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Sun Tzu y el arte de los negocios Mark McNeilly

Sun Tzu y el arte de hacer negocios

Sun Tzu y el arte de los negocios Mark McNeilly

En la guerra como en los negocios la victoria depende de la estrategia que se utilice

Sun Tzu y el arte de los negocios Mark McNeilly

Los seis principios estratgicos


1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Gane todo sin combatir Cmo capturar su mercado sin destruirlo Evite la fortaleza y ataque la debilidad Arremeter donde menos lo esperen Engao y conocimiento previo Ampliar al mximo el poder de la informacin del mercado Velocidad y preparacin Actuar con diligencia para superar a los competidores Influya en su oponente Empleo de la estrategia para dominar la competencia Liderazgo basado en el carcter Ejercer un liderazgo eficaz en pocas turbulentas

Sun Tzu y el arte de los negocios Mark McNeilly

Primer principio Gane todo sin combatir

En la guerra la mejor poltica es la de tomar un Estado intacto; aniquilarlo es inferior a esto....porque obtener cien victorias en cien batallas no es el colmo de la habilidad. Someter al enemigo sin combatir es el colmo de la habilidad Sun Tzu Como la meta de una empresa es sobrevivir y prosperar debe capturar el mercado.

Ajedrez

Go

El objetivo es destruir las piezas del oponente en un esfuerzo por tomar su rey
Sun Tzu y el arte de los negocios Mark McNeilly

El objetivo es capturar y conservar la mayor cantidad de territorio con la menor inversin de piezas

Pero las batallas por el dominio del mercado no deben destruir la rentabilidad de su industria en el proceso La guerra es un asunto de gravedad; es preocupante que los hombres la emprendan sin la debida reflexin

People Express para ejemplificar estrategias de bajo precio que daan la industria. Southwest Airlines como nica aerolnea rentable entre 1989 y 1993.

Sun Tzu y el arte de los negocios Mark McNeilly

... Gane todo sin combatir

El que conozca el arte del acercamiento directo e indirecto obtendr la victoria Sun Tzu Un ataque directo es el que ocurre en un lugar esperado a una hora prevista. Un asalto indirecto es el que llega por sorpresa, tanto en ubicacin como en tiempo. Si combina los ataques directos sobre su competencia para centrar la atencin de los ejecutivos y engaarlos , le ser posible despus los ataques indirectos para obtener la victoria

Sun Tzu y el arte de los negocios Mark McNeilly

El ataque indirecto

No siempre el camino mas corto entre dos puntos es una linea recta. No siempre un ataque directo a la competencia es ms rpido, efectivo, eficiente y rentable.

Southwest Airlines decidi que para ganar el rea metropolitana de New York era mejor usar el aeropuerto McArthur de Long Island para evitar competir directamente en los grandes aeropuertos y poder mantener sus bajas tarifas.

Sun Tzu y el arte de los negocios Mark McNeilly

Segundo principio Evite la fortaleza, ataque la debilidad


Un ejercito puede compararse con una corriente de agua, porque ah como el caudal que fluye evita las alturas y corre presuroso hacia las tierras bajas, asi un ejrcito evita la fortaleza y ataca los objetivos mas dbiles. Sun Tzu

Atacar los puntos dbiles de su competidor es hacer un uso mucho ms eficaz y eficiente de los recursos propios, que atacar sus fortalezas. Recuerde que incluso los leones no persiguen al antlope ms veloz de la manada; por el contrario, caza a los ms lentos. Hay que: Aplicar sus fortalezas contra los puntos dbiles de su competidor Adentrarse en la nada, acometer contra el vaco y rodear lo que se defiende Atacar donde menos lo esperan Ser el primero en actuar

Sun Tzu y el arte de los negocios Mark McNeilly

Evite la fortaleza , y ataque...

