G.R. No.

L-5397

September 26, 1952

LAURETO A. TALAROC, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ALEJANDRO D. UY, respondent-appellant.
Claro M. Recto for appellant.
Justiniano R. Borja for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
The election of Alejandro D. Uy to the office of municipal mayor of Manticao, Misamis Oriental, on
November 13, 1951, brought the instant action of quo warranto in the Court of First Instance of that
province. The petitioner was Laureto A. Talaroc, one of the defeated candidates for the same office,
and the grounds of the petition were that the respondent is a Chinese national and therefore
ineligible. The court below found the petition well-founded and declared the position in question
vacant.
The personal circumstances of the respondent as found by the court are not in dispute. They are as
follows:
Estan establecidas por las pruebas, y admitidas por las partes, que Alejandro D. Uy nacio en
Enero 28, 1912, en el municipio de Iligan, provincia de Lanao (Exhibito A), de padre Chino,
Uy Piangco, y de madre Filipina, Ursula Diabo, cuando convivian estos como marido y
mujer, pero despues contrajeron matrimonio eclestiastico el Marso 3, 1914, en dicho pueblo
(exhibito 9). Tuvieron siete hijos, siendo el recurrido Alejandro D. Uy el 5. hijo. Uy Piangco
nativo de Chuitao, Amoy, China, nunca se ausento desde que llego hacia 1893 o 1895, en
Filipinas hasta su fallecimiento el Febrero 17, 19l7, en Iligan, Lanao, donde estuvo
residiendo continuamente. Ursula Diabo sin contraer nuevo matrimonio, murio con
posterioridad, el Agosto 29, 1949, en el municipio de Manticao, Misamis Oriental (Exhibito
3). Aparece tambien que el recurrido Alejandro D. Uy nunca fue a China y ha votado en las
anteriores elecciones verificades en el pais, y ha desempenado empleos como Inspector del
"Bureau of Plant Industry" en 1943 (Exh. 4), en los aos 1935, 1946 y 1947, maestro bajo el
Bureau of Public Schools, en Manticao District (Exhs. 5 y 5-a); filing clerk en la Tesoreria
Municipal de Initao, en 1935 al 1945 (Exh. 4); y acting Municipal Treasurer de Lagait, en
1942 a 1943 (Exh. 6); ademas de haber servido al 120th Infantry Regiment de la guerrilla, y
algun tiempo "tax collector" del gobierno de ocupacion Japonesa, en esta provincia de
Misamis Oriental.
These facts also appear uncontroverted in evidence: One of the respondent's brothers, Pedro D. Uy,
before the war and up to this time has been occupying the position of income tax examiner of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. His other brother, Jose D. Uy, is a practicing certified public accountant,
and before the war was the accountant of the National Abaca and Fiber Corporation p73 (NAFCO).
His other brother, Dr. Victorio D. Uy, is a practising physician, and before the war, was charity
physician in Initao and later a physician in the provincial hospital. During the war, Dr. Uy was a
captain in the Philippine Army. His younger brother was a lieutenant in the 120th Infantry Regiment
of the guerrillas. All his brothers married Filipino girls and they were never identified with any
Chinese political or social organization. Respondent's father acquired properties in Lugait. His
mother, who never remarried, campaigned for woman suffrage in 1935 and voted in the subsequent
elections.

The respondent's contentions, which the court below rejected, were that his father was a subject of
Spain on April 11, 1899 by virtue of Article 17 of the Civil Code; that his mother ipso facto reacquired
her Filipino citizenship upon the death of her husband on February 17, 1917, and the child followed
her citizenship; and that the respondent is a citizen of the Philippines by the mere fact of his birth
therein. His honor the Judge noted that, while under the Roa doctrine (Roa vs. Insular Collector of
Customs, 23 Phil., 315), Alejandro D. Uy would be a Filipino citizen regardless of the nationality of
his parents, yet, he said this doctrine was abandoned in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor, (79 Phil.,
249.), Swee Sang vs. The Commonwealth of the Philippines, (79 Phil., 249), decided with Tan
Chong vs. Secretary of Labor and Villahermosa vs. The Commissioner of Immigration, 80 Phil., 541.
It may be recalled that in the case of Roa vs. Insular Collector of Customs, supra, the petitioner was
born in lawful wedlock in the Philippines on July 6, 1899, his father being a native of China and his
mother a Filipina. His father was domiciled in this country up to the year 1895 when he went to
China and never returned, dying there about 1900. In May, 1901, Roa, was then a minor, was sent to
China by his widowed mother for the soul purpose of studying and returned in October, 1910, being
then about 21 years and 3 months of age. He was denied admission by the board of special inquiry,
whose decision was affirmed by the Court of First Instance in habeas corpus proceedings.
This Court held that Article 17 of the Civil Code "is sufficient to show that the first paragraph affirms
and recognizes the principle of nationality by place of birth, jus soli." Citing various decisions,
authorities, and opinions of the United States Attorney General, it found that the decided weight of
authority was to the effect that the marriage of an American woman with an alien conferred his
nationality upon her during coverture; that upon the dissolution of the marriage by death of the
husband, the wife reverted, ipso facto, to her former status, unless her conduct or acts showed that
she elected to retain the nationality of her husband, and that where the widowed mother herself thus
reacquired her former nationality, her children, she being their natural guardian, should follow her
nationality with the proviso that they may elect for themselves upon reaching majority.
The Roa decision, promulgated on October 30, 1912, set a precedent that was uniformly followed in
numerous cases. The long line of decisions applied the principle of jus soli up to September 16,
1947, when that principle was renounced in the cases of Tan Chong vs. Secretary of
Labor and Swee Sang vs. The Commonwealth of the Philippines cited in the appealed decision.
These two decisions are not, in our opinion, controlling in this case.
Article IV, entitled "Citizenship", of the Constitution provides:

1wphl.nt

SECTION 1. The following are the citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
xxx

xxx

xxx

On the strength of the Roa doctrine, Alejandro D. Uy undoubtedly was considered a full-fledged
Philippine citizen on the date of the adoption of the constitution, when jus soli had been the
prevailing doctrine. "With it", as Mr. Justice Laurel said in Ramon Torres, et al. vs. Tan Chin, 69 Phil.,
519, "the bench and the bar were familiar. The members of the Constitutional Convention were also
aware of this rule and in abrogating the doctrine laid down in the Roa case, by making the jus
sanguinis the predominating principle in the determination of Philippine citizenship, they did not
intend to exclude those who, in the situation of Tranquilino Roa, were citizens of the Philippines by
judicial declaration at the time of the adoption of the Constitution." "This," the Court went on to say,

"is apparent from the following excerpt of the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention when
Article IV of the Constitution was discussed:
Delegate Aruego. Mr. President, may I just have one question? May I ask Mr. Roxas if,
under this proposition that you have, all children born in the Philippines before the adoption
of the Constitution was included?
Delegate Roxas. No, sir: that is to say, if they are citizens in accordance with the present
law, they will be citizens.
Delegate Aruego. But as I have said they are citizens by judicial decisions.
Delegate Roxas. If they are citizens now by judicial decisions they will be citizens.
Delegate Aruego. I should like to make it clear that we are voting on the proposition so
that it will include all those born in the Philippines, regardless of their parentage, because I
have heard some objections here to the incorporation in toto of the doctrine of jus soli. There
are many who do not want to include as citizens, children of Chinese parents but they are
included in the proposition we are voting upon . . .
I should like to find out from the gentleman from Capiz if that proposition would make Filipino
citizens of children of Chinese parents born last year or this year.
Delegate Roxas. No, because by the laws of the Philippine Islands, they are not Filipino
citizens now. (Record of the Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, Session of
November 26, 1934.)
Unlike the Tan Chong case, the herein appellant Uy had attained the age of majority when the
Constitution went into effect, and had been allowed to exercise the right of suffrage, to hold public
office, and to take the oath of allegiance to the Commonwealth Government or Republic of the
Philippines.
The Tan Chong decision itself makes this express reservation: "Needless to say, this decision is not
intended or designed to deprive, as it can not divest, of their Filipino citizenship, those who have
been declared to be Filipino citizens, or upon whom such citizenship had been conferred by the
courts because of the doctrine or principle ofres adjudicata." Certainly, it would neither be fair nor
good policy to hold the respondent an alien after he had exercised the privileges of citizenship and
the Government had confirmed his Philippine citizenship on the faith of legal principle that had the
force of law. On several occasions the Secretary of Justice had declared as Filipino citizens persons
similarly circumstanced as the herein respondent. (Opinion 40, series of 1940, of the Secretary of
Justice. See also Opinion No. 18, series of 1942, of the Commissioner of Justice, 1942 Off. Gaz.,
September.)
Cut out of the same pattern and deserving of the same consideration is the proposition that
Alejandro D. Uy became a Philippine citizen at least upon his father's death.
It has been seen that, according to the rule of the Roa case, a Filipino woman married to
Chinese ipso factoreacquired her Filipino citizenship upon her husband's demise and that there after
her minor children's nationality automatically followed that of the mother's. This rule was not changed
by the adoption of the jus sanguinisdoctrine, and was in force until Commonwealth Act No. 63 went
into effect in 1936, by which the legislature, for the first time, provided a method for regaining

Philippine citizenship by Filipino women in such cases. It is to be noted that when Commonwealth
Act No. 63 was passed Ursula Diabo had been a widow for 19 years and Alejandro D. Uy had been
of age 3 years, and that the new law carries the provision giving it retroactive effect.
This conclusions make superfluous consideration of the rest of the several assignments of error by
the appellant upon which we refrain to express on opinion.
The decision of the lower court is reversed and the respondent and appellant declared a Filipino
citizen and eligible to the office of the municipal mayor. The petitioner and appellee will pay the costs
of both instances.
1wphl.nt

G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999

ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for
vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza
III. The results of the election were as follows:
Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853
Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275 1
The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a
citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, 2 the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of
Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground
that he is a dual citizen and, under 40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship
are disqualified from running for any elective position. The COMELEC's Second Division said:
What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of Eduardo
Barrios Manzano as candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May
11, 1998 elections. The petition is based on the ground that the respondent is an
American citizen based on the record of the Bureau of Immigration and
misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that he
is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of
Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was
born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United
States, San Francisco, California, September 14, 1955, and is considered in
American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American
citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is born a
Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship.
The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the
position for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he
seeks to be elected?

Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship
are disqualified from running for any elective local position.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios
Manzano DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.
On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. 3 The motion remained pending
even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the COMELEC, the
board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the
proclamation of the winner.
On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. 4 Petitioner's motion
was opposed by private respondent.
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its
resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en banc reversed the
ruling of its Second Division and declared private respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the
City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. 5The pertinent portions of the resolution of the
COMELEC en banc read:
As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States
Constitution and laws under the principle ofjus soli.
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the
age of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an American passport
as travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine
Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This,
however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not
renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United
States.
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he
registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998,
which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine
law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.
At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division,
adopted on May 7, 1998, was not yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the
highest number of votes among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City,
garnering one hundred three thousand eight hundred fifty three (103,853) votes over
his closest rival, Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one hundred thousand eight
hundred ninety four (100,894) votes, or a margin of two thousand nine hundred fifty
nine (2,959) votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty four thousand two
hundred seventy five (54,275) votes. In applying election laws, it would be far better
to err in favor of the popular choice than be embroiled in complex legal issues
involving private international law which may well be settled before the highest court
(Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727).

WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of the

Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the cancellation of the
respondent's certificate of candidacy.
We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a
candidate for the position of vice-mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998, elections.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers, upon
proper notice to the parties, to reconvene and proclaim the respondent Eduardo Luis
Barrios Manzano as the winning candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City.
Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, on the evening of
August 31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City of Makati.
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC en
banc and to declare private respondent disqualified to hold the office of vice mayor of Makati City.
Petitioner contends that
[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:
A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:
1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of
majority when he was already 37 years old; and,
2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered
himself as a voter and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the
City of Makati;
C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division
adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be
declared the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold
the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.
We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent Manzano whether
petitioner Mercado his personality to bring this suit considering that he was not an original party in
the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was petitioner's motion for leave to
intervene granted.
I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT
Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the
COMELEC in support of his claim that petitioner has no right to intervene and, therefore, cannot
bring this suit to set aside the ruling denying his motion for intervention:
Sec. 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. Any person
allowed to initiate an action or proceeding may, before or during the trial of an action
or proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its discretion to intervene in such
action or proceeding, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the

success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated

as to be adversely affected by such action or proceeding.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Discretion of Commission. In allowing or disallowing a motion for
intervention, the Commission or the Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the intervenor's
rights may be fully protected in a separate action or proceeding.
Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation
nor an interest to protect because he is "a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of
Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City if the private
respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment."
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the
proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the
election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only
second to private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at that time.
Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from the race at the
time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC, 6 reiterated in several cases, 7 only applies
to cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and the question is whether one who placed
second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the present case, at the time
petitioner filed a "Motion for Leave to File Intervention" on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation
of the winner, and petitioner's purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified "from running
for [an] elective local position" under 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted
the disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so
was petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
Nor is petitioner's interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for
intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to have garnered the
highest number of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to
intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear
from 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which provides:
Any candidate who his been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and
he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court
or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of action, inquiry, or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong.
Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after
election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.
The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioner's motion for intervention was tantamount
to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant petition for certiorari. As the
COMELEC en banc instead decided the merits of the case, the present petition properly deals not

only with the denial of petitioner's motion for intervention but also with the substantive issues
respecting private respondent's alleged disqualification on the ground of dual citizenship.
This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent Manzano possesses dual
citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION
The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under 40 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as "disqualified from running for any
elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship." This provision is incorporated in the
Charter of the City of Makati. 8
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General, who sides with him
in this case, contends that through 40(d) of the Local Government Code, Congress has
"command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold local
elective office."
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result
of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. 9 For instance, such a situation may arise when a person
whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state
which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person,ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part,
is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our
Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual
citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the
principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of
their father's' country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are
considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have
renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act,
be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional
provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance
is the result of an individual's volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual allegiance of citizens
is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." This provision was included in the
1987 Constitution at the instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as
follows: 10

. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I
have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to which a dual
allegiance and I reiterate a dual allegiance is larger and more threatening than
that of mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never
insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed marriages or of birth on
foreign soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship at all.
What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance of
the problem of dual allegiance. For example, we all know what happens in the
triennial elections of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce
which consists of about 600 chapters all over the country. There is a Peking ticket, as
well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is the fact chat the Filipino-Chinese
community is represented in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in Taiwan.
And until recently, sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in the People's Republic
of China, they have the Associated Legislative Council for overseas Chinese wherein
all of Southeast Asia including some European and Latin countries were represented,
which was dissolved after several years because of diplomatic friction. At that time,
the Filipino-Chinese were also represented in that Overseas Council.
When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of
allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts,
may be said to be bound by a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also
took close note of the concern expressed by some Commissioners yesterday,
including Commissioner Villacorta, who were concerned about the lack of guarantees
of thorough assimilation, and especially Commissioner Concepcion who has always
been worried about minority claims on our natural resources.
Dull allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore,
China or Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of the great commercial
places in downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese it is of
common knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic capital outflow when we have to
endure a capital famine which also means economic stagnation, worsening
unemployment and social unrest.
And so, this is exactly what we ask that the Committee kindly consider
incorporating a new section, probably Section 5, in the article on Citizenship which
will read as follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL
BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.
In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens with dual
allegiance, thus: 11
. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual
citizenship in the sense that it implies a double allegiance under a double sovereignty
which some of us who spoke then in a freewheeling debate thought would be
repugnant to the sovereignty which pervades the Constitution and to citizenship itself
which implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the Constitution is defined in
terms of rights and obligations exclusive to that citizenship including, of course, the
obligation to rise to the defense of the State when it is threatened, and back of this,
Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the concern for national security. In the course
of those debates, I think some noted the fact that as a result of the wave of
naturalizations since the decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's

