Reconciliation as a concept and as apolitical process has received virtually no attention in the literature on international relations, conflict studies, and peace research. Inthe context (ofthis study, reconciliation refers 1 a process by which countries can establish structures and procedures for establishing durable peace with their adversaries once they have entered ‘a postsetlement or postconfict phase. One of the major tasks ofthis article is o explore how reconciliation was realized asa policy process. Drawing on the Franco-German cas, the author reveals how reconciliation functioned asa peace-building strategy to overcome the historical ‘antagonism between the two countries through the use of cooperative linkages, community building, andthe expansion of the societal and cultural tes between France and Germany. \ RECONCILIATION AS A PEACE-BUILDING PROCESS IN POSTWAR EUROPE The Franco-German Case by Alice Ackermann Reconciliation as a concept and as a political process has re- ceived virtually no attention in the literature on international rela- tions, conflict studies, and peace research despite some empirical evidence whereby states and national groups have successively turned antagonistic relationships into peaceful ones through the pursuit of a policy of reconciliation. That reconciliation has been neglected as a dimension in international relations theory is perhaps the result of the nature of the concept as well as the absence of a well-established conceptual and theoretical framework. Although one finds its academic usage primarily in psychology, sociology, and criminology, reconciliation is in essence a biblical term. In a religious context, reconciliation has been interpreted by some scholars of Christian theology as “an authentic movement of indi- viduals and communities” toward making peace with those they are in conflict with. However, it also designates the act of forgiveness as “a necessary dimension of our existence in history.” Moreover, according to the theological perspective, “the concept of reconcili- [PEACE & CHANGE, Vol. 19 No.3, July 1994 229-250 (© 1904 Peace History Society and ‘Consortium on Peace Research, Eduction and Development 229 Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.230 PEACE & CHANGE /Iuly 1994 ation is dynamic; it integrates the destructive past with a movement that abolishes it.”" Among the scholars who have explored reconciliation as a crucial concept and process in international relations and conflict resolution are Lily Gardner Feldman and Daniel Smith. Investigat- ing the cultural resources of reconciliation in Arab and Israeli societies, Smith argues that “the language of forgiveness and rec- onciliation more appropriately expresses the inevitable fact that the parties involved not only need to ‘resolve a conflict’ or ‘reach a settlement,’ but must also live together in some form of socio- political relationship that is on-going and continuous.”* Gardner Feldman, a pioneer in conceptualizing reconciliation as anew focus of study in international relations theory, contends that reconciliation as a political concept encompasses notions of equal- ity, trust, acceptance of cultural and political differences, partner- ship, active friendship, and mutual or joint interests. Apart from its pragmatic character, Gardner Feldman argues that it is crucial to recognize not only the political dimensions but also the significance of the psychological and moral dimensions of reconciliation’ Drawing both on the conceptualizations of Smith and Gardner Feldman, reconciliation in the context of this study refers to a process by which countries can establish structures and procedures for establishing durable peace with their former adversaries once they have entered a postsettlement and/or postconflict phase. In other words, reconciliation functions as a postwar reconstruction policy, designed to build peace among peoples with long-standing animosities by creating a political, economic, social, and cultural relationship that is, in the words of Smith, “on-going and continuous.” ‘This article first explores some of the theoretical and empirical advances into reconciliation as a process. It then discusses the policy dimensions of reconciliation, analyzing how postwar Ger- many, that is, the Federal Republic of Germany, incorporated reconciliation into its Westpolitik and Ostpolitik. Franco-German relations serve as a relevant case study to test reconciliation as a crucial element in the Federal Republic’s postwar foreign policy. The study is limited to exploring reconciliation first conceptu- ally, and, then, empirically as a crucial element in Franco-German Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.‘Ackermann / PEACE-BUILDING PROCESS 231 relations. It proceeds from the assumption that reconciliation was but one factor in Franco-German rapprochement and that political, economic, and security considerations were also crucial in the formation of anew relationship between France and Germany after ‘World War Il. In other words, Franco-German relations were driven as much by considerations of Realpolitik as they were by the need for reconciliation as a means to overcome the historical antagonism between the two states. It is also important to note that for the Federal Republic reconciliation with France was a pragmatic as well as a moral foreign policy goal. As such, it was a calculated policy decision growing out of the experiences and failures of the interwar period. It also provided a vehicle for rehabilitation, both politically and morally, and for the expansion of Germany's room for political maneuvering. Reconciliation for France, on the other hand, was in many ways a policy that could enhance national security. Despite these diverging motives, reconciliation was a powerful and revolutionary strategy designed to break the histori- cally rooted animosities between the two countries. There are many complex aspects to Franco-German relations, and all cannot be entirely explained within a framework of recon- ciliation. Because this article intends to provide an analytical frame- work for exploring reconciliation as a strategy of conflict transfor- mation, it will refrain from a discussion of the more subtle details of Franco-German rapprochement. Central to this inquiry is uncov- ering the basic elements of reconciliation as a conflict-transformation strategy and exploring one of the few historical examples in inter- national relations where this particular approach was successful in turning a long-standing adversarial relationship between two states into a peaceful one. ‘TURNING ENEMIES INTO FRIENDS: ‘SOME THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ADVANCES ‘Two theoretical approaches lend themselves to the study of reconciliation in international relationships. One of them is Joseph Montville’s track two diplomacy theory. Although Montville’s theory focuses on the “unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations that aim to develop strate- Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.732. PEACE & CHANGE/ July 1998 gies, influence public opinion, and organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict,” track two diplomacy is directed toward reconciliation. At its core are three fundamental processes: the humanizing of relationships among leaders and their respective societies; the creation of a domestic environment conducive to peace, mainly through an official but also privately sponsored promotion of people-to-people contact; and the creation of cooperative linkages. Such linkages, according to Montville, “provide incentives, institutional support, and conti- uity to the political and psychological processes.”