Haney Teoria Feminista Del Estado Aplicacions Al Derecho La Criminologia y El Estado de Bienestar

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June 16, 2000 12:34 Annual Reviews CHAP-27
Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2000. 26:641–66

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c 2000 by Annual Reviews. All rights reserved
FEMINIST STATE THEORY: Applications

to Jurisprudence, Criminology,
and the Welfare State
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Lynne A. Haney
Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2000.26:641-666. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
Department of Sociology, New York University, 269 Mercer St. 4th Floor, New York, NY;
e-mail: Haney@mail.soc.nyu.edu
Key Words gender, social policy, law, criminal justice

■ Abstract This chapter discusses developments in feminist state theory through a
comparison of feminist interventions into jurisprudence, criminology, and welfare state
theory. Early feminist work on the state analyzed how women were subordinated by a
centralized state. More recently, feminist scholars unearthed how states are differenti-
ated entities, comprised of multiple gender arrangements. This discovery of state varia-
tion surfaced differently in these three branches of scholarship. Feminist legal theorists
concentrated on multiple legal discourses, feminist criminologists on the diverse sites
of case processing, and feminist welfare theorists on the varied dimensions of welfare
stratification. Because of their different approaches to state gender regimes, these schol-
ars have much to offer, and to gain from, one another. Thus, this chapter argues for the
importance of an interdisciplinary feminist dialogue on the state. It also suggests ways
to promote such a dialogue and to insert a sociological perspective into this new mode of
theorizing.
INTRODUCTION
State theory is a relatively recent addition to feminist scholarship. Although many

political sociologists spent the last decade bringing the state back into their field,
many feminist social scientists used this period to conceptualize ways to bring
the state into the study of gender. Initially, feminists drew the state into gender
studies through analyses of the state’s role in reproducing patriarchal social re-
lations; they examined how women, as a homogenous group, were oppressed by
a centralized state. More recently, feminists have eschewed such conspiratorial
notions of state patriarchy to take up the more complicated task of illuminating the
ways states shape, and are shaped by, gender relations. Through studies of state
spheres—including welfare provisions, legal codes, and penal policies—feminist
theorists uncovered how states are differentiated entities, composed of multiple
gender arrangements. The result has been the proliferation and diversification of
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feminist analyses of the state. This chapter charts the trajectories of the new fem-
inist scholarship on different state realms.
To a large extent, this new feminist scholarship is organized by the type of
state apparatus. Some scholars focus on the dynamics of welfare redistribution
and policy formulation (Skocpol 1992, Orloff 1993, Gordon 1994); others cen-
ter on the assignment of political citizenship and legal rights (Pateman 1988,
MacKinnon 1989, Rhode 1989). Still others are concerned with the formation of
penal and disciplinary practices (Smart 1990, Daly 1994, Messerschmidt 1997).
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Existing reviews tend to echo these divisions by systematizing feminist analyses of

a particular state apparatus and fleshing out their contributions to general scholarly
debates (Smart 1991, Orloff 1996, Daly & Maher 1998). By dialoguing with non-
feminist scholars, feminists made inroads into “mainstream” social science and
heightened the visibility of their work (Chavetz 1997). Although extraordinarily
important, these external dialogues often deflected attention from internal femi-
nist exchanges. Feminist welfare scholars rarely refer to the work of feminist legal
theorists or criminologists; the reverse is also true. Thus, we lack an understanding
of the theoretical developments and empirical findings of different branches of
feminist state theory.
This chapter crosses the traditional borders of subfields to compare feminist
interventions into jurisprudence, criminology, and welfare state theory. I chose
these fields for three primary reasons. First, although not all of these scholars
claim to study the state per se, they all analyze the gendered dynamics of state
apparatuses. Second, feminist research in these areas has been the most exten-
sive, thus allowing me to compare work of similar complexity. Third, feminist
scholarship in these fields has the most relevance to a broad sociological audience;
it addresses issues of concern to sociologists of law, criminologists, and politi-
cal sociologists. This does not imply that I confine my analysis to texts written
exclusively by sociologists. Although I place sociological work in the forefront,
feminist state theory is too interdisciplinary to be limited to one field. At the same
time, I do restrict my discussion in several ways. Most importantly, I address
feminist analyses of the state’s gender regime—or the “state of play of gender
relations in a given institution” (Connell 1987, p. 120). I review works that illu-
minate the state processes and arrangements active in fashioning gender relations
in the legal, criminal justice, and welfare systems. My interest is less in feminist
discussions of how or why women and men reach state systems, and more in their
theories of the gendered processes that subjects encounter once embedded in these
systems.
Even within these conceptual parameters, it is exceedingly difficult to do jus-
tice to the vast literature on gender and the state. Thus, this chapter is necessar-
ily schematic; it paints a portrait of feminist state scholarship in broad strokes.
Nonetheless, the portrait has a frame. As I analyze developments in these three
fields, I compare feminist work in two dimensions: their accounts of the state as
“need interpreter” and as “need satisfier” (Fraser 1989). I explore the extent to
which feminists in these fields view state gender regimes as operating through
interpretive structures, redistributive structures, or some combination of the two.
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FEMINIST STATE THEORY 643
How do feminists understand the state’s role in interpreting the categories of gen-
der? Do they see these acts of interpretation as key to the gender regimes of law,
criminal justice, and welfare? Or do they conceptualize state regimes as primarily
redistributive in nature, that is, as stratifying women and men through differential
access to material goods, social rights, and punishment? Have feminists connected
these dimensions to link state interpretation and stratification? In short, I investi-
gate the trajectories of three branches of feminist scholarship through “cultural”
and “structural” perspectives.
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This two-dimensional framework will facilitate dialogue among feminist think-

ers who too often seem to talk past each other. It also offers a way to disentangle the
complex processes that make up state gender regimes, and it highlights the similar-
ities and differences in feminist theoretical trajectories and empirical findings. In

all of these fields, feminists have moved away from simply critiquing nonfeminist
scholarship or imposing mainstream paradigms onto gender analyses. They have
developed models that draw on and expand existing frameworks. Their models
tend to share a critical, albeit tacit, understanding of the state as a multifaceted
entity. In a similar manner, they expose the way state arenas are often fraught with
conflicting and contradictory messages about gender. When taken together, this
feminist work replaces the notion of a singular, centralized state structure with a
conception of the diversity of state apparatuses.
This recognition of state variation has surfaced differently in these three fields
of feminist studies. Feminist legal scholars have developed sophisticated theories
of legal interpretation and textual representation, but remain less attentive to the
law’s stratifying dimensions. I discuss this development in the first section of
this chapter. Feminist criminologists, on the other hand, have done extraordinary
empirical work on the redistributive inequalities of the criminal justice system, but
have yet to advance a full theorization of the politics of representation. I describe
this trajectory in the second part of the chapter. Recent feminist welfare state theory
has moved in two directions—one strand examining the politics of redistribution
and the other examining the politics of recognition. It has also begun to link these
state dimensions in provocative ways. These theoretical innovations have much
to offer, and to gain from, feminist jurisprudence and criminology. I outline these
lessons in the chapter’s third section. In the concluding section, I argue for the
importance of establishing a dialogical field that encompasses feminist analyses
of the state. I also suggest ways to create such a field and to insert a sociological
perspective into this new mode of theorizing.
REPRESENTATIONS OF EQUALITY AND DIFFERENCE:

