Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila FIRST DIVISION
NOLI ALFONSO and ERLINDA FUNDIALAN, Petitioners, G.R. No. 166236

Present: CORONA, C. J., Chairperson, VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, DEL CASTILLO, and PEREZ, JJ. Promulgated: July 29, 2010

- versus -

SPOUSES HENRY and LIWANAG ANDRES, Respondents.

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DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.: Technical rules may be relaxed only for the furtherance of justice and to benefit the deserving. In the present petition for review, petitioners assail the August 10, 2004 Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV. No. 78362, which dismissed the appeal before it for failure of petitioners to file their brief within the extended reglementary period.

Factual Antecedents The present case stemmed from a complaint for accion publiciana with damages filed by respondent spouses Henry and Liwanag Andres against Noli Alfonso and spouses Reynaldo and Erlinda Fundialan before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 77, San Mateo, Rizal. On July 8, 1997, the RTC rendered a Decision[2] in favor of respondents. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants and all persons claiming rights under them who are ordered: 1. to vacate the premises located at 236 General Luna St., Dulongbayan 11, San Mateo, Rizal; 2. to jointly and severally pay the sum [of] P100.00 as reasonable compensation for the use of said premises commencing from 04 September 1995; [and] 3. to jointly and severally pay the sum of P10,000.00 as and for attorney's fees and to pay the cost of suit. SO ORDERED.[3]

Petitioners,[4] thus, appealed to the CA. Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals On November 5, 2003, petitioners' previous counsel was notified by the CA to file appellants' brief within 45 days from receipt of the notice. The original 45-day period expired on December 21, 2003. But before then, on December 8, 2003, petitioners' former counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw Appearance. Petitioners consented to the withdrawal. On December 19, 2003, petitioners themselves moved for an extension of 30 days or until January 21, 2004 within which to file their appellants' brief. Then on March 3,

2004, petitioners themselves again moved for a fresh period of 45 days from March 3, 2004 or until April 18, 2004 within which to file their appellants' brief. On March 17, 2004, the CA issued a Resolution:[5] a) noting the withdrawal of appearance of petitioners' former counsel; b) requiring petitioners to cause the Entry of Appearance of their new counsel; and c) granting petitioners' motions for extension of time to file their brief for a period totaling 75 days, commencing from December 21, 2003 or until March 5, 2004. Petitioners themselves received a copy of this Resolution only on April 6, 2004. By that time, the extension to file appellants' brief had already long expired. On April 14, 2004, the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), having been approached by petitioners, entered[6] its appearance as new counsel for petitioners. However, on August 10, 2004, the CA issued the assailed Resolution dismissing petitioners' appeal, to wit:
FOR failure of defendants-appellants to file their brief within the extended reglementary period which expired on March 5, 2004 as per Judicial Records Division report dated July 26, 2004, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED pursuant to Sec. 1 (e), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. SO ORDERED.

On September 6, 2004, the PAO filed their Motion for Reconsideration[7] which requested for a fresh period of 45 days from September 7, 2004 or until October 22, 2004 within which to file appellants' brief. On October 21, 2004, the brief[8] was filed by the PAO. On November 26, 2004, the CA issued a Resolution[9] which denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review. Issues Petitioners raise the following issues:

I THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS' APPEAL FOR FAILURE TO FILE THEIR DEFENDANTSAPPELLANTS BRIEF, DESPITE THE ATTENDANCE OF PECULIAR FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING SUCH FAILURE, LIKE THE GROSS AND RECKLESS NEGLIGENCE OF THEIR FORMER COUNSEL, THE ABSENCE OF MANIFEST INTENT TO CAUSE DELAY, THE SERIOUS QUESTIONS OF LAW POSED FOR RESOLUTION BEFORE THE APPELLATE COURT, AND THE FACT THAT THE APPELLANTS' BRIEF HAD ALREADY BEEN FILED WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS AND ALREADY FORMED PART OF THE RECORDS OF THE CASE. II THE DISMISSAL OF PETITIONERS' APPEAL BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS HIGHLY UNJUSTIFIED, INIQUITOUS AND UNCONSCIONABLE BECAUSE IT OVERLOOKED AND/OR DISREGARDED THE MERITS OF PETITIONERS CASE WHICH INVOLVES A DEPRIVATION OF THEIR PROPERTY RIGHTS.[10]

Petitioners' Arguments Petitioners contend that their failure to file their appellants' brief within the required period was due to their indigency and poverty. They submit that there is no justification for the dismissal of their appeal specially since the PAO had just entered its appearance as new counsel for petitioners as directed by the CA, and had as yet no opportunity to prepare the brief. They contend that appeal should be allowed since the brief had anyway already been prepared and filed by the PAO before it sought reconsideration of the dismissal of the appeal and is already part of the records. They contend that the late filing of the brief should be excused under the circumstances so that the case may be decided on the merits and not merely on technicalities. Respondents Arguments

On the other hand, respondents contend that failure to file appellants' brief on time is one instance where the CA may dismiss an appeal. In the present case, they contend that the CA exercised sound discretion when it dismissed the appeal upon petitioners failure to file their appellants' brief within the extended period of 75 days after the original 45-day period expired.

Our Ruling The petition has no merit. Failure to file Brief On Time

Rule 50 of the Rules of Court states:

Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal.-An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds: xxxx (e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or memorandum within the time provided by these Rules;

Petitioners plead for the suspension of the rules and cite a number of cases where the Court excused the late filing of a notice of appeal as well as the late filing of the appellant's brief. They further cite Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals[11] where the late filing of the appellant's brief was excused because the Court found the case impressed with public interest. The cases cited by petitioners are not in point. In the present civil case which involves the failure to file the appellants' brief on time, there is no showing of any public interest involved. Neither is there a showing that an injustice will result due to the application of technical rules. Poverty cannot be used as an excuse to justify petitioners' complacency in allowing months to pass by before exerting the required effort to find a replacement lawyer. Poverty is not a justification for delaying a case. Both parties have a right to a speedy resolution of their case. Not only petitioners, but also the respondents, have a right to have the case finally settled without delay. Furthermore, the failure to file a brief on time was due primarily to petitioners' unwise choices and not really due to poverty. Petitioners were able to get a lawyer to represent them despite their poverty. They were able to get two other lawyers after they

consented to the withdrawal of their first lawyer. But they hired their subsequent lawyers too late. It must be pointed out that petitioners had a choice of whether to continue the services of their original lawyer or consent to let him go. They could also have requested the said lawyer to file the required appellants' brief before consenting to his withdrawal from the case. But they did neither of these. Then, not having done so, they delayed in engaging their replacement lawyer. Their poor choices and lack of sufficient diligence, not poverty, are the main culprits for the situation they now find themselves in. It would not be fair to pass on the bad consequences of their choices to respondents. Petitioners' low regard for the rules or nonchalance toward procedural requirements, which they camouflage with the cloak of poverty, has in fact contributed much to the delay, and hence frustration of justice, in the present case. No compelling technicalities reason to disregard

Petitioners beg us to disregard technicalities because they claim that on the merits their case is strong. A study of the records fails to so convince us. Petitioners theorize that publication of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Marcelino Alfonso is required before their father, Jose Alfonso (Jose) could validly transfer the subject property. We are not convinced. In Alejandrino v. Court of Appeals,[12] the Court upheld the effectivity of a deed of extrajudicial settlement that was neither notarized nor published. Significantly, the title of the property owned by a person who dies intestate passes at once to his heirs. Such transmission is subject to the claims of administration and the property may be taken from the heirs for the purpose of paying debts and expenses, but this does not prevent an immediate passage of the title, upon the death of the intestate, from himself to his heirs.[13] The deed of extrajudicial settlement executed by Filomena Santos Vda. de Alfonso and Jose evidences their intention to partition the inherited property. It delineated what portion of the inherited property would belong to whom. The sale to respondents was made after the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate. The extrajudicial settlement of estate, even though not published,

being deemed a partition[14] of the inherited property, Jose could validly transfer ownership over the specific portion of the property that was assigned to him.[15] The records show that Jose did in fact sell to respondents the subject property. The deed of sale executed by Jose in favor of the respondents being a public document, is entitled to full faith and credit in the absence of competent evidence that its execution was tainted with defects and irregularities that would warrant a declaration of nullity. As found by the RTC, petitioners failed to prove any defect or irregularities in the execution of the deed of sale. They failed to prove by strong evidence, the alleged lack of consent of Jose to the sale of the subject real property. As found by the RTC, although Jose was suffering from partial paralysis and could no longer sign his name, there is no showing that his mental faculties were affected in such a way as to negate the existence of his valid consent to the sale, as manifested by his thumbmark on the deed of sale. The records sufficiently show that he was capable of boarding a tricycle to go on trips by himself. Sufficient testimonial evidence in fact shows that Jose asked respondents to buy the subject property so that it could be taken out from the bank to which it was mortgaged. This fact evinces that Joses mental faculties functioned intelligently. In view of the foregoing, we find no compelling reason to overturn the assailed CA resolution. We find no injustice in the dismissal of the appeal by the CA. Justice dictates that this case be put to rest already so that the respondents may not be deprived of their rights. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 10, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 78362 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice

[1]

[2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]

[15]

CA rollo, p. 82; penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes and concurred in by Associate Justices Perlita J. Tria-Tirona and Jose C. Reyes, Jr. Records, pp. 93-101; penned by Judge Francisco C. Rodriguez, Jr. Id. at 101. Reynaldo Fundialan did not file a Notice of Appeal; id. at 102. CA rollo, p. 77. Id. at 78-79. Id. at 85-89. Id. at 96-110. Id. at 121-123. Rollo, p. 157. 411 Phil. 121, 135 (2001). 356 Phil. 851, 862 (1998). Heirs of Ignacio Conti v. Court of Appeals, 360 Phil. 536, 546 (1998). CIVIL CODE, Art. 774. Art. 1082 of the Civil Code states: Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction. See Alejandrino v. Court of Appeals, supra note 12.

THIRD DIVISION

CELESTINO BALUS, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 168970 Present: CORONA, J., Chairperson, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, PERALTA, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: January 15, 2010

- versus -

SATURNINO BALUS andLEONARDA BALUS VDA. DE CALUNOD, Respondents.

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DECISION

PERALTA, J.: Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 31, 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 58041 which set aside the February 7, 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Norte, Branch 4 in Civil Case No. 3263. The facts of the case are as follows: Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses Rufo and Sebastiana Balus. Sebastiana died on September 6, 1978, while Rufo died on July 6, 1984. On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land, which he owns, as security for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte (Bank). The said property was originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-439(788) and more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land with all the improvements thereon, containing an area of 3.0740 hectares, more or less, situated in the Barrio of Lagundang, Bunawan, Iligan City, and bounded as follows: Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2, by Lot 5122, Csd-292; along line 2-12, by Dodiongan River; along line 12-13 by Lot 4649, Csd-292; and along line 12-1, by Lot 4661, Csd-292. x x x [2]

Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the mortgaged property was foreclosed and was subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole bidder at a public auction held for that purpose. On November 20, 1981, a Certificate of Sale[3] was executed by the sheriff in favor of the Bank. The property was not redeemed within the period allowed by law. More than two years after the auction, or on January 25, 1984, the sheriff executed a Definite Deed of Sale[4] in the Bank's favor. Thereafter, a new title was issued in the name of the Bank. On October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate[5] adjudicating to each of them a specific onethird portion of the subject property consisting of 10,246 square meters. The Extrajudicial Settlement also contained provisions wherein the parties admitted

knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged the subject property to the Bank and that they intended to redeem the same at the soonest possible time. Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, herein respondents bought the subject property from the Bank. On October 12, 1992, a Deed of Sale of Registered Land[6] was executed by the Bank in favor of respondents. Subsequently, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T39,484(a.f.)[7] was issued in the name of respondents. Meanwhile, petitioner continued possession of the subject lot. On June 27, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint[8] for Recovery of Possession and Damages against petitioner, contending that they had already informed petitioner of the fact that they were the new owners of the disputed property, but the petitioner still refused to surrender possession of the same to them. Respondents claimed that they had exhausted all remedies for the amicable settlement of the case, but to no avail. On February 7, 1997, the RTC rendered a Decision[9] disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the plaintiffs to execute a Deed of Sale in favor of the defendant, the one-third share of the property in question, presently possessed by him, and described in the deed of partition, as follows: A one-third portion of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-39,484 (a.f.), formerly Original Certificate of Title No. P-788, now in the name of Saturnino Balus and Leonarda B. Vda. de Calunod, situated at Lagundang, Bunawan, Iligan City, bounded on the North by Lot 5122; East by shares of Saturnino Balus and Leonarda Balus-Calunod; South by Lot 4649, Dodiongan River; West by Lot 4661, consisting of 10,246 square meters, including improvements thereon. and dismissing all other claims of the parties. The amount of P6,733.33 consigned by the defendant with the Clerk of Court is hereby ordered delivered to the plaintiffs, as purchase price of the onethird portion of the land in question. Plaintiffs are ordered to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.[10]

The RTC held that the right of petitioner to purchase from the respondents his share in the disputed property was recognized by the provisions of the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, which the parties had executed before the respondents bought the subject lot from the Bank. Aggrieved by the Decision of the RTC, herein respondents filed an appeal with the CA. On May 31, 2005, the CA promulgated the presently assailed Decision, reversing and setting aside the Decision of the RTC and ordering petitioner to immediately surrender possession of the subject property to the respondents. The CA ruled that when petitioner and respondents did not redeem the subject property within the redemption period and allowed the consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new title in the name of the Bank, their co-ownership was extinguished. Hence, the instant petition raising a sole issue, to wit:
WHETHER OR NOT CO-OWNERSHIP AMONG THE PETITIONER AND THE RESPONDENTS OVER THE PROPERTY PERSISTED/CONTINUED TO EXIST (EVEN AFTER THE TRANSFER OF TITLE TO THE BANK) BY VIRTUE OF THE PARTIES' AGREEMENT PRIOR TO THE REPURCHASE THEREOF BY THE RESPONDENTS; THUS, WARRANTING THE PETITIONER'S ACT OF ENFORCING THE AGREEMENT BY REIMBURSING THE RESPONDENTS OF HIS (PETITIONER'S) JUST SHARE OF THE REPURCHASE PRICE.[11]

The main issue raised by petitioner is whether co-ownership by him and respondents over the subject property persisted even after the lot was purchased by the Bank and title thereto transferred to its name, and even after it was eventually bought back by the respondents from the Bank. Petitioner insists that despite respondents' full knowledge of the fact that the title over the disputed property was already in the name of the Bank, they still proceeded to execute the subject Extrajudicial Settlement, having in mind the

intention of purchasing back the property together with petitioner and of continuing their co-ownership thereof. Petitioner posits that the subject Extrajudicial Settlement is, in and by itself, a contract between him and respondents, because it contains a provision whereby the parties agreed to continue their co-ownership of the subject property by redeeming or repurchasing the same from the Bank. This agreement, petitioner contends, is the law between the parties and, as such, binds the respondents. As a result, petitioner asserts that respondents' act of buying the disputed property from the Bank without notifying him inures to his benefit as to give him the right to claim his rightful portion of the property, comprising 1/3 thereof, by reimbursing respondents the equivalent 1/3 of the sum they paid to the Bank. The Court is not persuaded. Petitioner and respondents are arguing on the wrong premise that, at the time of the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, the subject property formed part of the estate of their deceased father to which they may lay claim as his heirs. At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is no dispute with respect to the fact that the subject property was exclusively owned by petitioner and respondents' father, Rufo, at the time that it was mortgaged in 1979. This was stipulated by the parties during the hearing conducted by the trial court on October 28, 1996.[12] Evidence shows that a Definite Deed of Sale[13] was issued in favor of the Bank on January 25, 1984, after the period of redemption expired. There is neither any dispute that a new title was issued in the Bank's name before Rufo died on July 6, 1984. Hence, there is no question that the Bank acquired exclusive ownership of the contested lot during the lifetime of Rufo. The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death. In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession.[15] In the present case, since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer
[14]

formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently, petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject lot from their father. Petitioner and respondents, therefore, were wrong in assuming that they became co-owners of the subject lot. Thus, any issue arising from the supposed right of petitioner as co-owner of the contested parcel of land is negated by the fact that, in the eyes of the law, the disputed lot did not pass into the hands of petitioner and respondents as compulsory heirs of Rufo at any given point in time. The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds a necessity for a complete determination of the issues raised in the instant case to look into petitioner's argument that the Extrajudicial Settlement is an independent contract which gives him the right to enforce his right to claim a portion of the disputed lot bought by respondents. It is true that under Article 1315 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, contracts are perfected by mere consent; and from that moment, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law. Article 1306 of the same Code also provides that the contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. In the present case, however, there is nothing in the subject Extrajudicial Settlement to indicate any express stipulation for petitioner and respondents to continue with their supposed co-ownership of the contested lot. On the contrary, a plain reading of the provisions of the Extrajudicial Settlement would not, in any way, support petitioner's contention that it was his and his sibling's intention to buy the subject property from the Bank and continue what they believed to be co-ownership thereof. It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts that the intention of the parties shall be accorded primordial consideration.[16] It is the duty of the courts to place a practical and

realistic construction upon it, giving due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and the purpose which it is intended to serve.[17] Such intention is determined from the express terms of their agreement, as well as their contemporaneous and subsequent acts.[18] Absurd and illogical interpretations should also be avoided.[19] For petitioner to claim that the Extrajudicial Settlement is an agreement between him and his siblings to continue what they thought was their ownership of the subject property, even after the same had been bought by the Bank, is stretching the interpretation of the said Extrajudicial Settlement too far. In the first place, as earlier discussed, there is no co-ownership to talk about and no property to partition, as the disputed lot never formed part of the estate of their deceased father. Moreover, petitioner's asseveration of his and respondents' intention of continuing with their supposed co-ownership is negated by no less than his assertions in the present petition that on several occasions he had the chance to purchase the subject property back, but he refused to do so. In fact, he claims that after the Bank acquired the disputed lot, it offered to re-sell the same to him but he ignored such offer. How then can petitioner now claim that it was also his intention to purchase the subject property from the Bank, when he admitted that he refused the Bank's offer to re-sell the subject property to him? In addition, it appears from the recitals in the Extrajudicial Settlement that, at the time of the execution thereof, the parties were not yet aware that the subject property was already exclusively owned by the Bank. Nonetheless, the lack of knowledge on the part of petitioner and respondents that the mortgage was already foreclosed and title to the property was already transferred to the Bank does not give them the right or the authority to unilaterally declare themselves as co-owners of the disputed property; otherwise, the disposition of the case would be made to depend on the belief and conviction of the party-litigants and not on the evidence adduced and the law and jurisprudence applicable thereto. Furthermore, petitioner's contention that he and his siblings intended to continue their supposed co-ownership of the subject property contradicts the

provisions of the subject Extrajudicial Settlement where they clearly manifested their intention of having the subject property divided or partitioned by assigning to each of the petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion of the same. Partition calls for the segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property owned in common. It seeks a severance of the individual interests of each coowner, vesting in each of them a sole estate in a specific property and giving each one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the other.[20] In other words, the purpose of partition is to put an end to coownership,[21] an objective which negates petitioner's claims in the present case. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated May 31, 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 58041, isAFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice

JOSE C. MENDOZA Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice Third Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

[1]

Penned by Associate Justice Arturo G. Tayag, with Associate Justices Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. and Normandie B. Pizarro, concurring; CA rollo, pp. 69-76. [2] See Certificate of Sale and Definite Deed of Sale, Exhibits A and B, respectively, records, pp. 74-75. [3] Exhibit A, records, p. 74.

[4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17]

Exhibit B, id. at 75. Exhibit C/4, id. at 76. Exhibit D, id. at 79. Exhibit E, id. at 80. Records, pp. 1-6. Id. at 131-140. Id. at 139-140. Rollo, p. 21. See TSN, October 28, 1996 p. 2. Exhibit B, records, p. 75. Civil Code, Art. 777. Civil Code, Art. 781. Alio v. Heirs of Angelica A. Lorenzo, G.R. No. 159550, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 139, 148. TSPIC Corporation v. TSPIC Employees Union (FFW), G.R. No. 163419, February 13, 2008, 545 SCRA

215, 226.
[18] [19]

Tating v. Marcella, G.R. No. 155208, March 27, 2007, 519 SCRA 79, 87. TSPIC Corporation v. TSPIC Employees Union (FFW), supra note 17. [20] Arbolario v. Court of Appeals, 449 Phil. 357, 369 (2003). [21] Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122904, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 165, 171; Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 446 Phil. 722, 743 (2003).

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 140371-72 November 27, 2006 DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO, Petitioners, vs. HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D. SEANGIO, Respondents. DECISION AZCUNA, J.: This is a petition for certiorari 1 with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeking the nullification of the orders, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 (the RTC), dismissing the petition for probate on the ground of preterition, in the consolidated cases, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99-93396, and entitled, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Segundo C. Seangio v. Alfredo D. Seangio, et al." and "In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of Segundo C. Seangio v. Dy Yieng Seangio, Barbara D. Seangio and Virginia Seangio." The facts of the cases are as follows: On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 9890870 of the RTC, and praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D. SeangioSantos as special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio. Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise control and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a certified public accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the probate of the will. On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 9993396, was filed by petitioners before the RTC. They likewise reiterated that the probate proceedings should take precedence over SP. Proc. No. 9890870 because testate proceedings take precedence and enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. 2 The document that petitioners refer to as Segundos holographic will is quoted, as follows: Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana Tantunin ng sinuman Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila at nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pagiisip at disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng lahat at anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging lapastangan sa akin at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si Virginia Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob ko at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa ibabaw. Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para makapagutang na kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si

Merna de los Reyes sa China Bangking Corporation na millon pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa mga may-ari at stockholders ng China Banking. At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga custome[r] ng Travel Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si Virginia. Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong inaalisan ng lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at hindi siya makoha mana. Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa harap ng tatlong saksi. 3 (signed) Segundo Seangio Nilagdaan sa harap namin (signed) Dy Yieng Seangio (signed) Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi (signed) ikatlong saksi On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners motion, SP. Proc. No. 9890870 and SP. Proc. No. 9993396 were consolidated. 4 On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings 5 primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will only shows an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition which would result to intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents maintained that while procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face of the will it is clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent. Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: 1) generally, the authority of the probate court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the will; 2) private respondents question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the will; 3) disinheritance constitutes a disposition of the estate of a decedent; and, 4) the rule on preterition does not apply because Segundos will does not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs. 6 On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order, dismissing the petition for probate proceedings: A perusal of the document termed as "will" by oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio, et al., clearly shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned thereat are Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he other heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus applies. However, insofar as the widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not apply, she not being a compulsory heir in the direct line.

