Case 425, Part A

ALLIED RELATIONS IN IRAN: 19411945

David S. Painter

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CRISIS IN IRAN
During World War II, strategically-located and oilrich Iran was jointly occupied by Great Britain and the Soviet Union, while 30,000 U.S. troops operated a major supply route through Iran to the Soviet Union and American advisers assisted the Iranian government and military. In the fall of 1945, local unrest in Soviet-occupied Azerbaijan and Kurdistan turned into a full scale revolt against the government in Tehran. Jafar Pishevari, a veteran communist whose election to the Majlis (parliament) of Azerbaijan in 1943 had been rejected by the conservative majority, returned to his native province in early September, and, together with fellow veterans of the old Communist Parry and survivors of the short-lived separatist Soviet Socialist Republic of Gilan (19191921), established the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan. In its first statement, the new party while expressing its desire to remain within Iran, declared Azerbaijan to be a distinct nation; demanded provincial assemblies (as required by the constitution); use of Azeri in local schools and government offices; and retention of provincial tax revenues for regional development. Almost simultaneously in Mahabad, Kurdish tribal

leaders, with Soviet assistance, formed a Kurdish nationalist party, and demanded similar rights for their people.1 Veteran Middle East hand Wallace Murray, who had been named U.S. ambassador to Iran in June, reported on September 25 that he viewed the situation in Iran with grave concern.2 Internal political, economic, and social conditions are deplorable and present ruling class shows little evidence of either will or ability to improve them. Danger however lies in temptation, opportunity and excuse this offers for intervention by British and Russians. Both powers are undoubtedly guilty of such intervention at present but I believe British objectives are purely defensive to prevent further Soviet penetration to the south and that British sincerely desire independence and stability of Iran as being in their own interests. . . . Their activity in my opinion is not to be feared except as counter measures to Soviet moves. Soviet attitude therefore is crux of matter. Based on accumulated external evidence I have come to following conclusions this regard: 1. Ultimate Soviet objectives may include access to Persian Gulf and penetration into other regions of Near East but present aims are probably limited to maintenance of buffer zone in Iran as protection against attack from south. To accomplish this they are determined to have predominant influence in northern provinces at least.

Copyright 1986 by Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. ISBN: 1-56927-425-8 Publications, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 200571025 http://data.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/isd/

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2. Since Anglo-Russian entry into Iran 1941, presence their troops in northern Iran has assured Soviets of dominant position that area which they have utilized fully. They are probably now seeking means to perpetuate that state of affairs after final withdrawal of forces which should occur by March 1946. 3. . . . Recent events in Azerbaijan and the Caspian provinces seem to indicate that promotion of regional consciousness and dissatisfaction with central Govt leading to separatism and eventual incorporation in ranks of Soviet Republics is one of tactics being employed. However, I suspect this is merely second string to bow and think it likely their principal aim at present is establishment in power in Tehran of so-called popular govt like Groza regime in Rumania which would be led by men under Soviet influence amenable to Russian demands and hostile to other foreign nations. General trend Soviet propaganda . . . indicates Soviets may be paving way for coup detat which they would support and defend against outside criticism on grounds it represented will of people. Known corruption and inefficiency of Iranian cabinets and Majlis [Parliament] would make the contention more plausible. In addition to being clear and unjustifiable interference in Iranian affairs, such development would be most serious in its effect on Anglo-Russian relations which are already badly strained in this country. British would undoubtedly react violently to threat it would constitute to vital oil fields and refinery, to India, and to Empire communications. Moreover, Soviet dominance of Iran Government would be definitely harmful to American interests for following reasons: 1. It would mean exclusion of American airlines from Iran. 2. It would orient Iranian trade toward Russia to detriment of our commercial interests. 3. It would end all possibility of an American oil concession in Iran. 4. Most important of all it would mean extension of Soviet influence to the shores of the Persian Gulf creating a potential threat to our immensely rich oil holdings in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait. However much we may deplore present conditions in Iran, a cure administered by a minority group under Russian direction would be worse than the disease for United States, for the Iranians and for world peace.

I am strongly of opinion time has come for us to take positive stand against continuance present Soviet activities. First and foremost step should be immediate withdrawal British and Russian military forces. . . . Meanwhile, at the State Departments urging, the War Department had agreed to increase its support for the U.S. military missions to the Iranian army and the Iranian gendarmerie. In an October 17 letter to the War Department, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes wrote:3 Continuance of the Military Missions to Iran, at the request of the Iranian Government, is considered to be in the national interest of the United States. Strengthening of Irans internal security forces by the American Missions contributes to the stabilization of Iran, and, thereby, to its reconstruction as a sound member of the international community. By increasing the ability of the Iranian Government to maintain order and security, it is hoped to remove any pretext for British or Soviet intervention in Irans internal affairs, and, accordingly, to remove such future threat to Allied solidarity and international security. The stabilization of Iran, moreover, will serve to lay a solid foundation for the development of American commercial, petroleum, and aviation interests in the Middle East. With light arms provided by the Soviet occupation forces, the Azeri Democrats, joined by the provincial branch of the pro-Soviet Tudeh (masses) parry carried out an almost bloodless revolt throughout Azerbaijan, culminating in mid-November with their victorious entry into the provincial capital, Tabriz. The Iranian government immediately asked for U.S. support. Denying the domestic aspects of the crisis, the Iranian government claimed that the Soviet Union was carrying out a carefully laid plan to deprive Iran of its independence, and warned that if the United States stood aside, no small country in the world can in the future have any confidence in promises made by the Great Powers.4 Accurate information on the situation in northern Iran was hard to obtain. Communications with the north were cut off for a period, and the Soviets were reluctant to allow U.S. and British observers to enter the province. Moreover, as Ambassador Murray noted, Iranian government officials were unreliable factual reporters.5

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Allied Relations in Iran

After a U.S. military attache had confirmed that the Soviets had prevented Iranian troops from entering Azerbaijan, the United States dispatched a note to the Soviet Union on November 23 protesting the Soviet action as a violation of the Tehran Declaration. The note pointed out that the United States planned to withdraw all its forces from Iran by January 1, 1946, and urged the Soviets to do likewise. The note concluded:6 Nations such as Iran were encouraged at the United Nations Conference at San Francisco to place full trust in the friendly intentions and good will of the permanent members of the Security Council. The Government of the United States is confident that the Soviet Union and Great Britain are no less anxious than the United States, in dealing with nations such as Iran, to follow a line of action which will make it clear that the trust of these nations in the permanent members of the Security Council has not been misplaced. The Soviets replied on November 29:7 . . . . The events which have taken place in recent days in [northern] Iran not only do not constitute an armed uprising but also are not directed against the Shahanshah Government of Iran . . . it is evident that this is a matter of aspirations with respect to the assurance of the democratic rights of Azerbaijani population of northern Iran which is seeking national autonomy within the limits of the Iranian State. . . . The undesirable incidents which have taken place in conjunction with these recent events . . . have been caused by reactionary elements which have opposed the extension of national rights to the populations of northern Iran. . . . As far as the Soviet military command is concerned it has not hindered, and is not hindering, the movements of the Iranian military forces and the gendarme police units which are in the districts of northern Iran. . . . The Soviet Government opposed the dispatch of new Iranian troops to northern districts of Iran and informed the Iranian Government that the dispatch of further Iranian forces to northern Iran could cause not the cessation but the increase of the disorders, and likewise bloodshed, which would compel the Soviet Government to introduce into Iran further forces of its own for the purpose of preserving order and of assuring the security of Soviet garrison. . . .

As to the reference . . . to the Three-Power Declaration concerning Iran December 1, 1943, the Soviet Government . . . must state that it adheres unwaveringly to the principles of that declaration. The Declaration in question, however, does not affect questions of the number of Soviet armed forces on Iranian territory just as it does not affect the question of the period of the stationing of Soviet troops in Iran. This latter is determined by . . . the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Tripartite Treaty of 1942, and in connection with the stationing of its troops in Iran notwithstanding the fact that the right of introduction of Soviet troops into the territory of Iran was envisaged by the Soviet Iranian treaty of February 26, 1921. Furthermore, as the Government of the United States is aware, the question of the time for the removal of Soviet and British troops from Iran was subject of consideration at the Council of Foreign Ministers in London. . . . 8 On the strength of the consideration set forth above with relation to Soviet troops, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics does not see grounds for renewed consideration of the question of the time limit for the removal of these forces from Iran. When U.S. and British observers were able to enter Azerbaijan, their reports underlined the complexity of the situation. On the one hand, Iranian claims of extensive Soviet involvement in the revolt proved to be exaggerated. Both U.S. and British reports from Azerbaijan noted the real grievances of the local population, the failure of the Tehran government to address these grievances, and substantial popular sympathy if not support for the rebels. On the other hand, the reports confirmed that the Soviets had interfered with Iranian government troops, in Azerbaijan and had prevented the central government from sending reinforcements to the province. In addition, both the U.S. and British consuls in Tabriz believed that the rebellion would probably collapse without Soviet support.9 Irans newly-appointed ambassador to the United States, Hussein Ala, former minister of court and an advocate of close ties with the United States, asked for a show of support by the U.S. forces still in Iran, U.S. assistance in obtaining the immediate removal of Soviet and British forces, and U.S. backing for Irans efforts to obtain a seat on the U.N. Security Council. Ala also requested that the United States take up the cause of Iran at the upcoming Foreign Ministers Meeting in Moscow. Ala, who insisted on