® On the empirical side, Montville explores the applicability of his theory to Franco-German rapprochement after 1945 and the sub- sequent emergence of the European Community (EC). Montville proceeds from the following premise: ‘The old, bitter conflict between the French and the Germans appears to have been resolved by humanizing relations among adversary leaders, enhancing public opinion for peace making, and bui cooperative economic development schemes that institutionalized the revolutionary new peaceful relationships between the coun- tries involved. Delineating the above-mentioned political and psychological proc- esses and instruments involved in Franco-German rapprochement, Montville comments that “we take the peace of Western Europe and the Economic Community for granted almost as though this condi- tion always existed.” But he also cautions scholars not to regard the dismantling of the long history of conflict between France and Germany as a result of the latter’s defeat in war. Nor is his analysis intended to demonstrate “that war is justifiable as an instrument of positive political change.” Rather his objective is to point out the difference between conflict settlement and conflict resolution in that only the latter process was crucial to eliminate over time “the systemic economic, social, and psychological roots of Franco- German and European conflict in general.”” Thus, reconciliation becomes a crucial component of conflict resolution. In exploring postwar reconciliation in Europe and its political, psychological, and moral dimensions, Gardner Feldman maintains that reconciliation as process involves the creation of structures that Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.‘Ackermann / PEACE-BUILDING PROCESS 233 make for durable peaceful relationships between states—and thus the transformation of conflict. The final objective of reconciliation, according to Gardner Feldman, is “structural peace,” that is, a condition of durable peace based on the establishment of multilat- eral and bilateral structures such as regional organizations and bilateral forums as well as mechanisms of regular consultation. Such linkages on many different levels are characterized by fre- quency of contact, and such regularity ensures familiarity of rele- vant actors with one another. Although Gardner Feldman empha- sizes that reconciliation does not eliminate conflict of interest, it does provide structures and mechanisms (¢.g., regular meetings of leaders and cabinet ministers, common institutions) that can elimi- nate the basis for war. In essence then, reconciliation provides a means by which states can build durable peace ‘As an offshoot of her theory on special relationships," Gardner Feldman provides a model of reconciliation that encompasses the following elements: first, the interplay of two processes of interac- tion, both on the governmental level and on the societal level; second, the creation of cooperative linkages, which manifest them- selves on a bilateral or multilateral level or both and which become institutionalized over time and eventually provide the essential structures for sustaining durable peace. In the case of postwar Germany reconciliation can be empirically identified as a novel concept in the foreign policy of that country, a phenomenon that goes beyond the fact that Germany’s immediate postwar options were limited? The subsequent analysis of the Franco-German case will draw primarily on Gardner Feldman’s criteria for reconcili- ation which, of course, also encompass some of Montville’s ele- ments of track two diplomacy. RECONCILIATION AS FOREIGN POLICY: ‘THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC’S WESTPOLITIK AND OSTPOLITIK Reconciliation constitutes one of the core elements in the post- war foreign policy of the Federal Republic toward the West and the East, generally referred to as Westpolitik and Ostpolitik. The first, Westpolitik, formulated immediately after World War II, is primar- ily directed toward the West and is generally associated with the Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.234 PEACE & CHANGE /Tuly 1994 Federal Republic's integration into NATO and other Western Euro- pean institutions such as the Council of Europe, the EC, and the Western European Union. Ostpolitik is a parallel policy orienta- tion that developed in the 1960s, following the construction of the Berlin Wall and the formation of the CDU/SPD Grand Coalition Government. The concept of Westpolitik and, a decade later, Ostpolitik had as much to do with learning from the lessons of the past as it did with implementing a new foreign policy strategy by which the young West German state could become rehabilitated, achieve political and economic recovery, obtain equality and security, and establish new relationships with the countries in Westen Europe and the United States. For Konrad Adenauer, Westpolitik, that is, integra- tion into the West, allowed not only for the restoration of sover- eignty but provided insurance against any resurgent German nationalism or a potential shift to neutrality by successor govern- ments. Its also crucial to point out that the concept of Westpolitik was as much “the product of Adenauer’s interpretation of the failures of 20th-century German foreign policy” as it was his “realization that in the postwar era a revolutionary transformation of the European state system had occurred.” For Adenauer, then, the pursuit of integration was dictated as much by necessity as it was by choice. Three considerations influenced Adenauer's thinking: first, the system that emerged in Europe in the early postwar years was marked by an East-West antagonism in which Germany could always become a potential battlefield. This required new thinking on how security could be obtained not only by military means but also by political means, such as through Westem integration. Sec- ond, Germany’s recent history had left many visible scars, both in the East and West. These traumatic experiences demanded that the ‘Wester allies take certain precautions against Germany. Therefore, Western European security was as much directed toward Germany as the Soviet Union, a classic example of “double containment.” Moreover, it demanded that German leaders design a foreign policy that would redress the psychological and political barriers of incorporating Germany into the community of nations. Third, Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.