As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition, for to do otherwise would amount to an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court in the case of Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court [155 SCRA 100 (1987)] has made its position clear: "for respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress when, on its face, the will appears to be intrinsically void would have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved (underscoring supplied). WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Special Proceedings No. 9993396 is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. 7 Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in its order dated October 14, 1999. Petitioners contend that: THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF HER JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF LAW NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED ORDERS, DATED 10 AUGUST 1999 AND 14 OCTOBER 1999 (ATTACHMENTS "A" AND "B" HEREOF) CONSIDERING THAT: I THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN COMPLYING WITH SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR SETTING THE CASE FOR INITIAL HEARING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JURISDICTIONAL FACTS, DISMISSED THE TESTATE CASE ON THE ALLEGED GROUND THAT THE TESTATORS WILL IS VOID ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF PRETERITION, WHICH GOES INTO THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT THE AUTHORITY OF PROBATE COURTS IS LIMITED ONLY TO A DETERMINATION OF THE EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, I.E., THE DUE EXECUTION THEREOF, THE TESTATORS TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND THE COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OR SOLEMNITIES PRESCRIBED BY LAW; II EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO RULE UPON THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL OF THE TESTATOR, IT IS INDUBITABLE FROM THE FACE OF THE TESTATORS WILL THAT NO PRETERITON EXISTS AND THAT THE WILL IS BOTH INTRINSICALLY AND EXTRINSICALLY VALID; AND, III RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE INTESTATE CASE CONSIDERING THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT TESTATE PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS. Petitioners argue, as follows: First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which respectively mandate the court to: a) fix the time and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and cause notice of such time and place to be published three weeks successively previous to the appointed time in a newspaper of general circulation; and, b) cause the mailing of said notice to the heirs, legatees and devisees of the testator Segundo; Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but rather, as its title clearly states,Kasulatan ng Pag-

Aalis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a compulsory heir. Thus, there is no preterition in the decedents will and the holographic will on its face is not intrinsically void; Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private respondents alike, with the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the compulsory heirs in the direct line of Segundo were preterited in the holographic will since there was no institution of an heir; Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that it is both intrinsically and extrinsically valid, respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the hearing of the testate case; and, Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work injustice to petitioners, and will render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo. The purported holographic will of Segundo that was presented by petitioners was dated, signed and written by him in his own handwriting. Except on the ground of preterition, private respondents did not raise any issue as regards the authenticity of the document. The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed Segundos intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo. For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code: Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children and descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate: (1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants; (2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found groundless; (3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the testator; (4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes the testator to make a will or to change one already made; (5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parents or ascendant who disinherit such child or descendant; (6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant; [8] (7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life; (8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction. Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will.

A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. Segundos document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa [9] can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latters property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo. 10 Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect. 11 Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator. 12 In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated, 13 the disinheritance cannot be given effect. 14 With regard to the issue on preterition, 15 the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Courts opinion, Segundos last expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir 16 to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo. Considering that the questioned document is Segundos holographic will, and that the law favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory. 17 In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic will to be probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. 18 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, are set aside. Respondent judge is directed to reinstate and hear SP Proc. No. 99-93396 for the allowance of the holographic will of Segundo Seangio. The intestate case or SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 is hereby suspended until the termination of the aforesaid testate proceedings. No costs. SO ORDERED. ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice WE CONCUR: REYNATO S. PUNO

Associate Justice Chairperson ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice Associate Justice CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the cases were assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. REYNATO S. PUNO Associate Justice Chairperson, Second Division CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the cases were assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Records, p. 20. Id. at 17. Id. at 63. Id. at 65. Id. at 82. Id. at 96. Emphasis supplied.

Article 783 of the Civil Code states: "A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death."
10

Tolentino, Arturo M., "Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines," Volume III, p. 30. Id. at 38. Id. at 37-39.

11

12

13

In a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: 1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedents last will and testament; 2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; 3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and, 4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedents. As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. However, in exceptional circumstances, courts are not powerless to do what the situation constrains them to do, and pass upon certain provisions of the will (Ajero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106720, September 15, 1994, 236 SCRA 488).
14

Supra note 10.

15

Article 854 of the Civil Code states: "The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation."
16

Article 841 of the Civil Code states: "A will is valid even though it should not contain an institution of an heir, or such institution should not comprise the entire estate, and even though the person so instituted should not accept the inheritance or should be incapacitated to succeed. In such cases the testamentary dispositions made in accordance with law shall be complied with and the remainder of the estate shall pass to the legal heirs."
17

Maninang v. Court of Appeals, No. L-57848, June 19, 1982, 114 SCRA 478. Cuenco v. Court of Appeals, No. L-24742, October 26, 1973, 53 SCRA 360.

18

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

THIRD DIVISION

LETICIA VALMONTE ORTEGA, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 157451 Present:

Panganiban, J., Chairman, - versus Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio Morales, Garcia, JJ

JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, Respondent.

Promulgated:

December 16, 2005 x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

T
will.

he law favors the probate of a will. Upon those who oppose it rests the burden of showing why it should not be allowed. In the present case, petitioner has failed to discharge this burden

satisfactorily. For this reason, the Court cannot attribute any reversible error on the part of the appellate tribunal that allowed the probate of the

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the December 12, 2002 Decision[2] and the March 7, 2003 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 44296. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED, and the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In its place judgment is rendered approving and allowing probate to the said last will and testament of Placido Valmonte and ordering the issuance of letters testamentary to the petitioner Josefina Valmonte. Let this case be remanded to the court a quo for further and concomitant proceedings.[4]

The

assailed

Resolution

denied

petitioners

Motion

for

Reconsideration.

The Facts

The facts were summarized in the assailed Decision of the CA, as follows:
x x x: Like so many others before him, Placido toiled and lived for a long time in the United States until he finally reached retirement. In 1980, Placido finally came home to stay in the Philippines, and he lived in the house and lot located at #9200 Catmon St., San Antonio Village, Makati, which he owned in common with his sister Ciriaca Valmonte and titled in their names in TCT 123468. Two years after his arrival from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old, in a ceremony solemnized by Judge Perfecto Laguio, Jr. on February 5, 1982. But in a little more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido died on October 8, 1984 of a cause written down as COR PULMONALE.

Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of two (2) pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and a part of the attestation clause, and was signed at the end or bottom of that page by the testator and on the left hand margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The second page contains the continuation of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment, and was signed by the witnesses at the end of the attestation clause and again on the left hand margin. It provides in the body that:

LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF PLACIDO VALMONTE IN THE NAME OF THE LORD AMEN:

I, PLACIDO VALMONTE, of legal age, married to Josefina Cabansag Valmonte, and a resident of 9200 Catmon Street,

Makati, Metro Manila, 83 years of age and being of sound and disposing mind and memory, do hereby declare this to be my last will and testament:

1. It is my will that I be buried in the Catholic Cemetery, under the auspices of the Catholic Church in accordance with the rites and said Church and that a suitable monument to be erected and provided my by executrix (wife) to perpetuate my memory in the minds of my family and friends;

2. I give, devise and bequeath unto my loving wife, JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, one half (1/2) portion of the followdescribed properties, which belongs to me as [co-owner]:

a. Lot 4-A, Block 13 described on plan Psd-28575, LRC, (GLRO), situated in Makati, Metro Manila, described and covered by TCT No. 123468 of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro-Manila registered jointly as coowners with my deceased sister (Ciriaca Valmonte), having share and share alike;

b. 2-storey building standing on the above-described property, made of strong and mixed materials used as my residence and my wife and located at No. 9200 Catmon Street, Makati, Metro Manila also covered by Tax Declaration No. A-025-00482, Makati, MetroManila, jointly in the name of my deceased sister, Ciriaca Valmonte and myself as co-owners, share and share alike or equal co-owners thereof;

3. All the rest, residue and remainder of my real and personal properties, including my savings account bank book in USA which is in the possession of my nephew, and all others whatsoever and wherever found, I give, devise and bequeath to my said wife, Josefina C. Valmonte;

4. I hereby appoint my wife, Josefina C. Valmonte as sole executrix of my last will and testament, and it is my will that said executrix be exempt from filing a bond;

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 15th day of June 1983 in Quezon City, Philippines.

The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia on the grounds that:

1.

Petitioner failed to allege all assets of the testator, especially those found in the USA;

2.

Petitioner failed to state the names, ages, and residences of the heirs of the testator; or to give them proper notice pursuant to law;

3. Will was not executed and attested as required by law and legal solemnities and formalities were not complied with;

4. Testator was mentally incapable to make a will at the time of the alleged execution he being in an advance sate of senility;

5. Will was executed under duress, or the influence of fear or threats;

6. Will was procured by undue and improper influence and pressure on the part of the petitioner and/or her agents and/or assistants; and/or

7. Signature of testator was procured by fraud, or trick, and he did not intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto;

and she also opposed the appointment as Executrix of Josefina alleging her want of understanding and integrity.

At the hearing, the petitioner Josefina testified and called as witnesses the notary public Atty. Floro Sarmiento who prepared and notarized the will, and the instrumental witnesses spouses Eugenio Gomez, Jr. and Feliza Gomez and Josie Collado. For the opposition, the oppositor Leticia and her daughter Mary Jane Ortega testified.

According to Josefina after her marriage with the testator they lived in her parents house at Salingcob, Bacnotan, La Union but they came to Manila every month to get his $366.00 monthly pension and stayed at the said Makati residence. There were times though when to shave off on expenses, the testator would travel alone. And it was in one of his travels by his lonesome self when the notarial will was made. The will was witnessed by the spouses Eugenio and Feliza Gomez, who were their wedding sponsors, and by Josie Collado. Josefina said she had no knowledge of the existence of the last will and testament of her husband, but just serendipitously found it in his attache case after his death. It was only then that she learned that the testator bequeathed to her his properties and she was named the executrix in the said will. To her estimate, the value of property both real and personal left by the testator is worth more or less P100,000.00. Josefina declared too that the testator never suffered mental infirmity because despite his old age he went alone to the market which is two to three kilometers from their home cooked and cleaned the kitchen and sometimes if she could not accompany him, even traveled to Manila alone to claim his monthly pension. Josefina also asserts that her husband was in good health

and that he was hospitalized only because of a cold but which eventually resulted in his death.

Notary Public Floro Sarmiento, the notary public who notarized the testators will, testified that it was in the first week of June 1983 when the testator together with the three witnesses of the will went to his house cum law office and requested him to prepare his last will and testament. After the testator instructed him on the terms and dispositions he wanted on the will, the notary public told them to come back on June 15, 1983 to give him time to prepare it. After he had prepared the will the notary public kept it safely hidden and locked in his drawer. The testator and his witnesses returned on the appointed date but the notary public was out of town so they were instructed by his wife to come back on August 9, 1983, and which they did. Before the testator and his witnesses signed the prepared will, the notary public explained to them each and every term thereof in Ilocano, a dialect which the testator spoke and understood. He likewise explained that though it appears that the will was signed by the testator and his witnesses on June 15, 1983, the day when it should have been executed had he not gone out of town, the formal execution was actually on August 9, 1983. He reasoned that he no longer changed the typewritten date of June 15, 1983 because he did not like the document to appear dirty. The notary public also testified that to his observation the testator was physically and mentally capable at the time he affixed his signature on the will.

The attesting witnesses to the will corroborated the testimony of the notary public, and testified that the testator went alone to the house of spouses Eugenio and Feliza Gomez at GSIS Village, Quezon City and requested them to accompany him to the house of Atty. Floro Sarmiento purposely for his intended will; that after giving his instructions to Atty. Floro Sarmiento, they were told to return on June 15, 1983; that they returned on June 15, 1983 for the execution of the will but were asked to come back instead on August 9, 1983

because of the absence of the notary public; that the testator executed the will in question in their presence while he was of sound and disposing mind and that he was strong and in good health; that the contents of the will was explained by the notary public in the Ilocano and Tagalog dialect and that all of them as witnesses attested and signed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. And that during the execution, the testators wife, Josefina was not with them.

The oppositor Leticia declared that Josefina should not inherit alone because aside from her there are other children from the siblings of Placido who are just as entitled to inherit from him. She attacked the mental capacity of the testator, declaring that at the time of the execution of the notarial will the testator was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind. She knew whereof she spoke because in 1983 Placido lived in the Makati residence and asked Leticias family to live with him and they took care of him. During that time, the testators physical and mental condition showed deterioration, aberrations and senility. This was corroborated by her daughter Mary Jane Ortega for whom Placido took a fancy and wanted to marry.

Sifting through the evidence, the court a quo held that [t]he evidence adduced, reduces the opposition to two grounds, namely:

1. Non-compliance with the legal solemnities and formalities in the execution and attestation of the will; and

2. Mental incapacity of the testator at the time of the execution of the will as he was then in an advanced state of senility

It then found these grounds extant and proven, and accordingly disallowed probate.[5]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Reversing the trial court, the appellate court admitted the will of Placido Valmonte to probate. The CA upheld the credibility of the notary public and the subscribing witnesses who had acknowledged the due execution of the will. Moreover, it held that the testator had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will. It added that his sexual exhibitionism and unhygienic, crude and impolite ways[6] did not make him a person of unsound mind.

Hence, this Petition.[7]

Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:

I.

Whether or not the findings of the probate court are entitled to great respect.

II.

Whether or not the signature of Placido Valmonte in the subject will was procured by fraud or trickery, and that Placido Valmonte never intended that the instrument should be his last will and testament.

III.

Whether or not Placido Valmonte has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly executed the subject will.[8]

In short, petitioner assails the CAs allowance of the probate of the will of Placido Valmonte.

This Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Main Issue:

Probate of a Will

At the outset, we stress that only questions of law may be raised in a Petition for Review under Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As an exception, however, the evidence presented during the trial may be examined and the factual matters resolved by this Court when, as in the instant case, the findings of fact of the appellate court differ from those of the trial court.[9]

The fact that public policy favors the probate of a will does not necessarily mean that every will presented for probate should be allowed. The law lays down the procedures and requisites that must be

satisfied for the probate of a will.[10] Verily, Article 839 of the Civil Code states the instances when a will may be disallowed, as follows:

Article 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:

(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;

(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its execution;

(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;

(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person;

(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;

(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.

In the present case, petitioner assails the validity of Placido Valmontes will by imputing fraud in its execution and challenging the testators state of mind at the time.

Existence of Fraud in the Execution of a Will

Petitioner does not dispute the due observance of the formalities in the execution of the will, but maintains that the circumstances surrounding it are indicative of the existence of fraud. Particularly, she alleges that respondent, who is the testators wife and sole beneficiary, conspired with the notary public and the three attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception is allegedly reflected in the varying dates of the execution and the attestation of the will.

Petitioner contends that it was highly dubious for a woman at the prime of her young life [to] almost immediately plunge into marriage with a man who [was] thrice her age x x x and who happened to be [a] FilAmerican pensionado,[11] thus casting doubt on the intention of respondent in seeking the probate of the will. Moreover, it supposedly defies human reason, logic and common experience[12] for an old man

with a severe psychological condition to have willingly signed a last will and testament.

We are not convinced. Fraud is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretense, by which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or contents of the document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will which, but for the fraud, he would not have made.[13]

We stress that the party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time of its execution.[14] The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud.[15] Unfortunately in this case, other than the self-serving allegations of petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever presented.

It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a will.[16] That the testator was tricked into signing it was not sufficiently established by the fact that he had instituted his wife, who was more than fifty years his junior, as the sole beneficiary; and disregarded petitioner and her family, who were the ones who had taken the cudgels of taking care of [the testator] in his twilight years.[17]

Moreover, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, the conflict between the dates appearing on the will does not invalidate the document, because the law does not even require that a [notarial] will x x x be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion.[18] More important, the will must be subscribed by the testator, as well as by three or more credible witnesses who must also attest to it in the presence of the testator and of one another.[19] Furthermore, the testator and the witnesses must acknowledge the will before a notary public.[20] In any event, we agree with the CA that the variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed execution and attestation was satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary public and the instrumental witnesses.[21]

The pertinent transcript of stenographic notes taken on June 11, 1985, November 25, 1985, October 13, 1986, and October 21, 1987 -- as quoted by the CA -- are reproduced respectively as follows:
Atty. Floro Sarmiento:

You typed this document exhibit C, specifying the date June 15 when the testator and his witnesses were supposed to be in your office? Yes sir.

On June 15, 1983, did the testator and his witnesses come to your house? They did as of agreement but unfortunately, I was out of town.

xxx

xxx

xxx

The document has been acknowledged on August 9, 1983 as per acknowledgement appearing therein. Was this the actual date when the document was acknowledged? Yes sir.

What about the date when the testator and the three witnesses affixed their respective signature on the first and second pages of exhibit C?

On that particular date when it was acknowledged, August 9, 1983.

Why did you not make the necessary correction on the date appearing on the body of the document as well as the attestation clause? Because I do not like anymore to make some alterations so I put it in my own handwriting August 9, 1983 on the acknowledgement. (tsn, June 11, 1985, pp. 8-10)

Eugenio Gomez:

It appears on the first page Mr. Witness that it is dated June 15, 1983, whereas in the acknowledgement it is dated August 9, 1983, will you look at this document and tell us this discrepancy in the date? We went to Atty. Sarmiento together with Placido Valmonte and the two witnesses; that was first week of June and Atty. Sarmiento told us to return on the 15th of June but when we returned, Atty. Sarmiento was not there.

When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento on June 15, 1983, did you again go back? We returned on the 9th of August and there we signed.

This August 9, 1983 where you said it is there where you signed, who were your companions? The two witnesses, me and Placido Valmonte. (tsn, November 25, 1985, pp. 7-8)

Felisa Gomez on cross-examination:

Why did you have to go to the office of Atty. Floro Sarmiento, three times?

xxx

xxx

xxx

The reason why we went there three times is that, the first week of June was out first time. We went there to talk to Atty. Sarmiento and Placido Valmonte about the last will and testament. After that what they have talked what will be placed in the testament, what Atty. Sarmiento said was that he will go back on the 15th of June. When we returned on June 15, Atty. Sarmiento was not there so we were not able to sign it, the will. That is why, for the third time we went there on August 9 and that was the time we affixed our signature. (tsn, October 13, 1986, pp. 4-6)

Josie Collado:

When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento in his house on June 15, 1983, what transpired? The wife of Atty. Sarmiento told us that we will be back on August 9, 1983.

And on August 9, 1983 did you go back to the house of Atty. Sarmiento? Yes, Sir.

Q A

For what purpose? Our purpose is just to sign the will.

Q A

Were you able to sign the will you mentioned? Yes sir. (tsn, October 21, 1987, pp. 4-5)[22]

Notably, petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of a grand conspiracy in the commission of a fraud. There was no showing that the witnesses of the proponent stood to receive any benefit from the allowance of the will. The testimonies of the three subscribing witnesses and the notary are credible evidence of its due execution.[23] Their testimony favoring it and the finding that it was executed in accordance with the formalities required by law should be affirmed, absent any showing of ill motives.[24]

Capacity to Make a Will

In determining the capacity of the testator to make a will, the Civil Code gives the following guidelines:
Article 798. In order to make a will it is essential that the testator be of sound mind at the time of its execution.

Article 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or shattered by disease, injury or other cause.

It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.

Article 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.

The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval.

According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the testators bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act. Applying this test to the present case, we find that the appellate court was correct in holding that Placido had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of his will.

It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their locations. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As we have stated earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant. Worth reiterating in determining soundness of mind is Alsua-Betts v. CA,[25] which held thus:

"Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries with it full testamentary

capacity, and that degrees of mental aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity and while on one hand it has been held that mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will not render a person incapable of making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may make a valid will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is about to do and how or to whom he is disposing of his property. To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise. It has been held that testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of unsound mind."[26]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Associate Justice

Chairman, Third Division

W E C O N C U R:

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Associate Justice Chairman, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairmans Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. Chief Justice

[1] [2]

[3] [4] [5] [6] [7]

[8] [9]

[10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16]

[17]

Rollo, pp. 9-25. Annex A of Petition; id., pp. 26-43. Penned by Justice Roberto A. Barrios (Fourteenth Division chair) and concurred in by Justices Perlita J. Tria-Tirona and Edgardo F. Sundiam (members). Annex C of Petition; id., pp. 54-56. CA Decision, p. 18; rollo, p. 43. Id., pp. 3-8 & 28-33. Id., pp. 15 & 40. The case was deemed submitted for decision on July 14, 2004, upon this Courts receipt of petitioners Memorandum, signed by Atty. Manuel T. de Guia. Respondents Memorandum, filed on April 19, 2004, was signed by Atty. Benigno P. Pulmano. Petitioners Memorandum, p. 6; rollo, p. 331. Original in uppercase. Heirs of Saludares v. CA, 420 SCRA 51, January 16, 2004; Heirs of Celestial v. Celestial, 408 SCRA 291, August 5, 2003; Garrido v. CA, 421 Phil. 872, November 22, 2001; Meralco v. CA, 413 Phil. 338, July 11, 2001. Leviste v. CA, 169 SCRA 580, January 30, 1989. Petitioners Memorandum, p. 19; rollo, p. 344. Id., pp. 14 & 339. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III (1992), p. 166. Pecson v. Coronel, 45 Phil. 216, October 11, 1923. Cuyugan v. Baron, 62 Phil. 859, January 16, 1936. Heirs of the Late Matilde Montinola-Sanson v. CA, 158 SCRA 247, February 26, 1988; Pascual v. dela Cruz, 138 Phil. 446, May 30, 196; Rodriguez v. CA, 137 Phil. 371, March 28, 1969; In the Matter of the Testate Estate of the Juana Juan Vda. De Molo, 100 Phil. 344, November 26, 1956; Barrera v. Tampoco, 94 Phil. 346, February 17, 1954; Pecson v. Coronel, 45 Phil. 216, October 11, 1923. Petitioners Memorandum, p. 18; rollo, p. 343.

