land, not because
it is actually used for the purposes of agriculture, but because it was originally agricultural and may again become so under other circumstances;
besides, the Act of Congress contains only three classification, and makes no special provision with respect to building lots or urban lands that have
ceased to be agricultural land.
In other words, the Court ruled that in determining whether a parcel of land is agricultural, the test is not only whether it is actually agricultural, but
also its susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural purposes. But whatever the test might be, the fact remains that at the time the Constitution was
adopted, lands of the public domain were classified in our laws and jurisprudence into agricultural, mineral, and timber, and that the term "public
agricultural lands" was construed as referring to those lands that were not timber or mineral, and as including residential lands. It may safely be
presumed, therefore, that what the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the Constitution was this well-known
classification and its technical meaning then prevailing.
Certain expressions which appear in Constitutions, . . . are obviously technical; and where such words have been in use prior to the adoption of a
Constitution, it is presumed that its framers and the people who ratified it have used such expressions in accordance with their technical meaning. (11
Am. Jur., sec. 66, p. 683.) AlsoCalder vs. Bull, 3 Dall. [U.S.], 386; 1 Law. ed., 648; Bronson vs. Syverson, 88 Wash., 264; 152 P., 1039.)
It is a fundamental rule that, in construing constitutions, terms employed therein shall be given the meaning which had been put upon them, and
which they possessed, at the time of the framing and adoption of the instrument. If a word has acquired a fixed, technical meaning in legal and
constitutional history, it will be presumed to have been employed in that sense in a written Constitution. (McKinney vs. Barker, 180 Ky., 526; 203
S.W., 303; L.R.A., 1918 E, 581.)
Where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning, and have been adopted by the
legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute in which they are used, the rule of construction requires that the words used in
such statute should be construed according to the sense in which they have been so previously used, although the sense may vary from strict literal
meaning of the words. (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.)
Therefore, the phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing in section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution must be construed as including residential
lands, and this is in conformity with a legislative interpretation given after the adoption of the Constitution. Well known is the rule that "where the
Legislature has revised a statute after a Constitution has been adopted, such a revision is to be regarded as a legislative construction that the statute so
revised conforms to the Constitution." (59 C.J., 1102.) Soon after the Constitution was adopted, the National Assembly revised the Public Land Law
and passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, and sections 58, 59 and 60 thereof permit the sale of residential lots to Filipino citizens or to associations or
corporations controlled by such citizens, which is equivalent to a solemn declaration that residential lots are considered as agricultural lands, for,
under the Constitution, only agricultural lands may be alienated.
It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141, "alienable or disposable public lands" which are the same "public agriculture lands"
under the Constitution, are classified into agricultural, residential, commercial, industrial and for other puposes. This simply means that the term
"public agricultural lands" has both a broad and a particular meaning. Under its broad or general meaning, as used in the Constitution, it embraces all
lands that are neither timber nor mineral. This broad meaning is particularized in section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which classifies "public
agricultural lands" for purposes of alienation or disposition, into lands that are stricly agricultural or actually devoted to cultivation for agricultural
puposes; lands that are residential; commercial; industrial; or lands for other purposes. The fact that these lands are made alienable or disposable
under Commonwealth Act No. 141, in favor of Filipino citizens, is a conclusive indication of their character as public agricultural lands under said
statute and under the Constitution.
It must be observed, in this connection that prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of Public Land Act No. 2874, aliens could acquire public
agricultural lands used for industrial or residential puposes, but after the Constitution and under section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right
of aliens to acquire such kind of lands is completely stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation. And, again, prior to the
Constitution, under section 57 of Public Land Act No. 2874, land of the public domain suitable for residence or industrial purposes could be sold or
leased to aliens, but after the Constitution and under section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, such land may only be leased, but not sold, to aliens,
and the lease granted shall only be valid while the land is used for the purposes referred to. The exclusion of sale in the new Act is undoubtedly in
pursuance of the constitutional limitation, and this again is another legislative construction that the term "public agricultural land" includes land for
residence purposes.
Such legislative interpretation is also in harmony with the interpretation given by the Executive Department of the Government. Way back in 1939,
Secretary of Justice Jose Abad Santos, in answer to a query as to "whether or not the phrase 'public agricultural lands' in section 1 of Article XII (now
XIII) of the Constitution may be interpreted to include residential, commercial, and industrial lands for purposes of their disposition," rendered the
following short, sharp and crystal-clear opinion:
Section 1, Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution classifies lands of the public domain in the Philippines into agricultural, timber and mineral.
This is the basic classification adopted since the enactment of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill. At the time of the
adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines, the term 'agricultural public lands' and, therefore, acquired a technical meaning in our public laws.
The Supreme Court of the Philippines in the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, held that the phrase 'agricultural public
lands' means those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither timber nor mineral lands. This definition has been followed by our Supreme
Court in many subsequent case. . . .
Residential commercial, or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must have to be included in one or more of these classes. Clearly, they
are neither timber nor mineral, of necessity, therefore, they must be classified as agricultural.
Viewed from another angle, it has been held that in determining whether lands are agricultural or not, the character of the land is the test
(Odell vs. Durant, 62 N.W., 524; Lorch vs. Missoula Brick and Tile Co., 123 p.25). In other words, it is the susceptibility of the land to cultivation for
agricultural purposes by ordinary farming methods which determines whether it is agricultural or not (State vs. Stewart, 190 p. 129).
Furthermore, as said by the Director of Lands, no reason is seen why a piece of land, which may be sold to a person if he is to devote it to
agricultural, cannot be sold to him if he intends to use it as a site for his home.
This opinion is important not alone because it comes from a Secratary of Justice who later became the Chief Justice of this Court, but also because it
was rendered by a member of the cabinet of the late President Quezon who actively participated in the drafting of the constitutional provision under
consideration. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 598.) And the opinion of the Quezon administration was reiterated by the
Secretary of Justice under the Osmeña administration, and it was firmly maintained in this Court by the Solicitor General of both administrations.
It is thus clear that the three great departments of the Government — judicial, legislative and executive — have always maintained that lands of the
public domain are classified into agricultural, mineral and timber, and that agricultural lands include residential lots.
Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be aliented," and with
respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in
the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It
is partly to prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows:
Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into aliens' hands. It would certainly be
futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private
agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. Undoubtedly, as above indicated, section 5 is intended to insure the policy of nationalization
contained in section 1. Both sections must, therefore, be read together for they have the same purpose and the same subject matter. It must be noticed
that the persons against whom the prohibition is directed in section 5 are the very same persons who under section 1 are disqualified "to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines." And the subject matter of both sections is the same, namely, the non-transferability of
"agricultural land" to aliens. Since "agricultural land" under section 1 includes residential lots, the same technical meaning should be attached to
"agricultural land under section 5. It is a rule of statutory construction that "a word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning
throughout the statute, unless a different intention appears." (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.) The only difference between "agricultural
land" under section 5, is that the former is public and the latter private. But such difference refers to ownership and not to the class of land. The lands
are the same in both sections, and, for the conservation of the national patrimony, what is important is the nature or class of the property regardless of
whether it is owned by the State or by its citizens.
Reference is made to an opinion rendered on September 19, 1941, by the Hon. Teofilo Sison, then Secretary of Justice, to the effect that residential
lands of the public domain may be considered as agricultural lands, whereas residential lands of private ownership cannot be so considered. No
reason whatsoever is given in the opinion for such a distinction, and no valid reason can be adduced for such a discriminatory view, particularly
having in mind that the purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony, and private residential lands are as much
an integral part of the national patrimony as the residential lands of the public domain. Specially is this so where, as indicated above, the prohibition
as to the alienable of public residential lots would become superflous if the same prohibition is not equally applied to private residential lots. Indeed,
the prohibition as to private residential lands will eventually become more important, for time will come when, in view of the constant disposition of
public lands in favor of private individuals, almost all, if not all, the residential lands of the public domain shall have become private residential
lands.
It is maintained that in the first draft of section 5, the words "no land of private ownership" were used and later changed into "no agricultural land of
private ownership," and lastly into "no private agricultural land" and from these changes it is argued that the word "agricultural" introduced in the
second and final drafts was intended to limit the meaning of the word "land" to land actually used for agricultural purposes. The implication is not
accurate. The wording of the first draft was amended for no other purpose than to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties. The words "no land" of
the first draft, unqualified by the word "agricultural," may be mistaken to include timber and mineral lands, and since under section 1, this kind of
lands can never be private, the prohibition to transfer the same would be superfluous. Upon the other hand, section 5 had to be drafted in harmony
with section 1 to which it is supplementary, as above indicated. Inasmuch as under section 1, timber and mineral lands can never be private, and the
only lands that may become private are agricultural lands, the words "no land of private ownership" of the first draft can have no other meaning than
"private agricultural land." And thus the change in the final draft is merely one of words in order to make its subject matter more specific with a view
to avoiding the possible confusion of ideas that could have arisen from the first draft.
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural, the result would be that
"aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and
that "they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools,
health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant's words,
strictly agricultural." (Solicitor General's Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question.
One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution and which was embodied in the report of the
Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of Lands and other Natural Resources of the Constitutional Convention, is "that lands, minerals,
forests, and other natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino nation. They should, therefore, be preserved for those under the
sovereign authority of that nation and for their posterity." (2 Aruego, Framing of the Filipino Constitution, p. 595.) Delegate Ledesma, Chairman of
the Committee on Agricultural Development of the Constitutional Convention, in a speech delivered in connection with the national policy on
agricultural lands, said: "The exclusion of aliens from the privilege of acquiring public agricultural lands and of owning real estate is a necessary
part of the Public Land Laws of the Philippines to keep pace with the idea of preserving the Philippines for the Filipinos." (Emphasis ours.) And, of
the same tenor was the speech of Delegate Montilla who said: "With the complete nationalization of our lands and natural resources it is to be
understood that our God-given birthright should be one hundred per cent in Filipino hands . . .. Lands and natural resources are immovables and as
such can be compared to the vital organs of a person's body, the lack of possession of which may cause instant death or the shortening of life. If we
do not completely antionalize these two of our most important belongings, I am afraid that the time will come when we shall be sorry for the time we
were born. Our independence will be just a mockery, for what kind of independence are we going to have if a part of our country is not in our hands
but in those of foreigners?" (Emphasis ours.) Professor Aruego says that since the opening days of the Constitutional Convention one of its fixed and
dominating objectives was the conservation and nationalization of the natural resources of the country. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine
Constitution, p 592.) This is ratified by the members of the Constitutional Convention who are now members of this Court, namely, Mr. Justice
Perfecto, Mr. Justice Briones, and Mr. Justice Hontiveros. And, indeed, if under Article XIV, section 8, of the Constitution, an alien may not even
operate a small jitney for hire, it is certainly not hard to understand that neither is he allowed to own a pieace of land.
This constitutional intent is made more patent and is strongly implemented by an act of the National Assembly passed soon after the Constitution was
approved. We are referring again to Commonwealth Act No. 141. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874 sections 120
and 121 which granted aliens the right to acquire private only by way of reciprocity. Said section reads as follows:
SEC. 120. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be
encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain
under this Act; to corporations organized in the Philippine Islands authorized therefor by their charters, and, upon express authorization by the
Philippine Legislature, to citizens of countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease,
encumber, dispose of, or alienate land, or permanent improvements thereon, or any interest therein, as to their own citizens, only in the manner and to
the extent specified in such laws, and while the same are in force but not thereafter.
SEC. 121. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of the former Public Land Act or of any other Act, ordinance, royal order,
royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippine Islands with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or
lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent
improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations, or associations who may acquire land of the
public domain under this Act; to corporate bodies organized in the Philippine Islands whose charters may authorize them to do so, and, upon express
authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of the countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to
acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land or pemanent improvements thereon or any interest therein, as to their own citizens, and
only in the manner and to the extent specified in such laws, and while the same are in force, but not thereafter: Provided, however, That this
prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by
competent courts, nor to lands and improvements acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes, while used for such purposes: Provided,
further, That in the event of the ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in this section and in the last preceding section being
transferred by judicial decree to persons,corporations or associations not legally capacitated to acquire the same under the provisions of this Act, such
persons, corporations, or associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to others so capacitated within the precise period of five
years, under the penalty of such property reverting to the Government in the contrary case." (Public Land Act, No. 2874.)
It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in these section refers to all private lands, whether strictly agricultural, residential or otherwise,
there being practically no private land which had not been acquired by any of the means provided in said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition
contained in these two provisions was, in effect, that no private land could be transferred to aliens except "upon express authorization by the
Philippine Legislature, to citizens of Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land." In other words,
aliens were granted the right to acquire private land merely by way of reciprocity. Then came the Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 141 was
passed, sections 122 and 123 of which read as follows:
SEC. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be
encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain
under this Act or to corporations organized in the Philippines authorized thereof by their charters.
SEC. 123. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other
provision of law formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public lands terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that
were actually or presumptively of the public domain, or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be
encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations or associations who may acquire land of the public domain under this Act or to
corporate bodies organized in the Philippines whose charters authorize them to do so: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable
to the conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent courts: Provided, further, That in
the event of the ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in this section and in the last preceding section being transferred by judicial
decree to persons, corporations or associations not legally capacitated to acquire the same under the provisions of this Act, such persons,
corporations, or associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to others so capacitated within the precise period of five years;
otherwise, such property shall revert to the Government.
These two sections are almost literally the same as sections 120 and 121 of Act No. 2874, the only difference being that in the new provisions, the
right to reciprocity granted to aliens is completely stricken out. This, undoubtedly, is to conform to the absolute policy contained in section 5 of
Article XIII of the Constitution which, in prohibiting the alienation of private agricultural lands to aliens, grants them no right of reciprocity. This
legislative construction carries exceptional weight, for prominent members of the National Assembly who approved the new Act had been members
of the Constitutional Convention.
It is said that the lot question does not come within the purview of sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, there being no proof that the
same had been acquired by one of the means provided in said provisions. We are not, however, diciding the instant case under the provisions of the
Public Land Act, which have to refer to land that had been formerly of the public domain, otherwise their constitutionality may be doubtful. We are
deciding the instant case under section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution which is more comprehensive and more absolute in the sense that it
prohibits the transfer to alien of any private agricultural land including residential land whatever its origin might have been.
And, finally, on June 14, 1947, the Congress approved Republic Act No. 133 which allows mortgage of "private real property" of any kind in favor
of aliens but with a qualification consisting of expressly prohibiting aliens to bid or take part in any sale of such real property as a consequence of the
mortgage. This prohibition makes no distinction between private lands that are strictly agricultural and private lands that are residental or
commercial. The prohibition embraces the sale of private lands of any kind in favor of aliens, which is again a clear implementation and a legislative
interpretation of the constitutional prohibition. Had the Congress been of opinion that private residential lands may be sold to aliens under the
Constitution, no legislative measure would have been found necessary to authorize mortgage which would have been deemed also permissible under
the Constitution. But clearly it was the opinion of the Congress that such sale is forbidden by the Constitution and it was such opinion that prompted
the legislative measure intended to clarify that mortgage is not within the constitutional prohibition.
It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are construing the Constitution as it is and not as we may desire it to
be. Perhaps the effect of our construction is to preclude aliens, admitted freely into the Philippines from owning sites where they may build their
homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we will not attempt to compromise it even in the name of amity or equity. We are
satisfied, however, that aliens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for residential purposes. Since their residence in
the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they
desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire.
For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands, including residential lands, and,
accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without costs.
Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, and Briones, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinion
PERFECTO, J., concurring:
Today, which is the day set for the promulgation of this Court's decision might be remembered by future generations always with joy, with gratitude,
with pride. The failure of the highest tribunal of the land to do its duty in this case would have amounted to a national disaster. We would have
refused to share the responsibility of causing it by, wittingly or unwittingly, allowing ourselves to act as tools in a conspiracy to sabotage the most
important safeguard of the age-long patrimony of our people, the land which destiny of Providence has set aside to be the permanent abode of our
race for unending generations. We who have children and grandchildren, and who expect to leave long and ramifying dendriform lines of
descendants, could not bear the thought of the curse they may fling at us should the day arrive when our people will be foreigners in their fatherland,
because in the crucial moment of our history , when the vision of judicial statemanship demanded on us the resolution and boldness to affirm and
withhold the letter and spirit of the Constitution, we faltered. We would have prefered heroic defeat to inglorious desertion. Rather than abandon the
sacred folds of the banner of our convictions for truth, for justice, for racial survival. We are happy to record that this Supreme Court turned an
impending failure to a glorious success, saving our people from a looming catastrophe.
On July 3, 1946, the case of Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, (43 Off. Gaz., 866), was submitted for our decision. The case was initiated in the Court of
First Instance of Tayabas on January 17, 1940, when an alien, Oh Cho, a citizen of China, applied for title and registration of a parcel of land located
in the residential district of Guinayangan, Tayabas, with a house thereon. The Director of Lands opposed the application, one of the main grounds
being that "the applicant, being a Chinese, is not qualified to acquire public or private agricultural lands under the provisions of the Constitution."
On August 15, 1940, Judge P. Magsalin rendered decision granting the application. The Director of Lands appealed. In the brief filed by Solicitor
General Roman Ozaeta, afterwards Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and now Secretary of Justice, and Assistant Solicitor General Rafael
Amparo, appellant made only two assignments of error, although both raised but one question, the legal one stated in the first assignment of error as
follows:
The lower court erred in declaring the registration of the land in question in favor of the applicant who, according to his own voluntary admission is a
citizen of the Chinese Republic.
The brief was accompanied, as Appendix A, by the opinion of Secretary of Justice Jose A. Santos — who, while Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
suffered heroic martyrdom at the hands of the Japanese — addressed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce on July 15, 1939, supporting the
same theory as the one advanced by the Director of Lands. The same legal question raised by appellant is discussed, not only in the brief for the
appellee, but also in the briefs of the several amici curiae allowed by the Supreme Court to appear in the case.
As a matter of fact, the case has been submitted for final decision of the Supreme Court since July of 1941, that is, six years ago. It remained
undecided when the Pacific War broke out in December, 1941. After the Supreme Court was recognized in the middle of 1945, it was found that the
case was among those which were destroyed in February, 1945, during the battle for the liberation of Manila. The case had to be reconstituted upon
motion of the office of the Solicitor General, filed with this Court on January 14, 1946, in which it was also prayed that, after being reconstituted, the
case be submitted for final adjudication. The case was for the second time submitted for decision on July 3, 1946.
After the last submission, it took the Supreme Court many days to deliberate on the case, especially on the legal question as to whether an alien may,
under the Constitution, acquire private urban lands. An overwhelming majority answered no. But when the decision was promulgated on August 31,
1946, a majority resolved to ignore the question, notwithstanding our efforts to have the question, which is vital, pressing and far-reaching, decided
once and for all, to dispel definitely the uncertainty gnawing the conscience of the people. It has been out lot to be alone in expressing in
unmistakable terms our opinion and decision on the main legal question raised by the appellant. The constitutional question was by-passed by the
majority because they were of opinion that it was not necessary to be decided, notwithstanding the fact that it was the main and only legal question
upon which appellant Director of Lands relied in his appeal, and the question has been almost exhaustively argued in four printed briefs filed by the
parties and the amici curiae. Assurance was, nevertheless, given that in the next case in which the same constitutional question is raised, the majority
shall make known their stand on the question.
The next case came when the present one submitted to us for decision on February 3, 1947. Again, we deliberated on the constitutional question for
several days.
On February 24, 1947, the case was submitted for final vote, and the result was that the constitutional question was decided against petitioner. The
majority was also overwhelming. There were eight of us, more than two-thirds of the Supreme Court. Only three Justices dissented.
While the decision was being drafted, somehow, the way the majority had voted must have leaked out. On July 10, 1947, appellant Krivenko filed a
motion for withdrawal of his appeal, for the evident purpose of preventing the rendering of the majority decision, which would settle once and for all
the all-important constitutional question as to whether aliens may acquire urban lots in the Philippines.
Appellant chose to keep silent as to his reason for filing the motion. The Solicitor General's office gave its conformity to the withdrawal of the
appeal. This surprising assent was given without expressing any ground at all. Would the Supreme Court permit itself to be cheated of its decision
voted since February 24, 1947?
Discussion immediately ensued as to whether the motion should be granted or denied, that is, whether this Court should abstain from promulgating
the decision in accordance with the result of the vote taken on February 24, 1947, as if, after more than six years during which the question has been
submitted for the decision of the highest tribunal of the land, the same has failed to form a definite opinion.
After a two-day deliberation, the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Hontiveros, Mr. Justice Padilla and and Mr. Justice Tuason voted to
grant the motion for withdrawal. Those who voted to deny the motion were Mr. Justice Feria, Mr. Justice Pablo, ourselves, Mr. Justice Hilado and
Mr. Justice Bengzon. The vote thus resulted in a tie, 5-5. The deadlock resulting from the tie should have the effect of denying the motion, as
provided by section 2 of Rule 56 to the effect that "where the Court in banc is equally divided in opinion . . . on all incidental matters, the petition or
motion shall be denied." And we proposed that the rule be complied with, and the denial be promulgated.
Notwithstanding this, as Mr. Justice Briones was then absent, our brethren resolved to give him the opportunity of casting his vote on the question,
although we insisted that it was unnecessary. Days later, when all the members of the Court were already present, a new vote was taken. Mr. Justice
Briones voted for the denial of the motion, and his vote would have resulted, as must be expected, in 6 votes for the denial against 5 for granting. But
the final result was different. Seven votes were cast for granting the motion and only four were cast for its denial.
But then, by providential design or simply by a happy stroke of luck or fate, on the occasion of the registration by the register of deeds of Manila of
land purchases of two aliens, a heated public polemic flared up in one section of the press, followed by controversial speeches, broadcast by radio,
and culminating in the issuance on August 12, 1947, of Circular No. 128 of the Secretary of Justice which reads as follows:
TO ALL REGISTER OF DEEDS:
Paragraph 5 of Circular No. 14, dated August 25, 1945, is hereby amended so as to read as follows:
5"(a). Instruments by which private real property is mortgaged in favor of any individual, corporation, or association for a period not exceeding five
years, renewable for another five years, may be accepted for registration. (Section 1, Republic Act No. 138.)
"(b). Deeds or documents by which private residential, commercial, industrial or other classes of urban lands, or any right, title or interest therein is
transferred, assigned or encumbered to an alien, who is not an enemy national, may be registered. Such classes of land are not deemed included
within the purview of the prohibition contained in section 5, Article XIII of the Constitution against the acquisition or holding of "private
agricultural land" by those who are not qualified to hold or acquire lands of the public domain. This is in conformity with Opinion No. 284, series of
1941, of the Secretary of Justice and with the practice consistently followed for nearly ten years since the Constitution took effect on November 15,
1935.
"(c). During the effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into between the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States
on July 4, 1946, in pursuance of the so-called Parity Amendment to the Constitution, citizens of the United States and corporations or associations
owned or controlled by such citizens are deemed to have the same rights as citizens of the Philippines and corporations or associations owned or
controlled by such are deemed to have the same rights as citizens of the Philippines and corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens
of the Philippines in the acquisition of all classes of lands in the Philippines, whether of private ownership or pertaining to the public domain."
ROMAN OZAETA
Secretary of Justice
Paragraph 5 of Circular No. 14 dated August 25, 1945, amended by the above is as follows:
Deeds or other documents by which a real property, or a right, or title thereto, or an interest therein, is transferred, assigned or encumbered to an
alien, who is not enemy national, may be entered in the primary entry book; but, the registration of said deeds or other documents shall be denied —
unless and/or until otherwise specifically directed by a final decision or order of a competent court — and the party in interest shall be advised of
such denial, so that he could avail himself of the right to appeal therefrom, under the provisions of section 200 of the Revised Administrative Code.
The denial of registration of shall be predicated upon the prohibition contained in section 5, Article XIII (formerly Article XII) of the Constitution of
the Philippines, and sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the former as amended by the Commonwealth Act No. 615.
The polemic found echo even in the Olympic serenity of a cloistered Supreme Court and the final result of long and tense deliberation which ensued
is concisely recorded in the following resolution adopted on August 29, 1947:
In Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, City of Manila, L-630, a case already submitted for decision, the appellant filed a motion to withdraw his appeal
with the conformity of the adverse party. After full discussion of the matter specially in relation to the Court's discretion (Rule 52, section 4, and Rule
58), Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Hilado, Mr. Justice Bengzon, Mr. Justice Padilla and Mr. Justice Tuazon voted to grant, while the Chief Justice,
Mr. Justice Feria, Mr,. Justice Pablo, Mr. Justice Perfecto and Mr. Justice Briones voted to deny it. A redeliberation was consequently had, with the
same result. Thereupon Mr. Justice Paras proposed that Mr. Justice Hontiveros be asked to sit and break the tie; but in view of the latter's absence due
to illness and petition for retirement, the Court by a vote of seven to three did not approve the proposition. Therefore, under Rule 56, section 2, the
motion to withdraw is considered denied.
Mr. Justice Padilla states that in his opinion the tie could not have the effect of overruling the previous vote of seven against four in favor of the
motion to withdraw.
Mr. Justice Paras states: Justice Hontiveros is aware of and conversant with the controversy. He has voted once on the motion to withdraw the appeal.
He is still a member of the Court and, on a moment's notice, can be present at any session of the Court. Last month, when all the members were
present, the votes on the motion stood 7 to 4. Now, in the absence of one member, on reconsideration, another changed his vote resulting in a tie.
Section 2 of Rule 56 requires that all efforts be exerted to break a deadlock in the votes. I deplore the inability of the majority to agree to my
proposition that Mr. Justice Hontiveros be asked to participate in the resolution of the motion for withdrawal. I hold it to be fundamental and
necessary that the votes of all the members be taken in cases like this.
Mr. Justice Perfecto stated, for purposes of completeness of the narration of facts, that when the petition to withdraw the appeal was submitted for
resolution of this Court two days after this petition was filed, five justices voted to grant and five others voted to deny, and expressed the opinion that
since then, according to the rules, the petition should have been considered denied. Said first vote took place many days before the one alluded to by
Mr. Justice Padilla.
Mr. Justice Tuason states: The motion to withdraw the appeal was first voted upon with the result that 5 were granting and 5 for denial. Mr. Justice
Briones was absent and it was decided to wait for him. Some time later, the same subject was deliberated upon and a new voting was had, on which
occasion all the 11 justices were present. The voting stood 7 for allowing the dismissal of the appeal and 4 against. Mr. Justice Perfecto and Mr.
Justice Briones expressed the intention to put in writing their dissents. Before these dissents were filed, about one month afterwards, without any
previous notice the matter was brought up again and re-voted upon; the result was 5 to 5. Mr. Justice Hontiveros, who was ill but might have been
able to attend if advised of the necessity of his presence, was absent. As the voting thus stood, Mr. Justice Hontiveros' vote would have changed its
result unless he changed his mind, a fact of which no one is aware. My opinion is that since there was no formal motion for reconsideration nor a
previous notice that this matter would be taken up once more, and since Mr. Justice Hontiveros had every reason to believe that the matter was over
as far as he was concerned, this Justice's vote in the penultimate voting should, if he was not to be given an opportunity to recast his vote, be counted
in favor of the vote for the allowance of the motion to withdraw. Above all, that opportunity should not have been denied on grounds of pure
technicality never invoked before. I counted that the proceeding was arbitrary and illegal.
The resolution does not recite all the reasons why Mr. Justice Hontiveros did not participate in that last two votings and why it became unnecessary
to wait for him any further to attend the sessions of the Court and to cast his vote on the question.
Appellant Krivenko moved for the reconsideration of the denial of his withdrawal of appeal, alleging that it became moot in view of the ruling made
by the Secretary of Justice in circular No. 128, thus giving us a hint that the latter, wittingly or unwittingly, had the effect of trying to take away from
the Supreme Court the decision of an important constitutional question, submitted to us in a pending litigation. We denied the motion for
reconsideration. We did not want to entertain any obstruction to the promulgation of our decision.
If the processes had in this case had been given the publicity suggested by us for all the official actuations of this Supreme Court, it should have been
known by the whole world that since July, 1946, that is, more than a year ago, the opinion of the members of this Court had already been crystallized
to the effect that under the Constitution, aliens are forbidded from acquiring urban lands in the Philippines, and it must have known that in this case a
great majority had voted in that sense on February 24, 1947.
The constitutional question involved in this case cannot be left undecided without jeopardizing public interest. The uncertainty in the public mind
should be dispelled without further delay. While the doubt among the people as to what is the correct answer to the question remains to be dissipated,
there will be uneasiness, undermining public morale and leading to evils of unpredictable extent. This Supreme Tribunal, by overwhelming majority,
already knows what the correct answer is, and should not withhold and keep it for itself with the same zealousness with which the ancient families of
the Eumolpides and Keryces were keeping the Eleusinian mysteries. The oracle of Delphus must speak so that the people may know for their
guidance what destiny has in store for them.
The great question as to whether the land bequeathed to us by our forefathers should remain as one of the most cherished treasures of our people and
transmitted by inheritance to unending generations of our race, is not a new one. The long chain of land-grabbing invasions, conquests, depredations,
and colonial imperialism recorded in the darkest and bloodiest pages of history from the bellicose enterprises of the Hittites in the plains of old
Assyria, irrigated by the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates, and the invasion of Egypt by the Hyksos, up to the conquests of Hernan Cortes and
Pizarro, the achievements of Cecil Rhodes, and the formation of the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, French and German colonial empires, had many of
its iron links forged in our soil since Magellan, the greatest navigator of all history, had set foot at Limasawa and paid, for his daring enterprises, with
his life at the hands of Lapulapu's men in the battle of Mactan.
Since then, almost four centuries ago, our people have continuously been engaged in an unrelentless struggle to defend the national patrimony against
the aggressive onslaughts of foreigners bent on grabbing our lands. First came the Spanish encomenderos and other gratuitous concessioners who
were granted by the Spanish crown immense areas of land. Immediately came the friars and other religious corporations who, notwithstanding their
sacred vow of poverty, felt their greed whetted by the bountiful opportunities for easy and unscrupulous enrichment. Taking advantage of the
uncontrollable religious leadership, on one side, and of the Christian virtues of obedience, resignation, humility, and credulity of a people who, after
conversion to Catholicism, embraced with tacit faith all its tenets and practiced them with the loyalty and fidelity of persons still immune from the
disappointments and bitterness caused by the vices of modern civilization, the foreign religious orders set aside all compunction to acquire by foul
means many large estates. Through the practice of confession and other means of moral intimidation, mostly based on the eternal tortures of hell,
they were able to obtain by donation or by will the lands of many simple and credulous Catholics who, in order to conquer the eternal bliss of heaven,
renounced all their property in favor of religious orders and priests, many under the guise of chaplaincies or other apparently religious purposes,
leaving in destitute their decendants and relatives. Thus big religious landed estates were formed, and under the system unbearable iniquities were
committed. The case of the family of Rizal is just an index of the situation, which, under the moral leadership of the hero, finally drove our people
into a national revolution not only against the Spanish sovereignty under which the social cancer had grown to unlimited proportions.
Profiting from the lessons of history, the Delegates to our Constitutional Convention felt it their duty to insert in the fundamental law effective
guarantees for conserving the national patrimony, the wisdom of which cannot be disputed in a world divided into nations and nationalities. In the
same way that scientists and technicians resorted to radar, sonars, thermistors and other long range detection devices to stave off far-away enemy
attacks in war, said Delegates set the guarantees to ward off open inroads or devious incursions into the national patrimony as a means of insuring
racial safety and survival.
When the ideal of one world should have been translated into reality, those guarantees might not be needed and our people may eliminate them. But
in the meantime, it is our inescapable devoir, as the ultimate guardians of the Constitution, never to neglect the enforcement of its provisions
whenever our action is called upon in a case, like the one now before us.
One of the fundamental purposes of the government established by our Constitution is, in its very words, that it "shall conserve and develop the
patrimony of the nation." That mandate is addressed to all departments and branches of our government, without excluding this Supreme Court. To
make more specific the mandate, Article XIII has been inserted so as to avoid all doubt that all the natural resources of the country are reserved to
Filipino citizens. Our land is the most important of our natural resources. That land should be kept in the hands of our people until, by constitutional
amendment, they should decide to renounce that age-long patrimony. Save by hereditary succession — the only exception allowed by the
Constitution — no foreigner may by any means acquire any land, any kind of land, in the Philippines. That was the overwhelming sentiment
prevailing in the Constitutional Convention, that was the overpowering desire of the great majority of the Delegates, that was the dominating thought
that was intended to be expressed in the great document, that was what the Committee on Style — the drafter of the final text — has written in the
Constitution, and that was what was solemnly ratified in the plebiscite by our people, who then were rankling by the sore spot of illegally Japanized
Davao.
The urgency of settling once and forever the constitutional question raised in this case cannot be overemphasized. If we should decide this question
after many urban lots have been transferred to and registered in the name of alien purchasers, a situation may be created in which it will be hard to
nullify the transfers and the nullification may create complications and problems highly distasteful to solve. The Georgia case is an objective lesson
upon which we can mirror ourselves. From pages 22 and 23 of the book of Charless P. Curtiss, Jr. entitled "Lions Under the Throne," we quote the
following:
It is of interest that it seems to have happened chiefly in important cases. Fletcher vs. Peck, in 1810, is the stock example. That was the first case in
which the Court held a state statute void. It involved a national scandal. The 1795 legislature of Georgia sold its western lands, most of Alabama and
Mississippi, to speculators. Perhaps it was the greatest real estate steal in our history. The purchase price was only half a million dollars. The next
legislature repealed the statute for fraud, the bribery of legislator, but not before the land companies had completed the deal and unloaded. By that
time, and increasingly soon afterwards, more and more people had bought, and their title was in issue. Eleven million of the acres had been bought
for eleven cents an acre by leading citizens of Boston. How could they clear their title? Alexander Hamilton gave an opinion, that the repeal of the
grant was void under the Constitution as an impairment of the obligation of a contract.
But could they not get a decision from the Supreme Court? Robert Fletcher of Anhirst, New Hampshire, had bought fifteen thousand acres from John
Peck of Boston. He sued Peck, and he won. Fletcher appealed. Plainly it was a friendly suit. Marshall was nobody's fool. He told Cranch that the
Court was reluctant to decide the case "as it appeared manifestly made up for the purpose of getting the Court's judgment." John Quincy Adams so
reports in his diary. Yet Marshall decided it, and he held the repeal void, just as Hamilton said it was. "The fact that Marshall rendered an opinion,
under the circumstances," says Beveridge, "is one of the finest proofs of his greatness. A weaker man than John Marshall, and one less wise and
courageous, would have dismissed the appeal." That may be, but it was the act of a stateman, not of a judge. The Court has always been able to
overcome its judicial diffidence on state occasions.
We see from the above how millions of acres of land were stolen from the people of Georgia and due to legal technicalities the people were unable to
recover the stolen property. But in the case of Georgia, the lands had fallen into American hands and although the scandal was of gigantic
proportions, no national disaster ensued. In our case if our lands should fall into foreign hands, although there may not be any scandal at all, the
catastrophe sought to be avoided by the Delegates to our Constitutional Convention will surely be in no remote offing.
We conclude that, under the provisions of the Constitution, aliens are not allowed to acquire the ownership of urban or residential lands in the
Philippines and, as consequence, all acquisitions made in contravention of the prohibitions since the fundamental law became effective are null and
void per se and ab initio. As all public officials have sworn, and are duty bound, to obey and defend the Constitution, all those who, by their
functions, are in charge of enforcing the prohibition as laid down and interpreted in the decision in this case, should spare no efforts so that any and
all violations which may have taken place should be corrected.
We decide, therefore, that, upon the above premises, appellant Alexander A. Krivenko, not being a Filipino citizen, could not acquire by purchase the
urban or residential lot here in question, the sale made in his favor by the Magdalena Estate, Inc. being null and void ab initio, and that the lower
court acted correctly in rendering the appealed decision, which we affirm.
HILADO, J., concurring:
Upon appellant's motion to withdraw his appeal herein with the conformity of the Solicitor General in behalf of appellee, indulging, at that time, all
possible intendments in favor of another department, I ultimately voted to grant the motion after the matter was finally deliberated and voted upon.
But the votes of the ten Justices participating were evenly divided, and under Rule 52, section 4, in relation, with Rule 56, section 2, the motion was
denied. The resolution to deny was adopted in the exercise of the court's discretion under Rule 52, section 4, by virtue of which it has discretion to
deny the withdrawal of the appeal even though both appellant and appellee agree upon the withdrawal, when appellee's brief has been filed. Under
the principle that where the necessary number have concurred in an opinion or resolution, the decision or determination rendered is the decision or
determination of the court (2 C.J.S., 296), the resolution denying the motion to withdraw the appeal was the resolution of the court. Pursuant to Rule
56, section 2, where the court in banc is equally divided in opinion, such a motion "shall be denied." As a necessary consequence, the court as to
decide the case upon the merits.
After all, a consistent advocate and defender of the principle of separation of powers in a government like ours that I have always been, I think that
under the circumstances it is well for all concerned that the Court should go ahead and decide the constitutional question presented. The very doctrine
that the three coordinate, co-equal and independent departments should be maintained supreme in their respective legitimate spheres, makes it at once
the right and duty of each to defend and uphold its own peculiar powers and authority. Public respect for and confidence in each department must be
striven for and kept, for any lowering of the respect and diminution of that confidence will in the same measure take away from the very usefulness
of the respective department to the people. For this reason, I believe that we should avert and avoid any tendency in this direction with respect to this
Court.
I am one of those who presume that Circular No. 128, dated August 12, 1947, of the Secretary of Justice, was issued in good faith. But at the same
time, that declaration in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 5 of Circular No. 14, which was already amended, to the effect that private residential,
commercial, industrial or other classes of urban lands "are not deemed included within the purview of the prohibition contained in section 5, Article
XIII, of the Constitution", made at a time when the self-same question was pending decision of this Court, gives rise to the serious danger that should
this Court refrain from deciding said question and giving its own interpretation of the constitutional mandate, the people may see in such an attitude
an abandonment by this Court of a bounden duty, peculiarly its own, to decide a question of such a momentous transcedence, in view of an opinion,
given in advance of its own decision, by an officer of another department. This will naturally detract in no small degree from public respect and
confidence towards the highest Court of land. Of course, none of us — the other governmental departments included — would desire such a situation
to ensue.
I have distinctively noticed that the decision of the majority is confined to the constitutional question here presented, namely, "whether or not an alien
under our Constitution may acquire residential land." (Opinion, p. 2) Leases of residential lands, or acquisition, ownership or lease of a house or
building thereon, for example, are not covered by the decision.
With these preliminary remarks and the statement of my concurrence in the opinion ably written by the Chief Justice, I have signed said decision.
BRIONES, M., conforme:
Estoy conforme en un todo con la ponencia, a la cual no e puede añadir ni quitar nada, tal es su acabada y compacta elaboracion. Escribo, sin
embargo, esta opinion separada nada mas que para unas observaciones, particularmente sobre ciertas fases extraordinarias de este asunto harto
singular y extraordinario.
I. Conforme se relata en la concurrencia del Magistrado Sr. Perfecto, despues de laboriosas deliberaciones este asunto se puso finalmente a votacion
el 24 de Febrero de este año, confirmandose la sentencia apelada por una buena mayoria. En algunos comentarios adelantados por cierta parte de la
prensa — impaciencia que solo puede hallar explicacion en un nervioso y excesivo celo en la vigilancia de los intereses publicos, maxime tratandose,
como se trata, de la conservacion del patrimonio nacional — se ha hecho la pregunta de por que se ha demorado la promulgacion de la sentencia,
habiendose votado el asunto todavia desde case comienzos del año.
A simple vista, la pregunta tiene justificacion; pero bien considerados los hechos se vera que no ha habido demora en el presente caso, mucho menos
una demora desusada, alarmante, que autorice y justifique una critica contra los metodos de trabajo de esta corte. El curso seguido por el asunto ha
sido normal, bajo las circunstancias. En realidad, no yan en esta Corte ahora, sino aun en el pasado, antes de la guerra, hubo mas lentitud en casos no