Las debilidades en puntos limtrofes

La debilidad psicolgica

Sun Tzu y el arte de los negocios Mark McNeilly

Atacar los puntos limtrofes

Ejemplo militar Investigacin y desarrollo Fabricacin Ventas Servicios

Cadena de valor del competidor

Sun Tzu y el arte de los negocios Mark McNeilly

Fuentes de oportunidades preventivas

Sistemasde aprovisionamiento

Sistemas de produccin Producto

Sistemas de distribucin

Clientes

Sun Tzu y el arte de los negocios Mark McNeilly

Fuentes de oportunidades preventivas


Sistemas de aprovisionamiento

Asegurar el acceso a las materias primas componentes Apropiarse de manera exclusiva de equipos de produccin Dominar la logstica de los suministros

Producto

Lanzar nuevas lneas de producto Desarrollar el diseo dominante Posicionamiento Asegurar la aprobacin acelerada de las agencias gubernamentales Asegurar el desarrollo del producto y tcnicas de distribucin Ampliar el alcance del producto

Sistemas de produccin

Procesos patentados Ampliacin pujante de la capacidad Integracin vertical con los proveedores clave Asegurar las tcnicas de produccin escasas y fundamentales

Sun Tzu y el arte de los negocios Mark McNeilly

Fuentes de oportunidades preventivas Continuacin

Clientes

Segmentacin Crear un apronta presencia de marca Capacitar a los clientes en las tcnicas de uso Capturar cuentas clave

Sistemas de distribucin y servicio

Ocupacin de las mejores ubicaciones Acceso preferente a los distribuidores clave Dominio de la logstica de distribucin Acceso a capacidades superiores de servicio Adquisicin de tcnicas de distribucin

Sun Tzu y el arte de los negocios Mark McNeilly

Seleccin y concentracion de ataque El schwerpunkt


Cul es el punto dbil ms eficaz de atacar? Los mejores puntos dbiles que deben atacarse son los que no slo son muy vulnerables, sino que, si se atacan con xito, perjudicaran gravemente a su competencia

La invencibilidad radica en la defensa; la posibilidad de la victoria, en el ataque. La defensa es aconsejable cuando la fortaleza es inadecuada: se ataca cuando existen medios abundantes. Cuando se concentre, preprate para combatirlo; cuando sea fuerte, evtalo Sun Tzu

Sun Tzu y el arte de los negocios Mark McNeilly

Tercer principio Engao y conocimiento previo


Conocimiento previo
Agtalo y descubre la pauta de sus movimientos. Determina sus disposiciones y asegura asi el campo de batalla. Ponlo a prueba y averigua dnde es ms fuerte y dnde tiene deficiencias Por tanto digo: Conoce a tu enemigo y concete a ti mismo; y en cien batallas, nunca estars en peligro. Cuando no conoces a tu enemigo pero te conoces a ti mismo, tus oportunidades de ganar o perder son iguales. Si no conoces a tu enemigo ni a ti mismo, es seguro que estars en peligro en todas las batallas.

Sun Tzu

Sun Tzu y el arte de los negocios Mark McNeilly

Tercer principio Engao y conocimiento previo


Engao
Todas las guerras se basan en el engao. El enemigo debe ignorar donde me propongo librar batalla, porque si lo ignora deber estar preparado en muchos lugares. Y cuando se prepara en muchos sitios, slo tendr que combatir a unos cuantos hombres en cualquiera de ellos. Sun Tzu Deje que sus competidores piensen que usted no es tan fuerte como en realidad es. Permtales que subestimen su potencial. Entonces, cuando ataque no estarn preparados. De este modo, el engao los toma desprevenidos, lo que a su vez produce la victoria.

Sun Tzu y el arte de los negocios Mark McNeilly

Cuarto principio Velocidad y preparacin


La velocidad es la esencia misma de la guerra. Aprovecha la falta de la preparacin del enemigo; viaja por rutas inesperadas y atcalo donde no est prevenido Sun Tzu

Las aplicaciones de la velocidad Sustituto de recursos Aprovechar las oportunidades y los puntos dbiles Suscitar sorpresa y conmocin

Velocidad

Crear mpetu

Sun Tzu y el arte de los negocios Mark McNeilly

Com aumentar la velocidad de su compaa

DURACIN DE LOS CICLOS PRINCIPALES Informacin / Decisin / Accin Desarrollo Produccin Distribucin Respuesta del cliente