[18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26]

CA Decision, p. 11; rollo, p. 36. Article 805, Civil Code. Article 806, id. CA Decision, p. 9; rollo, p. 34. Id., pp. 9-11 & 34-36. Gonzales v. CA, 90 SCRA 183, May 25, 1979; Vda.de Ramos v CA, 81 SCRA 393, January 31, 1978; Roxas v. Roxas, 87 Phil. 692, December 1, 1950. Gonzales v. CA, supra; Galvez v. Galvez, 26 Phil. 243, December 5, 1913. 92 SCRA 332, July 30, 1979 (citing Bugnao v. Ubag, 14 Phil. 163, September 18, 1909). Id., p. 363, per Guerrero, J.

THIRD DIVISION

FELIX AZUELA, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 122880 Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, and TINGA, JJ.

- versus -

COURT OF APPEALS, GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO Promulgated: substituted by ERNESTO G. CASTILLO, April 12, 2006 Respondents. x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
TINGA, J.:

The core of this petition is a highly defective notarial will, purportedly executed by Eugenia E. Igsolo (decedent), who died on 16 December 1982 at the age of 80. In refusing to give legal recognition to the due execution of this document, the Court is provided the opportunity to assert a few important doctrinal rules in the execution of notarial wills, all self-evident in view of Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code.

A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all three defects is just aching for judicial rejection. There is a distinct and consequential reason the Civil Code provides a comprehensive catalog of imperatives for the proper execution of a notarial will. Full and faithful compliance with all the detailed requisites under Article 805 of the Code leave little room for doubt as to the validity in the due execution of the notarial will. Article 806 likewise imposes another safeguard to the validity of notarial wills that they be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. A notarial will executed with indifference to these two codal provisions opens itself to nagging questions as to its legitimacy. The case stems from a petition for probate filed on 10 April 1984 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The petition filed by petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo,

which was notarized on 10 June 1981. Petitioner is the son of the cousin of the decedent. The will, consisting of two (2) pages and written in the vernacular Pilipino, read in full:
HULING HABILIN NI EUGENIA E. IGSOLO SA NGALAN NG MAYKAPAL, AMEN: AKO, si EUGENIA E. IGSOLO, nakatira sa 500 San Diego St., Sampaloc, Manila, pitongput siyam (79) na gulang, nasa hustong pagiisip, pag-unawa at memoria ay naghahayag na ito na ang aking huling habilin at testamento, at binabali wala ko lahat ang naunang ginawang habilin o testamento: Una-Hinihiling ko na ako ay mailibing sa Sementerio del Norte, La Loma sangayong sa kaugalian at patakaran ng simbahang katoliko at ang taga-pagingat(Executor) ng habiling ito ay magtatayo ng bantayog upang silbing ala -ala sa akin ng aking pamilya at kaibigan; PangalawaAking ipinagkakaloob at isinasalin ang lahat ng karapatan sa aking pamang kin na si Felix Azuela, na siyang nag-alaga sa akin sa mahabang panahon, yaongmga bahay na nakatirik sa lote numero 28, Block 24 at nakapangalan sa Pechaten Korporasyon, ganoon din ibinibigay ko ang la hat ng karapatan sa bahay na nakatirik sainoopahan kong lote, numero 43, Block 24 na pagaari ng Pechaten Corporation. Ipinagkakaloob kong buong buo ang lahat n g karapatan sa bahay at lupa na nasa 500 San Diego St., Lot 42, Block 24, Sampaloc, Manila kay Felix Azuela at ang pagkakaloob kong ito ay walang pasubalit at kondiciones; PangatloNa ninunumbrahan ko si VART PAGUE na siyang nagpapatupad ng huling habiling ito at kagustuhan ko rin na hindi na kailanman siyang mag-lagak ngpiyansiya.

Aking nilagdaan ang Huling Habilin na ito dito sa Maynila ika 10 n g Hunyo, 1981.

(Sgd.) EUGENIA E. IGSOLO (Tagapagmana) PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSI Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng ____ dahon pati ang huling dahong ito, na ipinahayag sa amin ni Eugenia E. Igsolo, tagapagmana na siya niyang Huling Habilin,ngayon ika10 ng Hunyo 1981, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng kasulatang nabanggit at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon, sa harap ng lahat atbawat sa amin, at kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing tagapagmana a t sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng nasabing kasulatan at sakaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon ng kasulatan ito. EUGENIA E. IGSOLO address: 500 San Diego St. Sampaloc, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-7717-37 Issued at Manila on March 10, 1981. QUIRINO AGRAVA address: 1228-Int. 3, Kahilum Pandacan, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-458365 Issued at Manila on Jan. 21, 1981 LAMBERTO C. LEAO address: Avenue 2, Blcok 7, Lot 61, San Gabriel, G.MA., Cavite Res. Cert. No. A-768277 issued at Carmona, Cavite on Feb. 7, 1981 JUANITO ESTRERA address: City Court Compound,

City of Manila Res. Cert. No. A574829 Issued at Manila on March 2, 1981.

Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10, 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila.

Doc. No. 1232 ; Page No. 86 ; Book No. 43 ; Series of 1981

(Sgd.) PETRONIO Y. BAUTISTA NOTARIO PUBLIKO Until Dec. 31, 1981 PTR-152041-1/2/81-Manila TAN # 1437-977-8[1]

The three named witnesses to the will affixed their signatures on the lefthand margin of both pages of the will, but not at the bottom of the attestation clause.

The probate petition adverted to only two (2) heirs, legatees and devisees of the decedent, namely: petitioner himself, and one Irene Lynn Igsolo, who was alleged to have resided abroad. Petitioner prayed that the will be allowed, and that letters testamentary be issued to the designated executor, Vart Prague. The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo (Geralda Castillo), who represented herself as the attorney-in-fact of the 12 legitimate heirs of the decedent.[2] Geralda Castillo claimed that the will is a forgery, and that the true purpose of its emergence was so it could be utilized as a defense in several court cases filed by oppositor against petitioner, particularly for forcible entry and usurpation of real property, all centering on petitioners right to occupy the properties of the decedent.[3] It also asserted that contrary

to the representations of petitioner, the decedent was actually survived by 12 legitimate heirs, namely her grandchildren, who were then residing abroad. Per records, it was subsequently alleged that decedent was the widow of Bonifacio Igsolo, who died in 1965,[4] and the mother of a legitimate child, Asuncion E. Igsolo, who predeceased her mother by three (3) months.[5] Oppositor Geralda Castillo also argued that the will was not executed and attested to in accordance with law. She pointed out that decedents signature did not appear on the second page of the will, and the will was not properly acknowledged. These twin arguments are among the central matters to this petition. After due trial, the RTC admitted the will to probate, in an Order dated 10 August 1992.[6] The RTC favorably took into account the testimony of the three (3) witnesses to the will, Quirino Agrava, Lamberto Leano, and Juanito Estrada. The RTC also called to fore the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will x x x with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes;[7] and from this perspective, rebutted oppositors arguments that the will was not properly executed and attested to in accordance with law.
After a careful examination of the will and consideration of the testimonies of the subscribing and attesting witnesses, and having in mind the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will, i.e., the liberalization of the interpretation of the law on the formal requirements of a will with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes, this Court is persuaded to rule that the will in question is authentic and had been executed by the testatrix in accordance with law. On the issue of lack of acknowledgement, this Court has noted that at the end of the will after the signature of the testatrix, the following statement is made under the sub-title, Patunay Ng Mga Saksi: Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng _____ dahon pati ang huling dahong ito,

na ipinahayag sa amin ni Eugenia N. Igsolo, tagapagmana na siya niyangHuling Habilin, ngayong i ka-10 ng Hunyo 1981, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng kasulatan g nabanggit at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat atbawat dahon, sa harap ng lahat at bawat sa amin, at kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing t agapagmana at sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa saamin, sa ilalim ng nasabing kasulatan at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon ng kasulatan ito. The aforequoted declaration comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgement and is considered by this Court as a substantial compliance with the requirements of the law. On the oppositors contention that the attestation clause was not signed by the subscribing witnesses at the bottom thereof, this Court is of the view that the signing by the subscribing witnesses on the left margin of the second page of the will containing the attestation clause and acknowledgment, instead of at the bottom thereof, substantially satisfies the purpose of identification and attestation of the will. With regard to the oppositors argument that the will was not numbered correlatively in letters placed on upper part of each page and that the attestation did not state the number of pages thereof, it is worthy to note that the will is composed of only two pages. The first page contains the entire text of the testamentary dispositions, and the second page contains the last portion of the attestation clause and acknowledgement. Such being so, the defects are not of a serious nature as to invalidate the will. For the same reason, the failure of the testatrix to affix her signature on the left margin of the second page, which contains only the last portion of the attestation clause and acknowledgment is not a fatal defect. As regards the oppositors assertion that the signature of the testatrix on the will is a forgery, the testimonies of the three subscribing witnesses to the will are convincing enough to establish the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix and the due execution of the will.[8]

The Order was appealed to the Court of Appeals by Ernesto Castillo, who had substituted his since deceased mother-in-law, Geralda Castillo. In a

Decision dated 17 August 1995, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered the dismissal of the petition for probate.[9] The Court of Appeals noted that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in the will, thus rendering the will void and undeserving of probate.[10]

Hence, the present petition. Petitioner argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code that the number of pages used in a notarial will be stated in the attestation clause is merely directory, rather than mandatory, and thus susceptible to what he termed as the substantial compliance rule.[11] The solution to this case calls for the application of Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code, which we replicate in full.
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another. The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page. The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them. Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.

The appellate court, in its Decision, considered only one defect, the failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages of the will. But an examination of the will itself reveals several more deficiencies. As admitted by petitioner himself, the attestation clause fails to state the number of pages of the will.[12] There was an incomplete attempt to comply with this requisite, a space having been allotted for the insertion of the number of pages in the attestation clause. Yet the blank was never filled in; hence, the requisite was left uncomplied with. The Court of Appeals pounced on this defect in reversing the trial court, citing in the process Uy Coque v. Navas L. Sioca[13] and In re: Will of Andrada.[14] In Uy Coque, the Court noted that among the defects of the will in question was the failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages contained in the will.[15] In ruling that the will could not be admitted to probate, the Court made the following consideration which remains highly relevant to this day: The purpose of requiring the number of sheets to be stated in the attestation clause is obvious; the document might easily be so prepared that the removal of a sheet would completely change the testamentary dispositions of the will and in the absence of a statement of the total number of sheets such removal might be effected by taking out the sheet and changing the numbers at the top of the following sheets or

pages. If, on the other hand, the total number of sheets is stated in the attestation clause the falsification of the document will involve the inserting of new pages and the forging of the signatures of the testator and witnesses in the margin, a matter attended with much greater difficulty.[16] The case of In re Will of Andrada concerned a will the attestation clause of which failed to state the number of sheets or pages used. This consideration alone was sufficient for the Court to declare unanim[ity] upon the point that the defect pointed out in the attesting clause is fatal. [17] It was further observed that it cannot be denied that the x x x requirement affords additional security against the danger that the will may be tampered with; and as the Legislature has seen fit to prescribe this requirement, it must be considered material.[18] Against these cited cases, petitioner cites Singson v. Florentino[19] and Taboada v. Hon. Rosal,[20] wherein the Court allowed probate to the wills concerned therein despite the fact that the attestation clause did not state the number of pages of the will. Yet the appellate court itself considered the import of these two cases, and made the following distinction which petitioner is unable to rebut, and which we adopt with approval:
Even a cursory examination of the Will (Exhibit D), will readily show that the attestation does not state the number of pages used upon which the will is written. Hence, the Will is void and undeserving of probate. We are not impervious of the Decisions of the Supreme Court in Manuel Singson versus Emilia Florentino, et al., 92 Phil. 161 and Apolonio [Taboada] versus Hon. Avelino Rosal, et al., 118 SCRA 195, to the effect that a will may still be valid even if the attestation does not contain the number of pages used upon which the Will is written. However, the Decisions of the Supreme Court are not applicable in the aforementioned appeal at bench. This is so because, in the case of Manuel Singson versus Emilia Florentino, et al., supra, although the attestation in

the subject Will did not state the number of pages used in the will, however, the same was found in the last part of the body of the Will: x x x

The law referred to is article 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, which requires that the attestation clause shall state the number of pages or sheets upon which the will is written, which requirement has been held to be mandatory as an effective safeguard against the possibility of interpolation or omission of some of the pages of the will to the prejudice of the heirs to whom the property is intended to be bequeathed (In re Will of Andrada, 42 Phil. 180; Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405; Gumban vs. Gorcho, 50 Phil. 30; Quinto vs. Morata, 54 Phil. 481; Echevarriavs. Sarmiento, 66 Phil. 611). The ratio decidendi of these cases seems to be that the attestation clause must contain a statement of the number of sheets or pages composing the will and that if this is missing or is omitted, it will have the effect of invalidating the will if the deficiency cannot be supplied, not by evidence aliunde, but by a consideration or examination of the will itself. But here the situation is different. While the attestation clause does not state the number of sheets or pages upon which the will is written, however, the last part of the body of the will contains a statement that it is composed of eight pages, which circumstance in our opinion takes this case out of the rigid rule of construction and places it within the realm of similar cases where a broad and more liberal view has been adopted to prevent the will of the testator from being defeated by purely technical considerations. (page 165-165, supra) (Underscoring supplied) In Apolonio Tabaoda versus Hon. Avelino Rosal, et al. supra, the notarial acknowledgement in the Will states the number of pages used in the: x x x

We have examined the will in question and noticed that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in writing the will. This would have been a fatal defect were it not for the fact that, in this case, it is discernible from the entire will that it is really and actually composed of only two pages duly signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses. As earlier stated, the first page which contains the entirety of the testamentary dispositions is signed by the testatrix at the end or at the bottom while the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin. The other page which is marked as Pagina dos comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgment. The acknowledgment itself states that this Last Will and Testament consists of two pages including this page (pages 200-201, supra) (Underscoring supplied). However, in the appeal at bench, the number of pages used in the will is not stated in any part of the Will. The will does not even contain any notarial acknowledgment wherein the number of pages of the will should be stated.[21]

Both Uy Coque and Andrada were decided prior to the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, at a time when the statutory provision governing the formal requirement of wills was Section

618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.[22] Reliance on these cases remains apropos, considering that the requirement that the attestation state the number of pages of the will is extant from Section 618.[23] However, the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950 did put in force a rule of interpretation of the requirements of wills, at least insofar as the attestation clause is concerned, that may vary from the philosophy that governed these two cases. Article 809 of the Civil Code states: In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of article 805. In the same vein, petitioner cites the report of the Civil Code Commission, which stated that the underlying and fundamental objective permeating the provisions on the [law] on [wills] in this project consists in the [liberalization] of the manner of their execution with the end in view of giving the testator more [freedom] in [expressing] his last wishes. This objective is in accord with the [modern tendency] in respect to the formalities in the execution of wills.[24] However, petitioner conveniently omits the qualification offered by the Code Commission in the very same paragraph he cites from their report, that such liberalization be but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator.[25] Caneda v. Court of Appeals[26] features an extensive discussion made by Justice Regalado, speaking for the Court on the conflicting views on the manner of interpretation of the legal formalities required in the execution of the attestation clause in wills.[27] Uy Coque and Andrada are cited therein, along with several other cases, as examples of the application of the rule of strict construction.[28] However, the Code Commission opted to recommend a

more liberal construction through the substantial compliance rule under Article 809. A cautionary note was struck though by Justice J.B.L. Reyes as to how Article 809 should be applied:
x x x The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All these are facts that the will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in the probate proceedings.[29] (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court of Appeals did cite these comments by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in its assailed decision, considering that the failure to state the number of pages of the will in the attestation clause is one of the defects which cannot be simply disregarded. In Caneda itself, the Court refused to allow the probate of a will whose attestation clause failed to state that the witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other,[30] the other omission cited by Justice J.B.L. Reyes which to his estimation cannot be lightly disregarded. Caneda suggested: [I]t may thus be stated that the rule, as it now stands, is that omission which can be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself.[31] Thus, a failure by the attestation clause to state that the testator signed every page can be liberally construed, since that fact can be checked by a visual examination; while a failure by the

attestation clause to state that the witnesses signed in one anothers presence should be considered a fatal flaw since the attestation is the only textual guarantee of compliance.[32] The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which the will was written remains a fatal flaw, despite Article 809. The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state the number of pages on which the will is written is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and to prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.[33] The failure to state the number of pages equates with the absence of an averment on the part of the instrumental witnesses as to how many pages consisted the will, the execution of which they had ostensibly just witnessed and subscribed to. Following Caneda, there is substantial compliance with this requirement if the will states elsewhere in it how many pages it is comprised of, as was the situation in Singson and Taboada. However, in this case, there could have been no substantial compliance with the requirements under Article 805 since there is no statement in the attestation clause or anywhere in the will itself as to the number of pages which comprise the will. At the same time, Article 809 should not deviate from the need to comply with the formal requirements as enumerated under Article 805. Whatever the inclinations of the members of the Code Commission in incorporating Article 805, the fact remains that they saw fit to prescribe substantially the same formal requisites as enumerated in Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, convinced that these remained effective safeguards against the forgery or intercalation of notarial wills.[34] Compliance with these requirements, however picayune in impression, affords the public a high degree of comfort that the testator himself or herself had decided to convey property post mortem in the manner established in the will.[35] The transcendent legislative intent, even as expressed in the cited comments

of the Code Commission, is for the fruition of the testators incontestable desires, and not for the indulgent admission of wills to probate. The Court could thus end here and affirm the Court of Appeals. However, an examination of the will itself reveals a couple of even more critical defects that should necessarily lead to its rejection. For one, the attestation clause was not signed by the instrumental witnesses. While the signatures of the instrumental witnesses appear on the left-hand margin of the will, they do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause which after all consists of their averments before the notary public. Cagro v. Cagro[36] is material on this point. As in this case, the signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin.[37] While three (3) Justices[38] considered the signature requirement had been substantially complied with, a majority of six (6), speaking through Chief Justice Paras, ruled that the attestation clause had not been duly signed, rendering the will fatally defective.
There is no question that the signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin. We are of the opinion that the position taken by the appellant is correct. The attestation clause is "a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will" required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof negatives their participation. The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the three witnesses on the left-hand margin conform substantially to the law and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause. This is untenable,

because said signatures are in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be signed on the left-hand margin of all its pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the witnesses.[39]

The Court today reiterates the continued efficacy of Cagro. Article 805 particularly segregates the requirement that the instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will, from the requisite that the will be attested and subscribed by [the instrumental witnesses]. The respective intents behind these two classes of signature are distinct from each other. The signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify, among others, that the witnesses are aware that the page they are signing forms part of the will. On the other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish that the witnesses are referring to the statements contained in the attestation clause itself. Indeed, the attestation clause is separate and apart from the disposition of the will. An unsigned attestation clause results in an unattested will. Even if the instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand margin of the page containing the unsigned attestation clause, such signatures cannot demonstrate these witnesses undertakings in the clause, since the signatures that do appear on the page were directed towards a wholly different avowal. The Court may be more charitably disposed had the witnesses in this case signed the attestation clause itself, but not the left-hand margin of the page containing such clause. Without diminishing the value of the instrumental witnesses signatures on each and every page, the fact must be noted that it is the attestation clause which contains the utterances reduced into writing of the testamentary witnesses themselves. It is the witnesses, and not the testator, who are required under Article 805 to state the number of pages used upon which the will is written; the fact that the testator had signed the will and every page thereof; and that they witnessed and signed the will

and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. The only proof in the will that the witnesses have stated these elemental facts would be their signatures on the attestation clause. Thus, the subject will cannot be considered to have been validly attested to by the instrumental witnesses, as they failed to sign the attestation clause. Yet, there is another fatal defect to the will on which the denial of this petition should also hinge. The requirement under Article 806 that every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses has also not been complied with. The importance of this requirement is highlighted by the fact that it had been segregated from the other requirements under Article 805 and entrusted into a separate provision, Article 806. The non-observance of Article 806 in this case is equally as critical as the other cited flaws in compliance with Article 805, and should be treated as of equivalent import. In lieu of an acknowledgment, the notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista, wrote Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), [40] 1981 ditosa Lungsod ng Maynila. By no manner of contemplation can those words be construed as an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed.[41] It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signor actually declares to the notary that the executor of a document has attested to the notary that the same is his/her own free act and deed. It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not hew to the usual language thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that before him/her, the document was subscribed

and sworn to by the executor.[42] Ordinarily, the language of the jurat should avow that the document was subscribed and sworn before the notary public, while in this case, the notary public averred that he himself signed and notarized the document. Possibly though, the word ninotario or notarized encompasses the signing of and swearing in of the executors of the document, which in this case would involve the decedent and the instrumental witnesses. Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a jurat, the will would nonetheless remain invalid, as the express requirement of Article 806 is that the will be acknowledged, and not merely subscribed and sworn to. The will does not present any textual proof, much less one underoath, that the decedent and the instrumental witnesses executed or signed the will as their own free act or deed. The acknowledgment made in a will provides for another all-important legal safeguard against spurious wills or those made beyond the free consent of the testator. An acknowledgement is not an empty meaningless act.[43] The acknowledgment coerces the testator and the instrumental witnesses to declare before an officer of the law that they had executed and subscribed to the will as their own free act or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury, thus allowing for the criminal prosecution of persons who participate in the execution of spurious wills, or those executed without the free consent of the testator. It also provides a further degree of assurance that the testator is of certain mindset in making the testamentary dispositions to those persons he/she had designated in the will. It may not have been said before, but we can assert the rule, selfevident as it is under Article 806. A notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is subscribed and sworn to before a notary public.