tan dificiles ni tan complicados como el que nos ocupa, en que las cuestiones planteadas y discutidas no tenian la densidad constitucional y juridica
de las que se discuten en el presente caso. Hay que tener en cuenta que desde el 24 de Febrero en que se voto finalmente el asunto hasta el 1.0 de
Abril en que comenzaron las vacaciones judiciales, no habian transcurrido mas que 34 dias; y cuando se reanudaron formalmente las sesiones de esta
Corte en Julio se suscito un incidente de lo mas extraordinario — incidente que practicamente vino a impedir, a paralizar la pronta promulgacion de
la sentencia. Me refiero a la mocion que el 10 de Julio persentaron los abogados del apelante pidiendo permiso para retirar su apelacion. Lo
sorpredente de esta mocion es que viene redactada escuetamente, sin explicar el por que de la retirada, ni expresar ningun fundamento. Pero lo mas
sorpredente todavia es la conformidad dada por el Procurador General, tambien escueta e inceremoniosamente.
Digo que es sorprendente la retirada de la apelacion porque pocos casos he visto que hayan sido arguidos con tanta energiaa, tanto interes y tanto celo
por la parte apelante como este que nos ocupa. Los abogados del apelante no solo presentaron un alegato concienzudo de 34 paginas, sino que cuando
se llamo a vista el asunto informaron verbalmente ante esta Corte argumentando vigorosa y extensamente sobre el caso. El Procurador General, por
su parte, ha presentado un alegato igualmente denso, de 31 paginas, en que se discuten acabadamente, hasta el punto maximo de saturacion y
agotamiento, todos los angulos de la formidable cuestion constitutional objeto de este asunto. Tambien informo el Procurador General verbalmente
ante esta Corte, entablando fuerte lid con los abogados del apelante.
Con la mocion de retirada de la apelacion se hubo de retardar necesariamente la promulgacion de la sentencia, pues trabajosas deliberaciones fueron
necesarias para resolver la cuestion, dividiendose casi por igual los miembros de la Corte sobre si debia o no permitirse la retirada. Habia unanimidad
en que bajo la regla 52, seccion 4, del Reglamento de los Tribunales teniamos absoluta discrecion para conceder o denegar la mocion, toda vez que
los alegatos estaban sometidos desde hacia tiempo, el asunto estaba votado y no faltaba mas que la firma y promulgacion de la decision juntamente
con las disidencias. Sin embargo, algunos Magistrados opinaban que la discrecion debia ejercitarse en favor de la retirada en virtud de la practica de
evitar la aplicacion de la Constitucion a la solucion de un litigio siempre que se puede sentenciarlo de otra manera. (Entre los Magistrados que
pensaban de esta manera se incluian algunos que en el fundo del asunto estaban a favor de la confirmacion de la sentencia apelada, es decir, creian
que la Constitucion prohibe a los extranjeros la adquisicion a titulo dominical de todo genero de propiedad inmueble, sin excluir los solares
residenciales, comerciales e industriales.) Pero otros Magistrados opinaban que en el estado tan avanzado en que se hallaba el asunto los dictados del
interes publico y de la sana discrecion requerian imperiosamente que la cuestion se atacase y decidiese frontalmente; que si una mayoria de esta
Corte estaba convencida, como al parecer lo estaba, de que existia esa interdiccion constitucional contra la facultad adquisitiva de los extranjeros,
nuestro claro deber era apresurarnos a dar pleno y positivo cumplimiento a la Constitucion al presentarse la primera oportunidad; que el meollo del
asunto, la lis mota era eso — la interdiccion constitucional — ; por tanto, no habia otra manera de decidirlo mas que aplicando la Constitucion; obrar
de otra manera seria desercion, abandono de un deber jurado.
Asi estaban las deliberaciones cuando ocurre otro incidente mucho mas extraordinario y sorprendente todavia que la retirada no explicada de la
apelacion con la insolita conformidad del Procurador General; algo asi como si de un cielo sereno, sin nubes, cayera de pronto un bolido en medio de
nosotros, en medio de la Corte: me refiero a la circular num. 128 del Secretario de Justicia expedida el 12 de Agosto proximo pasado, esto es, 32 dias
despues de presentada la mocion de retirada de la apelacion. Esa circular se cita comprensivamente en la ponencia y su texto se copia integramente
en la concurrencia del Magistrado Sr. Perfecto; asi que me creo excusado de transcibirla in toto. En breves terminos, la circular reforma el parrafo 5
de la circular num. 14 del mismo Departamento de Justicia de fecha 25 de Agosto, 1945, y levanta la prohibicion o interdiccion sobre el registro e
inscripcion en el registro de la propiedad de las "escrituras o documentos en virtud de los cuales terrenos privados residencias, comerciales,
industriales u otras clases de terrenos urbanos, o cualquier derecho, titulo o interes en ellos, se transfieren, ceden o gravan a un extranjero que no es
nacional enemigo." En otras palabras, el Secretario de Justicia, por medio de esta circular dejaba sin efecto la prohibicion contenida en lacircular
num. 14 del mismo Departamento — la prohibicion que precisamente ataca el apelante Krivenko en el asunto que tenemos ante Nos — y authorizaba
y ordenaba a todoslos Registradores de Titulos en Filipinas para que inscribiesen las escrituras o documentos de venta, hipoteca o cualquier otro
gravamen a favor de extranjeros, siempre que no se tratase de terrenos publicos o de "terrenos privados agricolas," es decir, siempre que los terrenos
objeto de la escritura fuesen "residenciales, comerciales e industriales."
La comparacion de esa circular con un bolido caido subitamenteen medio de la Corte no es un simple tropo, no esuna mera imagen retorica; refleja
una verdadera realidad.Esa circular, al derogar la prohibicion decretada en elparrafo 5 de la circular num. 14 — prohibicion que, comoqueda dicho,
es precisamente el objeto del presente asunto — venia practicamente a escamotear la cuestion discutida, lacuestion sub judice sustrayendola de la
jurisdiccion de lostribunales. Dicho crudamente, el Departamento de Justiciavenia a arrebatar el asunto de nuestras manos, delas manos de esta Corte,
anticipandose a resolverlo por simismo y dando efectividad y vigor inmediatos a su resolucionmediante la correspondiente autorizacion a los
Registradoresde Titulos.
A la luz de esa circular queda perfectamente explicadala mocion de retirada de la apelacion consentida insolitamentepor el Procurador General. ¿
Para que esperar ladecision de la Corte Suprema que acaso podria ser adversa? ¿ No estaba ya esa circular bajo la cual podian registrarseahora la
ventas de terrenos residenciales, comerciales oindustriales a extranjeros? Por eso no es extraño quelos abogados del apelante Krivenko, en su mocion
de 1.0 de Septiembre, 1947, pidiendo la reconsideracion de nuestroauto denegando la retirada de la apelacion, dijeran porprimera vez como
fundamento que la cuestion ya era simplemente academica ("question is now moot") en vista deesa circular y de la conformidad del Procurador
Generalcon la retirada de la apelacion. He aqui las propias palabras de la mocion del apelante Krivenko:
In view of Circular No. 128 of the Department of Justice, dated August 12, 1947, which amends Circular No. 14 by expressly authorizing the
registration of the sale of urban lands to aliens, and in view of the fact that the Solicitor General has joined in the motion for withdrawal of the
appeal, there is no longer a controversy between the parties and the question is now moot. For this reason the court no longer has jurisdiction to act
on the case.1
Lo menos que se puede decir de esa accion del Departamentode Justicia atravesandose en el camino de los tribunalesmientras un asunto esta sub
judice, es que ello no tieneprecedentes, que yo sepa, en los anales de la administracionde justicia en Filipinas en cerca de medio siglo que llevamosde
existencia bajo un gobierno constitucional y sustancialmente republicano. Ni aun en los llamados dias del Imperio, cuando la soberania americana era
mas propensa a manejar el baston grueso y afirmar vigorosamente losfueros de su poder y autoridad, se vio jamas a un departamento de Justicia o a
alguna de sus dependencias entrometerseen el ejercicio ordenado por los tribunales de sujurisdiccion y competencia. Era una tradicion
firmamenteestablecida en las esfersas del Poder Ejecutivo — tradicioninviolada e inviolable — maxime en el Departamento de Justicia y en la
Fiscalia General, el inhibirse de expresar algunaopinion sobre un asunto ya sometido a los tribunales, excepto cuando venian llamados a hacerlo, en
representaciondel gobierno, en los tramites de un litigio, civil o criminal,propiamente planteado ante dichos tribunales. Fuera deestos casos, la
inhibicion era tradicionalmente absoluta,observada con la devocion y la escrupulosidad de un rito.Y la razon era muy sencilla: hamas se queria
estorbar nientorpecer la funcion de los tribunales de justicia, loscuales, bajo la carta organica y las leyes, tenian absolutoderecho a actuar con maximo
desembarazo, libres de todaingerencia extraña. Esto se hizo bajo la Ley Cooper; estose hizo bajo la Ley Jones; y esto se hizo bajo la Ley Tydings-
McDuffie, la ley organica del Commonwealth. Creo que el pueblo filipino tiene derecho a que eso mismo se haga bajo el gobierno de la Republica,
que es suyo, que es de su propia hechura. ¡ No faltaba mas que los hombres de su propia raza le nieguen lo que no le negaron gobernantesde otra
raza!
No se niega la facultad de supervision que tiene el Departamento de Justicia sobre las oficinas y dependenciasque caen bajo su jurisdiccion, entre
ellas las varias oficinasde registro de la propiedad en Manila y en las provincias.Tampoco se niega la facultad que tiene dicho Departamentopara
expedir circulares, ya de caracter puramente administrativo,ya de caracter semijudicial, dando instrucciones,vgr., a los registradores acerca de como
deben desempenarsus funciones. De hecho la circular num. 14 de 25 deAgosto, 1945, es de esta ultima naturaleza: en ella seinstruye y ordena a los
registradores de titulos que noregistren ni inscriban ventas de propiedad inmueble aextranjeros, asi sean terrenos residenciales, comerciales
oindustriales. Pero la facultad llega solo hasta alli; fuerade esas fronteras el campo ya es pura y exclusivamentejudicial. Cuando una determinada
circular del Departamentoa los registradores es combatida o puesta en telade juicio ante los tribunales, ora por fundamentosconstitucionales, ora por
razones meramente legales, ya no esel Departamento el que tiene que determinar o resolverla disputa, sino que eso compete en absoluto a los
tribunalesde justicia. Asi lo dispone terminantemente el articulo200 del Codigo Administrativo. Segun este articulo, elasunto o disputa debe elevarse
en forma de consulta a la Sala Cuarta del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila.La ley no confiere ninguna facultad al Departamento deJusticia
para enjuiciar y decidir el caso. Y cuando unaparte no estuviere conforme con la decision de la SalaCuarta, ella puede alzarse de la sentencia para
ante laCorte Suprema. He aqui el texto integro del articulo 200 del Codigo Administrativo:
SEC. 200. Reference of doubtful matter to judge of fourth branch of Court of First Instance at Manila. — When the register of deeds is in doubt with
regard to the proper step to be taken or memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument presented for registration
or where any party in interest does not agree with the register of deeds with reference to any such matter, the question shall be referred to the judge of
the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of the Ninth Judicial District either on the certificate of the register of deeds stating the question upon
which he is in doubt or upon the suggestion in writing of the party in interest; and thereupon said judge, upon consideration of the matter as shown by
the record certified to him, and in case of registered lands, after notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step to be taken
or memorandum to be made.
Tal es lo que ha ocurrido en el presente caso. Krivenkopresento su escritura de compraventa al Registrador de laPropiedad de Manila. Este denego la
inscripcion solicitadaen virtud de la prohibicion contenida en la circular num.14. ¿ Que hizo Krivenko entonces? Elevo acaso el asuntoal
Departamento de Justicia? No. Lo que hicieron susabogados entonces fue presentar una demanda el 23 de Noviembre, 1945, contra el Registrador de
Titulos ante laSala Cuarta del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila,numerandose dicha demanda como consulta num. 1289; ycuando esta Sala
decidio el asunto confirmando la acciondel Registrador, Krivenko trajo a esta Corte la apelacionque estamos considerando. Tan elemental es esto que
enla misma circular num. 14 se dice que la prohibicion quedadecretada hasta que los tribunales resuelvan lo contrario. He aqui la fraseologia
pertinente de dicha circularnum. 14:
. . . the registration of said deeds or other documents shall be denied, — unless and /or until otherwise specifically directed by a final decision or
order of a competent court — and the party in interest shall be advised of such denial, so that he could avail himself of the right to appeal therefrom,
under the provisions of section 200 of the Revised Administrative Code.
La posicion de la Corte Suprema ante este caso claro ypositivo de intromision (interference) en sus funciones esde lo mas peculiar. Tenemos en el
Reglamento de losTribunales algunas disposiciones que proveen sancion pordesacato para ciertos actos de intromision en el ejercicio de lasfunciones
judiciales.2 Pero se preguntara naturalmente;son aplicables estas disposiciones cuando la intromisionprocede de un ramo del poder ejecutivo, el cual,
como sesabe, en la mecanica de los poderes del Estado, es — usandoun anglicismo-coigual y coordinado con el poder judicial,maxime si esa
intromision se ha realizado so capa de unacto oficial? Cualquiera, pues, puede imaginarse la situaciontremendamente embarazosa, inclusive
angustiosa enque esta Corte ha quedado colocada con motivo de esa intromision departamental, exponiendose a chocar con otropoder del Estado. En
casos recientes en que estaban envueltos otros poderes, esta Corte, estimando dudosa suposicion constitucional, prefirio adoptar una actitud
deelegante inhibicion, de "manos fuera" (hands-off), si bienhay que hacer constar que con la fuerte disidencia dealgunos Magistrados, entre ellos el
opinante.3 Tenemos, portanto, un caso de verdadera intromision en que siendo, porlo menos, dudosa la facultad de esta Corte para imponeruna
sancion por desacato de acuerdo con el Reglamento delos Tribunales, le queda el unico recurso decente, ordenado:registrar su excepcion sin ambages
ni eufemismos contrala intromision, y reafirmar con todo vigor, con toda firmezasu independencia.
Se arguye con tenaz persitencia que debiamos de haberconcedido la mocion de retirada de la apelacion, por dosrazones: (a) porque el Procurador
General estaba conformecon dicha retirada; (b) para evitar la resolucion delpunto constitucional envuelto, en virtud de la practica,segun se dice, de
soslayar toda cuestion constitucionalsiempre que se pueda. Respecto de la primera razon serasuficiente decir que el Procurador General es libre de
entraren cualquiera transaccion sobre un asunto en que interviene,pero es evidente que su accion no ata no obliga aesta Corte en el ejercicio de la
discrecion que le confierela regla, 52, seccion 4, del Reglamento de los Tribunales,que reza como sigue:
Rule 52, SEC. 4 — An appeal may be withdrawn as of right at any time before the filing of appelle's brief. After that brief is filed the withdrawal may
be allowed by the court in its discretion. . . . (Las cursivas son nuestras.)
Como se ve, nuestra discrecion es absoluta:no estacondicionada por la conformidad o disconformidad de una delas partes. Y la incondicionalidad de
esa discrecion es masabsoluta e imperativa alli donde el litigio versa sobre unamateria queno afecta solo a un interes privado, sino quees de interes
publico, como el caso presente en que el Procurador General ha transigido no sobre un asunto suyopersonal o de un cliente particular, sino de un
cliente demucha mayor monta y significacion — el pueblo filipino — ysiendo materia del litigio la propiedad del suelo, parte, vitalisima del
patrimonio nacional que nuestro pueblo hacolocado bajo la salvaguardia de la Constitucion.
Respecto del segundo fundamento, o se que debiamospermitir la retirada dela apelacion para no tener queresolver la cuestion constitucional
disputada, bastara decirque la practica, prinsipio o doctrina que se invoca, llevaconsigo una salvedad o cualificacion y es que el litigio se pueda
resolver de otra mañera. ¿ Podemos soslayar elpunto constitucional discutido en el pleito que nos ocupa? ¿ Podemos decidirlo bajo otra ratio
decidendi, esto es, queno sea la constitucionalidad o inconstitucionalidad de laventa del inmueble al apelante Krivenko, en virtud desucondicion de
extranjero? Indudablemente que no: la lis mota, la unica, es la misma constitucionalidad de la compraventa de que se trata. Para decidir si al recurrido
apelado, Registrador de Titulos de la Ciudad de Manila,le asiste o no razon para denegar la inscripcion solicitada por el recurrente y apelante,
Krivenko, la unica disposicionlegal que se puede aplicar es el articulo XIII, seccion 5, dela Constitucion de Filipinas, invocado por el Registrador
como defensa e inserto en el parrafo 5 de la circular num.14 como fundamento de la prohibicion o interdiccion contrael registro de las ventas de
terreno a extranjeros. Nohay otra ley para el caso.
El caso de Oh Cho contra el Director de Terrenos43 Gac. Of., No. 3 pag. 866), que se cita en unade las disidencias, es completamente diferente. Es
verdadque alli se planteo tambien la cuestion constitucional de quese trata, por cierto que el que lo planteaba en nombre delGobierno era el actual
Secretario de Justicia que entoncesera Procurador General, y lo pleantaba en un sentido absolumente concorde con la circular num. 14. Pero esta
Corte, con la disidencia de algunos Magistrados, opto porsoslayar el punot constitucional denegando el registro solicitadopor Oh Cho, por
fundamento de que bajo la LeyNo. 2874 sobre terrenos de dominio publico los extranjerosestan excluidos de dichos terrenos; es decir, que el
terrenosolicitado se considero como terreno publico. ¿ Podemos hacer la misma evasion en el presente caso, acogiendonosa la ley No. 2874 o a
cualquier otra ley? Indudablemente que no porque ningun Magistrado de esta Corte, muchomenos los disidentes, consideran el terreno reclamado por
Krivenko como terreno publico. Luego todos los caminosestan bloqueados para nosotros, menos el camino constitucional.Luego el segundo
fundamento alegado paracubrir la evasiva tambien debe descartarse totalmente.
Se insinua que no debiamos darnos prisa en resolver constitucionalmente el presente asunto, puesto que puedenpresentarse otros de igual naturaleza
en tiempo no remoto,y en efecto se cita el caso de Rellosa contraGaw Chee Hun(49 Off. Gaz., 4345), en que los alegatos de ambas partesya estan
sometidos y se halla ahora pendiente de decision.Es evidente que esto tampoco arguye en favor de la evasiva,en primer lugar, porque cuando se le
somete el deber de iraveriguando en su Escribania si hay casos de igual naturaleza, sino que los casos se someten por orden de prelaciony prioridad
de tiempo a medida que esten preparados paracaso debe decidirse por sus propios meritos y conforme ala ley pertinente. La salvedad o cualificacion
de la doctrinao practica que se invoca no dice: "hay qoe soslayar la cuestionconstitucional siempre que se pueda resolver
de otra manera, reservando dicha cuestion constitucional para otro caso; la salvedad es dentro del mismo caso. De otro modono seria un
simple soslayo legal, sino que seria unsub terfugio impropio, indebido, ilegal. En el presente caso no ha habido ninguna prisa, excesivo celo, como se
insinua;desde luego no mayor prisa que en otros asuntos. Elcurso, el ritmo de los tramites ha sido normal; en realidad,si ha habido algo, ha sido un
poco de parsimonia, lentitud.
¿ Habia justificacion para demorar el pronto, rapido pronunciamento de nuestro veredicto sobre la formidablecuestion constitucional debatida, por lo
menos, tan pronto como fuese posible? ¿ Habia alguna razon de interespublico para justificar una evasiva? Absolutamenteninguna. Por el contrario,
nuestro deber ineludible, imperioso,era formular y promulgar inmediatamente ese veredicto. Lo debiamos a nuestras conciencias; lo debiamos,
sobretodo, al pais para la tranquilidad y conveniencia de todos — del pueblo filipino y de los extranjeros residentes o quetuvieren voluntad de residir
o negociar en estas Islas. Asicada cual podria hacer su composicion de lugar, podriaorientarse sin zozobras ni miedo a la incertidumbre.
Tantonacionales como extranjeros sabrian donde invertir sudinero. Todo lo que necesitabamos era tener dentro de esta Corte una provee la
interdiccion de que se trata. Tuvimosesa mayoria cunado se voto por primera vez este asuntoen Febrero de este año (8 contra 3); la tuvimos
cuandodespues de laboriosas deliberaciones quedo denegada lamocion de retirada de la mayoria haya cambiado de opinionsobre el fondo de la
cuestion; la tenemos ahora naturalmente.Por tanto, nada hace falta ya para que se de lasenal de "luz verde" a la promulgacion de la sentencia.Toda
evasiva seira neglignecia, desidia. Es mas: seriaabandono de un deber jurado, como digo en otra parte deesta concurrencia; y la Corte Suprema
naturalmente npha de permitir que se la pueda proferir el cargo de queha abandonado su puesto privilegiado de vigia, de centinela avanzado de la
Constitucion.
No es que la Corte Suprema, con esto, pretenda tener"un monopolio de la virtud de sostener y poner en vigor,o de suplir una deficiencia en la
Constitucion," o que segobierno, como se insinua en una de las disidencias. Nohay tal cosa. El principio de la supremacia judicial no esuna
pretension ni mucho menos un ademan de inmodestiao arrogancia, sino que es una parte vital de nuestrasinstutuciones, una condicion peculiarisima
de nuestro sistema de gobierno en que la judicatura, como uno de lostres poderes del Estado, corresponde la facultad exclusivade disponer de los
asuntos judiciales. Con respecto a losasuntos de registro particularmente esa facultad exclusivano solo se infiere del principio de la supremacia
judicial, sino que, como ya se ha dicho en otra parte de esta concurrencia,se halla especificamente estutuida en el articulo 200del Codigo
Administrativo transcrito arriba. Este articuloconfiere jurisdiccion exclusiva a los tribunales de justiciapara decidir las cuestiones sobre registro, y
esto lo ha reconocido el mismo Departamento de Justicia en su circularnum. 14 al referir tales cuestiones a la determinacion oarbitrio judicial en
casos de duda o litigio.
Es injustificada la insinuacion de que, al parecer, la mayoria denego la retirada de la apelacion no tanto para resolver el asunto en su fondo o por sus
meritos, como paraenrvar los efectos de la circular num. !28 del Departamentode Justicia, pues Krivenko, el apelante, habriaganado entonces su
pleito no en virtud de una sentenciajudicial, sino pasando por la puerta trasera abierta por esacircular. Tampoco hay tal cosa. Ya repetidas veces seha
dicho que el presente asunto se habia votado muchoantes de que se expidiese esa circular. Lo que mascorrectamente podria decirse es que antes de la
expedicion deesa desafortunada circular poderosas razones de interespublico aconsejaban que se denegase la retirada de la apelacion y se diese fin al
asunto mediante una sentencia enel fondo, despues de la expidicion esas razones quedaroncentuplicadas. La explicacion es sencilla: nuestra
aquiescenciaa la reirada hubiera podico interpretarse entoncescomo que nuestra jurisdiccion. Es mas: hubiera podidointerpretarse como una abyecta
rendicion en la pugna porsostener los fueros de cada ramo coigual y coordinado del gobierno.
Es todavia mas injustificada la insinuacion de que ladenegacion de la retirada de la apelacion equivale "a asumir queel solicitante-apelante y el
Procurador General sehan confabulado con el Departamento de Justicia no solopara ingerirse en las funciones de esta Corte, sino paraenajenar el
patrimonio nacional a los extranjeros." Estoes inconcebible. La corte presume que todos han obradode buena fe, de acuerdo con los dictados de su
conciencia.Se ha denegado la retirada de la apelacion por razonespuramente juridicas y objectivas, sin consideracion a losmotivos de nadie.
Por ultimo, estimo que debe rectificarse la asercion de queel Magistrado Hontiveros fue excluido de la votacion queculmino en un emmpate y que
determino el rechazamientode la retirada de la apelacion, a tenor de la regla 56, seccion2, Reglamento de los Tribunales. El Magistrado Hontiverosno
estaba presente en la sesion por estar enfermo;pero estaban presentes 10 Magistrados, es decir, mas queel numero necesario para formar quorum y
para despacharlos asuntos. La rueda de la justicia en la Corte Supremajamas ha dejado de rodar por la ausencia de uno o dosmiembros, siempre que
hubiese quorum. A la votacionprecedieron muy laboriosas y vivas deliberaciones. Ningun Magistrado Ilamo la atencion de la Corte hacia la ausencia
del Sr. Hontiveros. Ningun Magistrado pidio que se leesperase o llamase al Sr. Hontiveros. Todos se conformaroncon que se efectuase la votacion,
no obstante la ausencia del Sr. Hontiveros. En efecto, se hace la votaciony resulta un empate, es decir, 5 contra 5. De acuerdo conla regla 56, quedaba
naturalmente denegrada la mocion deretirada. ¿Donde esta, pues, la "ilegalidad", donde la"arbitrariedad"?
Algunos dias despues se presento una mocion de reconsideracion,la misma en que ya se alegaba como ndamentoel hecho de que la cuestion era
simplemente academica (moot question) por la conformidad del Procurador Generalcon la retirada y por la circular num. !28 del Departamento de
Justicia. Tampoco estaba presente el Sr. Hontiverosal someterse la mocion, la cual fue de nuevo denegada.Pregunto otra vez: ¿donde esta la
"arbitrariedad"? Queculpa tenia la Corte de que el Sr. Hontiveros no pudieraestar presente por estar enfermo? ¿Iba a detenerse larueda de la justicia
por eso? Conviene, sin embargo, hacerconstar que sobre el fondo de la cuestion el Sr. Hontiverosera uno de los 8 que habian votado en favor de la
confirmacion de la sentencia apelada, es decir, en favor delveredicto de que la Contitucion excluye a los extrajerosde la propiedad de bienes raices en
Filipinas.
II. No queda casi nada decir sobre el fondo de lacuestion. Todos los angulos y fases de la misma estanacabadamente tratados y discutidos en la
ponencia. Melimitare, por tanto, a hacer unas cuantas observaciones,unas sobre hermeneutica legal, y otra sobre historia nacionalcontemporanea,
aprovachando en este ultimo respectomis reminiscencias y mi experiencia como humilde miembroque fui de la Asamblea Constituyente que redacto
y arobola Constitucion de Filipinas.
Toda la cuestion, a mi juicio, se reduce a determinar einterpretar la palabra "agricola" (agricultural) usada enel articulo XIII, seccion 5, de la
Constitucion. He aqui eltexto completo de la seccion:
SEC. 5. — Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
¿Incluye la palabra "agricultural" aqui empleada los terrenosresidenciales, comerciales e industriales? Tal es lacuestion: la mayoria de esta Corte que
si; los disidentesdicen que no.
Es indudable que por razones sanas de hermenuetica legalel articulo XIII de que se trata debe interpretarse como untodo homogeneo, simetrico. En
otras palabras, los cocablosalli empleados deben interpretarse en el sentido de quetienen un mismo significado. Es absurdo pensar o suponerque en el
texto de una ley, sobre todo dentro del estrechomarco de un articulo, un vocablo tenga dos o mas significadosdistintos, a menos que la misma ley asi
to diga expresamente. Lapresuncion es que el legislador sigue y seatiene a las reglas literarias elementales.
Ahora bien: el articulo XIII consta de dos partes — laprimera, que trata de los terrenos agricolas de dominiopublico, y la segunda, que se a los
terrenos agricolaprivados o partuculares.
La primera parte se compone de las secciones 1 y 2que vinculanla propiedad de los terrenos publicos enel Estado y disponen que solo se pueden
enajenar a favorde ciudadanos filipinos, o de corporaciones o asociacionesen que el 60 por ciento del cacital, por lo menos, pertenecea tales
ciudadanos. En secciones se emplea literalmentela frase "public agricultural land."
La segunda parte la componen las secciones 3 y 5: laseccion 3 perceptua que "the Congress may determine bylaw the size of private agricultural land
which individuals,coporations, or associations may acquire and hold, subjectto rights existing prior to the enactment of such law"4 ;y la seccion 5 es
la que queda transcrita mas arriba y esobjeto del presente litigio. En ambas secciones se emplealiteralmente la frase "private agricultural land."
No hay ninguna cuestion de que la frase "public agriculturalland" empleada en la primera parte comprende terrenosresidenciales, comerciales e
industriales; lo admitenlos mismos abogados del apelante y los Sres. Magistradosdisidentes. Y ¿por que lo admiten? Sera porque en laConstitucion se
define la palabra "agricultural" aplicadaa terrenos publicos, en el sentido de incluir solaresresidenciales, comerciales e industriales?
Indudablementeque no, porque en ninguna parte de la Constitucion se datal definicion. Lo admiten porque en esta jurisdicciontenemos una serie
consistente de sentencias de esta CorteSuprema en que es jurisprudencia firmamente establecidala doctrina de que la palabra "agricultural" usada en
laLey del Congreso de los Estados Unidos de 1902 (LeyCooper) y en nuestras leyes de terrenos publicos comprendey abarca solares residenciales,
comerciales, industriales yqualquier otra clase de terrenos, excepto forestales yminerales.5 Es decir, que se aplica a la actual Constitucion deFilipinas
una interpretacion clasica, tradicional, embebidaen nuestra jurisprudencia de cerca de medio siglo.
Ahora bien, pregunto: si la palabra "agricultural" empleadaen la primera parte del articulo XIII tiene talsignificado — y lo tiene porque la
Constitucion no da otrodiferente — ¿por que esa misma palabra empleada en lasegunda parte, unas cuantas lineas mas adelante, no hade tener el
mismo significado? ¿Da acaso la Constitucionuna definicion de la palabra "agricultural" cuandose refiere a terreno privado? ¿Donde esta esa
definicion? ¿O es que se pretende que la diferenciacion opera no envirtud de la palabra "agricultural", sino en virtud delvocablo "public" o "private",
segun que se trate de terrenopublico o privado?
Si la intencion de la Asemblea Constituyente fuera eldar a la palabra "agricultural" aplicada a terreno privadoun significado distinto de cuando se
refiere a terreno publico, lo hubiese hecho constar asi expresamente en elmismo texto de la Constitucion Si, como se admite, laAsemblea opto por no
definir la palabra "agricultural"aplicada a terreno poblico porque contaba para ello con ladefinicion clasica establecida en la jurisprudencia, cuandola
misma Asemblea tampoco definio la palabra con relaciona terreno privado, es logico inferir que tuvo la mismaintencion, esto es, aplicar la definicion
de la jurisprudenciaa ambos tipos de terreno — el publico y el privado. Pensarde otra manera podria ser ofensivo, insultante; podriaequivaler a decir
que aquella Asemblea estaba compuestade miembros ignorantes, desconocederos de las reglas elementalesen la tecnica de redaccion legislativa.
Tuve el honor de partenecer a aquella Asemblea comouno de los Delegados por Cebu. Tambien me cupo elhonor de partenecer al llamado Comite de
Siete — elcomite encargado finalmente de redactar la ponencia dela Constitucion. No digo que aquella Asemblea estabacompuesta de sabios, pero
indudablemente no era inferiora ninguna otra de su tipo en cualquiera otra partedel mundo. Alli habia un plantel de buenos abogados,algunos
versados y especialistas en derecho constitucional.Alli estaba el Presidente de la Universidad de FilipinasDr. Rafael Palma; alli estaba el propio
Presidentede la Asemblea Constituyente Hon. Claro M. Recto, conlos prestigios de su reconocida cultura juridica y humanista; alli estaba tambien el
Dr. Jose P. Laurel, considerado comouna de las primeras autoridades en derecho constitucionaly politico en nuestro pais. En el Comite de Siete o
dePonencia figuraban el actual Presidente de Filipinas Hon.Manuel Roxas; el ex-Senador de Cebu Hon. Filemon Sotto;el Hon. Vicente Singson
Encarnacion, lider de la minoria en la primera Asemblea Filipina, ex-miembro de la Comisionde FIlipinas, ex-Senador y ex-Secretario de Gabinete;el
ex-Magistrado de la Corte Suprema Hon. NorbertoRomualdez; el actual Secretario de Hacienda Hon. MiguelCuaderno; y el ex-Decano del Colegio
de Artes Liberalesde la Universidad de Filipinas, Hon. Conrado Benitez.
No se puede concebir como bajo la inspiracion y guiade estas personas pudiera redactarse el texto de un articuloenque un vocablo — el vocablo
"agricultural" — tuviera dosacepciones diferentes: una, aplicada a terrenos publicos;y otra, aplicada a terrenos privados. Menos se concibeque, si
fuese esta la intencion, se incurriese en una comisionimperdonable: la omision de una definicion especifica, diferenciadora, que evitase caos y
confusion en la mente delos abogados y del publico. Teniendo en cuenta la innegablecompetencia de los Delegados a la Asemblea Constituyentey de
sus liders, lo mas logico pensar es que alno definir la palabra "agricultural" y al no diferenciarsu aplicacion entre terrenos publicos y privados, lo
hicierondeliberamente, esto es, conla manifiesta intencion dedejar enteramente la interpretacion de la palabra a la luzde una sola comun definicin —
la establecida en la jurisprudenciadel asunto tipico de Mapa contra Gobierno Insular y otrossimilares (supra); es decir, que la palabra
"agricultural",aplicada a terrenos privados, incluye tambien solaresresidenciales, comerciales, e industriales.
A word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statute, unless a different intention appears. . . . Where words have
been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as having
a certain meaning prior to a particular statute in which they are used, the rule of construction requires that the words used in such statute should be
construed according to the sense in which they have been so previously used, although that sense may vary from the strict literal meaning of the
words." (II Sutherland, Stat. Construction, p. 758.)
Pero acaso se diga que la Asemblea Constituyente hadejado sin definir la palabra "agricultural" referente aterreno particular, dando a entendar con su
silencio queendosaba la definicion al diccionario o a la usanza popular.La suposicion es igualmente insostenible. ?Por queen un caso se entrega la
definicion a la jurisprudencia,y por que en otro al diccionario, o al habla popular?Aparte de que los miembros y dirigentes de la
AsembleaConstituyente sabian muy bien que esto causaria unatremenda confusion. Ni los diccionarios, ni mucho menosel lenguaje popular, ofrecen
apoyo seguro para una fiely autorizada interpretacion. Si el texto mismo de la ley,con definiciones especificas y casuisticas, todavia ofrecedudas a
veces ¿como no el lexico vulgar, con su infinitavariedad de matices e idiotismos?
Ahora mismo ¿no estamos presenciando una confusionn,una perplejidad? ¿Hay acaso uniformidad en la definicionde lo que es un terreno privado
agricola? No; cadacual lo define a su manera. Uno de los disidentesel Magistrado Sr. Tuason toma su definicion de la palabra "agricultural " del
Diccionario Internacional de Webster que dice . . . "of or pertaining to agricultural connected with, or engaged in, tillage; as the agricultural class;
agricultural implements, wages etc." Tambien hacereferncia el mismo Magistrado al concepto popular. Otrodisidente el Magistrado Sr. Padilla dice
que "the termprivate agricultural land means lands privately owneddevoted to cultivation, to the raising of agriculturalproducts." El Magistrado Sr
Paras no da ninguna definicion;da por definida la palabra "agricultural", al parecer, segunel concepto popular.
Pero, sobre todo, los abogados del apelante definen elvocablo de una manera distinta. Segun ellos, "land spoken of as `agricultural' naturally refers to
land not only susceptible of agricultural or cultivation but more valuable for such than for another purpose, say residential,commercial or educational.
. . . The criterion is notmere susceptibility of conversion into a farm but its greater value when devoted to one or the other purpose." Demode que,
segun esta definicion, lo que determina la calidaddel terreno es su valor relativo, segun que se dedique alcultivo, o a residencia, o al comercio, o a la
industria.Los autores de esta definicion indudablemente tienen encuenta el hecho de que en las afueras de las ciudades existenterrenos immensos que
desde tiempo inmemorial se handedicado a la agricultura, pero que se han convertido ensubdivisiones multiplicandose su valor en mil por cientosi no
mas. De hecho esos terrenos son agricolas; comoque todavia se ven alli los pilapiles y ciertas partes estancultivadas; pero en virtud de su mayor
valor para residencia,comercio e industria se les aquiere colocar fuera dela prohibicion constitucional. En verdad, el criterio nopuede ser mas elastico
y convencional, y denota cuanincierta y cuan confusa es la situacion a que da lugar latesis del apelante y de los que le sostienen.
Si hubieramos de hacer depender la definicion de loque es un terreno agricola del concepto popular y de losdiccionarios, asi sean los mejores y mas
cientificamente elaborados ¿que normas claras, concretas y definitivasde diferenciacion podrian establecerse? ¿Podrian trazarsefronteras
inconfundibles entre lo que es agricola y lo quees residencial, comercial e industrial? ¿Podria hacerseuna clasificacion que no fuese arbitraria?
Indudablementeque no. El patron mas usual de diferenciacion es lanaturaleza urbana o rural del terreno; se considera comoresidencial, comercial e
industrial todo lo que esta dentrode una urbe, ciudad o poblacion. Pero ¿resolveria esto la dificultad? Proporcionaria un patron exacto, cientifico,no
arbitrario? Tampoco. Por que dentro de una ciudado poblacio puede haber y hay terrenos agricolas. Comodijo muy bien el Magistrado Sr. Willard en
el asunto clasico de Mapa contra Gobierno Insular, "uno de los inconvenientes de la adopcion de este criterio es que es tanvago e indeterminado, que
seria muy dificil aplicarlo enla practica. ¿Que terrenos son agricolas por naturaleza? l mismo Fiscal General, en su alegato presentado en este asunto,
dice: 'La montaña mas pedregosa y el suelo mas pobre son susceptible de cultivo mediante la mano del hombre'" (Mapa contra Insular, 10 Jur.
Fil.,183). Y Luego el Sr. Willard añade las siguietes observacionessumamente petinentes e ilustratives para una correctare solucion del asunto que
nos ocupa, a saber:
. . . Tales terrenos (agricolas, quiere decir) se pueden encontrar dentro de los limites de cualquier ciudad. Hay dentrode la ciudad de Manila, y en la
parte densamente poblada de lamisma, una granja experimental. Esta es por su naturaleza agricola. Contigua a la Luneta, en la misma ciudad, hay una
gran extension de terreno denominado Camp Wallace, destinada a sports. El terreno que circuda los muros de la ciudad de Manila, situado entre estos
y el paseo del Malecon por el Sur y Este contiene muchas hectareas de extension y es de naturaleza agricola. La Luneta misma podria en cualquier
tiempo destinarse al cultivo.
La dificultad es mayor tratanndose de diferenciar unterreno agricola de un terreno industrial. En este respectoes preciso tener en cuenta que un
terreno industiralno tienee que ser necesariamente urbano; en realidad,la tendencia moderna es a situar las industrias fuera deas ciudades en vastas
zonas rurales. Verbigracia; anpredor de la famosa cascada de Maria Cristina en Lanao existen grandes extensiones de terreno agricola, algunasde
propiedad particular. Cuando, se industrialice aquellaformidable fuerza hidraulica bajo el llamado Plan Beyster ¿que normas segfuras se podrian
establecer para poner envigor la prohibicion constitucional fuese burlada enajenandosetierras agricolas de propiedad privada a favorde extranjeros, ya
sean individuos, ya sean corporacioneso asociaciones, so pretexto de ser industriales?
Resulta evidence de lo expueto que los redactores denuetra Constitucion no pudienron haber tenido la idea deque el articulo XIII fuera interpretado a
la luz de ese criterio vago e indeterminado que llama el Sr. Willard. Es mas logico pensar que el criterio que ellos tenian enla mente era el criterio
establicido en la jurisprudencia sentada en el asunto clasico de Mapa contra Gobierno y otros asuntos concomitantes citados — criterio mas frime,
mas seguro, menos expuesto a confusion y arbitrariedad, y sobre todo, "que ofrece menos inconvenientes", parafraseando otra vez al Magistrado Sr.
Willard, (supra, p. 185).
Otro serio inconveniente, La seccion 3, articulo XIIIde;la Constitucion, dispone que "el Congreso puedo determinarpor ley l;a eextension superficial
del terrenoprivado agricola que los individous, corporaciones o asociaciones pueden adquirir y poseer, sujeto a los derechos existentes antes de la
aprobacion de dicha ley." Si seinterpretase que la frase "private agricultural land" noincluye terrenos residenciales, comerciales e
industriales,entonces estas ultimas clases de yterreno quedarian excluidas de la facultad reguladora concedida por la Constitucion al Congreso
mediante dicha seccion 3. Entoncesun individuo o una corporacion podrian ser dueños de todoslos terrenos de una ciudad; no habria limite a las
adquisicionesy posesiones en lo tocante a terrenos residenciales,comerciales e industriles. Esto parece absurdo, peroseria obligada consecuencia de la
tesis sustentada por elapelante.
Se hace hincapie en el argumento de que el el procesode tamizacion del articulo XIII durante las deliberacionesde la Asamblea Constituyente y de los
Comites de Ponnnnenciay de estilo al principio no figuraba el adjetivo "agricola"en la seccion 5, diciendose solo "terreno privado" y quesolo mas
trade se añadio la palabra calificativa agricola—"private agricultural land" De este se quiere inferir quela adicion de la palabra "agricultural" debio
de ser poralgun motivo y este no podia ser mas que el de que sequiso excluir los terrenos residenciales comerciales e industriales, limitandose el
precepto a los propia o estrictamenteagricolas.
La deduccion es incorrecta y sin fundamento. No cabedecir que la adicion de la plabra "agricultural" en estecaso equivale a excuir los terrenos
residenciales, comercialese industriales, por la sencilla razon de que la Constitucion no solo no define lo que es residencial comercial e industrial,
comercial e industrial. En cambio ya hemosvisto que la palabra "agricultral" tiene una significaciontradicionalmente bien establecida en nuestra
jurisprudenciay en nuestro vocabulario juridico: incluye no solo terrenoscultivados o susceptibles fe cultivo, sino tambien residencialescomerciales e
industriales. Se admite por todo elmundo que la palabra tiene tal significacion en el articuloXIII, seccion 5, de la Constitucion, en cuanto se refierea
terreno publico. Ahora bien; ¿que diferencia hay, despuesde todo, entire un terreno publico agricolo y uno sea a la calidad de agricola, absolutamente
ninguna.Uno no es mas menois agricola que el otro. La unicadiferencia se refiere a la propiedad, al titulo dominical — en que el uno es del Estado y
el otro es de un particular.
En realidad, creo que la diferencia es mas bien psicologica,subjetiva — en que vulgarmente hablando pareceque los conceptos de "agricola" y
"residencial" se repelen.No se debe menospreciar la influencia del vulgo en algunascosas; en la misma literatura el vulgo juega su papel; digasi no la
formacion popular del romancero. Pero es indudable que cietas cosas estan por encima del conceptovulgar — una de estae la interpretacion de la
leyes, lahermeneutica legal. Esto no es exagerar la importancia de la tecnica sino que es simplemente colocar las cosasensu verdadero lugar. La
interpretacion de la ley es unafuncion de minoria — los abogados. Si no fuera asi paraque los abogados? ¿Y para que las escuelas de dercho,y para
que los exmenes, cada vez mas rigidos, para de purar el alma de la toga, que dijo un gran abogado español?6 Asi que cuando decimos que el precepto
constitucional en cuestion debe interpretatarse tecnicamente, a la luz de la jurisprudencia, por ser ello el metodo mas seguro para hallar la verdad
judicial, no importa que ello repugne al concepto vulgar a simple vista, no ponemos,en realidad, nionguna pica en Flandes, sino que propugnamos
una cosa harto elememntal por lo sabida.
Por tanto no es necesario especular o devanarse lossesos tratando de inquirir por que en la tamizacion delprecepto se añadio el adjetivo 'agricultural"
a las palabras"private land" en vez de dejarlas solas sin cualificacion.Algunos diran que fue por razon de simentria para hacer"pendant diran que fue
por razon de simetria para hacer"pendant" con la frase "public agricultural land" puestamas arriba. Pero esto np tiene ninguna importancia.
Loimportante es saber que la añadidura, tal como esta jurisdiccion, de la palbra "agricultural" empleada en dicho texto. Eso es todo; lo demas creo
que es puro bizantinis mo.
III. Cero que una examen de los documentos y debatesde la Asamblea Constituyente para ver de inquirir la motivacion y finalidad del precepto
constitucional que nos ocupapuede ayudar grandemente y arrojar no poca luz en lainterpretacion de la letra y espiritu de dicho precepto.Este genero
de inquisicion es perfectamente propio y permisible en hermeneutica constitucional, y se ha hechosiempre, segun las majores autoridades sobre la
materia. Cooley, en su authorizado tratado sobre Limitaciones Constitucionales (Constitutional Limitations) dice a este efectolo sigiuente:
When the inquiry is directedto ascertaining the mischief designed to be remedied, or the purpose sought to be accomplished by a particular provision,
it may be proper to examine the proceedings of the convention which framed the instrument. Where the proceedings clearly point out the purpose of
the provision, the aid will be valuable and satisfactory; but where the question is one of abstract meaning, it will be difficult to derive from this
source much reliable assistance in interpretation. (1 Cooley on Constitutional Limitations [8th ed.], p. 142.)
¿Que atmosfera prevalecia en la Asamblea sobre elproblema de la tierra en general sobre el problema capitalismo de los terrenos naturales? ¿Cual era
la tendenciapredominante entre los Delegados? Y ¿como era tambienel giro de la opinion, del sentimiento publico es decir comoera el pulso del
pueblo mismo del cual la Asamblea despuesde todo no era mas que organo e interprete?
Varios discursos sobre el particular se pronounciaronen la Asamblea Constituyente. El tono predomionante entodos ellos era un fuerte, profundo
nacionalismo. Tanto dentro como fuera de la Asamblea Constituyente era evidente, acusado, el afan unanime y decidido de conservar el patrimonio
nacional no solo para las presentes generaciones filipinas, sino tambien para la posteridad. Y patrimonio nacional tenia, en la mente de todos un
significadocategorio e indubitable; significion de si es dedominio publico o privado. Muestras tipicas y representativas de este tono pecular y
dominantes de la ideologiaconstituyente son ciertas m,anifestaciones que constanen el diario de serines has en el curso de los debateso en el proceso
de la redaccion del proyecto constitucionalpor Delegados de palabra autorizadam bien por su significacion personal bein por el papel particula que
desempeñaban en las treas constituyentes. Por ejemplo el Delegado Montilla por Negros Occidental, conspicuo representante del agro, usando del
privilegio de madia horaparlamentaria dijo en parte lo siguinte:
. . . Con la completa nacionnalization de nuestras tierras y recursos natural debe entenderse que nuetro patrimonio nacional debe estar vinculado 100
por 100 en manos filipinas. Tierras y recursos naturales son inm,uebles y como tales pueden compararse con los organos vitales del cuerpo de una
persona: la falta de posesion de los mismo puede caussar la muete instantannea o el abreviamiento de la vida (Diario de Sesiones Asamblea
Constituyente, inedita, "Framing of the Constitution," tit. 2 0 pag. 592 Libro del Profesor Aruego).
Como se ve el Delegado Montilla habla de tierras sin adjetivacion, es decir sin difenciar entre propiedad publica y privada.
El Delgado Ledesma, por Iloilo, otro conspicuo representante del agro presidente del comte de agricultura de la Asamblea que los extramnjeros no
podian ser mismas palabras:
La exclusion de los extranjeros del privilegio de adquirir terrenos publicos agricolas y de poder se dueños de propiedades inmuebles (real estate) es
una parte necesaria de las leyes de terrenos publicos de Filipinas para mantener firme la idea de conservar Filipinaspara los filipos' (Diario de
Sesiones, id.; Libro de Aruego, supra, pag. 593.)
Es harto significtativo que en el informe del Colite de Nacionalizacion y Conservacion de Recursos Naturales de la Asamblea Constituyente la plabra
tierra (land) se usa generricamente sin cualificacion de publica o privada. Dice el Comite:
Que la tierra, los minerales los bosques y otros recursos naturalesconstituyen la herencia exclusiva de la nacion filipina. Deben,por tanto, ser
conservados para aquellos que se halian bajo la autoridad soberana de esa nacion y para su posteridad. (Libro de Aruego, supra, pag. 595.)
La conservacion y fomento del patrimonio nacional fue una verdadera obsesion en la Asamblea Constituyente. Sus mienbros que todavia viven
recordaran l;a infinita paciencia, el esmero de orfe breria con que se trabajo el preambulo de la Constitucion. Cada frase, cada concepto se sometio a
un rigido proceso de seleccion y las gemas resultans es la labor benedictina una de las gemas redel patrimonio nacional. He aqui el preambulo:
The Filipino people, imploring the aid of Divene Providence,in order to establish a government that shall enbody their ideals, conserve and develop
the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themslves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of
justice, liberty, and democracy, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
El espiritu fuertemente nacionalista que saturaba la Asamblea Constituyente con respecto a la tierre y recursosnaturales es de facil explicacion.
Estabamos escribiendouna Constitucion no solo para el Commonwealth, sino tambien para la republica que advendria despues de10 años. Querianos,
puesd asegurar firmemente las basesde nuestra nacionalidad. ¿Que cosa major para ello quebildar por los cuatro costrados el cuerpo dela mnacion
delcual — parodiando al Delegado Montilla — la tierra y losresoursos naturales son como organos vitales cuya perdidapuede causar la muerte
instantanea o el abreviamiento dela vida?
Para aprociar el pulso de la nacion en aquel memontohistorico es preciso tener en cuenta las cirucmstancias.Nos debamos perfecta cuenta de nuetra
posicion geografica,asi como tambien de nuestras limitaciones demograficas.Se trataba, por ciento de una conciencia agudamenteatormentadora y
alarmante. Estabamos roodeadosde enormes mesas humanas — centenares de milliones — economica y biologicamente agresivas, avidad de
desbordarsepor tadas partes, poir las areas del Pafico particularmente,en busca de espacio vitales. China, Japon-Japon, sobretodo que estaba entonces
en el apogeo de su delirio deengrandecimiento economico y militarista. Teniamos apantadoal mismo corazon, como espada rutilante de Samurrai,el
pavoroso problema de Davao, donde, por errores incialesdel Gobierno, Japon tenia el control de la tierra, instituyendos alli una especie de Japon en
miniatura, con todaslas amenasas y peligros que ello implicaba para la integridadde nuestra existancia nacional. Como que Davaoya se llamaba
popular y sarcasticamente Davaoko, entragica rima con Manchuko.
Tambien nos obsesionaban otras lecciones dolorosas dehistoria contemporanea. Texas, Mejico, Cuba y otraspaises del Mar Caribe y de la America
Latina que todaviaexpiaban, como una terrible maldicion el error de susgobernantes al permitir la enajenacion del suelo a extranjeros.
Con el commercio y la industria principalmente en manosno-filipinas, los Delegados a la Constituyente se haciancargo tambien de la vitalisima
necesidad de, por lo menos,vincular el apatrimonio nacional, entre otras cosas la tierra, en manos de los filipinos.
Que de extraño habia, pues, que en semejante atmosfera y tales circumstancias se aprobase un articulo rigidamentenacionalismta como es el Article
XIII? La motivacion y finalidad, como ya se ha dicho, era triple: (a)consetvar el patrimonio nacional para las presentes yfuturas generaciones
filipinas; (b) vincular, por lo menos,la propiedad de la tierra y de los recursos naturales en manos filipinas como la mejor manera de mantener
elequilibrio de un sistema economico dominado principalmente por extranjeros en virtud de su tecnica (know-how) superior y de su abudancia de
capitales: (c) prefictos y complicaciones internacionales.
No se concibe que los Delegados tuvieran la intercionde excluir del precepto los terrenos residenciales comercialese industrial, pues sabian muy bien
que los finesque se trataban de conseguir y los peligros quie se trataban de evitar con la politica de nacionalizacion y conservacionrezaban tanto para
una clase de terrenos como para otra. ¿Por que se iba a temer, verbigracia, el dominio extranjero sobre un terreno estrictamente, agricola, sujeto a
cultivo, y no sobre el terreno en que estuviera instalada unaformidable industria o fabrica?
Otro detalle significativo. Era tan vigoroso el sentimiento nacionalista en la Asamblea Constituyente que, noobstante el natural sentimiento de
gratitud que nos obligabaa favor de los americanos., a estos no se les concedioningun privilegio en relacion con la tierra y demas recusosnaturales,
sino que se les coloco en el mismo plano que alos otros extranjeros. Como que ha habido necesidad deuna reforma constitucional — la llmada
reforma sobre laparidad — para equipararlos a los filipinos.
The mere literal construction of a section in a statute ought not to prevail if it is opposed to the intention of the legislature apparent by the statute; and
if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of some other construction it is to be adopted to effectuate that intention. The intent prevails over the
letter, and the latter will, if possible, be so read as to conform to the spirit of the act. While the intention of the legislature must be ascertained from
the words used to express it, the manifest reason and the obvious purpose of the law should not be sacrificed to a literal interpretation of such words.
(II Sutherland, Stat. Construction, pp. 721, 722.)
IV. — Se insinua que no debieramos declarar que laConstitucion excluye a loc extranjeros de la propiedadsobre terrenos residenciales e
industriales,porque ello imposibilitaria toda accion legislativa en sentidocontrario para el caso de que el Congreso Ilegagealguna vez a pensar que
semejante interdiccio debialevantarse. Se dice que es majes y mas conveniente dejaresta cuestion en manos del Congreso para que haya
maselasticidad en las soluciones de los diferentes problemassobre la tierra.
Cometeriamos un grave error si esto hicieramos. Estaes una cuestion constitucional por excelencia. Solamenteel pueblo puede disponer del
patrimonio nacional. Ni el Congreso, ni mucho menos los tribunales, pueden disponerde ese patrimonio. Lo mas que puede hecer el Congreso es
proponer una reforma constitucional mediante los votosde tres cuartas (3/4) de sus miembros; y el pueblo tienela ultima palabra que se expresara en
una eleccion oplebiscito convocado al efecto.
El argumento de que esto costaria dinero es insostenible. Seria una economia mal entendida. Si no se escatiman gastos para celebrar elctiones
ordinarias periodicamente ¿como ha del pueblo en un asunto tan vital como es la disposicion del patrimonio nacional, base de su mismaexistencia?
para reformar la Constitucion, apoyado portres cuartas (3/4) del Congreso, por lo menos.
En el entretanto el articulo XIII de la Constitucion debequedar tal como es, e interpretarse en la forma como lo interpretamos en nuestra decision.
Se confirma la sentencia.