Feminist Jurisprudence
Feminist jurisprudence arose in the 1970s in response to political and intellec-
tual developments in the field of law. From the onset, feminist legal scholars
were closely tied to the second-wave women’s movement (Weisberg 1993). As
more women entered law school, they began to problematize issues of sexual
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discrimination; as many of them became practitioners, they confronted difficul-

ties “doing law” as feminists (Kay 1985, Littleton 1987). Feminist jurisprudence
also emerged along with critical legal studies, forming part of a larger critique of
legal liberalism and the inherent logic of law (Menkel-Meadow 1988). Feminist
jurisprudence also arose at a time when sociologists of law had largely moved
away from structural approaches toward ideological and interpretive frameworks
(Seron & Munger 1996). Thus, the timing of feminist jurisprudence’s birth shaped
its subsequent maturation. These broad intellectual currents surfaced in the devel-
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opment of feminist jurisprudence—in its view of the law as a sexist ideology, then
as an interpretation of gender relations, and finally as a constitutive discourse.
Much of the early work in feminist jurisprudence chronicled the law as an
institution of male dominance. Like many Marxist feminists, these scholars in-
dicted the law as a tool and a symbol of male power. Echoing Hartmann (1976),
they claimed that the law acted to secure private patriarchy—by excluding women
from the public sphere and refusing to interfere in the domestic realm, the law
ensured that women remained subordinate to men (Taub & Schneider 1982, Polan
1982). Moreover, echoing Rubin (1975), feminist legal theorists argued that law
was constructed around the exchange and commodification of women (Rifkin
1980). The law distorted social reality in the interest of men and was thus integral
to patriarchal culture (McIntosh 1978).
Such conspiratorial arguments were a sign of the times, reminiscent of early
trends in feminist theory. Although provocative, these conspiracy theories soon
proved to be limited. They were of little help to feminist practitioners in their
struggles doing law. Nor did they offer particularly nuanced accounts of legal in-
stitutions. Like feminist theory in general, feminist jurisprudence began to shift
focus to view the law as an interpretive structure that articulated powerful state-
ments about gender differentiation. Throughout the 1980s, feminist scholars un-
earthed the legal system’s gender regime and explicated the state of play of gender
relations in legal doctrine. There was little consensus over the character of this
regime: For some, the law’s gender regime operated through its assumptions of
gender difference, for others through its sameness standard, and for still others
through its constitution of gendered subjects.
Gender Regimes of Difference and Sameness

The equality/difference debate within feminist jurisprudence is well documented in
the literature (Fineman & Thomadsen 1991, Weisberg 1993, Smith 1993,
Holland 1996). At the center of the debate were competing visions of the legal
system’s representation of gender. On one side were those scholars who viewed
the law’s insistence on gender difference as the core of its regime: by conceiving
of women and men as fundamentally different, the law perpetuated discrimination
against women. Commonly known as “equality feminists,” these scholars analyzed
the gendered assumptions of U.S. legal theory and practice. Like their feminist pre-
decessors, they located the law’s gender bias in women’s exclusion from the rights
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granted to some men (Minow 1987). Their work documented the long history of
such exclusion and linked it to classifications of “real” sex differences (Eisenstein
1988). In effect, they argued that the law reproduced gender inequality by adhering
to an ideology of difference (Williams 1984). The solution was therefore clear:
if the law’s gender regime rested on sexual difference, it could be countered by
accentuating sexual similarity. Equality feminists therefore pushed legal liberalism
to its limits—claiming that the law should indeed become a neutral instrument and
treat women as citizens not classified by sex (Minow 1987, Eisenstein 1988).
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These arguments about gender sameness unquestionably led to a series of court

victories. By appropriating notions of equality, feminists challenged long-standing
legal biases, especially in the areas of employment and divorce (Smart 1986, Rhode
1989, Hoff 1991). Yet this approach had more troubling outcomes in other areas,
particularly in reproductive law. For instance, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
of 1978 sparked a heated debate within feminist jurisprudence. The Act applied
a disability standard to pregnancy and effectively compelled employers to treat
it like all other disabilities (Kay 1985, Finley 1986). Some feminists found such
reasoning entirely appropriate—to secure equality, pregnant workers should be
treated like workers with temporary disabilities (Williams 1984). For others, the
absurdity of viewing pregnancy as a disability exemplified the danger inherent in
the application of a single standard and the overall poverty of equality feminism
(Krieger & Cooney 1983, Scales 1986, Eisenstein 1988).
Equality feminism was not only challenged on practical grounds; legal scholars
who advanced a deeper critique of law also subjected it to theoretical scrutiny. For
these scholars, equality feminists accepted precisely what was most problematic
about law—its myth of equal treatment and individualism. Often referred to as
“difference” or “inequality” feminists, these scholars saw the law’s gender regime
as rooted in the tyranny of male objectivity and male norms (Weisberg 1993).
They located the law’s gender bias in its viewpoint, that is, in its objective, neutral,
and distanced stance toward the social world. They argued that objectivity was
male in both the cultural and the psychological sense: It not only reflected male
interests, but it was integral to male socialization and the male psyche (Scales
1986). They also faulted legal liberalism’s assumptions about human separation
and distance—assumptions that failed to appreciate the connectedness fostered by
women’s child-rearing experiences (West 1988). As MacKinnon (1989, p. 162)
put it, the law “sees and treats women as men see and treat women” and is thus
the institutionalization of male subjectivity.
Other feminist scholars used a difference approach to analyze the masculine
foundations of legal norms. They revealed how legal notions of reasonable be-
havior worked to dismiss the experiences of those who refused to conform—the
structures of sexism, racism, and homophobia often conditioned people to act in
ways that made them appear unreasonable and therefore not entitled to legal pro-
tection (Lahey 1991). Legal interpretations of suffering also failed to acknowledge
the distinct quality of women’s pain. According to West (1991), men and women
experience pleasure and pain differently; men often find pleasure in those acts that
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cause women pain, such as sexual harassment on the street, the consumption of
pornography, or domestic abuse. Here too the law adhered to a male standard by
excluding women-specific forms of injury from legal redress (Dixon 1994). More-
over, legal constructions of relevancy insisted on a male mode of argumentation—
by demanding that women frame arguments in legal or administrative categories
and abandon a story-telling mode, the law systematically curtailed women’s ability
to speak or be heard (Finley 1986, Bumiller 1990).
Still other feminists exposed how the law’s gender regime of sameness obscured
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social relations of domination. They problematized equality doctrine’s promise of

similar treatment for the similarly situated—pointing out that it masked those social
processes that situated women and men differently (Minow 1987). As MacKinnon
(1987) argued, the sameness standard removed power from the social world and
negated women’s economic dependency and sexual accessibility. It also failed
to recognize the distinct nature of women’s embodiment, that is, how women’s
bodies are used as an entrance point for the regulation of social norms (Eisenstein
1988, Smart 1993). In this way, the law’s denial of structural inequality ended up
reproducing male dominance and privilege.
Thus, the equality/difference debate encompassed competing perspectives on
the law’s gender regime: For some, the law was unjust in its unequal treatment of
equals, whereas for others its injustice lay in its equal treatment of unequals. By the
late 1980s, many legal scholars concluded that this debate had reached an impasse.
They then proposed ways to link the insights offered by each side. These scholars
advanced alternative conceptions of equality—equality as acceptance (Littleton
1987), equality as a strategy (Majury 1987), and equality as “episodic” (Kay
1985). They also redefined notions of difference by shifting focus from difference
to disadvantage (Rhode 1989) and by emphasizing multiple axes of difference
(Harris 1990, Crenshaw 1991). In addition, they attempted to break down the
dichotomies inherent in the difference/equality debate to argue for a theory of
equality based on a pluralized notion of difference, what Eisenstein (1988, p. 5)
termed “radical egalitarianism.”
All of these theorists provided powerful readings of the law’s interpretive bias.
Their theoretical sophistication is largely unparalleled in other areas of feminist
state theory. However, their concentration on legal interpretation often deflected
attention from full analyses of redistributive practices. By eschewing empirical
work in favor of abstract theorizing, feminist jurisprudence left a series of is-
sues underexplored. How have different legal interpretations been received in the
courtroom? What practical and discursive resources have they accorded women
as claimants? As practitioners? How have these interpretations been adjudicated?
What were the outcomes?
The one case in which feminists have explored these practical outcomes was
the infamous Sears Case—the 1979 case in which the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission accused Sears, Roebuck and Co. of sex discrimination in
their assignment, training, and promotion of women (Milkman 1986, Scott 1988,
Eisenstein 1988). The case exemplified what could happen when certain legal
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interpretations were put into action. Few feminists liked what they saw: The case
pitted “difference” feminism, articulated by Rosalind Rosenberg, against “equal-
ity” feminism, articulated by Alice Kessler Harris. Even more troubling than the
court’s 1986 ruling in favor of Sears was its selective use of difference arguments
to justify discrimination. Once they hit the courtroom, both feminist approaches
were stripped of their complexity and nuance (Scott 1988). Although the omi-
nous tale of the Sears case could have provoked a renewed interest in the rela-
tionship between legal theory and practice, it did not. Instead, feminist jurispru-
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dence moved toward increasingly abstract conceptions of the law as a constitutive