Republic of China was made in 1975, a good number of these naturalized Filipinos
still routinely go to Taipei every October 10; and it is asserted that some of them do
renew their oath of allegiance to a foreign government maybe just to enter into the
spirit of the occasion when the anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is
commemorated. And so, I have detected a genuine and deep concern about double
citizenship, with its attendant risk of double allegiance which is repugnant to our
sovereignty and national security. I appreciate what the Committee said that this
could be left to the determination of a future legislature. But considering the scale of
the problem, the real impact on the security of this country, arising from, let us say,
potentially great numbers of double citizens professing double allegiance, will the
Committee entertain a proposed amendment at the proper time that will prohibit, in
effect, or regulate double citizenship?
Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was
not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No.
7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those
with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination
of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with
dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of
different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional
Commission, pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no
control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But
whether she is considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our
control." 12
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other
country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be
that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively
renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the following discussion on 40(d)
between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows: 13
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17:
"Any person with dual citizenship" is disqualified to run for any elective local position.
Under the present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is a citizen of
the Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the Republic.
There is no requirement that such a natural born citizen, upon reaching the age of
majority, must elect or give up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the
country of his or her father and one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may
such a situation disqualify the person to run for a local government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment
when he would want to run for public office, he has to repudiate one of his
citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of
origin or the country of the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No
one can renounce. There are such countries in the world.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in
effect, be an election for him of his desire to be considered as a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require
an election. Under the Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the
Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the
Gentleman's example, if he does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is
opening himself to question. So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing he
should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: "I am a Filipino citizen, and I
have only one citizenship."
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr.
President. He will always have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested
upon him or her in the Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will
prove that he also acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall under
this disqualification.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce "all allegiance
and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty" 14 of which at the time he is a subject
or citizen before he can be issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines. In Parado
v. Republic, 15 it was held:
[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he
renounce, his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that
he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by
law is satisfied and compiled with. The determination whether such renunciation is
valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the
province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the
law duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or
should interfere with its operation and application. If the requirement of the Chinese
Law of Nationality were to be read into our Naturalization Law, we would be applying
not what our legislative department has deemed it wise to require, but what a foreign
government has thought or intended to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It must be
resisted by all means and at all cost. It would be a brazen encroachment upon the
sovereign will and power of the people of this Republic.
III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on September 4,
1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while the
United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a
national both of the Philippines and of the United States. However, the COMELEC en banc held that,
by participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent "effectively
renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law," so that now he is solely a Philippine national.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is not
sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was made

when private respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have been made
when he reached the age of majority.
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American
citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the
United States, which provided that "A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth
or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or
participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory." To be
sure this provision was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk 16 as
beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign relations. However, by filing a certificate
of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in
effect renounced his American citizenship. Private respondent's certificate of candidacy, filed on March
27, 1998, contained the following statements made under oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF "NATURAL-BORN" OR
"NATURALIZED") NATURAL-BORN
xxx xxx xxx
10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN
LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR.
11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN
COUNTRY.
12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT
AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL MAINTAIN
TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY THE LAWS,
LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED
AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE
THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL
RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE
FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively
removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v. COMELEC it was
held: 17
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the
retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under
Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any
elective local position?" We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent
reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of
allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment,
Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American
citizenship long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim
when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was
repatriated to his Filipino citizenship."
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:

By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American
citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine
Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995.
Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the
Philippine Government.
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the
elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic
that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any
showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.
There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner's contention that the oath of allegiance contained in private
respondent's certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation that, to be effective,
such renunciation should have been made upon private respondent reaching the age of majority
since no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.
Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is registered as an
American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American
passport which he used in his last travel to the United States on April 22, 1997. There is no merit in
this. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship. The
acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American nationality before
the termination of his American citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar
v.COMELEC 18 applies mutatis mundatis to private respondent in the case at bar:
. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an
American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate staring he is an American does not
mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an American does
not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or
citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship;
truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We
consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be
"express," it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship
when there is no renunciation, either "express" or "implied."
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution
of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental
reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with
the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession
as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of
Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath.
Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, 19 we
sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a
naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial
documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against

any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does
some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

1wphi1.nt

G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991

ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner,
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG,
JR., respondents.
G.R. Nos. 92202-03 July 30, 1991
SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, JR., petitioner,
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG,
JR., respondents.
Hechanova & Associates for petitioner Co.
Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro and Arcilla Law Offices for respondent Ong, Jr.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p

The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The sole issue before us is whether or not, in making
that determination, the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of
Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose
Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern
Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following
grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however,
denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.

Hence, these petitions for certiorari.

We treat the comments as answers and decide the issues raised in the petitions.
ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION
The first question which arises refers to our jurisdiction.
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and
the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualificationsof their respective members. (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution)
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the
word soleemphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals.
The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin v. HRET (168 SCRA 391 [1988]) stated that under the
1987 Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal is original and exclusive, viz:
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction
conferred (Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra at p. 162). The exercise of power
by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as
"intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had originally remained in the
legislature." (id., at p. 175) Earlier this grant of power to the legislature was
characterized by Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and complete; (Veloso v. Board of
Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919]) Under the amended 1935
Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and it
remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the Legislature and
the Electoral Commission, (Lachica v. Yap, 25 SCRA 140 [1968]) The same may be
said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal under the 1987
Constitution. (p. 401)
The Court continued further, ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the
sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a
rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and
complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise
restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same." (pp. 403-404)
When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral Tribunals under our constitutional grants of
power?
In the later case of Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1990]) the Supreme Court stated that the
judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference save only "in the exercise of this Court's
so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision or
resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or
paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of
its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear
unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has
to be a remedy for such abuse." (at pp. 785-786)

In the leading case of Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429 [1938]) the Court ruled that the power of the
Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear showing of
such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due process." The Court
does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of independent branches
of the Government, It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an
abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution calls for remedial action.
The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded jurisdiction, so to
speak, to review the decisions of the other branches and agencies of the government to determine
whether or not they have acted within the bounds of the Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section 1,
Constitution)
Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the governmental branch or
agency has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different
view. In the absence of a showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it
will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide. (See Marcos v.
Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989]) It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.
As constitutional creations invested with necessary power, the Electoral Tribunals, although not
powers in the tripartite scheme of the government, are, in the exercise of their functions independent
organs independent of Congress and the Supreme Court. The power granted to HRET by the
Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
legislature. (Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936])
In passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and careful regard for the balance of powers,
must permit this exclusive privilege of the Tribunals to remain where the Sovereign authority has
place it. (See Veloso v. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919])
It has been argued that under Article VI, Section 17 of the present Constitution, the situation may
exist as it exists today where there is an unhealthy one-sided political composition of the two
Electoral Tribunals. There is nothing in the Constitution, however, that makes the HRET because of
its composition any less independent from the Court or its constitutional functions any less exclusive.
The degree of judicial intervention should not be made to depend on how many legislative members
of the HRET belong to this party or that party. The test remains the same-manifest grave abuse of
discretion.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part
of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme
Court.
ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP
The records show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the
Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on
land which he bought from the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish
colonial administration.

The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought
by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915.
Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. In Laoang, he was able to establish
an enduring relationship with his neighbors, resulting in his easy assimilation into the community.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino
cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong
Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in
1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private respondent who was born in 1948.
The private respondent's father never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware
store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo,
Manila. In the meantime, the father of the private respondent, unsure of his legal status and in an
unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of
Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen.
On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April
28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of
naturalization was issued to him.
At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then a minor of nine years was
finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar. There is nothing in the records to
differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local populace were
concerned.
Fortunes changed. The house of the family of the private respondent in Laoang, Samar was burned
to the ground.
Undaunted by the catastrophe, the private respondent's family constructed another one in place of
their ruined house. Again, there is no showing other than that Laoang was their abode and home.
After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better education,
went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education.
In the meantime, another misfortune was suffered by the family in 1975 when a fire gutted their
second house in Laoang, Samar. The respondent's family constructed still another house, this time a
16-door apartment building, two doors of which were reserved for the family.
The private respondent graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board
Examinations.

Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He
found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the
hardware business of his family in Manila. In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate
to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged.
Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment
given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared
Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to
be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on
this subject.
The private respondent frequently went home to Laoang, Samar, where he grew up and spent his
childhood days.
In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim.
For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar,
and correspondingly, voted there during those elections.
The private respondent after being engaged for several years in the management of their family
business decided to be of greater service to his province and ran for public office. Hence, when the
opportunity came in 1987, he ran in the elections for representative in the second district of Northern
Samar.
Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of Northern Samar as their representative in
Congress. Even if the total votes of the two petitioners are combined, Ong would still lead the two by
more than 7,000 votes.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:
SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those
who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine
citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers,
elected citizenship before that date.

The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates against
Filipino women. There is no ambiguity in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz:
Mr. Azcuna: With respect to the provision of section 4, would this refer
only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of
the 1973 Constitution or would it also cover those who elected it
under the 1973 Constitution?
Fr. Bernas: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine
citizenship by virtue of the provision of the 1935 Constitution whether
the election was done before or after January 17, 1973. (Records of
the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 228; Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Trenas: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political
Rights and Obligations and Human Rights has more or less decided
to extend the interpretation of who is a natural-born citizen as
provided in section 4 of the 1973 Constitution by adding that persons
who have elected Philippine Citizenship under the 1935 Constitution
shall be natural-born? Am I right Mr. Presiding Officer?
Fr. Bernas: yes.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Nolledo: And I remember very well that in the Reverend Father
Bernas' well written book, he said that the decision was designed
merely to accommodate former delegate Ernesto Ang and that the
definition on natural-born has no retroactive effect. Now it seems that
the Reverend Father Bernas is going against this intention by
supporting the amendment?
Fr. Bernas: As the Commissioner can see, there has been an
evolution in my thinking. (Records of the Constitutional Commission,
Vol. 1, p. 189)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Rodrigo: But this provision becomes very important because his
election of Philippine citizenship makes him not only a Filipino citizen
but a natural-born Filipino citizen entitling him to run for Congress. . .
Fr. Bernas: Correct. We are quite aware of that and for that reason
we will leave it to the body to approve that provision of section 4.
Mr. Rodrigo: I think there is a good basis for the provision because it
strikes me as unfair that the Filipino citizen who was born a day
before January 17, 1973 cannot be a Filipino citizen or a natural-born
citizen. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 231)

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Rodrigo: The purpose of that provision is to remedy an
inequitable situation. Between 1935 and 1973 when we were under
the 1935 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers
were natural-born Filipinos. However, those born of Filipino mothers
but alien fathers would have to elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and if they do elect, they become
Filipino citizens but not natural-born Filipino citizens. (Records of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 356)
The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers. To make the provision prospective from
February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation resulting in an inequitable situation. It must also
be retroactive.
It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts are not always to be hedged in by the literal
meaning of its language. The spirit and intendment thereof, must prevail over the letter, especially
where adherence to the latter would result in absurdity and injustice. (Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35
SCRA 279 [1970])
A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it effective operation and suppress the
mischief at which it is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of the provision which should prevail over the letter
thereof. (Jarrolt v. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580)
In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason v. LTA (31 SCRA 413 [1970]:
To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated. Our Constitution, any constitution is
not to be construed narrowly or pedantically for the prescriptions therein contained,
to paraphrase Justice Holmes, are not mathematical formulas having their essence
in their form but are organic living institutions, the significance of which is vital not
formal. . . . (p. 427)
The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a
Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen
while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship.
If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an
alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural-born citizens.
Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the fleeting
accident of time or result in two kinds of citizens made up of essentially the same similarly situated
members.
It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this accidental
anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally all those born before the 1973 Constitution and who elected
Philippine citizenship either before or after the effectivity of that Constitution.
The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative in nature. The enactment was meant to
correct the inequitable and absurd situation which then prevailed, and thus, render those acts valid

which would have been nil at the time had it not been for the curative provisions. (See Development
Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 342 [1980])
There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her
marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a
Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born
status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to
ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only
was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was
only nine (9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the
Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing
citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn
statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen
since he was nine years old.
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process.
In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the
right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship (p. 52; emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his
life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have elected
citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of Samar where there are no alien enclaves and
no racial distinctions. The respondent has lived the life of a Filipino since birth. His father applied for
naturalization when the child was still a small boy. He is a Roman Catholic. He has worked for a
sensitive government agency. His profession requires citizenship for taking the examinations and
getting a license. He has participated in political exercises as a Filipino and has always considered
himself a Filipino citizen. There is nothing in the records to show that he does not embrace
Philippine customs and values, nothing to indicate any tinge of alien-ness no acts to show that this
country is not his natural homeland. The mass of voters of Northern Samar are frilly aware of Mr.
Ong's parentage. They should know him better than any member of this Court will ever know him.
They voted by overwhelming numbers to have him represent them in Congress. Because of his acts
since childhood, they have considered him as a Filipino.
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect
citizenship.For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate
choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public
office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and

other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice for these
persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his status is
doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's
being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would not
only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen
elect Philippine citizenship?
The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected citizenship. It observed
that "when protestee was only nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong Chuan became a naturalized
Filipino. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to him for he was
then a minor residing in this country. Concededly, it was the law itself that had already elected
Philippine citizenship for protestee by declaring him as such." (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen because of
his premature taking of the oath of citizenship.
The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship after
his death and at this very late date just so we can go after the son.
The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach. This can not be
done. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action
for its nullity. (See Queto v. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970])
To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and void
would run against the principle of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has already been laid to rest. How
can he be given a fair opportunity to defend himself. A dead man cannot speak. To quote the words
of the HRET "Ong Chuan's lips have long been muted to perpetuity by his demise and obviously he
could not use beyond where his mortal remains now lie to defend himself were this matter to be
made a central issue in this case."
The issue before us is not the nullification of the grant of citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan. Our
function is to determine whether or not the HRET committed abuse of authority in the exercise of its
powers. Moreover, the respondent traces his natural born citizenship through his mother, not through
the citizenship of his father. The citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine whether or not
the respondent "chose" to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to the present,
both mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have elected any other
citizenship unless he first formally renounced Philippine citizenship in favor of a foreign nationality.
Unlike other persons faced with a problem of election, there was no foreign nationality of his father
which he could possibly have chosen.
There is another reason why we cannot declare the HRET as having committed manifest grave
abuse of discretion. The same issue of natural-born citizenship has already been decided by the
Constitutional Convention of 1971 and by the Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of the
Constitution drafted by that Convention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent, was declared
and accepted as a natural born citizen by both bodies.

Assuming that our opinion is different from that of the Constitutional Convention, the Batasang
Pambansa, and the respondent HRET, such a difference could only be characterized as error. There
would be no basis to call the HRET decision so arbitrary and whimsical as to amount to grave abuse
of discretion.
What was the basis for the Constitutional Convention's declaring Emil Ong a natural born citizen?
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on the
11th day of April 1899 and then residing in said islands and their children born subsequent thereto
were conferred the status of a Filipino citizen.
Was the grandfather of the private respondent a Spanish subject?
Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those who were considered Spanish Subjects, viz:
ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards:
1. Persons born in Spanish territory.
2. Children born of a Spanish father or mother, even though they were born out of
Spain.
3. Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers.
4. Those without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in any town in the
Monarchy. (Emphasis supplied)
The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence. This domicile, once
established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established.
(Article 50, NCC; Article 40, Civil Code of Spain; Zuellig v. Republic, 83 Phil. 768 [1949])
As earlier stated, Ong Te became a permanent resident of Laoang, Samar around 1895.
Correspondingly, a certificate of residence was then issued to him by virtue of his being a resident of
Laoang, Samar. (Report of the Committee on Election Protests and Credentials of the 1971
Constitutional Convention, September 7, 1972, p. 3)
The domicile that Ong Te established in 1895 continued until April 11, 1899; it even went beyond the
turn of the 19th century. It is also in this place were Ong Te set-up his business and acquired his real
property.
As concluded by the Constitutional Convention, Ong Te falls within the meaning of sub-paragraph 4
of Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain.
Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he, nevertheless, always returned to the Philippines.
The fact that he died in China, during one of his visits in said country, was of no moment. This will
not change the fact that he already had his domicile fixed in the Philippines and pursuant to the Civil
Code of Spain, he had become a Spanish subject.
If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having established his domicile in a town under the
Monarchy of Spain, necessarily, Ong Te was also an inhabitant of the Philippines for an inhabitant
has been defined as one who has actual fixed residence in a place; one who has a domicile in a

place. (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. II) Apriori, there can be no other logical conclusion but to
educe that Ong Te qualified as a Filipino citizen under the provisions of section 4 of the Philippine
Bill of 1902.
The HRET itself found this fact of absolute verity in concluding that the private respondent was a
natural-born Filipino.
The petitioners' sole ground in disputing this fact is that document presented to prove it were not in
compliance with the best the evidence rule. The petitioners allege that the private respondent failed
to present the original of the documentary evidence, testimonial evidence and of the transcript of the
proceedings of the body which the aforesaid resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was
predicated.
On the contrary, the documents presented by the private respondent fall under the exceptions to the
best evidence rule.
It was established in the proceedings before the HRET that the originals of the Committee Report
No. 12, the minutes of the plenary session of 1971 Constitutional Convention held on November 28,
1972 cannot be found.
This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention; by
Atty. Nolledo, Delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention; and by Atty. Antonio Santos, Chief
Librarian of the U.P Law Center, in their respective testimonies given before the HRET to the effect
that there is no governmental agency which is the official custodian of the records of the 1971
Constitutional Convention. (TSN, December 12, 1988, pp. 30-31; TSN, January 17, 1989, pp. 34-35;
TSN, February 1, 1989, p. 44; TSN, February 6, 1989, pp. 28-29)
The execution of the originals was established by Atty. Ricafrente, who as the Assistant Secretary of
the 1971 Constitutional Convention was the proper party to testify to such execution. (TSN,
December 12, 1989, pp. 11-24)
The inability to produce the originals before the HRET was also testified to as aforestated by Atty.
Ricafrente, Atty. Nolledo, and Atty. Santos. In proving the inability to produce, the law does not
require the degree of proof to be of sufficient certainty; it is enough that it be shown that after a bona
fide diligent search, the same cannot be found. (see Government of P.I. v. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817
[1918])
Since the execution of the document and the inability to produce were adequately established, the
contents of the questioned documents can be proven by a copy thereof or by the recollection of
witnesses.
Moreover, to erase all doubts as to the authenticity of the documentary evidence cited in the
Committee Report, the former member of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, Atty. Nolledo, when
he was presented as a witness in the hearing of the protest against the private respondent,
categorically stated that he saw the disputed documents presented during the hearing of the election
protest against the brother of the private respondent. (TSN, February 1, 1989, pp. 8-9)
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento, a vice-president of the Constitutional Convention,
states that he was presiding officer of the plenary session which deliberated on the report on the
election protest against Delegate Emil Ong. He cites a long list of names of delegates present.
Among them are Mr. Chief Justice Fernan, and Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. The petitioners could have

presented any one of the long list of delegates to refute Mr. Ong's having been declared a naturalborn citizen. They did not do so. Nor did they demur to the contents of the documents presented by
the private respondent. They merely relied on the procedural objections respecting the admissibility
of the evidence presented.
The Constitutional Convention was the sole judge of the qualifications of Emil Ong to be a member
of that body. The HRET by explicit mandate of the Constitution, is the sole judge of the qualifications
of Jose Ong, Jr. to be a member of Congress. Both bodies deliberated at length on the controversies
over which they were sole judges. Decisions were arrived at only after a full presentation of all
relevant factors which the parties wished to present. Even assuming that we disagree with their
conclusions, we cannot declare their acts as committed with grave abuse of discretion. We have to
keep clear the line between error and grave abuse.
ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE
The petitioners question the residence qualification of respondent Ong.
The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence" under the Constitution. The term "residence"
has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous Constitutions but
also under the 1987 Constitution.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of residence vis-avis the qualifications of a candidate for Congress continues to remain the same as that of domicile,
to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971
Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence
in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of
the elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of
residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or
is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, in so far as the regular members of
the National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely
provides, among others, and a resident thereof, that is, in the district,
for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of the
election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the
interpretation given to it was domicile. (Records of the 1987
Constitutional Convention, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986. p. 87)
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think
Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has
been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual
residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.

Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the
proper time to go back to actual residence rather than mere intention
to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially
considering that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on
Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law.
So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by
domicile and not physical and actual residence. (Records of the 1987
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986, p. 110)
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word "residence" which
regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or
pleasure, one intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The absence of a
person from said permanent residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the
domicile of that person. In other words, domicile is characterized by animus revertendi (Ujano v.
Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966])
The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at
Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said
domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the present.
The private respondent, in the proceedings before the HRET sufficiently established that after the
fire that gutted their house in 1961, another one was constructed.
Likewise, after the second fire which again destroyed their house in 1975, a sixteen-door apartment
was built by their family, two doors of which were reserved as their family residence. (TSN, Jose
Ong, Jr., November 18,1988, p. 8)
The petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he
cannot, therefore, be a resident of said place is misplaced.
The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name of the private respondent's parents. Upon
the demise of his parents, necessarily, the private respondent, pursuant to the laws of succession,
became the co-owner thereof (as a co- heir), notwithstanding the fact that these were still in the
names of his parents.
Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme Court
in the case of De los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not required that a person
should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live
in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis supplied)
To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be
tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the
age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that
the candidate should also own property in order to be qualified to run. (see Maquera v. Borra, 122
Phil. 412 [1965])

It has also been settled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or
registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of
residence. (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954])
As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose of finishing his studies
and later to practice his profession, There was no intention to abandon the residence in Laoang,
Samar. On the contrary, the periodical journeys made to his home province reveal that he always
had the animus revertendi.
The Philippines is made up not only of a single race; it has, rather, undergone an interracial
evolution. Throughout our history, there has been a continuing influx of Malays, Chinese, Americans,
Japanese, Spaniards and other nationalities. This racial diversity gives strength to our country.
Many great Filipinos have not been whole-blooded nationals, if there is such a person, for there is
none. To mention a few, the great Jose Rizal was part Chinese, the late Chief Justice Claudio
Teehankee was part Chinese, and of course our own President, Corazon Aquino is also part
Chinese. Verily, some Filipinos of whom we are proud were ethnically more Chinese than the private
respondent.
Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest wealth. Citizenship is a special privilege which
one must forever cherish.
However, in order to truly revere this treasure of citizenship, we do not, on the basis of too harsh an
interpretation, have to unreasonably deny it to those who qualify to share in its richness.
Under the overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our antiquated naturalization laws only the very
affluent backed by influential patrons, who were willing to suffer the indignities of a lengthy,
sometimes humiliating, and often corrupt process of clearances by minor bureaucrats and whose
lawyers knew how to overcome so many technical traps of the judicial process were able to acquire
citizenship. It is time for the naturalization law to be revised to enable a more positive, affirmative,
and meaningful examination of an applicant's suitability to be a Filipino. A more humane, more
indubitable and less technical approach to citizenship problems is essential.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal is AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is declared a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996

JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.
G.R. No. 123755 June 28, 1996
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:p
The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who should be declared the
rightful governor of Sorsogon (i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in three successive
elections but who was twice declared by this Court to be disqualified to hold such office due to his
alien citizenship, and who now claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine citizenship thru
repatriation;
(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who claims that the votes cast in
favor of Frivaldo should be considered void; that the electorate should be deemed to have
intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured the most number of valid votes;
or
(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously was not voted directly to the
position of governor, but who according to prevailing jurisprudence should take over the said post
inasmuch as, by the ineligibility of Frivaldo, a "permanent vacancy in the contested office has
occurred"?
In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on repatriation, clarifies/reiterates/amplifies
existing jurisprudence on citizenship and elections, and upholds the superiority of substantial justice
over pure legalisms.
G.R. No. 123755
This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules of Court for certiorari and
preliminary injunction to review and annul a Resolution of the respondent Commission on Elections
(Comelec), First Division, 1 promulgated on December 19, 1995 2 and another Resolution of the
Comelec en banc promulgated February 23, 1996 3 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R.
Lee, another candidate, filed a petition 4 with the Comelec docketed as SPA No. 95-028 praying that

Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a
citizen of the Philippines", and that his Certificate of Candidacy be canceled. On May 1, 1995, the Second
Division of the Comelec promulgated a Resolution 5granting the petition with the following disposition 6:

WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that
respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for the Office of Governor of Sorsogon on the
ground that he is NOT a citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly, respondent's
certificate of candidacy is canceled.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995
elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections held on said date.
On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc 7 affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the Second
Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns and a Certificate
of Votes 8dated May 27, 1995 was issued showing the following votes obtained by the candidates for the
position of Governor of Sorsogon:
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060
Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440
Raul R. Lee 53,304
Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a (supplemental) petition 9 praying for his
proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.
In an order 10 dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition "only on June 29, 1995," the
Comelec en banc directed "the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose
of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon on
June 29, 1995 . . ." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June 30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of
Sorsogon.
On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition, 11 docketed as SPC No. 95-317,
praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He
alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the
Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on
Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted". As such, when "the said order (dated June 21,
1995) (of the Comelec) . . . was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the
evening, there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor . . ." In the
alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec, 12 the Vice-Governor - not Lee
- should occupy said position of governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed
Resolution 13 holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of votes," was not legally entitled
to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest number of
votes,
and . . . having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 725 . . . (is) qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon"; thus:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division), therefore RESOLVES

to GRANT the Petition.
Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the proclamation of Raul R. Lee
as Governor of Sorsogon is hereby ordered annulled, being contrary to law, he not
having garnered the highest number of votes to warrant his proclamation.
Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, the Provincial
Board of Canvassers is directed to immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the
completed canvass, proclaim petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo as the duly elected
Governor of Sorsogon having garnered the highest number of votes, and he having
reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 and, thus, qualified to hold the office of
Governor of Sorsogon.
Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), the
Clerk of the Commission is directed to notify His Excellency the President of the
Philippines, and the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
Sorsogon of this resolution immediately upon the due implementation thereof.
On December 26, 1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Comelec en
banc in its Resolution 14 promulgated on February 23, 1996. On February 26, 1996, the present petition
was filed. Acting on the prayer for a temporary restraining order, this Court issued on February 27, 1996 a
Resolution which inter alia directed the parties "to maintain the status quo prevailing prior to the filing of
this petition."
The Issues in G.R. No. 123755
Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand may briefly be capsulized in the following
propositions" 15:
First -- The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in form and substance to
warrant the exercise by the COMELEC of its jurisdiction with the result that, in effect,
the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and deciding said
petition;
Second -- The judicially declared disqualification of respondent was a continuing
condition and rendered him ineligible to run for, to be elected to and to hold the Office
of Governor;
Third -- The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid nor is the effect
thereof retroactive as to cure his ineligibility and qualify him to hold the Office of
Governor; and
Fourth -- Correctly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully supports the validity of
petitioner's proclamation as duly elected Governor of Sorsogon.
G.R. No. 120295
This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the respondent Comelec, the first two of which are
also at issue in G.R. No. 123755, as follows:

1. Resolution 16 of the Second Division, promulgated on May 1, 1995, disqualifying

Frivaldo from running for governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections "on the
ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines";
2. Resolution 17 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated on May 11, 1995; and
3. Resolution 18 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated also on May 11, 1995 suspending
the proclamation of, among others, Frivaldo.
The Facts and the Issue
The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R. No. 123755. However, Frivaldo
assails the above-mentioned resolutions on a different ground: that under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, which is reproduced hereinunder:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied.)
the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions because they were not rendered
"within the period allowed by law" i.e., "not later than fifteen days before the election."
Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec to act on the petition for
disqualification within the period of fifteen days prior to the election as provided by law is a
jurisdictional defect which renders the said Resolutions null and void.
By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 120295 and 123755 since they
are intimately related in their factual environment and are identical in the ultimate question
raised, viz., who should occupy the position of governor of the province of Sorsogon.
On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from the parties and required them thereafter to
file simultaneously their respective memoranda.
The Consolidated Issues
From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be restated as follows:
1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of citizenship
as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it be given
retroactive effect? If so, from when?
2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to
his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon?
3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-317
considering that said petition is not "a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo
warranto case"?

4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing
jurisprudence?
5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed
Resolutions, all of which prevented Frivaldo from assuming the governorship of Sorsogon,
considering that they were not rendered within the period referred to in Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, viz., "not later than fifteen days before the elections"?
The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation
The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota, the threshold legal issue in this
case. All the other matters raised are secondary to this.
The Local Government Code of 1991 19 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a qualification for
elective local officials, including that of provincial governor, thus:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the
case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or
sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for
at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read
and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member
of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of
the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at
least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.
xxx xxx xxx
Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court 20 as a non-citizen, it is therefore incumbent
upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he possesses the qualifications
prescribed under the said statute (R.A. 7160).
Under Philippine law, 21 citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by
repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 104654 22 and during the oral argument in this case that
he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of Congress, but that the bill allowing him to do so "failed to
materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of the House of Representatives" due,
according to him, to the "maneuvers of his political rivals." In the same case, his attempt
at naturalization was rejected by this Court because of jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects.
Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected governor by the
electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000 in 1992, and
20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Raul Lee. Twice, he was judicially declared a non-Filipino
and thus twice disqualified from holding and discharging his popular mandate. Now, he comes to us
a third time, with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon and a favorable decision from the
Commission on Elections to boot. Moreover, he now boasts of having successfully passed through
the third and last mode of reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No. 725, with no less
than the Solicitor General himself, who was the prime opposing counsel in the previous cases he
lost, this time, as counsel for co-respondent Comelec, arguing the validity of his cause (in addition to
his able private counsel Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath of allegiance under the

provisions of said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is not disputed. Hence, he insists that he -not Lee -- should have been proclaimed as the duly-elected governor of Sorsogon when the
Provincial Board of Canvassers met at 8:30 p.m. on the said date since, clearly and unquestionably,
he garnered the highest number of votes in the elections and since at that time, he already
reacquired his citizenship.
En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is tainted with serious defects, which we shall
now discuss in seriatim.
First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed", asserting that "then President
Corazon Aquino exercising legislative powers under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Constitution, forbade the grant of citizenship by Presidential Decree or Executive Issuances as the
same poses a serious and contentious issue of policy which the present government, in the exercise
of prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the judgment of the first Congress under the
1987 Constitution", adding that in her memorandum dated March 27, 1987 to the members of the
Special Committee on Naturalization constituted for purposes of Presidential Decree No. 725,
President Aquino directed them "to cease and desist from undertaking any and all proceedings
within your functional area of responsibility as defined under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 270
dated April 11, 1975, as amended." 23
This memorandum dated March 27, 1987 24 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed
as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only by subsequent
ones 25 and a repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious that no express repeal was made because
then President Aquino in her memorandum -- based on the copy furnished us by Lee -- did not
categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being repealed or was being rendered without any
legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention it specifically by its number or text. On the other hand, it is a
basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not
be allowed "unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clearly
repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist". 26
The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a legislative enactment, for
not every pronouncement of the Chief Executive even under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Constitution can nor should be regarded as an exercise of her law-making powers. At best, it could
be treated as an executive policy addressed to the Special Committee to halt the acceptance and
processing of applications for repatriation pending whatever "judgment the first Congress under the
1987 Constitution" might make. In other words, the former President did not repeal P.D. 725 but left it
to the first Congress -- once created -- to deal with the matter. If she had intended to repeal such
law, she should have unequivocally said so instead of referring the matter to Congress. The fact is
she carefully couched her presidential issuance in terms that clearly indicated the intention of "the
present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion" to leave the matter of repeal
to the new Congress. Any other interpretation of the said Presidential Memorandum, such as is now
being proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upon statutory
construction but on common sense as well.
Second, Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularities flawed the repatriation proceedings,"
asserting that Frivaldo's application therefor was "filed on June 29, 1995 . . . (and) was approved in
just one day or on June 30, 1995 . . .", which "prevented a judicious review and evaluation of the
merits thereof." Frivaldo counters that he filed his application for repatriation with the Office of the
President in Malacaang Palace on August 17, 1994. This is confirmed by the Solicitor General.
However, the Special Committee was reactivated only on June 8, 1995, when presumably the said
Committee started processing his application. On June 29, 1995, he filled up and re-submitted the

FORM that the Committee required. Under these circumstances, it could not be said that there was
"indecent haste" in the processing of his application.
Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of the Special Committee on Naturalization was
intended solely for the personal interest of respondent," 27 the Solicitor General explained during the
oral argument on March 19, 1996 that such allegation is simply baseless as there were many others who
applied and were considered for repatriation, a list of whom was submitted by him to this Court, through a
Manifestation 28 filed on April 3, 1996.
On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty and the presumption of legality in the repatriation of Frivaldo have not
been successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that the proceedings were speeded up is by itself
not a ground to conclude that such proceedings were necessarily tainted. After all, the requirements
of repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to comply with, nor are they tedious and
cumbersome. In fact, P.D.
725 29 itself requires very little of an applicant, and even the rules and regulations to implement the said
decree were left to the Special Committee to promulgate. This is not unusual since, unlike in
naturalization where an alien covets a first-timeentry into Philippine political life, in repatriation the
applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship. In
the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a natural-born citizen who openly and faithfully served his
country and his province prior to his naturalization in the United States -- a naturalization he insists was
made necessary only to escape the iron clutches of a dictatorship he abhorred and could not in
conscience embrace -- and who, after the fall of the dictator and the re-establishment of democratic
space, wasted no time in returning to his country of birth to offer once more his talent and services to his
people.
So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by the Solicitor General, were granted
repatriation argues convincingly and conclusively against the existence of favoritism vehemently
posited by Raul Lee. At any rate, any contest on the legality of Frivaldo's repatriation should have
been pursued before the Committee itself, and, failing there, in the Office of the President, pursuant
to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Third, Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it could
only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas the citizenship qualification prescribed by
the Local Government Code "must exist on the date of his election, if not when the certificate of
candidacy is filed," citing our decision in G.R. 104654 30 which held that "both the Local Government
Code and the Constitution require that only Philippine citizens can run and be elected to public office."
Obviously, however, this was a mere obiter as the only issue in said case was whether Frivaldo's
naturalization was valid or not -- and NOT the effective date thereof. Since the Court held his
naturalization to be invalid, then the issue of when an aspirant for public office should be a citizen was
NOT resolved at all by the Court. Which question we shall now directly rule on.
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he
intends to be elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election;

* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor . . . must be at least twentythree (23) years of age on election day.
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the
candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one
year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three years of
age on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, 31 and the
purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing
allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an
official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law
mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995 -- the
very day 32 the term of office of governor (and other elective officials) began -- he was therefore already
qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof
as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the
liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with
the purpose for which such law was enacted. So too, even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal)
construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of "Qualifications"
of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS", not of candidates. Why then should such qualification be required at the time
of election or at the time of the filing of the certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such
qualifications -- unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and residence -- should
thus be possessed when the "elective [or elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is
proclaimed and at the start of his term -- in this case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing this Court's ruling
in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons, 33 if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to
ensure that our people and country do not end up being governed by aliens,i.e., persons owing allegiance
to another nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the
citizenship qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his
term.
But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral argument 34 to the effect
that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate (or for that matter the
elected official) registered as a voter. After all, Section 39, apart from requiring the official to be a citizen,
also specifies as another item of qualification, that he be a "registered voter". And, under the law 35 a
"voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo could not have been a voter -- much
less a validly registered one -- if he was not a citizen at the time of such registration.
The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If the law
intended thecitizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the requirement
of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The
law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a
qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. It also
stands to reason that the voter requirement was included as another qualification (aside from
"citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the official be registered as a
voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: "a registered voter in
the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he intends to be elected." It should be
emphasized that the Local Government Code requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It
does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registration -- not the actual voting -- is the core of this