There are two other requirements under Article 805 which were not fully satisfied by the will in question. We need not discuss them at length, as they are no longer material to the

disposition of this case. The provision requires that the testator and the instrumental witnesses sign each and every page of the will on the left margin, except the last; and that all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page. In this case, the decedent, unlike the witnesses, failed to sign both pages of the will on the left margin, her only signature appearing at the so-called logical end[44] of the will on its first page. Also, the will itself is not numbered correlatively in letters on each page, but instead numbered with Arabic numerals. There is a line of thought that has disabused the notion that these two requirements be construed as mandatory.[45] Taken in isolation, these omissions, by themselves, may not be sufficient to deny probate to a will. Yet even as these omissions are not decisive to the adjudication of this case, they need not be dwelt on, though indicative as they may be of a general lack of due regard for the requirements under Article 805 by whoever executed the will. All told, the string of mortal defects which the will in question suffers from makes the probate denial inexorable.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

DANTE TINGA

O. Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice

[1]

Rollo, pp. 21-22. Id. at 35. Id. at 36. Records, p. 505. Id. Penned by Judge Perfecto Laguio, Jr. Rollo, p. 41. Id. at 41-42.

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

Decision penned by Associate Justice (now Supreme Court Associate Justice) Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., and concurred in by Associate Justices Jorge S. Imperial and Pacita Caizares-Nye.
[10]

[9]

See rollo, pp. 46-50. Id. at 24. See rollo, p. 26. 43 Phil. 405 (1922). 42 Phil. 180 (1921). Uy Coque v. Navas L. Sioca, supra note 13, at 409. Id. In re: Will of Andrada, supra note 14 at 181. Id. at 182. 92 Phil. 161 (1952). No. L-36033, 5 November 1982, 118 SCRA 195. Rollo, pp. 47-49. Underscoring not ours. Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2645 reads:

[11]

[12]

[13]

[14]

[15]

[16]

[17]

[18]

[19]

[20]

[21]

[22]

"No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or effect the same, unless it be written in the language or dialect known by the testator and signed by him, or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, on the left margin, and said pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each sheet. The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and each other."

[23]

Id. Rollo, pp. 23-25. See Report of the Code Commission, p. 103. The full citation reads:

[24]

[25]

The underlying and fundamental objectives permeating the provisions of the law on wills in this Project consists in the liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes, but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator. This objective is in accord with the modern tendency with respect to the formalities in the execution of wills. The proposed Code provides for two forms of will, namely, (1) the holographic, and (2) the ordinary will.
[26]

G.R. No. 103554, 28 May 1993, 222 SCRA 781. Id. at 795-800. Id. at 796-797.

[27]

[28]

Id. at 794; citing Lawyers Journal, November 30, 1950, 566. In the same article, Justice J.B.L. Reyes suggested that Article 809 be reworded in such a manner that the will would not be rendered invalid if the defects and imperfections in the attestation can be supplied by an examination of the will itself and it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article 805. See R. BALANE,JOTTINGS AND JURISPRUDENCE IN CIVIL LAW (1998 ed.) at 87, citing Lawyers Journal, November 30, 1950.
[30]

[29]

Id. at 792-793. Id. at 800. See BALANE, supra note 29, at 87. Caneda v. Court of Appeals, supra note 26 at 790; citing Andrada, supra note 14.

[31]

[32]

[33]

The Code Commission did qualify in its Report that the thrust towards liberalization be qualified with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator Supra note 25. The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. A. TOLENTINO, III Civil Code of the Philippines (1992 ed.), at 67.
[36] [35]

[34]

92 Phil. 1032 (1953) Id. at 1033. Justices Felix Bautista Angelo, Pedro Tuason and Felicisimo R. Feria. Cagro v. Cagro, supra note 36, at 1033-1034.

[37]

[38]

[39]

[40]

Rollo, p. 22. Tigno v. Aquino, G.R. No. 129416, 25 November 2004, 444 SCRA 61, 72.

[41]

See Gamido v. New Bilibid Prisons Officials, 312 Phil. 100, 104; citing Theobald v. Chicago Ry. Co., 75 Ill. App. 208. Protacio v. Mendoza, Adm. Case No. 5764, 13 January 2003, 395 SCRA 10, 15; citing Coronado v. Felongco, 344 SCRA 565 (2000); Nunga v. Viray, 306 SCRA 487 (1999); Arrieta v. Llosa, 282 SCRA 248 (1997); Dinoy v. Rosal, 235 SCRA 419 (1994). To use the term adopted by eminent civilists Prof. Balane and Dr. Tolentino, who distinguish the physical end where the writing stops from the logical end where the last testamentary disposition ends. SeeBALANE, supra note 29 at 60; TOLENTINO, supra note 35, at 70.
[45] [44] [43]

[42]

See e.g., BALANE, supra note 28 at 63, 67; TOLENTINO, supra note 34, at 104.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION A.C. No. 5281 February 12, 2008

MANUEL L. LEE, petitioner, vs. ATTY. REGINO B. TAMBAGO, respondent. RESOLUTION CORONA, J.: In a letter-complaint dated April 10, 2000, complainant Manuel L. Lee charged respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago with violation of the Notarial Law and the ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a spurious last will and testament. In his complaint, complainant averred that his father, the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr., never executed the contested will. Furthermore, the spurious will contained the forged signatures of Cayetano Noynay and Loreto Grajo, the purported witnesses to its execution. In the said will, the decedent supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to his wife Lim Hock Lee, save for a parcel of land which he devised to Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena Lee, half-siblings of complainant. The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before respondent on June 30, 1965.1 Complainant, however, pointed out that the residence certificate2 of the testator noted in the acknowledgment of the will was dated January 5, 1962.3 Furthermore, the signature of the testator was not the same as his signature as donor in a deed of donation4 (containing his purported genuine signature). Complainant averred that the signatures of his deceased father in the will and in the deed

of donation were "in any way (sic) entirely and diametrically opposed from (sic) one another in all angle[s]."5 Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the residence certificates of the purported witnesses Noynay and Grajo. He alleged that their signatures had likewise been forged and merely copied from their respective voters affidavits. Complainant further asserted that no copy of such purported will was on file in the archives division of the Records Management and Archives Office of the National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA). In this connection, the certification of the chief of the archives division dated September 19, 1999 stated: Doc. 14, Page No. 4, Book No. 1, Series of 1965 refers to an AFFIDAVIT executed by BARTOLOME RAMIREZ on June 30, 1965 and is available in this Office[s] files.6 Respondent in his comment dated July 6, 2001 claimed that the complaint against him contained false allegations: (1) that complainant was a son of the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr. and (2) that the will in question was fake and spurious. He alleged that complainant was "not a legitimate son of Vicente Lee, Sr. and the last will and testament was validly executed and actually notarized by respondent per affidavit7 of Gloria Nebato, common-law wife of Vicente Lee, Sr. and corroborated by the joint affidavit8 of the children of Vicente Lee, Sr., namely Elena N. Lee and Vicente N. Lee, Jr. xxx."9 Respondent further stated that the complaint was filed simply to harass him because the criminal case filed by complainant against him in the Office of the Ombudsman "did not prosper." Respondent did not dispute complainants contention that no copy of the will was on file in the archives division of the NCCA. He claimed that no copy of the contested will could be found there because none was filed. Lastly, respondent pointed out that complainant had no valid cause of action against him as he (complainant) did not first file an action for the declaration of nullity of the will and demand his share in the inheritance. In a resolution dated October 17, 2001, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.10 In his report, the investigating commissioner found respondent guilty of violation of pertinent provisions of the old Notarial Law as found in the Revised Administrative Code. The violation constituted an infringement of legal ethics, particularly Canon 111 and Rule 1.0112 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).13 Thus, the investigating commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the suspension of respondent for a period of three months. The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-285 dated May 26, 2006, resolved: [T]o ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents failure to comply with the laws in the discharge of his function as a notary public, Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby suspended from the practice of law for

one year and Respondents notarial commission is Revoked and Disqualified from reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years.14 We affirm with modification. A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death.15 A will may either be notarial or holographic. The law provides for certain formalities that must be followed in the execution of wills. The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door on bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity.16 A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself. In addition, it should be attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.17 The will in question was attested by only two witnesses, Noynay and Grajo. On this circumstance alone, the will must be considered void.18 This is in consonance with the rule that acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity. The Civil Code likewise requires that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses.19 The importance of this requirement is highlighted by the fact that it was segregated from the other requirements under Article 805 and embodied in a distinct and separate provision.20 An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signatory actually declares to the notary public that the same is his or her own free act and deed.21 The acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1) to safeguard the testators wishes long after his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is administered in the manner that he intends it to be done. A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question shows that this particular requirement was neither strictly nor substantially complied with. For one, there was the conspicuous absence of a notation of the residence certificates of the notarial witnesses Noynay and Grajo in the acknowledgment. Similarly, the notation of the testators old residence certificate in the same acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These omissions by respondent invalidated the will. As the acknowledging officer of the contested will, respondent was required to faithfully observe the formalities of a will and those of notarization. As we held in Santiago v. Rafanan:22 The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are required to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before him had presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification. These formalities are mandatory and cannot be disregarded, considering the degree of importance and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents.23 A notary public, especially a lawyer,24 is bound to strictly observe these elementary requirements.

The Notarial Law then in force required the exhibition of the residence certificate upon notarization of a document or instrument: Section 251. Requirement as to notation of payment of [cedula] residence tax. Every contract, deed, or other document acknowledged before a notary public shall have certified thereon that the parties thereto have presented their proper [cedula] residence certificate or are exempt from the [cedula] residence tax, and there shall be entered by the notary public as a part of such certificate the number, place of issue, and date of each [cedula] residence certificate as aforesaid.25 The importance of such act was further reiterated by Section 6 of the Residence Tax Act26 which stated: When a person liable to the taxes prescribed in this Act acknowledges any document before a notary public xxx it shall be the duty of such person xxx with whom such transaction is had or business done, to require the exhibition of the residence certificate showing payment of the residence taxes by such person xxx. In the issuance of a residence certificate, the law seeks to establish the true and correct identity of the person to whom it is issued, as well as the payment of residence taxes for the current year. By having allowed decedent to exhibit an expired residence certificate, respondent failed to comply with the requirements of both the old Notarial Law and the Residence Tax Act. As much could be said of his failure to demand the exhibition of the residence certificates of Noynay and Grajo. On the issue of whether respondent was under the legal obligation to furnish a copy of the notarized will to the archives division, Article 806 provides: Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witness. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court. (emphasis supplied) Respondents failure, inadvertent or not, to file in the archives division a copy of the notarized will was therefore not a cause for disciplinary action. Nevertheless, respondent should be faulted for having failed to make the necessary entries pertaining to the will in his notarial register. The old Notarial Law required the entry of the following matters in the notarial register, in chronological order: 1. nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him; 2. person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument; 3. witnesses, if any, to the signature; 4. date of execution, oath, or acknowledgment of the instrument; 5. fees collected by him for his services as notary; 6. give each entry a consecutive number; and 7. if the instrument is a contract, a brief description of the substance of the instrument.27

In an effort to prove that he had complied with the abovementioned rule, respondent contended that he had crossed out a prior entry and entered instead the will of the decedent. As proof, he presented a photocopy of his notarial register. To reinforce his claim, he presented a photocopy of a certification28 stating that the archives division had no copy of the affidavit of Bartolome Ramirez. A photocopy is a mere secondary evidence. It is not admissible unless it is shown that the original is unavailable. The proponent must first prove the existence and cause of the unavailability of the original,29 otherwise, the evidence presented will not be admitted. Thus, the photocopy of respondents notarial register was not admissible as evidence of the entry of the execution of the will because it failed to comply with the requirements for the admissibility of secondary evidence. In the same vein, respondents attempt to controvert the certification dated September 21, 199930 must fail. Not only did he present a mere photocopy of the certification dated March 15, 2000;31 its contents did not squarely prove the fact of entry of the contested will in his notarial register. Notaries public must observe with utmost care32 and utmost fidelity the basic requirements in the performance of their duties, otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of notarized deeds will be undermined.33 Defects in the observance of the solemnities prescribed by law render the entire will invalid. This carelessness cannot be taken lightly in view of the importance and delicate nature of a will, considering that the testator and the witnesses, as in this case, are no longer alive to identify the instrument and to confirm its contents.34 Accordingly, respondent must be held accountable for his acts. The validity of the will was seriously compromised as a consequence of his breach of duty.35 In this connection, Section 249 of the old Notarial Law provided: Grounds for revocation of commission. The following derelictions of duty on the part of a notary public shall, in the discretion of the proper judge of first instance, be sufficient ground for the revocation of his commission: xxx xxx xxx

(b) The failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law. xxx xxx xxx

(f) The failure of the notary to make the proper notation regarding cedula certificates.36 These gross violations of the law also made respondent liable for violation of his oath as a lawyer and constituted transgressions of Section 20 (a), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court37 and Canon 138 and Rule 1.0139 of the CPR. The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land.40 For a lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice.41

While the duty to uphold the Constitution and obey the law is an obligation imposed on every citizen, a lawyer assumes responsibilities well beyond the basic requirements of good citizenship. As a servant of the law, a lawyer should moreover make himself an example for others to emulate.42 Being a lawyer, he is supposed to be a model in the community in so far as respect for the law is concerned.43 The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.44 A breach of these conditions justifies disciplinary action against the erring lawyer. A disciplinary sanction is imposed on a lawyer upon a finding or acknowledgment that he has engaged in professional misconduct.45 These sanctions meted out to errant lawyers include disbarment, suspension and reprimand. Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction.46 We have held in a number of cases that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution47 and should not be decreed if any punishment less severe such as reprimand, suspension, or fine will accomplish the end desired.48 The rule then is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court.49 Respondent, as notary public, evidently failed in the performance of the elementary duties of his office. Contrary to his claims that he "exercised his duties as Notary Public with due care and with due regard to the provision of existing law and had complied with the elementary formalities in the performance of his duties xxx," we find that he acted very irresponsibly in notarizing the will in question. Such recklessness warrants the less severe punishment of suspension from the practice of law. It is, as well, a sufficient basis for the revocation of his commission50 and his perpetual disqualification to be commissioned as a notary public.51 WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby found guilty of professional misconduct. He violated (1) the Lawyers Oath; (2) Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; (3) Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; (4) Art. 806 of the Civil Code and (5) the provisions of the old Notarial Law. Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year and his notarial commissionREVOKED. Because he has not lived up to the trustworthiness expected of him as a notary public and as an officer of the court, he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all the courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant, as well as made part of the personal records of respondent. SO ORDERED.

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Supreme Court of the Philippines

First Division
G.R. No. 174144, April 17, 2007

BELLA A. GUERRERO, PETITIONER, VS. RESURRECCION A. BIHIS, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
Corona, J.:
The Scriptures tell the story of the brothers Jacob and Esau[1], siblings who fought bitterly over the inheritance of their father Isaacs estate. Jurisprudence is also replete with cases involving acrimonious conflicts between brothers and sisters over successional rights. This case is no exception. On February 19, 1994, Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, mother of petitioner Bella A. Guerrero and respondent Resurreccion A. Bihis, died at the Metropolitan Hospital in Tondo, Manila. On May 24, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last will and testament of the decedent in Branch 95[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City where the case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-94-20661. The petition alleged the following: petitioner was named as executrix in the decedents will and she was legally qualified to act as such; the decedent was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of her death; at the time of the execution of the will, the testatrix was 79 years old, of sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence and was capacitated to dispose of her estate by will. Respondent opposed her elder sisters petition on the following grounds: the will was not executed and attested as required by law; its attestation clause and acknowledgment did not comply with the requirements of the law; the signature of the testatrix was procured by fraud and petitioner and her children procured the will through undue and improper pressure and influence. In an order dated November 9, 1994, the trial court appointed petitioner as special administratrix of the decedents estate. Respondent opposed

petitioners appointment but subsequently withdrew her opposition. Petitioner took her oath as temporary special administratrix and letters of special administration were issued to her. On January 17, 2000, after petitioner presented her evidence, respondent filed a demurrer thereto alleging that petitioners evidence failed to establish that the decedents will complied with Articles 804 and 805 of the Civil Code. In a resolution dated July 6, 2001, the trial court denied the probate of the will ruling that Article 806 of the Civil Code was not complied with because the will was acknowledged by the testatrix and the witnesses at the testatrixs, residence at No. 40 Kanlaon Street, Quezon City before Atty. Macario O. Directo who was a commissioned notary public for and in Caloocan City. The dispositive portion of the resolution read: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds, and so declares that it cannot admit the last will and testament of the late Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura to probate for the reasons hereinabove discussed and also in accordance with Article 839 [of the Civil Code] which provides that if the formalities required by law have not been complied with, the will shall be disallowed. In view thereof, the Court shall henceforth proceed with intestate succession in regard to the estate of the deceased Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura in accordance with Article 960 of the [Civil Code], to wit: Art. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place: (1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has subsequently lost its validity, xxx. SO ORDERED.[3] Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but the appellate court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the resolution of the trial court.[4] Thus, this petition.[5] Petitioner admits that the will was acknowledged by the testatrix and the witnesses at the testatrixs residence in Quezon City before Atty. Directo and that, at that time, Atty. Directo was a commissioned notary public for and in Caloocan City. She, however, asserts that the fact that the notary public was acting outside his territorial jurisdiction did not affect the validity of the notarial will.

Did the will acknowledged by the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses before a notary public acting outside the place of his commission satisfy the requirement under Article 806 of the Civil Code? It did not. Article 806 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court. One of the formalities required by law in connection with the execution of a notarial will is that it must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses.[6] This formal requirement is one of the indispensable requisites for the validity of a will.[7] In other words, a notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the instrumental witnesses is void and cannot be accepted for probate. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer and declaring it to be his act or deed.[8] In the case of a notarial will, that competent officer is the notary public. The acknowledgment of a notarial will coerces the testator and the instrumental witnesses to declare before an officer of the law, the notary public, that they executed and subscribed to the will as their own free act or deed.[9] Such declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury, thus paving the way for the criminal prosecution of persons who participate in the execution of spurious wills, or those executed without the free consent of the testator.[10] It also provides a further degree of assurance that the testator is of a certain mindset in making the testamentary dispositions to the persons instituted as heirs or designated as devisees or legatees in the will.[11] Acknowledgment can only be made before a competent officer, that is, a lawyer duly commissioned as a notary public. In this connection, the relevant provisions of the Notarial Law provide: SECTION 237. Form of commission for notary public. -The appointment of a notary public shall be in writing, signed by the judge, and substantially in the following form: GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PROVINCE OF ___________

This is to certify that ____________, of the municipality of ________ in said province, was on the ___ day of __________, anno Domini nineteen hundred and _______, appointed by me a notary public, within and for the said province, for the term ending on the first day of January, anno Domini nineteen hundred and _____. _________________ Judge of the Court of irst Instance[12] of said Province xxx xxx xxx SECTION 240. Territorial jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall be co-extensive with the province. The jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of Manila shall be co-extensive with said city. No notary shall possess authority to do any notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction. (emphases supplied) A notary publics commission is the grant of authority in his favor to perform notarial acts.[13] It is issued within and for a particular territorial jurisdiction and the notary publics authority is co-extensive with it. In other words, a notary public is authorized to perform notarial acts, including the taking of acknowledgments, within that territorial jurisdiction only. Outside the place of his commission, he is bereft of power to perform any notarial act; he is not a notary public. Any notarial act outside the limits of his jurisdiction has no force and effect. As this Court categorically pronounced in Tecson v. Tecson:[14] An acknowledgment taken outside the territorial limits of the officers jurisdiction is void as if the person taking it ware wholly without official character. (emphasis supplied) Since Atty. Directo was not a commissioned notary public for and in Quezon City, he lacked the authority to take the acknowledgment of the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses. In the same vein, the testatrix and her witnesses could not have validly acknowledged the will before him. Thus, Felisa Tamio de Buenaventuras last will and testament was, in effect, not acknowledged as required by law.

Moreover, Article 5 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity. The violation of a mandatory or a prohibitory statute renders the act illegal and void unless the law itself declares its continuing validity. Here, mandatory and prohibitory statutes were transgressed in the execution of the alleged acknowledgment. The compulsory language of Article 806 of the Civil Code was not complied with and the interdiction of Article 240 of the Notarial Law was breached. Ineluctably, the acts of the testatrix, her witnesses and Atty. Directo were all completely void. The Court cannot turn a blind eye to Atty. Directos participation in the preparation, execution and unlawful acknowledgment of Felisa Tamio de Buenaventuras will. Had he exercised his notarial commission properly, the intent of the law to effectuate the decedents final statements[15] as expressed in her will would not have come to naught.[16] Hence, Atty. Directo should show cause why he should not be administratively sanctioned as a member of the bar and as an officer of the court. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against petitioner. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation on the possible misconduct of Atty. Macario O. Directo. SO ORDERED. Puno, C.J., (Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna and Garcia, JJ., concur. Jacob and Esau were the sons of Isaac and Rebekah. Even before they were born, they were struggling against each other in the womb of their mother. Their prenatal striving foreshadowed later conflict. (Genesis 25:2126) Jacob, the younger of the two, desired Esaus birthright -the special honor that Esau possessed as the older son which entitled him to a double portion of his fathers inheritance. Jacob was later on able to acquire not only Esaus birthright and superior right to inheritance but also their fathers blessing. (Genesis 25:27-34, 27: 1-40)
[1]

Presided by Judge (now Sandiganbayan Associate Justice) Diosdado M. Peralta. [3] Rollo, pp. 81-87. [4] Decision dated July 31, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 76707. Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino and concurred in by Associate Justices Portia Alio-Hormachuelos and Santiago Javier Ranada (retired) of the Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals. Id., pp. 55-64. [5] Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. [6] The other formalities are: (1) the will must be in writing; (2) it must be written in a language or dialect known to the testator; (3) it must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testators name written by some other person in his presence and by his express direction; (4) it must be attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another; (5) the testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will shall also sign each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin; (6) all the pages of the will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page and (7) the will must contain an attestation clause.
[2]

In the Matter of the Testate Estate of the Deceased Vicente C. Alberto, 408 Phil. 1281 (1959). [8] Tigno v. Aquino, G.R. No. 129416, 25 November 2004, 444 SCRA 61. [9] Azuela v Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122880, 12 April 2006, 487 SCRA 119. [10] Id. [11] Id. [12] Now, Regional Trial Court. [13] 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. [14] 61 Phil. 781(1935). [15] A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same force and effect in the probate court as if the testator stood before the court in full life making the declarations by word of mouth as
[7]

they appear in the will. (Dissenting opinion of J. Moreland inSantos v. Manalang, 27 Phil. 209 [1914]. [16] For one, he testified during the proceedings in the trial court that the will was executed and signed by the testatrix in his presence and in the presence of the instrumental witnesses in the decedents house in Quezon City and it was also there where the same was acknowledged although his commission was for Caloocan City. He also made it appear in the acknowledgment that the testatrix and the witnesses personally appeared before him to execute and knowledge the will in Caloocan City where he was commissioned as a notary public. This entry was posted in Jurisprudence. Bookmark the permalink.

THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 165748, September 14, 2011] HEIRS OF POLICRONIO M. URETA, SR., NAMELY: CONRADO B. URETA, MACARIO B. URETA, GLORIA URETA-GONZALES, ROMEO B. URETA, RITA URETA-SOLANO, NENA URETA-TONGCUA, VENANCIO B. URETA, LILIA URETA-TAYCO, AND HEIRS OF POLICRONIO B. URETA, JR., NAMELY: MIGUEL T. URETA, RAMON POLICRONIO T. URETA, EMMANUEL T. URETA, AND BERNADETTE T. URETA, PETITIONERS, VS. HEIRS OF LIBERATO M. URETA, NAMELY: TERESA F. URETA, AMPARO URETA-CASTILLO, IGNACIO F. URETA, SR., EMIRITO F. URETA, WILKIE F. URETA, LIBERATO F. URETA, JR., RAY F. URETA, ZALDY F. URETA, AND MILA JEAN URETA CIPRIANO; HEIRS OF PRUDENCIA URETA PARADERO, NAMELY: WILLIAM U. PARADERO, WARLITO U. PARADERO, CARMENCITA P. PERLAS, CRISTINA P. CORDOVA, EDNA P. GALLARDO, LETICIA P. REYES; NARCISO M. URETA; VICENTE M. URETA; HEIRS OF FRANCISCO M. URETA, NAMELY: EDITA T. URETA-REYES AND LOLLIE T. URETA-VILLARUEL; ROQUE M. URETA; ADELA URETA-GONZALES; HEIRS OF INOCENCIO M. URETA, NAMELY: BENILDA V. URETA, ALFONSO V. URETA II, DICK RICARDO V. URETA, AND ENRIQUE V. URETA; MERLINDA U. RIVERA; JORGE URETA; ANDRES URETA, WENEFREDA U. TARAN; AND BENEDICT URETA, RESPONDENTS. [G.R. NO. 165930 ] HEIRS OF LIBERATO M. URETA, NAMELY: TERESA F. URETA, AMPARO URETA-CASTILLO, IGNACIO F. URETA, SR., EMIRITO F. URETA, WILKIE F. URETA, LIBERATO F. URETA, JR., RAY F. URETA, ZALDY F. URETA, AND MILA JEAN URETA CIPRIANO; HEIRS OF PRUDENCIA URETA PARADERO, NAMELY: WILLIAM U. PARADERO, WARLITO U. PARADERO, CARMENCITA P. PERLAS, CRISTINA P. CORDOVA, EDNA P. GALLARDO, LETICIA P. REYES; NARCISO M. URETA; VICENTE M. URETA; HEIRS OF FRANCISCO M. URETA, NAMELY: EDITA T. URETA-REYES AND LOLLIE T. URETA-VILLARUEL; ROQUE M. URETA; ADELA URETAGONZALES; HEIRS OF INOCENCIO M. URETA, NAMELY: BENILDA V. URETA, ALFONSO V. URETA II, DICK RICARDO V. URETA, AND ENRIQUE V. URETA; MERLINDA U. RIVERA; JORGE URETA; ANDRES URETA, WENEFREDA U. TARAN; AND BENEDICT URETA, PETITIONERS, VS. HEIRS OF POLICRONIO M. URETA, SR., NAMELY: CONRADO B. URETA, MACARIO B. URETA, GLORIA URETA-GONZALES, ROMEO B. URETA, RITA URETA-SOLANO, NENA URETA-TONGCUA, VENANCIO B. URETA, LILIA URETA-TAYCO, AND HEIRS OF POLICRONIO B. URETA, JR., NAMELY: MIGUEL T. URETA, RAMON POLICRONIO T. URETA, EMMANUEL T. URETA, AND BERNADETTE T. URETA, RESPONDENTS. DECISION
MENDOZA, J.: These consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure assail the April 20, 2004 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), and its October 14, 2004 Resolution[2] in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 71399, which affirmed with modification the April 26, 2001 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Kalibo, Aklan (RTC) in Civil Case No. 5026. The Facts In his lifetime, Alfonso Ureta (Alfonso) begot 14 children, namely, Policronio, Liberato, Narciso, Prudencia, Vicente, Francisco, Inocensio, Roque, Adela, Wenefreda, Merlinda, Benedicto, Jorge, and Andres. The children of Policronio (Heirs of Policronio), are opposed to the rest of Alfonso's children and their descendants (Heirs of Alfonso). Alfonso was financially well-off during his lifetime. He owned several fishpens, a fishpond, a sari-sari store, a passenger jeep, and was engaged in the buying and selling of copra. Policronio, the eldest, was the only child of Alfonso who failed to finish schooling and instead worked on his father's lands.

Sometime in October 1969, Alfonso and four of his children, namely, Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia, and Francisco, met at the house of Liberato. Francisco, who was then a municipal judge, suggested that in order to reduce the inheritance taxes, their father should make it appear that he had sold some of his lands to his children. Accordingly, Alfonso executed four (4) Deeds of Sale covering several parcels of land in favor of Policronio,[4] Liberato,[5] Prudencia,[6] and his common-law wife, Valeriana Dela Cruz.[7] The Deed of Sale executed on October 25, 1969, in favor of Policronio, covered six parcels of land, which are the properties in dispute in this case. Since the sales were only made for taxation purposes and no monetary consideration was given, Alfonso continued to own, possess and enjoy the lands and their produce. When Alfonso died on October 11, 1972, Liberato acted as the administrator of his father's estate. He was later succeeded by his sister Prudencia, and then by her daughter, Carmencita Perlas. Except for a portion of parcel 5, the rest of the parcels transferred to Policronio were tenanted by the Fernandez Family. These tenants never turned over the produce of the lands to Policronio or any of his heirs, but to Alfonso and, later, to the administrators of his estate. Policronio died on November 22, 1974. Except for the said portion of parcel 5, neither Policronio nor his heirs ever took possession of the subject lands. On April 19, 1989, Alfonso's heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition,[8] which included all the lands that were covered by the four (4) deeds of sale that were previously executed by Alfonso for taxation purposes. Conrado, Policronio's eldest son, representing the Heirs of Policronio, signed the Deed of ExtraJudicial Partition in behalf of his co-heirs. After their father's death, the Heirs of Policronio found tax declarations in his name covering the six parcels of land. On June 15, 1995, they obtained a copy of the Deed of Sale executed on October 25, 1969 by Alfonso in favor of Policronio. Not long after, on July 30, 1995, the Heirs of Policronio allegedly learned about the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition involving Alfonso's estate when it was published in the July 19, 1995 issue of the Aklan Reporter. Believing that the six parcels of land belonged to their late father, and as such, excluded from the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, the Heirs of Policronio sought to amicably settle the matter with the Heirs of Alfonso. Earnest efforts proving futile, the Heirs of Policronio filed a Complaint for Declaration of Ownership, Recovery of Possession, Annulment of Documents, Partition, and Damages[9] against the Heirs of Alfonso before the RTC on November 17, 1995 where the following issues were submitted: (1) whether or not the Deed of Sale was valid; (2) whether or not the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition was valid; and (3) who between the parties was entitled to damages. The Ruling of the RTC On April 26, 2001, the RTC dismissed the Complaint of the Heirs of Policronio and ruled in favor of the Heirs of Alfonso in a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the preponderance of evidence tilts in favor of the defendants, hence the instant case is hereby DISMISSED. The counterclaims are likewise DISMISSED. With costs against plaintiffs. SO ORDERED.

The RTC found that the Heirs of Alfonso clearly established that the Deed of Sale was null and void. It held that the Heirs of Policronio failed to rebut the evidence of the Heirs of Alfonso, which proved that the Deed of Sale in the possession of the former was one of the four (4) Deeds of Sale executed by Alfonso in favor of his 3 children and second wife for taxation purposes; that although tax declarations were issued in the name of Policronio, he or his heirs never took possession of the subject lands except a portion of parcel 5; and that all the produce were turned over by the tenants to Alfonso and the administrators of his estate and never to Policronio or his heirs. The RTC further found that there was no money involved in the sale. Even granting that there was, as claimed by the Heirs of Policronio, ?2,000.00 for six parcels of land, the amount was grossly inadequate. It was also noted that the aggregate area of the subject lands was more than double the average share adjudicated to each of the other children in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition; that the siblings of Policronio were the ones who shared in the produce of the land; and that the Heirs of Policronio only paid real estate taxes in 1996 and 1997. The RTC opined that Policronio must have been aware that the transfer was merely for taxation purposes because he did not subsequently take possession of the properties even after the death of his father. The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, on the other hand, was declared valid by the RTC as all the heirs of Alfonso were represented and received equal shares and all the requirements of a valid extra-judicial partition were met. The RTC considered Conrado's claim that he did not understand the full significance of his signature when he signed in behalf of his co-heirs, as a gratutitous assertion. The RTC was of the view that when he admitted to have signed all the pages and personally appeared before the notary public, he was presumed to have understood their contents. Lastly, neither party was entitled to damages. The Heirs of Alfonso failed to present testimony to serve as factual basis for moral damages, no document was presented to prove actual damages, and the Heirs of Policronio were found to have filed the case in good faith. The Ruling of the CA Aggrieved, the Heirs of Policronio appealed before the CA, which rendered a decision on April 20, 2004, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The appealed Decision, dated 26 April 2001, rendered by Hon. Judge Dean R. Telan of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 9, is herebyAFFIRMED with MODIFICATION: 1.) The Deed of Sale in favor of Policronio Ureta, Sr., dated 25 October 1969, covering six (6) parcels of land is hereby declared VOID for beingABSOLUTELY SIMULATED; 2.) The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, dated 19 April 1989, isANNULLED; 3.) The claim for actual and exemplary damages are DISMISSED for lack of factual and legal basis. The case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for the proper partition of ALFONSO URETA'S Estate in accordance with Rule 69 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. No costs at this instance. SO ORDERED. The CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that the Deed of Sale was void. It found the Deed of Sale to be absolutely simulated as the parties did not intend to be legally bound by it. As such, it produced no legal effects and did not alter the juridical situation of the parties. The CA also noted that Alfonso continued to exercise all the rights of an owner even after the execution of the Deed of Sale, as it was undisputed that he

remained in possession of the subject parcels of land and enjoyed their produce until his death. Policronio, on the other hand, never exercised any rights pertaining to an owner over the subject lands from the time they were sold to him up until his death. He never took or attempted to take possession of the land even after his father's death, never demanded delivery of the produce from the tenants, and never paid realty taxes on the properties. It was also noted that Policronio never disclosed the existence of the Deed of Sale to his children, as they were, in fact, surprised to discover its existence. The CA, thus, concluded that Policronio must have been aware that the transfer was only made for taxation purposes. The testimony of Amparo Castillo, as to the circumstances surrounding the actual arrangement and agreement between the parties prior to the execution of the four (4) Deeds of Sale, was found by the CA to be unrebutted. The RTC's assessment of the credibility of her testimony was accorded respect, and the intention of the parties was given the primary consideration in determining the true nature of the contract. Contrary to the finding of the RTC though, the CA annulled the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition due to the incapacity of one of the parties to give his consent to the contract. It held that before Conrado could validly bind his co-heirs to the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, it was necessary that he be clothed with the proper authority. The CA ruled that a special power of attorney was required under Article 1878 (5) and (15) of the Civil Code. Without a special power of attorney, it was held that Conrado lacked the legal capactiy to give the consent of his co-heirs, thus, rendering the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition voidable under Article 1390 (1) of the Civil Code. As a consequence, the CA ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for the proper partition of the estate, with the option that the parties may still voluntarily effect the partition by executing another agreement or by adopting the assailed Deed of Partition with the RTC's approval in either case. Otherwise, the RTC may proceed with the compulsory partition of the estate in accordance with the Rules. With regard to the claim for damages, the CA agreed with the RTC and dismissed the claim for actual and compensatory damages for lack of factual and legal basis. Both parties filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration, which were denied by the CA for lack of merit in a Resolution dated October 14, 2004. In their Motion for Reconsideration, the Heirs of Policronio argued that the RTC violated the best evidence rule in giving credence to the testimony of Amparo Castillo with regard to the simulation of the Deed of Sale, and that prescription had set in precluding any question on the validity of the contract. The CA held that the oral testimony was admissible under Rule 130, Section 9 (b) and (c), which provides that evidence aliunde may be allowed to explain the terms of the written agreement if the same failed to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto, or when the validity of the written agreement was put in issue. Furthermore, the CA found that the Heirs of Policronio waived their right to object to evidence aliunde having failed to do so during trial and for raising such only for the first time on appeal. With regard to prescription, the CA ruled that the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract did not prescribe under Article 1410 of the Civil Code. On the other hand, the Heirs of Alfonso argued that the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition should not have been annulled, and instead the preterited heirs should be given their share. The CA reiterated that Conrado's lack of capacity to give his co-heirs' consent to the extra-judicial settlement rendered the same voidable. Hence, the present Petitions for Review on Certiorari. The Issues

The issues presented for resolution by the Heirs of Policronio in G.R. No. 165748 are as follows: I. Whether the Court of Appeals is correct in ruling that the Deed of Absolute Sale of 25 October 1969 is void for being absolutely fictitious and in relation therewith, may parol evidence be entertained to thwart its binding effect after the parties have both died? Assuming that indeed the said document is simulated, whether or not the parties thereto including their successors in interest are estopped to question its validity, they being bound by Articles 1412 and 1421 of the Civil Code? II. Whether prescription applies to bar any question respecting the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 25 October 1969? Whether prescription applies to bar any collateral attack on the validity of the deed of absolute sale executed 21 years earlier? III. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly ruled in nullifying the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition because Conrado Ureta signed the same without the written authority from his siblings in contravention of Article 1878 in relation to Article 1390 of the Civil Code and in relation therewith, whether the defense of ratification and/or preterition raised for the first time on appeal may be entertained? The issues presented for resolution by the Heirs of Alfonso in G.R. No. 165930 are as follows: I. Whether or not grave error was committed by the Trial Court and Court of Appeals in declaring the Deed of Sale of subject properties as absolutely simulated and null and void thru parol evidence based on their factual findings as to its fictitious nature, and there being waiver of any objection based on violation of the parol evidence rule. II. Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that Conrado Ureta's lack of capacity to give his co-heirs' consent to the Extra-Judicial Partition rendered the same voidable. III. Granting arguendo that Conrado Ureta was not authorized to represent his co-heirs and there was no ratification, whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in ordering the remand of the case to the Regional Trial Court for partition of the estate of Alfonso Ureta. IV. Since the sale in favor of Policronio Ureta Sr. was null and void ab initio, the properties covered therein formed part of the estate of the late Alfonso Ureta and was correctly included in the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition even if no prior action for nullification of the sale was filed by the heirs of Liberato Ureta.

V. Whether or not the heirs of Policronio Ureta Sr. can claim that estoppel based on Article 1412 of the Civil Code as well as the issue of prescription can still be raised on appeal. These various contentions revolve around two major issues, to wit: (1) whether the Deed of Sale is valid, and (2) whether the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition is valid. Thus, the assigned errors shall be discussed jointly and in seriatim. The Ruling of the Court Validity of the Deed of Sale Two veritable legal presumptions bear on the validity of the Deed of Sale: (1) that there was sufficient consideration for the contract; and (2) that it was the result of a fair and regular private transaction. If shown to hold, these presumptions infer prima facie the transaction's validity, except that it must yield to the evidence adduced.[10] As will be discussed below, the evidence overcomes these two presumptions. Absolute Simulation First, the Deed of Sale was not the result of a fair and regular private transaction because it was absolutely simulated. The Heirs of Policronio argued that the land had been validly sold to Policronio as the Deed of Sale contained all the essential elements of a valid contract of sale, by virtue of which, the subject properties were transferred in his name as evidenced by the tax declaration. There being no invalidation prior to the execution of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, the probity and integrity of the Deed of Sale should remain undiminished and accorded respect as it was a duly notarized public instrument. The Heirs of Policronio posited that his loyal services to his father and his being the eldest among Alfonso's children, might have prompted the old man to sell the subject lands to him at a very low price as an advance inheritance. They explained that Policronio's failure to take possession of the subject lands and to claim their produce manifests a Filipino family practice wherein a child would take possession and enjoy the fruits of the land sold by a parent only after the latter's death. Policronio simply treated the lands the same way his father Alfonso treated them - where his children enjoyed usufructuary rights over the properties, as opposed to appropriating them exclusively to himself. They contended that Policronio's failure to take actual possession of the lands did not prove that he was not the owner as he was merely exercising his right to dispose of them. They argue that it was an error on the part of the CA to conclude that ownership by Policronio was not established by his failure to possess the properties sold. Instead, emphasis should be made on the fact that the tax declarations, being indicia of possession, were in Policronio's name. They further argued that the Heirs of Alfonso failed to appreciate that the Deed of Sale was clear enough to convey the subject parcels of land. Citing jurisprudence, they contend that there is a presumption that an instrument sets out the true agreement of the parties thereto and that it was executed for valuable consideration,[11] and where there is no doubt as to the intention of the parties to a contract, the literal meaning of the stipulation shall control.[12] Nowhere in the Deed of Sale is it indicated that the transfer was only for taxation purposes. On the contrary, the document clearly indicates that the lands were sold. Therefore, they averred that the literal meaning of the stipulation should control. The Court disagrees.

The Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the finding of the CA that the Deed of Sale is null and void for being absolutely simulated. The Civil Code provides: Art. 1345. Simulation of a contract may be absolute or relative. The former takes place when the parties do not intend to be bound at all; the latter, when the parties conceal their true agreement. Art. 1346. An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation, when it does not prejudice a third person and is not intended for any purpose contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy binds the parties to their real agreement. Valerio v. Refresca[13] is instructive on the matter of simulation of contracts: In absolute simulation,there is a colorable contract but it has no substance as the parties have no intention to be bound by it.The main characteristic of an absolute simulation is that the apparent contract is not really desired or intended to produce legal effect or in any way alter the juridical situation of the parties. As a result, an absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void, and the parties may recover from each other what they may have given under the contract.However, if the parties state a false cause in the contract to conceal their real agreement, the contract is relatively simulated and the parties are still bound by their real agreement.Hence, where the essential requisites of a contract are present and the simulation refers only to the content or terms of the contract, the agreement is absolutely binding and enforceable between the parties and their successors in interest. Lacking, therefore, in an absolutely simulated contract is consent which is essential to a valid and enforceable contract.[14] Thus, where a person, in order to place his property beyond the reach of his creditors, simulates a transfer of it to another, he does not really intend to divest himself of his title and control of the property; hence, the deed of transfer is but a sham.[15] Similarly, in this case, Alfonso simulated a transfer to Policronio purely for taxation purposes, without intending to transfer ownership over the subject lands. Theprimary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract is the intention of the parties.If the words of a contract appear to contravene the evident intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail. Such intention is determined not only from the express terms of their agreement, but also from the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties.[16] The true intention of the parties in this case was sufficiently proven by the Heirs of Alfonso. The Heirs of Alfonso established by a preponderance of evidence[17] that the Deed of Sale was one of the four (4) absolutely simulated Deeds of Sale which involved no actual monetary consideration, executed by Alfonso in favor of his children, Policronio, Liberato, and Prudencia, and his second wife, Valeriana, for taxation purposes. Amparo Castillo, the daughter of Liberato, testified, to wit: Q: Now sometime in the year 1969 can you recall if your grandfather and his children [met] in your house? A: Yes sir, that was sometime in October 1969 when they [met] in our house, my grandfather, my late uncle Policronio Ureta, my late uncle Liberato Ureta, my uncle Francisco Ureta, and then my auntie Prudencia Ureta they talk[ed] about, that idea came from my uncle Francisco Ureta to [sell] some parcels of land to his children to lessen the inheritance tax whatever happened to my grandfather, actually no money involved in this sale. Q: Now you said there was that agreement, verbal agreement. [W]here were you when this Alfonso Ureta and his children gather[ed] in your house?

A: xxx Q: A:

I was near them in fact I heard everything they were talking [about]

Were there documents of sale executed by Alfonso Ureta in furtherance of their verbal agreement? Yes sir.

