From Normativity to Responsibility Joseph Raz OXFORD ‘UNIVERSITY PRESScever version of the Guise id bridging the theory of 5 Reason, Rationality, and Normativity ‘We are now in a position to employ the view that all normative phenomena are the concept ofa re in exp (of normativity 1 will connection between reasons and Reason and between Reason wine an explan 1. Reasons and Reason Why are the fat reasons? As expect and Reason— possess Reason eat when ingry? If reasons da not call for Reason why are they reasons? ‘The fucts that are reasons are reasons because they are part of the case for a certain or an action or an emotion. The example there are, capacities and processes appropriate responses to fi powers. Nor are these absent in hu other processes. Of Though there need be no rivalry between interact with Reason-bypassing processesexcept through the use of Reason. ‘This i the case with most reasons that are cultural ‘reations, But even in their case, the explanation why they invite certain responses need not invoke that fact, For example, some epistemic reasons that can only be recognized as reasons by rational creatures can nevertheless be identified as facts cafliug for bli, because they are evidence forthe truth of that explained without invoking the way that they ate ide fied, So why are they reasons? ecause Reason is our general capacity to recognize id to reasous. There are ether eapacities that also do that. But Reason is universal capacity € recognize reasons, one that in principle enables us to recognize any reason that applies to us, and to respond to it appropriately. A litte later I will sy. ‘more about the way Rexson cnables us to recognize reasons. In particular that itenables people refectvely to recognize thatthe facts that are reasons ate reasons, Here Twill add Just one observation: that Reason isa capacity reflectively to recognize reasons docs ‘ental that every exercise ofteason involves reflection, reésoning, or deliberation. With though in ways cxpetience we leam to identify and respond ¢o reasons instinctive that depend on and presuppose fit, reliance ot’ post reflection, and second, the ‘monitoring prescnce of rational powers that contal and stand ready to comect mis- identifications or misdizected responses. Even so the statement that Reason isthe general capacity relletively to recognize and respond to reasons may appear formal and uninformative. Isnt saying that Reason isthe univeral capacity to identify and respond to reatons lke saying that we dream dreams? Since ‘dreams’ ate defined as the objects of dreaming, saying that we dream dicanss is a mere formal statement. But the analogy with Reason and reasons ignores the normative aspect. is between them, Reason ean malfaaction, There fore, rearons cannot be defined as what Reason recognizes and responds to. As Reason lure ate determined, and they may fill there are criteria by which success and determine what reasons there are to be recognized. Put another way: our, ration Powers are a general capacity to recognize and respond to facts that make certain, responses appropriate, atid such facts are reasons because they can be recognized and responded to by ou rational powers. The second half of this statement is a conse~ quence of the nexus: when cerain responses are beneficial or otherwise appropriate or welcome but they cannot be recojized by Reason, they are not reasons, In conclusion we can say that Reason does not make reasons into reasons (Reason is a source of reason). But they ate reasons because rational cxeatures can recognize and respond to them with the use of Reason, Needless to say, there are Features of the world that we respond to, where the response cannot be secured via wsing 0 powers. Such responses ate involuntary, and the tviggering features are classified stimuli, Because the response cannot be secured by our rational powers, that is because it cannot be guided reflectively, chose stimuli are not seacons, even if the response is sensible, beneficial, ete. Being the general reflective capacity co recognize reasons distinguishes Reason from other processes like hunger, or tive avoidance ‘or hte, whieh reeagnize some specitic kinds of reasons. To be a reason a fact must be ny specific fone that we can respond to using our rational powers, whether or not on is how we do respond to it iive/explanatory ness, It and the Features of the world constiuite in responses (actions, belief, emotions). But to be such a cae it is not 2 certain response to them is welcome or apt, It is necessary for rational creatures to be able to respond to those features by using their rational powers to recognize them for what they ate. This relationship of reasons to our rational powers has far-reaching consequences. The one that will feature later in the book is the only features of the wosld that we ean in principle ‘come to know can constitute reasons, Because only they can be responded to using our ‘ational powers, and as we stw, thats what makes reas into reasons 2, Reason and reasoning The thesis that Reason isthe power to recognize reasons will be finessed and somewhat nodified in Section 3. First, I will relate it to thy the power of reasoning, Paul Grice he fica reasoning” Grice thought that the two ideas harmonize, He proceeds to explain: Indeed if rss erences, fom sor ‘or are thought to be, re 1g should be characterisable as the goew A will basically follow Grice, though my understanding of the way the cwo ideas harmonize is somewhat different fiom his. Reasoning is Reason's main way of recognizing reasons. But Reason sn the power to reason, ‘aot all reasoning aims at identifying or operating with reasons the relatio Reason and the power to reaton is more complicated than may at fist appear. Uhave already noted that some mental activities that depend on past reasoning are manifestations of our rational powers even though they do not involve present reasoning, and that activities guided and monitored by Reason in the background are ako manifestations of rational powers not involving reasoning, But there is much ‘more: Sometimes itis imational for people to fail to engage in reasoning, when they have an oveniding reason to resson, and are in a position to know that. Such Grice, Apo Reson (Oxfort: OUP, 2001).5. > thi