Tiempo

MEDIOS PARA ACORTAR LA DURACIN DE LOS CICLOS Imponer disciplina en la toma de decisiones Comunicar las medidas estratgicas a los propietarios Disear para permitir flexibilidad Hacer simulacros de su estrategia Fomentar el aprendizaje organizacional

Sun Tzu y el arte de los negocios Mark McNeilly

Adaptarse a gran velocidad

Un general valora cambios oportunos segn las circunstancias Sun Tzu Es importante estar atento a los cambios tecnolgicos, demogrficos y de la competencia para ganar ventaja. Charles Shwab comenz como una revolucionaria compaa que provee a los inversores instrumentos financieros a un muy bajo costo y sin demasiado asesoramiento financiero en forma telefnica.Cuando el e-trading irrumpi en el mercado Shwab aprovech la nueva tecnologa y rpidamente se convirti la compaa lder en e-trading en todo el mundo.

Sun Tzu y el arte de los negocios Mark McNeilly

Preparacin Planeacin de escenarios y simulacros de combate


Si deseo obtener una ventaja sobre el enemigo, no debo percibir solamente la ventaja esperada, sino considerar, en primer lugar, qu posibilidades tiene el de perjudicarme si acto de esa manera Sun Tzu En materia de planeacin, jams un movimiento intil; en materia de estrategia, ningn paso en vano. Sun Tzu Para ser innovadora y creativa, es necesario que su compaa : Aliente el aprendizaje organizacional Considere nuevas ideas Confe en sus gerentes de menor nivel Fomente la educacin profesional Promueva el intercambio de ideas a travs de las fronteras organizacionales Conservar a la gente en sus puestos el tiempo suficiente para que sepa lo que est haciendo

Sun Tzu y el arte de los negocios Mark McNeilly

Quinto principio Influya en su oponente


Por tanto,aquellos que son duchos en el arte de la guerra atraen al enemigo al campo de batalla y no se dejan llevar ah por l. Sun Tzu

Para vencer a la competencia, es preciso lograr,ante todo que sta se ajuste a su estrategia, sus reglas, su voluntad. Debe aprovechar la ventaja y hacer que su competidor lo enfrente en el momento y el lugar que usted elija. Se requiere que su estrategia emplee tanto la fuerza directa como la indirecta para desequilibrarlos facilitando su victoria. Tambin es necesario adquirir y sostener posiciones estratgicas en el mercado mediante el uso de la tecnologa, compradores clave y canales de distribucin.Inducir a la competencia a cometer errores estratgicos ya sea conducindolos a ingresar en mercados no rentables o desvindolos de aquellos que usted desee. Tambin es preciso entender la naturaleza de las alianzas, cmo se forman y mantienen, y cmo dividir las de su competidor

Sun Tzu y el arte de los negocios Mark McNeilly

Las seis reglas de las alianzas

Impedir que sus competidores se unan para oponrsele Si existen alianzas poderosas, evite atacarlas

Si es preciso atacar, primero separe a su competidor de sus aliados Use con habilidad sus propios aliados No elija aliados que no convienen

Sepa cmo conservar una alianza y cundo terminarla

Sun Tzu y el arte de los negocios Mark McNeilly

Sexto principio Liderazgo basado en el carcter


Cuando uno trata a la gente con benevolencia, justicia y rectitud, y deposita en ella su confianza, el ejrcito est unido en espritu y todos estarn felices de servir a sus lderes. Sun Tzu

Ser un lder implica: Templar el carcter, no slo construirse una imagen Guiar mediante el ejemplo, no slo con palabras Compartir las tribulaciones de los empleados, no slo los triunfos Motivar emocionalmente , no slo de manera material Encomendar a todos misiones definidas con claridad,evitando que las misiones se traslapen y confundan Lograr que su estrategia impulse a la organizacin y no a la inversa

Sun Tzu y el arte de los negocios Mark McNeilly

How Good is your Company's Competitive Analysis? (STRATEGY SELF-ANALYSIS)