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presenting his credentials personally to the president, told Truman on November 29 that your country alone can save us, for you have always defended moral ideas and principles and your hands are clean.10 In a December 3 editorial, the New Republic examined What is Happening in Iran:11 The full truth about the revolutionary uprising in Azerbaijan province in northwestern Iran is not known. The Iranian government charges that the revolt is not only sanctioned but has been engineered by the Russian occupation forces. The Russians are alleged to have supplied the Democratic Party of Azerbaijanthe local branch, under a new name, of the pro-Soviet Tudeh, or Communist Partywith arms confiscated from, the Iranian government in 1941. Whatever the truth of these charges, it is clear that the Russians have made no effort to stop the uprising. They have, on the contrary, halted the advance of government troops dispatched from Teheran to quell the revolt. The charges made by the Iranian government have been denied by the Soviet government newspaper Isvestia. The Democratic Party, Isvestia declared, does not want to separate Azerbaijan province from Iran, but only seeks greater autonomy within the framework of the Iranian state. It accused the British of inspiring the charges for the purpose of diverting attention from Britains own difficulties in Palestine and Indonesia. In spite of this denial, but judged against the background of Russo-British rivalry in Iran, it is quite likely that the Iranian governments charges are true. It is equally true, however, that the current situation is not simply a matter of moral right or wrong, but can be understood only in the cold terms of power politics. If the Russians are currently the aggressive party existing conditions are the inevitable outcome of Russias and Britains competitive struggle for influence in a country in which their policy is dictated by strategic and economic interests. Both powers have sought from time to time to normalize this struggle by dividing Iran into separate spheres of influence. This policy has been successful only in so far as it prevented actual hostilities. But under the surface of treaty agreements the struggle for total influence went on. It is going on today. ....................................... It is not too far-fetched to assume, therefore, that the present uprising in Azerbaijan is Russiansponsored. Its objective would be to find a ground

not only for continued Russian occupation of northern Iran beyond March 2, 1946, the date set for the withdrawal of all foreign troops, but also to create political difficulties for the present government of Iran, which is assumed to be friendly to the Western powers. The political instrument used by the Soviet government is the Tudeh, one of the most important of Irans nine major parties. It is this party which a year ago demonstrated in favor of Russias oil demands. It is also believed to have staged the current revolt in Azerbaijan. While it may be true, therefore, that Russia is not interested in detaching the province from Iran, she is apparently interested in bringing to power a government which she considers friendly to herself and which may be counted upon to grant her the oil concessions she wants. Great Britain is similarly interested in a friendly Iranian government for the dual purpose of ensuring the concession of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and of protecting Indias northwestern frontier. How can the latent conflict between the Soviet Union and Great Britain be prevented from breaking out in open hostility? Obviously, the withdrawal of the forces of occupation will not be enough. Once more, as in so many other international danger areas, the part played by the United States may be decisive. Although this country has supplied the Iranian government throughout the war with advisers who enjoyed considerable power, and although the Persian Gulf Command has done a magnificent job of improving road and rail facilities, the United States has so far refused to assume any postwar responsibilities. Irans financial, economic, agricultural and social problems too complex a subject for analysis herecannot be solved without outside assistance. Whatever power promises to tackle these problems in the postwar period will undoubtedly wield most influence. As neither Britain nor this countrys private oil companies are likely to show particular interest in Irans many internal difficulties, the Soviet Union may well emerge as the most influential foreign force, especially if it has the support of a mass party like the Tudeh. In that case the British and American oil companies will sooner or later call for the support of their governments if their concessions should be threatened. Political and diplomatic difficulties among the three great powers will inevitably be the result. The time to prevent such an outcome is now. Instead of dividing the country into spheres of influence as before the last war, or leaving it in the precarious equilibrium of the inter-war period,

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the three powers should decide on the establishment of some sort of regional agency, made up of international personnel, which would be attached to the Iranian government in an advisory capacity. Its function would be not only to assist the government of Iran in reforming the countrys administration, developing its resources and solving its numerous internal economic and social problems, but also in supervising an equitable distribution of its oil concessions. If it were possible to make such foreign aidwhich is admittedly necessaryavailable through joint international action, it is likely that the majority of the Iranian people will not object. They will look on foreign participation in their countrys internal affairs not as a form of exploitation, but of international assistance. Finally, it would represent a practical and permanent solution of international rivalry which, unless checked through genuine international cooperation, can only have disastrous consequences for world peace. Meanwhile, the Azerbaijan Democrats had convened a National Congress of Azerbaijan, which issued a demand for provincial autonomy. Following elections in late November, a Azeri National MaJIis met in Tabriz, and on December 12 declared the formation of an autonomous government of Azerbaijan. Pishevari was named prime minster. A week later, Kurdish leaders proclaimed an independent Kurdish Peoples Republic.12 In addition, Iranian officials informed the United States at this time that the Soviets had revived their demand for an oil concession in the north, asked for internal air transportation rights in northern Iran, and indicated a desire for a special position at the port of Pahlavi on the Caspian (which had been under Russian control prior to the 1921 treaty). These developments raised concerns that if a solution was not found, the result could be dismemberment of Iran with the northern provinces eventually becoming integral parts of the Soviet Union.13 In a December 9 memorandum, the State Departments Petroleum Division argued that the Soviet objective in northern Iran was oil. According to this analysis, the Soviet Union faced an impending oil shortage, and off from northern Iran, which was close to established Soviet facilities at Baku, could help remedy the expected shortfall. Pointing out that the United States had supported the Iranian refusal to grant the Soviet Union an oil concession in 1944, that U.S. oil companies were interested in Iran, that the United States had opposed Soviet actions in Eastern Europe aimed at securing access

to oil, and that the Anglo-American oil agreement had left the Soviets out, the memorandums authors surmised that the Soviets probably had concluded that the United States was unsympathetic to Soviet oil problems and actively opposed to any extra-territorial expansion of Soviet oil interests. Experience in Eastern Europe, the memorandum noted, had shown that when there was a concrete economic or security interest at stake, the Soviets would act without regard to democracy or sovereignty. The Petroleum Division concluded that for the crisis to be resolved the United States would have to find a way to meet the Soviet Unions oil needs.14 Harold Minor, newly designated chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs, travelled to Tehran to gain more information about the situation. After conferring with Ambassador Murray and Iranian officials, Minor reported on December 11 that he believed:15 . . . the Russians are up to well planned and unscrupulous aggression with a short range objective of gaining ascendancy over a semiautonomous northern Iran and influence over a central Iranian government, looking to one or more long range objectives such as encirclement of Turkey, oil concessions, access to the Persian Gulf, penetration of the Near East, a safety zone for their southern frontier, and out right Communistic imperialism. In early December, after Ala again urged the United States to take up the cause of Iran at the upcoming Foreign Ministers Meeting in Moscow, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs Loy W. Henderson wrote to Secretary of State Byrnes:16 The United States is in a better position than either Great Britain or the Soviet Union to take the lead in the discussions concerning Iran because we are freer from suspicion of having selfish interests in that country and because the American case is based on an important principle of international conduct. You may wish to point out to Mr. Molotov and Mr. Bevin that we view the present situation in Iran as of importance not merely as regards Iran but more significantly as a test case of the ability of the permanent members of the Security Council to cooperate with each other on a basis of respect for the sovereignty of smaller members of the United Nations. We should emphasize, at the outset, that we are not concerned with the maintenance of any

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particular social or economic system in Iran. Our view that the Iranian Government should be permitted to move its troops freely throughout the country is based squarely on our understanding of the word sovereignty. . . . As regard foreign troops in Iran, the American Government sees no adequate justification for their continued presence there. We believe earnestly that it would be most helpful, in removing the suspicion of small countries everywhere regarding the motives of the Great Powers, for all foreign troops to be withdrawn from Iran promptly. . . . It has been suggested that one of the motives for Soviet interests in northern Iran is to obtain oil concessions there. Whether this is true or not, we readily recognize the legitimate desire of Soviet Russia to obtain oil concessions outside its territory. . . . If the Soviet authorities desire to enter into friendly negotiations with the Iranian Government for an oil concession, the American Government would view the discussions with all good will. However, an important attribute of sovereignty is the right of a government to grant or withhold commercial concessions within its territory, in terms which it finds satisfactory. Either direct or indirect pressure to obtain a concession is an infringement of sovereignty. A repetition of the events of last year, when a Soviet Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs demanded the ousting of an Iranian Prime Minister who refused such a concession to the U.S.S.R. would be most unfortunate. On the eve of the Moscow Conference Ala met with Henderson and influential Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson and argued:17 The effectiveness and prestige of the United Nations Organization is certain to be affected by what happens to Iran at this time. If a permanent member of the Security Council should be permitted to interfere in the internal affairs of another member of the United Nations in good standing and to pursue a policy which deprives the latter of sovereignty over its territory or any portion of its territory, the whole United Nations Organization will be affected. A few days later, Ala warned that if the United States did not stand by Iran the United Nations would forfeit its peacekeeping role, and Azerbaijan would prove to have been the first shot fired in [the] third world war.18

THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE

Iran was only one of many concerns at the Moscow Conference, December 1626. Nevertheless, resolution of the crisis there was one of Secretary of State James F. Byrnes priorities. Byrnes was determined to maintain Roosevelts legacy of great power cooperation, and, like FDR, preferred to work through personal diplomacy. At the opening session of the meeting he suggested that Iran be removed from the formal agenda and discussions on Iran be conducted on an informal basis.19 In private meetings with Stalin on December 19 and December 23, Byrnes pointed out that the United States was involved in the difficulties in Iran because of the Tehran Declaration. Repeatedly stressing his desire to avoid the embarrassing situation that would arise if Iran raised the issue at the forthcoming meeting of the United Nations, Byrnes pointed out that the United States did not want to take sides because of its close alliance with the Soviet Union during the war and now during the peace. Byrnes also emphasized that the great powers should always be in a position to show that they were behaving correctly and in accordance with agreements in regard to small nations.20 Stalin replied that Soviet troops were being retained in northern Iran in order to protect the Baku oil fields against any possible hostile act by Iran. According to Stalin, the Iranian government was hostile to the Soviet Union, and the oil fields were vulnerable to sabotage. Moreover, under the 1921 treaty with Iran, the Soviet Union had the right to put troops in northern Iran when there was a threat to Soviet security. Stalin maintained that Soviet troops were not involved in Irans internal difficulties, and that the reason the Soviet occupation authorities would not allow Iranian troops into the area was that they feared clashes with the local population and incidents against Soviet troops. Because of concerns for the safety of the Baku oil fields, it would be impossible for the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Iran before the date set by the 1942 treaty, and it would be necessary at that time to examine the situation to see whether or not it would be possible to withdraw them then. Stalin assured Byrnes that the Soviet Union had no designs territorial or otherwise against Iran, and that once it felt secure about the Baku oil fields it would withdraw its forces and take no interest in Irans internal problems. Stalin also noted that while it was right to respect small nations and to safeguard their independence, small nations were not always adverse to attempting to promote friction

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between large powers. It was therefore necessary to take a skeptical view of their complaints. As for the United Nations, Stalin stated that no one had any need to blush if Iran took its complaints there.21 The British were equally concerned about Iran, suspecting that Soviet actions there were part of an overall attempt to undermine the British position in the Middle East. On December 19, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin proposed the creation of a tripartite commission, composed of the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, to advise and assist the Iranian government in establishing provincial councils throughout Iran, as provided in the Iranian constitution. The commission would make recommendations on such matters as the use of minority languages and would supervise the first elections to the provincial councils. The commission would also deal with the question of accelerating troop withdrawals. After agreement on specifics by the three powers, the plan would be submitted to the Iranian government for its concurrence.22 In a note to the United States outlining the plan, the British explained: 23 These provisions are designed to bring the Azerbaijan question into proportion with the general problem of provincial reform. Unless this is done, Azerbaijan will be on the one hand sufficiently independent to work hand in glove with Russia and on the other hand sufficiently within the framework of the Persian State to exercise a highly disturbing influence throughout the country. The Commission may of course find it necessary to recommend special concessions for Azerbaijan and for Khuzistan, which is mainly an Arab province. Bevin discussed his proposal with Stalin on December 24, observing that he thought it offered a chance of clearing up the situation, safeguarding the integrity of Iran, and removing difficulties between Russia and the United Kingdom. Stalin replied that he thought the British proposal might serve as a basis for some sort of agreement, and that he hoped that our two Governments might find a common ground. He reserved further comment until the U.S. position could be learned.24 Bevin, Byrnes, and Molotov discussed a revised version of the British plan at a meeting on Christmas day. Molotov presented an amendment to the British proposal which provided that the commissions mandate to accelerate troop withdrawal be qualified by the phrase as far as possible, to avoid the impression that troops would be withdrawn

immediately Molotov also insisted that the commissions terms of reference need not include a date for completion of troop withdrawal since the date had already been agreed on. An additional Soviet amendment called for the commission to make recommendations concerning the free use of the languages of national minorities. Bevin and Byrnes were reluctant to accept these amendments, and further discussion of the issue was postponed to the next meeting.25 When discussions on Iran resumed on December 26, however, Molotov stated that nothing had come of the discussions so they should be dropped. Molotov also insisted that the conference communique not mention Iran, arguing that it was sufficient that the issue had been discussed. Bevin, who had tried unsuccessfully to arrange a third meeting with Stalin on Iran, responded: What is my next step? Molotov replied: You know that well.26

THE SITUATION
While Secretary Byrnes was in Moscow, the State Department had been working on instructions for the U.S. delegate to the United Nations in case Iran presented charges against the Soviet Union at the opening meeting of the new organization in January 1946. In a telegram to Ambassador Harriman in the Soviet Union, Acting Secretary of State Acheson explained:27 We do not see how, without undermining world confidence in UNO, our Delegate in view of the facts already known could pursue any course other than to agree that a careful investigation be made of Iranian charges to the effect that the Soviet Union had infringed upon the territorial integrity or political independence of Iran. Furthermore, if an investigation by UNO should convince this Government of the validity of the Iranian charges, this Government would be obliged to concur in a finding unfavorable to the Soviet Union. Such a finding, if made, might confront UNO with a situation similar to that which the League of Nations faced when presented with the problems of Manchuria and Ethiopia, with the result that the effectiveness of UNO as a factor in the preservation of world peace based upon the principles outlined in the Charter would be seriously undermined. In a lengthy December 28 paper entitled, The Present Situation in the Near EastA Danger to World Peace, Loy W Henderson, offered his

8 thoughts on the situation in the region:28

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At the present time the Near East . . . is a breeding ground for international misunderstandings. The national objectives of two Great Powers, namely the Soviet Union and Great Britain, collide head-on in this region. The most important interest of the United States in the Near East is not based, as a fairly large section of the American public appears to believe, upon American participation in petroleum extraction or in profits to be derived from trade, but upon preventing developments from taking place in that area which might make a mockery of the principles on which the United Nations Organization rests, which might lead to the impairment, if not the wrecking of that organization, and which might eventually give birth to a third World War. Behind the curtain of protestations of a desire for international cooperation, of devotion to the principles of democracy, and of loyalty to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, etc., four of the worlds Great Powers are carrying on four different, opposing policies in the Near East: (a) Great Britain is endeavoring to use the Near Eastern area as a great dam which serves both to hold back the flow of Russia towards the south and to maintain an avenue of communications with India and other British possessions in the Indian and Southeast Pacific Oceans. The British strive, by maintaining a certain control over the natural resources, industry means of communication, and commerce of this great causeway, to make it pay its own way so far as possible. (b) France. . . . (c) The Soviet Union seems determined to break down the structure which Great Britain has maintained so that Russian power and influence can sweep unimpeded across Turkey and through the Dardanelles into the Mediterranean, and across Iran and through the Persian Gulf into the Indian Ocean. During the last five years, two great barriers to Russian expansion have disappeared, namely, Germany in the West and Japan in the East. Judging from recent events in the Near East, Russia now appears to be concentrating upon the removal of a third barrier in the south. (d) The United States has been pursuing a policy of the open door in the Near East. It has taken the position that the independent countries of the Near East which are members of the United Nations should be treated with the same consid-

eration as other members of this organization; that they should not be considered as lying within the sphere of influence of any Great Power; that the idea of any single Great Power maintaining a paramount position in any of these countries by special treaty provisions is outmoded and dangerous to peace. . . . Great Britain is encountering difficulties in maintaining its Near Eastern ramparts in its present weakened condition and in the face of a series of unilateral acts which Russia has committed or appears to be about to commit with the aim of breaking through to the Mediterranean and to the Indian Ocean. There is undoubtedly a tendency among certain circles in Great Britain to enter into a series of compromises with the Russians in the hope that the Soviet Union may be satisfied by obtaining the control of certain territory now belonging to third powers and of achieving strategic defensive positions at the expense of other members of the United Nations. If the British Government should actually embark upon such a policy, it would appear that the United Nations Organization would either disappear as a force in world affairs or would tend to become merely an instrument for the use of the Great Powers in carving up the world into respective spheres of influence. It is, furthermore, clear that the struggle between Great Britain and Russia would not be eliminated by such concessions. The Russians, once in possession of the new positions conceded them by the British, would undoubtedly begin preparations for further attacks upon such barriers to their emergence into the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean as might remain. French policy. . . . The Soviet Union appears to be achieving certain successes in its efforts to break through the barriers which are restraining it in the south and the southwest. Although Soviet activities in northern Persia appear to have been in violation of commitments made by the Soviet Union both to Great Britain and the United States as well as contrary to the general principles of the United Nations Organization, no serious effort has as yet been made by the other Great Powers jointly responsible for the maintenance of world peace to cause the Soviet Union to cease such activities. It would seem that the Soviet Union is also preparing trouble of some kind for Turkey with the purpose of gaining control of all territory touching upon the Black Sea as well as of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. Although the situation in this