"qualification". In other words, the law's purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the
prospective official is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern -- and not anywhere else.
Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasized -- and Lee has not disputed -- that he "was
and is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and his registration as a voter has been sustained as valid by
judicial declaration . . . In fact, he cast his vote in his precinct on May 8, 1995." 36
So too, during the oral argument, his counsel steadfastly maintained that "Mr. Frivaldo has always
been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987, 1988, 1992, then he voted again in
1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was questioned, but the court dismissed (sic) his eligibility as a
voter and he was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the previous elections including on May 8,
1995." 37
It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province where he intended to be elected.
There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the date of
proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate of candidacy.
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code 38 gives any voter, presumably including the defeated
candidate, the opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a candidate. This is the only
provision of the Code that authorizes a remedy on how to contest before the Comelec an incumbent's
ineligibility arising from failure to meet the qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local
Government Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be availed of "within ten days after proclamation"
of the winning candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the issue of ineligibility may be taken
cognizance of by the Commission. And since, at the very moment of Lee's proclamation (8:30 p.m., June
30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo was already and indubitably a citizen, having taken his oath of allegiance
earlier in the afternoon of the same day, then he should have been the candidate proclaimed as he
unquestionably garnered the highest number of votes in the immediately preceding elections and such
oath had already cured his previous "judicially-declared" alienage. Hence, at such time, he was no longer
ineligible.
But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo
RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994.
It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, 39 "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless
the contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions 40 to this general rule, such as when the statute
is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
According to Tolentino, 41 curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and irregularities,
thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or private deeds and
contracts which otherwise would not produce their intended consequences by reason of some statutory
disability or failure to comply with some technical requirement. They operate on conditions already
existing, and are necessarily retroactive in operation. Agpalo, 42 on the other hand, says that curative
statutes are
"healing acts . . . curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations . . . (and) are
intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain evils. . . . By their very
nature, curative statutes are retroactive . . . (and) reach back to past events to correct errors or
irregularities and to render valid and effective attempted acts which would be otherwise ineffective for the
purpose the parties intended."
On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or modes of
procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of

the remedy or confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal meaning of a
retrospective law, nor within the general rule against the retrospective operation of statutes. 43
A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides for a new
remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D. 725 expressly recognizes
the plight of "many Filipino women (who) had lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens"
and who could not, under the existing law (C.A. No. 63, as amended) avail of repatriation until "after
the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital status" and who could neither be
benefitted by the 1973 Constitution's new provision allowing "a Filipino woman who marries an alien
to retain her Philippine citizenship . . ." because "such provision of the new Constitution does not
apply to Filipino women who had married aliens before said constitution took effect." Thus, P.D. 725
granted a new right to these women -- the right to re-acquire Filipino citizenship even during their
marital coverture, which right did not exist prior to P.D. 725. On the other hand, said statute also
provided a new remedyand a new right in favor of other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their
Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship", because prior to the
promulgation of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and
cumbersome process of naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire
their Philippine citizenship under the simplified procedure of repatriation.
The Solicitor General 44 argues:
By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP vs. CA, 96 SCRA 342),
since they are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws (Del
Castillo vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, 96 Phil. 119) and curb certain
evils (Santos vs. Duata, 14 SCRA 1041).
In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing
naturalization law, specifically C.A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino women are
allowed to repatriate only upon the death of their husbands, and natural-born
Filipinos who lost their citizenship by naturalization and other causes faced the
difficulty of undergoing the rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for reacquisition of Filipino
citizenship by naturalization.
Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the aforementioned legal
aberrations and thus its provisions are considered essentially remedial and curative.
In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the preamble, it is unarguable that the
legislative intent was precisely to give the statute retroactive operation. "(A) retrospective operation
is given to a statute or amendment where the intent that it should so operate clearly appears from a
consideration of the act as a whole, or from the terms thereof." 45 It is obvious to the Court that the
statute was meant to "reach back" to those persons, events and transactions not otherwise covered by
prevailing law and jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held that citizenship is a political and civil
right equally as important as the freedom of speech, liberty of abode, the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures and other guarantees enshrined in the Bill of Rights, therefore the legislative intent
to give retrospective operation to P.D. 725 must be given the fullest effect possible. "(I)t has been said
that a remedial statute must be so construed as to make it effect the evident purpose for which it was
enacted, so that if the reason of the statute extends to past transactions, as well as to those in the future,
then it will be so applied although the statute does not in terms so direct, unless to do so would impair
some vested right or violate some constitutional guaranty." 46 This is all the more true of P.D. 725, which
did not specify any restrictions on or delimit or qualify the right of repatriation granted therein.

At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the retroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit Frivaldo
considering that said law was enacted on June 5, 1975, while Frivaldo lost his Filipino citizenship
much later, on January 20, 1983, and applied for repatriation even later, on August 17, 1994?
While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became an American
citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be given retroactive effect, but
even the repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be deemed to have
retroacted to the date of his application therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason for this is simply that
if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority that the law should apply to past events
-- i.e., situations and transactions existing even before the law came into being -- in order to benefit
the greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the
constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the fullest
effect and expression, then there is all the more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or
retrospective manner to situations, events and transactions subsequent to the passage of such law.
That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and should be made to take effect
as of date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or
would show a contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that
damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result from giving retroactivity
to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result the impairment of any contractual
obligation, disturbance of any vested right or breach of some constitutional guaranty.
Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal
interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality should now be
deemed mooted by his repatriation.
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice to applicants.
If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee decides not to act, i.e.,
to delay the processing of applications for any substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos
who may be stateless, as Frivaldo -- having already renounced his American citizenship -- was, may
be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This should not be. In case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the law-making body intended right and
justice to prevail. 47
And as experience will show, the Special Committee was able to process, act upon and grant
applications for repatriation within relatively short spans of time after the same were filed. 48 The fact
that such interregna were relatively insignificant minimizes the likelihood of prejudice to the government
as a result of giving retroactivity to repatriation. Besides, to the mind of the Court, direct prejudice to the
government is possible only where a person's repatriation has the effect of wiping out a liability of his to
the government arising in connection with or as a result of his being an alien, and accruing only during the
interregnum between application and approval, a situation that is not present in the instant case.
And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people, already twice frustrated, should now
prevail. Under the circumstances, there is nothing unjust or iniquitous in treating Frivaldo's
repatriation as having become effective as of the date of his application, i.e., on August 17, 1994.
This being so, all questions about his possession of the nationality qualification -- whether at the
date of proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date of election (May 8, 1995) or date of filing his
certificate of candidacy (March 20, 1995) would become moot.
Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a registered voter would also be
deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as having been repatriated -- i.e., his Filipino
citizenship restored -- as of August 17, 1994, his previous registration as a voter is likewise deemed
validated as of said date.

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity of
his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local
Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective local position?" 49 We answer
this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the
time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his
Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship
-- long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim -- when he abandoned and
renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship." 50
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995: 51
By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship
when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for
Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an
oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government."
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of 1995
have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the
Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness
or
abuse. 52
The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship
a Continuing Disqualification?
Lee contends that the May 1, 1995 Resolution 53 of the Comelec Second Division in SPA No. 95-028 as
affirmed in toto by Comelec En Banc in its Resolution of May 11, 1995 "became final and executory after
five (5) days or on May 17, 1995, no restraining order having been issued by this Honorable
Court. 54 Hence, before Lee "was proclaimed as the elected governor on June 30, 1995, there was already
a final and executory judgment disqualifying" Frivaldo. Lee adds that this Court's two rulings (which
Frivaldo now concedes were legally "correct") declaring Frivaldo an alien have also become final and
executory way before the 1995 elections, and these "judicial pronouncements of his political status as an
American citizen absolutely and for all time disqualified (him) from running for, and holding any public
office in the Philippines."
We do not agree.
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in
connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in connection with the 1992
elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is final and can no longer be changed. In the
words of the respondent Commission (Second Division) in its assailed Resolution: 55
The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decided that Frivaldo was
not a Filipino citizen and thus disqualified for the purpose of the 1988 and 1992
elections. However, there is no record of any "final judgment" of the disqualification of
Frivaldo as a candidate for the May 8, 1995 elections. What the Commission said in
its Order of June 21, 1995 (implemented on June 30, 1995), directing the
proclamation of Raul R. Lee, was that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen "having
been declared by the Supreme Court in its Order dated March 25, 1995, not a citizen
of the Philippines." This declaration of the Supreme Court, however, was in
connection with the 1992 elections.

Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's future
status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his
citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose. Hence, in Lee
vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 56 we held:
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or
administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority
decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered res judicata, hence
it has to be threshed out again and again, as the occasion demands.
The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction
Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317
Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition in SPC No. 95317 because the only "possible types of proceedings that may be entertained by the Comelec are a
pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case". Again, Lee reminds us that he
was proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but that Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95-317 questioning his (Lee's)
proclamation only on July 6, 1995 -- "beyond the 5-day reglementary period." Hence, according to
him, Frivaldo's "recourse was to file either an election protest or a quo warranto action."
This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution 57 has given the Comelec ample power to "exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all
elective . . . provincial . . . officials." Instead of dwelling at length on the various petitions that Comelec, in
the exercise of its constitutional prerogatives, may entertain, suffice it to say that this Court has invariably
recognized the Commission's authority to hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations -- of
which SPC No. 95-317 obviously is one. 58 Thus, in Mentang vs.COMELEC, 59 we ruled:
The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption of office, a preproclamation controversy is no longer viable. Indeed, we are aware of cases holding
that pre-proclamation controversies may no longer be entertained by the COMELEC
after the winning candidate has been proclaimed. (citing Gallardo vs. Rimando, 187
SCRA 463; Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170 SCRA 513; Casimiro vs. COMELEC, 171
SCRA 468.) This rule, however, is premised on an assumption that the proclamation
is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot
deprive the COMELEC of the power to make such declaration of nullity.
(citing Aguam vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883; Agbayani vs. COMELEC, 186 SCRA
484.)
The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation must "be done within ten (10)
days following the proclamation." Inasmuch as Frivaldo's petition was filed only six (6) days after
Lee's proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction over the
same.
The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation Valid?
Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him for the following reasons:
First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC, 60 "the fact remains that he (Lee) was not the
choice of the sovereign will," and in Aquino vs. COMELEC, 61 Lee is "a second placer, . . . just that, a
second placer."

In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorship on the pronouncement of this Court in the
aforesaid Labo 62 case, as follows:
The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in law of a
candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In
such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their
votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in
which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be
deemed elected.
But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus:
But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been shown,
and none was alleged, that petitioner Labo was notoriously known as an ineligible
candidate, much less the electorate as having known of such fact. On the contrary,
petitioner Labo was even allowed by no less than the Comelec itself in its resolution
dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office of the city Payor as its resolution dated
May 9, 1992 denying due course to petitioner Labo's certificate of candidacy had not
yet become final and subject to the final outcome of this case.
The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee, is the ruling appropriate in this case
because Frivaldo was in 1995 in an identical situation as Labo was in 1992 when the Comelec's
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was not yet final on election day as there was in both
cases a pending motion for reconsideration, for which reason Comelec issued an (omnibus)
resolution declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo in 1992) and several others can still be voted for in the
May 8, 1995 election, as in fact, he was.
Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence presented to show that the electorate of
Sorsogon was "fully aware in fact and in law" of Frivaldo's alleged disqualification as to "bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety;" in other words, that the voters intentionally wasted their
ballots knowing that, in spite of their voting for him, he was ineligible. If Labo has any relevance at
all, it is that the vice-governor -- and not Lee -- should be pro- claimed, since in losing the election,
Lee was, to paraphrase Labo again, "obviously not the choice of the people" of Sorsogon. This is the
emphatic teaching of Labo:
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not
entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be
declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the
office.
Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably reacquired his citizenship and
inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995 elections, he -- not Lee -- should
be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation was patently erroneous and should now be corrected.
The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the
Election Code Mandatory?
In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the assailed Resolution of the Comelec (Second Division)
dated May 1, 1995 and the confirmatory en banc Resolution of May 11, 1995 disqualifying him for
want of citizenship should be annulled because they were rendered beyond the fifteen (15) day
period prescribed by Section 78, of the Omnibus Election Code which reads as follows:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A

verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided after notice and hearing, not
later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied.)
This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these resolutions are deemed superseded by the
subsequent ones issued by the Commission (First Division) on December 19, 1995, affirmed en
banc 63 on February 23, 1996; which both upheld his election. At any rate, it is obvious that Section 78 is
merely directory as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the Commission to try and decide petitions for
disqualifications even after the elections, thus:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. -- Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and upon motion of the complainant
or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
(emphasis supplied)
Refutation of
Mr. Justice Davide's Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. argues that President
Aquino's memorandum dated March 27, 1987 should be viewed as a suspension (not a repeal, as
urged by Lee) of P.D. 725. But whether it decrees a suspension or a repeal is a purely academic
distinction because the said issuance is not a statute that can amend or abrogate an existing law.
The existence and subsistence of P.D. 725 were recognized in the first Frivaldo case; 64 viz., "(u)nder
CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and P.D. No. 725, Philippine citizenship maybe reacquired by . . .
repatriation". He also contends that by allowing Frivaldo to register and to remain as a registered voter,
the Comelec and in effect this Court abetted a "mockery" of our two previous judgments declaring him a
non-citizen. We do not see such abetting or mockery. The retroactivity of his repatriation, as discussed
earlier, legally cured whatever defects there may have been in his registration as a voter for the purpose
of the 1995 elections. Such retroactivity did not change his disqualifications in 1988 and 1992, which were
the subjects of such previous rulings.
Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is not the sole remedy to question the ineligibility
of a candidate, citing the Comelec's authority under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
allowing the denial of a certificate of candidacy on the ground of a false material representation
therein as required by Section 74. Citing Loong, he then states his disagreement with our holding
that Section 78 is merely directory. We really have no quarrel. Our point is that Frivaldo was in error
in his claim in G.R. No. 120295 that the Comelec Resolutions promulgated on May 1, 1995 and May
11, 1995 were invalid because they were issued "not later than fifteen days before the election" as
prescribed by Section 78. In dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 120295, we hold that the Comelec
did not commit grave abuse of discretion because "Section 6 of R.A. 6646 authorizes the Comelec to
try and decide disqualifications even after the elections." In spite of his disagreement with us on this
point, i.e., that Section 78 "is merely directory", we note that just like us, Mr. Justice Davide
nonetheless votes to "DISMISS G.R. No. 120295". One other point. Loong, as quoted in the dissent,

teaches that a petition to deny due course under Section 78 must be filed within the 25-day period
prescribed therein. The present case however deals with the period during which the Comelec
may decide such petition. And we hold that it may be decided even after thefifteen day period
mentioned in Section 78. Here, we rule that a decision promulgated by the Comelec even after the
elections is valid but Loong held that a petition filed beyond the 25-day period is out of time. There is
no inconsistency nor conflict.
Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's holding that, given the unique factual
circumstances of Frivaldo, repatriation may be given retroactive effect. He argues that such
retroactivity "dilutes" our holding in the first Frivaldo case. But the first (and even the second
Frivaldo) decision did not directly involve repatriation as a mode of acquiring citizenship. If we may
repeat, there is no question that Frivaldo was not a Filipino for purposes of determining his
qualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections. That is settled. But his supervening repatriation has
changed his political status -- not in 1988 or 1992, but only in the 1995 elections.
Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that Frivaldo was stateless prior to his repatriation,
saying that "informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose American citizenship".
Since our courts are charged only with the duty of determining who are Philippine nationals, we
cannot rule on the legal question of who are or who are not Americans. It is basic in international law
that a State determines ONLY those who are its own citizens -- not who are the citizens of other
countries. 65 The issue here is: the Comelec made a finding of fact that Frivaldo was stateless and such
finding has not been shown by Lee to be arbitrary or whimsical. Thus, following settled case law, such
finding is binding and final.
The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by chasmic margins to Frivaldo in all three
previous elections, should be declared winner because "Frivaldo's ineligibility for being an American
was publicly known". First, there is absolutely no empirical evidence for such "public" knowledge.
Second, even if there is, such knowledge can be true post facto only of the last two previous
elections. Third, even the Comelec and now this Court were/are still deliberating on his nationality
before, during and after the 1995 elections. How then can there be such "public" knowledge?
Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the Local Government Code refers to the qualifications
of electivelocal officials, i.e., candidates, and not elected officials, and that the citizenship
qualification [under par. (a) of that section] must be possessed by candidates, not merely at the
commencement of the term, but by election day at the latest. We see it differently. Section 39, par.
(a) thereof speaks of "elective local official" while par. (b) to (f) refer to "candidates". If the
qualifications under par. (a) were intended to apply to "candidates" and not elected officials, the
legislature would have said so, instead of differentiating par. (a) from the rest of the paragraphs.
Secondly, if Congress had meant that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at election
day or prior thereto, it would have specifically stated such detail, the same way it did in pars. (b) to (f)
far other qualifications of candidates for governor, mayor, etc.
Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactive effect to Frivaldo's repatriation on the
ground, among others, that the law specifically provides that it is only after taking the oath of
allegiance that applicants shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. We do not
question what the provision states. We hold however that the provision should be understood
thus: that after taking the oath of allegiance the applicant is deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship, which reacquisition (or repatriation) is deemed for all purposes and intents to have
retroacted to the date of his application therefor.
In any event, our "so too" argument regarding the literal meaning of the word "elective" in reference
to Section 39 of the Local Authority Code, as well as regarding Mr. Justice Davide's thesis that the

