ARMS AND INFLUENCE BY THOMAS C. SCHELLING NEW HAVEN AND LONDON YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS1 THE DIPLOMACY OF VIOLENCE “The usual distinction between diplomacy and force isn tmetly ie instrument, words or ballets, ut i the Feta interplay of motves and te role o nding, compromise, and retin. plomacy is bargaining: i secks outcomes that, though not 1c foreither pay are bette or both than some of de alternatives fardiplomacy each party somewhat controls what the othet wants and can get more by compromise, exchange, of colabo~ {ation than by taking things in his own hands and ignoring the Sher’ wishes. The bargaining can be polite or rude, entail threats a well as offers, assume a satus quo or ignore all rights Gnd privileges, and assume mistrast rather than trst, But ‘wheter polit or polite, constructive or aggresive, respectful {br vielous, whether It occurs among friends or antagonists and creer or not there is a Bais foe tust and goodwil there must 3c some eamagon interest, if only in the avoidance of mutual Gamage, and an awarenes of the need to make the oter party prefer an outcome acceptable to ones. ‘With-enaugh miliary fonse-a country may not-need to-bat gain-Some things a country wars it can take, and some things {Tins ican keep, by sheer strength, sil and ingenuity. Te ean do this forcibly, accommodating only 10 opposing strength, SE, and ingenuity and without trying to appeal to an enemy's Wishes Forebly a country can repel and expel, penetrate and ‘ovupy, seize, extermina, disarm and disable, confine, deny feces, and dieclyfrostrate intrusion or attack, 1 ean, that 5, iit enough strength. "Enough" depends on how moch a opponent has. 1 i aaa ae‘There is something ese, though, that force cam do. Iti less military, less heroic, less impersonal, and less unilateral it i uglier, and has received less attention in Western military strat- ‘fy. In addition to seizing and holding, disarming and confining, Penetrating and obstructing, and all that, mitay foree can be ‘used 20 hurt. In addition to taking and protecting things OF value itean destroy value. In addition to weakening an enemy miitar- ily ivcan cause enemy plain sue Pain and shock, los and grit, privation and horror ways in some degree, sometimes in terrible degree, among the results of warfare; but in tational military science they ate in- ‘dental, they are not the object. If violence ean be done inci- dentally, though, it ean also be done purposely. The power to hurt can be counted among the most impressive attibutes of nilitary fore. “Hurting, unlike forcible seizure or self-defense, is not uncon- corned with the interest of others. It is measured inthe suffering itcan cause and the victims’ motivation to avoid it, Forcible a tion will work agenst weeds or floods as well a6 against armies, bt sulflering requires a vieim that can feel pain or has some. thing to lose. To inflict suffering gains nothing and saves noth- ing directly; it can only make people behave to avoid it. The ‘only purpose, unless sport or revenge, must be to influence somebody's behavior, 10 coerce his decision or ehoiee, To be coercive, violence has tobe anticipated. And it has to be avoid able by accommodation. The power to hurt is bargaining power. To exploit itis diplomacy—vicious diplomacy, bat diplomacy. The Contrast of Brute Force with Coercion ‘There isa diference betwoea taking what you want and making someone give it to you, between fending of assault and making Someone sid to ssaut you, betwen holding what people a trying to take and making Gem afraid to tke it between losing what someone ean forcibly take and giving twp to avoid risk or damoge tis the dfereace between defense and deter tepi, Beween brate fore and iatimidation, between conqust and blackmail, between action and threat tis the dflerence 1B DIPLOMACY OF VIOLENCE 4 tween the unilateral, “undiplomatic” recourse to strength, and coereve diplomacy based on the power to hurt. The contrasts are several. The purely “military” or “undiplo- mate” recourse 10 0% wis-concerned_ih enemy ‘engl aot enon fs; the coercive use of the power to hurt though i dhe wery exploitation of enemy wants and fears. ‘And_bruestength_is_usually measured relative to enemy ‘irengt, the one directly opposing the other, while te power £0 hurt is typically not reduced by the enemy's power to hurt in return, Opposing strengths may cancel each other, pain and fief do not, The willingness to hurt, the eredbility of a threat, snd the ability to exploit the power to hurt will indeed depend ‘on how much the adversary can hurtin return; but there is litle tv nothing about an adversary's pain or grief that directly re- Aluces one's own, Two sides cannot both overcome each other with superior strength; they may both be able to hurt each Taher. With strength they ean dispute objects of valu; with sheer violence they can destroy them, "And brute force succeeds when iti used, whereas the power held in is the of damage, that ean make someone yield or comply. It s latent violence that can influence some- fne'schoice-—volence that can sill be withheld or inflicted, oF that a vitim believes ean be withheld or ificted. The threat of pain tries to structure someone's motives, while brute force tries {o overcome his strength, Unhappily, the power to hurt is often ‘communicated by some performance of it. Whether it is sheer terroristie violence t© induce an irrational response, or cool premeditated violence to persuade somebody that you mean it nnd may do it again, itis not the pain and damage islf but its influence on somebody's behavior that matters. Its the expes- tation of more violence that gets the wanted behavior, if the power to hurt can get itat all, "To exploit « capacity for hurting and inflicting damage one needs to know what an adversary teasures and what scares bim fand one neods the adversary to understand what behavior of his will eause the violence to be inflicted and what will cause it to4 ARMS AND INFLUENCE be wield. The vein has to know what wane, and he may have tobe aired of what snot wanted The pain and ‘syflering have t contingent on his behavior; it is not aloe the teat hats efletve—he testo pain ors i he fas to comply—but the corresponding asurnce, posbly an ‘mpi one, that he can voll the pain or los Ht he toes comply. The prospec of certain deh nay stn him, butt gies imino choi. Coercion by teat of damage ako requires that our interests and oir opponents ot be abssuely opposed. I his pain were ur gre ligt and our saisfacion his genet woe, ve would jst proced to har and to frastate each other tis then spain vs us ile oo sailfacton compared. with What he can do for nd the conor inaction tha asus Gent ines tha he pu we on ust the oom fer Coercion. Coercion requis finding bargain, aranging fr him {0 be beter of doing what we want—wors of ot doing what ‘ve want—when he fakes tho thrstened penal info acount 10s this eaacty for pore damage, pore violence, that sus aly asioited withthe most vious lor dispute, with rca Aiorees, with cil uprisings and thei suppression, with rack txerng. ts so the per fo ut rater han brte forests ‘e ose in dealing with exminals; we hurt them afterward, oF threaten to, for thie mideeds rather than protect oureives with cordons of elec wie, masonry well, und. armed fuardh Jil ofcourse, canbe eter forcible restrit or teat fned_privaon; ifthe abet is to Keep ‘stinina cat, of rishi by confinement, sees is measured by how many of them are goton behind bars, but the objet ito treaten pre ‘ation, soca wl be meastred by how few have o be pet be- hind bars and sce then depens on the subjects understand ing ofthe consequences. Pute damage i what a car threatens when tis to hog the road o o Keep is righ share, otto fo int hough am itencton, A tank ora bulldozer ean force is way regardless of others’ wishes; the rest of us hive threaten damage, usually motos damage, hoping the ether stiver values hs ao hi imbseaough to ge a, hoping he TIE: DIPLOMACY OF VIOLENCE 5 sees us, and hoping he sin control of his own ear. The threat of pore damage