Please select "(Y)es" or "(N)o" to these questions about your company; 1. We have a formal intelligence-gathering and analysis process 2. We have a good understanding of our competitions' offerings and how they bring them to market 3. We know how well our competitors are doing financially, their business model, revenue sources and cost structure 4. We have a good understanding of the capabilities of the competitors--what they can and can't do 5. We know the goals of our competitors and which markets are most important to them 6. We know the strategy and plans of our competitors in detail 7. We know the mindset of the CEOs and key executives of our top competitors-how they view the industry, the degree of risk they are willing to take, the priority of their business goals and their individual ambitions. 8. We know how our top competitors will respond in key situations, based on knowing their mindset and how they've reacted in the past. 9. We regularly war-game our strategies vs. our competition; role-playing different scenarios that may occur so we can adjust our strategy & tactics 10. Competitive intelligence and analysis significantly influences the direction of our strategy and plans 11. Executive support for competitive intelligence is increasing in my firm
Sun Tzu y el arte de los negocios Mark McNeilly

PEOPLE EXPRESS

Sun Tzu y el arte de los negocios Mark McNeilly

Eventos sobresalientes en la historia de PEOPLE EXPRESS

Ene 1980 Jul 1980

Nov 1980 Ene 1981 Abr 1981

Dic 1981 Ene 1982 Dic 1982 May 1983


Jul 1984 Jul 1984 Nov 1984

El fundador Don Burr deja la presidencia de Texas International PE es el solicitante inicial para obtener certificacin de acuerdo a la ley de Desregulacin de Aerolneas de 1978 Emisin pblica de Pea US$ 8.50 / accin , obteniendo un total de US$ 24 millones Burr adquiere de Lufthansa 17 Boeings 737 usados Primeros vuelos comercialesde Newark a Buffalo, Columbus y Norfolk Prdidas en el primer ao por US$ 9.2 millones PE transporta a su pasajero un milln Se obtiene utilidad de US$ 540,000.00 Se inicia el servicio a Londres Las acciones alcanzan su valor mximo de casi US$ 50 y se declara un split al dos por uno Las acciones caen en picada a menos de US$ 8 Burr despide a la Directora / Gerente, Lori Dubose, arquitecta dela estrategia de recursos humanos

Sun Tzu y el arte de los negocios Mark McNeilly


Prof. Lucio Traverso - Noviembre 1999

Eventos sobresalientes en la historia de PEOPLE EXPRESS Continuacin Ene 1985 Oct 1985 Dic 1985 Dic 1985 Ene 1986 Jun 1986 Jun 1986 Jun 1986 Jul 1986 El presidente, Hap Paretti y casi una docena de empleados renuncian para formar Presidential Airways Burr compra Frontier Airlines en US$ 300 millones Adquisicin de Britt Airways Los ingresos en 1985 llegan a casi US$1,000 millones PE vuela a 133 aeropuertos Las prdidas en el semestre de 1986 llegan a US$ 103 millones Se abandona la filosofa espartana, buscando atraer al viajero de negocios Burr anuncia que est dispuesto a vender una parte o inclusive todo Tres semanas despus se anuncia un acuerdo con United para venderle Frontier en US$ 146 millones. Ese mismo da se rechaza la oferta de Texas Air para comprar todo PE en US$ 240 millones Se anuncia la compra de PE por Texas Air en US$ 125 millones. Texas Air tambim adquiere Frontier por US$176 millones

Sep 1986

Sun Tzu y el arte de los negocios Mark McNeilly


Prof. Lucio Traverso - Noviembre 1999

La historia de PEOPLE EXPRESS en grficos

77 72 67 62 57 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 % de capacidad promeio utilizada


14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 Nmero de pasajeros en millones
Sun Tzu y el arte de los negocios Mark McNeilly

10 0 -10 -20 -30 -40 -50 -60 -70 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 utilidad neta en millones de dlares