PARAS, J., dissenting:

Section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides that "save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines." The important
question that arises is whether private residential land is included in the terms "private agricultural land."
There is no doubt that under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, quoted in the majority opinion, lands of the public domain are classified
into agricultural, timber,or mineral. There can be no doubt, also, that public lands suitable or actually used for residential purposes, must of necessity
come under any of the three classes.
But may it be reasonably supposed that lands already of private ownership at the time of the approval of the Constitution, have the same
classification? An affirmative answer will lead to the conclusion — which is at once absurd and anomalous — that private timber and mineral lands
may be transferred or assigned to aliens by a mode other than hereditary succession. It is, however, contended that timber and mineral lands can
never be private, and reliance is placed on section 1, Article XIII, of the Constitution providing that "all agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the
public domain . . . belong to the State," and limiting the alienation of natural resources only to public agricultural land. The contention is obviously
untenable. This constitutional provision, far from stating that all timber and mineral lands existing at the time of its approval belong to the State,
merely proclaims ownership by the Government of all such lands as are then of the public domain; and although, after the approval of the
Constitution, no public timber or mineral land may be alienated, it does not follow that timber or mineral lands theretofore already of private
ownership also became part of the public domain. We have held, quite recently, that lands in the possession of occupants and their predecessors in
interest since time immemorial do not belong to the Government, for such possession justifies the presumption that said lands had been private
properties even before the Spanish conquest. (Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 43 Off. Gaz., 866.) This gives effect to the pronouncement in Cariño vs.
Insular Government (212 U.S., 446; 53 Law. ed., 594), that it could not be supposed that "every native who had not a paper title is a trespasser." It is
easy to imagine that some of such lands may be timber or mineral. However, if there are absolutely no private timber or mineral. However, if there
are absolutely no private timber or mineral lands, why did the framers of the Constitution bother about speaking of "private agricultural land" in
sections 3 and 5 of Article XIII, and merely of "lands" in section 4?
SEC. 3. The Congress may determine by law the size of private agricultural land which individuals, corporations, or associations may acquire and
hold, subject to rights existing prior to the enactmentof such law.
SEC. 4. The Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at
cost to individuals.
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
Under section 3, the Congress may determine by law the size of private agricultural land which individuals, corporations, or associations may acquire
and hold, subbject to rights existing prior to the enactment of such law, and under section 4 it may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the
expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals. The latter section clearly negatives the idea that private
lands can only be agricultural. If the exclusive classification of public lands contained in section 1 is held applicable to private lands, and , as we have
shown, there may be private timber and mineral lands, there would be neither sense nor justification in authorizing the Congress to determine the size
of private agricultural land only, and in not extending the prohibition of section 5 to timber and mineral lands.
In may opinion, private lands are not contemplated or controlled by the classification of public lands, and the term "agricultural" appearing in section
5 was used as it is commonly understood, namely, as denoting lands devoted to agricultural. In other words, residential or urban lots are not
embraced within the inhibition established in said provision. It is noteworthy that the original draft referred merely to "private land." This certainty
would have been comprehensive enough to included any kind of land. The insertion of the adjective "agricultural " is therefore significant. If the
Constitution prohibits the alienation to foreigners of private lands of and kind, no legislation can ever be enacted with a view to permitting limited
areas of land for residential, commercial, or industrial use, and said prohibition may readily affect any effort towards the attainment of rapid progress
in Philippine economy. On the other hand, should any danger arise from the absence of such constitutional prohibition, a law may be passed to
remedy the situation, thereby enabling the Government to adopt such elastic policy as may from time to time be necessary, unhampered by any
inconveniences or difficulties in amending the Constitution. The power of expropriation is, furthermore, a handy safeguard against undersirable
effects of unrestricted alienation to, or ownership by, aliens of urban properties. The majority argue that the original draft in which the more general
terms "private land" was used, was amended in the same that the adjective "agricultural" was inserted in order merely "to clarify concepts and avoid
uncertainties" and because, as under section 1, timber and mineral lands can never be private, "the prohibition to transfer the same, would be
superfluous." In answer, it may be stated that section 4 of Article XIII, referring to the right of expropriation, uses "lands" without any qualification,
and it is logical to believe that the use was made knowingly in contradistinctions with the limited term "private agricultural land" in section 3 and 5.
Following the line of reasoning of the majority, "lands" in section 4 necessarily implies that what may be expropriated is not only private agricultural
land but also private timber and mineral lands, as well, of course, as private residential lands. This of course tears apart the majority's contention that
there cannot be any private timber or mineral land.
Any doubt in the matter will be removed when it is, borne in mind that no less than Honorable Filemon Sotto, Chairman of the Sponsorship
Committee of the Constitutional Convention, in supporting section 3 of the Article XIII, explained that the same refers to agricultural land, and not to
urban properties, and such explanation is somewhat confirmed by the statement of another member of the Convention (delegate Sevilla) to the effect
that said section "is discriminatory and unjust with regard to the agriculturists."
Sr. SOTTO (F) Señor Presidente: "Que hay caballeros de laConvencion en el fondo de esta cuestion al parecer inocente yordinaria para que tanto
revuelo haya metido tanto en la sesion de ayer como en la de hoy? Que hay de misterios en el fondo de este problem, para que politicos del volumen
del caballero por Iloilo y del caballero por Batangas, tomen con gran interes una macion para reconsiderar lo acordado ayer? Voy a ser frio, señores.
Parece que es meyor tratar estas cuestiones con calma y no apasionamiento. He prestado atencion, como siempre suelo hacer a todos los argumentos
aqui en contra del precepto contenido en el draft y a favor ahora de la reconsideracion y siento decir lo siguiente; todos son argumentos muy buenos
a posteriori. Cuando la Asamble Nacional se haya reunido, sera la ocasion de ver si procede o no expropiar terrenos o latifundios existentes ahorao
existentes despues. En el presente, yo me limito a invitar la atencion de la Convencion al hecho de que el procepto no tome las medidas necesarias en
tiempo oportuno, cuando el problema del latifundismo se haya presentado con caracterres tales que el beinestar, interes y orden publico lo requieran.
Permitame la Convencion que lo discuta en globo las dos pates del articulo 9. Hay tal engranaje en los dos mandatos que tiene dicho precepto, hay
tral eslabon en una u otra parte que es imposible, que es dificil que quitaramos deslindes si nos limitasemos a considerar una sola parte. La primera
parte autoriza a la legislatura para fijar el limite maximo de propiedad agricola que los ciudadanos particulares puede tener. Parece que es un
punto que ha pasado desapercibido. No se trata aqui ahora de propiedades urbanas, sino de propiedades agricolas, y es por la razon de que con
mucha especialidad en las regiones agricolas, en las zones rusticas es donde el latifundismo se extiende con facilidad, y desde alli los pequeños
propietariou precisamente para ahogarles y para intilizarles. Esta pues, a salvo completamente la cuestion de las propiedades urbans. Cietos
grandes soleres de nuestras ciudaes que con pretexto de tener cietos eficios, que en realidad no necesitan de tales extensos solares para su existencia
ni para su mantenimineto, puedan dormir transquilos. No Vamos contra esas propiedades. Por una causa o por otra el pasado nos legardo ese lastre
doloroso. Pero la region agricola, la region menos explotada por nuetro pueblo, la region que necesitamos si queremos vivir cuenta propia la region
que es el mayor incentivo no para solo para los grandes capitalistas de fuera merece todos los ciudados del gobierno.
Voy a pasar ahora a la relacion que tiene la seggunda parte de la enmiendad con la primera. Una vez demostrado ante la Lehgislatura, una vez
convencida la Asamblea Nacional de que existe un latifundismo y que este laitifundismo puede producir males e esta produciendo daños a la
comunidad, es cuando entonces la Legislatura puede acordar la expropiacion de los latifundios. Donde esta el mal que los opositores a este es un
postulado que todos conocen. Bien, voy a admitir para los propositos del argumento que hoy no existen laifundios, y si los opostores al precepto
quieren mas vamos a convenir en que no existrian en el futuro. Pues, entonces, donde este el temor de que el hijo de tal no pueda recibir la herencia
de cual? Por lo demas el ejemplo repetidas veces presentado ayer yhoy en cuanto al herdero y al causahabiente no es completamente exacto. Vamos a
suponer que efectivamente un padre de familia posee un numero tal de hectareas de terreno, superior o exedente a lo que fija la ley. Creen los
Caballeros, creen los opositorees al precepto que la Legislatura, la Asamblea Nacional va a ser tan imprudente, tan loca que inmediatemente disponga
por ley que aquella porcion excedente del terreno que ha de recibir un hijo de su padre no podra poseerlo, no podra tenerlo o recibirlo el heredero.
Esa es una materia para la Asamblea Nacional. La asamblea Nacional sabe que no puede dictar leyes o medidas imposibles de cumplir. Fijara el
plazo, fijara la proporcion de acuedo con las circunstancias del tiempo entonces en que vivamos. Es posible que ahora un numero determinado de
hectereas sea excesivo; es posible que por desenvolvimientos economics del paius ese numero de hectareas puede ser elevado o reducido. Es por esto
porque el Comite precisamente no ha querido fijar desde ahora el numero de hectareas presamente no ha querido fijar desde ahora el numero de
hectareas, prefireindo dejar a la sabiduria, a la prudencia, al patriotismo y a la justicia de la Asambela Nacional el fijar ese numero.
Lomismo digo de la expropiacion. Se habla de que el gobierno no tendra dinero; se hablqa de que no podra revender las propieedades. Pero,
Caballeros de la Convencion, caballeros opositores del precepto; si la Legislatura, si la AsambleaNacional estuviera convencida de que el gobierno
no puede hecer una exporpiacion, va a hecerlo? La Asamblea Nacional dictara una ley autorizando la expropiacion de tal a cual latifundio cuando
este convencida, primero, de que la existencia de ese latifundio es amenazante para el publico; y segundo, cuando la asamblea Nacional este
convencida de que el gobierno esta disposicion para disponer la expropiacion.
Visto, pues, desde este punto el asunto, no es malo autorizar,fijar los limites, ni macho menos es malo autorizar a la Legislatura para dictar leyes de
expropiacion.
Pero voy a molestaros por un minuto mas. Se ha mentado aquicon algun exito esta mañana — y digo con exito porque he oidoalgunos aplausos — se
ha mentado la posibilidad de que los comunistas hagan un issuede esta disposicion que existe en el draft; podran los comunistas pedir los votos del
electorado para ser elloslos que dicten las leyes fijando el limite del terreno y ordenen la expropriacion? ¡Que argumento mas bonito si tuviera base!
Lo mas natural, creo yo, es que el pueblo, el electorado, al ver queno es una Asamblea Constituyente comunista la que ha puestoesta disposicion,
otorgue sus votors a esta misma Asamblea Nacional, o a esos condidatos no comunistas. ¿Quien esta en disposicion de terminar mejor una obra aquel
que trazado y puesto los primeros pilares, o aquel que viene de gorra al final de la obra para decir: "Aqui estoy poner el tejado?"
Es sensible, sin embargo, que una cuetion de importancia tannacional como este, pretendamos ligarla a los votos de los comulites de terreno; no ha de
venir porque nosotros fijemos loslimites de terreno; no ha de venir porque prohibamos los latifundiosmediante expropiacion forzosa, no; ha de venir
precisamentepor causa de los grandes propietarios de terreno, y ha de venir,queramoslo o no, porque el mundo esta evolucionando y se va
aconvencer de que la vida no es solamente para unos cuantos sinopara todos , porque Dios no la dio, con la libertad, el aire, la luz,la tierra para vivir
(Grandes Aplausosz), y por algo se ha dichoque en los comienzos de la vida himana debio haber sido fusilado,matado, a aquel primero que puso un
cerco a un pedazo de tierrareclamando ser suya a propiedad.
Por estas razones, señor Presidente, y sintiendo que mi tiempoesta para terminar, voy a dar fin a mi discurso agradeciendo a la Convencion. (Speech
of Delegate Sotto.)
I would further add, Mr. President, that this precept by limiting private individuals to holding and acquiring lands, private agricultural lands . . . is
discriminatory and unjust with regard to the agriculturists. Why not, Mr. President, extend this provision also to those who are engaged in commerce
and industries? Both elements amass wealth. If the purpose of the Committee, Mr. President, is to distribute the wealth in such a manner that it will
no breed discontent, I see no reason for the discrimination against the agricultural. In view of these reasons, Mr. President, I do not want to speak
further and I submit this amendment because many reasons have been given already yesterday and this morning. (Speech of Delegate Sevilla.)
Delegate Sotto was not interpellated, much less contradicted, on the observation that section 3 of Article XIII does not embrace private urban lands.
There is of course every reason to believe that the sense in which the terms "private agricultural lands" were employed in section 3 must be the same
as that in section 5, if consistency is to be attributed to the framers of the Constitution.
We should not be concluded by te remarks, cited in the majority opinion, made by Delegate Ledesma to the effect that "the exclusion of aleins from
the private of acquiring public agricultural lands and of owning real estate is a necessary part of the Public Land Laws," and of the statement of
Delegate Montilla regarding "the complete nationalization of our lands and natural resources," because (1) the remarks of Delegate Ledesma
expressly mentions "public agricultural lands" and the terms "real estate" must undoubtedly carry the same meaning as the preceding words "public
agricultural lands", under the principle of "ejusdem generis"; (2) Delegate Ledesma must have in mind purely "agricultural" lands, sicne he was the
Chairman of the Committee on Agricultural Development and his speech was made in connection with the national policy on agricultural lands; (3)
the general nature of the explanations of both Delegate Ledesma and Delegate Montilla, cannot control the more specific clarification of Delegate
Sotto that agricultural lands in section 3 do not include urban propeties. Neither are we bound to give reater force to the view (apparently based on
mere mental recollections) of the Justices who were members of the Constitutional Convention than tot he specific recorded manifestation of
Delegate Sotto.
The decision in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175), invoked by the majority, is surely not controlling, because, first, it dealt
with "agricultural public lands" and, secondly, in that case it was expressly held that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 "means
those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands," — the definition held to be found in section 13 of the Act of Congress
of July 1, 1902.
We hold that there is to found in the act of Congress a definition of the phrase "agricultural public lands," and after a carefully consideration of the
question we are satisfied that the only definition which exists in said act is the definition adopted by the court below. Section 13 says that the
Government shall "make rules and regulations for the lease, sale or other disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral lands." To our
minds that is the only definition that can be said to be given to agricultural lands. In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act
No. 926 means those public lands accquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. (Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 182.)
The majority, in support of their construction, invoke Commonwealth Act No. 141, enected after the approval of the Constitution, which prohibits the
alienation to foreigners of "land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act," (section 122) or "land originally acquired in any
manner under the provisions of any previous Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the
Philippines with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the
public domain." (Section 123.) They hold that the constitutional intent "is made more patent and is strongly implemented by said Act." The majority
have evidently overlooked the fact that the prohibition contained in said sections refer to lands originally acquired under said sections referto land
originally acqured under said Act or otherlegal provisions lands, which of course do not include lands not originally of the public domain. The lands
that may be acquired under Act No. 141 necessarily have to be public agricultural lands, since they are the only kinds that are subject to alienation or
disposition under the Constitution. Hence, even if they become private, said lands retained their original agricultural character and may not therefore
be alienated to foreigners. It is only in this sense, I think, that act No. 141 seeks to carry out and implement the constitutional objective. In the case
before us, however, there is no pretense that the land bought by the appellant was originally acquired under said Act or other legal provisions
contemplated therein.
The majority is also mistaken in arguing that "prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of the Public Land Act No. 2874 aliens could acquire public
agricultural lands used for industrial or residential purposes, but after the Constitution and under section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right
of aliens to acquire such kind of lands is completely stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuanceof the Constitutional limitation," and that "prior to the
Constitution, under section 57 of the Public Land Act No.2874, land of the public domain suitable for residence or industrial purposes could
be sold or leased to aliens, but after the Constitution and under section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, such land may only be leased, but not
sold, to aliens, and the lease granted shall only be valid while the land is used for the purpose referred to." Section 1 of article XIII of the Constitution
speaks of "public agricultural lands" and quite logically, Commonwealth Act No. 141, enacted after the approval of the Constitution, has to limit the
alienation of its subject matter (public agricultural land, which includes public residential or industrial land) to Filipino citizens. But it is not correct
to consider said Act as a legislation on, or a limitation against, the right of aliens to acquire residential land that was already of private ownership
prior to the approval of the Constitution.
The sweeping assertion of the majority that "the three great departments of the Government — Judicial, Legislative and Executive — have always
maintained that lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, mineral and timber, and that agricultural lands include residential lots," is
rather misleading and not inconsistent, with our position. While the construction mistakenly invoked by the majority refers exclusively to lands of the
public domain, our view is that private residential lands are not embraced within the terms "private agricultural land" in section 5 of Article XIII. Let
us particularize in somewhat chronological order. We have already pointed out that the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, supra, only
held that agricultural public lands are those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither timber nor mineral lands. The opinion of the
Secretary of Justice dated July 15, 1939, quoted in the majority opinion, limited itself in affirming that "residential, commercial or industrial
lots forming part of the public domain . . . must be classified as agricultural." Indeed, the limited scope of said opinion is clearly pointed out in the
following subsequent opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated September 25, 1941, expressly hoding that "in cases involving the prohibition in
section 5 of Article XIII (formerly Article XII) regarding transfer or assignment of private agricultural lands to foreigners, the opinion that
residential lots are not agricultural lands is applicable."
This is with reference to your first indorsement dated July 30, 1941, forwarding the request of the Register of Deeds of Oriental Misamis for an
opinion as to whether Opinion No. 130, dated July 15, 1939, of this Department quoted in its Circular No. 28, dated May 13, 1941, holding among
others, that the phrase "public agricultural land" in section 1, Article XIII (formerly article XII) of the Constitution of the Philippines, includes
residential, commercial or industrial lots for purposes of their disposition, amends or supersedeas a decision or order of the fourth branch of the Court
of First Instance of the City of Manila rendered pursuant to section 200 of the Administrative Code which holds that a residential lot is not an
agricultural land, and therefore, the prohibition in section 5, Article XIII (formerly Article XII) of the Constitution of the Philippines does not apply.
There is no conflict between the two opinions.
Section 1, Artcile XIII (formerly article XII of the Constitution of the Philippines, speaks of public agricultural lands while section 5 of the same
article treats of private agricultural lands. A holding, therefore, that a residential lot is not private agricultural land within the meaning of that phrase
as found in section 5 of Article XIII (formerly Article XII) does not conflict with an opinion that residential, commercial or industrial lots forming
part of the public domain are included within the phrase "public agricultural land" found in section 1, Article XIII (formerly Article XII) of the
Constitution of the Philippines. In cases involving the prohibition in section 5 of Article XIII (formerly Article XII) regarding transfer or assignment
of private agricultural lands to foreigners, the opinion that residential lots are not agricultural lands is applicable. In cases involving the prohibition
in section 1 of Article XIII (formerly Article XII) regarding disposition in favor of, and exploitation, development or utilization by foreigners
of public agricultural lands, the opinion that residential, commercial or industrial lots forming part of the public domain are included within the
phrase "public agricultural land" found in said section 1 of the Article XIII (formerly Article XII) governs.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, passed after the approval of the Constitution limited its restriction against transfers in favor of alien to public
agricultural lands or to lands originally acquired under said Act or other legal provisions formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public
lands. On November 29, 1943, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming that of the Court of First rendered a decision affirming that of the
Court of First Instance of Tarlac in a case in which it was held that private residential lots are not included in the prohibition in section 5 of Article
XIII. (CA-G. R. No. 29.) During theJapanese occupation, the Constitution of the then Republic of the Philippines contained an almost verbatim
reproduction of said section 5 of Article XIII; and the then National Assembly passed an Act providing that "no natural or juridical person who is not
a Filipino citizen shall acquire directly or indirectly any title to private lands (which are not agricultural lands) including buildings and other
improvements thereon or leasehold rights on said lands, except by legal succession of proper cases, unless authorized by the President of the
Republic of the Philippines." (Off. Gaz., Vol. I, p. 497, February,1944.) It is true that the Secretary of Justice in 1945 appears to have rendered an
opinion on the matter, but it cannot have any persuasive force because it merely suspended the effect of the previous opinion of his Department
pending judicial determination of the question. Very recently, the Secretary of Justice issued a circular adopting in effect the opinion of his
Department rendered in1941. Last but not least, since the approval of the Constitution, numerous transactions involving transfers of private
residential lots to aliens had been allowed to be registered without any opposition on the part of the Government. It will thus be seen that, contrary to
what the majority believe, our Government has constantly adopted the view that private residential lands do not fall under the limitation contained in
section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution.
I do not question or doubt the nationalistic spirit permeating the Constitution, but I will not permit myself to be blinded by any sentimental feeling or
conjectural considerations to such a degree as to attribute to any of its provisions a construction not justified by or beyond what the plain written
words purport to convey. We need not express any unnecessary concern over the possibility that entire towns and cities may come to the hands of
aliens, as long as we have faith in our independence and in our power to supply any deficiency in the Constitution either by its amendment or by
Congressional action.
There should really have been no occasion for writing this dissent, because the appellant, with the conformity of the appellee, had filed a motion for
the withdrawal of the appeal and the same should have been granted outright. In Co Chiong vs. Dinglasan (p. 122, ante),decided only a few days ago,
we reiterated the well-settled rule that "a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid unless
such question is raised by the the parties, and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its
judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such
question will be unavoidable." In other words, a court will always avoid a constitutional question, if possible. In the present case, that course of
action was not only possible but absolutely imperative. If appellant's motion for withdrawal had been opposed by the appellee, there might be some
reasons for its denial, in view of section 4 of Rule 52 which provides that after the filing of appellee's brief, "the withdrawal may be allowed by the
court in its discretion." At any rate, this discretion should always be exercised in favor of a withdrawal where a constitutional question will thereby
be avoided.
In this connection, let us describe the proceedings (called "arbitrary and illegal" by Mr. Justice Tuason) that led to teh denial of the motion for
withdrawal. During the deliberation in which all the eleven members were present, seven voted to allow and four to deny. Subsequently, without any
previous notice and when Mr. Justice Hontiveros was absent, the matter was again submitted to a vote, and one Justice (who previously was in favor
of the withdrawal) reversed his stand, with the result that the votes were five to five. This result was officially released and the motion denied under
the technicality provided in Rule of Court No. 56, section 2. It is very interesting to observe that Mr. Justice Hontiveros, who was still a member of
the Court and could have attended the later deliberation, if notified and requested, previously voted for the granting of the motion. The real
explanation for excluding Mr. Justice Hontiveros, against my objection, and for the reversal of the vote of one Justice who originally was in favor of
the withdrawal is found in the confession made in the majority opinion to the effect that the circular of the Department of Justice instructing all
registers of deeds to accept for registration transfers of residential lots to aliens, was an "interference with the regular and complete exercise by this
Court of its constitutional functions," and that "if we grant the withdrawal, the result is that petitioner-appellant Alexander A. Krivenko wins his case,
not by a decision of this Court, but by the decision or circular of the Department of Justice issued while this case was pending before this Court." The
zealousness thus shown in denying the motion for wuthdrawal is open to question. The denial of course is another way of assuming that the
petitioner-appellant and the Solicitor General had connived with the Department of Justice in a scheme not only to interfere with the functions of this
Court but to dispose of the national patrimony in favor of aliens.
In the absence of any injunction from this Court, we should recognize tha right of the Department of Justice to issue any circular it may deem legal
and proper on any subject, and the corollary right of the appellant to take advantage thereof. What is most regrettable is the implication that the
Department of Justice, as a part of the Executive Department, cannot be as patriotic and able as this Court in defending the Constitution. If the
circular in question is objectionable, the same can be said of the opinion of the Secretary of Justice in 1945 in effect prohibiting the registration of
transfers of private residential lots in favor of aliens, notwithstanding the pendency in this Court of the case of Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands (43 Off.
Gaz., 866), wherin according to the appellant, the only question raised was whether, or not "an alien can acquire a residential lot and register it in his
name," and notwithstanding the fact that in said case the appealed decision was in favor of the alien applicant and that, as hereinbefore stated, the
Court of Appeals in another case (CA-G.R. No. 29) had renderd in 1943 a decision holding that private residential lots are not included in the
prohibition in section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution. And yet this Court, failing to consider said opinion as an "interference," chose to evade the
only issue raised by the appellant and squarely met by the appellee in the Oh Cho case which already required a decision on the constitutional
question resolved in the case at bar against, so to say, the will of the parties litigant. In other words, the majority did not allow the withdrawal of the
present appeal not so much as to dispose of it on the merits, but to annul the circular of the Department of Justice which is, needless to say, not
involved in this case. I cannot accept the shallow excuse of the majority that the denial of the motion for withdrawal was promted by the fear that
"our indifference of today might signify a permanent offense to the Constitution," because it carries the rather immodest implication that this Court
has a monopoly of the virtue of upholding and enforcing, or supplying any deficiency in, the Constitution. Indeed, the fallacy of the impliation is
made glaring when Senator Franscisco lost no time in introducing a bill that would clarify the constitutional provision in question in the sense desired
by the majority. Upon the other hand, the majority should not worry about the remoteness of the opportunity that will enable this Court to pass upon
this constitutional question, because we can take advance notice of the fact that in Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee Hun (49 Off. Gaz., 4345), in which the
parties have already presented. But even disregarding said case, I am sure that, in view of the recent newspaper discussion which naturally reached
the length and breadth of the country, there will be those who will dispute their sales of residential lots in favor of aliens and invoke the constitutional
prohibition.
BENGZON, J., dissenting:
It is unnecessary to deliver at this time any opinion about the extent of the constitutional prohibition. Both parties having agreed to writer finis to the
litigation, there is no obligation to hold forth on the issue. It is not our mission to give advice to other person who might be interested to give advice
to other persons who might be interested to know the validity or invalidity of their sales or purchases. That is the work of lawyers and juriscounsults.
There is much to what Mr. Justice Padilla explains regarding any eagerness to solve the constitutional problem. It must be remembered that the other
departments of the Government are not prevented from passing on constitutional question arising in the exercise of their official powers. (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., p. 101.) This Tribunal was not established, nor is it expected to play the role of an overseer to supervise the other
Government departments, with the obligation to seize any opportunity to correct what we may believe to be erroneous application of the
constitutional mandate. I cannot agree to the suggestion that the way the incumbent Secretary of Justice has interpreted the fundamental law, no case
will ever arise before the court, because the registers of deeds under his command, will transfer on thier books all sales to aliens. It is easy to perceive
several probabilities: (1) a new secretary may entertain opposite views; (2) parties legally affected — like heirs or or creditors of the seller — may
wish to avoid the conveyance to aliens, invoking the constitutional inhibition. Then, in a truly contested case, with opposing litigants actively arguing
their sides we shall be in a position to do full justice. It is not enough that briefs — as in this case — have been filed; it is desirable, perhaps essential,
to make sure that in a motion for reconsideration, or in a re-hearing in case of tie, our attention shall be invited to points inadequately touched or
improperly considered.
It is stated that sales to aliens of residential lots are currently being effected. No matter. Those sales will be subject to the final decision we shall
reach in a properly submitted litigation. To spell necessity out of the existence of such conveyances, might amount to begging the issue with the
assumption that such transfers are obviously barred by the Organic Law. And yet sales to foreigners of residential lots have taken place since our
Constitution was approved in 1935, and no one questioned their validity in Court until nine years later in 1945, after the Japanese authorities had
shown distaste for such transfers.
The Court should have, I submit, ample time to discuss this all-important point, and reflect upon the conflicting politico-economic philosophies of
those who advocate national isolation against international cooperation, and vice-versa. We could also delve into several aspects necessarily
involved, to wit:
(a) Whether the prohibition in the Constitution operated to curtail the freedom to dispose of landowners at the time of its adoption; or whether it
merely affected the rights of those who should become landowners after the approval of the Constitution; 7
(b) What consequences would a ruling adverse to aliens have upon our position and commitments in the United Nations Organization, and upon our
treaty-making negotiations with other nations of the worlds; and
(c) When in 1941 Krivenko acquired this land he was a Russian citizen. Under the treaties between the United States and Russia, were Russian
nationals allowed to acquire residential lots in places under the jurisdiction of the United States? If so, did our Constitution have the effect of
modifying such treaty during the existence of the Commonwealth Government?
The foregoing view and doubts induced me to vote for dismissal of the appeal as requested by the parties, and for withholding of any ruling on the
constitutional prohibition. However, I am now ready to cast my vote. I am convinced that the organic law bans the sales of agricultural lands as they
are popularly understood — not including residential, commercial, industrial or urban lots. This belief is founded on the reasons ably expounded by
Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Padilla and Mr. Justice Tuason. I am particularly moved by the consideration that a restricted interpretation of the
prohibition, if erroneous or contrary to the poeple's desire, may be remedied by legislation amplifying it; whereas a liberal and wide application, if
erroneous, would need the cumbersome and highly expensive process of a constitutional amendment.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The question submitted for decision is whether a parcel of land of private ownership suitable or intended for residence may be alienated or sold to an
alien.
Section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution provides:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
The majority holds that a parcel of land of privateownership suitable or intended or used for residence is included in the term "private agricultural
land" and comes within the prohibition of the Constitution. In support of the opinion that lands of private ownership suitable for residence are
included in the term "private agricultural land" and cannot be alienated or sold to aliens, the majority invokes the decision of this Court in Mapa vs.
Insular Government (10 Phil., 175), which holds that urban lands of the public domain are included in the term "public agricultural land." But the
opinion of the majority overlooks the fact that the inclusion by this Court of public lands suitable for residence in the term "public agricultural land"
was due to the classification made by the Congress of the United States in the Act of 1 July 1902, commonly known as the Philippine Bill. In said
Act, lands of the public domain were classified into agricultural, timber and mineral. The only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain
were those belonging to the first class. Hence a parcel of land of the public domain suitable for residence, which was neither timber nor mineral,
could not be disposed of or alienated unless classified as public agricultural land. The susceptibility of a residential lot of the public domain of being
cultivated is not the real reason for the inclusion of such lot in the classification of public agricultural land, for there are lands, such as foreshore
lands, which would hardly be susceptible of cultivation (Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, 13 Phil., 159, 167-168), and yet the same come
under the classification of public agricultural land. The fact, therefore, that parcels of land of the public domain suitable for residence are included in
the classification of public agricultural land, is not a safe guide or index of what the framers of the Constitution intended to mean by the term "private
agricultural land." It is contrary to the rules of statutory construction to attach technical meaning to terms or phrases that have a common or ordinary
meaning as understood by he average citizen.
At the time of the adoption of the Constitution (8 February 1935), the Public Land Act in force was Act No. 2874. Under this Act, only citizens of the
Philippine Islands or of the United States and corporations or associations described in section 23 thereof, and citizens of countries the laws of which
grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire the public land as to their own citizens, could acquire by purchase agricultural land
of the public domain (section 23, Act No. 2874). This was the general rule. There was an exception. Section 24of the Act provides:
No person, corporation, association or partnership other than those mentioned in the last preceding section may acquire or own agricultural public
land or land of any other denomination or classification, not used for industrial or residence purposes, that is at the time or was originally, really or
presumptively, of the public domain, or any permanent improvement thereon, or any real right on such land and improvement: Provided, however,
That persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships which at the date upon which this Act shall take effect, hold agricultural public lands or land
of any other denomination not used for industrial or residence purposes, that belonged originally, really or presumptively, to the public domain, or
permanent improvements on such lands, or a real right upon such lands and improvements, having acquired the same under the laws and regulations
in force at the date of such acquisition, shall be authorized to continue holding the same as if such persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships
were qualified under the last preceding section; but they shall not encumber, convey, or alienate the same to persons, corporations, associations or
partnerships not included in section twenty-three of this Act, except by reason of hereditary succession, duly legalized and acknowledged by
competent Courts. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 57 of the Act, dealing with lands of the public domain suitable for residential, commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than
agricultural, provides:
Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased or sold, as the case may be, to any person, corporation, or association authorized to
purchase or lease public lands for agricultural purposes. . . . Provided further, That any person, corporation, association, or
partnership disqualified from purchasing public land for agricultural purposes under the provisions of this Act, may purchase or lease land included
under this title suitable for industrial or residence purposes, but the title or lease granted shall only be valid while such land issued for the purposes
referred to. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 121 of the Act provides:
No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of the former Public Land Act or of any other Act, ordinance, royal order, royal
decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippine Islands with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of
any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain, or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent
improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations, or associations who may acquire land of the
public domain under this Act; . . . Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason of
hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent Courts, nor to lands and improvements acquired or held for industrial or
residence purposes, while used for such purposes: . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
Under and pursuant to the above quoted provisions of Act No. 2874, lands of the public domain, that were neither timber nor mineral, held for
industrial or residence purposes, could be acquired by aliens disqualified from acquiring by purchase or lease public agricultural lands (sections 24,
57, 121, Act No. 2874). The delegates to the Constituent Assembly were familiar with the provisions of the Public Land Act referred to. The
prohibition to alienate public agricultural lands to disqualified persons, corporations or associations did not apply to "lands and improvements
acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes, while used for such purposes." Even under the provisions of Act No. 926, the first Public Land
Act, lots for townsites could be acquired by any person irrespective of citizenship, pursuant to section 47 of the said Act. In spite of the nationalistic
spirit that pervades all the provisions of Act No. 2874, the Philippine Legislature did not deem it necessary to exclude aliens from acquiring and
owning lands of the public domain suitable for industrial or residence purposes. It adopted the policy of excluding aliens from acquiring agricultural
lands of the public domain not "suitable for residential, commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes," which, together with timber, mineral
and private agricultural lands, constitute the mainstay of the nation. Act No. 2874 was in force for nearly sixteen years — from 1919 to 1935. There
is nothing recorded in the journals of proceedings of the Constituent Assembly regarding the matter which would have justified a departure from the
policy theretofore adopted.
If under the law in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, aliens could acquire by purchase or lease lands of the public domain, that
were neither timber nor mineral, held for industrial or residence purposes, how can it be presumed that the framers of the Constitution intended to
exclude such aliens from acquiring by purchase private lands suitable for industrial or residence purposes? If pursuant to the law in force at the time
of the adoption of the Constitution, lands of the public domain and improvements thereon acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes were
not included in the prohibition found in section 121 of ActNo. 2874, there is every reason for believing that the framers of the Constitution, who were
familiar with the law then in force, did not have the intention of applying the prohibition contained in section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution to
lands of private ownership suitable or intended or used for residence, there being nothing recorded in the journals of proceedings of the Constituent
Assembly regarding the matter which, as above stated, would have justified a departure from the policy then existing. If the term "private agricultural
land" comprehends lands of private ownership suitable or intended or used for residence, as held by the majority, there was no need of implementing
a self-executory prohibition found in the Constitution. The prohibition to alienate such lands found in section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 is a
clear indication and proof that section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution does not apply to lands of private ownership suitable or intended or used for
residence. The term "private agricultural land" means privately owned lands devoted to cultivation, to the raising of agricultural products, and does
not include urban lands of private ownership suitable for industrial or residence purposes. The use of the adjective "agricultural" has the effect of
excluding all other private lands that are not agricultural. Timber and mineral ands are not, however, included among the excluded, because these
lands could not and can never become private lands. From the land grants known as caballerias and peonias under the Laws of Indies down to those
under the Royal Decrees of 25 June 1880 and 13 February 1894, the Philippine Bill, Act No. 926, the Jones Law, Act No. 2874, the Constitution, and
Commonwealth Act No. 141, timber and mineral lands have always been excluded from alienation. The repeal by sections 23, 60, 123 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the exception provided for in sections 24, 57, 121 of Act No. 2874, did not change the meaning of the term "private
agricultural land," as intended by the framers of the Constitution and understood by the people that adopted it.
The next question is whether the court below was justified under the in confirming the refusal of the Register of Deeds of Manila to record the sale of
the private land for residence purposes to the appellant who is an alien.
There is no evidence to show the kind of land, the deed of sale of which is sought to be recorded by the appellant — whether it is one of those
described in section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141; or a private land that had never been a part of the public domain (Carino vs. Insular
Government, 212 U.S., 449; Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 43 Off. Gaz., 866). If it is the latter, the prohibition of section 123 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141 does not apply. If it is the former, section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, which providesthat —
No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of
law formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were
actually or presumptively of the public domain, or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be
encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations or associations who may acquire land of the public domain under this Act or to
corporate bodies organized in the Philippines whose charters authorize them to do so: . . .
is similar in nature to section 121 of Act No. 2874. This Court held the last mentioned section unconstitutional, for it violates section 3 of the Act of
Congress of 29 August 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law (Central Capiz vs.Ramirez, 40 Phil., 883). Section 123 of Commonwealth Act No.
141, following the rule laid down in the aforecited case, must also be declared unconstitutional, for it violates section 21 (1), Article VI, of the
Constitution, which is exactly the same as the one infringed upon by section 121 of Act No. 2874. This does not mean that a law may not be passed
by Congress to prohibit alienation to foreigners of urban lands of private ownership; but in so doing, it must avoid offending against the
constitutional provision referred to above.
Before closing, I cannot help but comment on the action taken by the Court in considering the merits of the case, despite the withdrawal of the appeal
by the appellants, consented to by the appellee. If discretion was to be exercised, this Court did not exercise it wisely. Courts of last resort generally
avoid passing upon constitutional questions if the case where such questions are raised may be decided on other grounds. Courts of last resort do not
express their opinion on a consitutional question except when it is the very lis mota (Yangco vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 36 Phil.,
116, 120; Co Chiong vs. Dinglasan, p. 122, ante). Moreover, the interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution is no exclusive of the courts. The
other coordinate branches of the government may interpret such provisions acting on matters coming within their jurisdiction. And although such
interpretation is only persuasive and not binding upon the courts, nevertheless they cannot be deprived of such power. Of course, the final say on
what is the correct interpretation of a constitutional provision must come from and be made by this Court in an appropriate action submitted to it for
decision. The correct interpretation of a constitutional provision is that which gives effect to the intent of its framers and primarily to the
understanding of such provision by the poeple that adopted it. This Court is only an interpreter of the instrument which embodies what its framers
had in mind and especially what the people understood it to be when they adopted it. The eagerness of this Court to express its opinion on the
constitutional provision involved in this case, notwithstanding of the withdrawal of the appeal, is unusualf or a Court of last resort. It seems as if it
were afraid to be deprived by the other coordinate branches of the government of its prerogative to pass upon the constitutional question herein
involved. If all the members of the Court were unanimous in the interpretation of the constitutional provision under scrutiny, that eagerness might be
justified, but when some members of the Court do not agree to the interpretation placed upon such provision, that eagerness becomes recklessness.
The interpretation thus placed by the majority of the Court upon the constitutional provision referred to will be binding upon the other coordinate
branches of the government. If, in the course of time, such opinion should turn out to be erroneous and against the welfare of the country,an
amendment to the Constitution — a costly process — would have to be proposed and adopted. But, if the Court had granted the motion for the
withdrawal of the appeal, it would not have to express its opinion upon the constitutional provision in question. It would let the other coordinate
branches of the Government act according to their wisdom, foresight and patriotism. They, too, possess those qualities and virtues. These are not of
the exclusive possession of the members of this Court. The end sought to be accomplished by the decision of this Court may be carried out by the
enactment of a law. And if the law should turn out to be against the well-being of the people, its amendment or repeal would not be as costly a
process as a constitutional amendment.
In view of the denial by this Court of the motion to dismiss the appeal, as prayed for by the appellant and consented to by the appellee, I am
constrained to record my opinion, that, for the reasons hereinbefore set forth, the judgment under review should be reversed.