‘Ackermann / PEACE-BUILDING PROCESS 235 the emergence of the Soviet Union as a hegemonial power made not only a close relationship with the United States an imperative for all Western democracies but also required Western European integration." As a policy strategy, Adenauer’s Westpolitik was consciously directed toward the establishment of a bilateral and multilateral framework for the conduct of relations with Westen Europe and the United States. This created a pattern still prominent in German foreign policy and served as an indicator of continuity and predict- ability, two crucial themes in Bonn’s foreign affairs. Anchoring the Federal Republic in a multilateral framework required Western European community building. Thus, German leaders voluntarily enmeshed the country in a security and political-economic commu- nity. On the bilateral level, new relationships were forged with former adversaries, of which the Franco-German and the German- American partnerships were the most crucial. Because of the long-term nature of the animosity between the two countries, a policy of reconciliation is most often associated with the Franco-German relationship. However, it must be noted that it also found practical applications in the Federal Republic's relations with other Western European countries and with the United States. In fact, reconciliation was first accomplished with the United States. A series of official policy statements that no longer depicted Germany as the enemy and that stressed American commitment to the country’s economic reconstruction and po- litical rehabilitation were vital steps in that direction. This in- cluded, for example, a speech given by Secretary of State James F, Byres in Stuttgart on September 6, 1946, in which he pledged U.S. support for German self-government and economic recovery.'’ Then came the implementation of the Marshall Plan in 1948, appropriating $13.2 billion to European (including West German) reconstruction. Reconciliation with the East was slower to emerge. However, the first steps in that direction came from Bonn’s foreign minister, Gerhard Schréder, who orchestrated the so-called policy of small steps that aimed at the normalization of relations with Eastern Europe. The peace note of March 25, 1966, initiated by Schréder Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.236 PEACE & CHANGE /Iuly 1994 and delivered to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, was a further building block in Bonn’s pursuit of reconciliation with the East. The peace note offered sweeping proposals on matters of arms control and European detente. It also intended to undermine fear of future West German aggression by expressing the willingness to exchange declarations on the renunciation of force with the governments of the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and every other Eastern European state. It also suggested bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe on the exchange of military observers and a promise to participate in intemational disarmament conferences.'* But the political leader most devoted to reconcili- ation was Willy Brandt, who, first as foreign minister, and later as, chancellor, never missed an opportunity to emphasize that recon- ciliation was a prerequisite for permanent peace, entailing the recognition of equality among states and their peoples, tolerance toward diverse cultural achievements and different forms of social and political life.” Froma practical perspective, a policy of reconciliation had three components. First, the German leadership considered it to be a process that was not merely confined to the West but one that could be duplicated in the East as well. Second, German officials believed that reconciliation must be pursued on the official as well as the informal, societal level (also referred to as grassroots or track two diplomacy). Third, toward achieving reconciliation, German politi- cal leaders made many public statements aimed at dismantling any psychological and cultural barriers that acted as stumbling blocks. This came most often in appeals to eliminate the image of the Federal Republic as the enemy. Moreover, reconciliation has not been limited to the preunification era. It continues as a vital process in an all-German foreign policy, particularly toward Poland and Russia. RECONCILIATION IN PRACTICE: THE CASE OF FRANCO-GERMAN RAPPROCHEMENT IN THE POST-WORLD WAR II ERA One of the best examples of reconciliation in practice is provided by the Franco-German relationship. Reconciliation between France and Germany did not develop spontaneously, but emerged gradu- Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.‘Ackermann / PEACE-BUILDING PROCESS 237 ally and painstakingly. A process once referred to by Chancellor Helmut Kohl as unique in the history of Europe, Franco-German reconciliation permanently terminated a long history of conflict, fierce national rivalries, and ethnic hatreds that had commonly been described as an Erbfeindschaft or “hereditary enmity.” A call for reconciliation with Germany had come first from leaders of the wartime French resistance movement, * but until 1948 or 1949 there were few initiatives on the part of the French govern- ment. Not only political, but more importantly, psychological fac- tors made reconciliation as an official governmental policy diffi- cult, French foreign policy as it emerged after 1945 evolved around one major objective: to obtain security against Germany. Initially, the French government thought it best to resort to a policy that would put at least parts of Germany firmly under French control. It was for this reason that General Charles de Gaulle in his nego- tiations with the other allies insisted on a French zone within occupied Germany. It explained also why France once again laid claims to Germany’s industrial centers, in particular the coal-rich region of the Saar, a policy that became a major obstacle in the early phase of Franco-German rapprochement.!” Other initial French foreign policy goals were to create some form of buffer zone between Germany and France, to maintain a decentralized Ger- many, to seek bilateral and multilateral security guarantees, and to assume a leadership position on the continent through which Paris could keep Germany isolated and weakened.” By 1947, however, a changed political reality in Europe com- pelled France slowly to engage in adjustments in its policy toward Germany. Policy adaptations were triggered in particular