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FRIENDLY TAKEOVER HOSTILE TAKEOVER THROUGH TENDER OFFER HOSTILE TAKEOVER THROUGH PROXY FIGHT HOSTILE TAKEOVER ATTEMPT TO FORCE THE ISSUE OF MISMANAGEMNT FOR POTENTIAL PUBLIC & LEGAL SCRUTINY REVERSE TAKEOVER REVERSE TAKEOVER UNDER AIM RULES BACK FLIP TAKEOVER N L STRATEGY FOR TAKEOVER
TAKEOVER DEFENSE
BACK-END BANKMAIL CROWN JEWEL DEFENSE FLIP-IN FLIP-OVER GOLDEN PARACHUTE GRAY KNIGHT GREENMAIL JONESTOWN DEFENSE KILLER BEES LEVERAGED RECAPITALIZATION LOBSTER TRAP LOCK-UP PROVISION NANCY REAGAN DEFENSE NON-VOTING STOCK PAC-MAN DEFENSE Pension parachute People Pill Poison pill Safe Harbor Scorched-earth defense Shark Repellent Staggered board of directors Standstill agreement Targeted repurchase Top-ups Treasury stock Trigger Voting plans White knight White squire Whitemail
SOURCE: WIKIPAEDIA
POISON PUTS
DEFINITION: POISON PUTS OR EVENT RISK COVENANTS GIVE BONDHOLDERS RIGHT TO PUT, AT PAR OR BETTER, TARGET BONDS IN EVENT OF CHANGE IN CONTROL
PROTECT AGAINST RISK OF TAKEOVER-RELATED DETERIORATION OF TARGET BONDS
ESPECIALLY WHEN LEVERAGE INCREASES ARE SUBSTANTIAL BEGAN TO BE INCLUDED IN BOND COVENANTS IN 1986
PLACE POTENTIALLY LARGE CASH DEMANDS ON NEW OWNER, RAISING COSTS OF ACQUISITION
TAKEOVER DEFENSE
BANKMAIL CROWN JEWEL DEFENSE PAC-MAN DEFENSE SCORCHED-EARTH DEFENSE GOLDEN PARACHUTE
TAKEOVER DEFENSE(CONTD)
WHITE KNIGHT WHITE SQUIRE GREEN MAIL JONESTOWN DEFENSE OR SUICIDE PILL KILLER BEES LEVERAGED RECAPITALIZAION LOBSTER TRAP
TAKEOVER DEFENSE(CONTD)
NANCY REGAN DEFENSE ISSUANCE OF NONVOTING STOCK PENSION PARACHUTE PEOPLE PILL SAFE HARBOR
TAKEOVER DEFENSE(CONTD)
CLASSIFIED BOARDS WITH STAGGERED ELECTIONS STANDSTILL AGREEMENT TARGETED REPURCHASE TOP UP OTHER ANTI TAKEOVER MEASURES
ANTITAKEOVER AMENDMENTS
ANTITAKEOVER AMENDMENTS TO FIRM'S CORPORATE CHARTER GENERALLY IMPOSE NEW CONDITIONS ON TRANSFER OF MANAGERIAL CONTROL OF FIRM CALLED "SHARK REPELLENTS" 95% OF PROPOSED ANTITAKEOVER AMENDMENTS ARE RATIFIED
MANAGEMENT INTRODUCES AMENDMENTS THAT IT FEELS ARE SURE OF SUCCESS FAILURE TO PASS MIGHT BE TAKEN AS VOTE OF NO CONFIDENCE
FAIR-PRICE AMENDMENTS
SUPERMAJORITY PROVISIONS WITH BOARD-OUT CLAUSE AND ADDITIONAL CLAUSE WAIVING SUPERMAJORITY REQUIREMENT IF FAIR PRICE IS PAID BY BIDDER FOR ALL PURCHASED SHARES FAIR PRICE HIGHEST MARKET PRICE OF TARGET DURING A PAST SPECIFIED PERIOD DEFEND AGAINST TWO-TIER TENDER OFFERS LEAST RESTRICTIVE AMONG CLASS OF SUPERMAJORITY AMENDMENTS
BLOCKHOLDERS PARTICIPATE MORE ACTIVELY IN VOTING THAN NON-BLOCKHOLDERS AND MAY OPPOSE PROPOSALS THAT APPEAR TO HARM SHAREHOLDERS JARRELL AND POULSEN (1987) AMENDMENTS HAVING MOST NEGATIVE EFFECT ON STOCK PRICE ARE ADOPTED BY FIRMS WITH LOWEST PERCENTAGE OF INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS AND HIGHEST PERCENTAGE OF INSIDER HOLDINGS BLOCKHOLDERS PLAY MONITORING ROLE INSTITUTIONAL HOLDERS ARE WELL INFORMED AND VOTE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR ECONOMIC INTERESTS
NEGATIVE RETURNS
ANTITAKEOVER AMENDMENTS REFLECT MANAGEMENT ENTRENCHMENT COMMENT AND SCHWERT (1995) DECLINE OF LESS THAN 1% FOR MOST TYPES OF ANTITAKEOVER MEASURES
SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM
Shareholders may seek to rescind antitakeover devices
Shareholders become active when they are concerned about managerial actions that may impede market for corporate control
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Chapter 19
Takeover Defenses
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2001 Prentice Hall Takeovers, Restructuring, and Corporate Governance, 3/e Weston - 24
Introduction
Not all mergers are welcome Arsenals of devices were developed to defend against unwelcome proposals during the 1980s
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Strategic Perspectives
Management and board of company must continuously reassess competitive environment All forms of M&A activities may impact firm both as threats and opportunities
Main developments in industry Opportunities for adding critical capabilities to participate in attractive growth areas
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Opportunities for rolling-up fragmented industries into stronger firms Likelihood of firm to be rolled-up Improving or deteriorating sales to capacity relationships in industry Impact of consolidating mergers on capacity and cost structure Enhanced capabilities of competitors as a result of their merger activity Preemptive moves Responses to takeover bids
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Subsidiaries or properties that could be sold off without significantly impairing cash flows Relatively small stockholdings under control of incumbent management Combinations of these factors can simultaneously make firm an attractive investment and facilitate its financing
Firm's assets can be used as collateral for acquirer's borrowing Target's cash flows from operations and divestitures can be used to repay loans
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Financial defenses
Increase debt use borrowed funds to
Repurchase equity Concentrate management's percentage holdings
Increase dividends Loan covenants structured to force acceleration of repayment in event of takeover Liquidate securities portfolio Decrease excess cash
Invest in positive net present value projects Return to shareholders in dividends or share repurchases