discourse.
Postmodern Legal Feminism

Feminists’ disillusionment with the difference/equality debate coincided with the
rise of postmodernism in critical legal studies. For many, postmodernism offered
a way out of the impasse (Ashe 1987, Smart 1991). Instead of viewing law as a
series of rules and doctrines, feminists defined it as a constitutive discourse (Frug
1992). The law, they argued, produces meaning and creates social categories (Smart
1992). Through representation and subjectivization, the law sets social boundaries.
Like literature and the media, the law is a cultural product that defines knowledge
and power (Heinzelman & Wiseman 1994, Fineman 1995, Fineman & McCluskey
1997). In the process of rethinking law, these scholars also reconceptualized gender.
Unlike feminist scholars who worked with fixed gender categories, postmodern
legal feminists saw gender as a classificatory scheme open to negotiation. The
legal system’s gender regime encompassed precisely this classificatory work—
the discursive processes through which gender categories accrued significance
(Cornell 1992). In Smart’s (1992) terms, postmodern legal feminists analyze the
“technology of gender”: the law as a mechanism that fixes gender signifiers, subject
positions, and differentiation (de Lauretis 1987).
Another key element of postmodern legal feminism is its recognition of the
law’s constitution of multiple categories of difference. Here too postmodern le-
gal feminists found fault in the work of their predecessors. They argued that the
equality/difference debate focused on a single axis of oppression; it was infused
with essentialism and premised on unified gender interests (Crenshaw 1991, Dixon
1994). Such reductionism missed the complex ways the law subordinates citizens
along the lines of race, class, and sexuality (Coombs 1996). According to Harris
(1990), these classifications form “inexplicable webs” of oppression; the law sets
down multiple boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. Thus, in Crenshaw’s (1989)
terms, legal theory and politics should begin to “demarginalize the intersections”
by centering on the multiply disadvantaged.
Postmodernism thus marked a profound shift in feminist jurisprudence. For
these theorists, the law became a framing discourse. Legal language became the
site of power struggles (Frug 1992). Gender became a subject position that the
law brings into being (Smart 1993). Cases like the Sears affair became texts to be
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648 HANEY
unpacked for their levels of rhetorical signification (Scott 1988). When postmodern
legal feminists veered away from abstract deconstruction, they turned to personal
narratives of legal power and subversion (Williams 1991, White 1991). Like legal
deconstruction, such narratives fostered an appreciation of juridical variability.
They revealed that the law’s regime does not operate through sameness or differ-
ence, but through interpretive processes that shape experience in complex ways.
Although provocative, it is not clear whether such narratives led feminist scholars
any closer to answering the questions posed earlier. How do legal discourses dis-
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tribute resources, rights, and tools to those they target? As Seron & Munger (1996)
ask of legal theory in general: what about the power of race, class, and gender that
extends beyond individual experience, consciousness, or discursive signification?
In short, what about a more sociologically inspired legal feminism?
PRACTICES OF BENEVOLENCE AND PUNISHMENT:

Feminist Criminology
In contrast to the abstract theorizing of feminist jurisprudence, feminist criminol-
ogy is quite empirically grounded. Feminist criminologists have been less influ-
enced by the theoretical and epistemological shifts of postmodernism (Carrington
1994). They have also been less engaged in the conceptual debates of feminist
theory (Simpson 1989). Until recently, their focus was primarily on the field of
criminology. This dialogue with criminology left its mark on feminist analyses—
surfacing in the kinds of questions they ask and the ways they answer them (Daly
& Maher 1998). Feminist criminologists are arguably the least theoretical of the
feminist scholars discussed in this essay, but they are also the most empirically
sophisticated. They investigate precisely those issues that elude feminist legal the-
orists, that is, distributive patterns of punishment and stratification in the justice
system.
Overall, analyses of the justice system’s gender regime constitute only a small
part of feminist criminology. As Daly & Chesney-Lind (1988) argue, feminist
criminologists were more preoccupied with gender-ratio and generalizability prob-
lems. First, feminist criminologists conducted important research on the gen-
der gap in crime rates. They found that women commit fewer crimes than men
(Morris 1987, Triplett & Myers 1995); they discovered that women and men com-
mit different kinds of crime (Heimer 1995), and they unearthed historical changes
in patterns of female offending (Adler 1975, Simon 1975). Second, feminist crim-
inologists challenged the misogyny underlying traditional explanations of female
crime, such as theories of hormonal imbalances, mental illness, and sexual mal-
function (Smart 1977, Naffine 1987). They also critiqued criminologists who im-
posed male models onto female experience—arguing that an “add women and stir”
approach led to distorted explanations of female crime (Morris 1987, Gelsthorpe
& Morris 1988). In response, feminist scholars proposed their own explanations
for female criminality. They pointed to a series of explanatory factors, including
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structures of gender and racial inequality, levels of anomie, modes of informal/

formal social control, socialization patterns, gender norms, and opportunity struc-
tures (Steffensmeier & Allan 1996, Mann 1996, Messerschmidt 1997).
In addition to analyses of the nature and causes of female crime, feminist
criminologists offered important insights into how the justice system genders its
subjects. At one level, their accounts parallel those of feminist legal theorists;
both groups are centrally concerned with questions of equality and difference.
Yet feminist criminologists approach these questions differently; they are less
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interested in interpretive structures and more in patterns of tracking or labeling. In

particular, feminist criminologists sought to understand how women and men are
treated in the justice system, that is, whether women are subjected to more severe
or more lenient treatment than men.
Gender Regimes of Severity and Leniency