over the failure of Allied accommodations with the Soviet Union and a growing unwillingness on the part of Great Britain and the United States to support the French position on Germany. What was initially pursued as a containment policy against Germany had become by 1947 a form of “double-containment” that now also included the Soviet Union2' With restored sovereignty and the possibility of German rearmament on the horizon, the idea of containing Germany within a framework of European integration provided an effective security guarantee. Although the French Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.238 PEACE & CHANGE /Iuly 1994 government remained keen on curbing German influence and “re- garded European integration as another means to ultimate security against a German revival," this policy strategy nonetheless laid the groundwork for Franco-German rapprochement. It is crucial to note that reconciliation was carried out at first through numerous informal contacts that French and German poli- ticians and private citizens deliberately sought in the immediate postwar years.* Reconciliation, then, initially took on the character of track two diplomacy—including efforts to humanize the rela- tionship between representatives of the two countries and to influ- ence public opinion to support first steps toward conflict resolution. The idea of Franco-German reconciliation was neither entirely novel for its time nor for Adenauer, who in 1949 became the first chancellor of the newly created Federal Republic of Germany. Although Adenauer viewed friendship, and thus reconciliation, with France as a political necessity, for him it was also a carefully chosen decision. Adenauer’s thinking on Franco-German reconcili- ation and his concept of a united Europe already had evolved during the early years of the Weimar Republic.”* For Adenauer, reconcili- ation entailed four essential and interdependent processes: the rebuilding of trust; the linking of political, economic, and societal interests on a bilateral level; the constructive creation of a political community; and the recognition of France’s legitimate security needs. The latter appeared particularly cumbersome because the need for security on the part of the French was as much determined by psychological as it was by political-military factors. Perpetu- ated by historical memory and experiences of victimization, ‘Adenauer never had any illusions that these psychological factors would be a substantial impediment to eradicating the antagonism between the two former adversaries.” ‘To create the necessary domestic support, Adenauer undertook considerable efforts to present to the German public the necessity for a Franco-German rapprochement that was to be accompanied by the construction of a new Europe. As early as 1946, in his capacity as leader of the Christian Democratic Party in the British zone, Adenauer spoke of a United States of Europe as the best means to guarantee peace in the region.”* But he became even more Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.‘Ackermann / PEACE-BUILDING PROCESS 239 outspoken in the next two or three years, expressing his vision that “the creation of lasting, good-neighborly relations between Ger- many and its Western neighbors, the Benelux states and France, were the foremost and most noble task of a future German foreign policy.” CREATING LINKAGES: THE BIRTH OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION On March 7, 1950, in an important interview with the journalist Kingsbury Smith, the chancellor—an ardent member of the Euro- pean Movement—proposed the political union of Europe with a Franco-German pillar as its foundation.” Adenauer listed four critical reasons for such a union: to provide a multilateral forum for Franco-German rapprochement; to alleviate French needs for se- curity; to curb the resurgence of German nationalism; and to function as a political instrument of deterrence against the Soviet Union.” ‘Adenauer’s proposal was met with an announcement by French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, a politician deeply committed to Franco-German reconciliation. On May 9, Schuman suggested an economic union for coal and steel production between the Federal Republic of Germany and France. The so-called Schuman Plan—drafted by Jean Monnet—was ratified by both countries in 1951 despite considerable domestic opposition in France and the Federal Republic. It led to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the first in the family of European institutions now called the European Union (EU)."*In his statement, Schuman cautioned that European integration was a long-term process. But he also emphasized the significance of Franco-Ger- man reconciliation for peace in Europe: ‘The contribution that an organized and dynamic Europe can make to civilization is essential for the maintenance of peaceful rela- tions. . . . Europe can not be created in one stroke but through concrete initiatives, which above all constitute an act of solidarity. The union of European nations demands that the centuries-old differ- ences between France and Germany are eliminated. The beginning, iative must therefore first involve Germany and France.” Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.240 PEACE & CHANGE /Iuly 1994 EXPANDING THE SOCIETAL BASIS FOR PEACE WITH FRANCE, ‘What further complemented the endeavors for political and economic linkages was the active pursuit of expanding societal and cultural ties between France and Germany. In the years following the war, these were largely initiated on the informal level, first by private citizens, then by local and regional officials. In the minds of many concerned individuals in both countries, expanding socie- tal and cultural linkages were felt to be necessary if comprehensive rapprochement was to be achieved and reconciliation was to be- come a lasting objective. But even among politicians, a firm con- viction prevailed that reconciliation required concerted and even institutionalized people-to-people interaction, Adenauer correctly recognized the importance of track two diplomacy for peace build- ing when he emphasized in a speech given at Reims on July 8, 1962, that “the two peoples in all social classes and professions, in all social positions, in all age groups, men and women and children must do it [build friendship]. Not surprisingly, the organizations that sprang up in both coun- tries adopted a wealth of different programs such as youth and academic exchanges, partnerships between German and French cities, and historical conferences for the revision of Franco-German history. Among the first private initiatives in France was the Bureau International de Liaison et Documentation, founded in 1945 under the direction of Jean du Rivau, a Jesuit priest. It was followed in July 1948 by the German-French Institute at Ludwigsburg, founded by Carlo Schmidt and Theodor Heuss, with a French counterpart, the Comité frangais d’Echanges avec |’ Allemagne Nouvelle, under Alfred Grosser in Paris. The objective was to facilitate reconcili- ation through individual and group exchanges, language instruc- tion, and lectures on Franco-German political and cultural affairs.