Prof. Lucio Traverso - Noviembre 1999

A Brief History of People Express


People Express unofficially began on January 7, 1980 when Don Burr submitted his resignation from Texas Air to Frank Lorenzo. He, along with his secretary Melrose Dawsey left to form their own carrier. Almost immediately, they were joined by Gerry Gitner, another associate from Texas Air. Using their own cash, they began making plans for the new carrier and by fall had come up with the name People Express. Burr was quite interested in creating a positive working environment, one where people would be motivated as owners, not just employees. All employees would be required take stock in the company as part of their compensation, and everyone (including pilots and executives) would be cross-utilized to help keep costs down. There would be no secretaries or assistants -- everyone would be a manager. Plans were made to locate the carrier at Newark Airport, long underutilized despite its close proximity to New York City. The Port Authority was willing to lease the entire North Terminal, which had been abandoned for many years. Originally a maintenance hanger, it had been converted into a terminal by placing a wall and windows where the main doors had once been. Two concourses extended out from the main building, however they were at ramp level: there were no jetways and few windows. Rather than paying for office space off the airport, Burr and his staff moved into the upper level of the hanger turned terminal. By the time the terminal lease was complete, the initial stock offering (3 million shares) had brought in $25M, far more than anyone had expected. Shortly thereafter, arrangements were made to acquire 17 737s from Lufthansa, the first being delivered in late March 1981. Service started on April 30, 1981 to Buffalo, NY, Columbus, OH and Norfolk, VA. People Express continued to gradually grow up for the next two years until mid 1983, when their growth exploded. Transatlantic services were inaugurated to LGW using a leased Boeing 747. Also in 1983, 50 Boeing 727-200's were purchased and 4 new cities were added to the route system, for a total of 22 cities. In 1984, growth escalated and another 10 cities were opened. The first three of eight Boeing 747's were added to the fleet. Transcontinental service was started to LAX and OAK. The last of the remaining 747's were delivered in July 1986. Back in 1981, People Express had about 250 employees; by 1984 they had grown to 4,000 employees and over 70 aircraft. An intern program had been created to recruit Flight Engineers, and Customer Service Representatives for inflight service. While many of the existing employees were college graduates, the intern program was specifically designed to attract people already holding a degree. This was later expanded to include part-time interns to staff check-in and boarding gates in both Newark and the outstations. Part-time interns were expected to be full-time college students with a 2.5/4.0 grade point average, while full time interns were expected to have at least 60 hours towards a Bachelor's degree. Interns who were qualified for inflight service or as flight engineers were expected to have a college degree. The intern program possibly created the most educated employee group of the airline industry. As PE expanded and grew into the nation's fifth largest airline, it became clear that the management infrastructure had to be realigned to reattain the close "family" atmosphere that had been largely credited for past successes. At Newark, Operational Groups of 300 managers were formed in order to provide the basic support structure. Additionally, each outstation would work with specific Ops Group. Each Ops Group functioned in essence as a "mini-airline" responsible for its own scheduling, manning and operating of aircraft, gates, and check-in counters, for the recruiting and training effort, and most importantly, for providing direction and leadership to the interns assigned with their Ops Group. Core functions such as dispatch and revenue accounting continued to support all of the airline, although the cross-utilized individuals working in those areas also belonged to an Ops Group. People Express maintained an operating cost of about $0.05/ASM through the end, with an average yield of $0.072/ASM in 1985. Yet as revenues grew, profits shrank: 1983 - Net profit $10M on $287M revenue 1984 - Net profit $2M on $561M revenue 1985 - Net loss of $28M on $977M revenue 1986 - Projected loss of $200M on over $1B revenue (actual loss unknown) A major part of the losses was related to Don Burr's allowing PE to lose its niche carrier identity. The growth that occurred with People's route system and fleet in 1984 and 1985 almost seemed to go unchecked. Fare battles and effective yield management by the "established" carriers took its toll as well and as People continued to expand it lost market share to the majors. In the midst of a full fare war with the majors, People Express again defied logic and went on a spending spree. In January 1985, PE committed to build Terminal C at Newark for an estimated $175M to be paid over 25 years. The new terminal was planned to open in late 1986 (and actually opened in early 1988), at which time the North Terminal would again be abandoned. A far cry from the North Terminal, it was planned to have 41 gates, jetways, and a customs / immigration facility. )