Unlike feminist jurisprudence’s debate about the law’s gender regime of sameness
or difference, feminist criminology began from the premise of difference. Empir-
ical evidence collected since the 1970s clearly pointed to differential treatment of
women in the justice system. Yet it was not entirely clear how to characterize this
treatment. Sometimes referred to as the “evil woman thesis,” a few early studies
found that women were treated more harshly by the justice system (Temin 1973,
Chesney-Lind 1977). This was particularly true for those who engaged in serious
offenses; women who were thought to repudiate female norms had their “moral-
ity” called into question (Visher 1983). State officials were said to deal with these
women retributively and to come down harder on those who did not conform to
conventional female expectations (Parisi 1982).
This argument about the severe treatment of females was especially prominent
in studies of the juvenile system. For example, Chesney-Lind & Sheldon (1997)
documented the discrimination that girls experienced in the justice system. They
argued that girls were drawn into the state’s web for less serious offenses, such as
sexual transgressions and status violations. They asserted that the justice system
attempted to secure female obedience and compliance, particularly for those girls
thought to be sexually active. Thus, the justice system’s gender regime was said
to operate through its harsh treatment and further victimization of girls.
Using large-scale statistical surveys, other feminist criminologists uncovered
the opposite pattern: The justice system treated women more leniently than men
(Steffensmeier et al 1993). Attention then turned to explaining this variation. On
the one hand, some criminologists used these data to suggest that the justice system
worked with stereotypical notions of gender (Eaton 1986). They claimed that the
state took a chivalrous approach to women; justice officials did not believe women
could commit crime and were unwilling to inflict harm on them (Webb 1984). State
actors were also said to act paternalistically, assuming that women were childlike
and not responsible for their actions (Anderson 1976). The outcome was lenient
treatment designed to protect the vulnerable.
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Feminist criminologists who supplemented statistical surveys with qualita-

tive data discovered that state officials seemed less influenced by paternalist im-
pulses and more affected by practical exigencies (Allen 1987, Ferraro 1989,
Simpson 1991). Although they also saw the justice system’s gender regime as
one of leniency, they viewed its motives differently. For instance, in a study of
>1000 probation cases, Kruttschnitt (1982) found that a defendant’s level of eco-
nomic dependency was the primary factor determining sentence severity. Instead
of attributing this to state patriarchy, she revealed that probation officers saw de-
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pendent women as safer bets owing to the control exerted over them by their
families. In a similar manner, Steffensmeier et al (1993) suggested that judges
viewed female defendants as less culpable in part because of women’s ties to and
responsibilities in the community. They also discovered that judges weighted prac-
tical concerns quite heavily in sentencing decisions, factoring in whether women
had child-care responsibilities and physical or emotional problems. Daly (1987,
1989) uncovered a similar reasoning at work in the court system. She claimed
that the justice system was invested in policing traditional economic and familial
roles—the court “familied” women not because they wanted to protect them, but
because they sought to maintain conventional domestic arrangements and informal
modes of social control.
Like the equality/difference debate, the severity/leniency debate preoccupied
feminists for much of the 1980s. As in feminist jurisprudence, feminist crim-
inologists eventually deemed this debate futile (Daly 1994). Instead of insist-
ing on a dichotomous gender regime, some suggested that the regime operated
through both severity and leniency. Perhaps the system did not function the same
way at all points for all women; in arrest and imprisonment decisions, sex had
a positive effect, but in sentencing decisions it exerted little influence; in all of
these decisions, race and class exerted their own influence (Morris 1987, Simpson
1991, Mann 1996). Others suggested that the “evil woman” and “state paternal-
ism” theses be seen as complementary (Crew 1991). Perhaps the system’s gender
regime was rooted in its enforcement of traditional sex roles, which sometimes bred
more severe, and sometimes more lenient, treatment. Still others questioned the
premise of the severity/leniency debate, arguing that it took men as the norm to
analyze how women deviated from that norm (Daly 1994, Naffine 1996). The po-
litical implications of this troubled many feminists: In this case, applying a male
standard to women could imply incarcerating more women under worse condi-
tions for longer periods (Rafter 1990). Why not take women as the norm? In short,
perhaps the justice system consisted of multiple regimes and diverse disciplinary
practices.
Processing Gender, Race, and Class

Although many legal theorists transcended their equality/difference debate through
postmodernism, few feminist criminologists took this route out of the severity/
leniency impasse. Instead, in recent years they have broadened their empirical
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focus to illuminate the gendered dynamics of case processing. Rather than ex-
amine how gender affects sentencing outcomes, these criminologists elucidate
the way gender constructs become embedded in case processing. With this new
focus, feminist criminologists discovered variations in the justice system’s mes-
sages, targets, and mode of operation. Hence, like feminist jurisprudence, feminist
criminology has become more sensitive to the diversity of gender regimes. Yet
they center on a different type of variation—exploring the diversity in the justice
system’s stratifying and labeling processes.
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Daly’s (1994) research on the New Haven court system is an excellent example
of this approach. Daly uses multiple methods to capture the diverse contexts and
dimensions of case processing. She reveals that the behavior of court officials was
not motivated by patriarchy, but was guided by gendered presuppositions about

criminality and justice. As cases made their way through the court, defendants were
constructed in contrasting ways: notions of appropriate domestic arrangements,
good mothering, familial responsibility, reformability, and victimization were de-
ployed to label women and men. This labeling helped to shape gender differences
in outcomes. Daly’s analysis thus moves beyond the severity/leniency dichotomy
to reject the idea of a singular gender regime. It also offers a compelling account
of the many justifications used to explain female and male criminality. In short,
Daly’s work introduces one type of state variation—diversity in the processes
through which the justice system genders its subjects.
Daly’s work identifies another form of variation through an analysis of how the
justice system constructs defendants along race, class, and gender lines. In doing so,
Daly rejects the essentialism that plagued so much feminist work in criminology.
As Simpson & Elis (1994) put it, early feminist criminology had privileged gender
subordination. By ignoring the intersection of race, class, and gender, feminist
criminologists had produced inaccurate analyses of the causes of female crime
and the system’s gender regime (Hill & Crawford 1990, Simpson 1991, Mann
1996). The justice system did not hold all women up to the same gender norms
(Ferraro 1989, Carrington 1994). Nor did it label all women according to the same
evaluative criteria (Arnold 1990, Naffine 1996). Thus, these scholars pointed to a
second type of variation—differences in the social constructions and disciplinary
practices applied to women themselves.
Reflecting these shifts, Messerschmidt’s (1997) most recent work lays out an
important framework for analyzing the construction of gender, race, class, and
crime. Messerschmidt’s framework combines Connell’s (1987) structural the-
ory of gender and West & Fenstermaker’s (1995) theory of “doing difference.”
Like crime, Messerschmidt claims that gender, race, and class must be “done.”
They are situational accomplishments that can take on a multiplicity of forms.
Their precise form depends largely on a social actor’s structural location and
context—positions that make available different constructive resources. To demon-
strate this, Messerschmidt presents four case studies of gender, race, class, and
crime in the making: He analyzes individual, institutional, and cultural stories
to explicate how these categories were constructed and how crime became a
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652 HANEY
resource for “doing” other identities. In acknowledging the constructive qual-

ity of these categories, Messerschmidt urges criminologists to unpack the diverse
nature of gender, race, and class relations. Moreover, in illuminating these con-
structs’ structural and situational aspects, he encourages criminologists to examine
the ways social relationships are “made” in different institutions, including the
state.
At one level, there are definite parallels between developments in feminist ju-
risprudence and feminist criminology. Both fields emerged with a critique of state
?
patriarchy and evolved to recognize variations in the form and content of state
gender regimes. However, their analyses of variations are of a different sort. Over-
all, feminist criminologists remain focused on how the justice system stratifies
its subjects. Some examine how gender affects arrest and sentencing outcomes,
thus offering compelling accounts of the system’s structural tracking; others link
these structural dynamics to the labeling of women and men, thus providing in-
sights into the construction of gender relations. Feminist criminologists’ empirical
focus therefore enables them to capture precisely what is missing from feminist ju-
risprudence: a sociologically inspired legal feminism attentive to forms of juridical
stratification and redistributive inequities.
Yet one could argue that the reverse is also true. Feminist criminologists have
yet to develop the sophisticated interpretive analyses advanced by feminist legal
theorists. Most feminist criminologists continue to study patterns of treatment by
sex. However, the justice system also gives meaning to the categories of gender.
Although some feminist criminologists have begun to illuminate how state actors
draw on available gendered scripts, they tend to assume the existence of a stable
symbolic order. That is, they take gendered meanings and scripts as being “out
there,” ready to be utilized by actors in different situations. However, as feminist
legal theorists reveal, the legal and penal systems help to establish this gendered
order: They produce key social categories, often in dichotomous terms, and imbue
those categories with significance. State actors not only use the available reper-
toires to construct gender relations; they also help to constitute those repertoires.
Thus, these two feminist fields have much to gain from each other. Together,
they point to the importance of analyzing state structures of stratification and of
interpretation in all of their nuance and complexity. It is here that feminist wel-
fare scholars have much to offer, and to learn from, their colleagues in law and
criminology.
POLICIES OF REDISTRIBUTION AND