very wordings of P.D. 725 suggest non-retroactivity, were already taken up rather extensively earlier
in this Decision.
Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: "This Court must be the first to uphold the Rule
of Law." We agree -- we must all follow the rule of law. But that is NOT the issue here. The issue
is how should the law be interpreted and applied in this case so it can be followed, so it can rule!
At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception of how to
interpret and apply laws relating to elections: literal or liberal; the letter or the spirit, the naked
provision or its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice; in isolation or in the context of
social conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the voters' obvious choice. In applying election
laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little
understood legalisms. Indeed, to inflict a thrice rejected candidate upon the electorate of Sorsogon
would constitute unmitigated judicial tyranny and an unacceptable assault upon this Court's
conscience.
EPILOGUE
In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be possessed
by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term of office
to which he has been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect up to the
present, not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's
repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly granted and thus valid and effective. Moreover,
by reason of the remedial or curative nature of the law granting him a new right to resume his
political status and the legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of having been
forced to give up his citizenship and political aspiration as his means of escaping a regime he
abhorred, his repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of the date of his application therefor,
during the pendency of which he was stateless, he having given up his U.S. nationality. Thus, in
contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start of the
term of office of governor, and should have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his
reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is
deemed to have been validated as of said date as well. The foregoing, of course, are precisely
consistent with our holding that lack of the citizenship requirement is not a continuing disability or
disqualification to run for and hold public office. And once again, we emphasize herein our previous
rulings recognizing the Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for
annulment of proclamations.
This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our country to
give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people, 66 for in case of doubt, political laws must be
interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Otherwise
stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way of the sovereign will. Consistently, we
have held:
. . . (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the
will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere
technical objections (citations omitted). 67
The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection, defense and refuge, in
deference to the popular will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving
effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving
the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to
resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound

public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To
successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate
that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic 68 to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such
ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people, would ultimately create greater
prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so
zealously protect and promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably failed.
In Frivaldo's case. it would have been technically easy to find fault with his cause. The Court could
have refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of his repatriation and hold him still ineligible due to
his failure to show his citizenship at the time he registered as a voter before the 1995 elections. Or, it
could have disputed the factual findings of the Comelec that he was stateless at the time of
repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual citizenship as a disqualification "from running for any
elective local position." But the real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over
patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of
law as a brick in the ultimate development of the social edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against
and eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in order
to evoke substantial justice in the larger social context consistent with Frivaldo's unique situation
approximating venerability in Philippine political life. Concededly, he sought American citizenship
only to escape the clutches of the dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt
about his loyalty and dedication to this country. At the first opportunity, he returned to this land, and
sought to serve his people once more. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three
times. He took an oath of allegiance to this Republic every time he filed his certificate of candidacy
and during his failed naturalization bid. And let it not be overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and
sheer determination to re-assume his nationality of birth despite several legal set-backs speak more
loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal technicality, of his consuming intention and burning
desire to re-embrace his native Philippines even now at the ripe old age of 81 years. Such loyalty to
and love of country as well as nobility of purpose cannot be lost on this Court of justice and equity.
Mortals of lesser mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo was assured of a life of ease and
plenty as a citizen of the most powerful country in the world. But he opted, nay, single-mindedly
insisted on returning to and serving once more his struggling but beloved land of birth. He therefore
deserves every liberal interpretation of the law which can be applied in his favor. And in the final
analysis, over and above Frivaldo himself, the indomitable people of Sorsogon most certainly
deserve to be governed by a leader of their overwhelming choice.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing:
(1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of the
respondent Commission are AFFIRMED.
(2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for being moot and academic. In any event,
it has no merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-6379

September 29, 1954

In the matter of the petition of WILFRED UYTENGSU to be admitted a citizen of the Philippine.
WILFRED UYTENGSU, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
Manuel A. Zosa for appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Isidro C. Borromeo for appellant.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an appeal taken by the Solicitor General from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, granting the application of Wilfred Uytengsu, for naturalization as citizen of the Philippines.
The main facts are not disputed. Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents, in Dumaguete,
Negros Oriental on October 6, 1927. He began his primary education at the Saint Theresa's College
in said municipality Subsequently, he attended the Little Flower of Jesus Academy, then the San
Carlos College and, still later the Siliman University all in the same locality where he completed
the secondary course. Early in 1946, he studied, for one semester, in the Mapua Institute of
Technology, in Manila. Soon after, he went to the United States, where, from 1947 to 1950, he was
enrolled in the Leland Stanford Junior University, in California, and was graduated, in 1950, with the
degree of Bachelor of Science. In April of the same year he returned to the Philippines for four (4)
months vacation. Then, to be exact, on July 15, 1950, his present application for naturalization was
filed. Forthwith, he returned to the United States and took a post-graduate course, in chemical
engineering, in another educational institution, in Fort Wayne, Indiana. He finished this course in July
1951; but did not return to the Philippines until October 13, 1951. Hence, the hearing of the case,
originally scheduled to take place on July 12, 1951, had to be postponed on motion of counsel for
the petitioner.
The only question for the determination in this appeal is whether or not the application for
naturalization may be granted, notwithstanding the fact that petitioner left the Philippines
immediately after the filing of his petition and did not return until several months after the first date
set for the hearing thereof. The Court of First Instance of Cebu decided this question in the
affirmative and accordingly rendered judgment for the petitioner. The Solicitor General, who
maintains the negative, has appealed from said judgment.
Section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 reads as follows:
Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship shall file with the competent court, a
petition in triplicate, accompanied by two photographs of the petitioner, setting forth his name
and surname, his present and former place of residence; his occupation; the place and date
of his birth; whether single or married and if the father of children, the name, age birthplace
and residence of the wife and of each of the children; the approximate date of his arrival in
the Philippines, the name of the port of debarkation, and if he remembers it, the name of the
ship on which he came; a declaration that he has the qualifications required by this Act,
specifying the same, and that he is not disqualified for naturalization under the provision of
this Act; that he has complied with the requirements of section five of this Act, and that he
will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up to the
time of his admission to Philippine citizenship ..." (Emphasis supplied.)
In conformity with this provision, petitioner stated in paragraph 13 of his application:

. . . I will reside continuously in the Philippine from the date of the filing of my petition up to
the time of my admission to Philippine citizenship. (Record on Appeal, page 3.)
Petitioner contends, and the lower court held, that the word "residence", as used in the aforesaid
provision of the Naturalization Law, is synonymous with domicile, which, once acquired, is not lost by
physical absence, until another domicile is obtained, and that, from 1946 to 1951, he continued to be
domiciled in, and hence a resident of the Philippines, his purpose in staying in the United States, at
that time, being merely to study therein.
It should be noted that to become a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization, one must reside
therein for not less than 10 years, except in some special cases, in which 5 years of residence is
sufficient (sections 2 and 3, Commonwealth Act No. 473). Pursuant to the provision above quoted,
he must, also, file an application stating therein, among other things, that he "has the qualifications
required" by law. Inasmuch as these qualifications include the residence requirement already
referred to, it follows that the applicant must prove that he is a residence of the Philippines at the
time, not only of the filing of the application, but, also, of its hearing. If the residence thus required is
the actual or constructive permanent home, otherwise known as legal residence or domicile, then
the applicant must be domiciled in the Philippines on both dates. Consequently, when section 7 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473 imposes upon the applicant the duty to state in his sworn application
"that he will reside continuously in the Philippines" in the intervening period, it can not refer merely to
the need of an uninterrupted domicile or legal residence, irrespective of actual residence, for said
legal residence or domicile is obligatory under the law, even in the absence of the requirement
contained in said clause, and, it is well settled that, whenever possible, a legal provision must not be
so construed as to be a useless surplusage, and, accordingly, meaningless, in the sense of adding
nothing to the law or having no effect whatsoever thereon. This consequences may be avoided only
by construing the clause in question as demanding actual residence in the Philippines from the filing
of the petition for naturalization to its determination by the court.
Indeed, although the words "residence" and "domicile" are often used interchangeably, each has, in
strict legal parlance, a meaning distinct and different from that of the other.
xxx

xxx

xxx

. . . There is a decided preponderance of authority to the effect that residence and domicile
are notsynonymous in connection with citizenship, jurisdiction, limitations, school privileges,
probate and succession.
. . . the greater or less degree of permanency contemplated or intended furnishes a clue to
the sometimes shadowy distinction between residence and domicile. To be a resident one
must be physically present in that place for a longer or shorter period of time. "The essential
distinction between residence and domicile is this: the first involves the intent to leave when
the purpose for which he has taken up his abode ceases; the other has no such intent, the
abiding is animo manendi. One may seek a place for purposes of pleasure, of business, or of
health. If his intent be to remain it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as
his purpose is accomplished, it is his residence. Perhaps the most satisfactory definition is
that one is a resident of a place from which his departure is in indefinite as to time, definite
as to purpose; and for this purpose he has made the place his temporary home.
For many legal purposes there is a clear distinction between "residence" and "domicile". A
person may hold an office or may have business or employment or other affair which
requires him to reside at a particular place. His intention is to remain there while the office or
business or employment or other concern continues; but he has no purpose to remain

beyond the time the interest exists which determines his place of abode. Domicile is
characterized by the animus manendi. . . . .
Residence and domicile are not to be held synonymous. Residence is an act. Domicile is an
act coupled with an intent. A man may have a residence in one state or country and his
domicile in another, and he may be a nonresident of the date of his domicile in the sense
that his place of actual residence is not there. Hence the great weight of authorities. rightly
so, as we think that a debtor, although his legal domicile is in the state, may reside or
remain out of it for so long a time and under such circumstances as to acquire so to speak,
an actual nonresidence within the meaning of the attachment statute.
Domicile is a much broader term than residence. A man may have his domicile in one state
and actually reside in another, or in a foreign country. If he has once had a residence in a
particular place and removed to another, but with the intention of returning after a certain
time, however long that may be, his domicile is at the former residence and his residence at
the place of his temporary habitation. Residence and habitation are generally regarded as
synonymous. A resident and an inhabitant mean the same thing. A person resident is defined
to be one "dwelling and having his abode in any place," "an inhabitant," "one that resides in a
place." The question of domicile is not involved in determining whether a person is a resident
of a state or country. The compatability of domicile in one state with actual residence in
another has been asserted and acted upon in the law of attachment by the Courts of New
York, New Jersey, Maryland, North Carolina, Mississippi and Wisconsin.
Residence indicates permanency of occupation, distinct from lodging or boarding, or
temporary occupation. It does not include as much as domicile, which requires intention
combined with residence." ... "one may seek a place for purposes of pleasure, of business,
or of health. If his intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent be to leave as
soon as his purpose is accomplished, it is his residence."
The derivation of the two words "residence" and "domicile" fairly illustrates the distinction in
their meaning. A home (domus) is something more than a temporary place of remaining
(residendi) however long such stay may continue.
"While, generally speaking, domicile and residence mean one and the same thing, residence
combined with intention to remain, constitutes domicile while an established abode, fixed
permanently for a time [!] for business or other purposes, constitutes a residence, though
there may be an intent, existing all the while, to return to the true domicile."
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate the
place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a
residence in one place and a domicile in another." "Residence is not domicile, but domicile is
residence coupled with intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one
domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of
residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means
necessarily as, since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute
domicile. (Kennan on Residence and Domicile, pp. 26, 31-35)
Such distinction was, in effect, applied by this Court in the case of Domingo Dy, alias William Dy
Chinco vs. Republic of the Philippines (92 Phil., 278). The applicant in that case was born in Naga,
Camarines Sur, on May 19, 1915. "At the age of seven or eight, or in the year 1923, he went to
China, with his mother to study, and while he used to go back and forth from China to the Philippines

during school vacations, he did not come back to live permanently here until the year 1937." He
applied for naturalization in 1949. The question arose whether, having been domiciled in the
Philippines for over 30 years, he could be naturalized as a citizen of the Philippines, without a
previous declaration of intention, in view of section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 (as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 535), exempting from such requirement "those who have resided in the
Philippines continuously for a period of thirty years or more, before filing their application." This Court
decided the question in the negative, upon that ground that "actual and substantial residence within
the Philippines, not legal residence", or "domicile," alone, is essential to the enjoyment of the
benefits of said exemption.
If said actual and substantial residence not merely legal residence is necessary to dispense
with the filing of a declaration of intention, it is even more necessary during the period intervening
from the filing of the petition for naturalization to the date of the hearing thereof. In this connection, it
should be remembered that, upon the filing of said petition, the clerk of court is ordained by law to
publish it with a notice of the date of the hearing, which pursuant to section 7 of Act No. 2927, shall
not be less than 60 days from the date of the last publication. This period was extended to two (2)
months, by section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, and then to six (6) months, by Republic Act No.
530. The purpose of said period, particularly the extensions thereof of making a declaration of
intention at least one (1) year prior to the filing of the application is not difficult to determine. It is
nothing but to give the government sufficient time to check the truth of the statements made in said
declaration of intention, if any, and in the application for naturalization, especially the allegations
therein relative to the possession of the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by
law. Although data pertinent to said qualifications and disqualifications could generally be obtained
from persons familiar with the applicant, it is to be expected that the information thus secured would
consist, mainly, of conclusions and opinions of said individuals. Indeed, what else can they be
expected to say on whether the applicant has a good moral character; or whether he believes in the
principles underlying our Constitution; or whether his conduct has been proper and irreproachable;
or whether he is suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases, or has not
mingled socially with the Filipinos, or has not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the
customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipinos? Obviously, the Government would be in a better
position to draw its own conclusions on these matters if its officers could personally observe the
behavior of the applicant and confer with him if necessary.
In the case at bar, the Government has not had any chance whatsoever to thus keep a watchful eye
on petitioner herein. Immediately after the filing of his application and notwithstanding the explicit
promise therein made by him, under oath, to the effect that he would reside continuously in the
Philippines "from the date of the filing of his petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine
citizenship" he returned to the United States, where he stayed, continuously, until October 13,
1951. For this reason, when this case was called for hearing, for the first time, on July 12, 1951, his
counsel had to move for continuance. The adverse effect of such absence upon the opportunity
needed by the Government to observe petitioner herein was enhanced by the fact that, having been
born in the Philippines, where he finished his primary and secondary education, petitioner did not
have to file, and did not file, a declaration of intention prior to the filing of his petition for
naturalization. Thus, the Government had no previous notice of his intention to apply for
naturalization until the filing of his petition and could not make the requisite investigation prior
thereto.
Moreover, considering that petitioner had stayed in the United States, practically without interruption,
from early in 1947 to late in 1951, or for almost five (5) years, over three years and a half of which
preceded the filing of the application, it may be said that he resided as distinguished from
domiciled in the United States at that time and for over a year subsequently thereto. In fact, under
our laws, residence for six (6) months suffices to entitle a person to exercise the right of suffrage in a
given municipality (section 98), Republic Act No. 180); residence for one (1) year, to run for a seat in

the House of Representatives (sec. 7, Art. VI, of the Constitution); and residence for two (2) years, to
run for the Senate (sec. 4, Art. VI, of the Constitution). In some states of the United States, a
residence of several weeks or months is enough to establish a domicile for purposes of divorce.
Although in these cases the word "residence" has been construed, generally, to mean "domicile"
that it to say, actual residence, coupled with the intention to stay permanently, at least at the time of
the acquisition of said domicile it would seem apparent from the foregoing that the length of
petitioner's habitation in the United States amply justifies the conclusion that he was residing abroad
when his application for naturalization was filed and for fifteen (15) months thereafter, and that this is
precisely the situation sought to be forestalled by the law in enjoining the applicant to "reside
continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up to the time of his
admission to Philippine citizenship," unless this legal mandate which did not exist under Act No.
2927, and was advisedly inserted, therefore, by section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 were to
be regarded as pure verbiage, devoid, not only, of any force or effect, but, also, of any intent or
purpose, as it would, to our mind, turn out to be, were we to adopt petitioner's pretense.
1wphl.nt

In short, we are of the opinion that petitioner herein has not complied with the requirements of
section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, and with the aforementioned promise made by him in his
application, and, accordingly, is not entitled, in the present proceedings, to a judgment in his favor.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and the case dismissed, with costs
against the petitioner, but without prejudice to the filing of another application, if he so desires, in
conformity with law. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990