°* ‘Through their personal efforts, these individuals created “the hu- man infrastructure of mutual contacts and trustworthy relations which made possible the political rapprochement of the 1950s and 1960s." ‘Apart from the small-scale initiatives sponsored by private indi- viduals and nongovernmental organizations, other more formally Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.‘Ackermann / PEACE-BUILDING PROCESS 241 arranged exchanges, many on the local level, also had their origins in those early postwar years. A novel concept for the promotion of international friendship, not only between France and Germany, but also between other Western European countries, was the so-called practice of twin-towning, a partnership program between French and German cities, towns, and counties. Between 1950 and 1962, 125 partnerships existed between French and German towns. By 1973, this number had reached 700, and in 1989 the West German foreign ministry listed the names of more than 1,300 Franco- German city, town, and county partnerships.” Partnerships were also created between secondary schools and universities, which contributed to reconciliation through the ex- change of educators and students. By 1989, for instance, 83 German universities had partnership arrangements with their French insti- tutions of higher learning. Over the years, many other cooperative programs sponsoring scientific and technological exchanges, tour- ism, and vocational training were created.* One of the most important steps toward promoting reconciliation on a broader societal basis, which would encompass the younger generations, came in 1963 through the Franco-German Treaty. Because Adenauer thought that the future of reconciliation was largely contingent on the younger generations in France and the Federal Republic, any cultural interaction on a people-to-people level demanded the participation of youth.” Therefore, the treaty created the German-French youth office as an autonomous bilateral organization. The office’s responsibilities included the administra- tion of an official program featuring diverse cooperative programs for teenagers and young adults. Although prior to 1963 private initiatives had assumed similar functions, the youth office was the first governmentally sponsored youth exchange organization, which up to the present has affected more than five million young people.” While establishing institutions that could link both countries to the present and the future, historical and psychological concerns required yet another approach, one that was primarily conducted through private initiatives. Inspired by a 1926 program of German and French teachers, who had founded an international institute for Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.242 PEACE & CHANGE /July 1994 the revision of textbooks in Amsterdam, historians from both countries met for the first time in 1950. In a series of meetings over the years, such joint historical commissions engaged in the arduous task of revising textbooks and national histories, critically scru- tinizing the myths of a “hereditary enmity” between France and Germany. Furthermore, nongovernmental organizations in both countries also began to provide avenues by which victims and victimizers could address their collective grief. Such initiatives focused on collective mourning, a crucial psychological process in reconcili- ation.*' These encounters were sponsored primarily by religious organizations or associations whose members had personal experi- ences with the immense suffering each side had inflicted on the other, Even to this day, several organizations such as Aktion Sih- nezeichen organize such collective mourning experiences, which include in particular the caretaking of grave sites and memorials. Veterans organizations such as Deutsche Kriegsgriiberflirsorge conduct annual war commemorations or the visiting of World War I and II battle sites by joint groups of former soldiers. INSTITUTIONALIZING RECONCILIATION ‘The Franco-German Treaty of 1963 marked the beginning phase of the institutionalization of Franco-German reconciliation.” Al- though the treaty did not include provisions for the “establishment of institutions,” as Manfred Abelein noted at the time, it did “have a strong institutional character™ and thus can be seen as the first major institutionalized framework for bilateral relations between France and the Federal Republic. ‘Two linkage mechanisms were to make Franco-German rap- prochement durable: the requirement for regular consultation and the promotion of interaction on a people-to-people level.“* The obligation for consultation “prior to all decisions in all vital ques- tions regarding foreign affairs and primarily questions of common interests so as to reach an equally directed perspective™® was crucial. Apart from the regular meetings for foreign and defense Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.‘Ackermann / PEACE-BUILDING PROCESS 243 ministers, the treaty also placed strong emphasis on the domain of cultural exchange, as it did on foreign and security affairs. Thus, education ministers were to meet once every three months to oversee the implementation of cultural cooperation between the two countries.”’ The treaty gave special consideration to fostering Tanguage education and scientific cooperation as well as youth exchange programs. * ‘Although most of the cooperative linkages that the treaty sought to implement in the 1960s did not come to maturity until the early 1980s, it is important to remember that the Franco-German Treaty, as Richard von Weizsicker explained in 1991, was “the foundation and the symbol of reconciliation.” And the 1980s truly provided evidence that reconciliation between France and Germany had reached its zenith. In particular, the 1980s saw the revitalization of those cooperative linkages that the 1963 treaty had mandated. This did not merely occur in the security sphere but touched on every human activity, be it political, economic, cultural, or scientific. It included a series of cultural agreements such as the regulation of bilingual education, the recognition of training and university de- grees, and joint research programs as well as the establishment of a Franco-German Cultural Council in 1988. Cooperative linkages were not only strengthened in the cultural sphere but also on the political, economic, and military-security levels, including the crea- tion of a Council for Common Defense and Security and a Franco- German Finance and Economic Council.” In the security relationship, the early 1990s also witnessed a joint French-German initiative to create a “Euro-corps” by 1995, which is to serve as the basis for a European defense structure.