INTERPRETATION: Feminist Welfare State Scholarship
Although feminist welfare scholarship emerged at roughly the same time as fem-
inist jurisprudence and criminology, it arose in response to different intellectual
developments. As Gordon (1990) argued, feminist welfare scholars stood in dia-
logue with the broader state scholarship. Many feminists drew on the long tradition
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of theoretical work on welfare development. They confronted structural function-

alist theories of the welfare state’s usurpation of family functions, they grappled
with Marxist theories of the welfare state as an instrument of capitalism, and they
encountered state-centered theories that traced the welfare state to particular po-
litical configurations. These theoretical perspectives left their mark on feminist
welfare scholarship. Of all the feminists scholars reviewed here, welfare scholars
are most likely to define themselves as state theorists. They also tend to adhere to
a more comparative and historical focus. From this perspective, feminist welfare
?
scholars have begun to combine their approaches to produce innovative theories

of state stratification and interpretation.
Yet these theoretical innovations took time to blossom. As in legal theory and
criminology, feminist welfare scholars began by inserting women into existing

frameworks. Unlike feminist jurisprudence, the welfare scholarship was not char-
acterized by debates about equality and difference—the welfare state clearly en-
meshed men and women in different programs. Thus, like feminist criminology,
the welfare scholarship began from a premise of difference. For them, the key ques-
tion was whether this differential treatment hurt or helped women. Early welfare
scholars tended to view the state as accentuating sexual hierarchies and reproduc-
ing capitalism and patriarchy (Hartmann 1976). Through its support of the nuclear
family, codification of a family ethic, and insistence on the family wage, the state
was said to bolster “private” patriarchy, or female dependence on individual men
(Abramovitz 1988). In addition, the state was indicted for creating a new form of
“public” patriarchy, or female reliance on men as a collective embodied in the state
(Brown 1981). By taking over men’s familial power and stepping in to manage
women’s lives, feminists argued that the welfare state fostered female dependence
on the state itself (Boris & Bardaglio 1983).
At the same time, other feminists advanced a more sanguine view of the welfare
state. They argued that, whatever its limitations, welfare policy does help women.
They pointed out that generous welfare states tend to be associated with lower
levels of female poverty (Ruggie 1984, Kamerman 1984). Even when states do
not eliminate female poverty, assistance programs can shield women from extreme
deprivation and enhance their ability to survive materially (Piven 1990, Edin & Lein
1996). These scholars also claimed that welfare policies can foster female activism
and heighten solidarity among the otherwise disconnected (Piven & Cloward 1977,
Schneider 1990).
Both feminist approaches offered insights into the welfare system’s effects on
women. Nonetheless, as Orloff (1996) argued, these analyses failed to capture the
complexity of welfare provision. They lacked an appreciation of how states actu-
ally operate; they were blind to national and historical variation in state structure.
To correct for these omissions, recent feminist welfare scholarship branched off in
two directions—some unpacked variation in systems of redistribution and others
explored variations in interpretive structures (Haney 1998). Together, these schol-
ars unearthed the stratifying and discursive practices of different welfare states as
they develop over time.
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654 HANEY
Gender Regimes of Need Satisfaction and Interpretation

To transcend the good state/bad state divide, feminist scholars began to probe into
the actual workings of the U.S. welfare state. They arrived at a critical discovery:
the welfare state was bifurcated into masculine and feminine subsystems that op-
erated in contrasting ways (Gordon 1990). The top tier, commonly known as the
“social insurance” subsystem, positioned recipients as rights-bearing individuals
entitled to assistance (Sapiro 1990). Policies like workmen’s compensation, unem-
?
ployment insurance, and Social Security bolstered recipients’ provider roles and
enabled them to support their families (Nelson 1990). The bottom tier, commonly
known as the “social assistance” subsystem, positioned recipients as dependent
clients who lacked a male breadwinner (Mink 1994). Policies like Mothers’ Pen-
sions, Aid to Dependent Children, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children
accorded assistance based on a principle of care; they allocated benefits in a discre-
tionary fashion that subjected recipients to means-tests and considerable regulation
(Nelson 1990).
Although few feminist scholars disputed this characterization of the two-tiered
welfare state, many found it to be incomplete. It relied on a narrow set of income-
maintenance programs; the state’s redistributive regime looked far more com-
plex when a fuller range of state policies were considered (Gordon 1994). As
Orloff (1996) points out, the two-tiered characterization also took the U.S. case
as the norm—implicitly assuming that other states were similarly bifurcated. This
assumption proved to be inaccurate. Drawing on Esping-Andersen’s (1990) wel-
fare regime typology, feminist scholars conducted comparative studies of the re-
distributive outputs of different welfare states. They began by adding women to
Esping-Andersen’s typology to ascertain whether liberal, conservative, and social-
democratic regimes had different effects on women’s material well being (Hobson
1994, Gustafsson 1994). They discovered that these regimes varied in several di-
mensions, including the organization of care work, rates of female employment,
and reproductive policies. They also unearthed variations among countries of simi-
lar regime types—social-democratic regimes differed in their support for employed
mothers, conservative regimes differed in their support for women’s paid employ-
ment, and liberal regimes differed in their support for sole mothers (Leira 1992,
Shaver 1993, Borchorst 1994, Orloff 1996). Perhaps there was not a single, uniform
state gender regime; perhaps gender regimes varied by system type?
With this insight, feminist scholars probed further into the gendered dimen-
sions of state redistribution. This resulted in a plethora of feminist welfare regime
models that emphasized different dimensions and redistributive outcomes (Lewis
1992, O’Connor 1993, Sainsbury 1994). Of all these models, Orloff’s work (1993,
1996) provides the most elaborate gender analysis of state welfare regimes. Her
regime analysis began with an extension of Esping-Andersen’s framework—she
added gender differentiation to his stratification dimension, she expanded his no-
tion of decommodification to account for care work, and she conceptualized a new
dimension to capture women’s ability to maintain autonomous households (Orloff
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1993). More recently, O’Connor, Orloff & Shaver (1999) proposed the most com-
prehensive regime model to date: Their model assesses three policy arenas—labor
markets, income support, and reproduction—to explicate gendered patterns of
stratification, social/civil rights, income organization, and power relations. The re-
sult is a multidimensional analysis of the redistributive practices of several liberal
welfare states.
As these regime analysts constructed new maps of the gendered dimensions
of state redistribution, another strand of feminist scholarship explicated the in-
?
terpretive bases of the welfare state. These scholars drew on and expanded the
conception of the welfare state articulated by other political sociologists (Skocpol
1992, Quadagno 1994, Amenta 1998). For them, the welfare state was not only a
redistributive arena; it was also a site of clashes over gendered meanings (Fraser
& Gordon 1994). State gender regimes were reflections of these ideological and
discursive battles. Welfare states embodied distinct claims-making modes and of-
fered an array of rhetorical possibilities for framing needs (Peattie & Rein 1983).
Like its distribution of material benefits, the allocation of discursive resources had
profound political and strategic importance. The state’s cultural dimensions were
thus as critical as its stratifying dimensions; both dimensions fixed social relations
and shaped social identities (Pringle & Watson 1992).
With this interpretive focus, feminist scholars produced a rich historiography of
the formation of state conceptions of gender. Their discoveries were many. First,
they complicated arguments about the state’s masculine origins—revealing how
female reformers appropriated a discourse of maternalism, and mixed it with a
unique version of professionalism, to participate in the construction of Western
welfare states (Bock & Thane 1991, Koven & Michel 1993). Exalting women’s
capacity to mother, female activists in the United States used a politics of difference
to enter the policy sphere and fill the political vacuum occupied by working-class
movements in other countries (Skocpol 1992, Sklar 1993). In doing so, they helped
establish policies that emphasized women’s child-rearing responsibilities and the
desirability of female dependence (Muncy 1991, Goodwin 1997).
However, female reformers were not the only ones motivated by gender inter-
ests. Feminist historians also unearthed the gendered scripts adhered to by other
social movements as they helped to construct the welfare state. Feminists recast
the traditional battle between capital and labor, movements of militarism, and the
politics of pronatalism to expose their gendered undercurrents (Klaus 1993). For
example, Gordon’s (1994) study of the US welfare state revealed that a variety of
political forces worked with gendered agendas—from professional caseworkers to
social security advocates to New Deal social movements. In her comparative study
of the origins of the British and French welfare states, Pedersen (1993) provides
a similarly nuanced account of the interests at stake in state formation. She shows
the policy sphere to be a crowded arena occupied by unions, employers, feminists,
and Catholic leaders, all with their own visions of social relationships. Ultimately,
these conflicting discourses became embodied in the French parental state and the
British male breadwinner model.
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656 HANEY
These two strands of welfare scholarship expose the dynamics of state strat-
ification and interpretation. Their work adheres to a comparative and historical
perspective unmatched in other areas of feminist state theory. The forms of state
variation they uncover are thus of a different sort: Feminist welfare theory points to
national variation among state gender regimes as they evolve. Yet there is another
insight to be garnered from their scholarship—a way to link the redistributive and
interpretive dimensions of state gender regimes.
?
Linking State Stratification and Interpretation