MATEO CAASI, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MERITO C. MIGUEL, respondents.
G.R. No. 84508 November 13, 1990
ANECITO CASCANTE petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MERITO C. MIGUEL, respondents.
Ireneo B. Orlino for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 88831 & 84508.
Montemayor & Montemayor Law Office for private respondent.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
These two cases were consolidated because they have the same objective; the disqualification
under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the private respondent, Merito Miguel for the
position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, to which he was elected in the local elections of
January 18, 1988, on the ground that he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the
United States of America, not of Bolinao.
G.R. No. 84508 is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated January 13, 1988 of the
COMELEC First Division, dismissing the three (3) petitions of Anecito Cascante (SPC No. 87-551),
Cederico Catabay (SPC No. 87-595) and Josefino C. Celeste (SPC No. 87-604), for the
disqualification of Merito C. Miguel filed prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988.
G.R. No. 88831, Mateo Caasi vs. Court of Appeals, et al., is a petition for review of the decision
dated June 21, 1989, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 dismissing the petition
for quo warranto filed by Mateo Caasi, a rival candidate for the position of municipal mayor of
Bolinao, Pangasinan, also to disqualify Merito Miguel on account of his being a green card holder.
In his answer to both petitions, Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the US
Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the United States. He
allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the United States
for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a permanent
resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on
February 2,1987 for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and the congressional elections on May
18,1987.
After hearing the consolidated petitions before it, the COMELEC with the exception of Commissioner
Anacleto Badoy, Jr., dismissed the petitions on the ground that:
The possession of a green card by the respondent (Miguel) does not sufficiently
establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines. On the contrary,
inspite (sic) of his green card, Respondent has sufficiently indicated his intention to
continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by his having voted in successive elections

in said municipality. As the respondent meets the basic requirements of citizenship

and residence for candidates to elective local officials (sic) as provided for in Section
42 of the Local Government Code, there is no legal obstacle to his candidacy for
mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. (p. 12, Rollo, G.R. No. 84508).
In his dissenting opinion, Commissioner Badoy, Jr. opined that:
A green card holder being a permanent resident of or an immigrant of a foreign
country and respondent having admitted that he is a green card holder, it is
incumbent upon him, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, to prove that
he "has waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant" to be qualified to
run for elected office. This respondent has not done. (p. 13, Rollo, G.R. No. 84508.)
In G.R. No. 88831, "Mateo Caasi, petitioner vs. Court of Appeals and Merito Miguel, respondents,"
the petitioner prays for a review of the decision dated June 21, 1989 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 14531 "Merito C. Miguel, petitioner vs. Hon. Artemio R. Corpus, etc., respondents,"
reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court which denied Miguel's motion to dismiss the
petition for quo warranto filed by Caasi. The Court of Appeals ordered the regional trial court to
dismiss and desist from further proceeding in the quo warranto case. The Court of Appeals held:
... it is pointless for the Regional Trial Court to hear the case questioning the
qualification of the petitioner as resident of the Philippines, after the COMELEC has
ruled that the petitioner meets the very basic requirements of citizenship and
residence for candidates to elective local officials (sic) and that there is no legal
obstacles (sic) for the candidacy of the petitioner, considering that decisions of the
Regional Trial Courts on quo warranto cases under the Election Code are appealable
to the COMELEC. (p. 22, Rollo, G.R. No. 88831.)
These two cases pose the twin issues of: (1) whether or not a green card is proof that the holder is a
permanent resident of the United States, and (2) whether respondent Miguel had waived his status
as a permanent resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A. prior to the local elections on January 18,
1988.
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution
allegiance at all times, and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his
citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his
tenure shall be dealt with by law.
In the same vein, but not quite, Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg.
881) provides:
SEC. 68. Disqualifications ... Any person who is a permanent resident of or an
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office
under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement
provided for in the election laws. (Sec. 25, 1971, EC).
In view of current rumor that a good number of elective and appointive public officials in the present
administration of President Corazon C. Aquino are holders of green cards in foreign countries, their

effect on the holders' right to hold elective public office in the Philippines is a question that excites
much interest in the outcome of this case.
In the case of Merito Miguel, the Court deems it significant that in the "Application for Immigrant Visa
and Alien Registration" (Optional Form No. 230, Department of State) which Miguel filled up in his
own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before his departure for the United
States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if
permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer was,"Permanently."
On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the United States Department of Justice
and Immigration and Registration Service to the respondent Merito C. Miguel identifies him in clear
bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. On the back of the card, the upper portion, the following
information is printed:
Alien Registration Receipt Card.
Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and
work in the United States." (Annex A pp. 189-190, Rollo of G.R. No.
84508.)
Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an
abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to the United States
merely to visit his children or his doctor there; he entered the limited States with the intention to have
there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa.
Based on that application of his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the requisite green card or
authority to reside there permanently.
Immigration is the removing into one place from another; the act of immigrating the
entering into a country with the intention of residing in it.
An immigrant is a person who removes into a country for the purpose of permanent
residence. As shown infra 84, however, statutes sometimes give a broader meaning
to the term "immigrant." (3 CJS 674.)
As a resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance to the U.S., the country
in which he resides (3 CJS 527). This is in return for the protection given to him during the period of
his residence therein.
Aliens reading in the limited States, while they are permitted to remain, are in general
entitled to the protection of the laws with regard to their rights of person and property
and to their civil and criminal responsibility.
In general, aliens residing in the United States, while they are permitted to remain
are entitled to the safeguards of the constitution with regard to their rights of person
and property and to their civil and criminal responsibility. Thus resident alien friends
are entitled to the benefit of the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal
constitution that no state shall deprive "any person" of life liberty, or property without
due process of law, or deny to any person the equal protection of the law, and the
protection of this amendment extends to the right to earn a livelihood by following the
ordinary occupations of life. So an alien is entitled to the protection of the provision of

the Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law. (3 CJS 529-530.)
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public officer or employee
who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during
his tenure shall be dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of
an immigrant of the United Statesbefore he was elected to public office, not "during his tenure" as
mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan.
The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), which
provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall
not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless such person has
waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.'
Did Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and presenting himself as a candidate
for mayor of Bolinao in the January 18,1988 local elections, waive his status as a permanent
resident or immigrant of the United States?
To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is
a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did
not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United
States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and
done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was
"disqualified to run for any elective office" (Sec. 68, Omnibus Election Code).
Respondent Merito Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he is a permanent
resident or immigrant it of the United States, but the records of this case are starkly bare of proof
that he had waived his status as such before he ran for election as municipal mayor of Bolinao on
January 18, 1988. We, therefore, hold that he was disqualified to become a candidate for that office.
The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not hard to find. Residence in the
municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least one (1) year at the time of filing his
certificate of candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must
possess (Sec. 42, Chap. 1, Title 2, Local Government Code). Miguel did not possess that
qualification because he was a permanent resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao
for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the Philippines in November
1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January 18, 1988.
In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents or immigrants
of a foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear policy of excluding from the
right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess dual loyalties and allegiance.
The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens who have cast their lot with our country "without
mental reservations or purpose of evasion." The assumption is that those who are resident aliens of
a foreign country are incapable of such entire devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland
for with one eye on their public duties here, they must keep another eye on their duties under the

laws of the foreign country of their choice in order to preserve their status as permanent residents
thereof.
Miguel insists that even though he applied for immigration and permanent residence in the United
States, he never really intended to live there permanently, for all that he wanted was a green card to
enable him to come and go to the U.S. with ease. In other words, he would have this Court believe
that he applied for immigration to the U.S. under false pretenses; that all this time he only had one
foot in the United States but kept his other foot in the Philippines. Even if that were true, this Court
will not allow itself to be a party to his duplicity by permitting him to benefit from it, and giving him the
best of both worlds so to speak.
Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of
a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S.
despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as
indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that
status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for
mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, our conclusion is that he was
disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void.
WHEREFORE, the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals in SPC Nos. 87551, 87-595 and 87-604, and CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 respectively, are hereby set aside. The election
of respondent Merito C. Miguel as municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan is hereby annulled.
Costs against the said respondent.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the
mischief at which it is aimed. 1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the
House of Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident
thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the election." 2 The mischief which
this provision reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution seeks to prevent is the possibility of a
"stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified
with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community." 3
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995,
providing the following information in item no. 8: 4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years
and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the
First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification" 5 with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional
requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the
Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on the
evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No. 3349772 6and in her Certificate
of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the
certificate of candidacy." 7
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the
entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate. 8 On the same day,
the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on
the ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing of the same having
already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy
should have been filed on or before the March 20, 1995 deadline. 9
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's
Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed
with the head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word
"seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest
misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her

domicile or residence.
she noted that:

11

Impugning respondent's motive in filing the petition seeking her disqualification,

When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as
a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner
immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that "she is
not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had
registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six month actual residence
therein, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa
from the First District to the Second District and pursued such a move up to the
Supreme Court, his purpose being to remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in
the congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other
Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation of another legislative district to remove the
town of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did
not pass the Senate. Having failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant
petition for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with
respondent for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte
in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995. 12
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2
to 1, 13 came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31,
1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely,
the validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline for filing
certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's compliance with the one year residency requirement, the
Second Division held:
Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word
"Seven" (months) was a result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake" on
her part and, therefore, an amendment should subsequently be allowed. She averred
that she thought that what was asked was her "actual and physical" presence in
Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in the First Legislative District, to which
she could have responded "since childhood." In an accompanying affidavit, she
stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First District, to which
she always intended to return whenever absent and which she has never
abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum, she tried to discredit petitioner's
theory of disqualification by alleging that she has been a resident of the First
Legislative District of Leyte since childhood, although she only became a resident of
the Municipality of Tolosa for seven months. She asserts that she has always been a
resident of Tacloban City, a component of the First District, before coming to the
Municipality of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa,
respondent announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City so that she can
be a candidate for the District. However, this intention was rebuffed when petitioner
wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident
of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never disputed this claim and instead implicitly
acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest
mistake." Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on
the basis of her Answer, she was quite aware of "residence of origin" which she

interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious why she did not cite Tacloban City in her
Certificate of Candidacy. Her explanation that she thought what was asked was her
actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because there is none
in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate of
Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be
elected immediately preceding the election." Thus, the explanation of respondent
fails to be persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation,
therefore, is devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made, she
cited the case ofAlialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent on
the case of Alialy is misplaced. The case only applies to the "inconsequential
deviations which cannot affect the result of the election, or deviations from provisions
intended primarily to secure timely and orderly conduct of elections." The Supreme
Court in that case considered the amendment only as a matter of form. But in the
instant case, the amendment cannot be considered as a matter of form or an
inconsequential deviation. The change in the number of years of residence in the
place where respondent seeks to be elected is a substantial matter which determines
her qualification as a candidacy, specially those intended to suppress, accurate
material representation in the original certificate which adversely affects the filer. To
admit the amended certificate is to condone the evils brought by the shifting minds of
manipulating candidate, of the detriment of the integrity of the election.
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her residency
in order to prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood" is to allow an untruthfulness
to be committed before this Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months
residency the respondent indicated in her certificate of candidacy can be gleaned
from her entry in her Voter's Registration Record accomplished on January 28, 1995
which reflects that she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the
time of the said registration (Annex A, Petition). Said accuracy is further buttressed
by her letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24, 1994,
requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters
thereat so that she can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
The dates of these three (3) different documents show the respondent's consistent
conviction that she has transferred her residence to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro
Manila only for such limited period of time, starting in the last week of August 1994
which on March 8, 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore,
cannot be persuaded to believe in the respondent's contention that it was an error.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be
admitted by this Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that
respondent has not complied with the one year residency requirement of the
Constitution.

In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous
with "domicile" which imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in-that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or
pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo
Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's
case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was not
Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to
Metro Manila and not Tacloban.
This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District
since childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of qualification where she is
otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face of the facts
admitted by the respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and
worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in
Manila. In 1959, after her husband was elected Senator, she lived and resided in San
Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San
Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered voter. In 1978, she served as
member of the Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of Manila and
later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. She could not have served these
positions if she had not been a resident of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when she
filed her certificate of candidacy for the office of the President in 1992, she claimed to
be a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994,
respondent wrote a letter with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila
requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the permanent list of voters that
she may be re-registered or transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts
manifest that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up
to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of
many places, including Metro Manila. This debunks her claim that prior to her
residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte
since childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her
domicile. She registered as a voter in different places and on several occasions
declared that she was a resident of Manila. Although she spent her school days in
Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned such place when she chose to stay
and reside in other different places. In the case of Romualdez vs. RTC(226 SCRA
408) the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by choice. There must
concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) intention to remain
there; and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must
basically be animus manendi withanimus non revertendi. When respondent chose to
stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by
registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that
place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her
childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be conduct
indicative of such intention. Respondent's statements to the effect that she has
always intended to return to Tacloban, without the accompanying conduct to prove
that intention, is not conclusive of her choice of residence. Respondent has not
presented any evidence to show that her conduct, one year prior the election,
showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was that prior to her
residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of Manila.

It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District
of Leyte "since childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First
District of Leyte for more than one year, petitioner correctly pointed out that on
January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration Record that she
resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of six months. This may be
inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it refers only to her residence in
Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a resident of the First District of
Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she
had been a resident of the district for six months only. 15
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to
run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of
Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to
DENY it, no new substantial matters having been raised therein to warrant reexamination of the resolution granting the petition for disqualification. 18
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should the
results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional
elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and
issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event
that she obtains the highest number of votes. 19
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming
winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995
based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner
alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833
votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the
Supplemental Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of the
First District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner
comes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues may
be classified into two general areas:
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of
Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections

Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying

petitioner outside the period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for
disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive
jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995
elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the
application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the COMELEC
seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes of election law,
residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake
the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of
determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as required by
the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an
elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil
obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong
vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place
to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and
circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." 21 Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the
twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the
intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain
place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential
distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when
the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes
such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his
intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. 22 It is thus, quite perfectly
normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can only have a
single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another
domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to
indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning.
A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is
not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an
unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time,
but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally
his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of
residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of
political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and

unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with
domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile which
imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention." 25 Larena vs. Teves 26 reiterated the same doctrine in a case
involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete,
Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or
practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected does not
constitute loss of residence. 28 So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and
other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent
residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions
have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election
law, it actually means only "domicile" to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one
year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the
Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual
residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National
Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, "and
a resident thereof", that is, in the district for a period of not less than one year
preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution,
the interpretation given to it was domicile. 29
xxx xxx xxx

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner
Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a
matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go
back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that
a provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living
abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that
it should be by domicile and not physical residence. 30
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that the framers
of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election law,
regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile. 32
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the
residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance

is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence in the First
Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in
determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification
requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It
would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a
certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word
"seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading
to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted
petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of
residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the space provided. These
circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned
resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner announced that
she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First District, private
respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not
Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in the First District, which is
Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close
look at said certificate would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence
(Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate
seeks election thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years
and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte
instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay
in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 the first
requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile coupled with the circumstances
surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an
unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be
allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means
more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District of
Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains
that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some years after graduation in
Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as
indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last few
decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in
San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the election of
her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In

1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro
Manila. "She could not, have served these positions if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila,"
the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has
lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual
relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to
pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does
not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been
a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy
because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which
this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law
purposes. In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house
wherein he lives with his family in a municipality without having ever had the intention
of abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or with his family in another
municipality, has his residence in the former municipality, notwithstanding his having
registered as an elector in the other municipality in question and having been a
candidate for various insular and provincial positions, stating every time that he is a
resident of the latter municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the saying
goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course includes study in other places, practice of
his avocation, or engaging in business. When an election is to be held, the citizen
who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to
cast his ballot but for professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he
may not absent himself from his professional or business activities; so there he
registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is not willing to
give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government
especially in national elections. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to
his home, to his domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken him. This may be
the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of
origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such
residence. It finds justification in the natural desire and longing of every person to
return to his place of birth. This strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's
birth must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its proposition
that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of (actual) residence, not her
domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in election law and the
deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code
(B.P. 881). 35
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of petitioner's
domicile, which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed Resolution: 36
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy

in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she graduated from high school. She pursued
her college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University in Tacloban,
where she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte
Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her
cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he
was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her
husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived
together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when her
husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him
in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and
kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In
1992, respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines and filed her
Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered
voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that
petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of these
purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte.
Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her
parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually established
residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even during her husband's
presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to her
domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other
important personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized projects for the
benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a political power base where her siblings
and close relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment, always with
either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the
history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely
ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest
of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin
because she did not live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place in
1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her
domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention to live there again." We do not agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new
one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte
was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established only when her
father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing
a new one; and

3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be
deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the
presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and
deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. 38 In the case
at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness
required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice
indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former
domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium
voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation
of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a
clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence." 39 The
presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage
cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil
Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific
area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence.
Both terms imply relations between a person and a place; but in residence, the
relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the
necessity of physical presence. 40
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may
exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the
service of the Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they
affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse
automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband's choice of residence upon
marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. Los
Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando
el marido transende su residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero .
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article, which
means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article clearly
contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family home or
residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido
translade su residencia" in the same provision which means, "when the husband shall transfer his
residence," referring to another positive act of relocating the family to another home or place of
actual residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place to
another not only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a circumstance
more consistent with the concept of actual residence.

