PyMEs: LOS PROBLEMAS

PARA ENCONTRAR UNA

FUENTE Y UN MECANISMO
DE FINANCIACIÓN
ADECUADOS

JAIME SIERRA, PhD

Junio 9, 2018
 UNA BREVE NARRATIVA…
Usualmente toda empresa necesita financiamiento (apalancado) por diferentes razones…

Solo el financiamiento de largo plazo (proyectos estructurales) facilita el crecimiento y fortalecimiento

de las empresas…

Los proyectos estructurales no son todos iguales (e.g., ampliar la planta de producción, penetrar un
mercado nuevo, desarrollar un nuevo producto, adquirir otra empresa)… las diferencias principales
tienen que ver con incertidumbre, riesgo, horizonte temporal, conocimiento (experiencia, novedad)…

Además, existen diferencias sectoriales relevantes (e.g., sector manufacturero tradicional vs sector
servicios intensivos en conocimiento)…

Las políticas públicas afectan este aspecto de las empresas por multiples razones y de multiples
maneras…

El funcionamiento de algunos sectores (e.g., financiero - En Colombia no existe una bolsa de valores
para PyMEs) y grupos estratégicos (proveedores, compradores, competidores) afecta este aspecto de
las empresas también por multiples razones y de multiples maneras…

Los estudios existentes no son aún suficientemente explicativos de estos fenómenos…

 CONTEXTO: COLOMBIA
DEFINICIÓN: Ley 905 de 2004 (Ley Mipyme) – clasificación basada solo en número de
empleados y volumen de activos (medido en SMLV). NO TOMA EN CUENTA VOLUMEN DE
VENTAS. Ratificada por Ley 1450 de 2011 (PND 2010-2014).

Micro: <=10 <500 SMLV

Pequeña: 11-50 501-5.000 SMLV
Mediana: 51-200 5.001-30.000 SMLV

PROBLEMAS:
- No toma en cuenta ventas
- No toma en cuenta sectores (manufacturas vs servicios; tradicionales vs intensivas en
conocimiento)
- “One size fits all”... Políticas transversales vs políticas diferenciadas
- Acciones insuficientes dirigidas a PyMEs (garantías mobiliarias, factoring, regulación de
crowdfunding)

Un ejemplo ilustrativo:Una empresa manufacturera tradicional (e.g., productos de

plástico en formas primarias) vs una empresa de servicios intensiva en conocimiento (e.g.,
desarrollador de software a la medida)
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(DATOS 2015) HTTP://ANIF.CO/SITES/DEFAULT/FILES/UPLOADS/DIC2-15.PDF

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Caracterización del Sistema Colombiano:

“- Predominio de los pequeños inversionistas;

- Escasa cultura financiera en general y de inversión en particular;

- Naciente cultura de la inversion real (titularización de finca raíz, proyectos productivos, capital de riesgo, etcétera);

- Baja cobertura y profundidad de los mecanismos de inversion existentes representados en bajos niveles de
bancarización, poca penetración del mercado público de capitales;

- Ausencia de un mercado de derivados, ausencia de un mercado de FOREX, volatilidad de la tasa de cambio (y

mecanismos de cobertura);

- Ausencia de capital semilla/de riesgo para financiar proyectos de amplio impacto (e.g., innovadores, de alta tecnología,
dirigidos a los mercados internacionales);

- Pocas empresas dispuestas a ingresar al MPC;

- Poca información sobre y participación en alternativas de inversion internacionales;

- Inexistencia de fondos de inversion que funcionan en los mercados más desarrollados.”

(p 195 - Sierra y Bedoya (2008) Potencial de las finanzas éticas en la generación de nuevas alternativas de inversion en Colombia)
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180 empresas registradas en BVC – 69 activas – ¡Todas o casi pertenecen al 0.4% de las GE!
Deficientes índices de profundización del mercado*: tamaño (28,74% - clasificado 37° en capitalización
de mercado); liquidez; eficiencia; concentración…
(Ver https://www.world-exchanges.org/home/index.php/statistics/annual-statistics)
(Ver índices: COLCAP – acciones más importantes en capitalización de mercado; COL20 – acciones más transadas)
(Fuente: https://www.bvc.com.co/pps/tibco/portalbvc/Home/Empresas/Listado+de+Emisores?action=dummy)

* Tamaño del mercado accionario se mide dividiendo la capitalización del mercado (valor en pesos de las acciones de emisores inscritas en bolsa a precios de mercado) por el PIB.
Liquidez (facilidad de comprar o vender una acción en determinado momento a un precio justo) se mide mediante la relación entre el valor total en pesos de los valores transados en el mercado de
valores y el PIB. Entre mayor sea el número, mayor es la liquidez o actividad relativa del mercado.
Eficiencia del mercado se mide mediante la relación entre la liquidez del mercado y su tamaño o capitalización del mercado.
Concentración del mercado se mide mediante la proporción que representa el monto total de las acciones de los diez principales emisores inscritos en bolsa contra el total de la capitalización
bursátil del total del mercado.