Q: To whom in particular did your grandfather Alfonso Ureta execute this deed of sale without money consideration according to you? A: Q: A: Q: A: To my uncle Policronio Ureta and to Prudencia Ureta Panadero. And who else? To Valeriana dela Cruz. How about your father? He has.[18]

The other Deeds of Sale executed by Alfonso in favor of his children Prudencia and Liberato, and second wife Valeriana, all bearing the same date of execution, were duly presented in evidence by the Heirs of Alfonso, and were uncontested by the Heirs of Policronio. The lands which were the subject of these Deeds of Sale were in fact included in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition executed by all the heirs of Alfonso, where it was expressly stipulated: That the above-named Amparo U. Castillo, Prudencia U. Paradero, Conrado B. Ureta and Merlinda U. Rivera do hereby recognize and acknowledge as a fact that the properties presently declared in their respective names or in the names of their respective parents and are included in the foregoing instrument are actually the properties of the deceased Alfonso Ureta and were transferred only for the purpose of effective administration and development and convenience in the payment of taxes and, therefore, all instruments conveying or affecting the transfer of said properties are null and void from the beginning.[19] As found by the CA, Alfonso continued to exercise all the rights of an owner even after the execution of the Deeds of Sale. It was undisputed that Alfonso remained in possession of the subject lands and enjoyed their produce until his death. No credence can be given to the contention of the Heirs of Policrionio that their father did not take possession of the subject lands or enjoyed the fruits thereof in deference to a Filipino family practice. Had this been true, Policronio should have taken possession of the subject lands after his father died. On the contrary, it was admitted that neither Policronio nor his heirs ever took possession of the subject lands from the time they were sold to him, and even after the death of both Alfonso and Policronio. It was also admitted by the Heirs of Policronio that the tenants of the subject lands never turned over the produce of the properties to Policronio or his heirs but only to Alfonso and the administrators of his estate. Neither was there a demand for their delivery to Policronio or his heirs. Neither did Policronio ever pay real estate taxes on the properties, the only payment on record being those made by his heirs in 1996 and 1997 ten years after his death. In sum, Policronio never exercised any rights pertaining to an owner over the subject lands. The most protuberant index of simulation of contract is the complete absence of an attempt in any manner on the part of the ostensible buyer to assert rights of ownership over the subject properties. Policronio's failure to take exclusive possession of the subject properties or, in the alternative, to collect rentals, is contrary to the principle of ownership. Such failure is a clear badge of simulation that renders the whole transaction void. [20]

It is further telling that Policronio never disclosed the existence of the Deed of Sale to his children. This, coupled with Policronio's failure to exercise any rights pertaining to an owner of the subject lands, leads to the conclusion that he was aware that the transfer was only made for taxation purposes and never intended to bind the parties thereto. As the above factual circumstances remain unrebutted by the Heirs of Policronio, the factual findings of the RTC, which were affirmed by the CA, remain binding and conclusive upon this Court.[21] It is clear that the parties did not intend to be bound at all, and as such, the Deed of Sale produced no legal effects and did not alter the juridical situation of the parties. The Deed of Sale is, therefore, void for being absolutely simulated pursuant to Article 1409 (2) of the Civil Code which provides: Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning: xxx (2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious; xxx For guidance, the following are the most fundamental characteristics of void or inexistent contracts: 1) As a general rule, they produce no legal effects whatsoever in accordance with the principle "quod nullum est nullum producit effectum." 2)They are not susceptible of ratification. 3) The right to set up the defense of inexistence or absolute nullity cannot be waived or renounced. 4)The action or defense for the declaration of their inexistence or absolute nullity is imprescriptible. 5) The inexistence or absolute nullity of a contract cannot be invoked by a person whose interests are not directly affected.[22] Since the Deed of Sale is void, the subject properties were properly included in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of the estate of Alfonso. Absence and Inadequacy of Consideration The second presumption is rebutted by the lack of consideration for the Deed of Sale. In their Answer,[23] the Heirs of Alfonso initially argued that the Deed of Sale was void for lack of consideration, and even granting that there was consideration, such was inadequate. The Heirs of Policronio counter that the defenses of absence or inadequacy of consideration are not grounds to render a contract void. The Heirs of Policronio contended that under Article 1470 of the Civil Code, gross inadequacy of the price does not affect a contract of sale, except as it may indicate a defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or some other act or contract. Citing jurisprudence, they argued that inadequacy of monetary consideration does not render a conveyance inexistent as liberality may be sufficient cause for a valid contract, whereas fraud or bad faith may render it either rescissible or voidable, although valid until annulled.[24] Thus, they argued that if the contract suffers from inadequate consideration, it remains valid until annulled, and the remedy of rescission calls for judicial intervention, which remedy the Heirs of Alfonso

failed to take. It is further argued that even granting that the sale of the subject lands for a consideration of ?2,000.00 was inadequate, absent any evidence of the fair market value of the land at the time of its sale, it cannot be concluded that the price at which it was sold was inadequate.[25] As there is nothing in the records to show that the Heirs of Alfonso supplied the true value of the land in 1969, the amount of ?2,000.00 must thus stand as its saleable value. On this issue, the Court finds for the Heirs of Alfonso. For lack of consideration, the Deed of Sale is once again found to be void. It states that Policronio paid, and Alfonso received, the P2,000.00 purchase price on the date of the signing of the contract: That I, ALFONSO F. URETA, x x x for and in consideration of the sum of TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to me in handpaid by POLICRONIO M. URETA, x x x, do hereby CEDE, TRANSFER, and CONVEY, by way of absolute sale, x x x six (6) parcels of land x x x.[26] [Emphasis ours] Although, on its face, the Deed of Sale appears to be supported by valuable consideration, the RTC found that there was no money involved in the sale.[27] This finding was affirmed by the CA in ruling that the sale is void for being absolutely simulated. Considering that there is no cogent reason to deviate from such factual findings, they are binding on this Court. It is well-settled in a long line of cases that where a deed of sale states that the purchase price has been paid but in fact has never been paid, the deed of sale is null and void for lack of consideration.[28] Thus, although the contract states that the purchase price of ?2,000.00 was paid by Policronio to Alfonso for the subject properties, it has been proven that such was never in fact paid as there was no money involved. It must, therefore, follow that the Deed of Sale is void for lack of consideration. Given that the Deed of Sale is void, it is unnecessary to discuss the issue on the inadequacy of consideration. Parol Evidence and Hearsay The Heirs of Policronio aver that the rules on parol evidence and hearsay were violated by the CA in ruling that the Deed of Sale was void. They argued that based on the parol evidence rule, the Heirs of Alfonso and, specifically, Amparo Castillo, were not in a position to prove the terms outside of the contract because they were not parties nor successors-in-interest in the Deed of Sale in question. Thus, it is argued that the testimony of Amparo Castillo violates the parol evidence rule. Stemming from the presumption that the Heirs of Alfonso were not parties to the contract, it is also argued that the parol evidence rule may not be properly invoked by either party in the litigation against the other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby.[29] Their arguments are untenable. The objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at the proper time, as soon as the grounds therefor become reasonably apparent, and if not so made, it will be understood to have been waived. In the case of testimonial evidence, the objection must be made when the objectionable question is asked or after the answer is given if the objectionable features become apparent only by reason of such answer.[30] In this case, the Heirs of Policronio failed to timely object to the testimony of Amparo Castillo and they are, thus, deemed to have waived the benefit of the parol evidence rule.

Granting that the Heirs of Policronio timely objected to the testimony of Amparo Castillo, their argument would still fail. Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. -- When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading: (a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; (b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto; (c) The validity of the written agreement; or (d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement. The term "agreement" includes wills. [Emphasis ours] Paragraphs (b) and (c) are applicable in the case at bench. The failure of the Deed of Sale to express the true intent and agreement of the parties was clearly put in issue in the Answer[31] of the Heirs of Alfonso to the Complaint. It was alleged that the Deed of Sale was only made to lessen the payment of estate and inheritance taxes and not meant to transfer ownership. The exception in paragraph (b) is allowed to enable the court to ascertain the true intent of the parties, and once the intent is clear, it shall prevail over what the document appears to be on its face.[32] As the true intent of the parties was duly proven in the present case, it now prevails over what appears on the Deed of Sale. The validity of the Deed of Sale was also put in issue in the Answer, and was precisely one of the issues submitted to the RTC for resolution.[33] The operation of the parol evidence rule requires the existence of a valid written agreement. It is, thus, not applicable in a proceeding where the validity of such agreement is the fact in dispute, such as when a contract may be void for lack of consideration.[34] Considering that the Deed of Sale has been shown to be void for being absolutely simulated and for lack of consideration, the Heirs of Alfonso are not precluded from presenting evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement. The Heirs of Policronio must be in a state of confusion in arguing that the Heirs of Alfonso may not question the Deed of Sale for not being parties or successors-in-interest therein on the basis that the parol evidence rule may not be properly invoked in a proceeding or litigation where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby. If their argument was to be accepted, then the Heirs of Policronio would themselves be precluded from invoking the parol evidence rule to exclude the evidence of the Heirs of Alfonso. Indeed, the applicability of the parol evidence rule requires that the case be between parties and their successors-in-interest.[35] In this case, both the Heirs of Alfonso and the Heirs of Policronio are successorsin-interest of the parties to the Deed of Sale as they claim rights under Alfonso and Policronio,

respectively. The parol evidence rule excluding evidence aliunde, however, still cannot apply because the present case falls under two exceptions to the rule, as discussed above. With respect to hearsay, the Heirs of Policronio contended that the rule on hearsay was violated when the testimony of Amparo Castillo was given weight in proving that the subject lands were only sold for taxation purposes as she was a person alien to the contract. Even granting that they did not object to her testimony during trial, they argued that it should not have been appreciated by the CA because it had no probative value whatsoever.[36] The Court disagrees. It has indeed been held that hearsay evidence whether objected to or not cannot be given credence for having no probative value.[37] This principle, however, has been relaxed in cases where, in addition to the failure to object to the admissibility of the subject evidence, there were other pieces of evidence presented or there were other circumstances prevailing to support the fact in issue. In Top-Weld Manufacturing, Inc. v. ECED S.A.,[38] this Court held: Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in an injunction suit (Parker v. Furlong, 62 P. 490) but, when no objection is made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be considered and given the importance it deserves. (Smith v. Delaware & Atlantic Telegraph & Telephone Co., 51 A 464). Although we should warn of the undesirability of issuing judgments solely on the basis of the affidavits submitted, where as here, said affidavits are overwhelming, uncontroverted by competent evidence and not inherently improbable, we are constrained to uphold the allegations of the respondents regarding the multifarious violations of the contracts made by the petitioner. In the case at bench, there were other prevailing circumstances which corroborate the testimony of Amparo Castillo. First, the other Deeds of Sale which were executed in favor of Liberato, Prudencia, and Valeriana on the same day as that of Policronio's were all presented in evidence. Second, all the properties subject therein were included in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of the estate of Alfonso. Third, Policronio, during his lifetime, never exercised acts of ownership over the subject properties (as he never demanded or took possession of them, never demanded or received the produce thereof, and never paid real estate taxes thereon). Fourth, Policronio never informed his children of the sale. As the Heirs of Policronio failed to controvert the evidence presented, and to timely object to the testimony of Amparo Castillo, both the RTC and the CA correctly accorded probative weight to her testimony. Prior Action Unnecessary The Heirs of Policronio averred that the Heirs of Alfonso should have filed an action to declare the sale void prior to executing the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition. They argued that the sale should enjoy the presumption of regularity, and until overturned by a court, the Heirs of Alfonso had no authority to include the land in the inventory of properties of Alfonso's estate. By doing so, they arrogated upon themselves the power of invalidating the Deed of Sale which is exclusively vested in a court of law which, in turn, can rule only upon the observance of due process. Thus, they contended that prescription, laches, or estoppel have set in to militate against assailing the validity of the sale. The Heirs of Policronio are mistaken. A simulated contract of sale is without any cause or consideration, and is, therefore, null and void; in such case, no independent action to rescind or annul the contract is necessary, and it may be treated as nonexistent for all purposes.[39] A void or inexistent contract is one which has no force and effect from the beginning, as if it has never been entered into, and which cannot be validated either by time or ratification. A void contract produces no effect whatsoever either against or in favor of anyone; it does not create, modify or extinguish the juridical relation to which it refers.[40]Therefore, it was not necessary for the Heirs

of Alfonso to first file an action to declare the nullity of the Deed of Sale prior to executing the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition. Personality to Question Sale The Heirs of Policronio contended that the Heirs of Alfonso are not parties, heirs, or successors-in-interest under the contemplation of law to clothe them with the personality to question the Deed of Sale. They argued that under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs. Thus, the genuine character of a contract which personally binds the parties cannot be put in issue by a person who is not a party thereto. They posited that the Heirs of Alfonso were not parties to the contract; neither did they appear to be beneficiaries by way of assignment or inheritance. Unlike themselves who are direct heirs of Policronio, the Heirs of Alfonso are not Alfonso's direct heirs. For the Heirs of Alfonso to qualify as parties, under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, they must first prove that they are either heirs or assignees. Being neither, they have no legal standing to question the Deed of Sale. They further argued that the sale cannot be assailed for being barred under Article 1421 of the Civil Code which provides that the defense of illegality of a contract is not available to third persons whose interests are not directly affected. Again, the Court disagrees. Article 1311 and Article 1421 of the Civil Code provide: Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, x x x Art. 1421. The defense of illegality of contracts is not available to third persons whose interests are not directly affected. The right to set up the nullity of a void or non-existent contract is not limited to the parties, as in the case of annullable or voidable contracts; it is extended to third persons who are directly affected by the contract. Thus, where a contract is absolutely simulated, even third persons who may be prejudiced thereby may set up its inexistence.[41] The Heirs of Alfonso are the children of Alfonso, with his deceased children represented by their children (Alfonso's grandchildren). The Heirs of Alfonso are clearly his heirs and successors-ininterest and, as such, their interests are directly affected, thereby giving them the right to question the legality of the Deed of Sale. Inapplicability of Article 842 The Heirs of Policronio further argued that even assuming that the Heirs of Alfonso have an interest in the Deed of Sale, they would still be precluded from questioning its validity. They posited that the Heirs of Alfonso must first prove that the sale of Alfonso's properties to Policronio substantially diminished their successional rights or that their legitimes would be unduly prejudiced, considering that under Article 842 of the Civil Code, one who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided that he does not contravene the provisions of the Civil Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs. Having failed to do so, they argued that the Heirs of Alfonso should be precluded from questioning the validity of the Deed of Sale. Still, the Court disagrees. Article 842 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 842. One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.

One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs. This article refers to the principle of freedom of disposition by will. What is involved in the case at bench is not a disposition by will but by Deed of Sale. Hence, the Heirs of Alfonso need not first prove that the disposition substantially diminished their successional rights or unduly prejudiced their legitimes. Inapplicability of Article 1412 The Heirs of Policronio contended that even assuming that the contract was simulated, the Heirs of Alfonso would still be barred from recovering the properties by reason of Article 1412 of the Civil Code, which provides that if the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause does not constitute a criminal offense, and the fault is both on the contracting parties, neither may recover what he has given by virtue of the contract or demand the performance of the other's undertaking. As the Heirs of Alfonso alleged that the purpose of the sale was to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes, they cannot take from the Heirs of Policronio what had been given to their father. On this point, the Court again disagrees. Article 1412 of the Civil Code is as follows: Art. 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a criminal offense, the following rules shall be observed: (1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he has given by virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of the other's undertaking; (2) When only one of the contracting parties is at fault, he cannot recover what he has given by reason of the contract, or ask for the fulfillment of what has been promised him. The other, who is not at fault, may demand the return of what he has given without any obligation to comply with his promise. Article 1412 is not applicable to fictitious or simulated contracts, because they refer to contracts with an illegal cause or subject-matter.[42] This article presupposes the existence of a cause, it cannot refer to fictitious or simulated contracts which are in reality non-existent.[43] As it has been determined that the Deed of Sale is a simulated contract, the provision cannot apply to it. Granting that the Deed of Sale was not simulated, the provision would still not apply. Since the subject properties were included as properties of Alfonso in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, they are covered by corresponding inheritance and estate taxes. Therefore, tax evasion, if at all present, would not arise, and Article 1412 would again be inapplicable. Prescription From the position that the Deed of Sale is valid and not void, the Heirs of Policronio argued that any question regarding its validity should have been initiated through judicial process within 10 years from its notarization in accordance with Article 1144 of the Civil Code. Since 21 years had already elapsed when the Heirs of Alfonso assailed the validity of the Deed of Sale in 1996, prescription had set in. Furthermore, since the Heirs of Alfonso did not seek to nullify the tax declarations of Policronio, they had impliedly acquiesced and given due recognition to the Heirs of Policronio as the rightful inheritors and should, thus, be barred from laying claim on the land. The Heirs of Policronio are mistaken. Article 1410 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1410. The action for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. This is one of the most fundamental characteristics of void or inexistent contracts.[44] As the Deed of Sale is a void contract, the action for the declaration of its nullity, even if filed 21 years after its execution, cannot be barred by prescription for it is imprescriptible. Furthermore, the right to set up the defense of inexistence or absolute nullity cannot be waived or renounced.[45] Therefore, the Heirs of Alfonso cannot be precluded from setting up the defense of its inexistence. Validity of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition The Court now resolves the issue of the validity of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition. Unenforceability The Heirs of Alfonso argued that the CA was mistaken in annulling the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition due to the incapacity of Conrado to give the consent of his co-heirs for lack of a special power of attorney. They contended that what was involved was not the capacity to give consent in behalf of the co-heirs but the authority to represent them. They argue that the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition is not a voidable or an annullable contract under Article 1390 of the Civil Code, but rather, it is an unenforceable or, more specifically, an unauthorized contract under Articles 1403 (1) and 1317 of the Civil Code. As such, the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition should not be annulled but only be rendered unenforceable against the siblings of Conrado. They further argued that under Article 1317 of the Civil Code, when the persons represented without authority have ratified the unauthorized acts, the contract becomes enforceable and binding. They contended that the Heirs of Policronio ratified the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition when Conrado took possession of one of the parcels of land adjudicated to him and his siblings, and when another parcel was used as collateral for a loan entered into by some of the Heirs of Policronio. The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition having been ratified and its benefits accepted, the same thus became enforceable and binding upon them. The Heirs of Alfonso averred that granting arguendo that Conrado was not authorized to represent his coheirs and there was no ratification, the CA should not have remanded the case to the RTC for partition of Alfonso's estate. They argued that the CA should not have applied the Civil Code general provision on contracts, but the special provisions dealing with succession and partition. They contended that contrary to the ruling of the CA, the extra-judicial parition was not an act of strict dominion, as it has been ruled that partition of inherited land is not a conveyance but a confirmation or ratification of title or right to the land.[46] Therefore, the law requiring a special power of attorney should not be applied to partitions. On the other hand, the Heirs of Policronio insisted that the CA pronouncement on the invalidity of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition should not be disturbed because the subject properties should not have been included in the estate of Alfonso, and because Conrado lacked the written authority to represent his siblings. They argued with the CA in ruling that a special power of attorney was required before Conrado could sign in behalf of his co-heirs. The Heirs of Policronio denied that they ratified the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition. They claimed that there is nothing on record that establishes that they ratified the partition. Far from doing so, they precisely questioned its execution by filing a complaint. They further argued that under Article 1409 (3) of the Civil Code, ratification cannot be invoked to validate the illegal act of including in the partition those properties which do not belong to the estate as it provides another mode of acquiring ownership not sanctioned by law. Furthermore, the Heirs of Policronio contended that the defenses of unenforceability, ratification, and preterition are being raised for the first time on appeal by the Heirs of Alfonso. For having failed to raise

them during the trial, the Heirs of Alfonso should be deemed to have waived their right to do so. The Court agrees in part with the Heirs of Alfonso. To begin, although the defenses of unenforceability, ratification and preterition were raised by the Heirs of Alfonso for the first time on appeal, they are concomitant matters which may be taken up. As long as the questioned items bear relevance and close relation to those specifically raised, the interest of justice would dictate that they, too, must be considered and resolved. The rule that only theories raised in the initial proceedings may be taken up by a party thereto on appeal should refer to independent, not concomitant matters, to support or oppose the cause of action.[47] In the RTC, the Heirs of Policronio alleged that Conrado's consent was vitiated by mistake and undue influence, and that he signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition without the authority or consent of his coheirs. The RTC found that Conrado's credibility had faltered, and his claims were rejected by the RTC as gratuitous assertions. On the basis of such, the RTC ruled that Conrado duly represented his siblings in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition. On the other hand, the CA annulled the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition under Article 1390 (1) of the Civil Code, holding that a special power of attorney was lacking as required under Article 1878 (5) and (15) of the Civil Code. These articles are as follows: Art. 1878.Special powers of attorney are necessary in the following cases: xxx (5) To enter into any contract by which the ownership of an immovable is transmitted or acquired either gratuitously or for a valuable consideration; xxx (15) Any other act of strict dominion. Art. 1390.The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have been no damage to the contracting parties: (1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract; (2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. These contracts are binding, unless they are annulled by a proper action in court. They are susceptible of ratification. This Court finds that Article 1878 (5) and (15) is inapplicable to the case at bench. It has been held in several cases[48] that partition among heirs is not legally deemed a conveyance of real property resulting in change of ownership. It is not a transfer of property from one to the other, but rather, it is a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance. It is merely a designation and segregation of that part which belongs to each heir. The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition cannot, therefore, be considered as an act of strict dominion. Hence, a special power of attorney is not necessary. In fact, as between the parties, even an oral partition by the heirs is valid if no creditors are affected. The requirement of a written memorandum under the statute of frauds does not apply to partitions effected by

the heirs where no creditors are involved considering that such transaction is not a conveyance of property resulting in change of ownership but merely a designation and segregation of that part which belongs to each heir.[49] Neither is Article 1390 (1) applicable. Article 1390 (1) contemplates the incapacity of a party to give consent to a contract. What is involved in the case at bench though is not Conrado's incapacity to give consent to the contract, but rather his lack of authority to do so. Instead, Articles 1403 (1), 1404, and 1317 of the Civil Code find application to the circumstances prevailing in this case. They are as follows: Art. 1403.The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified: (1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers; Art. 1404.Unauthorized contracts are governed by Article 1317 and the principles of agency in Title X of this Book. Art. 1317.No one may contract in the name of another without being authorized by the latter, or unless he has by law a right to represent him. A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the other contracting party. Such was similarly held in the case of Badillo v. Ferrer: The Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale is not a voidable or an annullable contract under Article 1390 of the New Civil Code. Article 1390 renders a contract voidable if one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to the contract or if the contracting party's consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. x x x The deed of extrajudicial parition and sale is an unenforceable or, more specifically, an unauthorized contract under Articles 1403(1) and 1317 of the New Civil Code.[50] Therefore, Conrado's failure to obtain authority from his co-heirs to sign the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in their behalf did not result in his incapacity to give consent so as to render the contract voidable, but rather, it rendered the contract valid but unenforceable against Conrado's co-heirs for having been entered into without their authority. A closer review of the evidence on record, however, will show that the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition is not unenforceable but, in fact, valid, binding and enforceable against all the Heirs of Policronio for having given their consent to the contract. Their consent to the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition has been proven by a preponderance of evidence. Regarding his alleged vitiated consent due to mistake and undue influence to the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, Conrado testified, to wit: Q: Mr. Ureta you remember having signed a document entitled deed of extra judicial partition consisting of 11 pages and which have previously [been] marked as Exhibit I for the plaintiffs? A: Q: Yes sir. Can you recall where did you sign this document?