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respect is quite clear, no single Great Power has thus far made any real effort to prevent the Russians from carrying out what seems to be their purpose. . . . As a way out of this dilemma, Henderson proposed holding a four-power conference on the problems of the Near East, including Iran. Such a conference, he argued, would be the most promising method for reaching a comprehensive agreement in harmony with the spirit of the United Nations Organization. The British still hoped that the Soviets would agree to their commission proposal, and requested that the United States join them in urging the Iranian government not to submit the Azerbaijan issue to the United Nations. Taking the matter to the United Nations, the British argued, would preclude any chance of the Soviets joining the proposed commission. Moreover, presenting such an issue to the fledgling United Nations might undermine its long term effectiveness. The British were also concerned that their activities in Palestine, Greece, and Indonesia might be vulnerable to similar charges of interference.29 Ambassador Murray warned that the British might be thinking in terms of conceding northern Iran to the Soviets and consolidating their own position in southern Iran. The reference in the British commission proposal to special treatment for Khuzistan, the southern province where the AngloIranian Oil Companys facilities were located, fueled U.S. suspicions in this regard. There were also concerns about establishing a precedent that could prevent small countries from having recourse to the Security Council.30 On January 10, 1946, the United Nations General Assembly convened at Church House in London for its first meeting. Seven days later, the newly constituted Security Council met to elect a chairman and to adopt provisional rules of procedure. The prospect of the Iranian Government submitting a complaint against the Soviet Union presented the Security Council with a serious dilemma:31 If it took the case it was faced with possible failure which might jeopardize the entire future of the organization. There was, as yet, no military forces at its command. There had not even been time to appraise possible techniques of pacific settlement. Furthermore, to deal with a complaint against one of the permanent members of the Security Council threatened to rock the foundations of an organization built upon the premise of unity among the great powers. On the other

hand, if the Council refused to hear the appeal of a small state against a great one, what would happen to the principles of the Charter and to the hopes which the community of nations had placed on this new instrument? Meanwhile, in its final issue of 1945, the New Republic looked Behind the Scenes in Iran.32 Although an autonomous Azerbaijani Province, separate from Iran is now a fait accompli, the trouble in that part of the world is far from ended. In Iran are all the ingredients of serious international dispute: oil, airways, imperialism, dollar diplomacy, overlapping security zones, antagonistic philosophies of government, native populations ripened for revolution by generations of serfdom. Political disintegration has been developed by half a century of struggle for power. No instrument less delicate than a neutral UNO commission, charged with supervising economic, social, and political reform in Iran, and keeping out all bigpower interference during that period, could possibly, meddle in Iran without harm to everyone. Each party to the big-power game being played there came to the table with a marked deck. To understand Russian suspicions of the American role, it might be well to outline a hypothetical similar situation south of our own border. Iran borders Russia from the Black Sea across the Crimean to Afghanistan in an incense-route version of Mexicos relation to us. Let us imagine that there are British troops in southern Mexico which, we understand, are arming reactionary. tribesmen there, and a hostile and authoritarian government in Mexico City en rapport with British representatives and with two Russian military missions advising that government. We know that the head of one of those missions, at least, is as anti-Yankee as Peron himself. The United States, meantime, occupies two border provincessay Sonora and Chihuahua. The people there are revolting against the oppression of absentee landlords, peonage, iron-handed rules. Their rebellion has been stimulated by exposure to our own freer way of life, and by a little left-handed proselytizing on the part of fellow Mexicans in New Mexico and Texas, possibly with inspiration from Washington. The three powers involved are deeply interested in Mexican oil. We, additionally, are pursuing that same interest in a secure border that sent a couple of American expeditions into Mexico in the early 1900s. The Russians invite us and the British to with-

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draw on January 1, although we are not obligated to withdraw, by the terms of a tripartite treaty with Great Britain and Mexico, until the first of March. Would we be likely cheerfully to accept such an invitation, especially if we knew that the Red Army missions had recently signed two year contracts to strengthen the Mexican security police? Would we intervene on the side of the government in the brave struggle of a democratic parry for popular rule and a decent way of life? This is not exactly the State Department or the Foreign Office version of what is going on in Iran. It is a version suggested by some recent remarks on the floor of the House of Representatives by Republican Representative Mundt of South Dakotaan ultraconservative in domestic affairs. He checked with the War Department and found out that the American military missions to the Teheran government of Mohammed Reza Pahlavi have been agreed upon for two years, and that American Colonel H. Norman Schwartzkopf, Russophobe to his polished boots, commands thousands of those same Iranian gendarmerie who were denied access to Russian-occupied Azerbaijan. These evidences of American interference struck Rep. Mundt as backing up a long way from. the pious phrases once enunciated in the Atlantic Charter. The real American position in Iran, complicated by the TWA and Pan-American Airways, Standard Oil, independent oil companies, and other business interests, may not be well known to the American public, but Moscow seems to feel it is no mystery. President Roosevelts occasional pressures on the young King to equalize opportunities for his people, and royal promises to do so as soon as Iranian independence was fully restored, are thin satisfaction to Moscow. The impression there is clearly that the United States as well as Great Britain is putting starch into an antiRussian, anti-democratic Iranian government, that this policy is leading to a cordon sanitaire running from Gibraltar and above Italy and Greece and Turkey across the Middle East littoral, and that Russian security requires it be challenged. Here, as in the Balkans, suspicious Russia is trying to build border security mile by stubborn mile. As for Great Britains special interests in this part of the world, they are common knowledge. Not only does she want the same things in this whole region that the other great powers do, but her politics is complicated by the need, whether

real or imaginary, of a safe and secure lifeline of empire through the Mediterranean and the Red Sea to India and the East. Russia, of course, cannot admit publicly the exact degree to which she has pulled the strings in the setting up of the independent Azerbaijan, but there can be few people anywhere in the world who believe that there were no such strings. Clifton Daniel, writing from Teheran in the New York Times, gives some facts about life in Iran that indicate an agrarian feudalism more vicious than that now under attack from MacArthurs directives in Japan. He says: Even in normal times, the vast majority of this predominantly agricultural country live in a state of peonage. Experts estimate that less than one percent of the land is owned by small holders. The remainder is held by landlords, probably 75 percent of who are absentee proprietors who live in the towns. Some holdings are said to measure more than 100 square miles each. The sharecropping system is worthy of an Iranian Grapes of Wrath or Tobacco Road. . . . Iran is a nation in rags. Abject misery is graven on most faces. Mr. Daniel further reports rampant malaria and venereal disease, and an infant mortality rate higher than 50 percent. All this is the stuff of civil war, stuff which gives an open invitation to outside interference, especially by powers playing for security stakes. The United States, in opposing any open or tacit Russian support to challenges of Iranian sovereignty, places itself uncomfortably on the side of the privileged parasites of Teheran, when our natural sympathy lies with the freedom-minded sharecroppers and intellectuals of the Tudeh Party and even with the angry Azerbaijans who call themselves democrats. These natural sympathies of ours are complicated, not only in Iran but everywhere else in the world, by our own ideological prepossessions. In most places, what is urgently needed is to break the grip of greedy landlords, usurious money lenders, hard-hearted employers of sweatshop labor in factories. But the dominant American policies are those of people reluctant to interfere so drastically with the sacred cause of free enterprise. The result in many casesin Italy, for example, as we point out in elsewhere in this issueis that we temporize, we play with the rightists, until the plain people, who desperately need help, lose all faith in the Americans and