TUASON, J., dissenting:

The decision concludes with the assertion that there is no choice. "We are construing" it says, "the Constitution as we see it and not as we may wish it
to be. If this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we cannot compromise it even in the name of equity." We wish deep in our heart that we
were given the light to see as the majority do and could share their opinion. As it is, we perceive things the other way around. As we see it, the
decision by-passed what according to our humble understanding is the plain intent of the Constitution and groped out of its way in search of the ideal
result. The denial by this Court of the motion to withdraw the appeal to which the Solicitor General gave his conformity collides with the professed
sorrow that the decision cannot be helped.
Section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution reads:
5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
The sole and simple question at issue is, what is the meaning of the term "agricultural land" as used in this section? Before answering the question, it
is convenient to refresh our memory of the pertinent rule in the interpretation of constitutions as expounded in decisions of courts of last resort and by
law authors.
It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of constitutions that the instrument must be a construed so to give effect to the intention of the people who
adopted it. This intention is to be sought in the constitution itself, and the apparent meaning of the words employed is to be taken as expressing it,
except in cases where the assumption would lead to absurdity, ambiguity, or contradiction. Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd ed., p. 20.)
Every word employed in the constitution is to be expounded in its plain, obvious, and common sense, unless the context furnishes some ground to
control, qualify, or enlarge it. Constitutions are not designed for metaphysical or logical subtleties, for niceties of expression, for critical propriety,
for elaborate shades of meaning, or for the exercise of philosophical acuteness or judicial research. They are instruments of a practical nature founded
on the common business of human life adapted to common wants, designed for common use, and fitted for common understandings. The people
make them, the people adopt them, the people must be supposed to read them with the help of common sense, and cannot be presumed to admit in
them any recondite meaningor any extraordinary gloss. (1 Story, Const. sec. 451.)
Marshall , Ch. J., says:
The framers of the Constitution, and the people who adopted it, "must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have
intended what they have said." (Gibbons vs. Ogdon, 9 Wheat, 1, 188; 6 Law. ed., 23).
Questions as to the wisdom, expediency, or justice of constitutional provisions afford no basis for construction where the intent to adopt such
provisions is expressed in clear and unmistakable terms. Nor can construction read into the provisions of a constitution some unexpressed general
policy or spirit, supposed to underline and pervade the instrument and to render it consonant to the genius of the institutions of the state. The courts
are not at liberty to declare an act void because they deem it opposed to the spirit of the Constitution. (12 C.J., 702-703.)
There is no obscurity or ambiguity in the section of the Constitution above quoted, nor does a literal interpretation of the words "agricultural land"
lead to any un-the majority opinion, the phrase has no technical meaning, and the same could not have been used in any sense other than that in
which it is understood by the men in the street.
That there are lands of private ownership will not be denied, inspite of the fiction tha all lands proceed from the sovereign. And, that lands of private
ownership are known as agricultural, residential, commercial and industrial, is another truth which no one can successfully dispute. In prohibiting the
alienation of private agricultural land to aliens, the Constitution, by necessary implication, authorizes the alienation of other kinds of private property.
The express mention of one thing excludes all others of the same kind.
Let us then ascertain the meaning of the word "agricultural" so that by process of elimination we can see what lands do not fall within the purview of
the constitutional inhibition. Webster's New international Dictionary defines this word as "of or pertaining to agriculture connected with, or engaged
in, tillage; as, the agricultural class; agricultural implements, wages, etc." According to this definition and according to the popular conception of the
word, lands in cities and towns intended or used for buildings or other kinds of structure are never understood to mean agricultural lands. They are
either residential, commercial, or industrial lands. In all city plannings, communities are divided into residential, commercial and industrial sections.
It would be extremely out of the ordinary, not to say ridiculous, to imagine that the Constitutional Convention considered a lot on the Escolta with its
improvement as agricultural land.
If extrinsic evidence is needed, a reference to the history of the constitutional provision under consideration will dispel all doubts that urban lands
were in the minds of the framers of the Constitution as properties that may be assigned to foreigners.
Dean Aruego, himself a member of the Constitutional Convention, is authority for the statement that the committee on nationalization and
preservation of lands and other natural resources in its report recommended the incorporation into the Constitution of the following provision:
SEC. 4. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no land of private ownership shall be transferred or assigned by the owner thereof except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands; and the Government shall
regulate the transfer or assignment of land now owned by persons, or corporations,or associations not qualified under the provisions of this
Constitution to acquire or hold lands in the Philippine Islands.
In Article XIII, entitled "General Provisions," of the first draft of the Constitution, the sub-committee of seven embodied the following provision
which had been recommended in the reports of the committee on agricultural development, national defense, industry, and nationalization and
preservation of lands and other natural resources:
SEC. 16. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no land of private ownership shall be transferred or assigned by the owner thereof except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
But on January 22, 1935, the sub-committee of seven submitted to the Convention a revised draft of the articleo n General Provisions of the first
draft, which revised draft had been prepared by the committee in consultation with President Quezon. The revised draft as it touches private lands
provides as follows:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no agricultural land of private ownership shall be transferred or assigned by the owner thereof except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands, of the public domain in the Philippine Islands. (2 The Framing of the
Philippine Constitution, Aruego, 595-599.)
The last-quoted proposal became section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution in its final form with sligh alteration in the phraseology.
It will thus be seen that two committees in their reports and the sub-committee of seven in its first draft of the Constitution all proposed to prescribe
the transfer to non-Filipino citizens of any land of private ownership without regard to its nature or use, but that the last mentioned sub-committee
later amended that proposal by putting the word "agricultural" before the word "land." What are we to conclude from this modification? Its self-
evident purpose was to confine the prohibition to agricultural lands, allowing the ownership by foreigners of private lands that do not partake of
agricultural character. The insertion of the word "agricultural" was studied and deliberated, thereby eliminating any possibility that its implication
was not comprehended.
In the following paragraphs we shall, in our inadequate way, attempt to show that the conclusions in this Court's decision are erroneous either
because the premises are wrong or because the conclusions do not follow the premises.
According to the decision, the insertion of the word "agricultural" was not intended to change the scope of the provision. It says that "the wording of
the first draft was amended for no other purpose than to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties."
If this was the intention of the Constitutional Assembly, that could not have devised a better way of messing up and obscuring the meaning of the
provision than what it did. If the purpose was "to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties," the insertion of the word "agricultural" before the word
"land" produced the exact opposite of the result which the change was expected to accomplish — as witness the present sharp and bitter controversy
which would not have arisen had they let well enough alone.
But the assumption is untenable. To brush aside the introduction of the word "agricultural" into the final draft as "merely one of words" is utterly
unsupported by evidence, by the text of the Constitution, or by sound principles of construction. There is absolutely no warrant or the statement that
the Constitutional Convention, which was guided by wise men, men of ability and experience in different fields of endeavor, used the termafter
mature deliberation and reflection and after consultation with the President, without intending to give it its natural signification and connotation. "We
are not at liberty to presume that the framers of the Constitution, or the people who adopted it, did not understand the force of language."
(People vs. Rathbone, 32 N.Y.S., 108.) The Constitution will be scanned in vain for any reasonable indication that its authors made the change with
intention that it should not operate according to the rules of grammar and the ordinary process of drawing logical inferences. The theory is against the
presumption, based on human experience, that the framers of a constitution "have expressed themselves in careful and measured terms,
corresponding with the immense importance of the powers delegated, leaving as little as possible to implication." (1 Cooley's Constitutional
Limitations, 8th ed., 128, 129.) "As men, whose intention require no concealment, generally employ the words which most directly and aptly express
the ideas they intend to convey, the enlightened patriots who framed our constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have
employed words in their natural sense and to have intended what they have said." (Gibbons vs. Ogden, ante.)
When instead of prohibiting the acquisition of private land of any kind by foreigners, as originally proposed, the prohibition was changed to private
agricultural lands, the average man's faculty of reasoning tells him that other lands may be acquired. The elementary rules of speech with which men
of average intelligence, and, above all, the members of the Constitutional Assembly were familiar, inform us that the object of a descriptive adjective
is to specify a thing as distinct from another. It is from this process of reasoning that the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius stems; a familiar
rule of interpretation often quoted, and admitted as agreeable to natural reason.
If then a foreigner may acquire private lands that are not agricultural, what lands are they? Timber land or mineral land, or both? As the decision
itself says these lands are not susceptible of private ownership, the answer can only be residential, commercial, industrial or other lands that are not
agricultural. Whether a property is more suitable and profitable to the owners as residential, commercial or industrial than if he devotes it to the
cultivation of crops is a matter that has to be decided according to the value of the property, its size, and other attending circumstances.
The main burden of this Court's argument is that, as lands of the public domain which are suitable for home building are considered agricultural land,
the Constitution intended that private residential, commercial or industrial lands should be considered also agricultural lands. The Court says that
"what the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the Constitution was this well-known classification (timber,
mineral and agricultural) and its technical meaning then prevailing."
As far as private lands are concerned, there is no factual or legal basis for this assumption. The classification of public lands was used for one
purpose not contemplated in the classification of private lands. At the outset, it should be distinctively made clear that it was this Court's previous
decisions and not an Act of Congress which declared that public lands which were not forest or mineral were agricultural lands. Little reflection on
the background of this Court's decisions and the nature of the question presented in relation to the peculia rprovisions of the enactments which came
up for construction, will bring into relief the error of applying to private lands the classification of public lands.
In the first place, we cannot classify private lands in the same manner as public lands for the very simple and manifest reason that only lands
pertaining to one of the three groups of public lands — agricultural — can find their way into the hands of private persons. Forest lands and mineral
lands are preserved by the State for itself and for posterity. Granting what is possible, that there are here and there forest lands and mineral lands to
which private persons have obtained patents or titles, it would be pointless to suppose that such properties are the ones which section 5 of Article XIII
of the Constitution wants to distinguish from private agricultural lands as lienable. The majority themselves will not admit that the Constitution
which forbids the alienation or private agricultural lands allows the conveyance of private forests and mines.
In the second place, public lands are classified under special conditions and with a different object in view. Classification of public lands was and is
made for purposes of administration; for the purpose principally of segregating lands that may be sold from lands that should be conserved. The Act
of July 1, 1902, of the United States Congress designated what lands of the public domain might be alienated and what should be kept by the State.
Public lands are divided into three classes to the end that natural resources may be used without waste. Subject to some exceptions and limitation,
agricultural lands may be disposed of by the Government. Preservation of forest and mineral lands was and is a dominant preoccupation. These are
important parts of the country's natural resources. Private non-agricultural land does not come within the category of natural resources. Natural
resources are defined in Webster's Standard Dictionary as materials supplied or produced by nature. The United States Congress evinced very little if
any concern with private lands.
It should also be distinctively kept in mind that the Act of Congress of the United States above mentioned was an organic law and dealt with vast
tracts of untouched public lands. It was enacted by a Congress whose members were not closely familiar with local conditions affecting lands. Under
the circumstances, it was natural that the Congress employed "words in a comprehensive sense as expressive of general ideas rather than of finer
shades of thought or of narrow distinctions. "The United States Congress was content with laying down a broad outline governing the administration,
exploitation, and disposition of the public wealth, leaving the details to be worked out by the local authorities and courts entrusted with the
enforcement and interpretation of the law.
It was a result of this broad classification that questions crept for a definition of the status of scattered small parcels of public lands that were neither
forest, mineral, nor agricultural, and with which the Congress had not bothered itself to mention separately or specifically. This Court, forced by
nature of its duty to decide legal controversies, ruled that public lands that were fit for residential purposes, public swamps and other public lands that
were neither forest nor mineral, were to be regarded as agricultural lands. In other words, there was an apparent void, often inevitable in a law or
constitution, and this Court merely filled that void. It should be noted that this Court did not say that agricultural lands and residential lands are the
same or alike in their character and use. It merely said that for the purpose of judging their alienability, residential, commercial or industrial lands
should be brought under the class of agricultural lands.
On the other hand, section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution treats of private lands with a different aim. This Court is not now confronted with any
problem for which there is no specific provision, such as faced it when the question of determining the character of public residential land came up
for decision. This Court is not called to rule whether a private residential land is forest, mineral or agricultural. This Court is not, in regard to private
lands, in the position where it found itself with reference to public lands, compelled by the limited field of its choice for a name to call public
residential lands, agricultural lands. When it comes to determining the character of private non-agricultural lands, the Court's task is not to compare it
with forests, mines and agricultural lands, to see which of these bears the closest resembrance to the land in question. Since there are no private
timber nor mineral lands, and if there were, they could not be transferred to foreigners, and since the object of section 5 of Article XIII of the
Constitution is radically at variance withthat of the laws covering public lands, we have to have different standards of comparison and have to look of
the intent of this constitutional provision from a different angle and perspective. When a private non-agricultural land demands to know where it
stands, we do not acquire, is it mineral, forest or agricultural? We only ask, is it agricultural? To ascertain whether it is within the inhibition of
section 5 of Article XIII.
The last question in turn resolves itself into what is understood by agricultural land. Stripped of the special considerations which dictated the
classification of public lands into three general groups, there is no alternative but to take the term "agricultural land" in its natural and popular
signification; and thus regarded, it imports a distinct connotation which involves no absurdity and no contradiction between different parts of the
organic law. Its meaning is that agricultural land is specified in section 5 of Article XIII to differentiate it from lands that are used or are more
suitable for purposes other than agriculture.
It would profit us to take notice of the admonition of two of the most revered writers on constitutional law, Justice Story and Professor Cooley:
"As a general thing, it is to be supposed that the same word is used in the same sense wherever it occurs in a constitution. Here again, however, great
caution must be observed in applying an arbitrary rule; for, as Mr. Justice Story has well observed; `It does not follow, either logically or
grammatically, that because a word is found in one connection in the Constitution with a definite sense, therefore the same is to be adopted in every
other connection in which it occurs. This would be to suppose that the framers weighed only the force of single words, as philologists or critics, and
not whole clauses and objects, as statesmen and practical reasoners. And yet nothing has been more common than to subject the Constitution to this
narrow and mischievous criticism. Men of ingenious and subtle minds, who seek for symmetry and harmony in language, having found in the
Constitution a word used in some sense which falls in with their favorite theory of interpreting it, have made that the standard by which to measure
its use in every other part of the instrument. They have thus stretched it, as it were, on the bed of Procrustes, lopping off its meaning when it seemed
too large for their purposes, and extending it, when it seemed too short. They have thus distorted it to the most unnatural shapes, and crippled where
they have sought only to adjust its proportions according to their own opinions? And he gives many instances where, in the National Constitution, it
is very manifest the same word is employed in different meanings. So that, while the rule may be sound as one of presumption merely, its force is but
slight, and it must readily give way to a different intent appearing in the instrument." (1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., 135.)
As to the proposition that the words "agricultural lands" have been given a technical meaning and that the Constitution has employed them in that
sense, it can only be accepted in reference to public lands. If a technical import has been affixed to the term, it can not be extended to private lands if
we are not to be led to an absurdity and if we are avoid the charge that we are resorting to subtle and ingenious refinement to force from the
Constitution a meaning which its framers never held. While in the construction of a constitution words must be given the technical meaning which
they have acquired, the rule is limited to the "well-understood meaning" "which the people must be supposed to have had in view in adopting them."
To give an example. "When the constitution speaks of an ex post facto law, it means a law technically known by that designation; the meaning of the
phrase having become definite in the history of constitutional law, and being so familiar to the people that it is not necessary to employ language of a
more popular character to designate it." In reality, this is not a departure from the general rule that the language used is to be taken in the sense it
conveys to the popular mind, "for the technical sense in these cases is the sense popularly understood, because that is the sense fixed upon the words
in legal and constitutional history where they have been employed for the protection of popular rights." (1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th
ed., 132-133.) Viewed from this angle, "agricultural land" does not possess the quality of a technical term. Even as applied to public lands, and even
among lawyers and judges, how many are familiar with the decisions of this Court which hold that public swamps and public lands more appropriate
for buildings and other structures than for agriculture are agricultural lands? The same can be truthfully said of members of the Constitutional
Assembly.
The speeches of delegates Montilla and Ledesma cannot serve as a means of interpretation. The sentiments expressed in those speeches, like the first
drafts of section 5 of Article XIII, may have reflected the sentiments of the Convention in the first stages of the deliberation or down to its close. If
they were, those sentiments were relaxed and not given full sway for reasons on which we need not speculate. Speeches in support of a project can be
a valuable criterion for judging the intention of a law or constitution only if no changes were afterward affected. If anything, the change in section 5
of Article XIII wrought in the face of a strong advocacy for complete and absolute nationalization of all lands, without exception, offers itself as the
best proof that to the framers of the Constitution the change was not "merely one of words" but represented something real and substantial. Firm and
resolute convictions are expressed in a document in strong, unequivocal and unqualified language. This is specially true when the instrument is a
constitution, "the most solemn and deliberate of human writings, always carefully drawn, and calculated for permanent endurance."
The decision quotes from the Framing of the Constitution by Dean Aruego a sentence which says that one of the principles underlying the provision
of Article XIII of the Constitution is "that lands, minerals, forests and other natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino Nation."
In underlying the word lands the Court wants to insinuate that all lands without exceptions are included. This is nothing to be enthusiastic over. It is
hyperbole, "a figure of speech in which the statement expresses more than the truth" but "is accepted as a legal form of expression." It is an
expression that "lies but does not deceive." When we say men must fight we do not mean all men, and every one knows we don't.
The decision says:
It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141,"alienable or disposable public lands" which are the same as "public agricultural lands"
under the Constitution, are classified into agricultural, residential, commercial, industrial and for other purposes. This simply means that the term
"public agricultural lands" has both a broad and a particular meaning. Under its broad or general meaning, as used in the Constitution, it embraces all
lands that are neither timber nor mineral. This broad meaning is particularized in section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which classifies "public
agricultural lands" for purposes of alienation or disposition, into lands that are strictly agricultural or actually devoted to cultivation for agricultural
purposes; lands that are residential; commercial; industrial; or lands for other purposes. The fact that these lands are made alienable or disposable
under Commonwealth Act No. 141, in favor of Filipino Citizen, is a conclusive indication of their character as public agricultural lands under said
statute and under the Constitution."
If I am not mistaken in my understanding of the line of reasoning in the foregoing passage, my humble opinion is that there is no logical connection
between the premise and the conclusion. What to me seems clearly to emerge from it is that Commonwealth Act No. 141, so far from sustaining that
Court's theory, actually pulls down its case which it has built upon the foundation of parallel classification of public and private lands into forest,
mineral and agricultural lands, and the inexistence of such things as residential, industrial or commercial lands. It is to be noted that Act No. 141,
section 9, classifies disposable lands into agricultural, industrial, residential, commercial, etc. And these are lands of the public domain.
The fact that the provisions regarding alienation of private lands happens to be included in Article XIII, which is entitled "Conservation and
Utilization of Natural Resources," is no ground for treating public lands and private lands on the same footing. The inference should rather be the
exact reverse. Agricultural lands, whether public or private, are natural resources. But residential, commercial, and industrial lands, as we have seen,
are not natural resources either in the sense these words convey to the popular mind or as defined in the dictionary. This fact may have been one
factor which prompted the elimination of private non-agricultural lands from the range of the prohibition, along with reasons, of foreign policy,
economics and politics.
From the opinion of Secretary of Justice Jose A. Santos in 1939, the majority can not derive any comfort unless we cling to the serious argument that
as public lands go so go private lands. In that opinion the question propounded was whether a piece of public land which was more profitable as a
homesite might not be sold and considered as agricultural. The illustrious Secretary answered yes, which was correct. But the classification of private
lands was not directly or indirectly involved. It is the opinion of the present Secretary of Justice that is to the point. If the construction placed by the
law-officer of the government on a constitutional provision may properly be invoked, as the majority say but which I doubt, as representing the true
intent of the instrument, this Court, if it is to be consistent, should adopt Secretary Ozaeta's view. If the Solicitor General's attitude as interested
counsel for the government in a judicial action is — as the decision also suggests but which, I think, is still more incorrect both in theory and in
practice — then this Court should have given heed to the motion for withdrawal of the present appeal, which had been concurred in by the Solicitor
General in line presumably with the opinion of the head of his department.
The Court fears that "this constitutional purpose of conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the
Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens." It reasons that "it would certainly be futile to prohibit the
alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands
of Filipino citizens." Sections122 and 123 of Act No. 141 should banish this fear. These sections, quoted and relied upon in the majority opinion,
prevent private lands that have been acquired under any of the public land laws from falling into alien possession in fee simple. Without this law, the
fear would be well-founded if we adopt the majority's theory, which we precisely reject, that agricultural and residential lands are synonymous, be
they public or private. The fear would not materialize under our theory, that only lands which are not agricultural may be owned by persons other
than FIlipino citizens.
Act No. 141, by the way, supplies the best argument against the majority's interpretation of section 5 of Article XIII. Prohibiting the acquisition by
foreigners of any lands originally acquired in any manner under its provisions or under the provisions of any previous law, ordinace, royal order,
royal decree, or any other law formerly enforced in the Philippines with regard to public lands, etc., it is a mute eloquent testimony that in the minds
of the legislature, whose interpretation the majority correctly say should be looked to as authoritative, the Constitution did not carry such prohibition.
For if the Constitution already barred the alienation of lands of any kind in favor of aliens, the provisions of sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141 would have been superfluous.
The decision says that "if under Article XIV section 8, of the Constitution, an alien may not even operate a small jeepney for hire, it is certainly not
hard to understand that neither is he allowed to own a piece of land." There is no similitude between owning a lot for a home or a factory or a store
and operating a jeepney for hire. It is not the ownership of a jeepney that is forbidden; it is the use of it for public service that is not allowed. A
foreigner is not barred from owning the costliest motor cars, steamships or airplanes in any number, for his private use or that of his friends and
relatives. He can not use a jeepney for hire because the operation of public utilities is reserved to Filipino nationals, and the operation of a jeepney
happens to be within this policy. The use of a jeepney for hire maybe insignificant in itself but it falls within a class of industry that performs a vital
function in the country's economic life, closely associated with its advancing civilization, supplying needs so fundamental for communal living and
for the development of the country's economy, that the government finds need of subjecting them to some measure of control and the Constitution
deems it necessary to limit their operation by Filipino citizens. The importance of using a jeepney for hire cannot be sneered at or minimized just as a
vote for public office by a single foreign citizen can not be looked at with a shrug of the shoulder on the theory that it would not cause a ripple in the
political complexion or scene of the nation.
This Court quotes with approval from the Solicitor General's brief this passage: "If the term `private agricultural lands' is to be construed as not
including residential lots or lands of similar nature, the result will be that aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses
for themselves but entire subdivisions and whole towns and cities, and that they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for
building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf — courses, playgrounds, airfields
and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant's words, strictly agricultural." Arguments like this have no place where there is no
ambiguity in the constitution or law. The courts are not at liberty to disregard a provision that is clear and certain simply because its enforcement
would work inconvenience or hardship or lead to what they believe pernicious results. Courts have nothing to do with inconvenience or
consequences. This role is founded on sound principles of constitutional government and is so well known as to make citations of authorities
presumptuous.
Granting the possibility or probability of the consequences which this Court and the Solicitor General dread, we should not overlook the fact that
there is the Congress standing guard to curtail or stop such excesses or abuses if and when the menace should show its head. The fact that the
Constitution has not prohibited, as we contend, the transfer of private non-agricultural lands to aliens does not prevent the Congress from passing
legislation to regulate or prohibit such transfer, to define the size of private lands a foreigner may possess in fee simple, or to specify the uses for
which lands may be dedicated, in order to prevent aliens from conducting fisheries, hatcheries, vacation resorts, markets, golf-courses, cemeteries.
The Congress could, if it wants, go so far as to exclude foreigners from entering the country or settling here. If I may be permitted to guess, the
alteration in the original draft of section 5 of Article XIII may have been prompted precisely by the thought that it is the better policy to leave to the
political departments of the Government the regulation or absolute prohibition of all land ownership by foreigners, as the changed, changing and
ever-changing conditions demand. The Commonwealth Legislature did that with respect to lands that were originally public lands, through
Commonwealth Act No. 141, and the Legislative Assembly during the Japanese occupation extended the prohibition to all private lands, as Mr.
Justice Paras has pointed out. In the present Congress, at least two bills have been introduced proposing Congressional legislation in the same
direction. All of which is an infallible sign that the Constitution does not carry such prohibition, in the opinion of three legislatures, an opinion which,
we entirely agree with the majority, should be given serious consideration by the courts (if needed there were any doubt), both as a matter of policy,
and also because it may be presumed to represent the true intent of the instrument. (12 C.J., 714.) In truth, the decision lays special emphasis on the
fact that "many members of the National Assembly who approved the new Act (No. 141) had been members of the Constitutional Convention." May
I add that Senator Francisco, who is the author of one of the bills I have referred to, in the Senate, was a leading, active and influential member of the
Constitutional Convention?

G.R. No. L-6776 May 21, 1955

THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
UNG SIU SI TEMPLE, respondent-appellant.
Alejo F. Candido for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Querube C. Makalintal and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar for appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
The Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal refused to accept for record a deed of donation executed in due form on January 22, 1953, by Jesus
Dy, a Filipino citizen, conveying a parcel of residential land, in Caloocan, Rizal, known as lot No. 2, block 48-D, PSD-4212, G.L.R.O. Record No.
11267, in favor of the unregistered religious organization "Ung Siu Si Temple", operating through three trustees all of Chinese nationality. The
donation was duly accepted by Yu Juan, of Chinese nationality, founder and deaconess of the Temple, acting in representation and in behalf of the
latter and its trustees.
The refusal of the Registrar was elevated en Consultato the IVth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila. On March 14, 1953, the Court
upheld the action of the Rizal Register of Deeds, saying:
The question raised by the Register of Deeds in the above transcribed consulta is whether a deed of donation of a parcel of land executed in favor of a
religious organization whose founder, trustees and administrator are Chinese citizens should be registered or not.
It appearing from the record of the Consulta that UNG SIU SI TEMPLE is a religious organization whose deaconess, founder, trustees and
administrator are all Chinese citizens, this Court is of the opinion and so hold that in view of the provisions of the sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of
the Constitution of the Philippines limiting the acquisition of land in the Philippines to its citizens, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of the capital stock of which is owned by such citizens adopted after the enactment of said Act No. 271, and the decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of Krivenko vs. the Register of Deeds of Manila, the deed of donation in question should not be admitted for admitted for
registration. (Printed Rec. App. pp 17-18).
Not satisfied with the ruling of the Court of First Instance, counsel for the donee Uy Siu Si Temple has appealed to this Court, claiming: (1) that the
acquisition of the land in question, for religious purposes, is authorized and permitted by Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission, providing as
follows:
SECTION 1. It shall be lawful for all religious associations, of whatever sort or denomination, whether incorporated in the Philippine Islands or in
the name of other country, or not incorporated at all, to hold land in the Philippine Islands upon which to build churches, parsonages, or educational
or charitable institutions.
SEC. 2. Such religious institutions, if not incorporated, shall hold the land in the name of three Trustees for the use of such associations; . . .. (Printed
Rec. App. p. 5.)
and (2) that the refusal of the Register of Deeds violates the freedom of religion clause of our Constitution [Art. III, Sec. 1(7)].
We are of the opinion that the Court below has correctly held that in view of the absolute terms of section 5, Title XIII, of the Constitution, the
provisions of Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission must be deemed repealed since the Constitution was enacted, in so far as incompatible
therewith. In providing that, —
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines,
the Constitution makes no exception in favor of religious associations. Neither is there any such saving found in sections 1 and 2 of Article XIII,
restricting the acquisition of public agricultural lands and other natural resources to "corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens" (of the Philippines).
The fact that the appellant religious organization has no capital stock does not suffice to escape the Constitutional inhibition, since it is admitted that
its members are of foreign nationality. The purpose of the sixty per centum requirement is obviously to ensure that corporations or associations
allowed to acquire agricultural land or to exploit natural resources shall be controlled by Filipinos; and the spirit of the Constitution demands that in
the absence of capital stock, the controlling membership should be composed of Filipino citizens.
To permit religious associations controlled by non-Filipinos to acquire agricultural lands would be to drive the opening wedge to revive alien
religious land holdings in this country. We can not ignore the historical fact that complaints against land holdings of that kind were among the factors
that sparked the revolution of 1896.
As to the complaint that the disqualification under article XIII is violative of the freedom of religion guaranteed by Article III of the Constitution, we
are by no means convinced (nor has it been shown) that land tenure is indispensable to the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession or
worship; or that one may not worship the Deity according to the dictates of his own conscience unless upon land held in fee simple.
The resolution appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
Pablo, Acting C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-8451 December 20, 1957

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC ADMINISTRATOR OF DAVAO, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF DAVAO CITY, respondents.
Teodoro Padilla, for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Assistant Solicitor General Jose G. Bautista and Troadio T. Quianzon, Jr., for respondents.