“Al terminar el 2016, las empresas con algún producto y con algún producto activo en el total de
entidades fueron 751.851 y 561.680, respectivamente.” Frente a más de 2.5 millones de empresas
existentes
(Fuente: Reporte Inclusión Financiera 2016 – Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia y Banca de las Oportunidades)

“Los recursos solicitados por las Pymes de los tres macrosectores al sistema financiero se utilizaron
principalmente para capital de trabajo durante el primer semestre de 2017. En segundo lugar, se ubicó
la consolidación del pasivo como destino de los recursos. El tercer destino de los recursos para el
sector industrial y el de comercio fueron las remodelaciones o adecuaciones, mientras que en el
sector de servicios fue la compra o arriendo de maquinaria.”
(Fuente: Gran Encuesta Pyme 2017 – ANIF)
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FUENTE: REPORTE TRIMESTRAL DE INCLUSION FINANCIERA – MARZO 2017

CONTEXTO: COLOMBIA

FUENTE: REPORTE TRIMESTRAL DE

INCLUSION FINANCIERA – MARZO 2017
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FUENTE: REPORTE TRIMESTRAL DE

INCLUSION FINANCIERA – MARZO 2017
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FUENTE: REPORTE TRIMESTRAL DE

INCLUSION FINANCIERA – MARZO 2017
 LONG-TERM REAL INVESTMENT AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE: TRADE-OFF THEORY VERSUS PECKING ORDER
THEORY
Trade-Off Theory (TOT): Firms will incur debt to a point in which marginal value of tax shields on additional debt is offset
by increase in present value of financial distress costs. Firms have optimal capital structure and adjust leverage toward optimum over time.

- Benefits: tax shield, lesser free cash flow problems, less other conflicts managers-shareholders.
- Expected costs: financial distress, underinvestment, asset substitution problems.

Pecking Order Theory (POT): Firms prefer to finance new investments with: 1) retained earnings (not subject to asymmetric
information problems); 2) debt financing [bond issues] (less information asymmetries, lower premia); 3) new equity [stock issues] last resort.

Evidence on the validity of each explanation is mixed. PO can be reversed for different reasons!

Prescriptive PO proposals:

- Transition in firm control “… from personal to business angel to venture capital to stock market finance involves a gradual broadening of
the investor base.”: 1) Founders, friends, family (seed); 2) Business angels (start-up); 3) Venture capitalists (early growth); 4) Non-
financial companies, equity markets, commercial banks (established) (Van Osnabrugge and Robinson, 2000)

- Related to firm size and development stages (information opacity degrees & financial requirements): 1) insider capital, informal private
equity and easy-term public financing (seed stage); 2) venture capital financing (start-up stage); 3) self-financing, bank and/or
business credit; (early growth stage); 4) direct issue of bonds and public equity (sustained growth stage) (Sau, 2007)

Problems: All managers reason along the same line; no role for potential funders, no differences
among them; no divergence among funding possibilities. Relational dimension (investors & project owners)
ignored, role of other actors and importance of institutions overlooked. No attention to projects’ differing
characteristics.
 CAPITAL STRUCTURE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND STRATEGY

Shareholder Stakeholder State-led Family/State Major stereotypical Systems

of Corporate Governance
Type of Outsider Insider Insider Insider
and Finance
coordination (Based on Tylecote & Visintin, 2008)

Directness of Indirect Direct Varying Direct

control &
Degree of No specific capital
managerial structure associated to
autonomy any stereotypical SCGF.
Poles of control Unipolar Multiple Bipolar Unipolar
Different funding sources
Retained profits, Bank debt Bank debt (banks Subsidies and allocated to each type on
(relational), agents for/owned others (State- grounds of suitability to
Corporate bonds,
by government) owned firms), predominant coordination
Transient private
Funding sources Private equity type, to control
equity, … Large banks- Bank debt
(VC & LBOs), directness, and degree of
to-large firms (transactional),
VC from banks managerial autonomy.
IPOs
VC
Typical example USA, UK Germany, Japan, France, Korea Italy, Spain, This contradicts cost-
Nordic countries Greece, Portugal based financial approach.
 DIMENSIONS OF DECISION-MAKING WHEN FINANCING INNOVATION
Innovative start-up´s and established firms may:

- be project-based (e.g., a typical spinout in start-up phase) or portfolio-based (e.g., typical established firm with multi-asset pipeline);

- use internal funds only, external funds exclusively or a combination of both. (External funds can be raised for specific project or for project
portfolio; allocation within portfolio decided internally)

Plus… Sectoral innovation “models” largely differ (e.g. Bio-pharma / Energy).