The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to
strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the
marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for the sake of family unity, be
reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS
AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article
109 which obliges the husband and wife to live together, thus:
Art. 109. The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual
respect and fidelity and render mutual help and support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. This
takes into account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of the
petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should
necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that
Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation
where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in
one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:
Residence and Domicile Whether the word "residence" as used with reference to
particular matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a question of some difficulty, and
the ultimate decision must be made from a consideration of the purpose and intent
with which the word is used. Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other times
they are distinguished from one another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a
person in a place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a country
residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by living in place; on the other
hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The important thing for
domicile is that, once residence has been established in one place, there be an
intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in some
other
place. 41
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the
marriage is not an iron-clad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a common
matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized certain situations 42 where the spouses
could not be compelled to live with each other such that the wife is either allowed to maintain a residence
different from that of her husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert to her original domicile (apart
from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs. Villareal 43 this Court held that "[a] married
woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of
the marriage where the husband has given cause for divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife
either to obtain new residence or to choose a new domicile in such an event. In instances where the wife
actually opts, .under the Civil Code, to live separately from her husband either by taking new residence or
reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife could not be compelled to live with her
husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo45 the Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the
province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to

cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property
rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of such rights can be
maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible
(sic) by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely
personal right of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other
purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and he experience
of those countries where the courts of justice have assumed to compel the
cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely
questionable. Thus in England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for
the restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife; and if the
facts were found to warrant it, that court would make a mandatory decree,
enforceable by process of contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent
party to live with the other and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was
sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to enforce such orders, and
in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in
the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed
his regret that the English law on the subject was not the same as that which
prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree for the
restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but
could not be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing
sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the
remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still
be procured, and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the
basis of an order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we
can discover, has ever attempted to make a preemptory order requiring one of the
spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to
follow and live with her husband, who had changed his domicile to the City of New
Orleans. The decision referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a
provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code.
It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even
in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing
cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have
affirmed an order of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to
the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a
particular disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession and to
deliver to her husband, as administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents,
and interest which might accrue to her from the property which she had brought to
the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that this order for the
return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than
the consequences that would be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of
her property; and it does not appear that her disobedience to that order would
necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was
obliged by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her husband's actual place of
residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of
residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which
of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed

any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual
residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been
incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of
1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference between the intentions of the Civil
Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in
an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article
110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights in the
intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the
spouses. 46
Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under
the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil
Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife the term residence
should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this
unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in
1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage
and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her
return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of
origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally
expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's
permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make
them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner
obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act
which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She
could not have gone straight to her home in San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having been
previously looted by vandals. Her "homes" and "residences" following her arrival in various parts of Metro
Manila merely qualified as temporary or "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover, and proceeding from
our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse either reverts to her domicile of
origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly illogical for us to
assume that she cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive act
of selecting a new one where situations exist within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife
gains a domicile different from her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to this
point, we are persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a
conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.
II. The jurisdictional issue
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the
assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in
violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner contends that it is the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the
election of members of the House of Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of the
Constitution. This is untenable.
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is
generally construed to be merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the

judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated
it." 50 The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often made on grounds of
necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American authorities, this court inMarcelino
vs. Cruz held that: 51

The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on

grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public
by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law.
In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a
limitation of thirty (30) days within which a decree may be entered without the
consent of counsel, it was held that "the statutory provisions which may be thus
departed from with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings,
are usually those which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to
effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the essential act."
Thus, in said case, the statute under examination was construed merely to be
directory.
The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from rendering a
decision after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in
the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely
on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period.
In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P.
881, 52 it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a
pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the
issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's
jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of
members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the
HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.
It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to either to
ignore or deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in
a case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a ground here. Surely, many established
principles of law, even of election laws were flouted for the sake perpetuating power during the preEDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals, including the meaning and spirit of EDSA
ourselves bending established principles of principles of law to deny an individual what he or she
justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the mistakes of the
past.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications
to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's
questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE.
Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 159507

April 19, 2006

ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and/or IAN T. FISH and DOMINIC
MASCRINAS, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. seeking to
reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated May 22, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
69553. The assailed decision directed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin City, Southern
Leyte, Branch 25 thereof, to vacate and set aside its Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January
2, 2002 in Civil Case No. R-3172, and enjoined the presiding judge2 thereof from conducting further
proceedings in said case, except to dismiss the complaint filed therewith on ground of improper
venue. The petition also seeks to reverse and set aside the appellate court's Resolution dated
August 14, 2003 denying the motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the American Express International, Inc.
(AMEX) and/or its officers Ian T. Fish, Vice-President and Country Manager, and Dominic Mascrinas,
Head of Operations, with the RTC of Maasin City, Southern Leyte. The case was raffled to Branch 25
of the said court.
The complaint alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff (herein petitioner Saludo) "is a Filipino citizen, of legal
age, and a member of the House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern
Leyte, Philippines." On the other hand, defendant (herein respondent AMEX, Inc.) "is a corporation
doing business in the Philippines and engaged in providing credit and other credit facilities and allied
services with office address at 4th floor, ACE Building, Rada Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City."
The other defendants (herein respondents Fish and Mascrinas) are officers of respondent AMEX,
and may be served with summons and other court processes at their office address.
The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor of petitioner Saludo's
AMEX credit card and the supplementary card issued to his daughter. The first dishonor happened
when petitioner Saludo's daughter used her supplementary credit card to pay her purchases in the
United States some time in April 2000. The second dishonor occurred when petitioner Saludo used
his principal credit card to pay his account at the Hotel Okawa in Tokyo, Japan while he was there
with other delegates from the Philippines to attend the Congressional Recognition in honor of Mr.
Hiroshi Tanaka.
The dishonor of these AMEX credit cards were allegedly unjustified as they resulted from
respondents' unilateral act of suspending petitioner Saludo's account for his failure to pay its balance
covering the period of March 2000. Petitioner Saludo denied having received the corresponding
statement of account. Further, he was allegedly wrongfully charged for late payment in June 2000.
Subsequently, his credit card and its supplementary cards were canceled by respondents on July 20,
2000.

Petitioner Saludo claimed that he suffered great inconvenience, wounded feelings, mental anguish,
embarrassment, humiliation and besmirched political and professional standing as a result of
respondents' acts which were committed in gross and evident bad faith, and in wanton, reckless and
oppressive manner. He thus prayed that respondents be adjudged to pay him, jointly and severally,
actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
In their answer, respondents specifically denied the allegations in the complaint. Further, they raised
the affirmative defenses of lack of cause of action and improper venue. On the latter, respondents
averred that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground that venue was improperly laid
because none of the parties was a resident of Leyte. They alleged that respondents were not
residents of Southern Leyte. Moreover, notwithstanding the claim in his complaint, petitioner Saludo
was not allegedly a resident thereof as evidenced by the fact that his community tax certificate,
which was presented when he executed the complaint's verification and certification of non-forum
shopping, was issued at Pasay City. To buttress their contention, respondents pointed out that
petitioner Saludo's complaint was prepared in Pasay City and signed by a lawyer of the said city.
Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the complaint a quo.
Thereafter, respondents filed an Opposition to Ex-Parte Motion (to Set Case for Pre-Trial) and
Motion for Preliminary Hearing (on Affirmative Defense of Improper Venue) to which petitioner
Saludo filed his Comments and/or Objections to the Affirmative Defense of Improper Venue. He
asserted that any allegation refuting his residency in Southern Leyte was baseless and unfounded
considering that he was the congressman of the lone district thereof at the time of the filing of his
complaint. He urged the court a quo to take judicial notice of this particular fact. As a member of
Congress, he possessed all the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution including that of being a
resident of his district. He was also a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Southern
Leyte Chapter, and has been such ever since his admission to the Bar. His community tax certificate
was issued at Pasay City only because he has an office thereat and the office messenger obtained
the same in the said city. In any event, the community tax certificate is not determinative of one's
residence.
In the Order dated September 10, 2001, the court a quo denied the affirmative defenses interposed
by respondents. It found the allegations of the complaint sufficient to constitute a cause of action
against respondents. The court a quo likewise denied respondents' affirmative defense that venue
was improperly laid. It reasoned, thus:
x x x [T]he fact alone that the plaintiff at the time he filed the complaint was and still is, the incumbent
Congressman of the Lone District of Southern Leyte with residence at Ichon, Macrohon, Southern
Leyte, is enough to dispell any and all doubts about his actual residence. As a high-ranking
government official of the province, his residence there can be taken judicial notice of. As such his
personal, actual and physical habitation or his actual residence or place of abode can never be in
some other place but in Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte. It is correctly stated by the plaintiff, citing
the case of Core v. Core, 100 Phil. 321 that, "residence, for purposes of fixing venue of an action, is
synonymous with domicile. This is defined as the permanent home, the place to which, whenever
absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on the facts and circumstances,
in the sense that they disclose intent. A person can have but one domicile at a time. A man can have
but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of
residence. Venue could be at place of his residence. (Masa v. Mison, 200 SCRA 715 [1991]) 3
Respondents sought the reconsideration thereof but the court a quo denied the same in the Order
dated January 2, 2002. They then filed with the appellate court a petition for certiorari and prohibition
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the presiding judge of the court a quo in issuing the
September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 Orders. Upon respondents' posting of a bond, the

appellate court issued on March 14, 2002 a temporary restraining order which enjoined the presiding
judge of the court a quo from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. R-3172.
On May 22, 2003, the appellate court rendered the assailed decision granting respondents' petition
for certiorari as it found that venue was improperly laid. It directed the court a quo to vacate and set
aside its Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002, and enjoined the presiding judge
thereof from further proceeding in the case, except to dismiss the complaint.
The appellate court explained that the action filed by petitioner Saludo against respondents is
governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. The said rule on venue of personal actions
basically provides that personal actions may be commenced and tried where plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the
election of plaintiff.
Venue was improperly laid in the court a quo, according to the appellate court, because not one of
the parties was a resident of Southern Leyte. Specifically, it declared that petitioner Saludo was not a
resident thereof. The appellate court pronounced that, for purposes of venue, the residence of a
person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or his actual residence or place of abode, which
may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity
and consistency.4
The appellate court quoted the following discussion in Koh v. Court of Appeals 5 where the Court
distinguished the terms "residence" and "domicile" in this wise:
x x x [T]he term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence,
for it is [an] established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more
permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given
place. In fact, this distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory
must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons.
xxxx
"There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of
abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which
when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a
domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with intention to
remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any
time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place of
domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of
remaining will constitute domicile."6 (Italicized for emphasis)
In holding that petitioner Saludo is not a resident of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, the appellate court
referred to his community tax certificate, as indicated in his complaint's verification and certification
of non-forum shopping, which was issued at Pasay City. Similarly, it referred to the same community
tax certificate, as indicated in his complaint for deportation filed against respondents Fish and
Mascrinas. Under Republic Act No. 7160,7 the community tax certificate shall be paid in the place of
residence of the individual, or in the place where the principal office of the juridical entity is
located.8 It also pointed out that petitioner Saludo's law office, which was also representing him in the
present case, is in Pasay City. The foregoing circumstances were considered by the appellate court
as judicial admissions of petitioner Saludo which are conclusive upon him and no longer required
proof.

The appellate court chided the court a quo for stating that as incumbent congressman of the lone
district of Southern Leyte, judicial notice could be taken of the fact of petitioner Saludo's residence
thereat. No evidence had yet been adduced that petitioner Saludo was then the congressman of
Southern Leyte and actual resident of Ichon, Macrohon of the said province.
The appellate court held that, based on his complaint, petitioner Saludo was actually residing in
Pasay City. It faulted him for filing his complaint with the court a quo when the said venue is
inconvenient to the parties to the case. It opined that under the rules, the possible choices of venue
are Pasay City or Makati City, or any place in the National Capital Judicial Region, at the option of
petitioner Saludo.
It stressed that while the choice of venue is given to plaintiff, said choice is not left to his caprice and
cannot deprive a defendant of the rights conferred upon him by the Rules of Court. 9 Further,
fundamental in the law governing venue of actions that the situs for bringing real and personal civil
actions is fixed by the rules to attain the greatest possible convenience to the party litigants by taking
into consideration the maximum accessibility to them - i.e., to both plaintiff and defendant, not only to
one or the other - of the courts of justice.10
The appellate court concluded that the court a quo should have given due course to respondents'
affirmative defense of improper venue in order to avoid any suspicion that petitioner Saludo's motive
in filing his complaint with the court a quo was only to vex and unduly inconvenience respondents or
even to wield influence in the outcome of the case, petitioner Saludo being a powerful and influential
figure in the said province. The latter circumstance could be regarded as a "specie of forum
shopping" akin to that in Investors Finance Corp. v. Ebarle 11 where the Court mentioned that the filing
of the civil action before the court in Pagadian City "was a specie of forum shopping" considering
that plaintiff therein was an influential person in the locality.
The decretal portion of the assailed Decision dated May 22, 2003 of the appellate court reads:
UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the challenged orders must be, as they hereby
are, VACATED and SET ASIDE and the respondent judge, or any one acting in his place or stead, is
instructed and enjoined to desist from further proceeding in the case, except to dismiss it. The
temporary restraining order earlier issued is hereby converted into a writ of preliminary injunction,
upon the posting this time by petitioners [herein respondents], within five (5) days from receipt of this
decision, of a bond in the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00), to answer for all damages
that private respondent [herein petitioner] may sustain by reason of the issuance of such injunction
should the Court finally decide that petitioners are not entitled thereto. Private respondent, if he so
minded, may refile his case for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City or Pasay
City, or any of the Regional Trial Courts of the National Capital Judicial Region. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.12
Petitioner Saludo sought the reconsideration of the said decision but the appellate court, in the
Resolution dated August 14, 2003, denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence, he filed the instant
petition for review with the Court alleging that:
The Court of Appeals, (Special Fourth Division), in promulgating the afore-mentioned Decision and
Resolution, has decided a question of substance in a way probably not in accord with law or with
applicable decisions of this Honorable Court.

(a) the Court of Appeals erred in not taking judicial notice of the undisputed fact that herein
petitioner is the incumbent congressman of the lone district of Southern Leyte and as such,
he is a residence (sic) of said district;
(b) the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on the basis of improper venue
due to the alleged judicial admission of herein petitioner;
(c) the Court of Appeals in dismissing the complaint ignored applicable decisions of this
Honorable Court; and
1avvphil.net