FELIX, J.:
This is a petition for mandamus filed by the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao seeking the reversal of a resolution by the Land
Registration Commissioner in L.R.C. Consulta No. 14. The facts of the case are as follows:
On October 4, 1954, Mateo L. Rodis, a Filipino citizen and resident of the City of Davao, executed a deed of sale of a parcel of land located in the
same city covered by Transfer Certificate No. 2263, in favor of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao Inc., s corporation sole
organized and existing in accordance with Philippine Laws, with Msgr. Clovis Thibault, a Canadian citizen, as actual incumbent. When the deed of
sale was presented to Register of Deeds of Davao for registration, the latter.
having in mind a previous resolution of the Fourth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila wherein the Carmelite Nuns of Davao were made
to prepare an affidavit to the effect that 60 per cent of the members of their corporation were Filipino citizens when they sought to register in favor of
their congregation of deed of donation of a parcel of land—
required said corporation sole to submit a similar affidavit declaring that 60 per cent of the members thereof were Filipino citizens.
The vendee in the letter dated June 28, 1954, expressed willingness to submit an affidavit, both not in the same tenor as that made the Progress of the
Carmelite Nuns because the two cases were not similar, for whereas the congregation of the Carmelite Nuns had five incorporators, the corporation
sole has only one; that according to their articles of incorporation, the organization of the Carmelite Nuns became the owner of properties donated to
it, whereas the case at bar, the totality of the Catholic population of Davao would become the owner of the property bought to be registered.
As the Register of Deeds entertained some doubts as to the registerability if the document, the matter was referred to the Land Registration
Commissioner en consulta for resolution in accordance with section 4 of Republic Act No. 1151. Proper hearing on the matter was conducted by the
Commissioner and after the petitioner corporation had filed its memorandum, a resolution was rendered on September 21, 1954, holding that in view
of the provisions of Section 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Philippine Constitution, the vendee was not qualified to acquire private lands in the
Philippines in the absence of proof that at least 60 per centum of the capital, property, or assets of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of
Davao, Inc., was actually owned or controlled by Filipino citizens, there being no question that the present incumbent of the corporation sole was a
Canadian citizen. It was also the opinion of the Land Registration Commissioner that section 159 of the corporation Law relied upon by the vendee
was rendered operative by the aforementioned provisions of the Constitution with respect to real estate, unless the precise condition set therein —
that at least 60 per cent of its capital is owned by Filipino citizens — be present, and, therefore, ordered the Registered Deeds of Davao to deny
registration of the deed of sale in the absence of proof of compliance with such condition.
After the motion to reconsider said resolution was denied, an action for mandamus was instituted with this Court by said corporation sole, alleging
that under the Corporation Law as well as the settled jurisprudence on the matter, the deed of sale executed by Mateo L. Rodis in favor of petitioner
is actually a deed of sale in favor of the Catholic Church which is qualified to acquire private agricultural lands for the establishment and
maintenance of places of worship, and prayed that judgment be rendered reserving and setting aside the resolution of the Land Registration
Commissioner in question. In its resolution of November 15, 1954, this Court gave due course to this petition providing that the procedure prescribed
for appeals from the Public Service Commission of the Securities and Exchange Commissions (Rule 43), be followed.
Section 5 of Article XIII of the Philippine Constitution reads as follows:
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
Section 1 of the same Article also provides the following:
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization
shall be limited to cititzens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens, SUBJECT TO ANY EXISTING RIGHT, grant, lease, or concession AT THE TIME OF THE INAUGURATION OF THE
GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED UNDER CONSTITUTION. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be
alienated, and no license, concession, or leases for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases other than the development and limit of the grant.
In virtue of the foregoing mandates of the Constitution, who are considered "qualified" to acquire and hold agricultural lands in the Philippines?
What is the effect of these constitutional prohibition of the right of a religious corporation recognized by our Corporation Law and registered as
a corporation sole, to possess, acquire and register real estates in its name when the Head, Manager, Administrator or actual incumbent is an alien?
Petitioner consistently maintained that a corporation sole, irrespective of the citizenship of its incumbent, is not prohibited or disqualified to acquire
and hold real properties. The Corporation Law and the Canon Law are explicit in their provisions that a corporation sole or "ordinary" is not the
owner of the of the properties that he may acquire but merely the administrator thereof. The Canon Law also specified that church temporalities are
owned by the Catholic Church as a "moral person" or by the diocess as minor "moral persons" with the ordinary or bishop as administrator.
And elaborating on the composition of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, petitioner explained that as a religious society or organization, it is
made up of 2 elements or divisions — the clergy or religious members and the faithful or lay members. The 1948 figures of the Bureau of Census
showed that there were 277,551 Catholics in Davao and aliens residing therein numbered 3,465. Ever granting that all these foreigners are Catholics,
petitioner contends that Filipino citizens form more than 80 per cent of the entire Catholics population of that area. As to its clergy and religious
composition, counsel for petitioner presented the Catholic Directory of the Philippines for 1954 (Annex A) which revealed that as of that year,
Filipino clergy and women novices comprise already 60.5 per cent of the group. It was, therefore, allowed that the constitutional requirement was
fully met and satisfied.
Respondents, on the other hand, averred that although it might be true that petitioner is not the owner of the land purchased, yet he has control over
the same, with full power to administer, take possession of, alienate, transfer, encumber, sell or dispose of any or all lands and their improvements
registered in the name of the corporation sole and can collect, receive, demand or sue for all money or values of any kind that may be kind that may
become due or owing to said corporation, and vested with authority to enter into agreements with any persons, concerns or entities in connection with
said real properties, or in other words, actually exercising all rights of ownership over the properties. It was their stand that the theory that properties
registered in the name of the corporation sole are held in true for the benefit of the Catholic population of a place, as of Davao in the case at bar
should be sustained because a conglomeration of persons cannot just be pointed out as the cestui que trust or recipient of the benefits from the
property allegedly administered in their behalf. Neither can it be said that the mass of people referred to as such beneficiary exercise ant right of
ownership over the same. This set-up, respondents argued, falls short of a trust. The respondents instead tried to prove that in reality, the beneficiary
of ecclesiastical properties are not members or faithful of the church but someone else, by quoting a portion a portion of the ought of fidelity
subscribed by a bishop upon his elevation to the episcopacy wherein he promises to render to the Pontificial Father or his successors an account of
his pastoral office and of all things appertaining to the state of this church.
Respondents likewise advanced the opinion that in construing the constitutional provision calling for 60 per cent of Filipino citizenship, the criterion
of the properties or assets thereof.
In solving the problem thus submitted to our consideration, We can say the following: A corporation sole is a special form of corporation usually
associated with the clergy. Conceived and introduced into the common law by sheer necessity, this legal creation which was referred to as "that
unhappy freak of English law" was designed to facilitate the exercise of the functions of ownership carried on by the clerics for and on behalf of the
church which was regarded as the property owner (See I Couvier's Law Dictionary, p. 682-683).
A corporation sole consists of one person only, and his successors (who will always be one at a time), in some particular station, who are
incorporated by law in order to give them some legal capacities and advantages, particularly that of perpetuity, which in their natural persons they
could not have had. In this sense, the king is a sole corporation; so is a bishop, or dens, distinct from their several chapters (Reid vs. Barry, 93 Fla.
849, 112 So. 846).
The provisions of our Corporation law on religious corporations are illuminating and sustain the stand of petitioner. Section 154 thereof provides:
SEC. 154. — For the administration of the temporalities of any religious denomination, society or church and the management of the estates and the
properties thereof, it shall be lawful for the bishop, chief priest, or presiding either of any such religious denomination, society or church to become a
corporation sole, unless inconsistent wit the rules, regulations or discipline of his religious denomination, society or church or forbidden by
competent authority thereof.
See also the pertinent provisions of the succeeding sections of the same Corporation Law copied hereunder:
SEC. 155. In order to become a corporation sole the bishop, chief priest, or presiding elder of any religious denomination, society or church must file
with the Securities and Exchange Commissioner articles of incorporation setting forth the following facts:
xxx xxx xxx.
(3) That as such bishop, chief priest, or presiding elder he is charged with the administration of the temporalities and the management of the estates
and properties of his religious denomination, society, or church within its territorial jurisdiction, describing it;
xxx xxx xxx.
(As amended by Commonwealth Act No. 287).
SEC. 157. From and after the filing with the Securities and Exchange Commissioner of the said articles of incorporation, which verified by affidavit
or affirmation as aforesaid and accompanied by the copy of the commission, certificate of election, or letters of appointment of the bishop, chief
priest, or presiding elder, duly certified as prescribed in the section immediately preceding such the bishop, chief priest, or presiding elder, as the case
may be, shall become a corporation sole and all temporalities, estates, and properties the religious denomination, society, or church therefore
administered or managed by him as such bishop, chief priest, or presiding elder, shall be held in trust by him as a corporation sole, for the use,
purpose, behalf, and sole benefit of his religious denomination, society, or church, including hospitals, schools, colleges, orphan, asylums,
parsonages, and cemeteries thereof. For the filing of such articles of incorporation, the Securities and Exchange Commissioner shall collect twenty-
five pesos. (As amended by Commonwealth Act. No. 287); and.
SEC. 163. The right to administer all temporalities and all property held or owned by a religious order or society, or by the diocese, synod, or district
organization of any religious denomination or church shall, on its incorporation, pass to the corporation and shall be held in trust for the use, purpose
behalf, and benefit of the religious society, or order so incorporated or of the church of which the diocese, or district organization is an organized and
constituent part.
The Cannon Law contains similar provisions regarding the duties of the corporation sole or ordinary as administrator of the church properties, as
follows:
Al Ordinario local pertenence vigilar diligentemente sobre la administracion de todos los bienes eclesiasticos que se hallan en su territorio y no
estuvieren sustraidos de su jurisdiccion, salvs las prescriciones legitimas que le concedan mas aamplios derechos.
Teniendo en cuenta los derechos y las legitimas costumbres y circunstancias, procuraran los Ordinarios regular todo lo concerniente a
la administracion de los bienes eclesciasticos, dando las oportunas instucciones particularles dentro del narco del derecho comun. (Title XXVIII,
Codigo de Derecho Canonico, Lib. III, Canon 1519).1
That leaves no room for doubt that the bishops or archbishops, as the case may be, as corporation's sole are merely administrators of the church
properties that come to their possession, in which they hold in trust for the church. It can also be said that while it is true that church properties could
be administered by a natural persons, problems regarding succession to said properties can not be avoided to rise upon his death. Through this legal
fiction, however, church properties acquired by the incumbent of a corporation sole pass, by operation of law, upon his death not his personal heirs
but to his successor in office. It could be seen, therefore, that a corporation sole is created not only to administer the temporalities of the church or
religious society where he belongs but also to hold and transmit the same to his successor in said office. If the ownership or title to the properties do
not pass to the administrators, who are the owners of church properties?.
Bouscaren and Elis, S.J., authorities on cannon law, on their treatise comment:
In matters regarding property belonging to the Universal Church and to the Apostolic See, the Supreme Pontiff exercises his office of supreme
administrator through the Roman Curia; in matters regarding other church property, through the administrators of the individual moral persons in the
Church according to that norms, laid down in the Code of Cannon Law. This does not mean, however, that the Roman Pontiff is the owner of all the
church property; but merely that he is the supreme guardian (Bouscaren and Ellis, Cannon Law, A Text and Commentary, p. 764).
and this Court, citing Campes y Pulido, Legislacion y Jurisprudencia Canonica, ruled in the case of Trinidad vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila, 63 Phil. 881, that:
The second question to be decided is in whom the ownership of the properties constituting the endowment of the ecclesiastical or collative
chaplaincies is vested.
Canonists entertain different opinions as to the persons in whom the ownership of the ecclesiastical properties is vested, with respect to which we
shall, for our purpose, confine ourselves to stating with Donoso that, while many doctors cited by Fagnano believe that it resides in the Roman
Pontiff as Head of the Universal Church, it is more probable that ownership, strictly speaking, does not reside in the latter, and, consequently,
ecclesiastical properties are owned by the churches, institutions and canonically established private corporations to which said properties have been
donated.
Considering that nowhere can We find any provision conferring ownership of church properties on the Pope although he appears to be the supreme
administrator or guardian of his flock, nor on the corporation sole or heads of dioceses as they are admittedly mere administrators of said properties,
ownership of these temporalities logically fall and develop upon the church, diocese or congregation acquiring the same. Although this question of
ownership of ecclesiastical properties has off and on been mentioned in several decisions of the Court yet in no instance was the subject of
citizenship of this religious society been passed upon.
We are not unaware of the opinion expressed by the late Justice Perfecto in his dissent in the case of Agustines vs. Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
80 Phil. 565, to the effect that "the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila is only a branch of a universal church by the Pope, with permanent
residence in Rome, Italy". There is no question that the Roman Catholic Church existing in the Philippines is a tributary and part of the international
religious organization, for the word "Roman" clearly expresses its unity with and recognizes the authority of the Pope in Rome. However, lest We
become hasty in drawing conclusions, We have to analyze and take note of the nature of the government established in the Vatican City, of which it
was said:
GOVERNMENT. In the Roman Catholic Church supreme authority and jurisdiction over clergy and laity alike as held by the pope who (since the
Middle Ages) is elected by the cardinals assembled in conclave, and holds office until his death or legitimate abdication. . . While the pope is
obviously independent of the laws made, and the officials appointed, by himself or his predecessors, he usually exercises his administrative authority
according to the code of canon law and through the congregations, tribunals and offices of the Curia Romana. In their respective territories (called
generally dioceses) and over their respective subjects, the patriarchs, metropolitans or archbishops and bishops exercise a jurisdiction which is called
ordinary (as attached by law to an office given to a person. . . (Collier's Encyclopedia, Vol. 17, p. 93).
While it is true and We have to concede that in the profession of their faith, the Roman Pontiff is the supreme head; that in the religious matters, in
the exercise of their belief, the Catholic congregation of the faithful throughout the world seeks the guidance and direction of their Spiritual Father in
the Vatican, yet it cannot be said that there is a merger of personalities resultant therein. Neither can it be said that the political and civil rights of the
faithful, inherent or acquired under the laws of their country, are affected by that relationship with the Pope. The fact that the Roman Catholic Church
in almost every country springs from that society that saw its beginning in Europe and the fact that the clergy of this faith derive their authorities and
receive orders from the Holy See do not give or bestow the citizenship of the Pope upon these branches. Citizenship is a political right which cannot
be acquired by a sort of "radiation". We have to realize that although there is a fraternity among all the catholic countries and the dioceses therein all
over the globe, the universality that the word "catholic" implies, merely characterize their faith, a uniformity in the practice and the interpretation of
their dogma and in the exercise of their belief, but certainly they are separate and independent from one another in jurisdiction, governed by different
laws under which they are incorporated, and entirely independent on the others in the management and ownership of their temporalities. To allow
theory that the Roman Catholic Churches all over the world follow the citizenship of their Supreme Head, the Pontifical Father, would lead to the
absurdity of finding the citizens of a country who embrace the Catholic faith and become members of that religious society, likewise citizens of the
Vatican or of Italy. And this is more so if We consider that the Pope himself may be an Italian or national of any other country of the world. The
same thing be said with regard to the nationality or citizenship of the corporation sole created under the laws of the Philippines, which is not altered
by the change of citizenship of the incumbent bishops or head of said corporation sole.
We must therefore, declare that although a branch of the Universal Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, every Roman Catholic Church in different
countries, if it exercises its mission and is lawfully incorporated in accordance with the laws of the country where it is located, is considered an entity
or person with all the rights and privileges granted to such artificial being under the laws of that country, separate and distinct from the personality of
the Roman Pontiff or the Holy See, without prejudice to its religious relations with the latter which are governed by the Canon Law or their rules and
regulations.
We certainly are conscious of the fact that whatever conclusion We may draw on this matter will have a far reaching influence, nor can We overlook
the pages of history that arouse indignation and criticisms against church landholdings. This nurtured feeling that snowbailed into a strong
nationalistic sentiment manifested itself when the provisions on natural to be embodied in the Philippine Constitution were framed, but all that has
been said on this regard referred more particularly to landholdings of religious corporations known as "Friar Estates" which have already bee
acquired by our government, and not to properties held by corporations sole which, We repeat, are properties held in trust for the benefit of the
faithful residing within its territorial jurisdiction. Though that same feeling probably precipitated and influenced to a large extent the doctrine laid
down in the celebrated Krivenco decision, We have to take this matter in the light of legal provisions and jurisprudence actually obtaining,
irrespective of sentiments.
The question now left for our determination is whether the Universal Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the Philippines, or better still, the
corporation sole named the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., is qualified to acquire private agricultural lands in the
Philippines pursuant to the provisions of Article XIII of the Constitution.
We see from sections 1 and 5 of said Article quoted before, that only persons or corporations qualified to acquire hold lands of the public domain in
the Philippines may acquire or be assigned and hold private agricultural lands. Consequently, the decisive factor in the present controversy hinges on
the proposition or whether or not the petitioner in this case can acquire agricultural lands of the public domain.
From the data secured from the Securities and Exchange Commission, We find that the Roman Catholic Bishop of Zamboanga was incorporated (as
a corporation sole) in September, 1912, principally to administer its temporalities and manage its properties. Probably due to the ravages of the last
war, its articles of incorporation were reconstructed in the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 8, 1948. At first, this corporation sole
administered all the temporalities of the church existing or located in the island of Mindanao. Later on, however, new dioceses were formed and new
corporations sole were created to correspond with the territorial jurisdiction of the new dioceses, one of them being petitioner herein, the Roman
Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., which was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on September 12, 1950, and
succeeded in the administrative for all the "temporalities" of the Roman Catholic Church existing in Davao.
According to our Corporation Law, Public Act No. 1549, approved April 1, 1906, a corporation sole.
is organized and composed of a single individual, the head of any religious society or church, for the ADMINISTRATION of the temporalities of
such society or church. By "temporalities" is meant estate and properties not used exclusively for religious worship. The successor in office of such
religious head or chief priest incorporated as a corporation sole shall become the corporation sole on ascension to office, and shall be permitted to
transact business as such on filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission a copy of his commission, certificate of election or letter of
appointment duly certified by any notary public or clerk of court of record (Guevara's The Philippine Corporation Law, p. 223).
The Corporation Law also contains the following provisions:
SECTION 159. Any corporation sole may purchase and hold real estate and personal; property for its church, charitable, benevolent, or educational
purposes, and may receive bequests or gifts of such purposes. Such corporation may mortgage or sell real property held by it upon obtaining an order
for that purpose from the Court of First Instance of the province in which the property is situated; but before making the order proof must be made to
the satisfaction of the Court that notice of the application for leave to mortgage or sell has been given by publication or otherwise in such manner and
for such time as said Court or the Judge thereof may have directed, and that it is to the interest of the corporation that leave to mortgage or sell must
be made by petition, duly verified by the bishop, chief priest, or presiding elder acting as corporation sole, and may be opposed by any member of the
religious denomination, society or church represented by the corporation sole: Provided, however, That in cases where the rules, regulations, and
discipline of the religious denomination, society or church concerned represented by such corporation sole regulate the methods of acquiring,
holding, selling and mortgaging real estate and personal property, such rules, regulations, and discipline shall control and the intervention of the
Courts shall not be necessary.
It can, therefore, be noticed that the power of a corporation sole to purchase real property, like the power exercised in the case at bar, it is not
restricted although the power to sell or mortgage sometimes is, depending upon the rules, regulations, and discipline of the church concerned
represented by said corporation sole. If corporations sole can purchase and sell real estate for its church, charitable, benevolent, or educational
purposes, can they register said real properties? As provided by law, lands held in trust for specific purposes me be subject of registration (section 69,
Act 496), and the capacity of a corporation sole, like petitioner herein, to register lands belonging to it is acknowledged, and title thereto may be
issued in its name (Bishop of Nueva Segovia vs. Insular Government, 26 Phil. 300-1913). Indeed it is absurd that while the corporations sole that
might be in need of acquiring lands for the erection of temples where the faithful can pray, or schools and cemeteries which they are expressly
authorized by law to acquire in connection with the propagation of the Roman Catholic Apostolic faith or in furtherance of their freedom of religion
they could not register said properties in their name. As professor Javier J. Nepomuceno very well says "Man in his search for the immortal and
imponderable, has, even before the dawn of recorded history, erected temples to the Unknown God, and there is no doubt that he will continue to do
so for all time to come, as long as he continues 'imploring the aid of Divine Providence'" (Nepomuceno's Corporation Sole, VI Ateneo Law Journal,
No. 1, p. 41, September, 1956). Under the circumstances of this case, We might safely state that even before the establishment of the Philippine
Commonwealth and of the Republic of the Philippines every corporation sole then organized and registered had by express provision of law the
necessary power and qualification to purchase in its name private lands located in the territory in which it exercised its functions or ministry and for
which it was created, independently of the nationality of its incumbent unique and single member and head, the bishop of the dioceses. It can be also
maintained without fear of being gainsaid that the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the Philippines has no nationality and that the framers of the
Constitution, as will be hereunder explained, did not have in mind the religious corporations sole when they provided that 60 per centum of the
capital thereof be owned by Filipino citizens.
There could be no controversy as to the fact that a duly registered corporation sole is an artificial being having the right of succession and the power,
attributes, and properties expressly authorized by law or incident to its existence (section 1, Corporation Law). In outlining the general powers of a
corporation. Public Act. No. 1459 provides among others:
SEC. 13. Every corporation has the power:
(5) To purchase, hold, convey, sell, lease, lot, mortgage, encumber, and otherwise deal with such real and personal property as the purpose for which
the corporation was formed may permit, and the transaction of the lawful business of the corporation may reasonably and necessarily require, unless
otherwise prescribed in this Act: . . .
In implementation of the same and specially made applicable to a form of corporation recognized by the same law, Section 159 aforequoted
expressly allowed the corporation sole to purchase and hold real as well as personal properties necessary for the promotion of the objects for which
said corporation sole is created. Respondent Land Registration Commissioner, however, maintained that since the Philippine Constitution is a later
enactment than public Act No. 1459, the provisions of Section 159 in amplification of Section 13 thereof, as regard real properties, should be
considered repealed by the former.
There is a reason to believe that when the specific provision of the Constitution invoked by respondent Commissioner was under consideration, the
framers of the same did not have in mind or overlooked this particular form of corporation. It is undeniable that the naturalization and conservation of
our national resources was one of the dominating objectives of the Convention and in drafting the present Article XII of the Constitution, the
delegates were goaded by the desire (1) to insure their conservation for Filipino posterity; (2) to serve as an instrument of national defense, helping
prevent the extension into the country of foreign control through peaceful economic penetration; and (3) to prevent making the Philippines a source
of international conflicts with the consequent danger to its internal security and independence (See The Framing of the Philippine Constitution by
Professor Jose M. Aruego, a Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Vol. II. P. 592-604). In the same book Delegate Aruego, explaining the
reason behind the first consideration, wrote:
At the time of the framing of Philippine Constitution, Filipino capital had been to be rather shy. Filipinos hesitated s a general rule to invest a
considerable sum of their capital for the development, exploitation and utilization of the natural resources of the country. They had not as yet been so
used to corporate as the peoples of the west. This general apathy, the delegates knew, would mean the retardation of the development of the natural
resources, unless foreign capital would be encouraged to come and help in that development. They knew that the naturalization of the natural
resources would certainly not encourage the INVESTMENT OF FOREIGN CAPITAL into them. But there was a general feeling in the Convention
that it was better to have such a development retarded or even postpone together until such time when the Filipinos would be ready and willing to
undertake it rather than permit the natural resources to be placed under the ownership or control of foreigners in order that they might be immediately
be developed, with the Filipinos of the future serving not as owners but utmost as tenants or workers under foreign masters. By all means, the
delegates believed, the natural resources should be conserved for Filipino posterity.
It could be distilled from the foregoing that the farmers of the Constitution intended said provisions as barrier for foreigners or corporations financed
by such foreigners to acquire, exploit and develop our natural resources, saving these undeveloped wealth for our people to clear and enrich when
they are already prepared and capable of doing so. But that is not the case of corporations sole in the Philippines, for, We repeat, they are mere
administrators of the "temporalities" or properties titled in their name and for the benefit of the members of their respective religion composed of an
overwhelming majority of Filipinos. No mention nor allusion whatsoever is made in the Constitution as to the prohibition against or the liability of
the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines to acquire and hold agricultural lands. Although there were some discussions on landholdings, they
were mostly confined in the inclusion of the provision allowing the Government to break big landed estates to put an end to absentee landlordism.
But let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that the above referred to inhibitory clause of Section 1 of Article XIII of the constitution does have
bearing on the petitioner's case; even so the clause requiring that at least 60 per centum of the capital of the corporation be owned by Filipinos is
subordinated to the petitioner's aforesaid right already existing at the time of the inauguration of the Commonwealth and the Republic of the
Philippines. In the language of Mr. Justice Jose P. Laurel (a delegate to the Constitutional Convention), in his concurring opinion of the case of Gold
Creek mining Corporation, petitioner vs. Eulogio Rodriguez, Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, and Quirico Abadilla, Director of the Bureau
of Mines, respondent, 66 Phil. 259:
The saving clause in the section involved of the Constitution was originally embodied in the report submitted by the Committee on Naturalization
and Preservation of Land and Other Natural Resources to the Constitutional Convention on September 17, 1954. It was later inserted in the first draft
of the Constitution as section 13 of Article XIII thereof, and finally incorporated as we find it now. Slight have been the changes undergone by the
proviso from the time when it comes out of the committee until it was finally adopted. When first submitted and as inserted to the first draft of the
Constitution it reads: 'subject to any right, grant, lease, or concession existing in respect thereto on the date of the adoption of the Constitution'. As
finally adopted, the proviso reads: 'subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government
established under this Constitution'. This recognition is not mere graciousness but springs form the just character of the government established. The
framers of the Constitution were not obscured by the rhetoric of democracy or swayed to hostility by an intense spirit of nationalism. They well knew
that conservation of our natural resources did not mean destruction or annihilation of acquired property rights. Withal, they erected a government
neither episodic nor stationary but well-nigh conservative in the protection of property rights. This notwithstanding nationalistic and socialistic traits
discoverable upon even a sudden dip into a variety of the provisions embodied in the instrument.
The writer of this decision wishes to state at this juncture that during the deliberation of this case he submitted to the consideration of the Court the
question that may be termed the "vested right saving clause" contained in Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution, but some of the members of this
Court either did not agree with the theory of the writer, or were not ready to take a definite stand on the particular point I am now to discuss deferring
our ruling on such debatable question for a better occasion, inasmuch as the determination thereof is not absolutely necessary for the solution of the
problem involved in this case. In his desire to face the issues squarely, the writer will endeavor, at least as a disgression, to explain and develop his
theory, not as a lucubration of the Court, but of his own, for he deems it better and convenient to go over the cycle of reasons that are linked to one
another and that step by step lead Us to conclude as We do in the dispositive part of this decision.
It will be noticed that Section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides, among other things, that "all agricultural lands of the public domain and
their disposition shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations at least 60 per centum of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens, SUBJECT TO ANY EXISTING RIGHT AT THE TIME OF THE INAUGURATION OF THE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED UNDER
THIS CONSTITUTION."
As recounted by Mr. Justice Laurel in the aforementioned case of Gold Creek Mining Corporation vs. Rodriguez et al., 66 Phil. 259, "this recognition
(in the clause already quoted), is not mere graciousness but springs from the just character of the government established. The farmers of the
Constitution were not obscured by the rhetoric of democracy or swayed to hostility by an intense spirit of nationalism. They well knew that
conservation of our natural resources did not mean destruction or annihilation of ACQUIRED PROPERTY RIGHTS".
But respondents' counsel may argue that the preexisting right of acquisition of public or private lands by a corporation which does not fulfill this 60
per cent requisite, refers to purchases of the Constitution and not to later transactions. This argument would imply that even assuming that petitioner
had at the time of the enactment of the Constitution the right to purchase real property or right could not be exercised after the effectivity of our
Constitution, because said power or right of corporations sole, like the herein petitioner, conferred in virtue of the aforequoted provisions of the
Corporation Law, could no longer be exercised in view of the requisite therein prescribed that at least 60 per centum of the capital of the corporation
had to be Filipino. It has been shown before that: (1) the corporation sole, unlike the ordinary corporations which are formed by no less than 5
incorporators, is composed of only one persons, usually the head or bishop of the diocese, a unit which is not subject to expansion for the purpose of
determining any percentage whatsoever; (2) the corporation sole is only the administrator and not the owner of the temporalities located in the
territory comprised by said corporation sole; (3) such temporalities are administered for and on behalf of the faithful residing in the diocese or
territory of the corporation sole; and (4) the latter, as such, has no nationality and the citizenship of the incumbent Ordinary has nothing to do with
the operation, management or administration of the corporation sole, nor effects the citizenship of the faithful connected with their respective
dioceses or corporation sole.
In view of these peculiarities of the corporation sole, it would seem obvious that when the specific provision of the Constitution invoked by
respondent Commissioner (section 1, Art. XIII), was under consideration, the framers of the same did not have in mind or overlooked this particular
form of corporation. If this were so, as the facts and circumstances already indicated tend to prove it to be so, then the inescapable conclusion would
be that this requirement of at least 60 per cent of Filipino capital was never intended to apply to corporations sole, and the existence or not a vested
right becomes unquestionably immaterial.
But let us assumed that the questioned proviso is material. yet We might say that a reading of said Section 1 will show that it does not refer to any
actual acquisition of land up to the right, qualification or power to acquire and hold private real property. The population of the Philippines, Catholic
to a high percentage, is ever increasing. In the practice of religion of their faithful the corporation sole may be in need of more temples where to pray,
more schools where the children of the congregation could be taught in the principles of their religion, more hospitals where their sick could be
treated, more hallow or consecrated grounds or cemeteries where Catholics could be buried, many more than those actually existing at the time of the
enactment of our Constitution. This being the case, could it be logically maintained that because the corporation sole which, by express provision of
law, has the power to hold and acquire real estate and personal property of its churches, charitable benevolent, or educational purposes (section 159,
Corporation Law) it has to stop its growth and restrain its necessities just because the corporation sole is a non-stock corporation composed of only
one person who in his unity does not admit of any percentage, especially when that person is not the owner but merely an administrator of the
temporalities of the corporation sole? The writer leaves the answer to whoever may read and consider this portion of the decision.
Anyway, as stated before, this question is not a decisive factor in disposing the case, for even if We were to disregard such saving clause of the
Constitution, which reads: subject to any existing right, grant, etc., at the same time of the inauguration of the Government established under this
Constitution, yet We would have, under the evidence on record, sufficient grounds to uphold petitioner's contention on this matter.
In this case of the Register of Deeds of Rizal vs. Ung Sui Si Temple, 2 G.R. No. L-6776, promulgated May 21, 1955, wherein this question was
considered from a different angle, this Court through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, said:
The fact that the appellant religious organization has no capital stock does not suffice to escape the Constitutional inhibition, since it is admitted that
its members are of foreign nationality. The purpose of the sixty per centum requirement is obviously to ensure that corporation or associations
allowed to acquire agricultural land or to exploit natural resources shall be controlled by Filipinos; and the spirit of the Constitution demands that in
the absence of capital stock, the controlling membership should be composed of Filipino citizens.
In that case respondent-appellant Ung Siu Si Temple was not a corporation sole but a corporation aggregate, i.e., an unregistered organization
operating through 3 trustees, all of Chinese nationality, and that is why this Court laid down the doctrine just quoted. With regard to petitioner, which
likewise is a non-stock corporation, the case is different, because it is a registered corporation sole, evidently of no nationality and registered mainly
to administer the temporalities and manage the properties belonging to the faithful of said church residing in Davao. But even if we were to go over
the record to inquire into the composing membership to determine whether the citizenship requirement is satisfied or not, we would find undeniable
proof that the members of the Roman Catholic Apostolic faith within the territory of Davao are predominantly Filipino citizens. As indicated before,
petitioner has presented evidence to establish that the clergy and lay members of this religion fully covers the percentage of Filipino citizens required
by the Constitution. These facts are not controverted by respondents and our conclusion in this point is sensibly obvious.
Dissenting Opinion—Discussed. — After having developed our theory in the case and arrived at the findings and conclusions already expressed in
this decision. We now deem it proper to analyze and delve into the basic foundation on which the dissenting opinion stands up. Being aware of the
transcendental and far-reaching effects that Our ruling on the matter might have, this case was thoroughly considered from all points of view, the
Court sparing no effort to solve the delicate problems involved herein.
At the deliberations had to attain this end, two ways were open to a prompt dispatch of the case: (1) the reversal of the doctrine We laid down in the
celebrated Krivenko case by excluding urban lots and properties from the group of the term "private agricultural lands" use in this section 5, Article
XIII of the Constitution; and (2) by driving Our reasons to a point that might indirectly cause the appointment of Filipino bishops or Ordinary to head
the corporations sole created to administer the temporalities of the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines. With regard to the first way, a great
majority of the members of this Court were not yet prepared nor agreeable to follow that course, for reasons that are obvious. As to the second way, it
seems to be misleading because the nationality of the head of a diocese constituted as a corporation sole has no material bearing on the functions of
the latter, which are limited to the administration of the temporalities of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the Philippines.
Upon going over the grounds on which the dissenting opinion is based, it may be noticed that its author lingered on the outskirts of the issues, thus
throwing the main points in controversy out of focus. Of course We fully agree, as stated by Professor Aruego, that the framers of our Constitution
had at heart to insure the conservation of the natural resources of Our motherland of Filipino posterity; to serve them as an instrument of national
defense, helping prevent the extension into the country of foreign control through peaceful economic penetration; and to prevent making the
Philippines a source of international conflicts with the consequent danger to its internal security and independence. But all these precautions adopted
by the Delegates to Our Constitutional Assembly could have not been intended for or directed against cases like the one at bar. The emphasis and
wonderings on the statement that once the capacity of a corporation sole to acquire private agricultural lands is admitted there will be no limit to the
areas that it may hold and that this will pave the way for the "revival or revitalization of religious landholdings that proved so troublesome in our
past", cannot even furnish the "penumbra" of a threat to the future of the Filipino people. In the first place, the right of Filipino citizens, including
those of foreign extraction, and Philippine corporations, to acquire private lands is not subject to any restriction or limit as to quantity or area, and We
certainly do not see any wrong in that. The right of Filipino citizens and corporations to acquire public agricultural lands is already limited by law. In
the second place, corporations sole cannot be considered as aliens because they have no nationality at all. Corporations sole are, under the law, mere
administrators of the temporalities of the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines. In the third place, every corporation, be it aggregate or sole, is
only entitled to purchase, convey, sell, lease, let, mortgage, encumber and otherwise deal with real properties when it is pursuant to or in consonance
with the purposes for which the corporation was formed, and when the transactions of the lawful business of the corporation reasonably and
necessarily require such dealing — section 13-(5) of the Corporation Law, Public Act No. 1459 — and considering these provisions in conjunction
with Section 159 of the same law which provides that a corporation sole may only "purchase and hold real estate and personal properties for its
church, charitable, benevolent or educational purposes", the above mentioned fear of revitalization of religious landholdings in the Philippines is
absolutely dispelled. The fact that the law thus expressly authorizes the corporations sole to receive bequests or gifts of real properties (which were
the main source that the friars had to acquire their big haciendas during the Spanish regime), is a clear indication that the requisite that bequests or
gifts of real estate be for charitable, benevolent, or educational purposes, was, in the opinion of the legislators, considered sufficient and adequate
protection against the revitalization of religious landholdings.
Finally, and as previously stated, We have reason to believe that when the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention drafted and approved Article
XIII of the Constitution they do not have in mind the corporation sole. We come to this finding because the Constitutional Assembly, composed as it
was by a great number of eminent lawyers and jurists, was like any other legislative body empowered to enact either the Constitution of the country
or any public statute, presumed to know the conditions existing as to particular subject matter when it enacted a statute (Board of Commerce of
Orange Country vs. Bain, 92 S.E. 176; N. C. 377).
Immemorial customs are presumed to have been always in the mind of the Legislature in enacting legislation. (In re Kruger's Estate, 121 A. 109; 277
P. 326).
The Legislative is presumed to have a knowledge of the state of the law on the subjects upon which it legislates. (Clover Valley Land and Stock Co.
vs. Lamb et al., 187, p. 723,726.)
The Court in construing a statute, will assume that the legislature acted with full knowledge of the prior legislation on the subject and its construction
by the courts. (Johns vs. Town of Sheridan, 89 N. E. 899, 44 Ind. App. 620.).
The Legislature is presumed to have been familiar with the subject with which it was dealing . . . . (Landers vs. Commonwealth, 101 S. E. 778, 781.).
The Legislature is presumed to know principles of statutory construction. (People vs. Lowell, 230 N. W. 202, 250 Mich. 349, followed in P. vs.
Woodworth, 230 N.W. 211, 250 Mich. 436.).
It is not to be presumed that a provision was inserted in a constitution or statute without reason, or that a result was intended inconsistent with the
judgment of men of common sense guided by reason" (Mitchell vs. Lawden, 123 N.E. 566, 288 Ill. 326.) See City of Decatur vs. German, 142 N. E.
252, 310 Ill. 591, and may other authorities that can be cited in support hereof.
Consequently, the Constitutional Assembly must have known:
1. That a corporation sole is organized by and composed of a single individual, the head of any religious society or church operating within the zone,
area or jurisdiction covered by said corporation sole (Article 155, Public Act No. 1459);
2. That a corporation sole is a non-stock corporation;
3. That the Ordinary ( the corporation sole proper) does not own the temporalities which he merely administers;
4. That under the law the nationality of said Ordinary or of any administrator has absolutely no bearing on the nationality of the person desiring to
acquire real property in the Philippines by purchase or other lawful means other than by hereditary succession, who according to the Constitution
must be a Filipino (sections 1 and 5, Article XIII).
5. That section 159 of the Corporation Law expressly authorized the corporation sole to purchase and holdreal estate for its church, charitable,
benevolent or educational purposes, and to receive bequests or gifts for such purposes;
6. That in approving our Magna Carta the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention, almost all of whom were Roman Catholics, could not have
intended to curtail the propagation of the Roman Catholic faith or the expansion of the activities of their church, knowing pretty well that with the
growth of our population more places of worship, more schools where our youth could be taught and trained; more hallow grounds where to bury our
dead would be needed in the course of time.
Long before the enactment of our Constitution the law authorized the corporations sole even to receive bequests or gifts of real estates and this Court
could not, without any clear and specific provision of the Constitution, declare that any real property donated, let as say this year, could no longer be
registered in the name of the corporation sole to which it was conveyed. That would be an absurdity that should not receive our sanction on the
pretext that corporations sole which have no nationality and are non-stock corporations composed of only one person in the capacity of administrator,
have to establish first that at least sixty per centum of their capital belong to Filipino citizens. The new Civil Code even provides:
ART. 10. — In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
Moreover, under the laws of the Philippines, the administrator of the properties of a Filipino can acquire, in the name of the latter, private lands
without any limitation whatsoever, and that is so because the properties thus acquired are not for and would not belong to the administrator but to the
Filipino whom he represents. But the dissenting Justice inquires: If the Ordinary is only the administrator, for whom does he administer? And who
can alter or overrule his acts? We will forthwith proceed to answer these questions. The corporations sole by reason of their peculiar constitution and
form of operation have no designed owner of its temporalities, although by the terms of the law it can be safely implied that the Ordinary holds
them in trust for the benefit of the Roman Catholic faithful to their respective locality or diocese. Borrowing the very words of the law, We may say
that the temporalities of every corporation sole are held in trust for the use, purpose, behalf and benefit of the religious society, or order so
incorporated or of the church to which the diocese, synod, or district organization is an organized and constituent part (section 163 of the
Corporation Law).
In connection with the powers of the Ordinary over the temporalities of the corporation sole, let us see now what is the meaning and scope of the
word "control". According to the Merriam-Webster's New International Dictionary, 2nd ed., p. 580, on of the acceptations of the word "control" is:
4. To exercise restraining or directing influence over; to dominate; regulate; hence, to hold from action; to curb; subject; also, Obs. — to overpower.
SYN: restrain, rule, govern, guide, direct; check, subdue.
It is true that under section 159 of the Corporation Law, the intervention of the courts is not necessary, to mortgageor sell real property held by the
corporation sole where the rules, regulations and discipline of the religious denomination, society or church concerned presented by such corporation
sole regulates the methods of acquiring, holding, selling and mortgaging real estate, and that the Roman Catholic faithful residing in the jurisdiction
of the corporation sole has no say either in the manner of acquiring or of selling real property. It may be also admitted that the faithful of the diocese
cannot govern or overrule the acts of the Ordinary, but all this does not mean that the latter can administer the temporalities of the corporation sole
without check or restraint. We must not forget that when a corporation sole is incorporated under Philippine laws, the head and only member thereof
subjects himself to the jurisdiction of the Philippine courts of justice and these tribunals can thus entertain grievances arising out of or with respect to
the temporalities of the church which came into the possession of the corporation sole as administrator. It may be alleged that the courts cannot
intervene as to the matters of doctrine or teachings of the Roman Catholic Church. That is correct, but the courts may step in, at the instance of the
faithful for whom the temporalities are being held in trust, to check undue exercise by the corporation sole of its power as administrator to insure that
they are used for the purpose or purposes for which the corporation sole was created.
American authorities have these to say:
It has been held that the courts have jurisdiction over an action brought by persons claiming to be members of a church, who allege a wrongful and
fraudulent diversion of the church property to uses foreign to the purposes of the church, since no ecclesiastical question is involved and equity will
protect from wrongful diversion of the property (Hendryx vs. Peoples United Church, 42 Wash. 336, 4 L.R.A. — n.s. — 1154).
The courts of the State have no general jurisdiction and control over the officers of such corporations in respect to the performance of their official
duties; but as in respect to the property which they hold for the corporation, they stand in position of TRUSTEES and the courts may exercise the
same supervision as in other cases of trust (Ramsey vs. Hicks, 174 Ind. 428, 91 N.E. 344, 92 N.E. 164, 30 L.R.A. — n.s. — 665; Hendryx vs.
Peoples United Church, supra.).
Courts of the state do not interfere with the administration of church rules or discipline unless civil rights become involved and which must be
protected (Morris St., Baptist Church vs. Dart, 67 S.C. 338, 45 S.E. 753, and others). (All cited in Vol. II, Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, p. 960-
964.).
If the Constitutional Assembly was aware of all the facts above enumerated and of the provisions of law relative to existing conditions as to
management and operation of corporations sole in the Philippines, and if, on the other hand, almost all of the Delegates thereto embraced the Roman
Catholic faith, can it be imagined even for an instant that when Article XIII of the Constitution was approved the framers thereof intended to prevent
or curtail from then on the acquisition sole, either by purchase or donation, of real properties that they might need for the propagation of the faith and
for there religious and Christian activities such as the moral education of the youth, the care, attention and treatment of the sick and the burial of the
dead of the Roman Catholic faithful residing in the jurisdiction of the respective corporations sole? The mere indulgence in said thought would
impress upon Us a feeling of apprehension and absurdity. And that is precisely the leit motiv that permeates the whole fabric of the dissenting
opinion.
It seems from the foregoing that the main problem We are confronted with in this appeal, hinges around the necessity of a proper and adequate
interpretation of sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution. Let Us then be guided by the principles of statutory construction laid down by
the authorities on the matter:
The most important single factor in determining the intention of the people from whom the constitution emanated is the language in which it is
expressed. The words employed are to be taken in their natural sense, except that legal or technical terms are to be given their technical meaning. The
imperfections of language as a vehicle for conveying meanings result in ambiguities that must be resolved by result to extraneous aids for discovering
the intent of the framers. Among the more important of these are a consideration of the history of the times when the provision was adopted and of
the purposes aimed at in its adoption. The debates of constitutional convention, contemporaneous construction, and practical construction by the
legislative and executive departments, especially if long continued, may be resorted to resolve, but not to create, ambiguities. . . . Consideration of
the consequences flowing from alternative constructions of doubtful provisions constitutes an important interpretative device. . . . The purposes of
many of the broadly phrased constitutional limitations were the promotion of policies that do not lend themselves to definite and specific formulation.
The courts have had to define those policies and have often drawn on natural law and natural rights theories in doing so. The interpretation of
constitutions tends to respond to changing conceptions of political and social values. The extent to which these extraneous aids affect the judicial
construction of constitutions cannot be formulated in precise rules, but their influence cannot be ignored in describing the essentials of the process
(Rottschaeffer on Constitutional Law, 1939 ed., p. 18-19).
There are times that when even the literal expression of legislation may be inconsistent with the general objectives of policy behind it, and on the
basis of equity or spirit of the statute the courts rationalize a restricted meaning of the latter. A restricted interpretation is usually applied where the
effect of literal interpretation will make for injustice and absurdity or, in the words of one court, the language must be so unreasonable 'as to shock
general common sense'. (Vol. 3, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., 150.).
A constitution is not intended to be a limitation on the development of a country nor an obstruction to its progress and foreign relations (Moscow Fire
Ins. Co. of Moscow, Russia vs. Bank of New York and Trust Co., 294 N. Y. S.648; 56 N.E. 2d. 745, 293 N.Y. 749).
Although the meaning or principles of a constitution remain fixed and unchanged from the time of its adoption, a constitution must be construed as if
intended to stand for a great length of time, and it is progressive and not static. Accordingly, it should not receive too narrow or literal an
interpretation but rather the meaning given it should be applied in such manner as to meet new or changed conditions as they arise (U.S. vs. Lassic,
313 U.S. 299, 85 L. Ed., 1368).
Effect should be given to the purpose indicated by a fair interpretation of the language used and that construction which effectuates, rather than that
which destroys a plain intent or purpose of a constitutional provision, is not only favored but will be adopted (State ex rel. Randolph Country vs.
Walden, 206 S.W. 2d 979).
It is quite generally held that in arriving at the intent and purpose the construction should be broad or liberal or equitable, as the better method of
ascertaining that intent, rather than technical (Great Southern Life Ins. Co. vs. City of Austin, 243 S.W. 778).
All these authorities uphold our conviction that the framers of the Constitution had not in mind the corporations sole, nor intended to apply them the
provisions of section 1 and 5 of said Article XIII when they passed and approved the same. And if it were so as We think it is, herein petitioner, the
Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., could not be deprived of the right to acquire by purchase or donation real properties for
charitable, benevolent and educational purposes, nor of the right to register the same in its name with the Register of Deeds of Davao, an
indispensable requisite prescribed by the Land Registration Act for lands covered by the Torrens system.
We leave as the last theme for discussion the much debated question above referred to as "the vested right saving clause" contained in section 1,
Article XIII of the Constitution. The dissenting Justice hurls upon the personal opinion expressed on the matter by the writer of the decision the most
pointed darts of his severe criticism. We think, however, that this strong dissent should have been spared, because as clearly indicated before, some
members of this Court either did not agree with the theory of the writer or were not ready to take a definite stand on that particular point, so that there
being no majority opinion thereon there was no need of any dissension therefrom. But as the criticism has been made the writer deems it necessary to
say a few words of explanation.
The writer fully agrees with the dissenting Justice that ordinarily "a capacity to acquire (property) in futuro, is not in itself a vested or existing
property right that the Constitution protects from impairment. For a property right to be vested (or acquired) there must be a transition from
the potential or contingent to the actual, and the proprietary interest must have attached to a thing; it must have become 'fixed and established'"
(Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498). But the case at bar has to be considered as an exception to the rule because among the rights granted by section
159 of the Corporation Law was the right to receive bequests or gifts of real properties for charitable, benevolent and educational purposes. And this
right to receive such bequests or gifts (which implies donations in futuro), is not a mere potentiality that could be impaired without any specific
provision in the Constitution to that effect, especially when the impairment would disturbingly affect the propagation of the religious faith of the
immense majority of the Filipino people and the curtailment of the activities of their Church. That is why the writer gave us a basis of his contention
what Professor Aruego said in his book "The Framing of the Philippine Constitution" and the enlightening opinion of Mr. Justice Jose P. Laurel,
another Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, in his concurring opinion in the case of Goldcreek Mining Co. vs. Eulogio Rodriguez et al., 66
Phil. 259. Anyway the majority of the Court did not deem necessary to pass upon said "vested right saving clause" for the final determination of this
case.
JUDGMENT
Wherefore, the resolution of the respondent Land Registration Commission of September 21, 1954, holding that in view of the provisions of sections
1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Philippine Constitution the vendee (petitioner) is not qualified to acquire lands in the Philippines in the absence of proof
that at least 60 per centum of the capital, properties or assets of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc. is actually owned or
controlled by Filipino citizens, and denying the registration of the deed of sale in the absence of proof of compliance with such requisite, is hereby
reversed. Consequently, the respondent Register of Deeds of the City of Davao is ordered to register the deed of sale executed by Mateo L. Rodis in
favor of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., which is the subject of the present litigation. No pronouncement is made as to
costs. It is so ordered.
Bautista Angelo and Endencia, JJ., concur.
Paras, C.J., and Bengzon, J., concur in the result.
LABRADOR, J., concurring:
The case at bar squarely present this important legal question: Has the bishop or ordinary of the Roman Catholic Church who is not a Filipino citizen,
as corporation sole, the right to register land, belonging to the Church over which he presides, in view of the Krivenko decision? Mr. Justice Felix
sustains the affirmative view while Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, the negative. As the undersigned understands it, the reason given for this last view is
that the constitutional provision prohibiting land ownership by foreigners also extends to control because this lies within the scope and purpose of the
prohibition.
To our way of thinking, the question at issue depends for its resolution upon another, namely, who is the owner of the land or property of the Church
sought to be registered? Under the Canon Law the parish and the diocese have the right to acquire and own property.
SEC. 1. La Iglesia catolica y la Sede Apostolica, libre e independientemente de la potestad civil, tiene derecho innato de adquirir, retener y
administrar bienes temporales para el logro de sus propios fines.
SEC. 2. Tambien las iglesias particulares y demas personas morales erigidas por la autoridad eclesiastica en persona juridica, tienen derecho, a tenor
de los sagrados canones, de adquirir, retener y administrar bienes temporales. (Canon 1495) (Codigo de Derecho Canonico por Miguelez-Alonzo-
Cabreros, 4a ed., p. 562.).
The Canon Law further states that Church property belongs to the non-collegiate moral person called the parish, or to the diocese.
In canon law the ownership of ecclesiastical goods belongs to each separate juridical person in the Church (C. 1499). The property of St. John's
Church does not belong to the Pope, the bishop, the pastor, or even to the people of the parish. It belongs to the non-collegiate moral person called
the parish, which has been lawfully erected. It is not like a stock company. The civil law does not recognize this canonical principle; it insists on an
act of civil incorporation or some other legal device. (Ready Answers in Canon Law by Rev. P.J. Lydon, DD., 3rd ed., 1948, p. 576.).
Parish. 3. A portion or subdivision of a diocese committed to the spiritual jurisdiction or care of a priest or minister, called rector or pastor. In the
Protestant Episcopal Church, it is a territorial division usually following civil bounds, as those of a town. In the Roman Catholic Church, it is usually
territorial, but whenever, as in some parts of the United States there are different rites and languages, the boundaries and jurisdiction are determined
by right or language; as, a Ruthenian or Polish parish. "5. The inhabitants or members of a parish, collectively.
Diocese. 3. Eccl. The circuit or extent of a bishop's jurisdiction; the district in which a bishop has authority. (Webster's New International
Dictionary).
We are aware of the fact that some writers believe that ownership of ecclesiastical properties resides in the Roman Catholic Pontiff as Head of the
Universal Church, but the better opinion seems to be that they do belong to the parishes and diocese as above indicated.
Canonists entertain different opinions as to the person in whom the ownership of the ecclesiastical properties is vested, with respect to which we
shall, for our purpose, confine ourselves to stating with Donoso that, while many doctors cited by Fagnano believe that it resides in the Roman
Pontiff as Head of the Universal Church, it is more probable that ownership, strictly speaking, does not reside in the latter and, consequently,
ecclesiastical properties are owned by the churches, institutions and canonically established private corporations to which said properties have been
donated. (3 Campos y Pulido, Legislacion y Jurisprudencia Canonica, P. 420, cited in Trinidad vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 63 Phil.,
881, 888-889.).
The property in question, therefore, appears to belong to the parish or the diocese of Davao. But the Roman Catholics of Davao are not organized as a
juridical person, either under the Canon law or under the Civil Law. Neither is there any provision in either for their organization as a juridical
person. Registration of the property in the name of the Roman Catholics of Davao is, therefore, impossible.
As under the Civil Law, however, the organization of parishes and dioceses as juridical persons is not expressly provided for, the corporation law has
set up the fiction known as the "corporation sole."
It tolerates the corporation sole wherever and as long as the state law does not permit the legal incorporation of the parish or diocese. The bishop
officially is the legal owner. (Ready Answers in Canon Law, supra, p. 577.) .
and authorizes it to purchase and hold real estate for the Church.
SEC. 159. Any corporation sole may purchase and hold real estate and personal property for its church, charitable, benevolent, or educational
purposes, and may receive bequests or gifts for such purposes. Such corporation may mortgage or sell real property held by it upon obtaining an
order for that purpose from the Court of First Instance of the province in which the property is situated; but before making the order proof must be
made to the satisfaction of the court that notice of the application for leave to mortgage or sell has been given by publication or otherwise in such
manner and for such time as said court or the judge thereof may have directed, and that it is to the interest of the corporation that leave to mortgage or
sell should be granted. The application for leave to mortgage or sell must be made by petition, duly verified by the bishop, chief priest, or presiding
elder, acting as corporation sole, and may be opposed by any member of the religious denomination, society, or church represented by the
corporation sole: Provided, however, That in cases when the rules, regulations and discipline of the religious denomination, society or church
concerned represented by such corporation sole regulate the methods of acquiring, holding, selling, and mortgaging real estate and personal property,
such rules, regulations, and discipline shall control and the intervention of the courts shall not be necessary. (The Corporation Law.)
And in accordance with the above section, temporalities of the Church or of parish or a diocese are allowed to be registered in the name of the
corporation sole for purposes of administration and in trust for the real owners.
The mere fact that the Corporation Law authorizes the corporation sole to acquire and hold real estate or other property does not make the latter the
real owner thereof, as his tenure of Church property is merely for the purposes of administration. As stated above, the bishop is only the legal
(technical) owner or trustee, the parish or diocese being the beneficial owner, or cestui que trust.
Having arrived at the conclusion that the property in question belongs actually either to the parish or to the dioceses of Davao, the next question that
possess for solution is, In case of said property, whose nationality must be considered for the purpose of determining the applicability of the
constitutional provision limiting ownership of land to Filipinos, that of the bishop or chief priest who registers as corporation sole, or that of the
constituents of the parish or diocese who are the beneficial owners of the land? We believe that of a latter must be considered, and not that of the
priest clothed with the corporate fiction and denominated as the corporation sole. The corporation sole is a mere contrivance to enable a church to
acquire, own and manage properties belonging to the church. It is only a means to an end. The constitutional provision could not have been meant to
apply to the means through which and by which property may be owned or acquired, but to the ultimate owner of the property. Hence, the citizenship
of the priest forming the corporation sole should be no impediment if the parish or diocese which owns the property is qualified to own and possess
the property.
We can take judicial notice of the fact that a great majority of the constituents of the parish or diocese of Davao are Roman Catholics. The affidavit
demanded is therefore, a mere formality.
The dissenting opinion sustains the proposition that control, not actual ownership, is the factor that determines whether the constitutional prohibition
against alien ownership of lands should or should not apply. We may assume the correctness of the proposition that the Holy See exercises control
cannot be real and actual but merely theoretical. In any case, the constitutional prohibition is limited by its terms to ownership and ownership alone.
And should the corporation sole abuse its powers and authority in relation to the administration or disposal of the property contrary to the wishes of
the constituents of the parish or the diocese, the act may always be questioned as ultra vires.
We agree, therefore, with the reversal of the order.
Montemayor and Reyes, A., JJ., concur.
REYES, J.B.L., dissenting:
I regret not being able to assent to the opinion of Mr. Justice Felix. The decision of the Supreme Court in this case will be of far reaching results, for
once the capacity of corporations sole to acquire public and private agricultural lands is admitted, there will be no limit to the areas they may hold
until the Legislature implements section 3 of Article XIII of the Constitution, empowering it to set a limit to the size of private agricultural land that
may be held; and even then it can only be done without prejudice to rights acquired prior to the enactment of such law. In other words, even if a
limitative law is adopted, it will not affect the landholdings acquired before the law become effective, no matter how vast the estate should be.
The Constitutional restrictions to the acquisition of agricultural land are well known:
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization
shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this
Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the
exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for
another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water
power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant. (Article XII, Constitution of the Phil.).
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. (Art. XII, Constitution of the Phil.).
In requiring corporations or associations to have sixty per cent (60%) of their capital owned by Filipino citizens, the constitution manifestly
disregarded the corporate fiction, i.e., the juridical personality of such corporations or associations. It went behind the corporate entity and looked at
the natural persons that composed it, and demanded that a clear majority in interest (60%) should be Filipino. To me this was done to ensure that the
control of its properties (not merely the beneficial ownership thereof) remained in Filipino hands. (Aruego, Framing of the Constitution, Vol. 2. pp.
604, 606.) .
The nationalization of the natural resources of the country was intended (1) to insure their conservation for Filipino posterity; (2) to serve as an
instrument of national defense, helping prevent the extension into the country of foreign control through peaceful economic penetration; and (3) to
prevent making the Philippines a source of international conflicts with the consequent danger to its internal security and independence. . . .
The convention permitted aliens to acquire an interest in the natural resources of the country and in private agricultural lands as component elements
of corporations or associations. The maximum limit of interest that they could hold in a corporation or association would be only forty per centum of
the capital. Accordingly the control of the corporation or association would remain in Filipino hands.
In its report the committee on nationalization and preservation of lands and other natural resources recommended that the maximum limit of interest
that aliens could hold in a corporation or association should be only twenty-five per centum of the capital. The purpose of the committee was to
enable Filipino-controlled corporations or associations, if necessary, to interest aliens to join their technical or managerial staff by giving them a part
interest in the same. The sub-committee of seven embodied this recommendation in the first draft of the Constitution; but in the revised article on
General Provisions, it raised the amount to forty per centum. (emphasis supplied.)
It was in recognition of this basic rule that we held in Register of Deeds vs. Ung Siu Si Temple, 51 Off. Gaz. p. 2866, that if the association had no
capital, its controlling membership must be composed of Filipinos. Because ownership divorced from control is not true ownership.
From these premises it can be deduced that the preliminary question to be decide by the court is the following: what and who exercises the power of
control in the corporation sole known as "The Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc."?.
Under section 155 of the Corporation Law, the bishop, or other religious head, as corporation sole, is "charged with the administration of the
temporalities of his church." It becomes then pertinent to inquire: if he is only an administrator, for whom does he administer? And who can alter or
overrule his acts?
If his acts as administrator can not be overridden, or altered, except by himself, then obviously the control of the corporation and its temporalities is
in the bishop himself, and he must be a Filipino citizen. If, on the other hand, the final say as to management, exploitation, encumbrance or
disposition of the temporalities resides in another individual or body of individuals, then the control resides there. To possess constitutional capacity
to acquire agricultural land or other natural resources, that body making the final decision for the corporation must have at least 60 per cent Filipino
membership.
By this test, the body of members professing the Catholic faith in the diocese of Davao does not constitute the controlling membership. For under the
rules of the Roman Catholic Church the faithful can not control the acts of the Ordinary; they cannot override his decision, just as they do not elect or
remove him. Only his hierarchical superiors can do that; the control is from above, not from below. Hence, the fact that 90 per cent (or even 100 per
cent) of the faithful in the diocese should be composed of Filipino citizens is totally devoid of significance from the standpoint of the constitutional
restrictions in question (see Codex, Canons 1518 and 1530, paragraph 1, No. 3).
Moreover, I do not think that the body of Catholic faithful in the Davao diocese can be taken, for the purpose here under consideration, as the Church
represented by the Ordinary of Davao. That body does not constitute an entity or unit separate and apart from the rest of the faithful throughout the
world that compose the Roman Catholic Church that has always claimed ecumenical (universal) character. There is nom Catholic Church of Davao
district and independent of the Catholic Church of Manila, Lipa or Rome. All those professing Catholic faith are members of only one single church
or religious group. Thus the Iglesia Filipina Independiente is not part of the Catholic Church, precisely because of its independence.
If, the, the Catholic Church of Davao is part and parcel of the universal Catholic Church, it can not be considered separate and apart from it in this
case. And if considered with it, obviously the condition of 60 per cent Filipino membership is not satisfied when all the Catholic faithful in the world
are taken into account.
The unity and singleness of the various diocese of the church appears expressly recognized in section 163 of the Corporation Law, which provides
that the corporation (sole) shall hold the temporalities, not for the diocese; but for the benefit "of the church of which the diocese — is an organized
or constituent part."
SEC. 163. The right to administer all temporalities and all property held or owned by a religious order or society, or by the diocese synod, or district
organization of any religious denomination or church shall, on its incorporation, pass to the corporation and shall be held in trust for the use purpose,
behalf, and benefit of the religious society or order so incorporated or of the church of which the diocese, synod, or district organization is an
organized and constituent part.
So that, even from the standpoint of beneficial ownership, the dioceses of Davao can not be viewed as a group legally isolated from the Catholic
Church as a whole.
Nor does court control over the acts of the corporation sole constitute a guarantee of Filipino control that would satisfy the purposes of the
constitution, for the reason that under section 159 (last proviso) of the Corporation law, the court intervention is dispensed with where the rules and
discipline of the church already regulate the acquisition and disposition of real estate and personal property.
Provided however, that in cases where the rules, regulations and discipline of the religious denomination, society, or church concerned represented by
such corporation sole regulate the methods of acquiring, holding, selling, and mortgaging real estate and personal property, such rules, regulations,
and discipline shall control and the intervention of the courts shall not be necessary. (emphasis supplied.)
It is argued that a distinction must be drawn between the lands to be devoted to purely religious purposes and the lands held in ordinary ownership.
But where in the Constitution is such a distinction drawn? Under it, capacity to acquire agricultural land for the erection of a church is capacity to
acquire agricultural lands for any lawful purpose, whether it be for convents or schools or seminaries or haciendas for their support or land to be held
solely for enjoyment of the revenue. Once the capacity to acquire is granted, the way is paved for the revitalization of religious landholdings that
proved so troublesome in our past. I cannot conceive that the Constitution intended to revive them.
It is also argued that, before the Constitution was adopted, the corporations sole had, by express statute, the right to acquire agricultural land; and that
the Constitution was not intended to destroy such "acquired property rights." If followed, the argument destroys the constitutional restrictions. All
aliens had a capacity to acquire agricultural land before the Constitution came into effect, because no prohibition existed previously. Must their right
to acquire and hold agricultural land be conceded in spite of the Constitution?.
That the law should have expressly conferred capacity to acquire land upon corporations sole was not due any special predilection for them; it was
exclusively due to the principle that corporation, as artificial entities, have no inherent rights, but only those granted by the sovereign. Unless
conferred, the corporate right would not exist.
Furthermore, a capacity to acquire in futuro, is not in itself a vested existing property right that the Constitution protects from impairment. For a
property right to be vested (or acquired) there must be a transition from the potential, or contingent, to the actual, and the proprietary interest must
have attached to a thing, it must have become "fixed or established "(Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498). If mere potentialities cannot be impaired,
then the law would become unchangeable, for every variation in it will reduce some one's legal ability to do or not to do. Already in Benguet
Consolidated vs. Pineda, 3 52 Off. Gaz. 1961, we have ruled that no one has a vested right in statutory privileges or exemptions. And in the
concurring opinion in Gold Creek Mining Corp. vs. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259 (cited by Justice Felix), Mr. Justice Laurel squarely declared that
"contingency or expectation is neither property right." (cas. cit., p. 269.) Finally, the point is also made that the Ordinary, as religious corporation
sole, has no citizenship, and is not an alien. The answer is that under the Constitution of the Republic, it is not enough that the acquirer of agricultural
land be not an alien; he must be a Filipino or controlled by Filipinos.
Wherefore, I am constrained to conclude:
(1) That the capacity of religious corporations sole to acquire agricultural land depends upon 60 per cent Filipino membership of the group or body
exercising control of the corporation;lawphi1.net
(2) That if control of any such corporation should be vested in a single person, then such person must be a Filipino citizen;1awphi1.net
(3) That in the absence of evidence on these points, the order appealed from, denying registration of the conveyance, should be affirmed.
Concepcion, J., concur.

