International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity

Chapter 5: Liberalism
By Diane Panke and Thomas Risse

Learning outcomes
After this lecture you should be able to: Know the defining features of second image liberalism Understand the four main variants along two vectors (rationalism / constructivism; agents and structures) Debate how well the variants of liberalism understand the Iraq war, from both a US and German perspective Know why proponents of liberalism continue to think it offers a convincing account of contemporary dynamics in world politics

Classical Liberalism
All classical liberal theories of IR rest on the assumption that domestic actors or structures strongly influence the foreign policy identities and interests of states Liberal theories focus on the second image explanations that are located at the level of the state Perhaps the most famous second image argument put forward by classical liberals is the idea of the democratic peace (DP). Origins of democratic peace: Resisting the view that war is caused by defective human nature or the absence of a central authority, Immanuel Kant in the 18th century argued that regime-type was the crucial variable

Debating the Democratic Peace

DP theory starts from a dual empirical puzzle: 1) democracies rarely go to war against each other 2) democracies are not per se more peaceful than any other regime type Jack Levy, in 1982, argued that the DP was
the only law we have found so far in international relations
Questions to consider 1.What does it mean to talk about the DP as a law? 2.Are there other laws in international relations?

Variants of Liberalism
Although the DP is the best known of the second image theories, there are a multitude of liberal approaches This diversity is best captured by thinking along two vectors: 1. Firstly, distinguishing between liberal explanations that rest on rationalism and those that rest on constructivism; 2. Secondly, distinguishing between the priority accorded to structures or agents

Upper-left box: Actor-Centred Rationalist Liberalism

The core claim of this version of liberalism is that domestic actors influence how states define their foreign policy interests Societal actors compete with each other for access to and influence upon decision-makers Such aggregation processes require that national decision-makers are responsive to interest group lobbying Once preferences have been formulated domestically, rationalist and actor-centred liberalism brings constraints at the international level back in

Upper-right box: Actor-Centred Constructivist Liberalism

In constructivist accounts, domestic actors and state actors participate in processes of mutual persuasion and arguing Constructivist liberal approaches focus on which argument of which societal group will ultimately be convincing They emphasise actors who can change norms, such as norm entrepreneurs, and epistemic communities

Lower-left box: Rationalist DP Interdependence Theories

To explain this outcome, rationalist DP theories (following Kant) highlight how citizens in general will oppose wars because they bear the costs of wars Governments, being rational actors, avoid starting wars in order to maximise their chances of success on election day Rationalist accounts also use cost-benefit analysis to show why it does not pay for democracies to fight each other

Lower-right box: Constructivist DP Theories

The basic argument of constructivist DP theory is that liberal states do not fight each other because they perceive each other as friendly rather than hostile An important dimension to this causal argument is that states learn that fellow liberal states are peaceful Democratic norms matter as they emphasise public debate, rational argument, and processes by which conflicts can be resolved without recourse to the threat or use of force

Case Study: The Iraq War 2004 Probing Liberal Hypotheses

?
How do these four variants of liberalism explain the actions of two key states who took different views of the conflict: the US government and the German government

Rationalist Constructivist actor-centred

In explaining US behaviour, this version would expect to find a powerful coalition of business interests in favour Germanys opposition might be explained in terms of Chancellor Schrders opportunistic reading of domestic public opinion Both these explanations are incomplete without ideological and ideational factors Focuses attention on the ideational and normative reasons for the decision to go to war, as well as the opposition against it The now familiar story of the rise of the neoconservative movement fits this account So does the ideological aversion to war that is embedded in Germanys collective identity

Rationalist Constructivist DP Theory

This account of liberalism rests on one strong general finding (democracies almost never wage war on each other) but is weak in explaining particular instances The 2003 Iraq War falls outside the dyadic DP theory as it was a war between democracies and an authoritarian state The stance of Germany public opinion is consistent with the Kantian belief that citizens are generally war-averse, the manner in which George W. Bush was relatively free to go to war suggests that it is not difficult to build a domestic coalition Since none of the learning mechanisms are present in relation between democracies and authoritarian states, it is likely that self/other dynamics will exacerbate the problem Constructivists arguments are at work in the social construction of enmity The association of Saddam Hussein with brutal totalitarianism did not play out in the same way in Germany for historical reasons

Conclusion
The variety of liberal theories on offer today are an indication of the healthy state of second image approaches This suggests that the examination of the nature of states and domestic politics, and their interaction with international processes, is set to remain central in IR theorising and research