(d) the Court of Appeals erred in deciding that herein petitioner violated the rules on venue,
and even speculated that herein petitioner's motive in filing the complaint in Maasin City was
only to vex the respondents.13
In gist, the sole substantive issue for the Court's resolution is whether the appellate court committed
reversible error in holding that venue was improperly laid in the court a quo in Civil Case No. R-3172
because not one of the parties, including petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff therein, was a resident of
Southern Leyte at the time of filing of the complaint.
The petition is meritorious.
Petitioner Saludo's complaint for damages against respondents before the court a quo is a personal
action. As such, it is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Courts which reads:
SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the
election of the plaintiff.
The choice of venue for personal actions cognizable by the RTC is given to plaintiff but not to
plaintiff's caprice because the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court. 14 The rule on venue, like
other procedural rules, is designed to insure a just and orderly administration of justice, or the
impartial and evenhanded determination of every action and proceeding. 15 The option of plaintiff in
personal actions cognizable by the RTC is either the place where defendant resides or may be
found, or the place where plaintiff resides. If plaintiff opts for the latter, he is limited to that place. 16
Following this rule, petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff, had opted to file his complaint with the court a quo
which is in Maasin City, Southern Leyte. He alleged in his complaint that he was a member of the
House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte to comply with the
residency requirement of the rule.
However, the appellate court, adopting respondents' theory, made the finding that petitioner Saludo
was not a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint. It hinged the said
finding mainly on the fact that petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate, indicated in his
complaint's verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay City. That his
law office is in Pasay City was also taken by the appellate court as negating petitioner Saludo's claim
of residence in Southern Leyte.
The appellate court committed reversible error in finding that petitioner Saludo was not a resident of
Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint, and consequently holding that venue was

improperly laid in the court a quo. In Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. v. Sarmiento, 17 the Court had
the occasion to explain at length the meaning of the term "resides" for purposes of venue, thus:
In Koh v. Court of Appeals, we explained that the term "resides" as employed in the rule on venue on
personal actions filed with the courts of first instance means the place of abode, whether permanent
or temporary, of the plaintiff or the defendant, as distinguished from "domicile" which denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning.
"It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of the Rules of Court) that the situs
for bringing real and personal civil actions are fixed by the rules to attain the greatest convenience
possible to the parties-litigants by taking into consideration the maximum accessibility to them of the
courts of justice. It is, likewise, undeniable that the term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal
contemplation with the term residence, for it is an established principle in Conflict of Laws that
domicile refers to the relatively more permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a
temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact, this distinction is very well emphasized in those
cases where the Domiciliary Theory must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases
involving stateless persons.
"This Court held in the case of Uytengsu v. Republic, 50 O.G. 4781, October, 1954, reversing its
previous stand in Larena v. Ferrer, 61 Phil. 36, and Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, that 'There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of
abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which
when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a
domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to
remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any
time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place of
domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of
remaining will constitute domicile.' (Italicized for emphasis)
"We note that the law on venue in Courts of First Instance (Section 2, of Rule 4, Rules of Court) in
referring to the parties utilizes the words 'resides or may be found,' and not 'is domiciled,' thus:
'Sec. 2(b) Personal actions - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or
any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides,
at the election of the plaintiff.' (Italicized for emphasis)
"Applying the foregoing observation to the present case, We are fully convinced that private
respondent Coloma's protestations of domicile in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, based on his manifested
intention to return there after the retirement of his wife from government service to justify his bringing
of an action for damages against petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte, is entirely of no moment
since what is of paramount importance is where he actually resided or where he may be found at the
time he brought the action, to comply substantially with the requirements of Sec. 2(b) of Rule 4,
Rules of Court, on venue of personal actions." (Koh v. Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 304-305.)
The same construction of the word "resides" as used in Section 1, Rule 73, of the Revised Rules of
Court, was enunciated in Fule v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. L-40502) and Fule v. Hon. Ernani
C. Pao, et al. (G.R. No. L-42670), decided on November 29, 1976. Thus, this Court, in the
aforecited cases, stated:
"2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term 'resides' mean? Does it refer to the
actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule

that the term 'resides' connotes ex vi termini 'actual residence' as distinguished from 'legal residence
or domicile.' This term 'resides,' like the terms 'residing' and 'residence' is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purposes of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules - Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature - residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word
'domicile' still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some
cases make a distinction between the terms 'residence' and 'domicile' but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
'inhabitant.' In other words, 'resides' should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning,
the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that
place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of residence is
required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary."18
There is no dispute that petitioner Saludo was the congressman or the representative of the lone
district of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of his complaint with the court a quo. Even the appellate
court admits this fact as it states that "it may be conceded that private respondent ever so often
travels to Maasin City, Southern Leyte, because he is its representative in the lower house." 19
As a member of the House of Representatives, petitioner Saludo was correctly deemed by the court
a quo as possessing the requirements for the said position,20 including that he was then a resident of
the district which he was representing, i.e., Southern Leyte. Significantly, for purposes of election
law, the term "residence" is synonymous with "domicile," thus:
x x x [T]he Court held that "domicile" and "residence" are synonymous. The term "residence," as
used in the election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends
to return. x x x21
It can be readily gleaned that the definition of "residence" for purposes of election law is more
stringent in that it is equated with the term "domicile." Hence, for the said purpose, the term
"residence" imports "not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."22 When parsed, therefore, the term
"residence" requires two elements: (1) intention to reside in the particular place; and (2) personal or
physical presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. As the Court
elucidated, "the place where a party actually or constructively has a permanent home, where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his
domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of
election law."23
On the other hand, for purposes of venue, the less technical definition of "residence" is adopted.
Thus, it is understood to mean as "the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile." 24
Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone representative of the district of Southern Leyte,
had his residence (or domicile) therein as the term is construed in relation to election laws,

necessarily, he is also deemed to have had his residence therein for purposes of venue for filing
personal actions. Put in another manner, Southern Leyte, as the domicile of petitioner Saludo, was
also his residence, as the term is understood in its popular sense. This is because "residence is not
domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time."
Reliance by the appellate court on Koh v. Court of Appeals25 is misplaced. Contrary to its
holding,26 the facts of the present case are not similar to the facts therein. In Koh, the complaint was
filed with the Court of First Instance in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte by plaintiff who admitted that he
was a resident of Kamias, Quezon City. Save for the fact that he grew up in San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte and that he manifested the intent to return there after retirement, plaintiff therein had not
established that he was actually a resident therein at the time of the filing of his complaint. Neither
did he establish that he had his domicile therein because although he manifested the intent to go
back there after retirement, the element of personal presence in that place was lacking. To reiterate,
domicile or residence, as the terms are taken as synonyms, imports "not only an intention to reside
in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention."27
In contrast, petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of Southern Leyte at the time
of filing of his complaint with the court a quo. Absent any evidence to the contrary, he is deemed to
possess the qualifications for the said position, including that he was a resident therein. And
following the definition of the term "residence" for purposes of election law, petitioner Saludo not only
had the intention to reside in Southern Leyte, but he also had personal presence therein, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention. The latter element, or his bodily presence as an inhabitant
in Southern Leyte, was sufficient for petitioner Saludo to be considered a resident therein for
purposes of venue.
The following ratiocination of the court a quo is apt:
Residence in civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. A
person can have two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city residence.
(Quetulio v. Ruiz, S.C. Off. Gaz. 156, Commentaries and Jurisprudence in Civil Law, Vol. 1, page
211, Tolentino). Residence is acquired by living in a place; on the other hand, domicile can exist
without actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is that, once residence has been
established in one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also
established in some other place.
Thus, if a person lives with his family habitually in Quezon City, he would have his domicile in
Quezon City. If he also has a house for vacation purposes in the City of Baguio, and another house
in connection with his business in the City of Manila, he would have residence in all three places
(Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on Civil Law, Vol. 1, Page 212, 1990 Edition) so that
one[']s legal residence or domicile can also be his actual, personal or physical residence or
habitation or place of abode if he stays there with intention to stay there permanently.
In the instant case, since plaintiff has a house in Makati City for the purpose of exercising his
profession or doing business and also a house in Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, for doing
business and/or for election or political purposes where he also lives or stays physically, personally
and actually then he can have residences in these two places. Because it would then be
preposterous to acknowledge and recognize plaintiff Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. as congressman of
Southern Leyte without also recognizing him as actually, personally and physically residing thereat,
when such residence is required by law.28

The fact then that petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City is of no
moment because granting arguendo that he could be considered a resident therein, the same does
not preclude his having a residence in Southern Leyte for purposes of venue. A man can have but
one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of
residence.29
That petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte
at the time of the filing of his complaint was admitted as a fact by the court a quo. In this connection,
it consequently held that, as such, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte, the district he
was the representing, could be taken judicial notice of. The court a quo cannot be faulted for doing
so because courts are allowed "to take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or
are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their
judicial functions." 30 Courts are likewise bound to take judicial notice, without the introduction of
evidence, of the law in force in the Philippines, 31 including its Constitution.
The concept of "facts of common knowledge" in the context of judicial notice has been explained as
those facts that are "so commonly known in the community as to make it unprofitable to require
proof, and so certainly known to as to make it indisputable among reasonable men." 32 Moreover,
"though usually facts of 'common knowledge' will be generally known throughout the country, it is
sufficient as a basis for judicial notice that they be known in the local community where the trial court
sits." 33 Certainly, the fact of petitioner Saludo being the duly elected representative of Southern
Leyte at the time could be properly taken judicial notice of by the court a quo, the same being a
matter of common knowledge in the community where it sits.
Further, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte could likewise be properly taken judicial
notice of by the court a quo. It is bound to know that, under the Constitution, one of the qualifications
of a congressman or representative to the House of Representatives is having a residence in the
district in which he shall be elected.
In fine, petitioner Saludo's act of filing his complaint with the court a quo cannot be characterized as
a "specie of forum-shopping" or capricious on his part because, under the rules, as plaintiff, he is
precisely given this option.
Finally, respondents' claim that the instant petition for review was not properly verified by petitioner
Saludo deserves scant consideration.
Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not
be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations
therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief," or
upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks proper verification, shall be treated as an
unsigned pleading.
Petitioner Saludo's verification and certification of non-forum shopping states that he has "read the
contents thereof [referring to the petition] and the same are true and correct of my

own personal knowledge and belief and on the basis of the records at hand." The same clearly
constitutes substantial compliance with the above requirements of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 22, 2003
and Resolution dated August 14, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69553 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, Branch 25 thereof, in Civil Case No. R-3172 are
REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186006

October 16, 2009

NORLAINIE MITMUG LIMBONA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MALIK "BOBBY" T. ALINGAN, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64, assailing the
Resolution1 dated November 23, 2007 of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) and the Resolution2 of the Comelec En Banc dated January 14, 2009 in SPA No. 07-621.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
Prior to the May 14, 2007 elections, petitioner Norlainie Mitmug Limbona and her husband,
Mohammad "Exchan" Limbona, each filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pantar, Lanao del
Norte. On April 2, 2007, private respondent Malik "Bobby" Alingan filed a disqualification case
against Mohammad before the Provincial Election Supervisor of Lanao del Norte. On April 12, 2007,
Alingan also filed a petition for disqualification against petitioner.3 Both disqualification cases were
premised on the ground that petitioner and her husband lacked the one-year residency requirement
and both were not registered voters of Pantar.4
On April 17, 2007, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Withdrawal of her certificate of
candidacy,5 which was subsequently approved by the Comelec.6 Petitioner also filed a Motion to
Dismiss the disqualification case against her for being moot and academic. 7
On election day, May 14, 2007, the Comelec resolved to postpone the elections in Pantar because
there was no final list of voters yet. A special election was scheduled for July 23, 2007. 8
On May 24, 2007, the Comelec First Division promulgated a Resolution disqualifying Mohammad as
candidate for mayor for failure to comply with the one-year residency requirement. 9 Petitioner then
filed her Certificate of Candidacy as substitute candidate on July 21, 2007. On July 23, 2007, Alingan
filed a petition for disqualification against petitioner for, among others, lacking the one-year residency
requirement (SPA No. 07-621).10
In a Resolution in SPA No. 07-62111 dated November 23, 2007, the Comelec Second Division ruled
that petitioner was disqualified from running for Mayor of Pantar. The Comelec held that petitioner
only became a resident of Pantar in November 2006. It explained that petitioners domicile of origin
was Maguing, Lanao del Norte, her birthplace. When she got married, she became a resident of
Barangay Rapasun, Marawi City, where her husband was Barangay Chairman until November 2006.

Barangay Rapasun, the Comelec said, was petitioners domicile by operation of law under the
Family Code. The Comelec found that the evidence petitioner adduced to prove that she has
abandoned her domicile of origin or her domicile in Marawi City two years prior to the elections
consisted mainly of self-serving affidavits and were not corroborated by independent and competent
evidence. The Comelec also took note of its resolution in another case where it was found that
petitioner was not even a registered voter in Pantar. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 12
The Comelec resolved the motion in an En Banc Resolution dated January 14, 2009, 13 affirming the
Second Divisions Resolution disqualifying petitioner. The Comelec said that the issue of whether
petitioner has complied with the one-year residency rule has been decided by the Supreme Court in
Norlainie Mitmug Limbona v. Commission on Elections and Malik "Bobby" T. Alingan promulgated on
June 25, 2008. The Comelec noted that, in said case, the Supreme Court upheld the Comelec First
Divisions Decision in SPA No. 07-611 disqualifying petitioner from running for mayor of Pantar for
failure to comply with the residency requirement.
Petitioner is now before this Court assailing the Comelecs November 23, 2007 and January 14,
2009 Resolutions. She posits that the Comelec erred in disqualifying her for failure to comply with
the one-year residency requirement. She alleges that in a disqualification case against her husband
filed by Nasser Macauyag, another mayoralty candidate, the Comelec considered her husband as a
resident of Pantar and qualified to run for any elective office there. Petitioner avers that since her
husband was qualified to run in Pantar, she is likewise qualified to run. 14
1avvphi1

Petitioner also stresses that she was actually residing and was physically present in that municipality
for almost two years prior to the May 2007 elections. During the time she had been residing in
Pantar, she associated and mingled with residents there, giving her ample time to know the needs,
difficulties, aspirations, and economic potential of the municipality. This, she said, is proof of her
intention to establish permanent residency there and her intent to abandon her domicile in Marawi
City.
She next argues that, even as her husband was Punong Barangay of Rapasun, Marawi City, he
never abandoned Pantar as his hometown and domicile of origin. She avers that the performance of
her husbands duty in Rapasun did not prevent the latter from having his domicile elsewhere. Hence,
it was incorrect for the Comelec to have concluded that her husband changed his domicile only on
November 11, 2006.15 At the very least, petitioner says, the Comelecs conflicting resolutions on the
issue of her husbands residence should create a doubt that should be resolved in her and her
husbands favor.16
She further contends that to disqualify her would disenfranchise the voters of Pantar, the
overwhelming majority of whom elected her as mayor during the July 23, 2007 special elections. 17
The Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Comment, insisting that the
Comelec correctly disqualified petitioner from running as mayor for lack of the one-year residency
requirement.18 The OSG argues that there is no evidence that petitioner has abandoned her domicile
of origin or her domicile in Marawi City.19 Moreover, the OSG said that this Court has ruled on the
issue of petitioners residency in Norlainie Mitmug Limbona v. Commission on Elections and Malik
"Bobby" T. Alingan.20 Lastly, the OSG contends that the Comelecs ruling in Nasser A. Macauyag v.
Mohammad Limbona is not binding on petitioner because she was not a party to the case. 21
We dismiss the Petition.
The issue of petitioners disqualification for failure to comply with the one-year residency requirement
has been resolved by this Court in Norlainie Mitmug Limbona v. Commission on Elections and Malik

"Bobby" T. Alingan.22This case stemmed from the first disqualification case filed by herein respondent
against petitioner, docketed as SPA No. 07-611. Although the petitioner had withdrawn the Certificate
of Candidacy subject of the disqualification case, the Comelec resolved the petition and found that
petitioner failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement, and was, therefore, disqualified
from running as mayor of Pantar.
A unanimous Court upheld the findings of the Comelec, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The September 4, 2007 Resolution of the
Commission on Elections in SPA Case No. 07-611 disqualifying petitioner Norlainie Mitmug Limbona
from running for office of the Mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte, and the January 9, 2008 Resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. In view of the permanent vacancy in the
Office of the Mayor, the proclaimed Vice-Mayor shall SUCCEED as Mayor. The temporary
restraining order issued on January 29, 2008 is ordered LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.23
The Court found that petitioner failed to satisfy the one-year residency requirement. It held:
The Comelec correctly found that petitioner failed to satisfy the one-year residency requirement. The
term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile," which imports not only
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. The manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to
exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and
not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community.
For purposes of election law, the question of residence is mainly one of intention. There is no hard
and fast rule by which to determine where a person actually resides. Three rules are, however, well
established: first, that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; second, that where
once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and third, a man can have but one domicile
at a time.
In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the
new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. A
persons "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a
new one is established.
To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual
change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one, and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there
must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or
at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be
voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
Petitioners claim that she has been physically present and actually residing in Pantar for almost 20
months prior to the elections, is self-serving and unsubstantiated. As correctly observed by the
Comelec:
In the present case, the evidence adduced by respondent, which consists merely of self-serving
affidavits cannot persuade Us that she has abandoned her domicile of origin or her domicile in
Marawi City. It is alleged that respondent "has been staying, sleeping and doing business in her

house for more than 20 months" in Lower Kalanganan and yet, there is no independent and
competent evidence that would corroborate such statement.
Further, We find no other act that would indicate respondents intention to stay in Pantar for an
indefinite period of time. The filing of her Certificate of Candidacy in Pantar, standing alone, is not
sufficient to hold that she has chosen Pantar as her new residence. We also take notice of the fact
that in SPA No. 07-611, this Commission has even found that she is not a registered voter in the said
municipality warranting her disqualification as a candidate.
We note the findings of the Comelec that petitioners domicile of origin is Maguing, Lanao del Norte,
which is also her place of birth; and that her domicile by operation of law (by virtue of marriage) is
Rapasun, Marawi City. The Comelec found that Mohammad, petitioners husband, effected the
change of his domicile in favor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte only on November 11, 2006. Since it is
presumed that the husband and wife live together in one legal residence, then it follows that
petitioner effected the change of her domicile also on November 11, 2006. Articles 68 and 69 of the
Family Code provide:
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support.
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall
decide. The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or
there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not
apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. (Emphasis ours)
Considering that petitioner failed to show that she maintained a separate residence from her
husband, and as there is no evidence to prove otherwise, reliance on these provisions of the Family
Code is proper and is in consonance with human experience.
Thus, for failure to comply with the residency requirement, petitioner is disqualified to run for the
office of mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte. x x x.24
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision was denied with finality on
March 3, 2009.25Petitioner filed another Motion for Reconsideration,26 which the Court treated as a
Second Motion for Reconsideration and, consequently, denied in a Resolution dated June 2,
2009.27 Of late, petitioner has filed a "Manifestation" that raises yet again the issues already resolved
in the petition and which the Court has, accordingly, merely noted without action. 28 Thus, our ruling
therein has now attained finality.
Consequently, the issue of petitioners compliance with the one-year residency requirement is now
settled. We are bound by this Courts ruling in the earlier Limbona case where the issue was
squarely raised and categorically resolved. We cannot now rule anew on the merits of this case,
especially since the present Petition merely restates issues already passed upon by the Comelec
and affirmed by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is DISMISSED and the Resolution
dated November 23, 2007 of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections and the
Resolution of the Commission on Elections En Banc dated January 14, 2009 in SPA No. 07-621 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.