wil not work against an unmanned vehicle. “This diference between coercion and brute force is as often in the Talent-as Ta the instrument, To hunt down Comanches ind to exterminate them was brute foree; to aid their villages to make them behave was coercive diplomacy, based on the power to hurt, The pain and loss to the Indians might have looked much the same one way as the other; the dillerence was ‘one of purpose and effect. If Indians were killed because they ‘were inthe way, or somebody wanted thei land, or the authori ties despaired of making them behave and covld not confine them and desided to exterminate them, that was pure unilateral force. If some Indians were kiled to make other Indians be- have, that was eoereive vilence—or intended to be, whether oF not it was effective. The Germans at Verdun perceived them- selves to be chewing up hundreds of thousands of French sol- irs in a gruesome "meatgrinder.” If dhe purpose was to elimi- nate @ military obstacle—the French infantryman, viewed military “asset” rather than as a warm human being—theoffen- sive at Verdun was a unilateral exerese of military force, If in- stead the object was to make the loss of young men—not of impersonal “effective” but of sons, husbands, fathers, and the pride of French manhood-—so anguishing as to be unendurabe, fo make surrender a welcome relief snd to spoil the foretaste of an Allied victory, then it was an exercise in coercion, in applied ‘lence, intended to offer relief upon accommodation. And of course, since any use of foree tends 10 be brutal, thoughts vengeful, or plain obstinate, the motives themselves can be mixed and confused. The fat that heroism and brutality ean be tither coercive diplomacy of a contest in pure strength does not ‘promise thatthe distinction will be made, and the strategies en ened by the distinction, every time some vicious enterprise stslaunched. “The contrast between brute force and coercion is illustrated by two alternative stratepies attributed to Genghis Khan. Early in his career he pursued the war ereed of the Mongols: the van- ‘uished can never be the friends of the victors, their death is6 ARMS AND INFLUENCE necessary for the victor’ safety. This wat the unilateral ex: termination of a menace or a liability. The twrning point of his career, according to Lynn Montross, came later when he di ‘covered how to use his power to hurt for diplomatic ends. “The great Khan, who was not inhibited by the usual mercies, con- tzived the plan of forcing captiver—women, children, aged fathers, favorite sons—to match ahead of his my as the fest Potential victims of resistance." Live captives have often proved more valvable than enemy dead; and the technigue dis- covered by the Khan in his maturity remains contemporary North Koreans and Chinese were reported to have quartered prisoners of war near strategie targets to inhibit bombing at- tacks by United Nations sireraft, Hostages represent the power ‘hurtin its purest form, Coercive Violence in Warfare ‘This distinction between the power to hurt and the power to hold forbs mportant in mxerh wa, Bolt ig and ile war, hypothe war and 7 the Gree C definitly but nether could quite take or hold forcibly what they waned or protect themscles from violence by phyla! means “The Jews i Palestine could not expel the British inthe Tate 1040s. hat they could cause psin and fear and frustration through terrorism, and eventually influence somebody's dec sion. The brutal war in. Alera was more a contest in pure iolenee than in mila strength; the question was who would fst find the pain and’ degradation tenduable, The French troops preferred—indeed they coninalytried—to make I a contest of stengh to pit iltary force against the nationalists ‘capacity for terror, to exterminate of dale the nationals ani to screen ofthe nationals fom the vitins of thie vio lence. But because in civil war terrorist commonly have secess to victims by sheer physiealpropinguity, the victims and thee properties could not be forcibly defended and inthe end the 1 yan Monts War Tough the Ages (3d ed. New Yor, Harpe | and Bote 1960 MB my Vrench toops themselves resorted, unsuccessfully, t0 a war of pai ‘Nobody believes that the Russians can take Hawaii from vs, ‘or New York, of Chicago, but nobody doubts that they might testray people and buiidings in Hawai, Chicago, or New York. Whether the Russians ean conquer West Germany in any mean- ingfu sense is questionable; whether they can hurt it terbly is not doubted. That the United States ean destroy a large pat of Russia is universally taken for granted; thatthe United Sates «an keep from being badly hurt, even devastated, in retur, oF «a keep Western Europe from being devastated while itself de- stroying Russa, sat best arguable; an it is virally ou of the «question that we could conquer Russia territorally and use its Sconomie assets unless it were by thretening disaster and in- cing compliance. Is the power to hurt, not military sreagth inthe traditional sens, that nkeres in our mos impressive mil ‘ary capabilities a time. We have a Department of, Pea empha tet cl (synonyms: requtal, reprisal, revenge, vengeance, retribution). ‘And itis pain and violence, not fore: in the traditional sense, ‘hat inheres also in some of the least. impresive military. capa- bits of the present time—the plastic bomb, the trrors's bull he burt crops, and the tortured farmer. ‘War appears tobe, or threatens t0 be, not so much a contest of strength as one of endurance, nerve, abstinay, and pai. It ppears to be, and threatens tbe, not s0 much a contest of nlitary strength as a bargaining process—dity, extortionats, and often quite reluctant bargaining on one side or both— nevertheless a bargaining process “The difeence cannot quite be expressed a one between the use of force and the threat of force. The actions involved in forcible accomplishment, o the one hand, and in fuliling a threat, on the other, can be quit diferent. Sometimes the most ‘fective direct ation ints enough cost or pain on the enemy toserve asa threat, sometimes not. The United States threatens the Sovit Union with vitteal destruction ofits society in the cvent of a surprise attack on the United States; a hundred mie’ ARMS AND INFLUENCE tion deaths ate awesome as pute damage, but they are uses in stopping the Soviet atack—especialy if the threat ist do ital ftervard anyway. So it is worth while to Keep the concept dlstnet—to distinguish foreible ation from the threat of paid recognizing that some actions serve a both a means of force bie accomplishment and a means of infcting pure damage, some do not, Hostages tend to entail almost pure pain and- damage, a do all forms of reprisal aftr the fact. Some modes of seledfense may exact so lit in blood or tessure a8 to en tail negligible violence; and some forcible actions entail so muuch violence that thir threat can be elective by il. ‘The power to hurt, though it can usualy accomplish nothin ao opel ate terion tena waigocee ‘capacity Tor forible accomplishment. By f ‘ven lead a hors f0 we cannot Tile DIPLOMACY OF VIOLENCE ° to be coerced by the fear of afew casuals Similarly on the bat thei: tactics that frighten soldiers so that they run, duck tel heads, olay down theie arms and surrender represent coercion Sse on the power to hur: tthe top command, which is frs- trated but not coerced, such tacties are part of the contest in nltary disipine and strength The fact that violenee—pure pain and damage—can be used tnsatened To eoetss-and to deer, to intimidate and to Bek tal, to demoralize and to-paflyze, im a conscious process of ‘Gey ening doesnot by any means imply that violence fx not often wanton sad-moaniglss of even wen PurPOS in dangSe-oE geting out of hand. Ancient wars were often quite total” for the loser, the men being put to death, the women sold as slaves, the boys castrated, the eat slaughtered, and the buildings leveled fo the sake of revenge, justice, personal gain, co merely custom, If an enemy bombs a city, by design or by areessness, we usually bomb his if we can. In the excitement and