Footnotes
1 Translation. — Unless by lawful provisions more ample rights are conferred upon him, to the local Ordinary pertains the duty to exercise diligence
in the administration of all the ecclesiastical properties located within the territory and to avoid their removal from his jurisdiction.
Taking into account the rights and the legitimate customs and circumstances, every Ordinary shall endeavor to regulate everything concerning the
administration of the ecclesiastical properties and shall give, within the bonds of Common Law, timely and particular instructions therefor.
2 97 Phil., 58.
3 98 Phil., 711.

G.R. No. L-33048 April 16, 1982

EPIFANIA SARSOSA VDA. DE BARSOBIA and PACITA W. VALLAR, petitioners,
vs.
VICTORIANO T. CUENCO, respondent.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Sought to be reviewed herein is the judgment dated August 18, 1970, of the Court of Appeals, 1 rendered in CA-G.R. No. 41318-R, entitled
"Victoriano T. Cuenco, Plaintiff-appellant, vs. Epifania Sarsosa Vda. de Barsobia and Pacita W. Vallar, Defendants- appellees, " declaring
Victoriano T. Cuenco (now the respondent) as the absolute owner of the coconut land in question.
The lot in controversy is a one-half portion (on the northern side) of two adjoining parcels of coconut land located at Barrio Mancapagao, Sagay,
Camiguin, Misamis Oriental (now Camiguin province), with an area of 29,150 square meters, more or less. 2
The entire land was owned previously by a certain Leocadia Balisado, who had sold it to the spouses Patricio Barsobia (now deceased) and Epifania
Sarsosa, one of the petitioners herein. They are Filipino citizens.
On September 5, 1936, Epifania Sarsosa then a widow, sold the land in controversy to a Chinese, Ong King Po, for the sum of P1,050.00 (Exhibit
"B"). Ong King Po took actual possession and enjoyed the fruits thereof.
On August 5, 1961, Ong King Po sold the litigated property to Victoriano T. Cuenco (respondent herein), a naturalized Filipino, for the sum of
P5,000.00 (Exhibit "A"). Respondent immediately took actual possession and harvested the fruits therefrom.
On March 6, 1962, Epifania "usurped" the controverted property, and on July 26, 1962, Epifania (through her only daughter and child, Emeteria
Barsobia), sold a one-half (1/2) portion of the land in question to Pacita W. Vallar, the other petitioner herein (Exhibit "2"). Epifania claimed that it
was not her intention to sell the land to Ong King Po and that she signed the document of sale merely to evidence her indebtedness to the latter in the
amount of P1,050.00. Epifania has been in possession ever since except for the portion sold to the other petitioner Pacita.
On September 19, 1962, respondent filed a Forcible Entry case against Epifania before the Municipal Court of Sagay, Camiguin. The case was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction since, as the laws then stood, the question of possession could not be properly determined without first settling that
of ownership.
On December 27, 1966, respondent instituted before the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental a Complaint for recovery of possession and
ownership of the litigated land, against Epifania and Pacita Vallar (hereinafter referred to simply as petitioners).
In their Answer below, petitioners insisted that they were the owners and possessors of the litigated land; that its sale to Ong King Po, a Chinese, was
inexistent and/or void ab initio; and that the deed of sale between them was only an evidence of Epifania's indebtedness to Ong King Po.
The trial Court rendered judgment:
1. Dismissing the complaint with costs against plaintiff (respondent herein).
2. Declaring the two Deeds of Sale, Exhibits A and B, respectively, inexistent and void from the beginning; and
3. Declaring defendant Pacita W. Vallar as the lawful owner and possessor of the portion of land she bought from Emeteria Barsobia (pp. 57, 67,
Record.) 3
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the aforementioned Decision and decreed instead that respondent was the owner of the litigated property,
thus:
xxx xxx xxx
In view of all the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed. In lieu thereof, we render judgment:
(a) Declaring the plaintiff-appellant Victoriano T. Cuenco the absolute owner of the land in question, with the right of possession thereof;
(b) Ordering the defendants-appellees to restore the possession of said land to the plaintiff;
(c) Dismissing the defendants' counterclaim;
(d) Condemning the defendants to pay to the plaintiff the sum of
P10,000.00 representing the latter's share from the sale of copra which he failed to receive since March, 1962 when he was deprived of his possession
over the land, and which defendants illegally appropriated it to their own use and benefit, plus legal interest from the filing of the complaint until
fully paid; plus P2,000.00 representing expenses and attorney's fees;
(e) Sentencing the defendants to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 4
Following the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review on certiorari with this Court on January 21,
1971. Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals erred:
I. ... when it reversed the judgment of the trial court declaring petitioner Pacita W. Vallar as the lawful possessor and owner of the portion of land she
purchased from Emeteria Barsobia, not a party to this case, there being no evidence against her.
II ... when it included petitioner Pacita W. Vallar to pay P10,000.00, with legal interest from the filing of the complaint, representing respondent's
share in the harvest and to pay the costs, there being no evidence against her.
III. ... when it condemned petitioners to pay P2,000.00 representing expenses and attorney's fees, there being no factual, legal and equitable
justification.
IV. ... in not applying the rule on pari delicto to the facts of the case or the doctrine enunciated ... in the case of Philippine Banking Corporation vs.
Lui She, L-17587, September 12, 1967, to ... Petitioner Epifania Sarsosa Vda. de Barsobia.
V. ... in denying, for lack of sufficient merits, petitioners' motion for rehearing or reconsideration of its decision. 5
As the facts stand, a parcel of coconut land was sold by its Filipino owner, petitioner Epifania, to a Chinese, Ong King Po, and by the latter to a
naturalized Filipino, respondent herein. In the meantime, the Filipino owner had unilaterally repudiated the sale she had made to the Chinese and had
resold the property to another Filipino. The basic issue is: Who is the rightful owner of the property?
There should be no question that the sale of the land in question in 1936 by Epifania to Ong King Po was inexistent and void from the beginning
(Art. 1409 [7], Civil Code) 6 because it was a contract executed against the mandatory provision of the 1935 Constitution, which is an expression of
public policy to conserve lands for the Filipinos. Said provision reads:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or
associations, qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. 7
Had this been a suit between Epifania and Ong King Po, she could have been declared entitled to the litigated land on the basis, as claimed, of the
ruling in Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Lui She, 8 reading:
... For another thing, and this is not only cogent but also important. Article 1416 of the Civil Code provides as an exception to the rule on pari
delicto that when the agreement is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited, and the prohibition by the law is designed for the protection of the
plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby enhanced, recover what he has sold or delivered. ...
But the factual set-up has changed. The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned by a disqualified
vendee. Respondent, as a naturalized citizen, was constitutionally qualified to own the subject property. There would be no more public policy to be
served in allowing petitioner Epifania to recover the land as it is already in the hands of a qualified person. Applying by analogy the ruling of
this Court in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons: 9
... if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands, as construed by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the
nation's lands for future generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real
estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization.
While, strictly speaking, Ong King Po, private respondent's vendor, had no rights of ownership to transmit, it is likewise inescapable that petitioner
Epifania had slept on her rights for 26 years from 1936 to 1962. By her long inaction or inexcusable neglect, she should be held barred from asserting
her claim to the litigated property (Sotto vs. Teves, 86 SCRA 157 [1978]).
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. (Tijam, et al. vs. Sibonghanoy, et al., No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29,
35). (cited in Sotto vs. Teves, 86 SCRA 154 [1978]).
Respondent, therefore, must be declared to be the rightful owner of the property.
The award of actual damages in respondent's favor of P10,000.00, as well as of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation of P2,000.00, is justified.
Respondent was deprived of the possession of his land and the enjoyment of its fruits from March, 1962. The Court of Appeals fixed respondent's
share of the sale of copra at P10,000.00 for eight years at four (4) harvests a year. The accuracy of this finding has not been disputed.
However, we find merit in the assigned error that petitioner, Pacita Vallar, should not be held also liable for actual damages to respondent. In the
absence of contrary proof, she, too, must be considered as a vendee in good faith of petitioner Epifania.
The award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the sum of P2,000.00 in respondent's favor is in order considering that both petitioners
compelled respondent to litigate for the protection of his interests. Moreover, the amount is reasonable. 10
WHEREFORE, except for that portion holding petitioner, Pacita W. Vallar, also liable for damages of P10,000.00, the appealed judgment is hereby
affirmed.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero and Plana, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Penned by Justice Jose M. Mendoza and concurred in by Justice Magno S. Gatmaitan and Edilberto Soriano.
2 Record on Appeal, pp. 57-58, Rollo, p. 58.
3 p. 7, Petitioners' Brief.
4 Decision, p. 10, Rollo p. 49.
5 Brief for the Petitioners, pp. 1-3, Rollo, p. 71.
6 Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning;
xxx xxx xxx
(7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law.
These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived.
7 Section 5, Article XIII.
8 21 SCRA 52 (1967).
9 96 Phil. 447 (1955).
10 Art. 2208, Civil Code.

G.R. No. 74170 July 18, 1989

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, GUILLERMO GONZALVES,** respondents.
Amando Fabio Jr. for private respondent.

NARVASA, J.:
The chief question presented in the appeal at bar concerns the validity of a conveyance of residential land to an alien prior to his acquisition of
Filipino citizenship by naturalization.
The Trial Court's description of the factual background is largely undisputed. The case principally concerns Chua Kim @ Uy Teng Be, who became a
naturalized Filipino citizen, taking his oath as such, on January 7,1977. 1 He was the adopted son of Gregorio Reyes Uy Un.
The case involved three (3) parcels of land, which were among those included in Land Registration Cases Numbered 405 and 14817 of the Court of
First Instance of Quezon Province: Lots Numbered 1 and 2, plan Psu-57676, 2 and Lot No. 549 of plan AP-7521-identical to Plan Psu-54565. 3 These
were respectively adjudicated in said land registration cases to two persons, as follows:
1) Lots 1 and 2, Psu-57676, to the Spouses Benigno Mañosca and Julia Daguison (in Opposition No. 51 ); 4 and
2) Lot 549, AP-7521 (Psu-54565), to Gaspar Marquez, married to Marcela Masaganda (in opposition No. 155). 5 However, no decree of confirmation
and registration was entered at the time.
Lots 1 and 2, Psu-57676, were sold by the owners, the Mañosca Spouses, to Gregorio Reyes Uy Un on Dec. 30, 1934. 6 Lot 549, Psu-54565, was also
sold by the Marquez Spouses to Gregorio Reyes Uy Un on December 27, 1934. 7
Subsequently, Gregorio Reyes Uy Un died, and his adopted son, Chua Kim @ Uy Teng, took possession of the property.
The three (3) parcels of land above mentioned, together with several others, later became subject of a compromise agreement in a litigation in the
Court of First Instance of Quezon Province, docketed as Civil Case No. C-385. 8 The compromise agreement was executed not only by the parties in
the case (plaintiffs Domingo Reyes and Lourdes Abustan, and the defendants, So Pick, et al.) — respectively described as "First Parties" and "Second
Parties"-but also Chua Kim @ Ting Be Uy, designated therein as "Third Party," although he had not been impleaded as a party to the case. In the
agreement, in consideration of Chua Kim's renunciation (a) of "any right or claim of whatever nature in .. (certain specifically identified) parcels of
land" and (b) of any other claim against the First Parties and Second Parties, both the latter, in turn waived "any claim of ownership or other right in
or to the parcels of land, or the improvements thereon, in Buenavista, Quezon covered by OCT Nos. 3697, 3696, 3439 and 4382 of the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon," in the name of Gregorio Reyes Uy Un, Chua Kim's adoptive father, and that they (the First and Second Parties) "will not oppose
the transfer, by means not contrary to law, of the ownership thereof to the Third Party," said Chua Kim. The compromise agreement was afterwards
submitted to the Court 9 which rendered judgment on July 29,1970 (amended by Order dated July 31, 1970), approving the same. 10
Chua Kim then filed a petition for issuance of decree of confirmation and registration in Land Registration Case No. 405 (LRC Rec. No. 14817) of
the Court of First Instance of Quezon Province.11
After due proceedings, and on the basis of the foregoing facts found to have been duly proven by the evidence, the Court of First Instance of
Quezon 12 promulgated on January 14, 1982 the following Order, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds that herein petitioner Chua Kim alias Uy Teng Be has duly established his registerable title
over the properties in question in this land registration case in so far as Oppositions Nos. 51 and 155 are concerned, and hereby GRANTS his
petition. The decision rendered on January 14, 1933 in so far as Opposition Nos. 51 and 155 are concerned, is hereby amended adjudicating the said
properties, better known now as Lots 1 and 2 of plan Psu-57676 in Opposition No. 51 and as Lot.549 of plan Ap-7521, which is Identical to plan Psu-
54565 in Opposition No. 155, to herein petitioner Chua Kim alias Uy Teng Be. Upon this order becoming final, let the corresponding decrees of
confirmation and registration be entered and thereafter upon payment of the fees required by law, let the corresponding certificate of titles be issued
in the name of petitioner, Chua Kim alias Uy Teng Be, married to Amelia Tan, of legal age, a naturalized Filipino citizen, and a resident of the
Municipality of Buenavista, Province of Quezon, as his own exclusive properties, free from all liens and encumbrances.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, challenged the correctness of the Order and appealed it to the Court of Appeals. That
Court, however, affirmed the Order "in all respects," in a decision promulgated on March 25,1986. 13
Still not satisfied, the Republic has come to this Court on appeal by certiorari, in a final attempt to prevent the adjudication of the property in
question to Chua Kim. The Solicitor General argues that —
1) the deeds and instruments presented by Chua Kim to prove the conveyance to him of the lands in question by the successor-in- interest of the
original adjudicates are inadequate for the purpose; and
2) Chua Kim has not proven his qualification to own private agricultural land at the time of the alleged acquisition of the property in question.
The Republic's theory is that the conveyances to Chua Kim were made while he was still an alien, i.e., prior to his taking oath as a naturalized
Philippine citizen on January 7, 1977, at a time when he was disqualified to acquire ownership of land in the Philippines (ART XIII, SEC. 5, 1935
Constitution; ART. XIV, Sec. 14, 1973 Constitution); hence, his asserted titles are null and void. 14 It is also its contention that reliance on the
decision and amendatory order in Civil Case No. C-385 of the CFI, Rizal15 is unavailing, since neither document declares that the property in
question was adjudicated to Chua Kim as his inheritance from his adoptive father, Gregorio Reyes Uy Un. 16
The conclusions of fact of the Intermediate Appellate Court, sustaining those of the Land Registration Court, reached after analysis and assessment of
the evidence presented at a formal hearing by the parties, are by firmly entrenched rule binding on and may not be reviewed by this Court. 17 Those
facts thus found to exist, and the legal principles subsumed in them, impel rejection of the Republic's appeal.
It is a fact that the lands in dispute were properly and formally adjudicated by a competent Court to the Spouses Gaspar and to the Spouses Marquez
in fee simple, and that the latter had afterwards conveyed said lands to Gregorio Reyes Uy Un, Chua Kim's adopting parent, by deeds executed in due
form on December 27, 1934 and December 30, 1934, respectively. Plainly, the conveyances were made before the 1935 Constitution went into effect,
i.e., at a time when there was no prohibition against acquisition of private agricultural lands by aliens. 18 Gregorio Reyes Uy Un therefore acquired
good title to the lands thus purchased by him, and his ownership was not at all affected either (1) by the principle subsequently enunciated in the
1935 Constitution that aliens were incapacitated to acquire lands in the country, since that constitutional principle has no retrospective
application,19 or (2) by his and his successor's omission to procure the registration of the property prior to the coming into effect of the
Constitution. 20
It is a fact, furthermore, that since the death of Gregorio Reyes Uy Un in San Narciso, Quezon, in 1946, Chua Kim @ Uy Teng Be had been in
continuous possession of the lands in concept of owner, as the putative heir of his adoptive father, said Gregorio Reyes; 21 this, without protest
whatever from any person. It was indeed Chua Kim's being in possession of the property in concept of owner, and his status as adopted son of
Gregorio Reyes, that were the factors that caused his involvement in Civil Case No. C-385 of the CFI at Calauag, Quezon, at the instance of the
original parties thereto, 22 and his participation in the Compromise Agreement later executed by all parties. As already mentioned, that compromise
agreement, approved by judgment rendered on July 29, 1970, 23 implicity recognized Chua Kim's title to the lands in question.
Be this as it may, the acquisition by Chua Kim of Philippine citizenship should foreclose any further debate regarding the title to the property in
controversy, in line with this Court's rulings relative to persons similarly situated. 24 In Sarsosa Vda. de Barsobia v. Cuenco, 113 SCRA 547, for
instance, the ruling was as follows:
... The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned by a disqualified vendee. Respondent, as a naturalized
citizen, was constitutionally qualified to own the subject property. There would be no more public policy to be served in allowing petitioner Epifania
to recover the land as it is already in the hands of a qualified person. Applying by analogy the ruling of this Court in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng
Giap & Sons (96 Phil. 447 [1955]),
... if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands, as construed by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the
nation's land for future generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real
estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, and the judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court subject thereof AFFIRMED in toto. SO
ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
** Actually, Guillermo Gonzalves should not have been impleaded as respondent in this case at all; he was unccessful applicant in the registration
proceedings before the Cadastral Court (Land Reg. Cases No. 405 and 14817), but has not taken part in any of the subsequent proceedings in the
Court of Appeals or this Court. The real party respondent is Chua Kim @ Uy Teng Be, who was also a petitioner/applicant, and eventually the
prevailing party, in the registration proceedings; and it is his right to the lands in question that is challenged by the Republic.
1 Exhs. A, A-1.
2 Exhs. B, B-1 and B-2.
3 Exhs. C, C-1 and C-2.
4 Exh D-1.
5 Exh. D-2.
6 Exh. F.
7 Exh. G.
8 The plaintiffs were Domingo Reyes and Lourdes Abustan; the defendant was So Pic or Pick @ Ignacia Te @ Kui Tin or Siu Tin Te.
9 Chua Kim thereby voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Court.
10 Exh. J.
11 See footnotes 2 and 3, supra.
12 Branch IV, Calauag, Quezon Province, Hon. Conrado R. Antona, presiding.
13 Ejercito, J., ponente, with whom concurred Coquia, Zosa and Bartolome, JJ.
14 Rollo, p. 32.
15 Exhs. H and I, respectively.
16 Rollo, p. 33.
17 Cailes et al. v. Mayuga, et al., G.R. No. L-30859, Feb. 20, 1989; Dihiansan et al. v. C.A., 153 SCRA 712 (1987); Rebuleda v. IAC, 155 SCRA
520 (1987); Korean Airlines, Ltd. v. C.A., 154 SCRA 211 (1987), cited in Sabena Belgian World Airlines v. C.A. et al., G.R. No. 82068, March 31,
1989.
18 Tejido v. Zamacoma, 138 SCRA 78;(1985), citing Herrera v. Luy Kim Guan, 1 SCRA 413; Heirs of Francisco Parco v. Haw Pia, 45 SCRA 164
(1983); see, also, Almario v. Corrales, CA-G.R. No. 923-R, Nov. 24, 1941, 45 O.G. 795.
19 Tejido v. Zamacoma, 138 SCRA 78, supra; Heirs of Francisco Parco v. Haw Pia, 45 SCRA 164, supra; Falcasantos v. Haw Suy Ching, 91 Phil.
456.
20 See Heirs of Francisco Parco v. Haw Pia, supra, and Bautista v. Dy Bun Chin, CA-G.R. No. 6983-R, Oct. 30 1953,49 O.G. 179.
21 Par. 4, p. 9, Record.
22 As earlier pointed out (footnote 6, supra), the plaintiffs were Domingo Reyes and Lourdes Abustan the defendant was So Pic or Pick @ Ignacia
Te @ Kui Tin or Sui Tin Te.
23 Exh. H.
24 E.G. Sarsosa Vda. de Barsobia v. Cuenco, 133 SCRA 547, reiterated in Godines v. Fong Pak Luen, 120 SCRA 223 (1983) and Yap v. Grageda,
121 SCRA 244 (1983); de Castro v. Joaguin Teng Queen Tan et al., 129 SCRA 85 (1984).

G.R. No. L-34672 March 30,1988

UNITED CHURCH BOARD FOR WORLD MINISTRIES, as owner of BROKENSHIRE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ALEJANDRO E. SEBASTIAN, as Presiding Judge of the CFI of Davao del Norte, and MELENCIO B. DELENA and
MAURO GEMENTIZA as Co-Executors of the Testate Estate of DAVID, Jacobson, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
This case is unusual because it arose not out of greed but of generosity. The only question to be resolved is the Identity and eligibility of the
beneficiary in the light of the pertinent constitutional provisions and the evidence of record.
David Jacobson was an American citizen who had been a resident of the Philippines for more than thirty years and up to the time of his death in
1970. 1 He left a will in which he "devised and bequeathed" to the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital 60% of his shares of stocks in the Tagdangua
Plantation Co., inc. which was incorporated under Philippine law in 1948. 2 This corporation was the registered owner of a tract of land in Pantuhan
Davao del Norte, with a total area of about 445 hectares acquired by virtue of a sales patent issued to it in 11953 . 3
In Special Proceeding No. 1695 of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Norte, Judge Alejandro E. Sebastian disallowed the above-described
legacy on the ground that it was in effect an alienation of private agricultural land in favor of a transferee which was not qualified under the
Constitution of 1935. 4 The finding was that the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital was owned by the United Church Board for World Ministries
(UCBWM) ,the herein petitioner, which was a non-stock corporation organized in the United States by virtue of a charter granted by the state
legislature of Massachussets . 5
The basis of this ruling was Article XII, Sections I and 5 of the 1935 Constitution, which barred foreigners, including Americans, from acquiring
agricultural lands in this country except only by hereditary succession. The court directed that a copy of its order be sent to the Solicitor General so
he could take the proper action, in view of the invalidity of the transfer, for the escheat of the subject property to the State. 6
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, the petitioner came to this Court, contending that the above-cited constitutional provisions were
not applicable because the object of the legacy was not land but shares of stocks. Moreover, even assuming that what was really involved was a
transfer of land, the petitioner was nonetheless qualified to acquire it under the provisions of the Parity Amendment and the Laurel-Langley
Agreement.
The Solicitor General disagreed at first, insisting that the legacy was prohibited by the 1935 Constitution and did not come under any of the allowed
exceptions. During the protracted exchange of pleadings among the parties, however, certain events transpired to considerably change the original
situation and, consequently, also the position of government.
It now appears from the voluminous documents submitted in this case that at the time the will was executed in 1966, the land on which the
Brokenshire Memorial Hospital was situated was already registered in the name of the Mindanao District Conference, an affiliate of the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines (PUCC).7 It was this non-stock corporation, organized in 1949 under Philippine law with a 100% Filipino
membership, that owned and was operating the Hospital at the time of Jacobson's death. 8 Later, the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital was itself
incorporated as a charitable institution, with Filipinos constituting the majority of its membership, 9 and on December 16,1970, became the
successor-in-interest of the UCCP to the devised parcel of land.10
In proof of these circumstances, the new counsel for Brokenshire presented, among many other documents, the articles of incorporation of the UCCP
and the Hospital and their corresponding certificates of registration issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission, the licenses issued by the
Board of Medical Sciences for the operation of the Hospital to the UCCP from 1968 to 1972 and to the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital, Inc. from
1973 to 1974, and the certificate of title over the subject land in the name of the "Mindanao District Conference, commonly known as the
Brokenshire Memorial Hospital."11
These facts were not brought earlier to the attention of the probate court by the former counsel of the Hospital, Atty. Juan V. Faune for reasons that
do not appear in the record. It was for such omission (the new counsel would call it "misrepresentation") that Atty. Faune was replaced by Atty.
Rodolfo D. de la Cruz, who disavowed his predecessor's representations. At any rate, the above-stated documents have now made it clear that the
United Church for Christ in the Philippines and not the United Church Board for World Ministries was the owner of the Hospital at the time of the
execution of the win in 1966 and of the testator's death in 1970. It is also not disputed that such ownership passed to the Brokenshire Memorial
Hospital itself upon its incorporation in 1970 when it thus became the proper party-in-interest to claim the property directly devised by Jacobson to it.
That the United Church Board for World Ministries no longer claims the subject property (if indeed it really did claim it before), is manifest in its sur
rejoinder to the rejoinder of the movant Brokenshire Memorial Hospital, Inc., which had asked to be substituted for the former as petitioner in this
case. The body of this pleading is reproduced in full as follows:
PETITIONER, by the Undersigned Counsel, to this Honorable Court most respectfully states:
l. That upon its organization in 1948 the United Church of Christ in the Philippines succeeded to the religious work, service and mission of the
United Church Board for World Ministries and other religion boards in the United States of America;
2. It was the intention, following the independence of the Philippines from the U.S.A. the constitution of an independent and autonomous United
Church of Christ in the Philippines, to eventually transfer all properties, schools, and hospitals established by said mission boards, to the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines;
3. That the United Church Board for World Ministries had, in fact, transferred the ownership of most of its properties in the Philippines to the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines, its religious organizations and/or instrumentalities;
4. That when the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital was destroyed by fire in 1964, reconstruction efforts and responsibilities was assumed by the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines, it was the intention of the United Church Board for World Ministries to relinquish the rights, interests and
ownership to the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital, now Brokenshire Memorial Hospital, Inc. and considered it so relinquished, with continuing
funding assistance from the United Church Board for World Ministries and other mission boards overseas;
5. The United Church Board for World Ministries continues to this date, with its fraternal and cooperative relationship with the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines;
6. That as has already been stated, the United Church Board for World Ministries does not intend to take, possess, or enjoy the legacy of David
Jacobson and has manifested and mandated that all properties that may be derived therefrom shall be used entirely and exclusively for the work of the
Brokenshire Memorial Hospital and its School of Nursing in accordance with the wishes of David Jacobson;
7. Considering the clear intention of David Jacobson to support the life and work of Brokenshire Memorial Hospital and its School of Nursing, and
further considering that what was bequeathed are shares of stocks in a corporation,, there exists no legal and moral impediment for the legacy to be
delivered to the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital, Inc., an instrumentality of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines, that has succeeded to the
ownership of and the humanitarian, and charitable service of said Hospital.
Respectfully submitted.
September 3, 1983, Davao City, Philippines.
(Sgd.) JUAN V. FAUNE
Counsel for Petitioner
United Church Board for
World Ministries
185-B Anda Street, Davao City
WITH OUR CONCURRENCE:
UNITED CHURCH BOARD FOR
WORLD MINISTRIES
by:
(Sgd.) BYRON W. CLARK
Treasurer
NO OBJECTION TO THE DELIVERY
OF THE LEGACY TO BROKENSHIRE
MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC.
(Sgd.) MELENCIO B. DELENA (Sgd.) DARIO C. RAMA
Executor-Respondent Counsel for the Estate
and Respondents
Melencio Delena and
the late Mauro
Gementiza
(deceased-Executor)
Security Bank Bldg.
Magsaysay Ave., Davao City
(Sgd.) DEAN CLAIR (Sgd.) ROSALINO D. ISIDRO
Executor Counsel for the Estate
and Executor Dean Clair
205 Aldavinco Bldg.,
C.M. Recto Ave., Davao City 12
Parenthetically, it should be observed, in fairness to Judge Sebastian, that he was unaware of these circumstances when he declared the legacy invalid
to enforce the nationalistic provisions of Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution. For his vigilance in the protection of the national patrimony, he should
be, as he is hereby, commenced.
Even on the assumption that the UCBWN was really the owner of the Hospital at the time of the effectivity of the will and that the devise was for that
reason unenforceable, the defect in the will should be deemed rectified by the subsequent transfer of the property to the Brokenshire Memorial
Hospital, Inc. Our consistent ruling on this matter is that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it
to a ctitizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.
Thus, in Sarsosa vda. de Barsobia v. Cuenco, 13 where a Filipino citizen sold her land to an alien who later sold it to a Filipino, we held that the
invalidity of the initial transfer to the alien was corrected by the subsequent transfer of the property to a citizen. A similar ruling was made in
Godinez v. Fong Pak Luen,14 involving a similar set of facts, where we also cited Vasquez v. Li Seng Giap, 15 and Herrera v. Luy King Guan.16 In
Yap v. Maravillas,17we validated the sale of agricultural land to an alien who, after the purchase, was naturalized as a Filipino and so became
qualified to acquire it. The facts were slightly different in De Castro v. Teng, 18 where, upon the death of an alien who had purchased a residential lot,
his heirs entered into an extrajudicial partition of his estate and transferred the land to one of his sons who was a naturalized Filipino. We also
sustained the sale.
This action has been pending for quite some time now because of the confusion regarding the status of the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital as the
ultimate beneficiary of the challenged legacy. The curious thing is that this case was mired in factual and legal complications caused by needless
misunderstanding among the parties which, it now appears, were never in any substantial disagreement over the ownership of the Hospital. Their
common concern for its welfare, in line with the charitable spirit and purposes of the testator, should have avoided all this tedious and acrimonious
dispute.
WHEREFORE, the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital, Inc. is hereby substituted for the United Church Board for World Ministries as petitioner in this
case and DECLARED to be qualified to accept the legacy of the late David Jacobson. The petition as thus modified is GRANTED. The order of the
respondent judge dated December 9, 1971, and his Resolution dated December 9, 1971, are SET ASIDE. This decision is immediately executory. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 4 & 12.
2 Ibid., p. 12.
3 Id., pp. 13 & 18.
4 Id., p. 20.
5 Id., p. 13.
6 Id., p. 21.
7 Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-15004 in the name of Southern Mindanao District Conference.
8 Articles of Incorporation of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP).
9 Articles of Incorporation of the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital.
10 Rollo, p. 281.
11 Rollo, pp. 284-298 (Annexes "A" to "L-5" for the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital).
12 Rollo, pp. 465-467.
13 113 SCRA 547.
14 120 SCRA 223.
15 96 Phil. 447.
16 1 SCRA 406.
17 121 SCRA 244.
18 129 SCRA 85.

[G.R. No. L-3676. January 31, 1955.]

SOCORRO VASQUEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LI SENG GIAP and LI SENG GIAP & SONS, Defendant-Appellees.

Jose S. Sarte for Appellant.

Lee, Orendain & Guzman for Appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SALE OF REAL ESTATE TO ALIENS DIVESTS VENDOR OF TITLE THERETO; EFFECT OF
NATURALIZATION OF ALIEN IF STATE FAILS TO FILE ESCHEAT PROCEEDINGS. — In a sale of real estate to an alien disqualified to hold
title thereto, the vendors divests himself of the title to such real estate and is not permitted to sue for the annulment of his contract. (Article 1302 of
the Civil Code.) In the United States the same rule prevails. Furthermore, the vendee may hold it against the whole world except as against the State.
If, however, the State does not commence escheat proceedings and in the meantime the alien becomes naturalized citizen, the State is deemed to have
waived its right to escheat the real property and the title of the alien thereto becomes lawful and valid as of the date of its conveyance or transfer to
him.

2. ID.; ID.; ID. — The rule in the United States as to the effect of naturalization may be adopted in this jurisdiction, because if the ban on aliens from
acquiring lands, as construed in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the nation’s lands for future generations of Filipinos, that aim would not be
thwarted by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who become naturalized citizens before the State commences forfeiture
proceedings.

DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

This is an action to rescind the sale of a parcel of land together with the improvements erected thereon, described in the complaint, which was sold by
the plaintiff to the defendant Li Seng Giap on 22 January 1940, on the ground that the vendee was an alien and under the Constitution incapable to
own and hold title to lands. The case was decided upon the following stipulation of facts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Plaintiff and defendants in the above-entitled case, by their respective attorneys, hereby stipulate and agree that the facts involved in this litigation are
as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That plaintiff and defendant Li Seng Giap are, and were at all times mentioned herein, of legal age and residents of the City of Manila, Philippines;
that defendant Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc., is a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, with
principal office in the City of Manila, Philippines.
II

That on January 22, 1940, plaintiff sold and transferred to defendant Li Seng Giap, then Chinese citizen, for the sum of P14,500, a parcel of land
together with a house of strong materials existing thereon, more particularly bounded and described as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot No. 22-A of the subdivision plan Psd- 15360, being a portion of Lot No. 22, Block No. 2809 of the Cadastral Survey of
Manila, G. L. R. O. Cadastral Record No. 192), situated in the District of Tondo, City of Manila. Bounded on the NE. by lot No. 23, Block No. 2809,
on the SE. by Lot No. 22-B, Block No. 2809; on the SW. by Lot No. 21, Block No. 2809; and on the NW. by Calle Magdalena; . . . containing an
area of four hundred twenty-three square meters and forty-five square decimeters (423.45) more or less." (Assessed value — P15,579.00)
III

That on August 21, 1940, defendant Li Seng Giap sold and transferred unto defendant Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc., whose shareholding then were
owned by Chinese citizens, for the same sum of P14,500, the above-mentioned parcel, together with the improvements thereon, and duly registered
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 59684 of the Office of the Register of Deeds for the city of Manila on August 23, 1940.
IV

That defendant Li Seng Giap was duly naturalized as a Filipino citizen on May 10, 1941, under Certificate of Naturalization No. 515, the records of
which were duly reconstituted under an order of this Honorable Court in Case No. R-603 dated May 24, 1946.
V

That,defendant Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc., is now a Filipino corporation, 96.67 per cent of its stocks being owned by Filipinos, and duly authorised
by its articles of incorporation to own, acquire or dispose of real properties.
VI

That the following are the names and respective citizenship and shareholdings of the present stockholders of Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc. :chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

Names Citizenship No. of shares Per cent Total amount

Li Seng Giap Filipino 3,400 56.67 P340,000.00

Tang Ho de Li Seng

Giap Filipino 1,200 20.00 120,000.00

William Lee Filipino 200 3.33 20,000.00

Henry Lee Filipino 200 3.33 20,000.00

Thomas J. Lee Filipino 200 3.33 20,000.00

Sofia Lee Teehankee Filipino 200 3.33 20,000.00

Julian M. Lee Filipino 200 3.33 20,000.00

Charles Lee Filipino 200 3.33 20,000.00

Anthony P. Lee Chinese 200 3.33 20,000.00

—— —— —————

6,000 100.00% P600,000.00.

VII
That Henry Lee was duly naturalized as a Filipino citizen on October 21,1936, under Certificate of Naturalization No. 352, the records of which were
duly reconstituted under an order of this Honorable Court in Case No. R-407 dated May 24, 1946.
VIII

That Thomas J. Lee was duly naturalized as a Filipino citizen on May 10, 1941, under Certificate of Naturalization No. 516, the records of which
were duly reconstituted under an order of this Honorable Court in Case No. R-604 dated May 24, 1946.
IX

That William Lee was duly naturalized as a Filipino citizen on November 1, 1948, under Certificate of Naturalization No. 2 of the Court of First
Instance of Daet, Camarines Norte.
X

That Sofia Lee Teehankee is a Filipino citizen being married to Dr. Rafael Teehankee, a Filipino citizen.
XI

That Julia M. Lee and Charles Lee are both Filipinos by operation of law as they were both minors when their father, Li Seng Giap, became a
Filipino citizen on May 10, 1941.

Manila, Philippines, September 7, 1949.

Respectfully Submitted:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(Sgd.) JOSE S. SARTE

Counsel for the Plaintiff

Room 213 Central Hotel, Manila

LEE, ORENDAIN & GUZMAN

Counsel for the Defendants

60 Novaliches St., Manila

By: (Sgd.) LEONARDO M. GUZMAN.

The Court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint with cost against the plaintiff. She has appealed.

In Caoile v. Yu Chiao, 49 Off, Gaz., 4321; Talento v. Makiki, 49 Off. Gaz., 4331; Bautista v. Uy 49 Off. Gaz., 4336; Rellosa v. Gaw Chee, 49 Off.
Gaz., 4345 and Mercado v. Go Bio, 49 Off. Gaz., 5360, the majority of this Court has ruled that in sales of real estate to aliens incapable of holding
title thereto by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution 1 both the vendor and the vendee are deemed to have committed the constitutional
violation and being thus in pari delicto the courts will not afford protection to either party. 2 From this ruling three Justices dissented. 3

The action is not of rescission because it is not postulated upon any of the grounds provided for in Article 1291 of the old Civil Code and because the
action of rescission involves lesion or damage and seeks to repair it. It is an action for annulment under Chapter VI, Title II, Book II, on nullity of
contracts, based on a defect in the contract which invalidates it independently of such lesion or damages. 4 It is very likely that the majority of this
Court proceeded upon that theory when it applied the in pari delicto rule referred to above.

In the United States the rule is that in a sale of real estate to an alien disqualified to hold title thereto the vendor divests himself of the title to such
real estate and has no recourse against the vendee despite the latter’s disability on account of alienage to hold title to such real estate and the vendee
may hold it against the whole world except as against the State. It is only the State that is entitled by proceedings in the nature of office found to have
a forfeiture or escheat declared against the vendee who is incapable of holding title to the real estate sold and conveyed to him. 5

However, if the State does not commence such proceedings and in the meantime the alien becomes naturalized citizen, the State is deemed to have
waived its right to escheat the real property and the title of the alien thereto becomes lawful and valid as of the date of its conveyance or transfer to
him. 6 The rule in the United States that in a sale of real estate to an alien disqualified to hold title thereto, the vendor divests himself of the title to
such real estate and is not permitted to sue for the annulment of his contract, is also the rule under the Civil Code. . . . Article 1302 of the old Civil
Code provides: . . . Persons sui juris cannot, however, avail themselves of the incapacity of those with whom they contracted; . . ."cralaw virtua1aw
library

Manresa’s comment on this clause of article 1302 of the Civil Code is as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Irresponsabilidad del defecto alegada. — Es la segunda de las condiciones necesarias para el ejercicio de la accion. Algunos la expresan diciendo que
solo puede intentar aquella el perjudicado, pero esta expresion puede conducir a ideas equivocadas, ya que la nulidad es independiente de la lesion,
como declara el art. 1.300, y es licito al favorecido economicamente por el contrato pedir la nulidad basandose en causas a el no imputables, y en
cambio no autoriza la ley el caso inverso.

Sencilla la regla contenida en el parrafo segundo de este articulo, puede complicarse cuando coexisten dos defectos del contrato, como puede
suceder, derivandose a veces de un mismo hecho, verbigracia, el contrato celebrado con un incapaz por quien ignora que lo es: eneste ejemplo es
indudable que la persona capaz no podra pedir la nulidad fundado en la incapacidad de la otra, pero si alegar el error o el dolo que pedeciera si las
circunstancias del sujeto eran de decisiva influencia en el contrato. (Supra, pp. 708-709.)

Appellant argues that if at the time of the conveyance of the real property the appellee was incapable of holding title to such real estate, the contract
of sale was null or void and may be annulled, and his subsequent naturalization as a Filipino citizen cannot retroact to the date of the conveyance to
make it lawful and valid. However, if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands, as construed by this Court in the
Krivenko case, is to preserve the nation’s lands for future generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making
lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization. The title to the parcel of land of the vendee, a
naturalized Filipino citizen, being valid that of the domestic corporation to which the parcel of land has been transferred, must also be valid, 96.67
per cent of its capital stock being owned by Filipinos.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, without costs.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, and Labrador, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions

REYES, J. B. L., J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I fully concur with the opinion of Justice Padilla, but wish to stress, as an additional reason for the decision in the present case, that when this action
was instituted in 1948, the disability of the original vendee had been already removed, since he was naturalized in 1941; and that the stockholders of
the second transferee, Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc., who hold more than 60 per cent of its capital stock, had likewise become Filipino citizens before,
and not after, the action to annul was filed.
Endnotes:

1. Section 5, Article XIII; Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 44 Off. Gaz., 471.

2. Article 1305, old Civil Code; Article 1411, new Civil Code.

3. Mr. Justice Pablo, Mr. Justice Alex. Reyes and the writer. See Caoile v. Yu Chiao, Talento v. Makiki, Bautista v. Uy, Rellosa v. Gaw Chee and
Mercado v. Go Bio, supra.

4. Manresa, Commentarios al Codigo Civil Español, Vol. VIII, p. 698, 4th ed.

5. Abrams v. State, 88 Pac. 327; Craig v. Leslie Et. Al., 4 Law, Ed. 460; 3 Wheat, 563, 539-590; Cross v. Del Valle, 1 Wall, (U. S.) 513; 17 Law.
Ed., 515; Governeur v. Robertson, 11 Wheat, 332, 6 Law. Ed., 488.

6. Osterman v. Baldwin 6 Wall 116, 18 Law. ed. 730; Manuel v. Wulff, 152 U. S. 505 38 Law. ed. 532; Pembroke v. Houston, 70 SW 470; Fieorella
v. Jones, 259 SW 782.

G.R. Nos. 113472-73 December 20, 1994

ONG CHING PO, YU SIOK LIAN DAVID ONG and JIMMY ONG, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SOLEDAD PARIAN, respondents.
Bautista, Salva, Arrieta, Salva for petitioner.
Arthem Maceda Potian for private respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 15, 1993,
which dismissed the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 28391-92.
I
On July 23, 1947, Ong Joi Jong sold a parcel of land located at Fundidor Street, San Nicolas to private respondent Soledad Parian, the wife of Ong
Yee. The latter, the brother of petitioner Ong Ching Po, died in January 1983; while petitioner Ong Ching Po died in October 1986. The said sale was
evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale written in English. Subsequently, the document was registered with the Register of Deeds of Manila, which
issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9260 dated September 2, 1947 in the name of private respondent.
According to private respondent, she entrusted the administration of the lot and building to petitioner Ong Ching Po when she and her husband
settled in Iloilo. When her husband died, she demanded that the lot be vacated because she was going to sell it. Unfortunately, petitioners refused to
vacate the said premises.
On March 19, 1984, private respondent filed a case for unlawful detainer against petitioner Ong Ching Po before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 26. The inferior court dismissed her case. The dismissal was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Manila. The decision
of the Regional Trial Court was, in turn, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition. The decision of the Court of Appeals
became final and executory.
Petitioners, on the other hand, claimed that on July 23, 1946, petitioner Ong Ching Po bought the said parcel of land from Ong Joi Jong. The sale was
evidenced by a photo copy of a Deed of Sale written in Chinese with the letter head "Sincere Trading Co." (Exh. "B"). An English translation of said
document (Exh. "C") read as follows:
Deed of Sale
I, Ong Joi Jong, a party to this Deed of Sale hereby sell in absolutely (sic) manner a lot located on No. 4 Fundidor Street, San Nicolas an (sic) area
consisting 213 square meters including a one-story house erected thereon unto Mr. Ong Ching Po for the sum of P6,000.00 the receipt of which is
hereby acknowledged by me and consequently I have executed and signed the government registered title (sic) the said lot inclusive of the house
erected thereon, now belong (sic) to Mr. Ong Ching Po unequivocally. And the purpose of this document is to precisely serve as proof of the sale.
Addendum: I have acceded to the request of Mr. Ong Ching Po into signing another document in favor of Soledad Parian (She is the Filipino wife of
Ong Yee, brother of Ong Ching Po) for the purpose of facilitating the issuance of the new title by the City Register of Deeds and for the reason that
he is not yet a Filipino. I certify to the truthfulness of this fact.
Lot Seller: Ong Joi Jong
(Exhibits for the plaintiff, p. 4)
On December 6, 1983, petitioner Ong Ching Po executed a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying to his children, petitioners Jimmy and David Ong, the
same property sold by Ong Joi Jong to private respondent in 1947. On December 12 1985, petitioners Ong Ching Po, Jimmy Ong and David Ong
filed an action for reconveyance and damages against private respondent in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Manila, docketed as Case No. 85-
33962.
On July 26, 1986, private respondent filed an action for quieting of title against petitioners Ong Ching Po and his wife, petitioner Yu Siok Lian, in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Manila, docketed as Civil Case No.
86-36818. Upon her motion, the case was consolidated with Civil Case No.
85-33962. On May 30 1990, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of private respondent. On appeal by petitioners to the Court of Appeals, the
said court affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Hence, this petition.
II
According to petitioners, the Court of Appeals erred:
(1) When it gave full faith and credit to the Deed of Sale (Exh. "A") in favor of private respondent, instead of the Deed of Sale (Exh. "B" and its
translation, Exh. "C") in favor of petitioner Ong Ching Po.
(2) When it concluded that the acts of petitioners were not acts of ownership; and
(3) When it ruled that no express nor implied trust existed between petitioners and private respondent (Rollo, pp. 17-18).
As stated by petitioners themselves, what is in dispute ". . . is not so much as to which between Exhibit "A" and "Exhibit "B" is more weighty, but
whether this document is what it purports to be (i.e., a deed of conveyance in favor of Soledad Parian [private respondent] or it was only resorted to
or executed as a subterfuge because the real buyer (Ong Ching Po) was an alien and it was agreed upon between Ong Ching Po and his brother (Ong
Yee, Soledad Parian's husband) that the land be registered in the name of Soledad Parian in order to avoid legal complications and to facilitate
registration and transfer and that the said title would be transferred by Soledad to Ong Ching Po or his successors-in-interest and that she would be
holding the title in trust for him" (Rollo, pp. 19-20).
We cannot go along with the claim that petitioner Ong Ching Po merely used private respondent as a dummy to have the title over the parcel of land
registered in her name because being an alien he was disqualified to own real property in the Philippines. To sustain such an outrageous contention
would be giving a high premium to a violation of our nationalization laws.
Assuming that Exhibit "B" is in existence and that it was duly executed, still petitioners cannot claim ownership of the disputed lot by virtue thereof.
Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution provides, as follows:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution provides, as follows:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified
to acquire or hold lands in the public domain.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified
to acquire or hold lands in the public domain.
The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Private land may be
transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities "qualified to acquire lands of the public domain" (II Bernas, The Constitution of the
Philippines 439-440 [1988 ed.]).
The 1935 Constitution reserved the right to participate in the "disposition, exploitation, development and utilization" of all "lands of the public
domain and other natural resources of the Philippines" for Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which was owned by
Filipinos. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring public lands; hence, they have also been disqualified
from acquiring private lands.
Petitioner Ong Ching Po was a Chinese citizen; therefore, he was disqualified from acquiring and owning real property. Assuming that the
genuineness and due execution of Exhibit "B" has been established, the same is null and void, it being contrary to law.
On the other end of the legal spectrum, the deed of sale executed by Ong Joi Jong in favor of private respondent (Exh. "A") is a notarized document.
To remove the mantle of validity bestowed by law on said document, petitioners claim that private respondent admitted that she did not pay anything
as consideration for the purported sale in her favor. In the same breath, petitioners said that private respondent implied in her deposition that it was
her husband who paid for the property. It appears, therefore, that the sale was financed out of conjugal funds and that it was her husband who handled
the transaction for the purchase of the property. Such transaction is a common practice in Filipino-family affairs.
It is not correct to say that private respondent never took possession of the property. Under the law, possession is transferred to the vendee by virtue
of the notarized deed of conveyance. Under Article 1498 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "when the sale is made through a public instrument, the
execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be
inferred." If what petitioners meant was that private respondent never lived in the building constructed on said land, it was because her family had
settled in Iloilo.
There is no document showing the establishment of an express trust by petitioner Ong Ching Po as trustor and private respondent as trustee. Not even
Exhibit "B" can be considered as such a document because private respondent, the registered owner of the property subject of said "deed of sale,"
was not a party thereto. The oral testimony to prove the existence of the express trust will not suffice. Under Article 1443 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, "No express trust concerning an immovable or any interest therein may be proved by parole evidence."
Undaunted, petitioners argue that if they cannot prove an express trust in writing, they can prove an implied trust orally. While an implied trust may
be proved orally (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 1457), the evidence must be trustworthy and received by the courts with extreme caution,
because such kind of evidence may be easily fabricated (Salao v. Salao, 70 SCRA 65 [1976]). It cannot be made to rest on vague and uncertain
evidence or on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations (Cf. De Leon v. Molo-Peckson, et al., 116 Phil. 1267 [1962]). Petitioners do not claim that
Ong Yee was not in a financial position to acquire the land and to introduce the improvements thereon. On the other hand, Yu Siok Lian, the wife of
petitioner Ong Ching Po, admitted in her testimony in court that Ong Yee was a stockholder of Lam Sing Corporation and was engaged in business.
The Court of Appeals did not give any credence to Exhibit "B" and its translation, Exhibit "C", because these documents had not been properly
authenticated.
Under Section 4, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court:
Secondary Evidence when Original is lost or destroyed. When the original writing has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon
proof of its execution and lost or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the recollection of the witnesses.
Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such secondary
evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the document. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence; execution; loss;
contents. This order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court (De Vera v. Aguilar, 218 SCRA 602 [1993]).
Petitioners failed to adduce evidence as to the genuineness and due execution of the deed of sale, Exhibit "B".
The due execution of the document may be established by the person or persons who executed it; by the person before whom its execution was
acknowledged; or by any person who was present and saw it executed or who after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures; or by a person
to whom the parties to the instrument had previously confessed the execution thereof (De Vera v. Aguilar, supra).
Petitioner Yu Siok Lian testified that she was present when said document was executed, but the trial court rejected her claim and held:
If it is true that she was present, why did she not sign said document, even merely as a witness? Her oral testimony is easy to concoct or fabricate.
Furthermore, she was married only on September 6, 1946 to the plaintiff, Ong Ching Po, in Baguio City where she apparently resided, or after the
deed of sale was executed. The Court does not believe that she was present during the execution and signing of the deed of sale involved therein,
notwithstanding her pretensions to the contrary (Decision p. 6, Records p. 414).
As to the contention of petitioners that all the tax receipts, tax declaration, rental receipts, deed of sale (Exh. "B") and transfer certificate of title were
in their possession, private respondent explained that she and her husband entrusted said lot and building to petitioners when they moved to Iloilo.
As observed by the Court of Appeals:
We find, however, that these acts, even if true, are not necessarily reflective of dominion, as even a mere administrator or manager may lawfully
perform them pursuant to his appointment or employment (Rollo,
p. 10).
It is markworthy that all the tax receipts were in the name of private respondent and her husband. The rental receipts were also in the name of her
husband.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 143958 July 11, 2003

ALFRED FRITZ FRENZEL, petitioner,
vs.
EDERLINA P. CATITO, respondent.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 53485 which affirmed the Decision 2 of the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 17,817 dismissing the petitioner's complaint, and the resolution of the Court of Appeals
denying his motion for reconsideration of the said decision.
The Antecedents3
As gleaned from the evidence of the petitioner, the case at bar stemmed from the following factual backdrop:
Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of German descent. He is an electrical engineer by profession, but worked as a pilot with the
New Guinea Airlines. He arrived in the Philippines in 1974, started engaging in business in the country two years thereafter, and married Teresita
Santos, a Filipino citizen. In 1981, Alfred and Teresita separated from bed and board without obtaining a divorce.
Sometime in February 1983, Alfred arrived in Sydney, Australia for a vacation. He went to King's Cross, a night spot in Sydney, for a massage where
he met Ederlina Catito, a Filipina and a native of Bajada, Davao City. Unknown to Alfred, she resided for a time in Germany and was married to
Klaus Muller, a German national. She left Germany and tried her luck in Sydney, Australia, where she found employment as a masseuse in the King's
Cross nightclub. She was fluent in German, and Alfred enjoyed talking with her. The two saw each other again; this time Ederlina ended up staying
in Alfred's hotel for three days. Alfred gave Ederlina sums of money for her services. 4
Alfred was so enamored with Ederlina that he persuaded her to stop working at King's Cross, return to the Philippines, and engage in a wholesome
business of her own. He also proposed that they meet in Manila, to which she assented. Alfred gave her money for her plane fare to the Philippines.
Within two weeks of Ederlina's arrival in Manila, Alfred joined her. Alfred reiterated his proposal for Ederlina to stay in the Philippines and engage
in business, even offering to finance her business venture. Ederlina was delighted at the idea and proposed to put up a beauty parlor. Alfred happily
agreed.
Alfred told Ederlina that he was married but that he was eager to divorce his wife in Australia. Alfred proposed marriage to Ederlina, but she replied
that they should wait a little bit longer.
Ederlina found a building at No. 444 M.H. del Pilar corner Arquiza Street, Ermita, Manila, owned by one Atty. Jose Hidalgo who offered to convey
his rights over the property for P18,000.00. Alfred and Ederlina accepted the offer. Ederlina put up a beauty parlor on the property under the business
name Edorial Beauty Salon, and had it registered with the Department of Trade and Industry under her name. Alfred paid Atty. Hidalgo P20,000.00
for his right over the property and gave P300,000.00 to Ederlina for the purchase of equipment and furniture for the parlor. As Ederlina was going to
Germany, she executed a special power of attorney on December 13, 1983 5 appointing her brother, Aser Catito, as her attorney-in-fact in managing
the beauty parlor business. She stated in the said deed that she was married to Klaus Muller. Alfred went back to Papua New Guinea to resume his
work as a pilot.
When Alfred returned to the Philippines, he visited Ederlina in her Manila residence and found it unsuitable for her. He decided to purchase a house
and lot owned by Victoria Binuya Steckel in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 218429 for
US$20,000.00. Since Alfred knew that as an alien he was disqualified from owning lands in the Philippines, he agreed that only Ederlina's name
would appear in the deed of sale as the buyer of the property, as well as in the title covering the same. After all, he was planning to marry Ederlina
and he believed that after their marriage, the two of them would jointly own the property. On January 23, 1984, a Contract to Sell was entered into
between Victoria Binuya Steckel as the vendor and Ederlina as the sole vendee. Alfred signed therein as a witness. 6 Victoria received from Alfred,
for and in behalf of Ederlina, the amount of US$10,000.00 as partial payment, for which Victoria issued a receipt. 7 When Victoria executed the deed
of absolute sale over the property on March 6, 1984,8 she received from Alfred, for and in behalf of Ederlina, the amount of US$10,000.00 as final
and full payment. Victoria likewise issued a receipt for the said amount. 9 After Victoria had vacated the property, Ederlina moved into her new
house. When she left for Germany to visit Klaus, she had her father Narciso Catito and her two sisters occupy the property.
Alfred decided to stay in the Philippines for good and live with Ederlina. He returned to Australia and sold his fiber glass pleasure boat to John Reid
for $7,500.00 on May 4, 1984.10 He also sold his television and video business in Papua New Guinea for K135,000.00 to Tekeraoi Pty. Ltd. 11 He had
his personal properties shipped to the Philippines and stored at No. 14 Fernandez Street, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. The proceeds of the
sale were deposited in Alfred's account with the Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC), Kowloon Branch under Bank Account No.
018-2-807016.12 When Alfred was in Papua New Guinea selling his other properties, the bank sent telegraphic letters updating him of his
account.13 Several checks were credited to his HSBC bank account from Papua New Guinea Banking Corporation, Westpac Bank of Australia and
New Zealand Banking Group Limited and Westpac Bank-PNG-Limited. Alfred also had a peso savings account with HSBC, Manila, under Savings
Account No. 01-725-183-01.14
Once, when Alfred and Ederlina were in Hong Kong, they opened another account with HSBC, Kowloon, this time in the name of Ederlina, under
Savings Account No. 018-0-807950.15 Alfred transferred his deposits in Savings Account No. 018-2-807016 with the said bank to this new account.
Ederlina also opened a savings account with the Bank of America Kowloon Main Office under Account No. 30069016. 16
On July 28, 1984, while Alfred was in Papua New Guinea, he received a Letter dated December 7, 1983 from Klaus Muller who was then residing in
Berlin, Germany. Klaus informed Alfred that he and Ederlina had been married on October 16, 1978 and had a blissful married life until Alfred
intruded therein. Klaus stated that he knew of Alfred and Ederlina's amorous relationship, and discovered the same sometime in November 1983
when he arrived in Manila. He also begged Alfred to leave Ederlina alone and to return her to him, saying that Alfred could not possibly build his
future on his (Klaus') misfortune.17
Alfred had occasion to talk to Sally MacCarron, a close friend of Ederlina. He inquired if there was any truth to Klaus' statements and Sally
confirmed that Klaus was married to Ederlina. When Alfred confronted Ederlina, she admitted that she and Klaus were, indeed, married. But she
assured Alfred that she would divorce Klaus. Alfred was appeased. He agreed to continue the amorous relationship and wait for the outcome of
Ederlina's petition for divorce. After all, he intended to marry her. He retained the services of Rechtsanwaltin Banzhaf with offices in Berlin, as her
counsel who informed her of the progress of the proceedings. 18 Alfred paid for the services of the lawyer.
In the meantime, Alfred decided to purchase another house and lot, owned by Rodolfo Morelos covered by TCT No. 92456 located in Peña Street,
Bajada, Davao City.19 Alfred again agreed to have the deed of sale made out in the name of Ederlina. On September 7, 1984, Rodolfo Morelos
executed a deed of absolute sale over the said property in favor of Ederlina as the sole vendee for the amount of P80,000.00. 20 Alfred paid
US$12,500.00 for the property.
Alfred purchased another parcel of land from one Atty. Mardoecheo Camporedondo, located in Moncado, Babak, Davao, covered by TCT No.
35251. Alfred once more agreed for the name of Ederlina to appear as the sole vendee in the deed of sale. On December 31, 1984, Atty.
Camporedondo executed a deed of sale over the property for P65,000.00 in favor of Ederlina as the sole vendee. 21 Alfred, through Ederlina, paid the
lot at the cost of P33,682.00 and US$7,000.00, respectively, for which the vendor signed receipts. 22 On August 14, 1985, TCT No. 47246 was issued
to Ederlina as the sole owner of the said property.23
Meanwhile, Ederlina deposited on December 27, 1985, the total amount of US$250,000 with the HSBC Kowloon under Joint Deposit Account No.
018-462341-145.24
The couple decided to put up a beach resort on a four-hectare land in Camudmud, Babak, Davao, owned by spouses Enrique and Rosela Serrano.
Alfred purchased the property from the spouses for P90,000.00, and the latter issued a receipt therefor. 25 A draftsman commissioned by the couple
submitted a sketch of the beach resort.26 Beach houses were forthwith constructed on a portion of the property and were eventually rented out by
Ederlina's father, Narciso Catito. The rentals were collected by Narciso, while Ederlina kept the proceeds of the sale of copra from the coconut trees
in the property. By this time, Alfred had already spent P200,000.00 for the purchase, construction and upkeep of the property.
Ederlina often wrote letters to her family informing them of her life with Alfred. In a Letter dated January 21, 1985, she wrote about how Alfred had
financed the purchases of some real properties, the establishment of her beauty parlor business, and her petition to divorce Klaus. 27
Because Ederlina was preoccupied with her business in Manila, she executed on July 8, 1985, two special powers of attorney 28 appointing Alfred as
attorney-in-fact to receive in her behalf the title and the deed of sale over the property sold by the spouses Enrique Serrano.
In the meantime, Ederlina's petition for divorce was denied because Klaus opposed the same. A second petition filed by her met the same fate. Klaus
wanted half of all the properties owned by Ederlina in the Philippines before he would agree to a divorce. Worse, Klaus threatened to file a bigamy
case against Ederlina.29
Alfred proposed the creation of a partnership to Ederlina, or as an alternative, the establishment of a corporation, with Ederlina owning 30% of the
equity thereof. She initially agreed to put up a corporation and contacted Atty. Armando Dominguez to prepare the necessary documents. Ederlina
changed her mind at the last minute when she was advised to insist on claiming ownership over the properties acquired by them during their
coverture.
Alfred and Ederlina's relationship started deteriorating. Ederlina had not been able to secure a divorce from Klaus. The latter could charge her for
bigamy and could even involve Alfred, who himself was still married. To avoid complications, Alfred decided to live separately from Ederlina and
cut off all contacts with her. In one of her letters to Alfred, Ederlina complained that he had ruined her life. She admitted that the money used for the
purchase of the properties in Davao were his. She offered to convey the properties deeded to her by Atty. Mardoecheo Camporedondo and Rodolfo
Morelos, asking Alfred to prepare her affidavit for the said purpose and send it to her for her signature.30 The last straw for Alfred came on
September 2, 1985, when someone smashed the front and rear windshields of Alfred's car and damaged the windows. Alfred thereafter executed an
affidavit-complaint charging Ederlina and Sally MacCarron with malicious mischief.31
On October 15, 1985, Alfred wrote to Ederlina's father, complaining that Ederlina had taken all his life savings and because of this, he was virtually
penniless. He further accused the Catito family of acquiring for themselves the properties he had purchased with his own money. He demanded the
return of all the amounts that Ederlina and her family had "stolen" and turn over all the properties acquired by him and Ederlina during their
coverture.32
Shortly thereafter, Alfred filed a Complaint33 dated October 28, 1985, against Ederlina, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, for recovery of
real and personal properties located in Quezon City and Manila. In his complaint, Alfred alleged, inter alia, that Ederlina, without his knowledge and
consent, managed to transfer funds from their joint account in HSBC Hong Kong, to her own account with the same bank. Using the said funds,
Ederlina was able to purchase the properties subject of the complaints. He also alleged that the beauty parlor in Ermita was established with his own
funds, and that the Quezon City property was likewise acquired by him with his personal funds. 34
Ederlina failed to file her answer and was declared in default. Alfred adduced his evidence ex parte.
In the meantime, on November 7, 1985, Alfred also filed a complaint 35 against Ederlina with the Regional Trial Court, Davao City, for specific
performance, declaration of ownership of real and personal properties, sum of money, and damages. He alleged, inter alia, in his complaint:
4. That during the period of their common-law relationship, plaintiff solely through his own efforts and resources acquired in the Philippines real and
personal properties valued more or less at P724,000.00; The defendant's common-law wife or live-in partner did not contribute anything financially
to the acquisition of the said real and personal properties. These properties are as follows:
I. Real Properties
a. TCT No. T-92456 located at Bajada, Davao City, consisting of 286 square meters, (with residential house) registered in the name of the original
title owner Rodolfo M. Morelos but already fully paid by plaintiff. Valued at P342,000.00;
b. TCT No. T-47246 (with residential house) located at Babak, Samal, Davao, consisting of 600 square meters, registered in the name of Ederlina
Catito, with the Register of Deeds of Tagum, Davao del Norte valued at P144,000.00;
c. A parcel of agricultural land located at Camudmud, Babak, Samal, Davao del Norte, consisting of 4.2936 hectares purchased from Enrique Serrano
and Rosela B. Serrano. Already paid in full by plaintiff. Valued at P228,608.32;
II. Personal Properties:
a. Furniture valued at P10,000.00.
...
5. That defendant made no contribution at all to the acquisition, of the above-mentioned properties as all the monies (sic) used in acquiring said
properties belonged solely to plaintiff;36
Alfred prayed that after hearing, judgment be rendered in his favor:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant:
a) Ordering the defendant to execute the corresponding deeds of transfer and/or conveyances in favor of plaintiff over those real and personal
properties enumerated in Paragraph 4 of this complaint;
b) Ordering the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff all the above real and personal properties or their money value, which are in defendant's name and
custody because these were acquired solely with plaintiffs money and resources during the duration of the common-law relationship between plaintiff
and defendant, the description of which are as follows:
(1) TCT No. T-92456 (with residential house) located at Bajada, Davao City, consisting of 286 square meters, registered in the name of the original
title owner Rodolfo Morelos but already fully paid by plaintiff. Valued at P342,000.00;
(2) TCT No. T-47246 (with residential house) located at Babak, Samal, Davao, consisting of 600 square meters, registered in the name of Ederlina
Catito, with the Register of Deeds of Tagum, Davao del Norte, valued at P144,000.00;
(3) A parcel of agricultural land located at Camudmud, Babak, Samal, Davao del Norte, consisting of 4.2936 hectares purchased from Enrique
Serrano and Rosela B. Serrano. Already fully paid by plaintiff. Valued at P228,608.32;
c) Declaring the plaintiff to be the sole and absolute owner of the above-mentioned real and personal properties;
d) Awarding moral damages to plaintiff in an amount deemed reasonable by the trial court;
e) To reimburse plaintiff the sum of P12,000.00 as attorney's fees for having compelled the plaintiff to litigate;
f) To reimburse plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 incurred as litigation expenses also for having compelled the plaintiff to litigate; and
g) To pay the costs of this suit;
Plaintiff prays other reliefs just and equitable in the premises.37
In her answer, Ederlina denied all the material allegations in the complaint, insisting that she acquired the said properties with her personal funds, and
as such, Alfred had no right to the same. She alleged that the deeds of sale, the receipts, and certificates of titles of the subject properties were all
made out in her name.38 By way of special and affirmative defense, she alleged that Alfred had no cause of action against her. She interposed
counterclaims against the petitioner.39
In the meantime, the petitioner filed a Complaint dated August 25, 1987, against the HSBC in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City40 for recovery
of bank deposits and damages.41 He prayed that after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in his favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully prays that the Honorable Court adjudge defendant bank, upon hearing the evidence that the parties might
present, to pay plaintiff:
1. ONE HUNDRED TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED AND THIRTY U.S. DOLLARS AND NINETY EIGHT CENTS
(US$126,230.98) plus legal interests, either of Hong Kong or of the Philippines, from 20 December 1984 up to the date of execution or satisfaction of
judgment, as actual damages or in restoration of plaintiffs lost dollar savings;
2. The same amount in (1) above as moral damages;
3. Attorney's fees in the amount equivalent to TWENTY FIVE PER CENT (25%) of (1) and (2) above;
4. Litigation expenses in the amount equivalent to TEN PER CENT (10%) of the amount in (1) above; and
5. For such other reliefs as are just and equitable under the circumstances.42
On April 28, 1986, the RTC of Quezon City rendered its decision in Civil Case No. Q-46350, in favor of Alfred, the decretal portion of which reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to perform the following:
(1) To execute a document waiving her claim to the house and lot in No. 14 Fernandez St., San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City in favor of
plaintiff or to return to the plaintiff the acquisition cost of the same in the amount of $20,000.00, or to sell the said property and turn over the
proceeds thereof to the plaintiff;
(2) To deliver to the plaintiff the rights of ownership and management of the beauty parlor located at 444 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila, including the
equipment and fixtures therein;
(3) To account for the earnings of rental of the house and lot in No. 14 Fernandez St., San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City, as well as the earnings
in the beauty parlor at 444 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila and turn over one-half of the net earnings of both properties to the plaintiff;
(4) To surrender or return to the plaintiff the personal properties of the latter left in the house at San Francisco Del Monte, to wit:
"(1) Mamya automatic camera
(1) 12 inch "Sonny" T.V. set, colored with remote control.
(1) Micro oven
(1) Electric fan (tall, adjustable stand)
(1) Office safe with (2) drawers and safe
(1) Electric Washing Machine
(1) Office desk and chair
(1) Double bed suits
(1) Mirror/dresser
(1) Heavy duty voice/working mechanic
(1) "Sony" Beta-Movie camera
(1) Suitcase with personal belongings
(1) Cardboard box with belongings
(1) Guitar Amplifier
(1) Hanger with men's suit (white)."
To return to the plaintiff, (1) Hi-Fi Stereo equipment left at 444 Arquiza Street, Ermita, Manila, as well as the Fronte Suzuki car.
(4) To account for the monies (sic) deposited with the joint account of the plaintiff and defendant (Account No. 018-0-807950); and to restore to the
plaintiff all the monies (sic) spent by the defendant without proper authority;
(5) To pay the amount of P5,000.00 by way of attorney's fees, and the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.43
However, after due proceedings in the RTC of Davao City, in Civil Case No. 17,817, the trial court rendered judgment on September 28, 1995 in
favor of Ederlina, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court cannot give due course to the complaint and hereby orders its dismissal. The counterclaims of the defendant are likewise
dismissed.
SO ORDERED.44
The trial court ruled that based on documentary evidence, the purchaser of the three parcels of land subject of the complaint was Ederlina. The court
further stated that even if Alfred was the buyer of the properties; he had no cause of action against Ederlina for the recovery of the same because as
an alien, he was disqualified from acquiring and owning lands in the Philippines. The sale of the three parcels of land to the petitioner was null and
void ab initio. Applying the pari delicto doctrine, the petitioner was precluded from recovering the properties from the respondent.
Alfred appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals45 in which the petitioner posited the view that although he prayed in his complaint in the court a
quo that he be declared the owner of the three parcels of land, he had no intention of owning the same permanently. His principal intention therein
was to be declared the transient owner for the purpose of selling the properties at public auction, ultimately enabling him to recover the money he had
spent for the purchase thereof.
On March 8, 2000, the CA rendered a decision affirming in toto the decision of the RTC. The appellate court ruled that the petitioner knowingly
violated the Constitution; hence, was barred from recovering the money used in the purchase of the three parcels of land. It held that to allow the
petitioner to recover the money used for the purchase of the properties would embolden aliens to violate the Constitution, and defeat, rather than
enhance, the public policy.46
Hence, the petition at bar.
The petitioner assails the decision of the court contending that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE RULE OF IN PARI DELICTO IN THE INSTANT CASE BECAUSE
BY THE FACTS AS NARRATED IN THE DECISION IT IS APPARENT THAT THE PARTIES ARE NOT EQUALLY GUILTY BUT RATHER
IT WAS THE RESPONDENT WHO EMPLOYED FRAUD AS WHEN SHE DID NOT INFORM PETITIONER THAT SHE WAS ALREADY
MARRIED TO ANOTHER GERMAN NATIONAL AND WITHOUT SUCH FRAUDULENT DESIGN PETITIONER COULD NOT HAVE
PARTED WITH HIS MONEY FOR THE PURCHASE OF THE PROPERTIES.47
and
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE INTENTION OF THE PETITIONER IS NOT TO OWN
REAL PROPERTIES IN THE PHILIPPINES BUT TO SELL THEM AT PUBLIC AUCTION TO BE ABLE TO RECOVER HIS MONEY USED
IN PURCHASING THEM.48
Since the assignment of errors are intertwined with each other, the Court shall resolve the same simultaneously.
The petitioner contends that he purchased the three parcels of land subject of his complaint because of his desire to marry the respondent, and not to
violate the Philippine Constitution. He was, however, deceived by the respondent when the latter failed to disclose her previous marriage to Klaus
Muller. It cannot, thus, be said that he and the respondent are "equally guilty;" as such, the pari delicto doctrine is not applicable to him. He acted in
good faith, on the advice of the respondent's uncle, Atty. Mardoecheo Camporedondo. There is no evidence on record that he was aware of the
constitutional prohibition against aliens acquiring real property in the Philippines when he purchased the real properties subject of his complaint with
his own funds. The transactions were not illegal per se but merely prohibited, and under Article 1416 of the New Civil Code, he is entitled to recover
the money used for the purchase of the properties. At any rate, the petitioner avers, he filed his complaint in the court a quo merely for the purpose of
having him declared as the owner of the properties, to enable him to sell the same at public auction. Applying by analogy Republic Act No. 133 49 as
amended by Rep. Act No. 4381 and Rep. Act No. 4882, the proceeds of the sale would be remitted to him, by way of refund for the money he used to
purchase the said properties. To bar the petitioner from recovering the subject properties, or at the very least, the money used for the purchase
thereof, is to allow the respondent to enrich herself at the expense of the petitioner in violation of Article 22 of the New Civil Code.
The petition is bereft of merit.
Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution provides, as follows:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified
to acquire or hold lands in the public domain.50
Lands of the public domain, which include private lands, may be transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities qualified to acquire or hold
private lands or lands of the public domain. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of the public
domain. Hence, they have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands. 51
Even if, as claimed by the petitioner, the sales in question were entered into by him as the real vendee, the said transactions are in violation of the
Constitution; hence, are null and void ab initio.52 A contract that violates the Constitution and the law, is null and void and vests no rights and creates
no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all.53 The petitioner, being a party to an illegal contract, cannot come into a court of law and ask to have
his illegal objective carried out. One who loses his money or property by knowingly engaging in a contract or transaction which involves his own
moral turpitude may not maintain an action for his losses. To him who moves in deliberation and premeditation, the law is unyielding.54 The law will
not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them.55 Under Article 1412 of the New Civil Code, the
petitioner cannot have the subject properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof.56 Equity as a
rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. 57 Where the wrong of
one party equals that of the other, the defendant is in the stronger position . . . it signifies that in such a situation, neither a court of equity nor a court
of law will administer a remedy.58 The rule is expressed. in the maxims: EX DOLO ORITUR ACTIO and IN PARI DELICTO POTIOR EST
CONDITIO DEFENDENTIS.59
The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the constitutional proscription, nor claim that he acted in good faith, let alone assert that he is less guilty than
the respondent. The petitioner is charged with knowledge of the constitutional prohibition. 60 As can be gleaned from the decision of the trial court,
the petitioner was fully aware that he was disqualified from acquiring and owning lands under Philippine law even before he purchased the properties
in question; and, to skirt the constitutional prohibition, the petitioner had the deed of sale placed under the respondent's name as the sole vendee
thereof:
Such being the case, the plaintiff is subject to the constitutional restrictions governing the acquisition of real properties in the Philippines by aliens.
From the plaintiff's complaint before the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 84, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-46350
he alleged:
x x x "That on account that foreigners are not allowed by the Philippine laws to acquire real properties in their name as in the case of my vendor Miss
Victoria Vinuya (sic) although married to a foreigner, we agreed and I consented in having the title to subject property placed in defendant's name
alone although I paid for the whole price out of my own exclusive funds." (paragraph IV, Exhibit "W.")
and his testimony before this Court which is hereby quoted:
ATTY. ABARQUEZ:
Q. In whose name the said house and lot placed, by the way, where is his house and lot located?
A. In 14 Fernandez St., San Francisco, del Monte, Manila.
Q. In whose name was the house placed?
A. Ederlina Catito because I was informed being not a Filipino, I cannot own the property. (tsn, p. 11, August 27, 1986).
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q. So you understand that you are a foreigner that you cannot buy land in the Philippines?
A. That is correct but as she would eventually be my wife that would be owned by us later on. (tsn, p. 5, September 3, 1986)
xxx xxx xxx
Q. What happened after that?
A. She said you foreigner you are using Filipinos to buy property.
Q. And what did you answer?
A: I said thank you very much for the property I bought because I gave you a lot of money (tsn., p. 14, ibid).
It is evident that the plaintiff was fully aware that as a non-citizen of the Philippines, he was disqualified from validly purchasing any land within the
country.61
The petitioner's claim that he acquired the subject properties because of his desire to marry the respondent, believing that both of them would
thereafter jointly own the said properties, is belied by his own evidence. It is merely an afterthought to salvage a lost cause. The petitioner admitted
on cross-examination that he was all along legally married to Teresita Santos Frenzel, while he was having an amorous relationship with the
respondent:
ATTY. YAP:
Q When you were asked to identify yourself on direct examination you claimed before this Honorable Court that your status is that of being
married, do you confirm that?
A Yes, sir.
Q To whom are you married?
A To a Filipina, since 1976.
Q Would you tell us who is that particular person you are married since 1976?
A Teresita Santos Frenzel.
Q Where is she now?
A In Australia.
Q Is this not the person of Teresita Frenzel who became an Australian citizen?
A I am not sure, since 1981 we were separated.
Q You were only separated, in fact, but not legally separated?
A Thru my counsel in Australia I filed a separation case.
Q As of the present you are not legally divorce[d]?
A I am still legally married.62
The respondent was herself married to Klaus Muller, a German citizen. Thus, the petitioner and the respondent could not lawfully join in wedlock.
The evidence on record shows that the petitioner in fact knew of the respondent's marriage to another man, but nonetheless purchased the subject
properties under the name of the respondent and paid the purchase prices therefor. Even if it is assumed gratia arguendi that the respondent and the
petitioner were capacitated to marry, the petitioner is still disqualified to own the properties in tandem with the respondent.63
The petitioner cannot find solace in Article 1416 of the New Civil Code which reads:
Art. 1416. When the agreement is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited, and the prohibition by the law is designed for the protection of the
plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby enhanced, recover what he has paid or delivered.64
The provision applies only to those contracts which are merely prohibited, in order to benefit private interests. It does not apply to contracts void ab
initio. The sales of three parcels of land in favor of the petitioner who is a foreigner is illegal per se. The transactions are void ab initio because they
were entered into in violation of the Constitution. Thus, to allow the petitioner to recover the properties or the money used in the purchase of the
parcels of land would be subversive of public policy.
Neither may the petitioner find solace in Rep. Act No. 133, as amended by Rep. Act No. 4882, which reads:
SEC. 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, private real property may be mortgaged in favor of any individual, corporation, or
association, but the mortgagee or his successor-in-interest, if disqualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines, shall not
take possession of the mortgaged property during the existence of the mortgage and shall not take possession of mortgaged property except after
default and for the sole purpose of foreclosure, receivership, enforcement or other proceedings and in no case for a period of more than five years
from actual possession and shall not bid or take part in any sale of such real property in case of foreclosure: Provided, That said mortgagee or
successor-in-interest may take possession of said property after default in accordance with the prescribed judicial procedures for foreclosure and
receivership and in no case exceeding five years from actual possession.65
From the evidence on record, the three parcels of land subject of the complaint were not mortgaged to the petitioner by the owners thereof but
were sold to the respondent as the vendee, albeit with the use of the petitioner's personal funds.
Futile, too, is petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code which reads:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the
expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. 66
The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No person should unjustly enrich himself
at the expense of another). An action for recovery of what has been paid without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso.67 This
provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the pari delicto doctrine. 68 It may be
unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso over the subject properties, or from recovering the money he paid for the
said properties, but, as Lord Mansfield stated in the early case of Holman vs. Johnson:69 "The objection that a contract is immoral or illegal as
between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is
ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy, which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him
and the plaintiff."
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Austria-Martinez and Tinga, JJ ., concur.
Quisumbing, J ., is on leave.

