Luego escribe que ni el geómetra ni el aritmético se preocupan por examinar si los

principios de los cuales se valen son verdaderos o falsos. En consecuencia, cabe

interpretar que cuando dice qe a que éste (el filósofo)
debe examinar si son verdaderos o falsos. los cuales se valen son verdaderos o
falsos.
En consecuencia, cabe interpretar que cuando dice que el filósofo debe de dar
cuenta
de los principios, a la luz de lo que dice sobre los matemáticos, el Estagirita se refiere
a que éste (el filósofo) debe examinar si son verdaderos o falsos. Lo anterior da
una
idea de la generalidad de la investigación filosófica tradicional195, ya que, si la filosofía
se pregunta por la legitimidad de los fundamentos, y esta pregunta es
lógicamente anterior a la de si estamos justificados en creer otras proposiciones que
no son básicas,
entonces el filósofo, según Aristóteles interpretado del modo propuesto, debe
investigar de manera general si tenemos fundamentos legítimos para nuestras
pretensiones de
validez.

la metafísica también estudiaría lógica, sip o rlógica entendemos el studio del razzonamiento
correcto, los principios vendrían a ser los principios del razonamiento correcto

Then either (i) you ground P1 on P2, P2 on P3, . .. , Pn on

Pn+1, ... , where each P1 is distinct from each of its predecessors; or (ii)
you ground P1 on P2, P2 on P3, . .. , Pn on Pn+l, .. . , where Pn+l is
identical with one of its predecessors; or (iii) you ground P1 on P2 , P2 on
P3, .. . , Pn on Pn+l, where Pn+l is ungrounded. is an infinite regress, and we cannot grasp
an infinite sequence of propositions; (ii) is circular, and circular argumentation
is always vicious; (iii) ends in bare assertion, and bare assertion
establishes nothing. Thus the Pyrrhonists follow Aristotle in rejecting
possibilities (i) and (ii);
one group concludes
that knowledge is impossible; a second group denies that demonstrative
knowledge yields a vicious regress; the third group denies that ali knowledge
is demonstrative.
It is in B 19 that we eventually find Aristotle's implicit attempt
to confute, proleptically, the Pyrrhonists. (On A 3 see also IRWIN (1988),
125-33.)

la metafísica también estudiaría lógica, sip o rlógica entendemos el studio del razzonamiento correcto,
los principios vendrían a ser los principios del razonamiento correcto

Then either (i) you ground P1 on P2, P2 on P3, . .. , Pn on

Pn+1, ... , where each P1 is distinct from each of its predecessors; or (ii)
you ground P1 on P2, P2 on P3, . .. , Pn on Pn+l, .. . , where Pn+l is
identical with one of its predecessors; or (iii) you ground P1 on P2 , P2 on
P3, .. . , Pn on Pn+l, where Pn+l is ungrounded. is an infinite regress, and we cannot grasp
an infinite sequence of propositions; (ii) is circular, and circular argumentation
is always vicious; (iii) ends in bare assertion, and bare assertion
establishes nothing. Thus the Pyrrhonists follow Aristotle in rejecting
possibilities (i) and (ii);
one group concludes
that knowledge is impossible; a second group denies that demonstrative
knowledge yields a vicious regress; the third group denies that ali knowledge
is demonstrative.

It is in B 19 that we eventually find Aristotle's implicit attempt

to confute, proleptically, the Pyrrhonists. (On A 3 see also IRWIN (1988),
125-33.)
+l is ungrounded. is an infinite regress, and we cannot grasp
an infinite sequence of propositions; (ii) is circular, and circular argumentation
is always vicious; (iii) ends in bare assertion, and bare assertion
establishes nothing. Thus the Pyrrhonists follow Aristotle in rejecting
possibilities (i) and (ii);
one group concludes
that knowledge is impossible; a second group denies that demonstrative
knowledge yields a vicious regress; the third group denies that ali knowledge
is demonstrative.

It is in B 19 that we eventually find Aristotle's implicit attempt

to confute, proleptically, the Pyrrhonists. (On A 3 see also IRWIN (1988),
125-33.)