INTERNATIONAL SECURITY UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS

31 March 2005

Peter Sickle, George Washington University, IAFF 005

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS

1.

Overview

2.
3.

Concepts
History

4.
5.

Current Trends
Policy Options

6.
7.

Cases
Looking Ahead
Peter Sickle, George Washington University, IAFF 005

31 March 2005

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS

1. Overview

Beyond War
Non-State Actors Intra-State Transnational Challenges to sovereignty The weak fighting the strong Outside the laws and norms of warfare Challenges for states to practice attrition, containment, deterrence, compellence, or negotiation

31 March 2005

Peter Sickle, George Washington University, IAFF 005

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS

1. Overview

Insurgency

Guerrilla Warfare Terrorism

Transnational Crime
Narco-trafficking Piracy Human Trafficking

31 March 2005

Peter Sickle, George Washington University, IAFF 005

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS

2. Concepts

Unconventional Threats
Use of organized violence by one or more non-state parties

Insurgency
Effort by non-state actor(s) to acquire control of territory and/or political control through the use of force

Guerrilla Warfare
Insurgency by militia organized but covert using force against government military forces to control territory and/or political representation

Terrorism
Non-state individuals and organizations using force (or threat) against civilians to pursue political, ideological, or religious goals

Transnational Crime
Non-state individuals and organizations using force (or threat) against government, corporations and individuals to acquire wealth

31 March 2005

Peter Sickle, George Washington University, IAFF 005

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS

2. Concepts

Clausewitz Challenged
Center of Gravity different from those of states; not easily identified Mass irrelevant for covert networks; indistinguishable from civilians Friction states present multiple targets; collective punishment

Fog of War concealment and dispersion favor the non-state actor

Legitimacy
Battle for Hearts and Minds Enough force? Too much force? Force multiplier the weak overcoming the strong

Resources
Membership Safe Haven

Money Arms
31 March 2005 Peter Sickle, George Washington University, IAFF 005

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS

2. Concepts

Advantages to the State

Resources personnel, weapons, funding, intelligence (?) International Law international community of states Safe Haven

Advantages to the Non-State Actor

Asymmetric will/motivation Operational surprise

Dispersion Concealment Access to targets

Advantages Up for Grabs

Legitimacy public support or hearts and minds
Peter Sickle, George Washington University, IAFF 005

31 March 2005

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS

2. Concepts

One mans terrorist is another mans freedom fighter Terrorists dont want a lot of people dead, they want a lot of people watching Terrorists are evildoers

31 March 2005

Peter Sickle, George Washington University, IAFF 005

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS

3. History

Rogues
Ex. Pirates; Gangs; Highwaymen

Rebellions/Revolutions
Ex. American Colonials; French Peasants; Bolsheviks; Maos Communists

Self-Determination/Anti-Colonialism
Ex. Zealots and Gauls v. Roman Empire; Vietnamese and Algerians v. French; Zionists and Mau Maus v. British; Filipinos v. U.S.

Terrorism
Ex. IRA (N. Ireland); Hizballah (Lebanon); Al Qaeda (global); Aum Shinrikyo (Japan); Red Brigades (Italy); Jamaa Islamiyya (Indonesia); Weathermen Underground (U.S.); Red Army Factions (Germany); Sendero Luminoso (Peru)

31 March 2005

Peter Sickle, George Washington University, IAFF 005

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS

3. History

Changes to System
Distribution of power Failing empires Changing norms democracy Imitation effect success breeds success

Technological Innovation
Small Arms; effective explosives Virtual communities; Global travel

Mass Media Communications

Newspapers; radio; television; internet and 24/7 cable

31 March 2005

Peter Sickle, George Washington University, IAFF 005

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS

3. History

Post WWII
Anti-Colonialism/SelfDetermination independence particularly British and French Algeria, Palestine, Indochina, Burma, Kenya Widespread surplus of small arms and fighters with combat-experience

31 March 2005

Peter Sickle, George Washington University, IAFF 005

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS

3. History
1960s-1970s
Social Revolutionary movements violent and non-violent

Rise of religious fundamentalism (esp. Islam v. secular/corrupt regimes)

Mass media and travel global communities

31 March 2005

Peter Sickle, George Washington University, IAFF 005

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS

3. History
Post Cold War
2nd Wave of SelfDetermination Rise of internet and 24/7 news cycle

31 March 2005

Peter Sickle, George Washington University, IAFF 005

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS

4. Current Trends

Terrorism

Religious fundamentalism violence is not only justified, but a duty WMD or CBRNE greater access to knowledge and building blocks Global networks shared ideology, training, weapons, safe havens Drop in State Sponsorship rising costs of links to terrorism

Insurgencies Failed States

Iraq foreign fighters, battle for legitimacy, anti-democracy Colombia entrenched economic interests overshadow politics Chechnya foreign fighters, battle for survival Nepal pseudo-Maoist revolution, town v. country, democracy (?)