fatigue of warfare revenge is one of the few satisfactions that ean be savored; and justice ean often be construed t0 de- mand the enemy's punishment, even iit is delivered with more Cnthusiasm than justice roquites, When Jerusalem fell to the CCrusaders in 1099 the ensuing slaughter was one of the bloodi= cst in military chronicles, “The men of the West literally waded in gore, their march to the chutch of the Holy Sepulcher being sracsomely likened to “treading out the wine pres... ports Montross (p. 138), who observes that these exceses ust ily came atthe climax of the capture ofa fortied post or city For long the assailants have endured more punishment than they were able fo inflict; then once the walls are breached, pent tp emotions find an outlet in murder, rape and plunder, which discipline is powerless to prevent.” The same occurred when Tyre fell to Alexander after a painful siege, and the phenome- ron was not unknown on Pacific islands in the Second World War. Pure violence, lke fre, can be harnessed to a purpose; that does aot mean that behind every holocaust is a shrewd i tention successfully fled, ‘But if the occurrence of violence docs not always bespeak 8wo ARMS AND INFLUENCE shrewd parpose, the absence of pain and destruction is no sign that violence was ide, Violence is most purposive and. most successful whem its threatened and not used. Successful threats are those that donot have to be carried out. By European standards, Denmark was virtually unharmed in the Second ‘World War, it was violence that made the Danes submit, With- held violence—succesfully threatened violence—can look clean, even merciful. The fact that a kidnap vietim is returned lunhaemed, against receipt of ample ransom, does. not make Kidnapping a nonviolent enterprise. The American victory at Mexico City in 1847 was a great success; with a minimum of brutality we taded a capital city for everything we wanted from the war. We didnot even have to say what we could do to Mex ico City to make the Mexican government understand what they had at stake. (They had undoubiedly got the message a month earlier, when Vera Cruz was being pounded into submission, “After forty-cight hours of sheliie, the foreign consuls in that city approached General Sots headquarters to ask for a truce so that women, children, and neutrals could evacuate the city General Scot, “counting on such inteenal pressure to help bring about the eitys surrender,” refused their request and added that anyone, soldier of noacombatant, who attempted to leave the city would be fred upon.) ? ‘Whether spoken or not, the threat i usually there. In earlier eras the etiquette was more permissive. When the Persians wanted to induce some Tonian cities to surrender and join them, ‘without having to Right them, they instructed their ambassadors ‘make your proposals to them and promise that, if they aban- don their ales, there will be no disagreeable consequences 2 Ot A. Singtary, The Mescon War (Chicago, Universty of Chicago Pres, 1960), pp. 75-76. n tsar epsode the Gaul defen lng the town of Ale a2 B.C. “derided fo tend ot of the town those wom age or nem Incapaciated for Aging. "They came ‘up to the Roman orcaons and wih tears esoughi ihe soles To tke them at wanes and relieve the hunger But Caesar posted goad ‘on the ramparts wih ofders to refuse them douson Casal The Conguest of Wosihp. 2 ful 8A. Handford, tan (Balumore, Peng Books Ilr: DIPLOMACY OF VIOLENCE n for them; we will not st fie to their houses or temples, or teaten them with any greater harshness than before this trouble occurred. If, however, they refuse, and insist upon Hehing, then you must resort to threats, and say exactly what ‘we will do to them; tell them, that i, that when they are beaten they will be sold. as slaves, their boys: will be made cunuchs, their girls carried off to Bactria, and their land confscated?* It sounds like Hitler talking to Schuschnigg. “I only need to tive an onder, and overnight all the ridiulous scarecrows on the frontier will vanish . . . Then you wil really experience some thing. . .. After the Woops will follow the S.A. and the Le- pion, No one will be able to hinder the vengeance, not even nyse." (Or Henry V before the gates of Harfleur: ‘We may as bootless spend our vain command ‘Upon the enraged soldiers in their spoil [As send precops tothe leviathan To come ashore, Therefore, you men of Harfleut, ‘Take pty of your town and of your people, \Whiles yet my soldiers are ia my command; Whiles yet the cool and temperate wind of grace (O‘erblows the fthy and contagious clouds ‘Of heady murder, spoil and villainy. Tf not, why, in a moment look to see “The blind snd bloody soldier with foul hand Defile the locks of your shril-shricking daughters; “Your fathers taken by the silver beard, ‘And their most reverent heads dash'd tothe walls, Your naked infants spitted upon pikes, \Whiles the mad mothers with theit howls confused. Do break the clouds « ‘What say you? will you yet, and this avoid, (Or, guilty n defence, be thus destroy'd? (Act II, Scene i) 5. Herodotus, The Misore, Aubrey de Selncour, tans. (Baltimore Penguin Books, 1958). 362n ARMS AND INFLUENCE The Strategic Role of Pain and Damage Pure violence, nonmiltary violence, appears. most_conspic ‘Sain ligs Wetwon-nnoqal coatees, whe ae ‘substantial military challeng and the outeome of military en- agement not in_question, Hitler coukd make bis. threats ontemptuously and Brutally against Austria: he could make them, it he wished, in a more refined way against Denmark. Its noteworthy that it was Hitler, not his generals, who Used this Kind of language; proud military establishments do not like to think of themselves 2s extortionists, Theit favorite job is to de~ liver victory, to dispose of opposing military force and to leave most of the civilian violence to polities and diplomacy. But if there is no room for doubt how & contest in strength will come out, it may be possible to bypass the military stage altogether and to proceed at once to the coercive bargaining ‘A typical confrontation of unequal forces occurs atthe end of war, between vctor and vanquished. Where Austria was vl erable before a shot was fired, France was vulnerable after is nity shield had collapsed in. 1940, Surcender negotiations are the place where the threat of civil vflence cam come T0 ths en Fo one-sided, Tors, Surrender negotiations are of sided. oF the po- tential violence so unmi that bargaining succeeds the violence remains in reserve. But the fact that most of the sicquat damage was done during the military stage of the war, Prior to victory and defeat, docs not mean that violence was idle In the aftermath, only that ft was latent and the threat of it sue- cessfl Tdeed, victory is often but a prerequisite to the exploitation of the power to hurt. When Xenophon was fighting in Asia Minor ‘under Persian leadership, it took military. strength to disperse enemy soldiers and occupy their lands; but land was not what the victor wanted, noe Was Vetory for its own sake Next day the Persian leader burned the villages tothe ground, rot leaving single house standing, so as to strike terror into the other tribes to show them what would happen if they did IMP DIPLOMACY OF VIOLENCE a not give in. . . . He sent some ofthe prisoners into the hills und tld them fo say that f the inhabitants didnot come down ond sete in their houses to submit to him, he would bura up theie villages too and destroy their crops, and they would die of hunger Miltary victory was but the price of admission. The payoff de- pended upon the successful threat of violence. Like the Persian leader, the Russians crushed Budapest in 10956 and cowed Poland and other neighboring countries. There was a lag of ten years between military victory and this show of ‘olenee, but the priniple was the ene explained by Xenophon Mui wot the end of ‘id he fact that successful violence is usually held in reserve What about pure violence during war itself, the infliction of pin and suffering as a military teehnigus? Is the threat of pain Involved only inthe