Feminist analyses of welfare stratification and interpretation did not develop in
isolation from one another. Perhaps because of their comparative and interdisci-
plinary focus, these scholars forged links between their approaches. As Adams
(1998) argues, feminists working in other areas of state theory might want to
consider how welfare scholars have connected the state’s structural and cultural
dimensions.
Sainsbury (1996) offers one example of how welfare scholars made these link-
ages. Her work begins from a redistributive focus and expands to include the
interpretive effects of welfare stratification. On the one hand, Sainsbury locates
her comparative study of the U.S., U.K., Dutch, and Swedish welfare states in a
traditional welfare regime framework. She then extends this framework by high-
lighting the bases of entitlement operative in each state, that is, how recipients
are drawn into the state and on what terms. Sainsbury reveals that states provide
a variety of modes of claims-making; they base entitlement claims on recipients’
needs, employment, families, or citizenship. By including types of claims-making
in her regime analysis, Sainsbury connects the insights of poststructuralist scholars
like Pringle & Watson (1992) to those of regime analysts like Orloff (1993) and
Lewis (1992). Her approach has empirical payoffs. She reveals why women fare
better in regimes that base claims on citizenship (like Sweden) and fare worse in
regimes that base claims on need and/or employment (like the United States).
As Sainsbury’s work moves from the redistributive to the interpretive, Fraser’s
(1989, 1997) scholarship makes the reverse connection. Influenced by critical
theory, Fraser’s (1989) work explicates the “politics of need interpretation” by
showing how needs leak out of the private sphere, are taken up in the social sphere,
and become administered in the state sphere. In the process, needs are translated
into juridical, administrative, or therapeutic issues. To investigate this translation
of needs, Fraser grounds her discursive model in an analysis of the two-tiered
welfare state: a state bifurcated between masculine and feminine subsystems that
distribute resources differently. Fraser then links these redistributive patterns and
interpretations of need. The masculine subsystem translates need into juridical and
administrative issues as it constructs recipients as rights-bearing individuals; the
feminine subsystem translates need into administrative and therapeutic issues as
it frames recipients as dependent clients or troubled souls in need of therapeutic
intervention. In Fraser’s (1997) recent work, she suggests that this formulation be
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used as an evaluative standard. She puts out a critical call to feminist scholars—
urging them to consider both redistribution and recognition when assessing state
gender regimes.
THE LOOSE COORDINATION OF FEMINIST

STATE SCHOLARSHIP
?
This review of developments in feminist jurisprudence, feminist criminology, and

feminist welfare theory revealed parallels among these fields. They all arose with
arguments about state patriarchy, moved on to track state conceptions of equality
and/or difference, and reached a recognition of state diversity. Together, these

scholars have come to reject the notion of a univocal state; they reveal that state
systems speak many languages. Moreover, as their research evolved, these scholars
confronted similar dilemmas. They encountered obstacles as they conceptualized
the dimensions of state systems and analyzed their influence on gender relations.
Yet feminists came at these issues quite differently. In their differences, they have
much to offer one another.
One of the main strengths of feminist jurisprudence is its sophisticated account
of the politics of representation. Feminist legal theorists provide ways to mine legal
norms for their gendered meanings—frameworks that could help welfare scholars
expand their focus on social policy to include a broader range of state projects
and interventions. Feminist jurisprudence also offers powerful arguments about
the limitations of opposing equality and difference—arguments that could help
feminist criminologists transcend the severity/leniency dichotomy. At the same
time, feminist jurisprudence has much to gain from feminist work in other fields.
They could look to feminist criminology for clues on how to retain a structural
analysis of juridical stratification. They could also appropriate welfare scholars’
comparative focus to illuminate the modes of claims-making that women have
utilized over time and in different national contexts to secure state resources.
Feminist criminologists also have important contributions to make to an inter-
disciplinary feminist dialogue on the state. One of their main strengths is their
willingness to conduct both quantitative and qualitative analyses; these scholars
are a model for how to mix research methods. Their work is also exemplary in its
concrete description of state stratifying processes—from arrest rates to sentencing
patterns to courtroom dynamics. From their concrete pictures, feminist criminolo-
gists reveal the practical effects of state gender regimes and how they vary by race
and class. Thus, their empirical work provides a model of how to account for the
intersections of gender, race, and class in the legal and welfare systems. However,
feminist criminologists have much to take from these other fields. They could ap-
propriate feminist jurisprudence’s conception of law as an interpretive structure
to capture the discursive dimensions of penal policies. Feminist welfare theorists
also offer the tools to approach this issue historically. Their historical frameworks
could enable feminist criminologists to explore how these discourses were inserted
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658 HANEY
into the justice system and how they evolved. In fact, the few historical accounts
of the justice system’s gender practices have revealed unexpected findings with
grave conceptual implications (Feeley & Little 1991).
In addition to offering a comparative approach to existing analyses of state strat-
ification and interpretation, feminist welfare theory formulates ways to join these
two state dimensions. This is perhaps their most important contribution to an inter-
disciplinary dialogue on the state. They not only recognize that state redistribution
and interpretation are intricately linked, but they have constructed frameworks to
?
capture these linkages. Their recent work explicates the stratifying effects of dif-
ferent modes of claims-making; it also exposes the interpretive underpinnings of
different redistributive models. At the same time, welfare scholars have much to
gain from increased dialogue with other fields. Feminist jurisprudence’s concep-
tualization of gender as a process of signification could deepen welfare scholars’
accounts of need interpretation and the constitution of gender identities. Welfare
theorists could also draw on feminist criminologists’ use of multiple methods to
reveal the complex dynamics of welfare case processing.
In this way, the creation of a dialogical field that encompasses feminist scholars
of law, criminology, and the welfare state could foster theoretical and empirical
insights in all three areas. In this chapter, I established such a field through a two-
dimensional framework of state stratification and interpretation. Using this frame,
I uncovered the ways in which feminist analyses have become attentive to the
diversity of state gender regimes—from the recognition of multiple legal discourses
to the acknowledgment of multiple sites of case processing to the identification
of multiple dimensions of welfare stratification. Yet this framework did little to
explain these variations. Such an explanation would require the development of
broader explanatory models or concepts, that is, a way to integrate feminists’
arguments about state diversity and to assess their common features. One way to
achieve this would be to begin to theorize the layered quality of state apparatuses
(Haney 1996).
Hagan’s (1998) formulation of the organizational dynamics of the criminal jus-
tice system provides a promising way to approach such theorizing. Hagan proposes
a framework for explaining the seemingly random, and frequently inconsistent, op-
erations of the criminal justice system. He argues that the system is composed of
a series of loosely coupled subsystems: entities that are organizationally distinct
but highly responsive to one another. His is an image of state layering, of state
apparatuses with macro- and microlevel embodiments that are loosely coordinated
and synchronized. This looseness is a key element of the framework. It opens up
the possibility of disjuncture—of rules that go unimplemented, of mandates that
go unobserved, and of precedents that go unfollowed in different state arenas.
Moreover, instead of viewing the criminal justice system as perpetually frac-
tured and unpredictable, Hagan posits that its level of looseness can wax and wane
over time. He roots such fluctuations in the presence of political power directed
at crime-oriented goals. At historical junctures, when the political environment
makes proactive demands on this state sphere, there is often a tightening of the
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links among subsystems. In a similar manner, in highly politicized settings where