** Of course, Franco-German reconciliation also continued to func- tion as the motor of European integration. Thus, the 1980s wit- nessed not only the institutionalization of Franco-German bilateral cooperation but also a concerted effort by Paris and Bonn to proceed toward more substantial European political and economic union. Thus, Franco-German policy coordination was crucial for paving the way for the establishment of an internal market by 1992 and for the policy program adopted at Maastricht in December 1991. Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.244 PEACE & CHANGE /Iuly 1994 (CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ‘Thus, what started in those grim postwar days as a conscious West German attempt to embrace its former adversary, France, became over more than forty years a “special relationship,” char- acterized by a complex web of cooperation. However, despite reconciliation, Franco-German relations were subjected to a series of crises and strains. Particularly in the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, the Federal Republic and France did not always agree on foreign policy matters, whether they concerned European politi- cal integration—which was less in the interest of Paris than Bonn— or the Atlantic Alliance from which France eventually severed itself. In many ways, France, especially under de Gaulle, used its friendship with the Federal Republic to gain support for its varied policy objectives: to strengthen French leadership on the Continent; to secure French national independence; and to undercut American predominance in Europe. These goals were not always compatible with the Federal Republic’s interests, nor were they conducive to the cordial relations Bonn sought with the United States. It meant most often that Bonn had to engage in a delicate balancing act between France and the United States. Nevertheless, despite di- verging agendas and national interests, Franco-German rapproche- ment became a permanent feature in European politics. PATTERNS OF INTERACTION First, Franco-German reconciliation from its beginning was conducted in both a bilateral and a multilateral setting. The creation of a Western European Community through a combined Franco- German effort thus was one of the earliest postwar confidence- building measures. Bilateral arrangements, which eventually be- came institutionalized, provided an additional tier on which recon- ciliation could proceed. Franco-German reconciliation not only had the strong support of German policy elites but it also found com- mitted proponents among private citizens. Expanding cultural and social ties between the citizens of both countries was equally Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.‘Ackermann / PEACE-BUILDING PROCESS 245 appealing not only because it held the prospects for peace between the two peoples but also because there was a strong moral need for rehabilitation on an individual, group, and societal level. INSTITUTIONALIZATION Given that Franco-German reconciliation has had a long period of maturity, itis of little surprise that the degree to which reconcili- ation has been institutionalized is quite advanced. The ECSC, and later the EEC, provided one of the first institutionalized settings in which Franco-German rapprochement could proceed. The Franco- German Treaty was the institutional framework in which reconcili- ation flourished on a bilateral level because it stipulated the setting up of regular consultative forums for French and German politi- cians and other senior offici PROSPECTS AND LIMITS It is important to note that reconciliation does not prevent con- flict. Reconciliation provides the necessary procedural arrange- ments and structures that can function as essential communication channels in times of crises. Reconciliation, therefore, creates the structural and procedural basis for the peaceful resolution of diverg- ing conflicts of interest. Moreover, the extensive linkages—in the economic, political, social, cultural, and security areas—by which states such as France and Germany are intricately linked, would make it too costly, both in political and human terms, for conflict to be carried out by violent means. Thus, while reconciliation does not preclude conflict, it does allow for the management of difficult issues in interstate relations in a peaceful manner, drawing on bargaining and compromise. ‘The question remains, however, regarding the degree to which the longevity of reconciliation or its institutionalization would make a difference when conflict surfaces, In the Franco-German case, it is evident that the institutionalization of reconciliation has advanced to such a degree that itis irrelevant which political party Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.246 PEACE & CHANGE/July 1994 is in office. Moreover, German unification became a clear indicator of the solidity of Franco-German relations, despite the initial strains that the French response precipitated. RECONCILIATION IN THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE “NEW” GERMANY As noted previously, Franco-German reconciliation has become a well-established phenomenon in the European landscape. Even the crisis surrounding the Maastricht Treaty, a bone of contention in British-German relations, has done little damage to the Franco- German relationship. However, further research is required to explore the prospects for reconciliation as a pivotal element in the foreign policy of Germany in the postunification era, particularly with respect to its foreign policies toward Centra/Eastem Europe and the successor states to the Soviet Union. One final concernis that the policy of international reconciliation as practiced by the Federal Republic in the postwar era may eventually be threatened by the spread of extreme nationalism, intolerance, racism, and xenophobia. The more than 2,200 acts of violence perpetrated against ethnically, culturally, and linguistically diversified groups in Germany should be a waming to German politicians and the concerned public that reconciliation must also be implemented as a viable domestic policy if it is to continue as a crucial element in the foreign policy of the new Germany. NOTES 1, Christian Duquoc, “Real Conciliation and Sacramental Reconciliation,” in Sacra- ‘mental Reconciliation, ed. E. Schillebeeckx (New York: Herder & Herder, 1971), 27 2. Daniel L. Smith, “The Rewards of Allah,” Journal of Peace Research 26, no. 4 (1989): 386 3. Lily Gardner Feldman, The Concept of Reconciliation: How Enemies Become Friends (US. Institute of Peace, Work in Progress). Because most of Gardner Feldman's, work on reconciliation is still in progress, my elaborations on this conceptual perspective were drawn from personal conversations withthe author and from a seminar given by Lily Gardner Feldman, “The Concept of Reconciliation inthe Federal Republic's Foreign Policy: How Enemies Become Friends,” American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Washington, DC, April 24 1991, handwritten notes, Also i ‘with the author, April 9, 1992, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Washington, DC. Shimon Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.