political use of vitory, or i it a decisive technique of war isell? Evidently between unequal powers it has been part of war- fare, Coloial conquest has often been a matter of “punitive ex- pedtions” rather than genuine. military engagements. If the tribesmen escape into the bush you ean burn their villages with- fut them until they assent to receive what, in strikingly modern language, used to be known as the Queen's “protectin.” British air power was used punitively against Arabian tribesmen in the 1920s and 30s to coerce them into submission * ioe ee ee _ eer eee cise eae“4 ARMS AND INFLUENCE If enemy forces are not strong enough to oppose, or ate un- willing to engage, there is no need to achieve victory a6 a pre- requisite to getting on witha display of coercive violence. When CCacsar was pacifying the tribes of Gaul he sometimes had to fight his way through their armed men in order to subdue them with a display of punitive violence, but sometimes he was vit ly unopposed and could proceed straight to the punitive ds- play. To hie legions there was more valor in Sighting their way to the seat of power; but, as governor of Gaul, Caesar could view enemy troops only as an obstacle to his political control, and that contol was usually based on the power to inflict pain, aret, and privation. In fact, he preferred to keep several hun ‘red hostages from the unreliable tribes, so that his threat of violence did not even depend on an expedition into the coun- nyse, Pure hurting, as a military tactic, appeared in some of the military actions against the plains Indians. In 1868, duing the war withthe Cheyennes, General Sheridan decided that his best, hope was to attack the Indians in their winter camps. His rea- soning was that the Indians could maraud as they pleased dur- ing the seasons when their ponies could subsist om grass, and in winter hide away in remote places. “To disabuse their minds from the idea that they were secure from punishment, and t0 strike at a period when they were helpless to move their stock and villoges, a winter campaign was projected against the large bands hiding away in the Indian territory." ® ‘These were not military engagements; they were punitive st- tacks on people. They were an effort to subdue by the use of violence, without a futile attempt to draw the enemy's military forces into decisive batle. They were “massive retaliation” on a lnwtreaking tte mutt be gen an sliemiive to being bombed and te told in te clearest possible terms what that keeatve ie ‘and, "ie woul be the grate mata to believe tata vetory which Spares the ves and feclings ofthe Toners need he aay less porn (slaty than one which inflts hey lus onthe fighting men and Ts a fee dnt om acon Sl" of he Ray Une Semizestutttion (London, May 1937) pp 343-5 Paull, Wellman, Death on she Pravle (Wem York, Mscmilan, 15a) \iminutive scale, with Toca effects not unlike those of Hiro- shima, ‘The Indians themselves totally lacked organization and sisciptne, and typically could not afford enovgh ammunition for target practice and were no military match forthe cavalry their own rudimentary strategy was at best one of haras- ment and reprisal. Half a century of Tadian fighting inthe West let usa legacy of cavalry tactics; but itis hard to find a serious twatie on American strategy against the Tdians or Tadian strategy against the whites, The Owen isnot the fist ceatiry in which “retaliation” has been pat of ou strategy, but iti the Fist in which we have systematically recognized it. ‘rting, asa strategy showed up in the American Civil Wa bout ak am episode, not asthe eeatral strategy. For the most part, the Civil War wes a military engagement with cach side's mii tary foree pitted against the other's. The Confederate forces hoped to lay waste enough Union trttory to negotiate thei a= dspendence, but hadn't enough capacity for such violence to make it work, The Union forees were intent on military victory, and it was. mainly Geral Shem that showed a ¢ ‘and artic Ope fase & how against my babar wer that war is war . If they want peace, they and their relatives must stop the war,” Sherman wrote, And one of his wsocites said, “Sherman is perfectly right ... The only Possible way to end this unhappy and dreadful confit . . . is {omake itteribte beyond endurance.” * ‘Making it “terrible beyond endurance” is what we associate with Algeria and Palestine, the crushing of Budapest and the tribal warfare in Central Africa, But in the great wars of the last hundred years it was usally military victory, not the hurting of the people, that was decisive; General Sherman's attempt to ‘make war hell for the Southern people did not come to a, “Fo Serine soy ‘nat soe Samp ta fescowar tant fom goverment {0 people and that pase Waking «produc of rvolston. This ws fo arty the prince of semonaey fo He uma stage» "The Conduct of Wars 1700186) (New Bedi, Rages Univeriy Brey 1361), Pp 107-12,16 ARMS AND INFLUENCE cpa mary sey fr testy flow. To snk Sita aeey then ly foe achieve ¢ Satng ony tt ey tis oe roel a Sse thse eal aim of estan sey ah wo in Nn glen a on alert bargain not a process of bargaining. aa i cin cout se so avn 0 oe Sa pay mamas ere te arp nese fy ol) To ‘Son splint te clog nd peppy a war faa ner ar neon yg ke el over a Inte cn eng n Ward War ep Sere videce (tating deci tre mir vy ma ached Micka hared'was aed atte whl een nation, nt Sarat ncaa in te Fie Wo War were vic fo ected a fh vile cut. It beer ton, ge Ser acc choot he Sut i te Ch War ot he aval Pores bh wel war or abr. wre tpi Burs eget oma var een a he pc cn fts eee t eaey ey Spi oars Teper dan egomets wee mie, but evar nnd fo teres abut he prone ngs ete pron we fark gine ight be te, “Smog Sctig! of omy tomes an So saan sen Tdi eon cpm end pion oa att on pole taste cama cu Gat tame, wan lo Sip cle te pp ooh ney cept sae as toe en enna no te Sage thei be doe war Sn anal a more ly tema an aeey cl city eying wr ail oe pe usa aya ely weatenng he eon on whch ‘nny eld sri te ie flechette oat oo IIE DIPLOMACY OF VIOLENCE ” ‘But as terrorism—as violence intended to coeree the enemy rather than to weaken him miltarily——Blockade and strategic teombing by themselves were not quite up to the job in ether World war in Europe. (They might have been sufficient in the War with Japan after straightforward military action had Fought American aircraft into range.) Ainplanes could not iqte’ make punitive, coercive violence decisive in Europe, at Kast om a tolerable time schedule, and preclude the need to de feat o to destroy enemy forces as long as they had nothing but ‘onentional explosives and incendiaries to carry. Hitler's V- tyuza bomb and tare fairy pure cases of weapons whose purpose vss 10 intimidate, to hurt Britain itself rt ‘han Allied maitary forces. What the V-2 needed was. punitive pyload worth earying, and the Germans did-not-haveit-Some ‘i the expectations in the 1920s and the 1930s that another ‘major war would be one of pure civilian violence, of shock and fertor from fhe skies, were fot borne out by the available tech nology. The threat of punitive violence kept occupied countries {iesoen; but the wars were won in Europe on the basis of brute strength and skill and not by intimidation, not by the threat of civilian violence but by the application of military force. Miltary victory was still the price of admission. Latent Violence against people was reserved for the politics of sur- render and occupation. The great exception was the two atomic bombs on Japanese cites, These were weapons of terror and shock. They hurt, and Promised. more hurt, and that was their purpose. The few ‘nall” weapons we had were undoubtedly of some direct mili- tary value But their enormous advantage Was in pure violence. Ina military sense the United States could gain a litle by de- stnuction of two Japanese industrial cites; in a civilian sense, the Japanese could lose mich, Th bomb that it Hiroshims. vasa that aimed ar alt Japan, The poiial target ofthe Bomb was of Hiroshima or the Tatries they ‘worked in, but the survivors ia Tokyo. The two bombs were