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Excess liquidity could be used to acquire other firms Divest subsidiaries that can be eliminated without impairing cash flows; or spin-offs to avoid large cash inflows Divest low-profit operations Undervalued assets should be sold Value increased by restructuring
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"Selling off crown jewels" firm may dispose of business segment in which bidder is most interested Reorganizing financial claims
Debt-for-equity exchanges increase leverage to levels unacceptable to bidder Dual-class recapitalizations increase voting powers of insider groups to levels that would enable them to block tender offers Leveraged recapitalizations incur huge amounts of debt, using proceeds to pay large cash dividends and increase ownership position of insiders "scorched earth" policy
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Other strategies
Joint ventures could represent liaisons that potential bidders might prefer to avoid ESOPs can be used to decrease voting shares available for tender MBOs and LBOs
Widely used as defense against outside tender offer Management can take firm private Managers may turn to LBO specialist because their stock ownership position may increase more than in an outside tender offer
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Target firm may look for international partner Share repurchase can be used to defend against takeovers
Increase ownership of insiders Low reservation price shareholders can be bought out higher tender offer price needed for bid to succeed
Proxy contest aim is to change control group and make performance improvements
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Event studies
Restructuring improves firm's efficiency: favorable stock price reaction Restructuring represents scorched-earth policy: negative stock price reaction
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Duty of Directors
Business judgment rule: Directors must demonstrate to the courts that the best interests of shareholders have been served
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Duty of directors to demonstrate sound business reasons to reject offer Duty of directors to approve only a transaction that is fair to shareholders and is best transaction available Duty of directors to fully explore independent competitive bids and obtain best offer
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Greenmail
Definition: Represents targeted repurchase of large block of stock from specified shareholders at premium to end hostile takeover threat
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Positive market reaction if greenmail viewed as giving directors more time to work out better solution
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Antigreenmail developments
Internal Revenue Code Section 5881 of 1986 imposes 50% excise tax on recipient of greenmail payments Antigreenmail charter amendments
Require management to obtain approval of majority or supermajority of nonparticipating shareholders prior to targeted repurchase
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Eckbo (1990)
Average market reaction to charter amendments prohibiting greenmail payments weakly negative Subsample of firms with abnormal stock price runup over three months prior to mailing of proxy: Market reaction strongly positive Particularly true if runup associated with evidence or rumors of takeover activity Prohibition against greenmail removes barrier to takeovers with positive gains to shareholders
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Strategic Actions
Pac Man defense
Definition: Target firm counteroffers for bidder firm Rarely used; usually designed not to be used Effective if target much larger than bidder Implies target finds combination desirable but seeks control of surviving entity Target gives up using antitrust issues as defense
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Extremely costly
Could involve devastating financial effects for both firms Large amount of debt used to purchase shares could cripple firms Under state law, should both firms buy substantial stakes in each other, each could be ruled as subsidiaries of each other Severity of defense may lead bidder to disbelieve target will employ such defense
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White knight
Definition: Target company chooses another company with which it prefers to be combined Alternative company preferred by target because:
Greater compatibility New bidder may promise not to break up target or engage in massive restructuring
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White squire
Definition: Modified form of white knight; white squire does not acquire control of target Target sells block of its stock to third party it considers to be friendly White squire may be required to vote its shares with target management Often accompanied by standstill agreement
Limits amount of additional target stock white squire can purchase for specified period of time Restricts sale of its target stock, usually giving right of first refusal to target
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Preferred stock usually used in white squire transactions because it enables board to tailor characteristics of stock as described
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Antitakeover Amendments