particular social groups are targeted, the system’s boundaries tend to tighten in
an attempt to maximize desired outcomes. Yet state systems not only act in ac-
cordance with larger political mandates, but can also tighten their systemic links
to direct public attention to certain political goals. In Hagan’s model, politics and
political power are key determinants of the organization of state systems and their
degree of looseness.
Although Hagan’s model of the loosely coupled system was not designed with
?
feminist state theory in mind, it may offer the kind of conceptual framework needed
to better integrate this scholarship. On the one hand, the concept provides a way to
make sense of the diversity of gender regimes within particular state apparatuses.
If feminist scholars begin to think of state arenas as loosely coupled, it becomes

understandable why they find different messages and agendas within a given state
sphere (Horowitz 1995). It also becomes clear how state gender regimes can take on
macro- and microlevel embodiments: At one level, welfare policy might position
women as dependent mothers, whereas at another level welfare institutions might
center on women as wage laborers. Rather than view these messages as competing
or contradictory, they can be seen as rooted in the welfare system’s loose coupling.
This approach could also help explain why feminist criminologists’ large-scale
statistical findings often diverge from those of observational studies (Daly 1994).
In short, it could clarify how feminists’ arguments about the state depend on their
unit of analysis and on the specific subsystem from which they theorize.
Conceptualizing state spheres as loosely coordinated not only explains the di-
versity in feminists’ empirical findings—it also raises a series of new issues ripe for
investigation. As Hagan (1998) notes, we know very little about the nature of the
links within state subsystems; we need a far more detailed understanding of how
macro- and microlevel subsystems remain organizationally distinct yet responsive
to one another. Feminist scholars are in a unique position to theorize such linkages.
They have collected extensive data on different state subsystems; they could use
these data to probe into how gendered messages are relayed among state levels. For
instance, although some scholars analyze abstract legal narratives, others research
the concrete practices of court officials and state administrators. Drawing this work
together would enable feminists to reflect on the macro- and microlevel translation
of gendered messages and signifiers. Hence, the concept of the loosely coupled
system raises common questions about state filtering processes—questions that
could unite feminist scholars working in a variety of subfields.
This concept also raises new questions regarding historical variability in these
macro- and microlinkages. Once the legal, criminal justice, and welfare systems
are seen as loosely coupled, feminists can begin to explore potential shifts in their
systemic tightness over time (Haney, forthcoming). Throughout this chapter, I have
argued that feminist scholars in all three fields have moved away from the assertion
of a singular, uniform gender regime to recognize the varied, and often inconsistent,
nature of state gender regimes. Is this shift a reflection of organizational and insti-
tutional changes in these state systems—of a political environment that loosened
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660 HANEY
the coupling of their respective subsystems? Or is it a reflection of the theoreti-

cal and empirical tools now used by feminist scholars? Recent work by welfare
scholars indicates that the U.S. welfare system has always been characterized by
diverse gender regimes: Their research on welfare policies and practices reveals
that loose linkages have held this system together since its inception (Kunzel 1993,
Gordon 1994, Goodwin 1997). Similar analyses of the evolution of macro- and
microconnections in the legal and criminal justice systems could provide the basis
for broader comparison and theorizing. Again, the goal is to use the concept of
?
the loosely coupled system to tighten the links among feminist scholars working
in different subfields.
In addition to illuminating and explaining diversity within a given state ap-
paratus, the concept of the loosely coupled system can be extended to expose
the connections among different state apparatuses. Such an extension would push
the concept beyond Hagan’s formulation: Although his concept was designed to
explicate the organizational dynamics within one system, the state itself can be
conceptualized as a composite of loosely coordinated systems that draw on and
respond to one another. Such a conceptualization would then open up another level
of dialogue among feminist scholars, enabling them to explore connections among
the legal, criminal justice, and welfare systems. It would allow them to compare
the macro- and microfiltering processes and translation work characteristic of dif-
ferent state apparatuses. For example, feminist legal scholars and criminologists
have uncovered strikingly similar dichotomies: The equality/difference bifurca-
tion embodied in law bears a close resemblance to the justice system’s practices of
severity/leniency. With increased dialogue, feminist scholars could theorize how
the legal and justice systems, although organizationally distinct, remain responsive
to similar doctrines and organizational routines.
Finally, not only would the development of a shared analytical framework be
theoretically innovative, but it has also become increasingly politically imperative.
In the last decade, tighter links seem to be forming among state apparatuses;
transformations in one state sphere appear to feed off of and inform changes
in other spheres. Evidence of this abounds. At the structural level, expansion in
the criminal justice apparatus occurred along with retrenchment in the welfare
system (Western & Beckett 1999). At the policy level, tougher sentencing laws
were passed along with the legislation of time limits and work requirements for
welfare recipients (Danner 1998). At the institutional level, new welfare agencies
have set up shop in some legal aid centers and criminal justice offices. These
linkages among state systems are certainly not new; they clearly existed at other
historical junctures, most notably the Progressive Era (Clapp 1998). But these
connections will make it difficult for feminist scholars to continue to limit their
analyses to one state realm. The profound shifts underway in the U.S. legal, criminal
justice, and welfare systems call for a more integrated feminist social science and
politics.
Hence, I am not proposing that feminist scholars reunite around a grand theory of
the centralized, tightly coordinated state. Nor am I suggesting that they move to the
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opposite extreme through a theory of uncoordinated, dispersed sites of state power.