Transnational Crime

Narco-trafficking persistent demand = persistent supply HumanTrafficking reduced barriers to travel/trade = neo-slavery Piracy persistent supply = persistent demand
Peter Sickle, George Washington University, IAFF 005

31 March 2005

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS

4. Current Trends

Counterterrorism

Local emergency preparedness, education, law enforcement Regional cooperation, extradition, intelligence Global growing consensus on terrorism and general threat Iraq protracted war of attrition Colombia beginnings of negotiations Chechnya protracted war of attrition Nepal containment and compellence Sudan peace (?)

Counterinsurgencies

Countering Transnational Crime

Narco-trafficking interdiction, crop destruction, substitute farming HumanTrafficking international coordination Piracy private security
Peter Sickle, George Washington University, IAFF 005

31 March 2005

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS

5. Policy Options

Attrition

Kill and/or capture members IF known who they are and where Degrade infrastructure seize assets; wipe out safe havens Separation Ex. Israeli Fence Enclaves Ex. Tamil Tigers, Turkish Kurds Difficult to clearly communicate specific and credible threats to networks Carrots negotiations, recognition, amnesty, political recognition Sticks lethal force, imprisonment, economic sanctions
Peter Sickle, George Washington University, IAFF 005

Containment

Deterrence

Compellence

31 March 2005

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS

5. Policy Options

Attrition Challenges

Too much leads to defeat or Pyrrhic victory; Too little is ineffective Collective punishment innocent suffering hurts state legitimacy Ceding space can lead to de-facto defeat and encourage further attempts Allows problem to fester Hard to anticipate future threat unpredictable/unknown potential enemy Too high a threat lacks credibility; Too low lacks impact

Containment Challenges

Deterrence Challenges

Compellence Challenges

Use of carrots may embolden present and future challenges Use of sticks difficult to discriminate between guilty and innocent Negotiation Dilemma states dont need to when enemy is weak; cant afford to when enemy is strong
Peter Sickle, George Washington University, IAFF 005

31 March 2005

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS

5. Policy Options

Difficult to establish shadow of the future

Difficult to identify enemy (and support)

Difficult to measure success (or progress) Difficult to employ full power capabilities

Asymmetric respect for laws and norms

Asymmetric motivation Lack of retreat space for one or both

Lack of institutional structures

Norms against negotiating with outlaws
Peter Sickle, George Washington University, IAFF 005

31 March 2005

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS

6. Cases

Counterterrorism Failures
Mostly nationalistseparatist terrorism FLN in Algeria

Lehi/Stern Gang in Mandate Palestine

31 March 2005 Peter Sickle, George Washington University, IAFF 005

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS

6. Cases

Counterterrorism Successes
Mostly ideological terrorism Aum Shinrikyo Weathermen Underground

31 March 2005

Peter Sickle, George Washington University, IAFF 005

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS

6. Cases

Counterterrorism Stalemate
Third Way (?) terrorists renounce violence but maintain goals and infrastructure IRA Gamaa Islamiyya

31 March 2005

Peter Sickle, George Washington University, IAFF 005

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS

7. Looking Ahead

Al Qaeda down but not out

WMD/CBRNE supply is up, but is demand?

Battle for Hearts and Minds hard power soft power Media attention increased supply = increased demand?

Smart Weapons only as smart as their targets

Diffusion and Learning best practices of insurgency Rules/Norms of warfare need updated consensus

No negotiation policy depends on vision of victory

31 March 2005

Peter Sickle, George Washington University, IAFF 005

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS

7. Looking Ahead

Strategic Advantage
Minimize opportunity costs; Balance Short-term/Long-term gains

Legitimacy
Transparency; Discrimination; Proportionality

Operational Capacity
Real-time intelligence; Stealth; Precision Strike

Window of Opportunity
Target identification; Long-distance reach; Diplomatic Access

= GO S.L.O.W.
Peter Sickle, George Washington University, IAFF 005

31 March 2005

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS

Thank You

Questions?

31 March 2005

Peter Sickle, George Washington University, IAFF 005