A: Q: A: Q: A:

The way I remember I signed that in our house. And who requested or required you to sign this document? My aunties. Who in particular if you can recall? Nay Pruding Panadero.

Q: You mean that this document that you signed was brought to your house by your Auntie Pruding Pa[r]adero [who] requested you to sign that document? A: When she first brought that document I did not sign that said document because I [did] no[t] know the contents of that document. Q: A: Q: A: How many times did she bring this document to you [until] you finally signed the document? Perhaps 3 times. Can you tell the court why you finally signed it? Because the way she explained it to me that the land of my grandfather will be partitioned.

Q: When you signed this document were your brothers and sisters who are your co-plaintiffs in this case aware of your act to sign this document? A: xxx Q: After you have signed this document did you inform your brothers and sisters that you have signed this document? A: xxx Q: Now you read the document when it was allegedly brought to your house by your aunt Pruding Pa[r]adero? A: Q: A: xxx Q: And why is it that you did not read all the pages of this document because I understand that you know also how to read in English? A: Because the way Nay Pruding explained to me is that the property of my grandfather will be partitioned that is why I am so happy. I did not read it because as I told her I still want to ask the advise of my brothers and sisters. So do I get from you that you have never read the document itself or any part thereof? I have read the heading. No I did not.
[51]

They do not know.

xxx Q: You mean to say that after you signed this deed of extra judicial partition up to the present you never informed them? A: Perhaps they know already that I have signed and they read already the document and they have read the document. Q: A: Q: A: My question is different, did you inform them? The document sir? I did not tell them. Even until now? Until now I did not inform them.[52]

This Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the finding of the RTC that Conrado's explanations were mere gratuitous assertions not entitled to any probative weight. The RTC found Conrado's credibility to have faltered when he testified that perhaps his siblings were already aware of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition. The RTC was in the best position to judge the credibility of the witness' testimony. The CA also recognized that Conrado's consent was not vitiated by mistake and undue influence as it required a special power of attorney in order to bind his co-heirs and, as such, the CA thereby recognized that his signature was binding to him but not with respect to his co-heirs. Findings of fact of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the CA, are binding to this Court.[53] Furthermore, this Court notes other peculiarities in Conrado's testimony. Despite claims of undue influence, there is no indication that Conrado was forced to sign by his aunt, Prudencia Paradero. In fact, he testified that he was happy to sign because his grandfather's estate would be partitioned. Conrado, thus, clearly understood the document he signed. It is also worth noting that despite the document being brought to him on three separate occasions and indicating his intention to inform his siblings about it, Conrado failed to do so, and still neglected to inform them even after he had signed the partition. All these circumstances negate his claim of vitiated consent. Having duly signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, Conrado is bound to it. Thus, it is enforceable against him. Although Conrado's co-heirs claimed that they did not authorize Conrado to sign the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in their behalf, several circumstances militate against their contention. First, the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition was executed on April 19, 1989, and the Heirs of Policronio claim that they only came to know of its existence on July 30, 1995 through an issue of the Aklan Reporter. It is difficult to believe that Conrado did not inform his siblings about the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition or at least broach its subject with them for more than five years from the time he signed it, especially after indicating in his testimony that he had intended to do so. Second, Conrado retained possession of one of the parcels of land adjudicated to him and his co-heirs in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition. Third, after the execution of the partition on April 19, 1989 and more than a year before they claimed to have discovered the existence of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition on July 30, 1995, some of the Heirs of Policronio, namely, Rita Solano, Macario Ureta, Lilia Tayco, and Venancio Ureta executed on June 1, 1994, a Special Power of Attorney[54] in favor of their sister Gloria Gonzales, authorizing her to obtain a loan from a bank and to mortgage one of the parcels of land adjudicated to them in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition to secure payment of the loan. They were able to obtain the loan using the land as collateral, over which a Real Estate Mortgage[55] was constituted. Both the Special Power of Attorney and the Real Estate Mortgage

were presented in evidence in the RTC, and were not controverted or denied by the Heirs of Policronio. Fourth, in the letter dated August 15, 1995, sent by the counsel of the Heirs of Policronio to the Heirs of Alfonso requesting for amicable settlement, there was no mention that Conrado's consent to the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition was vitiated by mistake and undue influence or that they had never authorized Conrado to represent them or sign the document on their behalf. It is questionable for such a pertinent detail to have been omitted. The body of said letter is reproduced hereunder as follows: Greetings: Your nephews and nieces, children of your deceased brother Policronio Ureta, has referred to me for appropriate legal action the property they inherited from their father consisting of six (6) parcels of land which is covered by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 25, 1969. These properties ha[ve] already been transferred to the name of their deceased father immediately after the sale, machine copy of the said Deed of Sale is hereto attached for your ready reference. Lately, however, there was published an Extra-judicial Partition of the estate of Alfonso Ureta, which to the surprise of my clients included the properties already sold to their father before the death of said Alfonso Ureta. This inclusion of their property is erroneous and illegal because these properties were covered by the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of their father Policronio Ureta no longer form part of the estate of Alfonso Ureta. Since Policronio Ureta has [sic] died in 1974 yet, these properties have passed by hereditary succession to his children who are now the true and lawful owners of the said properties. My clients are still entitled to a share in the estate of Alfonso Ureta who is also their grandfather as they have stepped into the shoes of their deceased father Policronio Ureta. But this estate of Alfonso Ureta should already exclude the six (6) parcels of land covered by the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Policronio Ureta. My clients cannot understand why the properties of their late father [should] be included in the estate of their grandfather and be divided among his brothers and sisters when said properties should only be divided among themselves as children of Policronio Ureta. Since this matter involves very close members of the same family, I have counseled my clients that an earnest effort towards a compromise or amicable settlement be first explored before resort to judicial remedy is pursued. And a compromise or amicable settlement can only be reached if all the parties meet and discuss the problem with an open mind. To this end, I am suggesting a meeting of the parties on September 16, 1995 at 2:00 P.M. at B Place Restaurant at C. Laserna St., Kalibo, Aklan. It would be best if the parties can come or be represented by their duly designated attorney-in-fact together with their lawyers if they so desire so that the problem can be discussed unemotionally and intelligently. I would, however, interpret the failure to come to the said meeting as an indication that the parties are not willing to or interested in amicable settlement of this matter and as a go signal for me to resort to legal and/or judicial remedies to protest the rights of my clients. Thank you very much.[56] Based on the foregoing, this Court concludes that the allegation of Conrado's vitiated consent and lack of authority to sign in behalf of his co-heirs was a mere afterthought on the part of the Heirs of Policronio. It appears that the Heirs of Policronio were not only aware of the existence of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition prior to June 30, 1995 but had, in fact, given Conrado authority to sign in their behalf. They are now estopped from questioning its legality, and the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition is valid, binding, and enforceable against them. In view of the foregoing, there is no longer a need to discuss the issue of ratification.

Preterition The Heirs of Alfonso were of the position that the absence of the Heirs of Policronio in the partition or the lack of authority of their representative results, at the very least, in their preterition and not in the invalidity of the entire deed of partition. Assuming there was actual preterition, it did not render the Deed of ExtraJudicial Partition voidable. Citing Article 1104 of the Civil Code, they aver that a partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, but the heirs shall be proportionately obliged to pay the share of the person omitted. Thus, the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition should not have been annulled by the CA. Instead, it should have ordered the share of the heirs omitted to be given to them. The Heirs of Alfonso also argued that all that remains to be adjudged is the right of the preterited heirs to represent their father, Policronio, and be declared entitled to his share. They contend that remand to the RTC is no longer necessary as the issue is purely legal and can be resolved by the provisions of the Civil Code for there is no dispute that each of Alfonso's heirs received their rightful share. Conrado, who received Policronio's share, should then fully account for what he had received to his other co-heirs and be directed to deliver their share in the inheritance. These arguments cannot be given credence. Their posited theory on preterition is no longer viable. It has already been determined that the Heirs of Policronio gave their consent to the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and they have not been excluded from it. Nonetheless, even granting that the Heirs of Policronio were denied their lawful participation in the partition, the argument of the Heirs of Alfonso would still fail. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code is as follows: Art. 854.The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation. Preterition has been defined as the total omission of a compulsory heir from the inheritance. It consists in the silence of the testator with regard to a compulsory heir, omitting him in the testament, either by not mentioning him at all, or by not giving him anything in the hereditary property but without expressly disinheriting him, even if he is mentioned in the will in the latter case.[57] Preterition is thus a concept of testamentary succession and requires a will. In the case at bench, there is no will involved. Therefore, preterition cannot apply. Remand Unnecessary The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition is in itself valid for complying with all the legal requisites, as found by the RTC, to wit: A persual of the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition would reveal that all the heirs and children of Alfonso Ureta were represented therein; that nobody was left out; that all of them received as much as the others as their shares; that it distributed all the properties of Alfonso Ureta except a portion of parcel 29 containing an area of 14,000 square meters, more or less, which was expressly reserved; that Alfonso Ureta, at the time of his death, left no debts; that the heirs of Policronio Ureta, Sr. were represented by Conrado B. Ureta; all the parties signed the document, was witnessed and duly acknowledged before Notary Public Adolfo M. Iligan of Kalibo, Aklan; that the document expressly stipulated that the heirs to whom some of the properties were transferred before for taxation purposes or their children, expressly recognize and acknowledge as a fact that the properties were transferred only for the purpose of effective administration and development

convenience in the payment of taxes and, therefore, all instruments conveying or effecting the transfer of said properties are null and void from the beginning (Exhs. 1-4, 7-d).[58] Considering that the Deed of Sale has been found void and the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition valid, with the consent of all the Heirs of Policronio duly given, there is no need to remand the case to the court of origin for partition. WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 165748 is DENIED. The petition in G.R. No. 165930 is GRANTED. The assailed April 20, 2004 Decision and October 14, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71399, are hereby MODIFIEDin this wise: (1) The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, dated April 19, 1989, is VALID, and (2) The order to remand the case to the court of origin is hereby DELETED. SO ORDERED. Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Abad, and Sereno,* JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 153736 August 12, 2010

SPOUSES NICANOR TUMBOKON (deceased), substituted by: ROSARIO SESPEE and their Children, namely: NICANOR S. TUMBOKON, JR., NELIA S. TUMBOKON, NEMIA T. SEGOVIA, NOBELLA S. TUMBOKON, NABIGAIL T. TAAY, NAZARENE T. MONTALVO, NORGEL S. TUMBOKON, NEYSA S. TUMBOKON, SILVESTRE S. TUMBOKON, NORA T. MILCZAREK, NONITA T. CARPIO, NERLYN S. TUMBOKON, and NINFA T. SOLIDUM, Petitioners, vs. APOLONIA G. LEGASPI, and PAULINA S. DE MAGTANUM, Respondents. DECISION BERSAMIN, J.: The question presented in this appeal is whether the ruling in a criminal prosecution for qualified theft (involving coconut fruits) bound the complainant (petitioners herein) and the accused (respondents herein) on the issue of ownership of the land, which was brought up as a defense, as to preclude the Regional Trial Court (RTC) or the Court of Appeals (CA) from adjudicating the same issue in a civil case filed prior to the promulgation of the decision in the criminal case. Under contention herein are the ownership and possession of that parcel of land with an area of 12,480 square meters, more or less, situated in Barangay Buenavista (formerly Barangay San Isidro, in the Municipality of Ibajay, Province of Aklan. The land planted to rice, corn, and coconuts was originally owned by the late Alejandra Sespee (Alejandra), who had had two marriages. The first

marriage was to Gaudencio Franco, by whom she bore Ciriaca Franco, whose husband was Victor Miralles. The second marriage was to Jose Garcia, by whom she bore respondent Apolonia Garcia (Apolonia), who married Primo Legaspi. Alejandra died without a will in 1935, and was survived by Apolonia and Crisanto Miralles, the son of Ciriaca (who had predeceased Alejandra in 1924) and Victor Miralles; hence, Crisanto Miralles was Alejandras grandson. The ownership and possession of the parcel of land became controversial after Spouses Nicanor Tumbokon and Rosario Sespee (petitioners) asserted their right in it by virtue of their purchase of it from Cresenciana Inog, who had supposedly acquired it by purchase from Victor Miralles. The tugof-war over the property between the petitioners and the respondents first led to the commencement of a criminal case. The Spouses Nicanor Tumbokon and Rosario Sespee filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft against respondents Apolonia and Paulina S. Magtanum and others not parties herein, namely: Rosendo Magtanum, Antonio Magtanum, Ulpiano Mangilaya, charging them with stealing coconut fruits from the land subject of the present case.1 The criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2269, was assigned to Branch III of the erstwhile Court of First Instance (CFI) of Aklan.2 After trial, the CFI found the respondents and their co-accused guilty as charged in its decision dated June 10, 1972. The respondents appealed (C.A.-G.R. No. 13830-CR), but the CA affirmed their conviction on February 19, 1975, whereby the CA rejected respondent Apolonias defense of ownership of the land.3 In the meanwhile, on September 21, 1972, or prior to the CAs rendition of its decision in the criminal case, the petitioners commenced this suit for recovery of ownership and possession of real property with damages against the respondents in the CFI. This suit, docketed as Civil Case No. 240 and entitled Spouses Nicanor P. Tumbokon and Rosario S. Sespee v. Apolonia G. Legaspi, Jesus Legaspi, Alejandra Legaspi, Primo Legaspi, Jose Legaspi, and Paulina S. de Magtanum, was assigned also to Branch III of the CFI, and involved the same parcel of land from where the coconut fruits subject of the crime of qualified theft in Criminal Case No. 2269 had been taken. On February 17, 1994, the RTC, which meanwhile replaced the CFI following the implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization Act,4 rendered its decision in favor of the petitioners herein, holding and disposing thus: After a careful study of the evidence on record, the Court finds that the plaintiffs were able to establish that plaintiff Rosario Sespee Tumbokon purchased the land in question from Cresenciana Inog on December 31, 1959 (Exh. "C"). Cresenciana Inog, in turn, acquired the land by purchase from Victor Miralles on June 19, 1957 (Exh. "B"). Seven (7) years before, on May 8, 1950, the land was mortgaged by Victor Miralles to Cresenciana Inog as shown by a Deed of Pacto de Retro (Exh. "A"), and from 1950 up to 1959, Cresenciana Inog was in continuous and peaceful possession of the land in question. xxx xxxx WHEREFORE, finding preponderance of evidence in favor of the plaintiffs, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: 1. The plaintiffs are hereby declared the true and lawful owners, and entitled to the possession of the parcel of land of 12,480 square meters in area, declared in the name of plaintiff Rosario S. Tumbokon, under Tax Declaration No. 29220, situated in Barangay Buenavista (formerly San Isidro), Ibajay, Aklan;

2. The defendants are ordered and directed to vacate the land in question, and restore and deliver the possession thereof to the plaintiffs; and 3. No pronouncement as to damages, but with costs against the defendants. SO ORDERED.5 The respondents appealed to the CA. On May 15, 2001, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and dismissed the complaint,6 opining and ruling thus: The appellees trace their acquisition of the subject lot to the admitted primal owner Alejandra Sespee through her supposed sale of it to her son-in-law Victor Miralles, who sold this to Cresenciana Inog, and who in turn sold it to the appellees. In the process, they presented the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. "B", June 19, 1957) executed by Victor Miralles in favor of Cresenciana Inog but wherein it is provided in the said instrument that: That this parcel of land abovementioned was inherited from the deceased Alejandra Sespee, by the party of the First Part being the sole heir of the said Alejandra Sespee, having no other brothers or sisters. This claim of being the sole heir is obviously false and erroneous for Alejandra Sespee had more than one intestate heir, and Victor Miralles as a mere son-in-law could not be one of them. This also damages and puts to serious doubt their other and contradictory claim that Victor Miralles instead bought the lot from Alejandra Sespee. This supposed sale was oral, one that can of course be facilely feigned. And it is likely to be so for the claim is sweeping, vacuous and devoid of the standard particulars like what was the price, when and where was the sale made, who were present, or who knew of it. The record is bereft too of documentary proof that Victor Miralles exercised the rights and performed the obligations of an owner for no tax declarations nor tax receipt has been submitted or even adverted to. The testimonial evidence of the appellants as to ownership, the sale and possession is inadequate, with even the appellant Nicanor Tumbokon stating that: Q Did you come to know before you purchase (sic) the property from whom did V. Miralles acquired (sic) the land? A No, sir. xxx Q And you did not come to know out (sic) and why V. Miralles came to possess the land under litigation before it was sold to C. Inog? A All I was informed was V. Miralles became automatically the heir of A. Sespee after the death of the wife which is the only daughter of A. Sespee. Q How did you know that V. Miralles became automatically the heir of the land after the death of his wife?

A He is the only son-in-law. (TSN, pp. 2-3, Feb. 26, 1974; emphasis supplied) While Victor Miralles may have been in physical possession of the lot for a while, this was not as owner but as mere Administrator as was clearly appearing in tax declaration no. 21714 ("Exhs. "J", "1").The corroboration in this by Lourdes Macawili (TSN, June 7, 1973) does not help the appellees (herein petitioners) any for she never knew the source of the property. Neither does the testimony of Crisanto Miralles succor the appellees (petitioners). He was the son of Victor Miralles and the husband of the said Cresenciana Inog, the supposed buyer, owner and possessor of the land in question from 1950-1957, and yet Crisanto Miralles could only say: Q Are there improvements on the land in question? A I do not know because I did not bother to go to the land in question.(TSN, p. 4, Aug. 18, 1973; emphasis supplied)] These strongly suggest that the sales and claim of possession were shams, and are further demolished by the following testimonies: Q After the death of Alejandra Sespee who inherited this land in question? A Apolonia. Q At present who is in possession of the land in question? A Apolonia Legaspi. Q From the time that Apolonia Legaspi took possession of the land up to the present do you know if anybody interrupted her possession? A No sir. (tsn, Urbana Ta-an Vda. de Franco, p. 7, Nov. 24, 1977) xxx Q Now, since when did you know the land in question? A Since I was at the age of 20 yrs. old. (TSN; Crispina Taladtad, p. 3; Jan. 20, 1977; [she was 74 yrs. old at the time of this testimony]). xxx Q And for how long has Apolonia Garcia Legaspi been in possession of the land in question? A Since the time I was at the age of 20 yrs. old when I was been (sic) invited there to work up to the present she is in possession of the land. Q You said that you know Cresenciana Inog, do you know if Cresenciana Inog has ever possessed the land in question? A Never.