in the tradition of Sheridan against the Comanches and Sherman in Georgia. Whether in the end those two bombs saved lives or6 ARMS AND INFLUENCE wasted them, Japanese lives or American lives; whether pusi- tive coercive violence is uglier than straightforward military force of more civilized; whether teror is more or less humane than military destruction; we can at least perceive that the ‘bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki represented violence against the country ite and not mainly aa attack on Japan's material strength. The effect of the bombs, and their purpose, were not mainly the military destruction they accomplished but the pain and the shock and the promise of more. The Nuclear Contribution to Terror and Violence ‘Man has, its said, forthe frst time in history enough military power to eliminate his species from the earth, weapons aguinst Which there is no conceivable defense. War has become, it is said, s0 destructive and terrible that it ceases to be an instr ‘ment of national power. “For the fist time in human history," says Max Lerner in a book whose tite, The ge of Overkil, conveys the point, “men have bottled up a power... . which they have thus far not dared to use." And Soviet military au- thortes, whose party dislikes having to accommodate an entire theory of history to single technological event, have had to ‘examine sot of principles that had boen given the embarrass ing name of "permanently operating factors” in warfate. In- deed, our era 18 epitomized by words like “the first time in hhuman history,” and by the abdication of what was “perma- For dramatic impact these statements are splendid. Some of them display a tendency, not at all necessary, to belie the catastrophe of ealir wars. They may exaggerate the historical novelty of deterrence and the balance of terror” More impor 9, New Yor, Sinon and Schner,1982 p. 7 Yih Winase Ch one ced til tm, “tlc of ton of miclear mista tench, though fom sesh in Seite in November 984 “Te tee we a ad Seer ee ener tel sea esmena erat ean penawintoear cd Being thle to nist simon oon he enemy oes Sama IP DIPLOMACY OF VIOLENCE » lont, they do not help to idenily just what is new about war Wis so much destructive energy ean be packed in watheads at "pice that permits advanced countries to have them in lage umber. Nuclear warheads ae incomparably more devastating than anything packaged before. What does tha imply about isnot tue thal for she Sst sme in-isory man-bas-the capability to destroy a large fasion, even the majar pst of the hhuman_race, Japan was defenseless by August 1945. With a combination of Bombing and blockade, eventually invasion, and iC necessary the deliberate spread of disease, the United States could probably have exterminated the population of the Japa- nese islands without nuclear weapons. It would have been a tvesome, expensive, and mortifying campaign; it would have token time and demanded persistence. But we had the economic nnd technical capacity to doit and, together with the Russians or without them, we could have done the same in many popu i = parts ofthe word, much th jone-with an ‘so-pick. And it would not have strained our Gross National Product 1 do itwith ice picks. It isa grisly thing to talk about, We didnot do it and it isnot imaginable that we would have done it. We had no reason; if we had had a reason, we would not have the persistence of pur- pose, once the fury of war had been dissipated in victory and we had taken on the task of executioner. If we and our enemies might do such a thing to each other now, snd to others 28 well, be can infit opon ourselves. Do not let vs underave the cacy th aie ac vein pace m3 tn fot themselves equily capable of lflcung damage upon ‘sch eer ‘fom it Adoption and both sufer te most hideos sejocalijuie, 12 aa onl posible bt it seems probable that nether wil ep that means” A facinating reexamiation of concepts like tere, Pictmpive. atch couteforce and countersty wars easton, and limited war, im the statpe Irate Of thet ge fro $a‘ he ery to he chow a Word War sn Greer2” ABMS AND INFLUENCE its not because nuclear weapons have forthe rst time made it feasible, “Nuclear meapons can doit quickly. That makes a diflerence When the Crusaders breached the walls of Jerusalem they sacked the city while the mood was on them. They burned things that they might, with time to reflect, have carried away instead and raped women that, with time to think about it, they might have married instead, To compress a catastrophic war within the span of time that a man ean stay awake drastcal ‘anges the polities of war, the process of decision, the posibil ity of central control and restraint, the motivations of people in charge, and the capacity to think and reflect while war is in progress. It is imaginable that we might destroy 200,000,000 osians ina war of the present, though not 80,000,000 Japs nese in a war of the past Its not only imaginable, itis imag- ined, Itis imaginable because it could be done “in a moment, in the twinkling ofan eye, atthe last trumpet.” "This may be why there is $0 litle discussion of how an all-out war might be brought to a close, People do not expect it to be “rought” f0 a close, but just to come fo an end when every thing has been spent, Te is also why the idea of “Timited war” hnas become so explicit in recent years. Egle: wars, like Wor ‘and ILof the Franco-Prussian” War-were_ limited by ending that occurred before the period of tential violence, by negotiation that brought ‘rear of pain and privation to bear but often precluded the massive exercise of clin violence. With nuclear weapons favailable, the restraint of violence cannot await the outcome of ‘contest of military stength; restraint, to occur at all, must ‘eur during war itself “This isa dillerence between nuclear weapons and bayonet ‘bis aot in the number of people they-can eventually Kil But thespeed-with-whichitcan be done, in the centalization of dé- isin, in he-divoree of the war from political processes, andin computerized programs that threaten to take the war out of Ihuman hands once it begins. "That nuclear weapons make it posible to compress the fury IIE DIPLOMACY OF VIOLENCE 2 of global war Into a few hours does not mean that they make it inevitable, We have sil ask whether that isthe way a major hcleae war would be fought, or cught to be fought. Neverthe- less, thatthe whole war might go off Uke one big string of fie- crackers makes a critical diference between our conception of hnelear war and the world wars we have experienced There is no guarantee, of couse, that a slower war would not persist. The First World War could have stopped at any time ter the Batle of the Marne. There was plenty of time to think tout war aims, to consult the long-range national interest, t0 Fellect on costs and casualties already incurred and the prospect ‘of more fo come, and to discuss terms of cessation with the enemy, The gruesome business continued as mechanically as i ithad been in the hands of computers (or worse: computers ‘might have been programmed to leara more quickly from ex- fetience). One may even suppose it would have been a blessing had all the pain and shock of the four years been compressed within four days, Stl it was terminated. And the victors had no Stomach for doing then with bayonets what nuclear weapons ‘ould do to the German people today. There is another diference. Inthe past it has usually been the victors who could do what they pleased to the enemy. War has ‘often been “total war” for the loser. With deadly monotony the Persians, Greeks, or Romans “put to death all men of military ‘age, and sold the women and children into slavery,” leaving the ‘efeated teritory nothing but its name until new sites arrived Sometime later, But the defeated could not do the same to their victors. The boys could be castrated and sold only after the war had been won, snd only on the side that lost it. The power to hurt could be brought ¢o beat only after military strength had achieved vietory. The same sequence characterized the great wars of