Footnotes
1 Penned by Justice Martin Villarama, Jr., with Presiding Justice Cancio C. Garcia and Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. concurring.
2 Penned by Judge William M. Layague.
3 The petitioner adduced testimonial and documentary evidence. The respondent did not adduce any testimonial evidence, but adduced as Exhibit "5,"

the petitioner's complaint in Civil Case No. 18,750-87 filed with the RTC of Davao City.
4 Exhibits "A" to "D-4."
5 Exhibits "B" and "B-1."

6 Exhibit "C."
7 Exhibit "E."
8 Exhibit "D."
9 Exhibit "F."
10 Exhibit "G."

11 Exhibits "H" to "H-12."

12 Exhibit "J."
13 Exhibits "K" to "K-5."
14 Exhibit "L."
15 Exhibit "M."
16 Exhibit "V."

17 Exhibit "N."
18 Exhibits "O" to "O-4."
19 Exhibit "P-4."
20 Exhibit "P" & "P-1."

21
Exhibit "Q" & "Q-1."
22 Exhibits "Q-4" to "Q-6."
23 Exhibit "Q-20."
24 Exhibits "V-4"–"V-10."
25 Exhibit "R-5."
26 Exhibit "R-13."

27 Exhibit "BB."
28 Exhibits "S" and "T."
29 Exhibit "BB."
30 Exhibits "CC" to "CC-4."
31 Exhibit "U;" Entitled and docketed as Alfred Fritz Frenzel vs. Ederlina P. Catito, Civil Case No. 46350.

32 Exhibit "GG."
33 Entitled and docketed as Alfred Fritz Frenzel vs. Ederlina P. Catito, Civil Case No. Q-46350.
34 Exhibit "W."
35
Entitled and docketed as Alfred Frenzel vs. Ederlina P. Catito, Civil Case No. 17,817.
36 Records, p. 2.
37 Records, pp. 4–5.

38
Exhibit "5."
39 Records, pp. 13–16.
40 Docketed as Civil Case No. 18,750-87.
41 Exhibit "5;" Records, pp. 194–198.
42 Exhibit "5-D;" Records, pp. 197–198.

43 Exhibit "X-2"–"X-3."
44 Records, p. 232.
45 Docketed as CA-G.R. CV. No. 53485.
46 Rollo, p. 30.
47 Id., at 16.
48 Id., at 19.

49 An act to authorize the mortgage of private real property in favor of any individual, corporation or association subject to certain conditions.
50 Supra. The conveyances subject of the case were executed when the 1973 Constitution was in effect.
51 Ong Ching Po vs. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 341 [1994].
52 Alexander Krivenko, vs. Register of Deeds, et al., 79 Phil. 461 [1947]; Rellosa vs. Hun, 93 Phil. 827 [1953]; Caoile vs. Peng, 93 Phil. 861

[1953]; Ong Ching Po vs. Court of Appeals, supra.

53 Francisco Chavez vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government, et al., 307 SCRA 394 [1999].

54 Aikman vs. City of Wheeling, Southeastern Reporter, 667 [1938].

55 Rellosa vs. Hun, supra.
56 ART. 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a criminal offense, the following rules shall be

observed:
(1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he has given by virtue of the contract, or demand the
performance of the other's undertaking. . .
57 Corkins vs. Ritter, 40 N.W., Reporter, 2d 726 [1950], Daley vs. City of Melvindale, 260 N.W. Reporter, 898 [1935].
58 19 Am. Jur., Equity, Section 478.
59 Bough & Bough vs. Cantiveros and Hanopol, 40 Phil. 209 [1919], Reporter.
60 Cheesman vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 193 SCRA 93 [1991].
61 Records, pp. 230–231.

62 TSN, 7 April 1987, pp. 2–3 (Frenzel).

63 See note 57.
64 Supra.
65 Supra.
66 Supra.

67 Id., at 85.
68 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1990 ed., Vol. I, p. 85.
69 Cited in Marissey vs. Bologna, 123 So. 2d 537 [1960].

G.R. No. L-64818 May 13, 1991

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
MARIA P. LEE and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.
Pedro M. Surdilla for private respondent.

FERNAN, C.J.:
In a land registration case, does the bare statement of the applicant that the land applied for has been in the possession of her predecessors-in- interest
for more than 20 years constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible" and "conclusive" evidence required in proceedings of this nature? This is the issue
to be resolved in the instant petition for review.
On June 29, 1976, respondent Maria P. Lee filed before the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pangasinan, an application 1 for
registration in her favor of a parcel of land consisting of 6,843 square meters, more or less, located at Mangaldan, Pangasinan.
The Director of Lands, in representation of the Republic of the Philippines, filed an opposition, alleging that neither the applicant nor her
predecessors-in-interest have acquired the land under any of the Spanish titles or any other recognized mode for the acquisition of title; that neither
she nor her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land in concept of owner at least thirty
(30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application; and that the land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines.2
After trial, the Court of First Instance3 rendered judgment on December 29, 1976, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to the Land Registration Law, Act No. 496, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 1942 and 6236, the Court hereby confirms
the title of the applicants over the parcel of land described in Plan Psu-251940 and hereby adjudicates the same in the name of the herein applicants,
spouses Stephen Lee and Maria P. Lee, both of legal age, Filipino citizens and residents of Dagupan City, Philippines, as their conjugal property.
Once this decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree and title issue therefor.
SO ORDERED.4
The Republic of the Philippines appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals), which however affirmed the lower court's
decision in toto on July 29, 1983.5
Hence, this petition based on the following grounds:6
The Intermediate Appellate Court erred:
A. IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT MARIA P. LEE HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH BY CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE HER FEE
SIMPLE TITLE OR IMPERFECT TITLE WHICH ENTITLES HER TO REGISTRATION EITHER UNDER ACT NO. 496, AS AMENDED
(LAND REGISTRATION ACT) OR SECTION 48 (B), C. A. NO. 141, AS AMENDED (PUBLIC LAND ACT);
B. IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE CLEARLY INCOMPETENT, SELF-SERVING AND UNRESPONSIVE TESTIMONY OF
RESPONDENT THAT THE SPOUSES URBANO DIAZ AND BERNARDA VINLUAN HAD BEEN IN POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY
FOR MORE THAN 20 YEARS LEADING TO REGISTRATION, THEREBY DEPRIVING THE STATE OF ITS PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE
PROCESS;
C. IN ORDERING REGISTRATION SIMPLY BECAUSE PETITIONER FAILED TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE TO REBUT RESPONDENT'S
EVIDENCE, WHICH, HOWEVER, STANDING ALONE, DOES NOT MEET THE QUANTUM OF PROOF—WHICH MUST BE
CONCLUSIVE—REQUIRED FOR REGISTRATION;
D. IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT HAS MISERABLY FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESCRIPTION THAT THE LAND IS
PUBLIC LAND BELONGING TO THE STATE.
Private respondent, on the other hand, contends that she was able to prove her title to the land in question through documentary evidence consisting
of Deeds of Sale and tax declarations and receipts as well as her testimony that her predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land in
question for more than 20 years; that said testimony, which petitioner characterizes as superfluous and uncalled for, deserves weight and credence
considering its spontaneity; that in any event, the attending fiscal should have cross-examined her on that point to test her credibility; and that, the
reason said fiscal failed to do so is that the latter is personally aware of facts showing that the land being applied for is a private land.7
We find for petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
The evidence adduced in the trial court showed that the land in question was owned by the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan, who on
August 11, 1960, sold separate half portions thereof to Mrs. Laureana Mataban and Mr. Sixto Espiritu. On March 18, 1963, and July 30, 1963,
respectively, Mrs. Mataban and Mr. Espiritu sold their half portions to private respondent Maria P. Lee. Private respondent had the property recorded
for taxation purposes in her name and that of her husband Stephen Lee, paying taxes thereon on March 25, 1975 and March 9, 1976 for the same
years.
At the time of the filing of the application for registration on June 29, 1976, private respondent had been in possession of the subject area for about
thirteen (13) years. She, however, sought to tack to her possession that of her predecessors-in-interest in order to comply with the requirement of
Section 48 (b) of commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, to wit:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain. under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title," except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this Chapter.
Private respondent's testimony on her predecessors-in-interest's possession is contained in a one-page declaration given before a commissioner on
December 22, 1976. It reads in full as follows:8
Commissioner: Atty. Surdilla, you can now present your evidence.
Atty. Surdilla: I am presenting the applicant, your Honor.
Commissioner: Swearing under oath the applicant.
Atty. Surdilla:
Q Please state your name and other personal circumstances.
A Maria P. Lee, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Stephen Lee, proprietor, and resident of Dagupan City.
Q Are you the applicant in this case now?
A Yes, sir, including that of my husband, Stephen Lee.
Q From whom did you acquire said property, subject of registration now?
A From Mr. Sixto Espiritu and Mrs. Laureana T. Mataban, sir.
Q Do you have evidence of such acquisition of yours over said property?
A Yes, sir.
Q Showing to you these documents styled as Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 18, 1963 and also Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 30, 1963, what
can you say to them?
A The deed of sale dated March 18, 1963 is the conveyance to us by Mrs. Laureana T. Mataban over the 1/2 portion of the property and the deed of
sale dated July 30, 1963 likewise refers to sale of the 1/2 portion of the property by Sixto Espiritu to us, sir.
Atty. Surdilla: At this juncture, may I pray that said Deeds of Absolute Sale adverted to above be marked as Exhibits "I" and "J", your Honor.
Commissioner: Please mark them accordingly.
Q Do you know from whom did Mr. Sixto Espiritu and Mrs. Laureana Mataban (your vendors) acquired likewise the property sought by you to be
registered?
A Yes, sir. They purchased it from the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan who possessed the same for more than 20 years.
Q Showing to you this document styled as Deed of Absolute Sale, dated August 11, 1970, is this the sale adverted or referred by you?
A Yes, sir.
Atty. Surdilla: At this juncture, may I pray that said deed be marked as Exhibit "H", your Honor.
Commissioner: Please mark it.
Q Who is in possession of the property now? What is the nature thereof?
A I and my husband are in possession of the property, which possession tacked to that of our predecessors-in-interest is adverse, continuous, open,
public, peaceful and in concept of owner, your Honor.
Q Whose name/names is the property declared for taxation purposes?
A We spouses Stephen Lee and Maria P. Lee, sir.
Atty. Surdilla: At this juncture, may I pray, sir, that Tax Declaration Nos. 22253 and 24126, be marked as Exhibits "K" and "K-1", respectively.
Commissioner: Please mark them accordingly.
Q Who has been paying taxes over the property?
A We the spouses Stephen Lee and myself, sir.
Atty. Surdilla: At this juncture, may I pray that Official Receipts Nos. H-6048922 and G-9581024, dated March 9, 1976 and March 25, 1975 be
marked as Exhibits "L" and 'L-1",' respectively.
Commissioner: Please mark them accordingly.
Q Is the property ever mortgaged or encumbered in the bank or private person/persons?
A No sir. It is free from liens and encumbrances.
That's all, your Honor.
The most basic rule in land registration cases is that "no person is entitled to have land registered under the Cadastral or Torrens system unless he is
the owner in fee simple of the same, even though there is no opposition presented against such registration by third persons. . . . In order that the
petitioner for the registration of his land shag be permitted to have the same registered, and to have the benefit resulting from the certificate of title,
finally, issued, the burden is upon him to show that he is the real and absolute owner, in fee simple."9
Equally basic is the rule that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from government. A grant is
conclusively presumed by law when the claimant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has occupied the land openly, continuously,
exclusively, and under a claim of title since July 26, 1894 10 or prior thereto.11
The doctrine upon which these rules are based is that all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to
the public domain. As enunciated in the case of Santiago vs. de los Santos:12
. . . Both under the 1935 and the present Constitutions, the conservation no less than the utilization of the natural resources is ordained. There would
be a failure to abide by its command if the judiciary does not scrutinize with care applications to private ownership of real estate. To be granted, they
must be grounded in well-nigh incontrovertible evidence. Where, as in this case, no such proof would be forthcoming, there is no justification for
viewing such claim with favor. It is a basic assumption of our polity that lands of whatever classification belong to the state. Unless alienated in
accordance with law, it retains its rights over the same as dominus . . .
Based on the foregoing, it is incumbent upon private respondent to prove that the alleged twenty year or more possession of the spouses Urbano Diaz
and Bernarda Vinluan which supposedly formed part of the thirty (30) year period prior to the filing of the application, was open, continuous,
exclusive, notorious and in concept of owners. This burden, private respondent failed to discharge to the satisfaction of the Court. The bare assertion
that the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan had been in possession of the property for more than twenty (20) years found in private
respondent's declaration is hardly the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence required in cases of this nature. Private respondent should have presented
specific facts that would have shown the nature of such possession. The phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner"
by which she described her own possession in relation to that of her predecessors-in-interest are mere conclusions of law which require factual
support and substantiation.
That the representing fiscal did not cross-examine her on this point does not help her cause because the burden is upon her to prove by clear, positive
and absolute evidence that her predecessors' possession was indeed adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner.1âwphi1 Her
bare allegation, without more, did not constitute such preponderant evidence that would shift the burden of proof to the oppositor.
Neither does the supposition that the fiscal had knowledge of facts showing that the land applied for is private land helpful to private respondent.
Suffice it to say that it is not the fiscal, but the court which should be convinced, by competent proof, of private respondent's registerable right over
the subject parcel of land.
Private respondent having failed to prove by convincing, positive proof that she has complied with the requirements of the law for confirmation of
her title to the land applied for, it was grave error on the part of the lower court to have granted her application.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bidin, J., took no part.

Footnotes
1 Annex "A", Petition, pp. 46-49, Rollo.
2 Annex "B", Petition, pp. 50- 51, Rollo.
3
Per Judge Modesto S. Bascos.
4 p. 55, Rollo.
5 The decision was penned by Associate Justice Porfirio V. Sison, and concurred in by then IAC now Supreme Court Associate Justice Abdulwahid

A. Bidin, Associate Justices Marcelino R. Veloso and Desiderio P. Jurado, pp. 56-59, Rollo.
6 pp. 102-103, Rollo.
7 pp. 144-149, Rollo.
8 pp. 25-28, Rollo.
9 Director of Lands vs. Agustin, 42 Phil. 227, citing Maloles and Malvar vs. Director of Lands, 25 Phil. 548; De los Reyes vs. Paterno, 34 Phil. 420,

424; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa vs. Municipality of Taal, 38 Phil. 367, 376.
10 Now June 12, 1945, as amended by P.D. 1073.
11 Padilla vs. Reyes & Director of Lands, 60 Phil. 967, citing Ongsiaco vs. Magsilang, 50 Phil. 380.
12 G.R. No. L-20241, November 22, 1974, 61 SCRA 146.

G.R. No. 149615 August 29, 2006

IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY ELENA BUENAVENTURA MULLER, Petitioner,
vs.
HELMUT MULLER, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari 1 assails the February 26, 2001 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 affirming with
modification the August 12, 1996 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862, which terminated
the regime of absolute community of property between petitioner and respondent, as well as the Resolution 4 dated August 13, 2001 denying the
motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple
resided in Germany at a house owned by respondent’s parents but decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By this time,
respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo,
Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of
petitioner under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 219438 5 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila.
Due to incompatibilities and respondent’s alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated. On September 26,
1994, respondent filed a petition 6 for separation of properties before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
On August 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision which terminated the regime of absolute community of property between the petitioner and
respondent. It also decreed the separation of properties between them and ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within the
country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that it was acquired
using paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds because the property was purchased in
violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution. Thus –
However, pursuant to Article 92 of the Family Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title by either spouse during the marriage shall be excluded
from the community property. The real property, therefore, inherited by petitioner in Germany is excluded from the absolute community of property
of the herein spouses. Necessarily, the proceeds of the sale of said real property as well as the personal properties purchased thereby, belong
exclusively to the petitioner. However, the part of that inheritance used by the petitioner for acquiring the house and lot in this country cannot be
recovered by the petitioner, its acquisition being a violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution which provides that "save in cases of
hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain." The law will leave the parties in the situation where they are in without prejudice to a voluntary partition by the parties
of the said real property. x x x
xxxx
As regards the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 219438 of the Registry of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila, situated in
Antipolo, Rizal and the improvements thereon, the Court shall not make any pronouncement on constitutional grounds. 7
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed decision modifying the trial court’s Decision. It held that respondent
merely prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It also considered
petitioner’s ownership over the property in trust for the respondent. As regards the house, the Court of Appeals ruled that there is nothing in the
Constitution which prohibits respondent from acquiring the same. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the lower court dated August 12, 1996 is hereby MODIFIED. Respondent Elena
Buenaventura Muller is hereby ordered to REIMBURSE the petitioner the amount of P528,000.00 for the acquisition of the land and the amount of
P2,300,000.00 for the construction of the house situated in Atnipolo, Rizal, deducting therefrom the amount respondent spent for the preservation,
maintenance and development of the aforesaid real property including the depreciation cost of the house or in the alternative to SELL the house and
lot in the event respondent does not have the means to reimburse the petitioner out of her own money and from the proceeds thereof, reimburse the
petitioner of the cost of the land and the house deducting the expenses for its maintenance and preservation spent by the respondent. Should there be
profit, the same shall be divided in proportion to the equity each has over the property. The case is REMANDED to the lower court for reception of
evidence as to the amount claimed by the respondents for the preservation and maintenance of the property.
SO ORDERED. 8
Hence, the instant petition for review raising the following issues:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT HEREIN IS ENTITLED TO
REIMBURSEMENT OF THE AMOUNT USED TO PURCHASE THE LAND AS WELL AS THE COSTS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE
HOUSE, FOR IN SO RULING, IT INDIRECTLY ALLOWED AN ACT DONE WHICH OTHERWISE COULD NOT BE DIRECTLY x x x
DONE, WITHOUT DOING VIOLENCE TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROSCRIPTION THAT AN ALIEN IS PROHIBITED FROM
ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP OF REAL PROPERTIES LOCATED IN THE PHILIPPINES.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SUSTAINING RESPONDENT’S CAUSE OF ACTION WHICH IS ACTUALLY A
DESPERATE ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN OWNERSHIP OVER THE LOT IN QUESTION, CLOTHED UNDER THE GUISE OF CLAIMING
REIMBURSEMENT.
Petitioner contends that respondent, being an alien, is disqualified to own private lands in the Philippines; that respondent was aware of the
constitutional prohibition but circumvented the same; and that respondent’s purpose for filing an action for separation of property is to obtain
exclusive possession, control and disposition of the Antipolo property.
Respondent claims that he is not praying for transfer of ownership of the Antipolo property but merely reimbursement; that the funds paid by him for
the said property were in consideration of his marriage to petitioner; that the funds were given to petitioner in trust; and that equity demands that
respondent should be reimbursed of his personal funds.
The issue for resolution is whether respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the acquisition of the Antipolo property.
The petition has merit.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified
to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from
acquiring private lands. 9 The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony. In the case of Krivenko v.
Register of Deeds, 10 the Court held:
Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated," and with
respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in
the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It
is partly to prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows:
"Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines."
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into aliens’ hands. It would certainly
be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private
agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. x x x
xxxx
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural, the result would be that
"aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and
that "they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools,
health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant’s words,
strictly agricultural." (Solicitor General’s Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question.
Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly admitted his knowledge thereof to this Court. 11 He declared that he had the
Antipolo property titled in the name of petitioner because of the said prohibition. 12His attempt at subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the
said property cannot be sustained.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created and resulted by operation of law in view of petitioner’s marriage to
respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, respondent’s disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is
absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its
express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. 13 To hold otherwise would allow circumvention of the
constitutional prohibition.
Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law but also a court of equity, is likewise misplaced. It has been held that equity as a rule will
follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. 14 He who seeks equity must do
equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. The latter is a frequently stated maxim which is also expressed in the principle
that he who has done inequity shall not have equity. It signifies that a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct
has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. 15
Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the
property despite the constitutional prohibition.
Further, the distinction made between transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile exercise on respondent’s part. To allow
reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise proscribed by
law. As expressly held in Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court: 16
Finally, the fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution ordains that, "Save in
cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain." Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged with knowledge of this prohibition. Thus,
assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue
of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; the
sale as to him was null and void. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by his
wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory
would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien
husband a not insubstantial interest and right over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the
Constitution does not permit him to have.
As already observed, the finding that his wife had used her own money to purchase the property cannot, and will not, at this stage of the proceedings
be reviewed and overturned. But even if it were a fact that said wife had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out
to militate, on high constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding the property so acquired, or any part thereof. And whether in such an
event, he may recover from his wife any share of the money used for the purchase or charge her with unauthorized disposition or expenditure of
conjugal funds is not now inquired into; that would be, in the premises, a purely academic exercise. (Emphasis added)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 26, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 59321 ordering petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller to reimburse respondent Helmut Muller the amount of P528,000 for the
acquisition of the land and the amount of P2,300,000 for the construction of the house in Antipolo City, and the Resolution dated August 13, 2001
denying reconsideration thereof, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The August 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862 terminating the regime of absolute community between the petitioner and respondent, decreeing a
separation of property between them and ordering the partition of the personal properties located in the Philippines equally, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 31-50.
2 Id. at 8-13. Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes and Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.
(who is now a Member of this Court).
3 Id. at 98-101. Penned by Judge Teodoro A. Bay.

4
Id. at 22.
5 Id. at 58.
6 Id. at 52-57.
7 Id. at 100-101.
8 Id. at 12.
9 Ong Ching Po v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 113472-73, December 20, 1994, 239 SCRA 341, 346.

10 79 Phil. 461, 473, 476 (1947).

11 Rollo, p. 114.
12 TSN, April 18, 1995, p. 12.
13 Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117228, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 282, 299.
14 Frenzel v. Catito, 453 Phil. 885, 905 (2003).

15 University of the Philippines v. Catungal, Jr., 338 Phil. 728, 743-744 (1997).
16 G.R. No. 74833, January 21, 1991, 193 SCRA 93, 103-104.

G.R. No. L-31606 March 28, 1983

DONATO REYES YAP and MELITONA MARAVILLAS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. EZEKIEL S. GRAGEDA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Albay and JOSE A. RICO, respondents.
Jose P. Oira for petitioners.
Rodolfo A. Madrid for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

We are asked in this petition to review the amended decision of the respondent court which declared as absolutely null and void the sale of a
residential lot in Guinobatan, Albay to a Chinese national and ordered its reconveyance to the vendors thirty years after the sale inspite of the fact that
the vendee had been a naturalized Filipino citizen for fifteen years at the time.
We grant the petition. The questioned decision and the order amending it are reversed and set aside.
The facts are not disputed.
On April 12, 1939, Maximino Rico, for and in his own behalf and that of the minors Maria Rico, Filomeno Rico, Prisco Rico, and Lourdes' Rico,
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale (Annex 'A' to the complaint) over Lot 339 and a portion of Lot 327 in favor of the petitioner Donato Reyes Yap
who was then a Chinese national. Respondent Jose A. Rico is the eldest son of Maximino Rico, one of the vendors in Annex 'A'.
Subsequently, the petitioner as vendee caused the registration of the instrument of sale and the cancellation of Original Certificates of Title Nos.
29332 and 29410 and the consequent issuance in his favor of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2433 covering the two lots subject matter of the
Contract of Sale.
After the lapse of nearly fifteen years from and after the execution of the deed of absolute sale, Donato Reyes Yap was admitted as a Filipino citizen
and allowed to take his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. He was, thereafter, issued Certificate of Naturalization No. 7, File No.
19 of the Court of First Instance of Albay.
On December 1, 1967, the petitioner ceded the major portion of Lot No. 327 consisting of 1,078 square meters which he acquired by purchase under
the deed of sale in favor of his engineer son, Felix Yap, who was also a Filipino citizen because of the Filipino citizenship of his mother and the
naturalization of his father Donato Reyes Yap.
Subsequently, Lourdes Rico, aunt and co-heir of respondent Jose A. Rico. sold the remaining portion of Lot 327 to the petitioner who had his rights
thereon duly registered under Act 496. Petitioner, Donato Reyes Yap, has been in possession of the lots in question since 1939, openly, publicly,
continuously, and adversely in the concept of owner until the present time. The petitioner has one surviving son by his first marriage to a Filipino
wife. He has five children by his second marriage also to a Filipina and has a total of 23 grandchildren all of whom are Filipino citizens.
The respondent court considered Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution that "no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines" to be an absolute and
unqualified prohibition and, therefore, ruled that a conveyance contrary to it would not be validated nor its void nature altered by the subsequent
naturalization of the vendee.
The dispositive portion of the amended decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Contract of Sale embodied in the 'Escritura de Compra Venta' which is attached to the Complaint as
Annex 'A', is hereby declared null and void ab initio and without any legal force and effect.
The action to recover Lot 339 of the Cadastral Survey of Guinobatan, Albay, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T2433. and Lot 327
covered by the same Transfer Certificate of Title, is hereby granted to plaintiff, upon payment of the consideration price of P150.00 and declaring
plaintiff as the lawful owner and entitled to the possession thereof.
Defendant Donato Reyes Yap is hereby ordered to produce his Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2433 to the Register of Deeds of Albay, so as to
enable said office to make the due and proper annotations on said title as well as in the original of the declaration of nullity as herein adjudged. Let
Transfer Certificate of Title issued to plaintiff, concerning said Lots 339 and 327 of the Cadastral Survey of Guinobatan, Albay.
COSTS AGAINST DEFENDANTS.
The rulings in Vasquez v.Leng Seng Giap et al. (96 Phil. 447) and Sarosa Vda. de Bersabia v. Cuenco (113 SCRA 547) sustain the petitioner's
contentions. We stated in Sarosa Vda de Bersabia:
There should be no question that the sale of the land in question in 1936 by Epifania to Ong King Po was inexistent and void from the beginning
(Art. 1409 [7], Civil Code) because it was a contract executed against the mandatory provision of the 1935 Constitution, which is an expression of
public policy to conserve lands for the Filipinos. Said provision reads:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to in. individuals, corporations, or
associations, qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Had this been a suit between Epifania and Ong King Po she could have been declared entitled to the litigated land on the basis, as claimed, of the
ruling in Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Lui She, reading:
... For another thing, and this is not only cogent but also important. Article 1416 of the Civil Code provides as an exception to the rule on pari
delicto that when the agreement is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited, and the prohibition by the law is designed for the protection of the
plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby enhanced, recover what he has sold or delivered. ...
But the factual set-up has changed. The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned by a disqualified
vendee. Respondent, as a naturalized citizen, was constitutionally qualified to own the subject property. There would be no more public policy to be
served in allowing petitioner Epifania to recover the land as it is already in the hands of a qualified person. Applying by analogy the ruling of this
Court in Vasquez vs. Giap and Leng Seng Giap & Sons:
... if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands, as construed by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the
nation's lands for future generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real
estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization.
Only recently, we had occasion to reiterate the above rulings in Vicente Godines v. Fong Pak Luen, et al. (G.R. No. L-36731, January 27, 1983).
WHEREFORE, the amended judgment of the respondent court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez and Relova, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-36731 January 27, 1983

VICENTE GODINEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FONG PAK LUEN ET AL., defendants, TRINIDAD S. NAVATA, defendant-appellee.
Dominador Sobrevinas for plaintiffs-appellants.
Muss S. Inquerto for defendant-appellee

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The plaintiffs filed this case to recover a parcel of land sold by their father, now deceased, to Fong Pak Luen, an alien, on the ground that the sale was
null and void ab initio since it violates applicable provisions of the Constitution and the Civil Code.
The order of the Court of First Instance of Sulu dismissing the complaint was appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter court certified the appeal
to us since only pure questions of law were raised by the appellants.
The facts of the case were summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows:
On September 30, 1966, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Sulu alleging among others that they are the heirs of Jose
Godinez who was married to Martina Alvarez Godinez sometime in 1910; that during the marriage of their parents the said parents acquired a parcel
of land lot No. 94 of Jolo townsite with an area of 3,665 square meters as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 179 (D -155) in the name of
Jose Godinez; that their mother died sometime in 1938 leaving the plaintiffs as their sole surviving heirs; that on November 27, 1941, without the
knowledge of the plaintiffs, the said Jose Godinez, for valuable consideration, sold the aforesaid parcel of land to the defendant Fong Pak Luen, a
Chinese citizen, which transaction is contrary to law and in violation of the Civil Code because the latter being an alien who is inhibited by law to
purchase real property; that Transfer Certificate Title No. 884 was then issued by the Register of Deeds to the said defendant, which is null and
void ab initio since the transaction constituted a non-existent contract; that on January 11, 1963, said defendant Fong Pak Luen executed a power of
attorney in favor of his co-defendant Kwan Pun Ming, also an alien, who conveyed and sold the above described parcel of land to co-defendant
Trinidad S. Navata, who is aware of and with full knowledge that Fong Pak Luen is a Chinese citizen as well as Kwan Pun Ming, who under the law
are prohibited and disqualified to acquire real property in this jurisdiction; that defendant Fong Pak Luen has not acquired any title or interest in said
parcel of land as the purported contract of sale executed by Jose Godinez alone was contrary to law and considered non- existent, so much so that the
alleged attorney-in-fact, defendant Kwan Pun Ming had not conveyed any title or interest over said property and defendant Navata had not acquired
anything from said grantor and as a consequence Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1322, which was issued by the Register of Deeds in favor of the
latter is null and void ab initio,- that since one-half of the said property is conjugal property inherited by the plaintiffs from their mother, Jose
Godinez could -not have legally conveyed the entire property; that notwithstanding repeated demands on said defendant to surrender to plaintiffs the
said property she refused and still refuses to do so to the great damage and prejudice of the plaintiffs; and that they were constrained to engage the
services of counsel in the sum of P2,000.00.1äwphï1.ñët The plaintiffs thus pray that they be adjudged as the owners of the parcel of land in question
and that Transfer Certificate of Title RT-90 (T-884) issued in the name of defendant Fong Pak Luen be declared null and void ab initio; and that the
power of attorney issued in the name of Kwan Pun Ming, as well as Transfer Certificate of Title No. 'L322 issued in the name of defendant Navata be
likewise declared null and void, with costs against defendants.
On August 18, 1966, the defendant Register of Deeds filed an answer claiming that he was not yet the register of deeds then; that it was only the
ministerial duty of his office to issue the title in favor of the defendant Navata once he was determined the registerability of the documents presented
to his office.
On October 20, 1966, the defendant Navata filed her answer with the affirmative defenses and counterclaim alleging among others that the complaint
does not state a cause of action since it appears from the allegation that the property is registered in the name of Jose Godinez so that as his sole
property he may dispose of the same; that the cause of action has been barred by the statute of limitations as the alleged document of sale executed by
Jose Godinez on November 27, 1941, conveyed the property to defendant Fong Pak Luen as a result of which a title was issued to said defendant;
that under Article 1144 (1) of the Civil Code, an action based upon a written contract must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of
action accrues; that the right of action accrued on November 27, 1941 but the complaint was filed only on September 30, 1966, beyond the 10 year
period provided for by law; that the torrens title in the name of defendant Navata is indefeasible who acquired the property from defendant Fong Pak
Luen who had been in possession of the property since 1941 and thereafter defendant Navata had possessed the same for the last 25 years including
the possession of Fong Pak Luen; that the complaint is intended to harass the defendant as a civic leader and respectable member of the community
as a result of which she suffered moral damages of P100,000.00, P2,500.00 for attorney's fees and P500.00 expenses of litigation, hence, said
defendant prays that the complaint be dismissed and that her counterclaim be granted, with costs against the plaintiffs. On November 24, 1967, the
plaintiffs filed an answer to the affirmative defenses and counter-claim. As the defendants Fong Pak Luen and Kwan Pun Ming are residing outside
the Philippines, the trial court upon motion issued an order of April 17, 1967, for the service of summons on said defendants by publication. No
answer has been filed by said defendants.
On December 2, 196 7, the court issued an order as follows:
Both parties having agreed to the suggestion of the Court that they submit their supplemental pleadings to support both motion and opposition and
after submittal of the same the said motion to dismiss which is an affirmative defense alleged in the complaint is deemed submitted. Failure of both
parties or either party to submit their supplemental pleadings on or about December 9, the Court will resolve the case.
On November 29, 1968, the trial court issued an order missing the complaint without pronouncement as to costs. (Record on Appeal, pp. 31- 37). A
motion for reconsideration of this order was filed by the plaintiffs on December 12, 196F, which was denied by the trial court in an order of July 11,
1969, (Rec. on Appeal, pp. 38, 43, 45, 47). The plaintiffs now interpose this appeal with the following assignments of errors:
I. The trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs-appellants' complaint on the ground of prescription of action, applying Art. 1144 (1) New Civil Code
on the basis of defendant Trinidad S. Navata's affirmative defense of prescription in her answer treated as a motion to dismiss.
II. The trial court erred in denying plaintiffs-appellants' motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal.
III. The trial court erred in not ordering this case to be tried on the merits."
The appellants contend that the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that their cause of action has prescribed. While the issue
raised appears to be only the applicability of the law governing prescription, the real question before us is whether or not the heirs of a person who
sold a parcel of land to an alien in violation of a constitutional prohibition may recover the property if it had, in the meantime, been conveyed to a
Filipino citizen qualified to own and possess it.
The question is not a novel one. Judicial precedents indicate fairly clearly how the question should be resolved.
There can be no dispute that the sale in 1941 by Jose Godinez of his residential lot acquired from the Bureau of Lands as part of the Jolo townsite to
Fong Pak Luen, a Chinese citizen residing in Hongkong, was violative of Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution which provided:
Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
The meaning of the above provision was fully discussed in Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila (79 Phil. 461) which also detailed the evolution
of the provision in the public land laws, Act No. 2874 and Commonwealth Act No. 141. The Krivenko ruling that "under the Constitution aliens may
not acquire private or agricultural lands, including residential lands" is a declaration of an imperative constitutional policy. Consequently,
prescription may never be invoked to defend that which the Constitution prohibits. However, we see no necessity from the facts of this case to pass
upon the nature of the contract of sale executed by Jose Godinez and Fong Pak Luen whether void ab initio, illegal per se or merely pro-
exhibited.** It is enough to stress that insofar as the vendee is concerned, prescription is unavailing. But neither can the vendor or his heirs rely on
an argument based on imprescriptibility because the land sold in 1941 is now in the hands of a Filipino citizen against whom the constitutional
prescription was never intended to apply. The lower court erred in treating the case as one involving simply the application of the statute of
limitations.
From the fact that prescription may not be used to defend a contract which the Constitution prohibits, it does not necessarily follow that the
appellants may be allowed to recover the property sold to an alien. As earlier mentioned, Fong Pak Luen, the disqualified alien vendee later sold the
same property to Trinidad S. Navata, a Filipino citizen qualified to acquire real property.
In Vasquez v. Li Seng Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons (96 Phil. 447), where the alien vendee later sold the property to a Filipino corporation, this
Court, in affirming a judgment dismissing the complaint to rescind the sale of real property to the defendant Li Seng Giap on January 22, 1940, on
the ground that the vendee was an alien and under the Constitution incapable to own and hold title to lands, held:
In Caoile vs. Yu Chiao 49 Qff Gaz., 4321; Talento vs. Makiki 49 Off. Gaz., 4331; Bautista vs. Uy 49 Off. Gaz., 4336; Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee 49 Off.
Gaz., 4345 and Mercado vs. Go Bio, 49 Off. Gaz., 5360, the majority of this Court has ruled that in sales of real estate to aliens incapable of holding
title thereto by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution (Section 5, Article XIII Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, 44 Off. Gaz., 471) both the vendor
and the vendee are deemed to have committed the constitutional violation and being thus in pari delicto the courts will not afford protection to either
party. (Article 1305, old Civil Code; Article 1411, new Civil Code) From this ruling three Justices dissented. (Mr. Justice Pablo, Mr. Justice Alex.
Reyes and the writer. See Caoile vs. Yu Chiao Talento vs. Makiki Bautista us. Uy, Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee and Mercado vs. Go Bio). supra.
The action is not of rescission because it is not postulated upon any of the grounds provided for in Article 1291 of the old Civil Code and because the
action of rescission involves lesion or damage and seeks to repair it. It is an action for annulment under Chapter VI, Title II, Book 11, on nullity of
contracts, based on a defect in the contract which invalidates it independently of such lesion or damages. (Manresa, Commentarios al Codigo Civil
Espanol Vol. VIII, p. 698, 4th ed.) It is very likely that the majority of this Court proceeded upon that theory when it applied the in pari delicto rule
referred to above.
In the United States the rule is that in a sale of real estate to an alien disqualified to hold title thereto the vendor divests himself of the title to such
real estate and has no recourse against the vendee despite the latter's disability on account of alienage to hold title to such real estate and the vendee
may hold it against the whole world except as against the State. It is only the State that is entitled by proceedings in the nature of office found to have
a forfeiture or escheat declared against the vendee who is incapable of holding title to the real estate sold and conveyed to him. Abrams vs. State, 88
Pac. 327; Craig vs. Leslie et al., 4 Law, Ed. 460; 3 Wheat, 563, 589590; Cross vs. Del Valle, 1 Wall, [U.S.] 513; 17 Law. Ed., 515; Governeur vs.
Robertson, 11 Wheat, 332, 6 Law. Ed., 488.)
However, if the State does not commence such proceedings and in the meantime the alien becomes naturalized citizen, the State is deemed to have
waived its right to escheat the real property and the title of the alien thereto becomes lawful and valid as of the date of its conveyance or transfer to
him. (Osterman vs. Baldwin, 6 Wall, 116, 18 Law. ed. 730; Manuel vs. Wulff, 152 U.S. 505, 38 Law. ed. 532; Pembroke vs. Houston, 79, SW 470;
Fioerella vs. Jones, 259 SW 782. The rule in the United States that in a sale of real estate to an alien disqualified to hold title thereto, the vendor
divests himself of the title to such real estate and is not permitted to sue for the annulment Of his Contract, is also the rule under the Civil Code. ...
Article 1302 of the old Civil Code provides: ... Persons sui juris cannot, however, avail themselves of the incapacity of those with whom they
contracted; ...
xxx xxx xxx
. . . (I)f the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but, also urban lands, as construed by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the
nation's land for future generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real
estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization. The title to the parcel of land of the vendee, a naturalized Filipino citizen, being valid
that of the domestic corporation to which the parcel of land has been transferred, must also be valid, 96.67 per cent of its capital stock being owned
by Filipinos.
Herrera v. Luy Kim Guan (SCRA 406) reiterated the above ruling by declaring that where land is sold to a Chinese citizen, who later sold it to a
Filipino, the sale to the latter cannot be impugned.
The appellants cannot find solace from Philippine Banking Corporation v. Lui She (21 SCRA 52) which relaxed the pari delicto doctrine to allow the
heirs or successors-in-interest, in appropriate cases, to recover that which their predecessors sold to aliens.
Only recently, in Sarsosa vda. de Barsobia v. Cuenco (113 SCRA 547) we had occasion to pass upon a factual situation substantially similar to the
one in the instant case. We ruled:
But the factual set-up has changed. The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned by a disqualified
vendee. Respondent, as a naturalized citizen, was constitutionally qualified to own the subject property. There would be no more public policy to be
served in allowing petitioner Epifania to recover the land as it is already in the hands of a qualified person. Applying by analogy the ruling of this
Court in Vasquez vs. Giap & Sons: (.96 Phil. 447 [1955])
... if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands, as construed by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the
nation's lands for future generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real
estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization.
While, strictly speaking, Ong King Po, private respondent's vendor, had no rights of ownership to transmit, it is likewise in escapable that petitioner
Epifania had slept on her rights for 26 years from 1936 to 1962. By her long inaction or inexcusable neglect, she should be held barred from asserting
her claim to the litigated property (Sotto vs. Teves, 86 SCRA 157 [1978])
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or ommission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. (Tijam, et al. vs. Sibonghanoy, et al., No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA
29, 35).' (Cited in Sotto vs. Teves, 86 SCRA 154 [1978]).
Respondent, therefore, must be declared to be the rightful owner of the property.
In the light of the above considerations, we find the second and third assignments of errors without merit. Respondent Navata, the titled owner of the
property is declared the rightful owner.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby denied. The orders dismissing the complaint and denying the motion for reconsideration are affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez and Relova, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
** Under the facts in Sarsosa vda. de Barsobia v. Cuenco (113 SCRA 547), this Court stated that "(t)here should be no question that the sale of the
land in question in 1936 by Epifania Sarsosa to Ong King Po was non-existent and void from the beginning (Art. 1409 [71, Civil Code) because it
was a contract executed against the mandatory provision of the 1935 Constitution, which is an expression of public policy to conserve lands for the
Filipinos." In Philippine Banking Corporation v. Lui She (21 SCRA 52) the Court, however, applied Article 1416 of the Civil Code, which refers
to agreements not illegal se but merely prohibited, to justify the exception to the rule on pari delicto.