Q You also said that you know Nicanor Tumbokon and his wife Rosario Tumbokon, my question is do you know if this Nicanor Tumbokon and his wife Rosario have ever possessed and usufructed this land under litigation? A No, sir. Q You also stated a while ago that you know Victor Miralles, do you know if Victor Miralles had ever possessed this under litigation? A No, he had not. (p. 9, ibid; emphasis supplied) Thus neither do We buy the appellees contention that ownership of the disputed land was acquired by their predecessors-in-interest thru lapse of time. Acquisitive prescription requires possession in the concept of owner, and they have not been able to prove even mere possession. As proponents it was incumbent upon the appellees to prove that they were the owners of the lot and that they were being unlawfully deprived of their possession thereof. But this they failed to do. It is a basic rule in evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation. Since the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts the affirmative allegation, the plaintiff or complainant has to prove this affirmative allegations in the complaint and the defendant or the respondent has to prove the affirmative allegation in his affirmative defenses and counterclaim.(AKELCO vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 121439, Jan 25,2000) But this hoary rule also cuts both ways. Appellants too must also prove the allegations to support their prayer to declare the litigated lot the exclusive property of the defendants Apolonia G. Legaspi and Paulina S. Magtanum;(Answer, p. 6, record). Apolonia Legaspi however is only one of the putative intestate heirs of Alejandra Sespee, the other being Crisanto Miralles who stands in the stead of Ciriaca, his predeceased mother and other daughter of the decedent. But then no judgment can be made as to their successional rights for Crisanto Miralles was never impleaded. Neither is there a proof that can convince that Paulina S. Magtanum who is merely a niece of the decedent, should also be declared a co-owner of the inherited lot. Because of said inadequacies, We cannot rule beyond the holding that the appellees (petitioners) are not the owners and therefore not entitled to the recovery of the litigated lot. WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in its place judgment is rendered DISMISSING the Complaint. SO ORDERED.7 Hence, the petitioners appeal by petition for review on certiorari. Issues The issues to be resolved are the following: 1. Whether or not the decision in C.A.-G.R. CV 45672 reversing the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 240 was supported by law and the evidence on record; 2. Whether or not the decision in C.A.-G.R. No. 13830-CR affirming the decision of the CFI of Aklan in Criminal Case No. 2269 had the effect of res judicata on the issue of ownership of

the land involved in Civil Case No. 240, considering that such land was the same land involved in Criminal Case No. 2269. Ruling The petition has no merit. A Reversal by the CA was supported by law and the evidence on record The CA correctly found that the petitioners claim of ownership could not be legally and factually sustained. First of all, the petitioners adduced no competent evidence to establish that Victor Miralles, the transferor of the land to Cresenciana Inog (the petitioners immediate predecessor in interest) had any legal right in the first place to transfer ownership. He was not himself an heir of Alejandra, being only her son-in-law (as the husband of Ciriaca, one of Alejandras two daughters). Thus, the statement in the deed of absolute sale (Exhibit B) entered into between Victor Miralles and Cresenciana Inog, to the effect that the "parcel of land was inherited from the deceased Alejandra Sespee" by Victor Miralles "being the sole heir of the said Alejandra Sespee, having no other brothers or sisters," was outrightly false. Secondly, a decedents compulsory heirs in whose favor the law reserves a part of the decedents estate are exclusively the persons enumerated in Article 887, Civil Code, viz: Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs: (1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants; (2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and descendants; (3) The widow or widower; (4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction; (5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287. Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another. In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved. The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code. (807a)

Only two forced heirs survived Alejandra upon her death, namely: respondent Apolonia, her daughter, and Crisanto Miralles, her grandson. The latter succeeded Alejandra by right of representation because his mother, Ciriaca, had predeceased Alejandra. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if she were living or if she could have inherited.8 Herein, the representative (Crisanto Miralles) was called to the succession by law and not by the person represented (Ciriaca); he thus succeeded Alejandra, not Ciriaca.9 The foregoing undeniable facts rendered the hearsay testimony of Nicanor Tumbokon to the effect that he had been informed that Victor Miralles had "bec[o]me automatically the heir" of Alejandra "after the death of his wife," the wife being "the only daughter" and he "the only son-in-law" a plain irrelevancy. Thirdly, Victor Miralles supposed acquisition of the land by oral sale from Alejandra had no competent factual support in the records. For one, the oral sale was incompatible with the petitioners anchor claim that he had acquired the land by inheritance from Alejandra. Also, the evidence that the petitioners adduced on the oral sale was insufficient and incredible, warranting the CAs rejection of the oral sale under the following terms: This also damages and puts to serious doubt their other and contradictory claim that Victor Miralles instead bought the lot from Alejandra Sespee. This supposed sale was oral, one that can of course be facilely feigned. And it is likely to be so for the claim is sweeping, vacuous and devoid of the standard particulars like what was the price, when and where was the sale made, who were present, or who knew of it. The record is bereft too of documentary proof that Victor Miralles exercised the rights and performed the obligations of an owner for no tax declarations nor tax receipt has been submitted or even adverted to.10 With Victor Miralles lacking any just and legal right in the land, except as an heir of Ciriaca, the transfer of the land from him to Cresenciana Inog was ineffectual. As a consequence, Cresenciana Inog did not legally acquire the land, and, in turn, did not validly transfer it to the petitioners. B Bar by res judicata is not applicable. The petitioners submit that the final ruling in the criminal case had already determined the issue of ownership of the land; and that such ruling in the criminal case barred the issue of ownership in the civil case under the doctrine of res judicata. The submission has no merit. Res judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.11 The doctrine of res judicata is an old axiom of law, dictated by wisdom and sanctified by age, and founded on the broad principle that it is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the same parties over a subject once fully and fairly adjudicated. It has been appropriately said that the doctrine is a rule pervading every well-regulated system of jurisprudence, and is put upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law: the one, public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation reipublicae ut sit finis litium; the other, the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for one and the same cause nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa. A contrary doctrine will subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and

prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquillity and happiness.12 Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits and on all points and matters determined in the previous suit.13 The foundation principle upon which the doctrine rests is that the parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.14 For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and second actions (a) identity of parties, (b) identity of the subject matter, and (c) identity of cause of action.15
1avv ph!1

The doctrine of res judicata has two aspects: the first, known as bar by prior judgment, or estoppel by verdict, is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action; the second, known as conclusiveness of judgment, also known as the rule of auter action pendant, ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action and has the effect of preclusion of issues only.16 Based on the foregoing standards, this action is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata. First of all, bar by prior judgment, the first aspect of the doctrine, is not applicable, because the causes of action in the civil and the criminal actions were different and distinct from each other. The civil action is for the recovery of ownership of the land filed by the petitioners, while the criminal action was to determine whether the act of the respondents of taking the coconut fruits from the trees growing within the disputed land constituted the crime of qualified theft. In the former, the main issue is the legal ownership of the land, but in the latter, the legal ownership of the land was not the main issue. The issue of guilt or innocence was not dependent on the ownership of the land, inasmuch as a person could be guilty of theft of the growing fruits even if he were the owner of the land. Conclusiveness of judgment is not also applicable. The petitioners themselves commenced both actions, and fully and directly participated in the trial of both actions. Any estoppel from assailing the authority of the CA to determine the ownership of the land based on the evidence presented in the civil action applied only to the petitioners, who should not be allowed to assail the outcome of the civil action after the CA had ruled adversely against them. Moreover, the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment is subject to exceptions, such as where there is a change in the applicable legal context, or to avoid inequitable administration of justice.17 Applying the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgments to this case will surely be iniquitous to the respondents who have rightly relied on the civil case, not on the criminal case, to settle the issue of ownership of the land. This action for recovery of ownership was brought precisely to settle the issue of ownership of the property. In contrast, the pronouncement on ownership of the land made in the criminal case was only the response to the respondents having raised the ownership as a matter of defense.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is denied, and the decision rendered on May 15, 2001 by the Court of Appeals is affirmed. Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioners. SO ORDERED. LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice WE CONCUR:

SECOND DIVISION

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF CRISTINA AGUINALDOSUNTAY; EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 183053 Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson, NACHURA, - versus PERALTA, ABAD, and PEREZ,* JJ.

ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, Respondent.

Promulgated:

June 16, 2010

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Unlike Pope Alexander VI[1] who, faced with the impasse between Spain and Portugal, deftly and literally divided the exploration, or more appropriately, the riches of the New World by issuing the Inter Caetera,[2] we are confronted with the difficult, albeit, all too familiar tale of another family imbroglio over the estate of a decedent.[3] This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949,[4] reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95.[5]

Before anything else, we disentangle the facts.

On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina), married to Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico), died intestate. In 1979, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina and Federico. At the time of her death, Cristina was survived by her husband, Federico, and several grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay.

During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they begot three children, namely: herein respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and Emilio II, all surnamed Cojuangco-Suntay. Emilio Is marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was subsequently annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had two children out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita Suntay Taedo (Nenita), by two different women, Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel Santos, respectively.

Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was reared ever since he was a mere baby, nine months old, by the spouses Federico and Cristina and was an acknowledged natural child of Emilio I. Nenita is an acknowledged natural child of Emilio I and was likewise brought up by the spouses Federico and Cristina.

As previously adverted to, the marriage between Emilio I and Isabel was annulled.[6] Consequently, respondent and her siblings Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their mother on Balete Drive, Quezon City, separately from their father and paternal grandparents.

Parenthetically, after the death of Emilio I, Federico filed a petition for visitation rights over his grandchildren: respondent Isabel, Margarita, and Emilio II. Although the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in Quezon City granted the petition and allowed Federico one hour of visitation monthly, initially reduced to thirty minutes, it was altogether stopped because of a manifestation filed by respondent Isabel, articulating her sentiments on the unwanted visits of her grandparents.

Significantly, Federico, after the death of his spouse, Cristina, or on September 27, 1993, adopted their illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.[7]

On October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor, containing the following allegations:

*A+t the time of *the decedents+ death, *she+ was a resident of the Municipality of Hagonoy, Province of Bulacan; that the [decedent] left an estate of real and personal properties, with a probable gross value of P29,000,000.00; that the names, ages and residences of the surviving heirs of the [decedent] are: (1) Federico C. Suntay, 89 years old, surviving spouse and a resident of x x x; (2) Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, 36 years old, legitimate granddaughter and a resident of x x x; (3) Margarita Cojuangco-Suntay, 39 years old, legitimate granddaughter and a resident of x x x; and (4) Emilio CojuangcoSuntay, 35 years old, legitimate grandson and a resident of x x x; and that as far as [respondent] knew, the decedent left no debts or obligation at the time of her death.[8]

Disavowing the allegations in the petition of his grandchild, respondent Isabel, Federico filed his opposition on December 21, 1995, alleging, among others, that:

[B]eing the surviving spouse of Cristina, he is capable of administering her estate and he should be the one appointed as its administrator; that as part owner of the mass of conjugal properties left by Cristina, he must be accorded legal preference in the administration thereof; that Isabel and her family had been alienated from their grandparents for more than thirty (30) years; that the enumeration of heirs in the petition was incomplete as it did not mention the other children of his son[,] namely: Emilio III and Nenita S. Taedo; that he is better situated to protect the integrity of the estate of Cristina as even before the death of his wife[,] he was already the one who managed their conjugal properties; that the probable value of the estate as stated in the petition was grossly overstated (sic); and that Isabels allegation that some of the properties are in the hands of usurpers is untrue.[9]

Meanwhile, after a failed attempt by the parties to settle the proceedings amicably, Federico filed a Manifestation dated March 13, 1999, nominating his adopted son, Emilio III, as administrator of the decedents estate on his behalf, in

the event he would be adjudged as the one with a better right to the letters of administration.

Subsequently, the trial court granted Emilio IIIs Motion for Leave to Intervene considering his interest in the outcome of the case. Emilio III filed his Opposition-In-Intervention, which essentially echoed the allegations in his grandfathers opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent to administer and manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina. Additionally, Emilio III averred his own qualifications that: *he+ is presently engaged in aquaculture and banking; he was trained by the decedent to work in his early age by involving him in the activities of the Emilio Aguinaldo Foundation which was established in 1979 in memory of her grandmothers father; the significant work experiences outside the family group are included in his curriculum vitae; he was employed by the oppositor [Federico] after his graduation in college with management degree at F.C.E. Corporations and Hagonoy Rural Bank; x x x.[10]

In the course of the proceedings, on November 13, 2000, Federico died.

After the testimonies of both parties witnesses were heard and evidence on their respective allegations were adduced, the trial court rendered a decision on November 9, 2001, appointing herein petitioner, Emilio III, as administrator of decedent Cristinas intestate estate, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is DENIED and the Opposition[-]in[-]Intervention is GRANTED.

Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III is hereby appointed administrator of the estate of the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay, who shall enter upon the execution of his trust upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P200,000.00, conditioned as follows:

(1) inventory;

To make and return within three (3) months, a true and complete

(2) To administer the estate and to pay and discharge all debts, legatees, and charge on the same, or dividends thereon;

(3) To render a true and just account within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the court, and

(4)

To perform all orders of the Court.

Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of Administration be issued in his favor.

SO ORDERED.[11]

Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and appointed respondent as administratrix of the intestate estate of the decedent, Cristina, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed decision dated November 9, 2001 of Branch 78, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan in SPC No. 117-M-95 isREVERSED and SET ASIDE and the letters of administration issued by the said court to Emilio A.M. Suntay III, if any, are consequently revoked. Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco[]Suntay is hereby appointed administratrix of the intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. Let letters of administration be issued in her favor upon her filing of a bond in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[12]

The motion for reconsideration of Emilio III having been denied, he appeals by certiorari to this Court, raising the following issues:

A. IN THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE UNDER SECTION 6 OF RULE 78 OF THE RULES OF COURT, WHETHER ARTICLE 992 OF THE CIVIL CODE APPLIES; and

B. UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS WHERE HEREIN PETITIONER WAS REARED BY THE DECEDENT AND HER SPOUSE SINCE INFANCY, WHETHER ARTICLE 992 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE APPLIES SO AS TO BAR HIM FROM BEING APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR OF THE DECEDENTS ESTATE.[13]

In ruling against the petition of herein respondent, the RTC ratiocinated, thus:

Evidence objectively assessed and carefully evaluated, both testimonial and documentary, the court opines that it is to the best interest of the estate of the decedent and all claimants thereto, that the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay III, be appointed administrator of the estate in the above-entitled special proceedings.

Based on the evidence and demeanor of the parties in court, *respondents immediate] family and that of the decedent are apparently estranged. The root cause of which, is not for this court to ascertain nor is this the right time and the proper forum to

dwell upon. What matters most at this time is the welfare of the estate of the decedent in the light of such unfortunate and bitter estrangement.

The Court honestly believes that to appoint the petitioner would go against the wishes of the decedent who raised [Emilio III] from infancy in her home in Baguio City as her own child. Certainly, it would go against the wishes of the surviving spouse x x x who nominated [Emilio III] for appointment as administrator.

As between [respondent] and the oppositor [Federico], the latter is accorded preference as the surviving spouse under Sec 6(a), Rule 78, Rules of Court. On the basis of such preference, he vigorously opposed the appointment of the petitioner and instead nominated [Emilio III], his grandchild and adopted child. Such nomination, absent any valid and justifiable reason, should not be imperiously set aside and insouciantly ignored, even after the oppositor [Federico] has passed away, in order to give effect to the order of preference mandated by law. Moreover, from the viewpoint of the estate, the nomination of [Emilio III] appear[s] intrinsically meritorious. For the benefit of the estate and its claimants, creditors, as well as heirs, the administrator should be one who is prepared, academically and by experience, for the demands and responsibilities of the position. While [respondent], a practicing physician, is not unqualified, it is clear to the court that when it comes to management of real estate and the processing and payment of debts, [Emilio III], a businessman with an established track record as a manager has a decided edge and therefore, is in a position to better handle the preservation of the estate.[14]

In marked contrast, the CA zeroed in on Emilio IIIs status as an illegitimate child of Emilio I and, thus, barred from representing his deceased father in the estate of the latters legitimate mother, the decedent. On the whole, the CA pronounced that Emilio III, who was merely nominated by Federico, and which nomination hinged upon the latters appointment as administrator of the decedents estate, cannot be appointed as the administrator of the decedents estate for the following reasons:[15]

1. The appointment of Emilio III was subject to a suspensive condition, i.e., Federicos appointment as administrator of the estate, he being the surviving spouse of Cristina, the decedent. The death of Federico before his appointment as administrator of Cristinas estate rendered his nomination of Emilio III inoperative;

2. As between the legitimate offspring (respondent) and illegitimate offspring (Emilio III) of decedents son, Emilio I, respondent is preferred, being the next of kin referred to by Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, and entitled to share in the distribution of Cristinas estate as an heir;

3. Jurisprudence has consistently held that Article 992[16] of the Civil Code bars the illegitimate child from inheriting ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother. Thus, Emilio III, who is barred from inheriting from his grandmother, cannot be preferred over respondent in the administration of the estate of their grandmother, the decedent; and

4. Contrary to the RTCs finding, respondent is as much competent as Emilio III to administer and manage the subject estate for she possesses none of the disqualifications specified in Section 1,[17] Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.

The pivotal issue in this case turns on who, as between Emilio III and respondent, is better qualified to act as administrator of the decedents estate.

We cannot subscribe to the appellate courts ruling excluding Emilio III in the administration of the decedents undivided estate. Mistakenly, the CA glosses over several undisputed facts and circumstances:

1. The underlying philosophy of our law on intestate succession is to give preference to the wishes and presumed will of the decedent, absent a valid and effective will;

2. The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron curtain bar rule,[18] is quite the opposite scenario in the facts obtaining herein for the actual relationship between Federico and Cristina, on one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, was akin to the normal relationship of legitimate relatives;

3. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her husband, Federico, who both acknowledged him as their grandchild;

4. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of the decedent, Cristina, as forming part of their conjugal partnership of gains during the subsistence of their marriage;

5. Cristinas properties forming part of her estate are still commingled with that of her husband, Federico, because her share in the conjugal partnership, albeit terminated upon her death, remains undetermined and unliquidated; and

6. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the distribution of the latters estate as a direct heir, one degree from Federico, not simply representing his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.

From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA erred in excluding Emilio III from the administration of the decedents estate. As Federicos adopted son, Emilio IIIs interest in the estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this Court as the interest therein of respondent, considering that the CA even declared that under the law, *Federico+, being the surviving spouse, would have the right of

succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his share in the conjugal partnership. Thus, we are puzzled why the CA resorted to a strained legal reasoning Emilio IIIs nomination was subject to a suspensive condition and rendered inoperative by reason of Federicos death wholly inapplicable to the case at bar.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of preference in the appointment of an administrator of an estate:

SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.

However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends on the attendant facts and circumstances of each case.[19] Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator lies in the sound discretion of the trial court.[20] In

the main, the attendant facts and circumstances of this case necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both respondent and Emilio III of their grandmothers, Cristinas, estate.

In the case of Uy v. Court of Appeals,[21] we upheld the appointment by the trial court of a co-administration between the decedents son and the decedents brother, who was likewise a creditor of the decedents estate. In the same vein, we declared in Delgado Vda. de De la Rosa v. Heirs of Marciana Rustia Vda. de Damian[22] that:

[i]n the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates, a situation which obtains here.

Similarly, the subject estate in this case calls to the succession other putative heirs, including another illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and Federico, Nenita Taedo, but who was likewise adopted by Federico, and the two (2) siblings of respondent Isabel, Margarita and Emilio II. In all, considering the conflicting claims of the putative heirs, and the unliquidated conjugal partnership of Cristina and Federico which forms part of their respective estates, we are impelled to move in only one direction, i.e., joint administration of the subject estate.

One final note. Counsel for petitioner meticulously argues that Article 992 of the Civil Code, the successional bar between the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of a decedent, does not apply in this instance where facts indubitably demonstrate the contrary Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild of the decedent, was actually treated by the decedent and her husband as their own son, reared from infancy, educated and trained in their businesses, and eventually legally

adopted by decedents husband, the original oppositor to respondents petition for letters of administration.

We are not unmindful of the critiques of civilists of a conflict and a lacuna in the law concerning the bone of contention that is Article 992 of the Civil Code, beginning with the eminent Justice J.B.L. Reyes:

In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only within the legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him in the intestate succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make a choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of representation, in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles 995 and 998. The first solution would be more in accord with an enlightened attitude vis--vis illegitimate children.[23]

Manresa explains the basis for the rules on intestate succession:

The law *of intestacy+ is founded on the presumed will of the deceased Love, it is said, first descends, then ascends, and, finally, spreads sideways. Thus, the law first calls the descendants, then the ascendants, and finally the collaterals, always preferring those closer in degree to those of remoter degrees, on the assumption that the deceased would have done so had he manifested his last will Lastly, in default of anyone called to succession or bound to the decedent by ties of blood or affection, it is

in accordance with his presumed will that his property be given to charitable or educational institutions, and thus contribute to the welfare of humanity.[24]

Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of intestate succession, i.e., love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The peculiar circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist animosity and antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a deceased.

Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to refrain from making a final declaration of heirship and distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in the estates of Cristina and Federico, considering that the question on who will administer the properties of the long deceased couple has yet to be settled.

Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata[25] on the same issue remains good law:

[T]he declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature, although the evidence sufficiently shows who are entitled to succeed the deceased. The estate had hardly been judicially opened, and the proceeding has not as yet reached the stage of distribution of the estate which must come after the inheritance is liquidated.

Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the foregoing admonition:

Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made. x x x. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to make a determination and to declare the heirs of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the actual factual milieu as proven by the parties, and all other persons with legal interest in the subject estate. It is further directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice

Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose C. Mendoza per Special Order No. 842 dated June 3,

2010.
[1]

Formerly Cardinal Rodrigo Borgia, before ascending to the religious title of Pope and assuming the name Alexander VI. [2] The Papal Bull which drew a longitudinal line (one hundred leagues west of the Azores and Cape Verde Islands) and bestowed all non-Christian lands west thereof to Spain, and east of the line to Portugal. [3] In The Family, a book with a factual core on the Borgia family of 15 th Century Rome, Mario Puzo recounts that the ostensibly fair and just papal ruling actually favored Spain and placed Portugal at a disadvantage because papal intervention and arbitration of the matter was made at the behest of King Ferdinand of Spain. More importantly, Pope Alexander VI was originally a Catalan who, at the start of his career as a cleric in Italy, conveniently changed his name from the Spanish Borja to the Italian Borgia to gain acceptance and credibility as an authentic Roman clergy.

[4]

Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon, with Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now a member of this Court) and Noel G. Tijam, concurring; rollo, pp. 20-32. [5] Penned by Judge Gregorio S. Sampaga; rollo, pp. 35-60. [6] Rollo, p. 43. [7] Id. at 137-138. [8] Id. at 35. [9] Id. at 21-22.
[10] [11]

Id. at 58. Id. at 60.

[12] [13]

Id. at 31-32. Memorandum of petitioner; id. at 195. [14] Rollo, pp. 59-60. [15] Id. at 25-31. [16] Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. [17] Sec.1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators. No person is competent to serve as executor or administrator who: (a) Is a minor; (b) Is not a resident of the Philippines; and (c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust by reason of drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by reason of conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude. [18] Called as such because the law does not recognize the natural tie of blood and is based on the presumed intervening antagonism and incompatibility between the legitimate and illegitimate family of a deceased. See Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-66574, June 17, 1987, 150 SCRA 645. [19] See Uy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 167979, March 16, 2006, 484 SCRA 699; Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101512, August 7, 1992, 212 SCRA 413; Capistrano v. Nadurata, 46 Phil. 726 (1922). [20] See Uy v. Court of Appeals, supra; Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, supra; Capistrano v. Nadurata, supra. [21] Supra note 19. [22] G.R. No. 155733, January 27, 2006, 480 SCRA 334, 360. (Citations omitted.) [23] Reflections on the Reform of Hereditary Succession, JOURNAL of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, First Quarter (1976), Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 40-41; cited in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 66574, February 21, 1990, 182 SCRA 427, 434; and Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 18, at 651. [24] Cited in BALANE, Jottings and Jurisprudence (1998), p. 368.
[25]

Supra note at 19, at 728.

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