this century; for reasons of technology and geography, riltary force has usually had to penetrate, to exhaust, or 10 collapse opposing military force—to achieve military vitory— before it could be brought to bear om the enemy nation isl. The Allies in World War I could not inlict coercive pain and suffering direcdy on the Germans in a decisive way until theycould defeat the German army; and the Germans could not ‘coerce the French people with bayonets unless they ist beat the Allied troops that stood in their way. With two-dimensional warfare, there is a tendency for troops to confront each other, shielding their own lands while attempting to press into each ‘others. Small penetrations could aot da major damage to the people; large penetrations were so destructive of military organ- Jaation that they usually ended the military phase of the ws ‘Nuclear weapons make it possible to do monstrous violence o-the enemy without fist achieving victory. With nucleat’ weapons and today’s means of delivery, one expects fo pene ‘rate_an enemy homeland without first collapsing his military force. What nuclear weapons have done, or appear t0 do, is 10 promote this kind of watfae to frst place. Nuclear weapons {eaten to make war ess military, and are responsible for the lowered status of “military victory" at the present time. Victory is no longer a prerequisite for hurting the enemy. And itis no assurance agent being terribly hut, One need not wait until he has won the war before inflicting “unendurable” damages on bis enemy. One need not wait until he has Tost the war, There was a time when the assurance of victory——false or genuine assurance could make national leaders not just willing but sometimes enthusiastic about war, Not now. ‘ot only can nuclear weapons hurt she enemy before the war 128 been won, and perhaps hurt decisively enovgh to make the military engagement academic, but itis widely sumed that in ‘4 major war that is all they ean Jo, Major war is often discussed 1s though it would be oniy a contest in national destruction, I this is indeed the case—if the destruction of cities and their populations has become, with nuclear weapons the primary ob- ject in an all-out war—the sequence of war has been reversed, Tnstead of destroying enemy forces as a prelude to imposing | one's will on the enemy nation, one would have to destroy the nation as a means or a prelude to destroying the enemy forces. fone cannot disable enemy forces without vrtally destroying the country, the victor does ot even have the option of sparing the conquered nation. He has already destryed it. Even with HN" DIrLoMAcY OF VIOLENCE 2 chide and strategic bombing it could be supposed that a y would be defeated before it was destroyed, or would ict surrender before annitilation had gone far. In the Civil War i could be hoped that the South would become too weak lo fight before it became too weak to survive, For “all-out” war, wylear weapons threaten to reverse this sequence. clear weapons do make a diference, marking an epoch Wn warfare. The efference isnot justin the amount of destruc- that ean be accomplished but in the role of destruction and Inthe decision process. Nuclear weapons can change the speed MW evens, the control of events the sequence of events, the rela- tion of victor to vanquished, and the relation of homeland to lining front, Deterrence rests today on the threat of pain and fstinction, not just on the threat of military defeat. We may syjue about the wisdom of announcing “unconditional sur- Tendce” a8 an aim in the last major war, but seem to expect tincondtional destruction” as a matter of course in another Something lke the same destruction always could be done, Wit nuclear weapons there isan expectation that it would be Te js not “overkil” thats new-the American army surely hit enough 30 ealiber bullets to kill everybody in the world in 1945, oF af it did not it could have Bought them without any esi, What is new is plain *kil—the idea that major war ‘night be just a contest in the Kling of countries, or not even a “ote bu oat two parallel exercises in devastation That is the diffrence nuclear weapons make. At least they ‘nay make that difference. They also may not. If the weapons themselves are vulnerable to attack, or the machines that carry them, a succesful surprise might eliminate the opponents means of retribution, That an enormous explosion can be pack- aged ina single bom docs not by itslf guarantce thatthe vi lor will receive deadly punishment. Two gunfighters facing each other ia a Western town had an unguestoned eapacity to ill fe another; that did not guarantee that both would die in a tunfight—only the slower ofthe two, Less deadly weapons, per- rntting an injured one to shoot back before he died, might havePa ARMS AND INFLUENCE bbeen more conducive to a restraining balance of terror, ot caution, The very efficiency of nuclear weapons could) ma them ideal for starting war, if they can suddenly eliminate 1 enemy's capability to shoot back, ‘And there isa contrary possibility: that nuclear weapons a not vulnerable fo attack and prove not to be terribly effective against each other, posing no need to shoot them quickly f fear they will be destroyed before they are launched, and with n task available but the systematic destruction of the enemy country and ao necessary reason o do it fast rather than slowly Imagine that nuclear destruction had to go slowly—that the bombs could be dropped only one per day. The prospect woul look very diferent, something like the most terroristc guer warfare on a massive seale Jt happens that nuclear war doe to go slowly; but it may also not have t0 go speedily ‘mere ‘Of nuclear weapons docs not itself deter everything must go off ja a binding fash, any mor than that it must go slowly. Nuclear weapons do not simplify ‘things quit that much, In seent years there has been a new emphasis on dining tvising what nuclear weapoor make posse and what hey Ia inovable in case of war The American government bo fm in 1961 to emphasize tat even a major nvr war might fot and red nt be singe cotta eu fry. Ste thy MeNamara gives cantoversial speech in June 1962 oa the sa that "erence" might operate even in wa el, cha beligerent might, out of sents, tempt mit th wa stucvenat Each might fee the sheer. destucton of neny people and cies would serve o dese mlary pur se But ata conned reo Yo detoy them might sve Purpose The continvd teat would depend on th aot beg Soaroyed yet. Each might eiprocate he ors esta, i Tied was of leer seope, Even he wo lesen ia the inert of recproiy, hve often not mulated pisones of war and zs might trv comparable testes. "The ory ‘oC aucer tacks might fall mny.on each ote’ wespont $d mary forces. lt DIPLOMACY OF VIOLENCE 2s The United States as come to the conclusion," said Seere- lary MeNamara, that to the extent feasible, basic military strategy in a $6) ible general war shold be approached i much the same way) that more conventional military operations have been re funded in the past, That isto $3, principal miltary obje-| should be the destruction of the enemy's military | forces, nt of his civilian populaion . . . giving the possible | Spponent the strongest imaginable incentive to retrain from | {king ovr own cites a This sa sensible way to shink about wa, i ne as to think out it and of course one does. But whether the Secretary's new stategy” was sensible or net, whether enemy populations shouldbe held hostage or instanly desuoyed, whether the pr- hry tages shonld be militar forest oF just people and their toute of livelihood this snot “much the same way that more Sonveational military operations have been regarded in the fost This i utely difleent, and the diference deserves trap Tn World Wars I and Ione went 1 work on enemy militery fous not his people, beause anubthecaeay' itary forecs had bees Jake ce there was typically aot anything sive that one could do tothe enemy sation iif, The Germans did hot in World War I, celrain fom Bayoneting French citizens by the milions in the Tope that the Allies Would abstain from ‘ooting up the German population. They eould net get atthe French citizens un they had breached the Aled ies. iter tried to terrorize London and did not make it. The Allied sic forces took the war straight t0 Hie’ tertry, with at least tome thought of doing in Germany what Sherman recognized he Wear doing ia. Georgy but with the bombing tchaology of Works War tone could not aod 1 bypas the tops and go txclusively for enemy popolations—not, anyway, in Germany. ‘Wah aelear weapons one has that alternative. To concentrate on the enemy’s military installations while de- iberately holding in reserve a massive capacity for destroying 11, Commencement Address, Unvesy of Michigan, Jone 16, 19626 ARMS AND INFLUENCE 11" DIPLOMACY OF VIOLENCE ” his cities, for exterminating his people and eliminating his soci] os targets by both Axis and Allied forces, not decisively but cy, on condition thatthe enemy observe similar restraint withlMl yevertheless deliberately. The trend has been the reverse of fRapect to one’ own society, is not the “conventional ap-MM hat the International Commies hoped fr. prouch.” In World Wars T and TE the fst order of business Wis presen era noncombatants appear i be not only de Aresoy auc armed forces beease ta wat the only pron pe aes essere 46 an for ising way to make him surrender. To fight a purely military Ear abcan ts tee Soca temp etTpee Sngggement “all-out” while Holding in reserve a deci capae-f {yr Tasi- noncombatants appeared to be primary targets at both {ior violence, on condition the enemy do likewise, is not thell ends ofthe scale of warfare; thermonuclear war threatened to ‘lay miltary operations have tradtonally been approached Ml by a contest inthe destruction of ees and populations; and, at Sreetary MeNamara was proposing new approach to warfarelMl he other end of the sae, insurgency is almost ently trons inane crn, era fm whith the power to hurts more inpres Ml, We ive in an er of ty wa. sive than the power to opp. Why ie this so? Is wae properly a military aair among combatants, and sit depravity petal tothe twentieth ene om Batlefeld Warfare 10 the Diplomacy of Violence ary that we cannot keep it within deent bounds? Oris wari Ce alee “BB icccaly dy, and was the Red Cross nosalge for an atl ‘Almost one hundred years before Secretary McNamara's} civilization in which war had become encrusted with eti- Mera re eee Cea Eee Tae ee Saran ee CM "eee geet decal beccnalaeeers asserted, “The only legitimate object which states should en- in the involvement of noncombatants—of plain people and their deavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the military possessions—in the fury of war. These stages are worth distin {forces of the enemy.” And in a letter to the League of Nations! quishing; but their sequence is merely descriptive of Western Pore rere ensats ER lang aah e sehen noemern Red Cross wrote; “The Committce considers it very desirable seneralization, The first stage is that in which the people may i reeee mmn —aemre torre tant ceca ee eee ee ‘outside the struggle and its consequences.” '* His language is ‘From about 1648 to the Napoleonic era, war in much of remarkably similar to Secretary McNamara’. ‘Western Europe was something superimposed on society. It was ‘The International Commitice was fated for disappointment, Mf 4 contest engaged in by monarchies for stakes that were meas- like everyone who labored in the late nineteenth century to def ced in territories and, occasionally, money or dynastic claims. Te ee ee ora eae tears cee re ee Cross was founded in 1863, it was concerned about the diste-| was confined to the aristocratic elite. Monarchs fought for bits ‘gard for noncombatants by those who made war; but in the ff of territory, but the residents of disputed terrain were more con- ‘Second World War noncombatants were deliberately chosen ccrned with protecting their crops and their daughters from Sores acer nae aay a loops eee ree imarr ea eetegam reesen ee mee Saino ee Linton ofthe Dangers Incuved hy the Civitan Population in Tine] (of War (286d. Genera, 1988), pp. 188, 151 War, tle concerned that the territory in which they lived had a8 ARMS AND INFLUENCE ew sovereign Furthermore, a far othe King of Praa eT fhe Engeror of Austia were concerned, the loyalty an Sxthusasm at the Bobemian farmer were not deve conse caine Te san exaggeration to refer to European war during Sh petiod as spor of king, Dut not a. ross exaggeration, “pasRbe mltary logistics of those day confined military opera- a toa scale that did not reqite the ethusism of a multi tude Tiurting people was not a decisive instrument of warfare fading ors Sxtoyng propery oy reced the vale of tha tne that were being fought over, to the disadvantage of Pou aike. Furtbermore, the monarchs who conducted Wars vt Hid not want to discredit the social insitions they shared ‘yl tnir enemies. Bypassing an enemy monarch and taking the rar taght to his people would have had revolutionary imp “Silo Bestroying the opposing monarchy was often notin the santas of either side; opposing sovereigns had much more in veers with each ober than with their own subjects, and 10 reat the claims ofa monarchy might have produced disas- trun tacts ent sorpiing—o,H 1 sureing ot ‘itogeterastoaishing-that onthe European continent i tha aril era wat was fairly wel confined to lary acti ‘uc soul sl, in thse days and in that pat ofthe world, be ‘concerned forth rights of noncombatants and hope to devise SSS hat both sdesin te war might observe. The rles might ‘Rabe observed because both sides had something to gin from Yfesening socal order and not destoying the enemy. Rules rt bees nuisance, but if hey rested both sides the dsad- ‘vantages might cancel out ni ope dureg te Napoleonic wars, Napoleons ‘France, poplo-cared about the outeome. The nation was mobil- aL Tie war was--natonalsfor, pot just an Alt Of the ‘fhe was both pole and mitary genius on the part of ‘Napoleon and his ministers that an entire nation could be m0- bed tor wae. Propaganda became a tol of warfare, and war ‘became vlgarize. Ta. Ching, Unveriy of Chiago Pres, 1940, p. 296 Many writers deplored thie popularization of wa volvement of the democratic mates. In fect, the horrors We atibute to thermonuclear war were already foreseen by many commentators, sme before the First World War and mere alter 5; But the new “weapon” to which these terors were ascribed ‘was people, milion of people, passionately engaged in national wars spending themscles in a quest for tt vietory and desperate to avoid total defeat. Today we are impressed that a small number of highly tained pilots can carey enough energy to blast and buen tns of millions of people snd the buildings they live into oF tree generations ago there was concer that teas of milons of people wsing bayonets and barbed wie, ma Chine guns and shrapns, could crate the same kind of destruc. tion and disorder. “That was the sscond stage in the relation of people t0-war, the second in Europe since the midale of the seventeenth con: {OFF Whe St stage pope aes neutral but thee ight be ivegnrded nts secon sage peopl were invlsd “peau was Mir war. Some fought, some prodiced material cof war, some produced food, and some took care of children; ‘out they wore al part ofa warsmaking nation. When Hite at tacked Poland in 1939, the Poles had reason to care about the outcome. When Churcil said the Britsh would fight on the teaches, he spoke for the British and not for a mercenary army. The war was about something that mattered. It people would rathcr fight a dsty war than lose a clean on, the wae will be tetween nations sad aot just Between governments. If people have an infuence on whether the wat i continved oe on the terms ofa trace, making the war hurt people serves a parpose. eis a dirty purpose, but war itself is often about something diy, The Poles and the Norwegians, the Rosia andthe Brit ish, had reason to believe that if they lost the war the cose quences would be diy. This is s0 evident in modern civ vrare—ciil wars that involve popula feclings—thot we expect them to