Case 425, Part A

Allied Relations in Iran

11

their glittering but unrealized promises. Certainly, so far as Iran is concerned, there can be agreement of the great powers without appeasement of Russia. There can be pressure for Iranian reform without menacing Iranian sovereignty. Without compromising anyone, there can be withdrawal of American military missions, a fuller explanation of our Janus-faced role in Iran, and a moderation of British influences inciting Soviet suspicion. In addition to the humanitarian consideration, the problem of a decent life for the voiceless peoples of Iran, is the frightening consideration of an Iranian threat to Big Three harmony at a time when the fledgling UNO is almost ready to try its wings. Neither has yet been approached directly or fairly by the State Department. . . . On January 18, 1946, Washington insider columnists Joseph and Stewart Alsop wrote:33 It is difficult, here in this country to lie awake nights worrying about a bleak and distant nation with a backward population and a frowzily corrupt government. Such a nation is Iran. Yet it must be recorded that the official American observers interpret the Iranian crisis in a manner which is downright spine-chilling. If the experts are correct, it is urgent to grasp the issues. . . . First, what are the facts? Many months ago the Soviet Union indicated long-term ambitions in Iran by requesting an oil concession. The terms of the request were such that granting it would have meant virtual cession to the Soviet Union of most of northern Iran. The Iranians hastily announced that they would grant no concessions to anyone, including the United States, which had also asked for oil rights of a more conventional sort. But the Russians did not let the matter rest there. The Iranian people are easy targets of agitation, being oppressed by a landlord-ridden government. In Azerbaijan, one of the northern provinces, a local front movement was organized and rebelled against the central authority. The Azerbaijani rebels were protected by the Russian occupying force, which forbade Iranian government troops to enter the area and put down the rebellion. With this assistance the rebels have now consolidated control of Azerbaijan. There are already strong indications that the process is about to be repeated in two other northern provinces, Meashead and Mazanderan, which will give the Russians about what they asked in the first in-

stance. If the matter were to end there, however, it would concern only the Iranians, and those who believe that the UNO should protect its member states from such misfortunes. Unfortunately, it seems extremely unlikely that the matter will end there. Opinion among the technicians at the State Department, based on the reports of our Teheran and Moscow Embassies, is virtually unanimous that the true Russian objective is the Iranian government itself. From their controlled northern provinces the Russians can send to the Iranian Parliament a solid bloc of deputies. That bloc, assisted by Russian pressure, and perhaps by other forms of persuasion which are notoriously acceptable to Iranian politicians, will be enough to throw out the present Iranian administration. A new, Russian-dominated regime for all of Iran will then be installed. If and when that is permitted to happen, illimitable perspectives of trouble will be opened out. The new Iranian government can transfer to the Russians the Anglo-Persian oil concessions which are vital to the British economy. They can bring the Russians down onto the Persian Gulf, a state of affairs which has been the nightmare of British imperial policy for 100 years. They can serve as a base for further pressure against Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East. Perhaps, most important of all, by the mere fact of being Russiandominated, such an Iranian government could not avoid inflicting a mortal blow to British prestige throughout the whole Middle and Far Eastern colonial area. The threat to the British imperial position will, of course, be redoubled if Soviet pressure on Turkey is renewed after the UNO meeting. Equally, the UNOs difficulties will be vastly increased, for the Turkish government is united and determined, where the Iranian government only weakly demands redress. In short, two things are at stake in the Iranian crisis and related Turkish problem. First, failure to find a solution will demonstrate the impotence of the UNO, almost at the moment of UNOs birth. Second, it will drastically alter the world balance of power by undermining Great Britain where it will hurt most. Neither the effectiveness of UNO nor the world balance of power can be considered matters of indifference to this country, although one may question the soundness of a power balance partly founded on imperialism. On the contrary, they are vital problems, directly affecting the national future. . . .

Case 425, Part B

ALLIED RELATIONS IN IRAN: 19411945
David S. Painter

COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL
Do Not Duplicate This is Copyrighted Material for Classroom Use. It is available only through the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. 202-965-5735 x3002 (tel) 202-965-5811 (fax)

THE ORIGINS OF GREAT POWER RIVALRY IN IRAN

Located at the crossroads of east and west, Iran became an arena of great power rivalry when the British acquired their empire in India. Fearful of the Russian drive toward the Mediterranean and India, the British came to view an independent Iran as an important buffer state. The British relied largely on diplomacy and commercial ties rather than military pressure to maintain their influence in Iran, and established a wide range of official and informal channels through which to influence Iranian affairs, including an extensive intelligence network. As in most of the Third World, the British supported cooperative local elites, thereby indirectly strengthening the status quo.34 Just before World War I, oil joined Irans geographic position directly athwart the lines of communication of the British Empire as a source of British interest in the country. After a British company discovered oil in southern Iran in 1908, the British government, at the insistence of First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill, acquired a majority interest in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which held the rights to Irans s oil. Although government-

Copyright 1986 by Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. ISBN: 1-56927-425-8 Publications, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 200571025 http://data.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/isd/

owned, APOC was operated as a commercial concern, except that the Royal Navy received a large, and undisclosed, discount on Iranian oil. By the eve of World War 11, Iranian oil production was the greatest in the Middle East, and the huge refinery complex at Abadan the chief source of refined products east of Suez.35 Iran was of equal, if not greater, strategic importance to Russia. A warm water port on the Persian Gulf was one of imperial Russias major aspirations. In addition, Iran not only constituted something of a back door to southern Russia, but did so near the emerging oil center in the Caucasus. To promote its interests in Iran, imperial Russia pursued a dual strategy of armed conquest and support for separatist movements of dissident minorities along its borders.36 In 1907, weakened by revolution, humiliated by defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, and faced with rising German strength, the Russians accepted an invitation from the British (who were equally concerned about Germany) to divide Iran into spheres of influence. World War I and the Russian Revolution, while giving Iran a brief respite from foreign pressures, also increased its importance to Britain both as a source of oil for the Royal Navy and as a buffer against the Bolsheviks.37 After the war, the British tried, unsuccessfully, to impose a treaty on Iran that would have made it a virtual British protectorate. Weakened by civil war and foreign intervention, Russia signed a treaty with Iran in 1921 pledging mutual respect for each

12

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Allied Relations in Iran

13

others territorial integrity and pledging noninterference in each others internal affairs. Iran had been used as a staging ground for counterrevolutionary forces, and article 6 of the treaty granted the Soviet Union the right to send troops into Iran should it again become a base for hostile third powers. In addition, the Soviets gave up all concession rights held by Russian nationals on the condition that the concessions would never be ceded to third parties.38 During the 1930s, Reza Shah (a military leader who had seized power in the mid-1920s, crowned himself shah, and instituted a program of forced modernization) turned increasingly to Germany to counterbalance British and Soviet influence. By the eve of World War II, Irans trade with Germany surpassed that with the Soviet Union and Britain, and the community of German technicians and businessmen in Iran included a well-established espionage network. Although Iran declared its neutrality when war broke out, Reza Shah was openly sympathetic to the Nazis. In unfriendly hands, Iran posed a potential threat on the Soviets southern flank, and could control the direct route from the Mediterranean to India as well as the oil fields of the Persian Gulf German agents in Iran could easily slip across the border from Azerbaijan and sabotage the Baku oil fields or threaten British oil facilities in the south. Moreover, in the event of a break between Germany and the Soviet Union, Iran would afford the only secure year-round channel for sending supplies to the Soviet Union from the West.39 In the summer of 1940, the British and the French, considered destroying the Baku oil fields in order to deny oil to the Nazis. The plans, which call for both air and ground attacks, were captured by the Germans and published in July 1940.40 In subsequent conversations with the Soviets, the Germans sought to direct Soviet attention away from the Balkans and toward Iran and the Persian Gulf The Soviets, however, reiterated their primary interest in matters affecting their western borders and the Turkish straits, and insisted that their objectives in Iran were limited to eliminating British influence, excluding any other third power from political influence in Iran, and securing free zones in Persian Gulf ports and transit rights on Iranian railroads.41

THREE-POWER CONTROL IN IRAN

Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the Soviets and the British signed a mutual assistance agreement and demanded that the nearly 2,000 Germans then resident in Iran be

expelled. Reza Shah, aware that the Iranian economy depended on German advisers and trade, and anticipating a Nazi victory over the Soviet Union, refused. On August 25, with German armies driving toward the Caucasus, British and Soviet troops invaded Iran.42 Iranian resistance collapsed quickly, and Reza Shah was forced to abdicate in favor of his 18-year old son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. Iran was divided into a northern zone of Soviet occupation and a southern zone under British control. A strip of neutral territory that included Tehran separated the two zones. The occupying powers took control of all means of transport and communication, and drafted a tripartite treaty to formalize the occupation. In the treaty signed January 29, 1942, Britain and the Soviet Union pledged to respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political independence of Iran, and to withdraw their forces from Iranian territory not later than six months after all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates had ended.43 The United States rebuffed Iranian requests for assistance against the Anglo-Soviet invasion and refused Iranian requests that it co-sign the occupation treaty. U.S. involvement in Iran increased dramatically after the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff, in September 1942, gave the United States direct responsibility for the Persian Corridor supply route through Iran to the Soviet Union. Over the next year, 30,000 U.S. troops moved into Iran under British auspices to facilitate the movement of supplies.44 In addition, the United States, in response to Iranian requests, sent advisory missions to the Iranian army, the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie (rural paramilitary police), and the Ministry of Finance. (There were also small advisory missions to the Tehran police and the Ministry of Food and Supply).45 The de facto partition of the country and monopolization of the Trans-Iranian Railroad for sending supplies to the Soviet Union disrupted the Iranian economy. The resulting scarcities and inflation exacerbated existing social tensions. Political activity also increased greatly because of dissatisfaction with the government response to the crisis, the relaxation of controls following the collapse of Reza Shahs autocracy, the revival of religious and ethnic concerns, and the encouragement of various political groups by the Allies. 46 In addition, the various parties and factions pursued great power sponsorship for the advantages such support could provide in the internal struggle for supremacy. Liberals gained a following in Tehran