Sun Tzu y el arte de los negocios Mark McNeilly

Prof. Lucio Traverso - Noviembre 1999

In August 1985, employees at Denver based Frontier Airlines were attempting to obtain an 80% stake in their company for just over $210M. Frank Lorenzo jumped in and upped the offer to over $270M, and later $290M. While Frontier's unions shuddered at the thought of working for Lorenzo, Don Burr saw an opportunity. Not only could People Express gain a foothold outside the east coast, but Frontier had a reservation system and an established frequent flyer program. Burr's final offer was more than $300M, a good part of it in cash plus concessions from Frontier's unions. While the PE shareholders approved the deal, People spent millions out of their own accounts to make up for continuing losses at Frontier. At the time, Frontier served 55 cities with a fleet of 42 aircraft, mostly 737's and DC-9's. In February 1986, midwest regional Britt Airways was purchased for $40M in a leveraged buyout. Britt had a system of routes feeding Chicago and St. Louis from cities in Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, Iowa, Missouri and Kentucky. Britt operated 49 aircraft: 11 Beech 99, 18 Fairchild Metro II, 14 Fairchild F-27 and 2 BAC-111 In April 1986, already bankrupt regional carrier Provincetown-Boston Airways (PBA) was acquired for less than $2M. PE also agreed to pay $25M to secured creditors, and provided about $700,000 in cash to keep operations going. At the time, PBA was flying routes in the northeast from Boston, plus a southern network to most Florida cities. Included in PBA's fleet of 52 aircraft were several Martin 404's and DC-3's. Frontier was not healthy before the buyout, and continued to lose millions under Burr's leadership. United and Continental stepped up the battle that was already underway on the east coast, and a fare war erupted in Denver. People Express was now clearly in trouble -- to finance the buyout, People had doubled its debt to equity ratio to 2.7-1, with outstanding debt of more than $500M. After pumping millions into Frontier to keep it running, cash reserves were down to $15M in March 1986, and short-term debt was skyrocketing. PE had interest liabilities of $10M in 1983 and $37M in 1984; in 1985, interest expenses climbed to $60M. A sale of equipment trust certificates brought in $115M in April 1986 to reduce the 1986 short-term debt to about $2M. In mid-June 1986, Don Burr, under pressure from PE's board of directors, reluctantly announced that part or all of People Express, was up for sale. Both United and Lorenzo stepped up the plate: United looking only to pick up Frontier, while Lorenzo was looking at the entire People Express operation for about $250M (the exact figure was not disclosed). While Burr was in favor of the Texas Air offer, the PE Board rejected Lorenzo in favor of United's bid. United offered about $140M for Frontier, but later retracted the bid when United's pilots rejected the contract proposal extended to the Frontier pilots. When the United deal fell apart, PE made the decision that they would no longer be able to keep pumping cash into Frontier. On August 24, Frontier ceased operations, leaving thousands stranded and declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy on August 28. Frank Lorenzo again approached Burr and offered to purchase People Express, but now offered about $125M, less than half of what was offered just a few weeks before and less than half of what Burr bid for Frontier just a year earlier. Faced with certain bankruptcy and thousands of People's people being out of work, Burr had little choice but to accept Lorenzo's offer. Just three weeks after the Frontier shutdown, the agreement to sell People Express to Texas Air was announced on September 15, 1986. Texas Air formally approved the deal on December 31, and plans were announced for the full integration of not only People Express, but also New York Air and four commuter carriers into Continental on February 1, 1987. The ensuing merger is another story altogether -- the North Terminal was eventually closed and all flights moved to Terminal B, where Continental and sister carrier Eastern were housed (some shuttle-type flights continued to operate out of the North Terminal until temporary gate space could be completed in Terminal B). Just as the kinks were finally being worked out, Terminal C opened in 1988. The name People Express, Inc. continued to exist on paper for several years, as a way to further shield Continental and Texas Air from the merger related losses. Despite popular rumor, the carrier never declared bankruptcy before the merger. While Texas Air seriously considered the move, it was not taken until Continental's most recent bankruptcy in December 1990, when all of Texas Air / Continental Air Holdings' domestic subsidiaries filed for bankrupcy. When they restructured in 1993, all of the subsidiaries were finally merged into Continental. Cities Served (Year End)

Sun Tzu y el arte de los negocios Mark McNeilly


Prof. Lucio Traverso - Noviembre 1999

Southwest Airlines

Sun Tzu y el arte de los negocios Mark McNeilly

Anexos

Sun Tzu y el arte de los negocios Mark McNeilly

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