Rather, I would argue that feminist scholars make use of their collective finding of
state diversity to theorize the dimensions of state layering, both within and among
apparatuses. I would also maintain that an interdisciplinary feminist dialogue on
the state is the best way to capture this layering. By loosely coordinating their
scholarship, feminist social scientists could retain their focus on specific state
spheres, while remaining responsive to theoretical and empirical developments in
research on other state arenas.
?
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Many colleagues and students offered valuable feedback on different incarnations

of the ideas presented in this chapter. For contributing to my understanding of
feminist legal theory and criminology, I thank Liena Gurevich, Vanessa Barker,
and Jo Dixon. For helping me to refine my general arguments about the wel-
fare scholarship, I thank Julia Adams, Michael Burawoy, Nancy Cauthen, Ruth
Horowitz, Sonya Michel, and graduate students in my 1998 seminar on gender
and the welfare state at New York University.
Visit the Annual Reviews home page at www.AnnualReviews.org
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Annual Review of Sociology
Volume 26, 2000
CONTENTS
COHABITATION IN THE UNITED STATES: An Appraisal of
Research Themes, Findings, and Implications, Pamela J. Smock 1
DOUBLE STANDARDS FOR COMPETENCE: Theory and Research,
Martha Foschi 21
THE CHANGING NATURE OF DEATH PENALTY DEBATES,
Michael L. Radelet, Marian J. Borg 43
WEALTH INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES, Lisa A. Keister,
Stephanie Moller 63
CRIME AND DEMOGRAPHY: Multiple Linkages, Reciprocal Relations,
Scott J. South, Steven F. Messner 83

ETHNICITY AND SEXUALITY, Joane Nagel 107
PREJUDICE, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC OPINION: Understanding the
Sources of Racial Policy Attitudes, Maria Krysan 135

RACE AND RACE THEORY, Howard Winant 169
STATES AND MARKETS IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION, Seán
Ó Riain 187
VOLUNTEERING, John Wilson 215
HOW WELFARE REFORM IS AFFECTING WOMEN''S WORK, Mary
Corcoran, Sandra K. Danziger, Ariel Kalil, Kristin S. Seefeldt
241
FERTILITY AND WOMEN''S EMPLOYMENT IN INDUSTRIALIZED

NATIONS, Karin L. Brewster, Ronald R. Rindfuss 271
POLITICAL SOCIOLOGICAL MODELS OF THE U.S. NEW DEAL,
Jeff Manza 297
THE TREND IN BETWEEN-NATION INCOME INEQUALITY, Glenn
Firebaugh 323
NONSTANDARD EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS: Part-time, Temporary
and Contract Work, Arne L. Kalleberg 341
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF IDENTITIES, Judith A. Howard 367
SCHOOLS AND COMMUNITIES: Ecological and Institutional
Dimensions, Richard Arum 395
RACIAL AND ETHNIC VARIATIONS IN GENDER-RELATED
ATTITUDES, Emily W. Kane 419
MULTILEVEL MODELING FOR BINARY DATA, Guang Guo,
Hongxin Zhao 441
A SPACE FOR PLACE IN SOCIOLOGY, Thomas F. Gieryn 463
WEALTH AND STRATIFICATION PROCESSES, Seymour Spilerman
497
THE CHOICE-WITHIN-CONSTRAINTS NEW INSTITUTIONALISM
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIOLOGY, Paul Ingram, Karen Clay
525
POVERTY RESEARCH AND POLICY FOR THE POST-WELFARE
ERA, Alice O'Connor 547
CLOSING THE ""GREAT DIVIDE"": New Social Theory on Society
and Nature, Michael Goldman, Rachel A. Schurman 563
SOCIALISM AND THE TRANSITION IN EAST AND CENTRAL
EUROPE: The Homogeneity Paradigm, Class, and Economic , Linda
Fuller 585
FRAMING PROCESSES AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: An Overview
and Assessment, Robert D. Benford, David A. Snow 611
FEMINIST STATE THEORY: Applications to Jurisprudence,
Criminology, and the Welfare State, Lynne A. Haney 641
PATHWAYS TO ADULTHOOD IN CHANGING SOCIETIES:
Variability and Mechanisms in Life Course Perspective, Michael J.
Shanahan 667
A SOCIOLOGY FOR THE SECOND GREAT TRANSFORMATION,
Michael Burawoy 693
AGENDA FOR SOCIOLOGY AT THE START OF THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY, Michael Hechter 697
WHAT I DON'T KNOW ABOUT MY FIELD BUT WISH I DID,
Douglas S. Massey 699
FAMILY, STATE, AND CHILD WELL-BEING, Sara McLanahan 703
GETTING IT RIGHT: SEX AND RACE INEQUALITY IN WORK
ORGANIZATIONS, Barbara F. Reskin 707

WHITHER THE SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF CRIME, Robert J.
Sampson 711
ON GRANULARITY, Emanuel Schegloff 715

HOW DO RELATIONS STORE HISTORIES?, Charles Tilly 721

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P1: FQK

June 16, 2000 12:34 Annual Reviews CHAP-27

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2000. 26:641–66

FEMINIST STATE THEORY: Applications

Key Words gender, social policy, law, criminal justice

State theory is a relatively recent addition to feminist scholarship. Although many

Existing reviews tend to echo these divisions by systematizing feminist analyses of

FEMINIST STATE THEORY 643

This two-dimensional framework will facilitate dialogue among feminist think-

ities and differences in feminist theoretical trajectories and empirical findings. In

REPRESENTATIONS OF EQUALITY AND DIFFERENCE:

discrimination; as many of them became practitioners, they confronted difficul-

Gender Regimes of Difference and Sameness

FEMINIST STATE THEORY 645

These arguments about gender sameness unquestionably led to a series of court

social relations of domination. They problematized equality doctrine’s promise of

FEMINIST STATE THEORY 647

dence moved toward increasingly abstract conceptions of the law as a constitutive

Postmodern Legal Feminism

In short, what about a more sociologically inspired legal feminism?

PRACTICES OF BENEVOLENCE AND PUNISHMENT:

FEMINIST STATE THEORY 649

structures of gender and racial inequality, levels of anomie, modes of informal/

interested in interpretive structures and more in patterns of tracking or labeling. In

or more lenient treatment than men.

Gender Regimes of Severity and Leniency

Feminist criminologists who supplemented statistical surveys with qualita-

Processing Gender, Race, and Class

FEMINIST STATE THEORY 651

not motivated by patriarchy, but was guided by gendered presuppositions about

resource for “doing” other identities. In acknowledging the constructive qual-

POLICIES OF REDISTRIBUTION AND

FEMINIST STATE THEORY 653

of theoretical work on welfare development. They confronted structural function-

scholars have begun to combine their approaches to produce innovative theories

criminology, feminist welfare scholars began by inserting women into existing

Gender Regimes of Need Satisfaction and Interpretation

FEMINIST STATE THEORY 655

Linking State Stratification and Interpretation

FEMINIST STATE THEORY 657

THE LOOSE COORDINATION OF FEMINIST

This review of developments in feminist jurisprudence, feminist criminology, and

and/or difference, and reached a recognition of state diversity. Together, these

FEMINIST STATE THEORY 659

links among subsystems. In a similar manner, in highly politicized settings where

If feminist scholars begin to think of state arenas as loosely coupled, it becomes

the coupling of their respective subsystems? Or is it a reflection of the theoreti-

FEMINIST STATE THEORY 661

opposite extreme through a theory of uncoordinated, dispersed sites of state power.

Many colleagues and students offered valuable feedback on different incarnations

Visit the Annual Reviews home page at www.AnnualReviews.org

Bumiller K. 1990. Fallen angels: the represen- criminology. Justice Q. 5:497–538

Chesney-Lind M. 1977. Judicial paternalism women of criminal justice policy reforms.

23:121–30 Miller, pp. 1–14. London: Sage

FEMINIST STATE THEORY 663

MacKinnon C. 1989. Toward a Feminist The- York: Cambridge Univ. Press

FEMINIST STATE THEORY 665

is the U.S. labor market? The penal system 325–80

Scott J. South, Steven F. Messner 83

Sources of Racial Policy Attitudes, Maria Krysan 135

FERTILITY AND WOMEN''S EMPLOYMENT IN INDUSTRIALIZED

ORGANIZATIONS, Barbara F. Reskin 707

ON GRANULARITY, Emanuel Schegloff 715

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