Antitakeover amendments to firm's corporate charter generally impose new conditions on transfer of managerial control of firm "shark repellents" 95% of proposed antitakeover amendments are ratified
Management introduces amendments that it feels are sure of success Failure to pass might be taken as vote of no confidence
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Blockholders participate more actively in voting than non-blockholders and may oppose proposals that appear to harm shareholders
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Supermajority amendments
Require shareholder approval by at least twothirds vote (sometimes as much as 90%) for all transactions involving change in control Involve "board-out" clause that gives board power to determine when and if supermajority provisions will be in effect
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Fair-price amendments
Supermajority provisions with board-out clause and additional clause waiving supermajority requirement if fair price is paid by bidder for all purchased shares Fair price highest market price of target during a past specified period Defend against two-tier tender offers Least restrictive among class of supermajority amendments
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Lock-in amendments to make it difficult to void previously passed antitakeover amendments Termination of overfunded pension plans (Iqbal, Shetty, Haley, and Jayakumar, 1999)
Firms can remove a significant source of cash flows to bidder firms by liquidating excess assets Stockholders favor termination only when firm faced takeover and managerial ownership was high view takeover as threat to their claim on excess pension assets
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Negative returns
Antitakeover amendments reflect management entrenchment Comment and Schwert (1995) decline of less than 1% for most types of antitakeover measures
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State Laws
Background
By 1982, 37 states passed first generation antitakeover laws First generation laws ruled to be preempted by 1968 Williams Act in Edgar v. MITE (1982) In 1987, Supreme Court reversed in Dynamic v. CTS; ruled that state antitakeover laws were enforceable as long as they did not prevent compliance with Williams Act Many states passed new antitakeover statutes between 1987-1990
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Swartz (1996)
Event date was passage of Pennsylvania Antitakeover Law (Act 36 based on Senate Bill 1310) on 4/27/90 Event returns (CARs)
Firms that opted out:
For window [-130,+60] = -5.24% (not significant) For window [-60,+20] = 0.70% (not significant)
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Poison Pills
Background
Definition: Creation of securities carrying special rights exercisable by triggering event such as accumulation of specified percentage of target shares or announcement of tender offer Make acquisition of control of target firm more costly
2001 Prentice Hall Takeovers, Restructuring, and Corporate Governance, 3/e Weston - 73
Can be adopted by board without shareholders' approval Poison pill adoptions often submitted to shareholders for ratification even though not required to do so Use of poison pills requires justification to be upheld by courts adoption of poison pills in the best interest of shareholders "business judgment rule"
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Types of plans
Flip-over plans
Bargain purchase of bidder's shares at some trigger point Weakness: If rights are exercisable only when bidder obtains 100% of company stock, bidder may buy just over 50% to obtain control
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Flip-in plans
Bargain purchase of target's shares at some trigger point More widely used than flip-over plans Ownership flip-in provision allows rights holder to purchase shares of target at a discount if acquirer exceeds a shareholding limit rights of bidder who triggered pill become void Some plans waive flip-in provision if acquisition is cash tender offer for all outstanding shares (defend against two-tier offers)
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Dead-hand provisions
Definition: Provision that grants board the ability to redeem or amend poison pill only by continuing directors directors on the board prior to bidder's takeover attempt Provision strengthens board's position
Board's ability to redeem poison pill gives it flexibility in negotiating with bidders Hostile bidder can put considerable pressure on the board by making premium cash bid conditional on redemption of pill Provision prevents bidder from achieving control of target's board which then removes pill
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In some 3,000 poison pills nationwide, 200 contained dead-hand features State laws
New York court invalidated dead-hand provisions in Bank of New York v. Irving Bank 1988 case Other state courts upheld dead-hand provisions Georgia approved dead-hand pill in Invacare v. Healthdyne Technologies 1997 case
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Some shareholders groups are critical of poison pills because they can be used to prevent takeovers
Pension fund TIAA-CREF lobbied 35 companies to remove dead-hand pills Pressure from Counsel for Institutional Investors and International Brotherhood of Teamsters forced Phillip Morris to remove entire poison pill provisions
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Results
Taking into account whether rumors of bid or actual bid made it likely that control premium was built into issuer's stock price at time of poison pill announcement: Wealth effect = negative 2% Taking into account whether M&A news was announced at same time as pill: Wealth effect = positive 3 - 4% Taking into account year of adoption In year-by-year results, only 1984 had negative wealth effects of 2.3% and 2.9% For later seven years, wealth effects positive by about 1% or less, significant only in 1988
2001 Prentice Hall Takeovers, Restructuring, and Corporate Governance, 3/e Weston - 82
Systematic evidence indicates small deterrence effects from poison pills Only earliest pills (before 1985) associated with large declines in shareholders' wealth Takeover premiums higher when target firms are protected by state antitakeover laws or by poison pills Target shareholders gained even after taking into account deals that were not completed because of poison pills Decline in takeover activity in 1991 and 1992 resulted from general economic factors, not widespread use of antitakeover measures
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Shareholder Activism
Shareholders may seek to rescind antitakeover devices Bizjak and Marquette (1998)
Sample 190 shareholder initiated proposals during 1987-1993
Sample of firms that received shareholder proposals to rescind poison pills Matched sample of firms that adopted poison pills but did not receive shareholder proposals to rescind them
2001 Prentice Hall Takeovers, Restructuring, and Corporate Governance, 3/e Weston - 84
Wealth effects
Cumulative abnormal returns for three-day event window
Proposal sample = -0.43% Matched sample = 1.35%
Shareholders become active when they are concerned about managerial actions that may impede market for corporate control
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Poison Puts
Definition: Poison puts or event risk covenants give bondholders right to put, at par or better, target bonds in event of change in control
Protect against risk of takeover-related deterioration of target bonds
Especially when leverage increases are substantial Began to be included in bond covenants in 1986
Place potentially large cash demands on new owner, raising costs of acquisition
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Empirical test:
Test for difference in yield spreads at offering date for samples of protected and unprotected bonds Inclusion of event risk protection reduced required yields on protected bonds by 25-50 basis points in two studies and no effect in a third
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Extreme cases of GPs viewed as "rewards for failure" Cost of GPs estimated to be less than 1% of total cost of takeover not considered to be an effective takeover defense
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Regulation
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984
Denies corporate tax deductions for "excess parachute payments" Executive has to pay additional 20% income tax on "excess parachute payments"
GPs have to be entered into at least one year prior to date of control change to be legally binding
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GPs are triggered either when manager is terminated by acquiring firm or when manager resigns voluntarily after change of control Court can invalidate or grant preliminary injunctions against exercise of GPs especially when payment could be triggered by recipient
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Rationale
Implicit contracts
Managers' real contribution to firm cannot be evaluated exactly in current period Optimal contract between managers and shareholders will include deferred compensation Since detailing all future possibilities and contingent payments in written contract is costly, long-term deferred contract largely implicit
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Encourage managers to accept changes of control that bring shareholders gains reduce agency problem and transaction costs from managerial resistance
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Mergers by tying payment to synergy gains in case of mergers, firm avoids misuse of GPs
GPs reduce incentives for executives to manage firms efficiently GPs may indicate level of influence of management over boards Negative gains to shareholders
Signaling hypothesis
Signal of likelihood of future takeover, which would be associated with positive gains to shareholders Signal of increased management influence over boards, which would have negative implications
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Sample firms from 1979 through 1984 not in process of takeover when GPs adopted positive stock returns Combined evidence consistent with takeover signaling hypothesis, but not with alignment hypothesis
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Finding consistent with wealth transfer hypothesis Stock returns associated with GPs changed from positive for 1975-1982 period of LL study to negative for 1986-1990 in MT
Associated with initiation of legislative restraints on GPs that may have encouraged boards to adopt them to avoid further restrictions Shareholders in later years may have perceived adoption of GPs as unfavorable signals of management's ability to control directors in their interest at expense of shareholders
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