Uncertainty and types of innovation - Source: Freeman and Soete (1997)

 PROJECT OWNERS’ PERSPECTIVE VS POTENTIAL EXTERNAL FUNDERS’ PERSPECTIVE

Potentially Preferable Ordering External Funding Available

Government Established Specialised Non-specialised

Own funds Government funds Debt funds New Equity funds
agencies companies Banks investors investors

JV equity OTC capital

Seed capital Seed capital
Own capital Low cost credit Outsourcing M&As JV equity Venture capital OTC capital
Subsidies Subsidies
Internal liquidity revenues IPOs Outsourcing funds Bank loans Bond debt Bond debt
Public procurement Low cost credit M&A equity Stock equity Stock equity
Public procurement

Internal External Strategy S&P Profitability

Funds Funds

Strategic reasons Socio-economic growth Access to or building of:

and development Knowledge
Legal and political Capabilities The higher the risk, the higher the expected return!
Insufficient commitments Products and services
Sufficient internal funds Funding competitive strategy Markets
Costly external funds Cheap external funds internal funds International agenda
First Mover Advantages interests Control of strategic competitors
Preserving control Externalising risk and cost Losing control

Possible Reasons Possible Reasons

Source: Author’s own elaboration

 MATCHING MONEY AND IDEAS: THE RELATIONAL DIMENSION

“… firms that invest in R&D at a much higher rate than their competitors are most likely trying to compete of the basis of innovativeness” (p.
419) so investment rates serve as signals to tell firms that compete on the basis of knowledge from firms that use a different strategy. “… if
competitive strategy guides the firm’s investment decisions, and the choice of investments can influence the choice of financing, then we
should expect that different capital structures best serve the needs of different strategies.” (O’Brien, 2003: p. 415).

“… the strategic importance of innovativeness to the firm will vary within an industry depending on whether each firm is attempting to be an
innovator, a fast follower, or a low-cost mass producer” (p. 420) … risk, uncertainty, costs faced by players are different since the beginning.

Key issues for project owners and funders’ matching:

i) matching environment and mechanisms: Matching environment and mechanisms that grant funds
supply and demand meeting (where and how project owners and funders can find information/establish
contact?) Macro/meso environment variable (e.g., agencies to implement innovation public policy, venture
capital funds and associations, well-developed stock market for bond/stock placement, innovative
company incubators)

ii) conditions under which parties interact and reach agreement: How and under which conditions
project owners and external financiers relate to one another? Strategic reasons come into play.

After initial contact, interaction revolves around conditions for formal contractual relation. Strategic decision-
making will shape relationship.
 MATCHING MONEY AND IDEAS: CONDITIONS FOR INTERACTION
Matching probabilities depend on quantity and nature of projects “in the market” (competing ideas? some projects more feasible than
others?), availability of funding sources (specialised investors? government funds?), characteristics and preferences of project owners
(start-ups or established companies? how experienced research-wise?) and those of the potential financiers (knowledge/preference for
specific sectors/projects?).

“… the relation between investment in productive resources and economic performance depends on who makes investment
decisions in corporate enterprises, what types of investments they make, and how returns from investments are distributed.”
O’Sullivan (1998 & 2000)

Innovation “a process of interpretation that takes place in an uninterrupted flow of learning” (O’Sullivan, 2000: p 185) so

… resource allocation should be a developmental (resources must be committed to irreversible investments with uncertain returns),
organisational (returns are generated through the integration of human and physical resources), and strategic (resources are allocated to
overcome market and technological conditions that other firms take as given) process.

Then, Corporate Governance should provide three conditions for better organisational control of knowledge
and money:

i) financial commitment which counters investor’s short-termism;

ii) organisational integration which facilitates in-house learning and helps contain knowledge
spillovers;
iii) insider control which strengthens strategic decision-making.

How can firms, external funders, context institutions/organisations facilitate this?

EXAMPLE: EMERGING ECONOMY SECTOR (COL)
 GRACIAS

jhsierra@javeriana.edu.co