‘Ackermann / PEACE-BUILDING PROCESS 247 ‘Shami, in his research conducted at the United States Institute of Peace, has proposed a ‘similar model to analyze the process of reconciliation between Egypt an Israel 4, Joseph V. Montville, “The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy," in Psychodynamics of International Relationships vo. 2, Unofficial Diplomacy ‘at Work, ed. Vamik D. Volkan, Joseph V. Montville, and Demetrios A. Julius (Lexington, ‘MA: Lexington Books, 1990), 162. 5. Thid,, 164. 6. Ibid, 171 7. Mbid,, 175; 8. See Lily Gardner Feldman, The Special Relationship between West Germany and Israel (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1984). ‘9, Gardner Feldman, Concept of Reconciliation. 10, Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Germany, America, and Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 4-8; Wolfram Hanrieder, “West German Foreign Policy, 1949-1979: Necessities and Choices,” in West German Foreign Policy: 1949-1979, ed. Wolfram F. Hansieder (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980), 15-36. 11, Edwina Campbell, Germany's Past and Europe's Future: The Challenges of West German Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989), 17. 12. Hans-Peter Schwarz, “Adenauer und Europa,” Vierteljahreshefte fr Zeitgeschichte 21, no. 4 (October 1979): 474. 13. See Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe, 6. 14, For an excellent analysis of Adenauer’s foreign policy conceptions, see Schwarz, “Adenauer und Europa.” 15. US, Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Secretary of State Bymes on United States Policy Regarding Germany, Stuttgart, September 6, 1946," in Documents on Germany 1944-1985 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1985), 91-99. 16. “Note der Bundesregierang zur Abriistung und Sicherung des Friedens vom 25. Mair 1966," in Die deutsche Ospolitk 1961-1970: Kontinuitat und Wandel, ed. Boris Meissner (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1970), 120-24. 17. “Artikel von AuBenminister Brandt Uber ‘Realititen des poitschen Handelns” in der jugoslawischen Zeitschrift ‘Intemationale Politk,’ vom 5. Juni 1968 (Ausziige),” in Die deutsche Ostpolitik, 258. 18, See Frank Roy Willis, France, Germany and the New Europe 1945-1963 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1965), 44; CH. Pegg, “Die Résistance als Triger der ‘europlischen Einigungsbestrebungen in Frankreich wahrend des 2weiten Weltkrieges,” Europa-Archiv 19 (1952); 5197-206. In his speech in Paris on January 21, 1983, Kohl also paid tribute to the efforts of members of the Resistance who as officials in the French ‘occupation zone made significant contributions toward reconciliation. In “Rede des deut- schen Bundeskanzlers, Helmut Kohl, in Paris am 21. Januar 1983 anlilich des 2wanzigsten. Jabrestags der Unterzeichnung des Vertrags Uber die deutsch-franzisische Zasammenar- beit.” Europa- Archiv 38, no. 5 (March 10, 1983): DIST, 19. Wills, France, Germany. Also Institut frangais de Stuttgart, ed., Die franzdsische ‘Deutschlandpolitk zwischen 1945 und 1949: Ergebnisse eines Kolloquiums des Institut francais de Sntigart und des Deutsch-Franzosischen Insts, Ludwigsburg (Tubingen, ‘Germany: Attempto, 1987); John W. Young, France, the Cold Warand the Western Alliance, 1944-1949: French Foreign Policy and Postwar Europe (New York: St. Martin's, 1990); Frank Roy Willis, Te French in Germany (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962); Emst Weiseafeld, Welches Deutschland soll es sein? Frankreich und die deutsche Einheit seit 1945 (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1986). Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.248 PEACE & CHANGE/ July 1994 20, Simon Serfaty, France, de Gaulle and Europe (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), 3-26 21, Hantieder, Germany, America, Europe, 467. 22. French foreign policy objectives are discussed for example in Alfred Grosser, French Foreign Policy under de Gaulle trans. Lois Ames Pattison (Boston: Litle, Brown, 1965). Also in Wolfram F. Hanrieder and Gracme P. Auton, The Foreign Policies of West Germany, France, and Britain (Englewood Cliff, NJ: Prenctice-Hall, 1980); and Serfaty, France, de Gaulle and Europe. 23, Serfaty, France, de Gaulle, and Europe, 25. 2A, According to Alfred Grosser, reconcilation between France and Germany proceeded in “Waves.” The first wave was “that ofthe small minorities of pioneers from 1945-1949"; the second one was constituted by “the Europeanists” such as Robert Schuman; the third one under Charles de Gaulle in the late 1950s “symbotize[4] largely the rallying of French ‘nationalism to the cause of Franco-German rapprochement.” See Grosser, French Foreign Policy under de Gaulle 6. 25. Ina speech delivered to the National Assembly on February 1, 1919, Adenauer, then Mayor of Cologne, introduced his idea of a European unity that was to rest on a Franco: German pillar. More significant was the address he presented atthe Cologne University on June 12, 1919, in which he directly spoke of reconciliation ofall European cultures as a _means to prevent another war on the Continent. In November 1923, Adenauer even suggested the creation of an economic union between Germany, Belgium, and France, and in December 1923 he also outlined his plan forthe linkage of German and French industrial sectors, with the possible inclusion of Luxembourg and Belgium. Moreover, Adenauer already had recognized that economic linkages were insufficient inthe absence of more lasting cultural ties, both of which were necessary to overcome the traditional enmity between the two peoples. See Konrad Adenauer, Erinnerungen 1945-1953 (Stuttgart, Germany: Deutsche ‘Verlags-Anstalt, 1965). Also, Hans-Peter Schwarz, “Adenauer und Europa,” Viertelja- Ihresheft fr eitgeschichte 27, no. 4 (October 1979): 71-524; Werner Weidenfeld, Konrad ‘Adenauer und Europa: Die geistigen Grundlagen der westeuropaischen Integrationspoliti des ersten Bundeskanzlers (Bonn: Europa Verlag, 1976). 