be bloody and violet. To hope that they Would be fought cleanly with no violence to people would be a litle Hike hoping for clean race ot” ARMS AND INFLUENCE ‘There as another way to put it that helps to bring out the se quence of events. If « modern war were 4 clean one, the vio- ence would not be ruled out but merely saved forthe postwar period. Once the army has been defeated in the clean war, the Wetorious enemy can be as brutally coercive as he wishes. A clean war would determine which side gets to use its power to hurt coerevely after victory, and iti likely to be worth some violence to avoid being the loser “Surrender” is the process following military hostilities in which the power to hurt is brought to bear, If surtender nogotia- tions are sucessful and not followed by overt violence, i is be- cause the capacity to inflct pain and damage was successfully used in the bargaining process. On the losing sie, prospective pain and damage were averted by concessions; om the winning ‘de, the capacity for inflicting further harm was traded for con cessions. The sime is true in a successful kidnapping. It only reminds us thatthe purpose of pure pain and damage is extor- tion; it is latent violence that can be used to advantage ‘A-well-behaved occupied country is not one in which violence plays no part it may be one in which latent violence is used so skilfully that it need not be spent in punishment, stags oth pdsopsin teers nea an ‘war itself, they need not wait for the surrender negotiation that Siesels amily decison, Itone can cere pope and thelr orton wie wa lng om, one ie A he ae achieved itn i losng by spending 1 all lsing war. General Sherman's march throvg- Georgy might ave’ ade ot much sone, possibly more had the North teen losing the war, stat the German bhzz bombs andV-2 rockets can be thought of as coercive Stuments to get the war slopped beoresileriag altar de- fae Ta the present er snce ant the major East-West powers are capable of mae clan yicence daring wa sell Beyond anything vale daig the Seood Word War, the o=ston for etait does ot avait he acivement of miltary tory THE DIPLOMACY OF VIOLENCE a or truce. The principal restraint ducing the Second World War was a temporal boundary, the date of surrender. In the present cera we find the violence dramatically restrained during War it self. The Korean War was furiously “all-out” in the fighting, not ‘only on the peninsular battlefield but in the resources used by both sides. 1 was “all-out,” though, only within some dramatic restraints: n0 nuclear weapons, no Russians, no Chinese te tory, no Japanese territory, no bombing of ships at sea oF even sirflelds on the United Nations sie ofthe line. It was a contest in military strength circumscribed by the threat of unprece- ‘dented civilian violence. Korea may or may not be a. good ‘model for speculation on limited war in the age of nuclear vio- lence, but it was dramatic evidence that the eapacity for vio- lence can be consciously restrained even under the provocation cof war that measures its military dead in tens of thousands and that fully preoecupies two of the largest counties in the world ‘A consequence of this third stage is that “vietory” inade- quately expresses what a nation wants from its military frees, Mostly it wants, in these times, the influence that resides in latent fore. It wants the bargaining power that comes from its ‘capacity to hurt, not just the direct consequence of successful military action. Even total victory over an enemy provides at best an opportunity for unopposed violence against the enemy Population. How to use that opportunity in the national interest, fo in some wider interest, can be just a8 important as the achievement of victory itself; but traditional military science oes not tell us how to use that eapacity for inficting pain, And ‘fa nation, vitor o potential Toser, is going to ute is capacity for pure violence to influence the enemy, there may be no need toawait the achievement of total victory. ‘Actually, this third stage can be analyzed into two quite itferent variants. In one, sheer pain and damage are primary instruments of coercive warfare and may actually be applied, 10 itimidate orto deter. Inthe other, pain and destruction in war are expected to serve litle ot no purpose but prior threats of sheer violence, even of automatic and uncontrolled violence, areARMS AND INFLUENCE 2 coupled to milary fore, The dence inthe albor none gurl tence and intndatin. Two acute dmimes cog the choke of making prospective olc0 as ee oes ot pombe being with some capac fr Fp fee The other i the cole of making rtaiaon torte reat gee or keeping deliberate contol over the Fae aesscos The choets ate dearmied pal By goer {at ey tenolgy Both variants are characterized Dy mes Pa le of puincand desrction—ot threatened (0t ita) pun and icin. Dt noe th et eh sa ik aagter and ey ening lene gOS: a Snr progessne pam a damage may actualy be wsed va ar Bote The presets for counties posesing wate pont is complex aid uncertain Bend ofthe 0. a Se Titimacy, bse onthe power our ws8 pO a owe poids of history whem miliary free was sa he pesto aks and fo Bolo fend of tack od caer ade and to poses tory guns! opposiion— te eae pe cain which mlilary foes tended f0 pit sell ta ming force Even the, 2 cial qunon was Bow esi Seer ai the oor ide would ner forthe disputed rh om Te met tet te, Miers would concede as Kew Mess an Calflora oe Meio Cy wt era sour handy as diplomatic judgment, not amit et oe could no ea tke the parle testy Be oe Aor hal against atk, ho could ake something ese war St sogpleg what the enc Iadrs would t8e— Seed i Oren log a he had ale sup of food Saar tut for am uneapeted accent says Heradots, the Sager wold have, peeved wile and the tee ul te AISA bers children the targaiiog tore complex Cz THE DIPLOMACY OF VIOLENCE a te i capil hy or national survivals cite part ot Srey een Inthe pst, Nw we are nan erain whch the power to hurt—4o fait pan and shock and praon on Sony tet ton flay fre oemensate Sith the power to take and to ol, perhaps moe hen om mens, perhpe dee, and teen mow ner 1 thin of wate proces of vent bargaining Ti ae the Sst ran wich Ine capes have teen worth mote that Sead orem ad the powe tou is ena turgalg af antges Bt is he asim American expres when tht End of power as been domiaat pat of miliary rentons "T-pmce ot xing new in at ‘ted Sates mode ecology: rail Sato tportce of pure unconsuctves aneooaTNe Fa image wheter to ls ‘This tom enhance he inprtance War an ENS Wat ts techie of fnfene, nt of destruction; of cotton ad Sereno cong ste a Bring an ‘uiney Wight, n his Study of Wor, devoted few (619-20) tothe “sane vale” of ma, wing the analogy ot 2 ankober vita bom in his band that weld desey Sea and otber, Nuance vale ade te thea of wa crag to Weg an ilo the omacy of uscruplcas pres Int" Now we eed suger tra and move peg to do th bet ui, and need fo tcopize ta re palo fevernment ote have It ce oly on mir Tes et freoanary how many eats on war and suey Mave Se sind 10 ecognize tit the power fo hut hs been thot istry, fndamentl charter of mifry Toe’ and fda mentale iptoay bao "Wat no oat looks Ie jt acme of tength, War and the Bik of warare mores cont of ache and Pking of pain. and endurance. Smal wars embody te heat ofa ger Stace ot jt miliary engagements but “esp, ‘mag’ The ten of war has ava fen somewhe be neath international diplomacy, but for Ameritas now4 ARMS AND INELUENCE much nearer the surface, Like the threat of strike in industrial Telations, the thveat of divorce in a family dispute, or the threat of bolting the party at political convention, the threat of vio- ‘nce continuously cireumseribes international pois. Neither strength nor goodwill procures immunity. Miltary strategy can no longer be thought af, as it could for some countries in some eras, as the science of military victory. ts now equally, not more, the art of coercion, of intimida~ tion and deterrence, The instruments of war are more punitive than acquisitive. Miltary strategy, whether we ike itor ot, has become the diplomacy of violence.