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and the larger provincial cities, and the pro-Soviet Tudeh (masses) party was strong in northern industrial areas and in the oil fields. Nevertheless, the Majlis (parliament) remained under the control of large landowners and urban merchant interests. The young shah focused his energies on preserving the monarchy, and tried to secure his position by winning the confidence of the Allies, especially the United States, and by retaining royal control of the military.47 Moreover, their country occupied by its traditional enemies, Iranian leaders, employing the traditional strategy of movazaneh (equilibrium), worked to intensify differences between Britain and the Soviet Union, and tried to attract U.S. involvement in hopes that the United States would act as a buffer and counterbalance to the British and the Soviets. The Iranians sought to gain U.S. attention, if not support, by reporting every instance of Soviet (and, to a more limited degree, British) misconduct. Many U.S. officials soon became concerned that the Soviets planned to Sovietize their zone, if not all Iran. British conduct caused less concern, though there were suspicions that the British were seeking to exclude U.S. economic interests from Iran.48 The United States was concerned that increasing instability in Iran due to the disruption caused by the occupation could interfere with the supply effort and hoped that American advisers would help the Iranians see that their real interests lie on the side of the United States. In addition, the United States hoped that the disinterested American advisers would help stabilize Iran and root out the conditions which served both as a reason and as an excuse for Soviet and British interference in Irans internal affairs.49 A January 1943 State Department memorandum summarizing U.S. policy argued that the United States could win the peace by making Iran selfreliant and prosperous, open to the trade of all nations and a threat to none. According to this paper, Iran was important to the Allies because it provided a vital supply route to the Soviet Union, because of its location, because it possessed vast petroleum reserves, and because it constituted a test case for the good faith of the United Nations and their ability to work out among themselves an adjustment of ambitions, rights, and interests which will be fair not only to the Great Powers of our coalition but also to the small nations. Moreover, the United States could not be indifferent to the welfare of any part of the world, no matter how remote, because sooner or later it will affect our own peace.50

By early 1943, the vital importance of adequate supplies of oil to military strength was already becoming recognized as one of the key lessons of the war. At the same time, growing concerns that U.S. oil reserves were being exhausted at an alarming rate led to a consensus within the government that the nations security and prosperity was dependent on access to foreign oil supplies, in particular in the Middle East, which not only contained vast reserves but also offered the best prospects for further discoveries.51 In an August 1943 memorandum to President Roosevelt on American Policy in Iran, Secretary of State Cordell Hull warned that both the British and the Soviets were likely to make moves to increase their influence in Iran. Explaining that it is to our interest that no great power be established on the Persian Gulf opposite the important American petroleum development in Saudi Arabia, Hull recommended that the United States adopt a policy of positive action in Iran, mainly through the use of American advisers, so as to facilitate not only the United Nations war operations in that country but also a sound postwar development. Hull believed that the British would support or at least acquiesce in U.S. policy While the attitude of the Soviet government was doubtful, the United States should be in a position to exert considerable influence if occasion should arise.52 The British were also concerned about Soviet intentions, but realized that they would need U.S. help to contain the Soviets in Iran. Strapped for resources and concerned over Soviet intentions as well as Iranian stability, the British had encouraged the Iranian request for American advisers. A high Foreign Office official noted in June 1943 that the success of the present American advisers in Persia is probably our best hope for establishing the kind of Persia that suits our interests.53 To gain U.S. support, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden proposed a three power declaration on Iran at the Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow in October, which included a pledge of support for the American advisers, Hull supported the idea, but Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov refused to go beyond the commitments contained in the Tripartite Treaty, and the issue was deferred to the meeting of the three Allied leaders in Tehran, November 27-December 2.54 Working through Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, whom Roosevelt had sent on a fact-finding mission to the Middle East, the Iranian government convinced the president to intercede with Stalin on behalf of the proposed declaration. Stalin agreed, and at the

Case 425, Part B

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15

conclusion of the Tehran Conference the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union issued a declaration which promised Iran some postwar assistance for its contribution to the war effort and pledged that the three governments were at one in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran.55 At Tehran, Roosevelt, in a private meeting with Stalin, also proposed that the allies establish an international trusteeship to operate the Trans-Iranian Railroad and a free port on the Persian Gulf After conferring with Molotov, Stalin reportedly stated that he was agreeable to the proposal. The president did not inform the State Department of the offer for over a year. The British were not informed at all.56 Despite initial high hopes the U.S. advisory missions accomplished very little in the way of reform. The largest mission was the financial mission headed by Arthur C. Millspaugh of the Brookings Institution, who was appointed director general of finance and promised wide authority over Irans economy as well as its financial administration. A former State Department official who had led a similar mission to Iran in the 1920s, Millspaugh saw his task as building a stable, prosperous, U.S.-oriented Iran. With a staff of 60 people and most important economic posts filled by Americans, the Millspaugh mission, on paper at least, constituted something of a government within the government. What the Iranians wanted, however, was not an expert to run their economy, but someone to plead their case at the highest levels of the U.S. government. Moreover, Millspaughs plans for reform upset the Iranian elite, and his uncompromising personal style alienated potential supporters. In January 1945, the Majlis, which was taking advantage of the shahs youth and inexperience, deprived Millspaugh of his economic powers. Millspaugh resigned the following month, and his mission ceased to function within the year.57 The missions to the gendarmerie and the army fared somewhat better. Col. H. Norman Schwartzkopf, a West Point graduate and former head of the New Jersey state police who had become known for his work in the Lindbergh case, was put in command of the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie. Despite scanty resources and royal opposition to transferring police authority away from the army, Schwartzkopf initiated changes which greatly increased the effectiveness of the gendarmerie. Schwartzkopf may also have helped lay the groundwork for a U.S. intelligence network in Iran. In contrast, the American mission to the Iranian army, hampered by the politi-

cal sensitivity of control of the military as well as by lack of support from the War Department, which refused to divert scarce supplies from the war effort, managed little more than to survive.58

THE OIL CONCESSION CRISIS

Meanwhile, as part of its effort to attract U.S. support, the Iranian government, in early 1943, approached the Standard Vacuum Oil Company (Stanvac) about a concession in Iran. Stanvac, a joint subsidiary of Standard Oil (New Jersey) and the Socony-Vacuum Oil Company (present day Exxon and Mobil, respectively), needed new sources of crude oil and decided to pursue the Iranian offer. Despite warnings from Millspaugh and the U.S. Minister in Iran that efforts by U.S. companies to gain oil concessions in Iran could damage allied unity and cast doubt on the disinterested nature of U.S. policy, the State Department informed the U.S. Legation in mid-November that because of the importance of petroleum, both from the long-range standpoint and for war purposes, the Department of State looks with favor upon the development of all possible sources of petroleum.59 Although the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) controlled all of Irans developed oil reserves, elements in the British government felt that unless Britain kept its end up, U.S. interests would get all the oil that was left in Iran. Therefore, they encouraged Royal Dutch-Shell (40 percent British-owned) to seek a concession in Iran. Shell representatives arrived in Iran in late 1943, closely followed by Stanvac officials. In early 1944, Sinclair Oil Company joined what was fast becoming a classic scramble for oil rights. To introduce some order into the process, the Iranian government, at the insistence of Millspaugh, hired a U.S. oil consulting firm in early April to advise it on oil matters.60 Soviet leaders, like their czarist predecessors, had traditionally objected to any great power establishing a presence in northern Iran. As noted above, the Soviets, in the 1921 treaty with Iran, had given up concession rights held by Russian nationals on the condition that the concessions would never be ceded to a third party. In 1940, the Soviets had opposed a U.S. oil concession in Iran as a threat to their security, and in 1941 had tried unsuccessfully to obtain an oil concession for themselves. In early 1944, the Soviet Embassy in Iran reiterated the Soviet claim to prior rights to oil development in northern Iran. Reviewing this history, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) warned in the spring of

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1944 that the Soviets would definitely oppose any U.S. concession in northern Iran, and would likely oppose U.S. concessions anywhere else in Iran. The OSS recommended that the United States reach an agreement with the Soviets before making any moves on oil.61 Neither the United States nor Britain consulted with the Soviets, an omission highlight by the absence of the Soviet Union from talks in Washington between the United States and Britain on an agreement to regulate the international oil economy.62 Left to look out for themselves, the Soviets, in early September, sent an oil mission, headed by Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs Sergei Kavtaradze, to Tehran to discuss an oil concession in northern Iran. On October 2, Kavtaradze proposed that Iran grant the Soviet Union oil exploration rights in a large area in northern Iran for a period of five years, after which time the area would be reduced. Kavtaradze also asked for mineral rights and the exclusion of all other foreigners from the concession area.63 The Soviet action caught the other three parties by surprise. The Iranian government, which had initiated the whole process, found itself faced with the choice of granting the Soviet request, and entrenching Soviet influence in northern Iran, or of incurring Soviet displeasure by refusing. As for the British, Shell needed additional sources of crude oil, and some British officials feared that opposition to a Soviet concession could be used by Iranian nationalists to rally opposition to AIOCs existing rights. On the other hand, the British Ambassador to Iran, Sir Reader Bullard, believed that the Soviets would use any rights they obtained to undermine Iranian independence and gain control of all Iran. Bullard and others in the Foreign Office argued that maintenance of Iran as a buffer state was more important than an additional oil concession for British interests, and that the best course was to urge the Iranians not to grant any concessions. Recently arrived U.S. Ambassador Leland B. Morris recommended that the United States either by itself or jointly with the British oppose the Soviet request. If higher policy precluded such action, Morris suggested that the United States encourage Iran to postpone for six months or a year the granting of oil concessions.64 Finding no support from the United States or Britain for a plan to set up a national oil company to control the development of all of Irans oil, the Iranian government, on October 8, announced that it had decided to postpone all oil concession negotiations until the end of the war. The announcement claimed that the decision had been reached on Sep-

tember 2, before the Soviets had indicated their interest in a concession. This claim, Ambassador Morris observed, was too apparently a desperate diplomatic lie.65 Interpreting the Iranian action as clearly aimed at denying them a concession, the Soviets reacted with tactics that seemed to Morris to smack of Hitlerian methods: The Tudeh party, which had reemerged following Reza Shahs abdication, organized demonstrations against the government; traffic heading north into the Soviet-occupied zone was disrupted; food shipments south from the Soviet zone were temporarily halted; and Kavtaradze, and the Soviet ambassador demanded the resignation of the Iranian prime minister responsible for the decision.66 The Soviet reaction caused alarm in Washington and London, and both governments sent protest notes to Moscow. The U.S. note, delivered on November 1, stressed that in the light of the Tehran Declaration, the American Government would not be able . . . to concur in any action which would constitute undue interference in the internal affairs of Iran. Nevertheless, the United States, despite Iranian urging, went no further than to give verbal support to the Tehran Declaration. Wallace Murray, the State Departments chief Middle East expert pointed out to the Iranian ambassador in early November: we are in the midst of a war and . . . we cannot take any action which would interfere with the conduct of the war and with our vitally important relations with Soviet Russia.67 The Soviets began to relax their pressure on Iran in early November. In an analysis of Soviet conduct, the U.S. charge in the Soviet Union, George F. Kennan, argued that the Soviets had reacted strongly to the Anglo-American scramble for oil concessions, not because they needed oil, but because they considered northern Iran, which bordered on their vital Caucasian oil center, so essential to Russian security that no other great power should have even the chance of gaining a footing there. Kennan ascribed, the clumsy tactics employed by the Soviets to an extensive preoccupation in Moscow today with the methods as well as the aims of czarist diplomacy Ambassador Morris and the American oil advisers also attributed Soviet actions to sensitivity about foreign influence in northern Iran.68 President Roosevelt asked his ambassador to the Soviet Union, W. Averell Harriman, to stop in Tehran on his way back to Moscow. Arriving in Iran in early December, Harriman told the shah that while the United States would stand by the Tehran Declaration and press the Soviet Union to fulfill its treaty obligations, the primary responsibility for maintaining

Case 425, Part B

Allied Relations in Iran

17

Iranian independence was Irans. Talks with Kavtaradze and Soviet Ambassador Mikhail Maximov led Harriman to conclude that the Soviets would at some point take aggressive action to attain their objectives in Iran. Maximovs remark that since the Iranian government did not represent the people of Iran, the Soviet Union had an obligation to see that the popular will was followed raised suspicions that Soviet objectives included more than oil.69 Meanwhile, the Iranian prime minister responsible for the decision to postpone the granting of concessions had been replaced by Ibrahim Hakimi, a conservative landowner and native of Azerbaijan. Working with nationalist deputy Mohammed Mossadegh, Hakimi supported a stringent law prohibiting any public official discussing oil concessions with either a foreign company or a foreign government. The MaJlis passed the law on December 2.70 The Soviets protested the oil law but took no action. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet oil mission returned home. In a December 28 note to the United States, the Soviets strongly defended their actions in Iran, accused the Iranian government of being hostile, and complained about the unsympathetic attitude taken by the United States. The Soviets also argued that their request for an oil concession did not violate Iranian sovereignty noting that if these arguments were recognized as sound, they would in the first place affect Great Britain which, as is known, has for a long time had an important oil concession in Iran.71

War Department proceed on this assumption), it is necessary to protect the vital communications of the Empire between Europe and the Far East. Britain has always tried desperately to keep Russians, whether of the Czarist or Soviet variety, away from the Persian Gulf, and will doubtless continue to do so. The foregoing considerations might be brushed aside if there were any reason for confidence that the Soviets would participate in an international trusteeship on the high principles the President had in mind. We would be deluding ourselves, however, if we built our plans on such hopes. Faced with the departments adamant opposition, Roosevelt dropped the idea.72 In a briefing paper prepared for the Yalta Conference, the State Department argued that the situation in Iran should be viewed as a testing ground for the Atlantic Charter and for Allied good faith. U.S. policy should therefore seek to maintain Irans independence and increase its internal strength because a strong and independent Iran would contribute to postwar security by eliminating the internal dissensions and weaknesses which invite foreign intervention. The oil concession controversy had created a situation that was potentially dangerous, not only as regards Iranian sovereignty but in the more important bearing it may have on allied relations. The department recommended that the United States continue to support Irans right to grant or withhold oil concessions.73 The British were also concerned about the situation in Iran. In a telegram to President Roosevelt on January 15, 1945, Prime Minister Churchill proposed that he and Roosevelt inform Stalin at their next meeting that they supported the Iranian decision regarding new oil concessions. Iran, Churchill warned, was something of a test case, and if the Soviets were able to secure what they wanted by their use of the big stick, Iran would not be the only place where the bad effect will be felt.74 At Malta in January 1945, Secretary of State Edward Stettinius and British Foreign Secretary Eden agreed to press the Soviets to agree to a mutual withdrawal of forces and to recognize the right of the Iranian government to refuse to negotiate oil concessions as long as the country was occupied by foreign troops. At the Yalta Conference, February 411, however, neither Churchill nor Roosevelt found time to bring up Iran, and the matter was relegated to the foreign ministers. Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov refused to agree to any statement on Iran. When Eden, with Churchills

BETWEEN CRISES
Meanwhile, President Roosevelt had resurrected his idea about establishing an international trusteeship to operate a free port on the Persian Gulf with rail connections to the Soviet Union. The State Department, however, opposed the idea. While conceding that the presidents plan offered potential benefits to Iran and might forestall Soviet attempts to achieve the same advantages by force, Wallace Murray pointed out that the Iranians would object to the violation of their sovereignty. The British would also object to a Soviet presence on the Persian Gulf because of the threat to the lines of communication of their empire as well as to their (and U.S.) oil interests. Murray explained: If we proceed on the assumption that the continuance of the British Empire in some reasonable strength is in the strategic interest of the United States (and I understand that the strategists in the

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blessing, approached Stalin directly, the Soviet leader laughed and remarked: You should never talk to Molotov about Iran. Didnt you realize that he had a resounding diplomatic defeat there? He is very sore with Iran. When Eden explained the Anglo-American plan for joint troop withdrawal, however, all Stalin would say was that he would consider it.75 Following the end of the war with Germany, Iran requested that the three allies withdraw their troops immediately The British and the United States began withdrawing their forces, but the Soviets took no action.76 Concerned that as long as Soviet troops remained in northern Iran, the Soviet Union could dominate the entire country the British presented a proposal at the Potsdam Conference calling for the early withdrawal of all foreign troops in three stages beginning with Tehran. Stalin pointed out that the date for ending the occupation would be determined by the surrender of Japan, not Germany, but agreed that troops could be withdrawn from Tehran immediately Further discussion of the issue would have to await the foreign ministers meeting to be held in London in September. President Truman stated that the United States hoped to withdraw all its troops from Iran within 60 days. Stalin then assured Truman that the Soviet Union had no intention of taking any action against Iran.77 Meanwhile, in Iran, a new prime minister, Mohsen Sadr, had taken office. Supported by the British, Sadr appointed a staunchy royalist and proBritish cabinet, signed an economic agreement with Britain, and named a conservative Anglophile, Gen. Hassan Arfa, chief of the army general staff. Arfa quickly moved to arm anti-Tudeh tribes and purge leftist officers from the armed forces. Sadr also closed opposition newspapers, occupied the Tudeh party headquarters, and arrested over 100 Tudeh cadres. Sadrs appointment resulted in a constitutional crisis in Iran as the opposition boycotted the Majlis for three months, thereby preventing parliamentary approval of the cabinet.78

The Soviets also protested Sadrs policies. A Pravda editorial in July criticized reactionary control of the Iranian government and called for drastic internal reforms. Pravda also charged that the Iranian army was waiting for the departure of Soviet troops to institute a military dictatorship.79 In late August, U.S. Soviet specialist Loy W. Henderson, who had recently taken over the expanded Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, wrote a long memorandum summarizing United States Policy Toward Iran. After reviewing expanding U.S. interests and influence in Iran, Henderson warned:80 In the course of the past year, certain modifications in Irans internal and international position have occurred, which directly or indirectly affect the application of American policy to Iran. Of these modifications, the most important is the intensification of the traditional Anglo-Soviet conflict for supremacy in Iran, which had been subordinated temporarily to a policy of outward cooperation in the interests of military expediency. Apart from the obvious effects of this conflict upon Anglo-Soviet relations and upon Allied solidarity, it is reflected in Iranian internal affairs in the form of a steadily widening politico-social schism between leftist and conservative forces, which makes impossible the maintenance of governmental stability and administrative continuity in Iran. With the progressive weakening of the Iranian Government, a political vacuum is being created in which continued foreign interference is inevitable. . . . The disturbing developments which are taking place in Iran make it increasingly clear that Iran threatens to become one of the major security problems of the future and one of the greatest threats to Allied solidarity, unless there can be achieved both the reconciliation of British and Soviet interests and the stabilization of Irans internal affairs. . . .

NOTES
1. Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 398399; Richard W. Cottam, Iran and the United States: A Cold War Case Study (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988), 6667. 2. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1945, vol. 8: 417419 (hereafter FR followed by year and volume number or by year and volume title). 3. Ibid., 526536. 4. Ibid., 431436; Stephen L. McFarland, A Peripheral View of the Origins of the Cold War: The Crises in Iran, 19411947, Diplomatic History 4 (Fall 1980): 343 344.

Case 425, Part B

Allied Relations in Iran

19

5. FR 1945 8: 436437, 445447. 6. Ibid., 448450. The Tehran Declaration, adopted by the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union at the end of the Tehran Conference, stated that the three governments were at one in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Iran. 7. Ibid., 468469. 8. At the Council of Foreign Ministers Meeting in London in September, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov replied, in response to British queries about the precise date troops would be withdrawn, that the Soviet Government attach exceptional importance to the strict fulfillment of obligations undertaken. This statement was taken as Soviet agreement that the date for withdrawal of their respective forces from Iran was March 2, 1946, six months after the surrender of Japan, as provided in the Tripartite Treaty. Ibid., 413415. 9. FR 1945 8: 454455, 485466; Gary R. Hess, The Iranian Crisis of 19451946 and the Cold War, Political Science Quarterly 89 (March 1974): 129130, Abrahamian, Iran Between Revolutions 218, 400401. 10. FR 1945 8: 459463, 487488, 500501; McFarland, Crises in Iran, 344347. 11. New Republic, 3 Dec. 1945, 731732. 12. Abrahamian, Iran Between Revolutions, 400402; FR 1945 8: 490491. 13. FR 1945 8: 455456, 496497. 14. Petroleum Division, Oil Concessions and the Problem in Iran, 9 Dec. 1945, Petroleum Division Records, National Archives. 15. Minor quoted in Mark Hamilton Lytle, The Origins of the Iranian-American Alliance, 19411953 (New York. Holmes & Meier, 1987), 154 27n; Hess, Iranian Crisis, 128129. 16. FR 1945 8: 487490. 17. FR 1945 8: 500. 18. Ibid., 508. 19. Lytle, Iranian-American Alliance 148149. Among the other issues discussed at Moscow were formation of a United Nations atomic energy commission, the civil wars in China and Greece, an international trusteeship for Korea, occupation policy in Japan, and peace treaties for Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland. 20. FR 1945 2: 684685, 750752. 21. FR 1945 2: 685687; 7507.52. Stalin made the same points in a meeting with British Foreign Minister Bevin on December 19, ibid., 689. 22. Ibid., 690, 708709, Wm. Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, 19451951: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 6668. 23. FR 1945 2: 709. 24. FR 1945 2: 774. 25. Ibid., 779780, 795797. 26. Ibid., 805, 808. 27. FR 1945 8: 512513. 28. FR 1946 7: 16. 29. FR 1946 7: 293295; Lytle, Iranian-American Alli-

ance, 156. 30. Lytle, Iranian-American Alliance, 156. 31. Richard W. Van Wagenen, The Iranian Case, 1946 (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1952), 1. 32. New Republic, 31 Dec. 1945, 731732. 33. Washington Post, 18 Jan. 1.946. 34. Lytle, Iranian-American Alliance, 2, 11. 35. Ronald Ferrier, The Development of Me Iranian Oil Industry, in Hossein Amirsadeghi, ed., Twentieth Century Iran (London: Heinemann, 1977), 93102. In the 1930s, APOC changed its name to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). 36. Lytle, Iranian-American Alliance, 2. 37. Ibid., 34. 38. Ibid., 45; Brian Lapping, End of Empire (New York St. Martin's, 1985), 196198; for text of the treaty, see J.C. Hurewitz, ed., The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record, 2d ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), vol. 2., 240245. 39. Lytle, Iranian-American Alliance 7, 910, Cottam, Iran and the United States, 4050. 40. Eduard Mark, Allied Relations in Iran, 19411947: The Origins of a Cold War Crisis, Wisconsin Magazine of History 59 (Autumn 1975): 57. 41. Ibid., 58; for the text of the conversations, see U.S. Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 19181945, Series D, vol. 10: 95; vol. 11: 508510, 533 539, 540570, 714715. 42. Sir Ernest Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World,5 volumes (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 19701976), 5: 2327. 43. Woodward, British Foreign Policy 2: 5357, text in Hurewitz, Middle East Documents 2: 587589. 44. Yonah Alexander and Allen Nanes, ads., The United States and Iran: A Documentary Record (Frederick, Md.: University Press of America, 1980), 7681. T.H. Vail Motter, The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia, vol. 7 of The United States Army in World War II (Washington: U.S. Govt Printing Office, 1952). 45. George V. Allen, American Advisers in Persia, Department of State Bulletin, July 23, 1944, 8893. 46. Nikki R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution: An Interpretative History of Modem Iran (New Haven., Yale University Press, 1981), 113119. 47. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 169 178; Cottam, Iran and the United States 5862. 48. McFarland, The Crises in Iran, 334338, FR 1941 3: 378, 463474; FR 1942 4: 184185, 227228. 49. FR 1942 4: 242243, 247249. 50. FR 1943 4: 331336. 51. David S. Painter, Oil and the American Century: The Political Economy of U.S, Foreign Oil Policy, 19411954 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 3435. 52. FR 1943 4: 377379. 53. Lytle, Iranian-American Alliance 23, 26, 5253. 54. Ibid., 5556. 55. 1bid., 5557. Hurewitz, Middle East Documents 2: 680684.

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David S. Painter

Case 425, Part B

56. FR 1944 5. 483; FR 1945 8: 525526; Lytle, Iranian-American Alliance, 5657, 62. 57. Ibid., 2829, 112116; Arthur C. Milispaugh, Americans in Persia (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1946). 58. Lytle, Iranian-American Alliance 2728, 106112. 59. Painter, Oil and the American Century, 77. 60. Ibid., 78. 61. Ibid., 7879. 62. Ibid., 5964. According to State Department Economic Adviser Herbert Feis, the Soviets were left out of Anglo-American oil negotiations because they did not own any concessions in the Middle East and because it was feared that they might bring the whole pattern of ownership in the region into question. Feis, Seen From E.A.: Three International Episodes (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947), 136. 63. Painter, Oil and the American Century,79, Mark, 'Allied Relations in Iran, 56n, points out that the Soviet request covered a smaller area than a U.S. oil company held in northern Iran in a short-lived 1937 concession. 64. Painter, Oil and the American Century, Lytle, IranianAmerican Alliance, 8789. 65. Painter, Oil and the American Century, 7980; Lytle, Iranian-American Alliance, 88. 66. FR 1945: 455478. 67. Ibid., 462463, 467, Lytle, Iranian-American Alli-

ance, 9095. 68. FR 1944 5: 470471; Lytle, Iranian-American Alliance 9598. 69. FR 1945: 3533,55, 480482. 70. Abrahamian, Iran Between Revolutions, 210214; text in Hurewitz, Middle East Documents, 738739. 71. FR 1945, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 334 336. 72. FR 1944 5: 483486, FR 1945 8: 523525, FR 1945, Yalta, 344345. 73. FR 1945, Yalta, 340345. 74. FR 1945, 336337. 75. Diane Shaver Clemens, Yalta (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 255258. 76. Lytle, Iranian-American Alliance, 128129. 77. Louis, British Empire in the Middle East, 6366; Rohan Butler, M.E. Pelly, and H.J. Yesamee, ads., Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series 1 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1984), vol. 1: 513, 591592. Truman later rescinded an order to this effect when he learned that If interpreted literally it would mean the withdrawal of the U.S. advisory missions to the Iranian army and gendarmerie; FR 1945, Conference at Berlin (Potsdam) 2: 1396; FR 1945 8: 416. 78. Abrahamian, Iran Between Revolutions, 215217. 79. Lytle, Iranian-American Alliance, 129130. 80. FR 1945 8: 393400.