26. Adenauer, Frinnerungen 1945-1953, 254-58, 27. Konrad Adenauer, “24. November 1949—Regicrungserklirung zum Petersburger ‘Abkommen,” in Reden 1917-1967: Fine Auswahl, ed. Hans-Peter Schwarz (Stuttgart, Germany: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1975), 174-75. See also Adenaver's memoirs on the significance of alleviating the psychological damage caused by Germany's past political and rilitary actions; in Erinnerungen 1945-1953, 254-73, Herbert Blankenhorn in his memoirs ‘mentions a conversation Adenaver had with Emst Friedlinder from the weekly German ‘newspaper Die Zeit, (November 3, 1949) in which Adenauer stressed his determination 10 ‘make Franco-German relations his priority. He reasoned that this was necessary because the historical obstacles and the psychological needs for security were so acutely inherent to the French experience; in Verstindnis und Verstindigung: Blitter eines politischen Tagebuchs 1949-1979 (Frankfurt: Verlag Ullstein, 1980). 28. See his speech given on German radio on March 6, 1946, cited in Weidenfeld, ‘Adenauer und Europa, 46. Also, his speech atthe University of Cologne on March 24, 1946, in Adenauer, Reden, 82-106. The Cologne speech outlines the tenets of the CDU party platform as they were pursued throughout the carly postwar years. Adenauer pointed out here that this new Europe would proceed far beyond the “organic linkages” between Germany, France, and Belgium that be had envisioned in the easly 1920s (p. 105). Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.‘Ackermann / PEACE-BUILDING PROCESS 249 29, Konrad Adenaver, “Eine Hoffnung fir Europa, Er6finungsrede 2um 2. Parteitag dee ‘CDU der Britischen Zone in Recklinghausen, 28. August 1948,” in Reden, 122-31. 30, Adenauer, Erinnerungen 1945-1953, 311-12. 31. Adenaver believed thet a common and united European front could undermine any Soviet scheme toward the domination of Wester Europe; se Erinnerungen 1945-1953, 313, 32. Wills, France, Germany, 103. Fora historical background on the beginnings ofthe Earopean Community, see also Simon Bulmer and William Paterson, The Federal Republic (of Germany and the European Community (London; Allen & Unwin, 1987); Michael Curis, Western European Integration (New York: Harper & Row, 1965); John Gillingham, Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Hanns-lirgen Kisters, Die Griindung der Europaischen Gemeinschaft (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 1982); Alan S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945- 1951 (Beekeley: University of Califomia Press, 1984); Raymond Poidevin and Jacques arity, Frankreich und Deutschland: Die Geschichte ihrer Beciehungen 1815-1975, tans. Josef Becker and Johannes Haas-Heye (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1982) 33. Declaration reprinted in Franz Knipping and Emst Weisenfeld, eds., Eine ungewohaliche Geschichte: Deutschland-Frankreich seit 1870 (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1988); 167, 34, Konrad Adenauer, “Tischrede in der Prafektur von Reims beim Staatsbesuch in Frankreich,” in Reden, 443 35, Willis, France, Germany; John E. Farquharson and Stephen C. Holt, Europe from Below: An Assessment of Franco-German Popular Contacts (London: George Allen, 1975). 36. Robert Picht, “Kulturelle Bezichungen als Voraussetaung doutsch-franaisischer Kommunikation,” in Deutschland, Frankreich, Europa: Bilanz einer schwierigen Pariner- ‘schaft ed, Robert Picht (Munich: Piper Verlag, 1978), 249 37. Farquharson and Holt, Europe from Below, 127; Auswartiges Amt, ed, Wege zur Freundschaf: Partner fr die deutsch franadsische Zasammenarbelt (Bont: Auswartiges ‘Amt, 1989); Picht,“Kulturelle Bezichungen” 249-51. See also Hansjtrgen Garstka, Die Rolle der Gemeinde in der internationalen Versténdigung nach dem Zweiten Weltkries, ‘gezeigt am Beispiel der deutsch francisischen Verstindigung (Stuttgart, Germany: IBU, 1976); Edwina S. Campbell, Germany's Past and Europe's Future: The Challenges of West German Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989). 38, Foralisting ofthe extensive cooperative programs see Auswiriges Amt, Wege. 39. For comments on the importance of young people asthe promoters of reconciliation, see for instance Konrad Adenauer, World Indivisible with Liberty and Justice for Al, tans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955), 40,Sce for example the Mitterrand speech in ‘Rede des franzisischen Staatsprisidenten, 20, Januar 1983,” D145-55, and the von Weisicker speech in “Ansprache des Prisidenten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Richard Freiherr von Weizsicker, bei einem Abendessen 2zy Ehren des franzisischen Staatsprisidenten, Frangois Mitterrand, in Brihl am 19, Oktober 1987,” Europa-Archiv 42, no, 21 (10 November 1987): DS89.92. Also, Auswatiges Amt, ‘Wege, and Frangois Altmayer, “Das deutsch-franzdsische Jugendwerk,” Aussenpoliik 15, 1. 5 (May 1964). 41, For the psychological processes involved, see Vamik D. Volkan, “An Overview of eychological Concepts Pertinent to Interethnic and/or Intemational Relationships,” in The Paychodynamics of International Relationships, vol. 1, Concepts and Theories, ed. Vamik 1D. Volkan, Joseph V. Montville, and Demetrios A Julius (Lexington, MA.: Lexington Books, 1990), 31-46 Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.280 PEACE & CHANGE / July 1994 442, See Farquharson and Holt, Europe from Below. 43, Maurice Couve de Murvlle argues thatthe Franco-German Treaty really constituted the conclusion of Franco-German reconciliation. See “Partnerschaft stat Rivaitit," Europa Archiv 38, no. 4 (1983); 102. 44, Manfred Abelein, “Frankreichs Vertrag mit der Bundesrepublik —Vorgeschichte und Bedeutung," Europa-Archiv 18, no. 4 (1963): 131. 45. Weer Weidenfeld refers to these two linkage mechanisms as “intemationally unusual.” See “25 Jahre nach dem 22. Januar 1963: Deutsch-Franzisischer Freund- schaftsvertrag,” Aussenpolik 39, no. ¥ (1988): 7. 46. “Vertrag zwischen der Franzisischen Republik und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ‘Uber die doutsch-franzisische Zusammenarbeit vom 22. Januar 1963," in Europa-Archiv 18, no 4 (1963): D84, 41, Bid, 48, Ibid, D86. 49. Richard von Weizsicker, “Ansprache des Prisidemten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Richard Freiherr von Weisicker, be einem Abendessen zu Ehren des fran- zisischen Staasprisidenten, Fangois Miterand, in Bevin am 18. September 1991 Europe Archiv 46, no. 22 (November 25,1991): D562. 50. “Protokoll aber die Schaffung eines dousch-ranzésischen Versidigungs- und Sicherheitsrats, untrzichnetin Paris am 2, Januar 1988," Europa-Archiv 43, n0. 5 (March 10, 1988); DI31;“Protokol ber die Schafung eines dousch-fanzsischen Fnanz- und ‘Winschaftrats,unereichntin Pars am 72. Januar 198,” Europa-Archiv 43, no. 3(March 10, 1988) D133-34 51, “Press Release onthe Summit ofthe Franco-German Defense and Security Council con May 22, 1992 in La Rochelle,” French Embassy, ress and Information Service, Washington, DC, May 26, 1992; “Summit ofthe Frnco-German Defense and Security Council on May 22,1992 n La Rochelle," Press Release, Embassy ofthe Federal Republic ‘of Germany, Washington, DC, May 25, 192 Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved.