The European Security Dilemma: A Revolution in European Foreign Affairs: The development of a European foreign policy has been

a difficult process that has occurred over the last three decades. It has reflected a variety of factors: the political landscape present in Europe, the institutions that will express its aims, and international system it must operate within. Many of the trends that exist today can be found in the inception of a European foreign policy in the early 1970s. In the last decade though, the effectiveness of the EU to articulate its strategy has increased exponentially. This has brought with it the questions about Europes role in the world. But the situation has been aggravated since September 11th, as many of the precepts that grounded the previous assumption about the EUs security environment have shifted. This article will examine the development of European Community security policy since the 1970s. As we will discover, the current debate in European Security policy is unlike any previous in both the affect it will have on the international system and on the European political entity. With the European Unions emergence as an economic power of the first rank, it is a debate that must be resolved lest Europe remains a political pygmy. Undoubtedly though, it will bring hard questions to European leaders about the role they want the EU to play in the world. The inherent contradictions between militarization of foreign policy as represented by the Military power model and non alignment as represented by Civilian Power, as well as Europes relationship with the United States must be solved out if the EU ever hopes to possess a coherent effective foreign policy. The Civilian Power Period (1970~1987): The first debates about the international role of the European Union surfaced during the early 1970s as a result of the formation of the European Political Community (EPC). Before 1970, a common European security organization did not exist for Europe, outside of the Western European Union (WEU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). By 1970 though, the WEU had become a hollow organization, existing only as a collective security treaty between its constituent members, the UK, Germany, France and Belgium. It was also limited to a narrow group of members, which made it unsuitable as a security organization for the EU. The lack of a political framework for political action made the need for a debate on a European Security strategy academic at best. Other attempts to imbue the European Communities with a security aspect also met with general failure, such as the 1954 Pleven Plan and the 1961 Fouchet plan. The situation changed with the Luxembourg Report of 1970 and the formation of the EPC in fall of 1970. The foundations of the EPC were basically a watered down version of the previous Fouchet Plan to increase political cooperation among European States. The EPC was a unique organization, which reflected the political circumstances that were present. First, it was not officially part of the European Community; rather it existed as a separate organization that existed in parallel. This was to prevent the EPC from expanding its influence into Community areas, which had been the major sticking point for the failed Fouchet plan. Secondly, the EPC only dealt with foreign policy issues, and had a strict disavowal of a military aspect. Although France supported including a defence aspect, Atlanticist members (States that supported the USs continued involvement in the European sphere) objected, as they feared that the organization would become a French ploy to disrupt NATOs security hegemony in Europe. The framework had no legal or formal standing until 1987, consisting of regular meetings between the foreign ministers and political directors of the member states with decisions based on unanimity. The nature and structure of the EPC made effective cooperation

on major issues difficult to achieve. Its limitation on defence and economic issues also handicapped its range of responses to security threats. Nevertheless, it still represented the start of a European Community security policy, and was the forefather to the Current Common Foreign and Security Policy. With the formation of a European Political Community, the inevitable questions about its strategy and aims cropped up. The debate soon became dominated by the Civilian Power Model, which was formulated by Francois Duchene. The model advocated a promotion of democratic values as a foreign policy and held disdain for the application of military force to remedy security issues. He pointed to the success of European Integration in creating close relations among former combatants and wished to apply the model across the world. Europe would be the first major area of the old World where the age old processes of war and indirect violence could be translated into something more in tune with the twentieth century notion of civilized politics. In such a context Western Europe could in a sense be one of the worlds first civilian centres of power. The argument cantered on the premise that stability for Europe would not be achieved by forming a European defence Identity and by doing so Europe would regress back to the era of power politics. Rather, Duchene argued that Europe would be better serving its aims of stability by promoting the values and conditions that had created lasting peace within the European Community. His argument resonated on several themes that had surfaced during the early 1970s. The rise of Dtente between the US and the USSR, and West German Chancellor Willy Brants Ostpolitik with East Germany had thrown the whole notion of East vs. West competition into question. The spectacular success of these initiatives where the traditional military instruments had failed for nearly two decades offered immense credibility to Duchenes claims. These were heightened by the creation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1972, which had even opened up the possibility of European Unification outside of the superpower conflict. Practically, the concept of Civilian Power also fitted neatly with the nature of the EPC. The EPC range of instruments was limited to diplomatic demarches and coordination of national policy, which slotted in nicely with the tenets of Civilian Power. Since the EPC was barred from utilizing defence instruments, the Civilian Power Model was certainly an attainable strategy to utilize. If anything, the EPC limited the full implementation of the Civilian Power Model as Duchene envisioned economic statecraft as a major instrument for the promotion of peace. Another factor for the Civilian Power Model attractiveness was that it could give the EPC a niche role within European security environment. Unlike NATO, which focused on the hard security issues such as military capabilities, Civilian Powers focus was primarily on the soft side of security, utilizing diplomatic instruments to handle policies. This made the conjunction of the EPC and the Civilian power model attractive to Atlanticist such as the UK, Netherlands and Denmark. At the very least, the Civilian Power model would not usurp NATOs position as a security apparatus, and possibly could contribute to European security if it could successfully engage Soviet Europe in political dialogue. By the same token, Civilian power was attractive to the Neutralist states within Europe. The EPCs renunciation of a defence aspect gave it the perception of being apart from the bi-polar structures of the Cold War (like NATO or the Warsaw Pact). It existed as alternative framework for neutralist states to carry out their policies on the world stage, which could give them far more collective influence than individually possible. Furthermore, the Civilian Power models support for diplomatic solutions to crisis resolution gelled nicely with the general precepts of neutralism found within many Neutralist states.

The success of the EPC during this period was varied. The limited nature of cooperation ensured that there was little risk in the venture, but by the same token there was little in the way of spectacular success. This would prove to be the largest criticism of the frameworks nature. As Simon Nuttall pointed out; it was rather that too many people were not content with a cosy process moving at its own pace. In the place of declaratory diplomacy, they wanted action not reaction to events; they wanted to take the initiative. In other words they wanted not the coordination of national policies but a common foreign and security policy. Furthermore, Civilian Power existence owed much to the US/NATO security guarantee. It allowed the European Community to assume a security identity divorced from the securitycentered organization of NATO. If the EPC were to be charged with guaranteeing the security of Europe, in all likelihood, the organization would be forced to create a defence identity for Europe. The early 1980s saw the first major challenges to the Civilian Power Model. Hedley Bull put forward the theory of the European Community as an international power of the first order that should acquire the military capabilities to defend its security interests independently. Bulls argument reflected the unstable strategic situation of the period. There were significant questions about the commitment of the United States to the deterrence of Europe, in lieu of the Euro-missile crisis. He thought it better that the European Community should take steps towards making themselves more self sufficient in defence and security, rather than relying on the unpredictable security guarantee of the United States. Bull had essentially borrowed the basic tenets of the French Gaullist position and applied them to the rest of Europe. He also questioned the legitimacy of the Civilian Power Model as a viable security strategy for Europe. The continued soviet threat to western community necessitated a military deterrence of its own, which the model could not provide. The idea of the European Communities becoming an independent security actor was difficult to realize at best though. The concept was firmly rejected by Atlanticist members for detaching Europe from the strength of the Atlantic alliance. By the same account, Civilian Power advocates rejected the notion that an increase in defence spending would further European security. Although Bulls thesis was not received well at the time, the military power model would soon find greater relevance at the end of the decade. Contradictions (1987~1998): The end of the Cold War radically changed the security environment of Europe and with it some of the tenants of European security policy. In 1987, the Single European Act (SEA) formally introduced the EPC into treaty structure and augmented its institutional organs by the creation of a secretariat. But the EPC still suffered the same problems as before. These were rudely exposed in the coming years as the European Community was forced to take a wait and see approach to the rapidly unfolding events in Eastern Europe with the end of Communism. But along with the major changes in the security environment, the European Community itself was undergoing tremendous change as well. As a result of the SEA, the European Community decided to start negotiations on monetary and political union. Discussions on political union, especially in the areas of foreign policy were deeply affected by the events surrounding the collapse of the Soviet Union. In reviewing the events, the weakness of the EPC as a institution was evident, as well as the surprising effectiveness of the European Commission in tackling economic development issues. As the Iron Curtain fell, the European Commission was actively involved in directing the distribution of aid of the G24 group and through the ECs own PHARE program. Therefore the need for Consistency among the various instruments of the soon to be named European Union shaped the formation of what would be called the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

The institutional development of the CFSP reflected the varied and often equivocal aims of the EUs member states. Frances institutional preference closely followed Bulls Military Power model, while the UK, Portugal and Netherlands supported continued close links with the US. The Civilian Defence Model remained popular with neutralist states such as Denmark and Ireland. Negotiations would lead to a policy making structure that was based upon a series of compromises in order to satisfy all parties involved. The new institutional arrangement for European foreign policy did mark a qualitative advance from the previous EPC structure, but it still was limited in its instruments. Although the CFSP had recourse to economic instruments such as sanctions, the EU was still excluded from maintaining a defence identity. Defence issues were to be referred to a revitalized Western European Union, which existed as a parallel organization to the Union much like the EPC did for most of its history. The WEU had a secondary role as a bridge organization between the EU and NATO, to ensure that an institutional link existed between the EU and the Transatlantic Alliance. The signing of the Maastricht Treaty and the creation of the European Union would once again significantly alter the European security strategy. But changes were already forthcoming due to the radical upheavals in the international system. The end of bi-polarity shattered the locus of the European Security threat from a definable single entity to a series of less serious but more unpredictable threats. To be fair NATO faced a similar situation, as it was left temporarily listless after the Soviet Union dissolved. Many commentators predicted the end of NATO, citing the Soviet threat provided a common issue on which Transatlantic relations were based. Hedley Bulls Military Power Model grew in relevance, as the possibility of NATOs irrelevance became an increasing possibility. In the early 1990s, several situations helped focus and define the terms of the European security debate. Both the EU and NATO faced the task of ensuring the stability of the former Communist bloc. As mentioned above, the EU was at the forefront of efforts in the region, which gave the organization greater confidence as an international actor. The excellent work of the EU Commission in spreading democratic values through a mixture of tied aid and diplomatic engagement was seen to be a validation of basic tenets the Civilian Power Model. If Europe could replicate its success in other regions such as the Middle East or Africa, the need for a European military identity would be minimal. But the Civilian Power Model also faced several challenges that exposed weaknesses in the program. The first major test of the CFSPs crisis resolution capability was its response to the deteriorating situation in Yugoslavia. The result of the EUs response exposed the direct limitations of CFSP as a crisis management organization and at the same time partially discredited Civilian Power model. At first the EUs response was alert and nimble, reacting robustly to the developing events. The member states were obviously buoyed by youthful enthusiasm for the new CFSP institutions, and attempted to handle the situation without recourse to UN or NATO instruments. Their enthusiasm though concealed deep flaws existed in the EUs security policy. The most glaring was a lack of a coherent strategy to deal with the developing crisis. Member states differing policies towards the conflict and towards conflict resolution were exposed and manipulated. Germanys insistent support for Slovenian and Croatian independence over the objection of most of the European Council was among the most visible examples of this incoherence. The EU's direct response was limited to a group of military observers as well as a combination of diplomatic and economic measures including sanctions, which proved to be wholly inadequate for stabilizing the situation. Although a military response was considered within the WEU, differing opinions among members scuppered discussions. By August 1992, the EU response to the situation had collapsed, and it passed its responsibility over to the United Nations. The near disastrous handling of the European Unions crisis response in the Balkans, and the

developing nature of international system had prompted a complete re-evaluation of European Union security strategy. By 1992, NATO had solidified its security strategy with the New Strategic Concept (NSC). In the document, NATO assigned itself four tasks:

To provide a stable security environment in Europe based on democratic institutions; Serve as a transatlantic forum for allied consultations; To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against NATO states; To preserve the strategic balance in Europe.

As a result NSC, NATO would remain an important fixture within the European security architecture. This effectively undercut the any discussion about an independent security role from NATO, as outlined within the Military Power Model. Regardless, Europe was unable to provide such a capability anyway, as the debacle in Yugoslavia had demonstrated. However, as a result of the events in the early 1990s, the EU was successful in recalibrating its security strategy to the Post-Cold War environment. A new paradigm was emerged, often referred to as the Normative Power Model. The Normative Power Model was very much a product of the post cold war events. Its roots can be found in Civilian Power Model, as it is based upon the same ideas of the diffusion of European values that Duchene argued for 1970. But it reflected a more nuanced approach to the idea of European norms. The EUs Normative power is manifested in its well-developed set of norms, which range from founding principles expressed in its treaties (liberty, democracy, rule of law, human rights) to objectives (social progress, anti-discrimination, sustainable development), as well as European Council conclusions such as Copenhagen criteria expressed in the EU charter of Fundamental Rights. Where the Normative Power model diverged from the Civilian Power model was in the applicability of military force to the European foreign policy. Without recourse to some sort of coercive capability beyond Economic sanctions, the EUs ability to carry out crisis management would be limited. Yet many member states remained uncomfortable with the EU assuming a defence identity. Therefore in June 1992, WEU defence ministers met in Petersburg, Germany and agreed upon the Petersburg Tasks, which would serve as the primary defence strategy of the EU. The Petersburg tasks served to limit the EUs Security strategy in two ways. The first was to prevent WEU from usurping NATOs position on the European security architecture. It did not feature a collective defence clause that would duplicate NATOs role. This was the primary concern of the Atlanticist nations, who wanted to guarantee NATO primacy. In the same vein, it also limited the WEU straying too far from the precepts of Civilian Power, which was the concern of the Neutralist member states. The Petersburg tasks themselves dedicated the WEU to crisis management operation, focusing on conflict prevention, peacekeeping and in extreme situations, peace enforcement. What the EU lacked though was an effective ability to carry out its security strategy. The WEU was ineffectual as a military capability, carrying out two token deployments in the Adriatic and the Persian Gulf in support of economic sanctions. As the 1990s progressed, opinions shifted towards the creation of a more effective EU defence identity. The turning point for the debate was the Srebrenica Massacre in July 1995. The event would horrify traditional opponents of EU defence identity and would recast the debate not in terms of European responsibility to resist war, but rather European responsibility to ensure that human rights standards should be upheld. Nowhere was this debate more acute than in Germany, where the massacre was

compared to holocaust in character. The German Green party realigned itself along the lines of the Normative Power model, and removed their calls for complete pacifism in German foreign policy. The movement towards a Normative Power model for the EU would set the stage for the final period of EU defence strategy starting off with the creation of a EU defence capability. A Normative Military Power (1998~2003): In 1998, the Kosovo crisis set into motion a complete revolution of European security affairs, of which the ramifications are still being felt. The crisis itself revealed to Atlanticists that the US might not always be available to underwrite European security; therefore an independent European defence identity may be necessary to assume a lead role in European Capabilities when NATO as a whole is not engaged. The Clinton Administrations reluctance to get involved in the crisis even at the behest of several European leaders, would lead to the St. Malo conference in December 8th 1998. St. Malo would mark the inception of the European Security and Defence Policy, which would give the EU a true defence capability in its own right, unlike the parallel position the WEU. The early development of the ESDP engendered the same disagreements that the development of the CFSP faced in 1990. (. ) The ESDP certainly was birthed in the thinking of the Normative Power Model but the direction the EU member states would wanted to go with it was another question. Again Atlanticists pushed to ensure that the program did not usurp NATO but rather completed its capabilities. France resisted those plans, arguing the ESDP should have some autonomy from NATO. It later relented and later agreed to create links between the two organizations. Neutralist States, such as Nordic countries and Ireland, also greeted the development EU of a Military apparatus with some apprehension. They argued that the development of a defence capability, although necessary, could take away the EUs emphasis on Civilian crisis management instruments. In an effort to remedy concerns, these states worked constructively by creating a civilian capability within the ESDP, including a rapidly deployable police unit and the launching of the EU Program for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts. Their efforts paid off as the development of the civilian aspects of crisis management surpassed developments on military aspects. The exceptional development of the civilian crisis management capability also resulted in the first official EU mission through the ESDP, the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina in 2001: The development of the security debate up until September 11th seemed destined to revolve around Atlanticism as the core of European security doctrine, but with some debate to the extent the Normative and Military power models should play a part of those classifications. Since September 11th 2001 though the EU security debate has taken on a new tone, one that has serious implications for the future of the union, the attacks themselves did not cause much of a change in European Security policy. Europeans long experience with terrorism is a likely reason for this as Europe already had stringent anti-terrorism measures before the attacks. Rather the change in European security policy had more to do with reacting to the changing security policy of the United States. Specifically, a divergence occurred in two areas. The first was the USs response to the terrorist threat which focused completely on military instruments. It regarded terrorism as a technical issue that military instruments could solve. Europeans on the other hand saw terrorism as a cancer endemic to the international system, and was a manifestation of other problems in the international system such as: civil wars against established Arab regimes territorial wars and conflicts over natural resources, and increasing global disparities over wealth and development. The Civilian and Normative Power Models saw economic and diplomatic instruments as the best means to achieve long-term solutions for these problems.

In some respects the EUs reliance on civilian instruments was seen as complementary to the USs struggle against terrorism. Under such a scheme the USs military capabilities would focus on attacking the direct terrorist threats to the world system while Europes civilian power would concentrate on preventing threats from emerging and rehabilitating post conflict areas. Robert Kagan referred to the division of labour as the US preparing dinner, and Europe cleans up the dishes. But Europeans are increasingly viewing such a division of labour as Europes passive support for the US foreign policies, as one French Diplomat put it in February 2002. This complimentary is fine in the short term, but it cannot continue in the long term. The Europeans would be very uncomfortable with this role. It would mean giving the US the Carte blanche for its military operations. The Europeans would be expected to by the Americans to pick up the pieces. And Frankly the US neither respects nor appreciates what the Europeans are doing. It would be a completely imbalanced relationship. The second major divergence was far more disconcerting to Europeans, which is the USs apparent growing contempt for international laws and norms. These included the abrogation of the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty, the rejection of the International Criminal Court and The Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, and most seriously the adoption of the pre-emptive strike doctrine for dealing with terrorist threats. As discussed earlier, the Normative Power Model was in part based upon the norms of international law as the guiding principles of European foreign policy. The United States rejection of many of those laws led many individuals to question the utility of the transatlantic partnership. If the US does not respect the very laws and values Europeans hold dear, then what is the value of a close transatlantic relationship for European Foreign policy aims? Whither the EU? The reaction to the divergence of European and American Foreign policies has completely changed the security debate within Europe. Atlanticism has been dealt a serious blow as a precept of European security doctrine. In its stead Bulls Military Power model has made resurgence, with France, Germany, Luxembourg and Belgium supporting an independent crisis management cell outside of NATO. The proposal was largely symbolic, as it would duplicate existing NATO facilities and allow the EU to plan missions without recourse to NATO assets. The reasoning for the promotion of an independent military capability was to ensure that European values were not misrepresented by American strategic aims. Undoubtedly, the Normative Power model and its predecessor the Civilian Power Model enjoy popularity in Europe. Yet by assuming a defence identity vis-a-vis the United States, the EU is undermining the enterprise of Civilian Power. To be fair though, the EU is nowhere near becoming a strategic competitor to the United States, and the roots of Atlanticism run deep. NATO still exists as the pinnacle of European security architecture. But if the United States does continue on its current post September 11th policies, Europeans will become gradually more resentful of its hegemony, and this will likely lead to increasing support for Europe to assume its own defence identity. Europe must reconcile the three pillars of its security strategy, Civilian, Military and Atlanticism before it can effectively articulate a coherent foreign policy. Europe must comprehend the implications of each pillar, otherwise it risks misrepresenting its own aims in the future.

History of WEU Origins of WEU: from the Brussels Treaty to the Paris Agreements (1948-1954) WEU was created by the Treaty on Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence signed at Brussels on 17 March 1948 (the Brussels Treaty), as amended by the Protocol signed at Paris on 23 October 1954, which modified and completed it. The Brussels Treaty was signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Conceived largely as a response to Soviet moves to impose control over the countries of Central Europe, the Treaty represented the first attempt to translate into practical arrangements some of the ideals of the European movement. Its main feature was the commitment to mutual defence should any of the signatories be the victim of an armed attack in Europe. In September 1948, military co-operation was initiated in the framework of the Brussels Treaty Organisation. A plan for common defence was adopted, involving the integration of air defences and a joint command organisation. By demonstrating their resolve to work together, the Brussels Treaty powers helped to overcome the reluctance of the United States to participate in the nascent European security arrangements. Talks between these powers and the United States and Canada began shortly afterwards, leading to the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington on 4 April 1949. Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal were invited and agreed to accede to the Treaty, which formalised the commitment by the United States and Canada to the defence of Europe. Article 5 of the Treaty states that an armed attack against one of the signatories shall be considered an attack against them all and that each party will then take such action as it deems necessary to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. The need to back up the commitments of the Washington Treaty with appropriate political and military structures led to the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). In December 1950, with the appointment of General Eisenhower as the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), the Brussels Treaty powers decided to merge their military organisation into NATO, which had become the central element in the West European and North Atlantic security system. Meanwhile, the desire to integrate the Federal Republic of Germany into the emerging security structures prompted France, in October 1950, to propose the creation of a European Army which would operate within the framework of the Alliance. This proposal led to the signature, in May 1952, of the Treaty setting up a European Defence Community (EDC) in which Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany were due to participate. However, in August 1954 the French National Assembly refused to ratify the Treaty. The failure of the EDC meant that an alternative way had to be found to integrate the Federal Republic of Germany into the Western security system. At a special Conference convened in London in September 1954 and attended by the Brussels Treaty powers, the United States, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, it was decided to invite the latter two countries to join the Brussels Treaty. The conclusions of the conference were formalised by the Paris Agreements, signed in October of that year, which amended the Brussels Treaty, created Western European Union (WEU) as a new international organisation and provided for the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy to join. WEU from 1955 to 1984: the Saar, arms control, the UK and the EC six:

The signatories of the Paris Agreements clearly stated their three main objectives in the preamble to the modified Brussels Treaty: To create in Western Europe a firm basis for European economic recovery; To afford assistance to each other in resisting any policy of aggression; To promote the unity and encourage the progressive integration of Europe.

From 1954 to 1973, WEU played an important role by promoting the development of consultation and co-operation in Western Europe, in the aftermath of the Second World War. It permitted: the integration of the Federal Republic of Germany into the Atlantic Alliance; the restoration of confidence among Western European countries by assuming responsibilities for arms control; settlement of the Saar problem; consultation between the European Community founding Member States and the United Kingdom.

The role of liaison between the European Community and the United Kingdom ended when the UK joined the European Community in 1973. Between 1973 and 1984, WEUs activities as an intergovernmental organisation gradually slowed down. The Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee continued their work. WEUs economic, social and cultural roles had been taken over by the OEEC and the Council of Europe. The WEU Councils political activities lost much of their relevance with the development of European Political Co-operation. During the following years, the political and institutional dialogue between the Council and the Assembly made a significant contribution to the reflection on European security and defence requirements. Reactivation of WEU: from the Rome Declaration to the Hague Platform (1984-1989): The Rome Declaration The early 1980s witnessed a revival of the debate on European security. European Political Cooperation (EPC) could not be extended beyond the economic aspects of security issues. The failure of the Genscher-Colombo initiative in November 1981, whose aim was to extend the EPCs sphere of competence to security and defence questions, prompted the countries in favour to look for another framework of consultation. WEU was the obvious choice. On the initiative of the Belgian and French Governments, a preliminary joint meeting of the Foreign and Defence Ministers within the WEU framework was held in Rome on 26 and 27 October 1984. It was marked by the adoption of the founding text of WEUs reactivation: the "Rome Declaration". Work on the definition of a European security identity and the gradual harmonisation of its members defence policies were among the stated objectives. Ministers recognised the "continuing necessity to strengthen western security, and that better utilization of WEU would not only contribute to the security of Western Europe but also to an improvement in the common defence of all the countries of the Atlantic Alliance".

The Rome Declaration reaffirmed that the WEU Council could pursuant to Article VIII (3) of the modified Brussels Treaty consider the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world. Pursuant to the decisions taken in Rome, the WEU Council was henceforth to hold two meetings a year at Ministerial level, in which Foreign and Defence Ministers were to sit at the same conference table. The Hague Platform (27 October 1987) The negotiations between the United States and the USSR on the withdrawal of intermediate nuclear forces highlighted the need for even closer European consultation on defence. The WEU Council and its Special Working Group produced a report on European security conditions and criteria and on the specific responsibilities of Europeans for their defence within the Atlantic Alliance. On this basis, in October 1987, the WEU Ministerial Council adopted a "Platform on European Security Interests". This Hague Platform also set out general guidelines for WEUs future programme of work. Its preamble stated: "We recall our commitment to build a European Union in accordance with the Single European Act, which we all signed as Members of the European Community. We are convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence." Stressing that the security of the Alliance was indivisible, Ministers expressed their resolve "to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance". The same meeting decided to open negotiations with Portugal and Spain regarding their accession to the modified Brussels Treaty. Those countries formally became full Members of WEU on 27 March 1990. The following year, two other Member countries of the Atlantic Alliance expressed their wish to join the Organisation : Turkey (summer 1988), and Greece (December 1988). Operational Role Joint WEU Actions in the Gulf (1988-1990) Joint WEU actions in the Gulf were undertaken in accordance with Article VIII (3) of the modified Brussels Treaty, which states that "At the request of any of the High Contracting Parties the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit them to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability". In 1987 and 1988, following the laying of mines in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war, WEU Member States reacted together to this threat to freedom of navigation. Minesweepers despatched by WEU countries helped secure free movement in international waters. "Operation Cleansweep" helped to complete the clearance of a 300-mile sea lane from the Strait of Hormuz, and was the first instance of a concerted action in WEU. During the Gulf War, WEU Ministers decided to co-ordinate their operations, with the aim of implementing and enforcing United Nations Resolution 661. At their meeting in Paris on 21

August 1990, Ministers stressed that co-ordination within WEU should facilitate co-operation with the forces of other countries in the region, including those of the United States. The co-ordination mechanisms approved by WEU Member States in 1988 were reactivated and extended. An ad hoc group of representatives of Foreign and Defence Ministers was made responsible for co-ordination in the capitals and in the operational zone. A meeting of the Chiefs of Defence Staff (CHODS) was held with the aim of co-ordinating naval operations to enforce the embargo on goods. The Permanent Council, sitting in London, monitored developments in the situation and met as required. After the cessation of hostilities, WEU continued its mission of co-ordinating mine-clearance operations in Gulf waters. It also contributed to the humanitarian actions for Kurdish refugees in Northern Iraq. Operations in the Context of the Yugoslav conflict (1992-1996) WEU/NATO Operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic In July 1992, the WEU Ministerial Council decided that WEU naval forces would participate in monitoring the embargo against former Yugoslavia in the Adriatic. NATO was also conducting its own operation at the time. On 8 June 1993, the WEU and NATO Councils met to approve a combined concept for a joint operation in support of United Nations Security Council Resolution 820. The agreement established a unified command for "Operation Sharp Guard", which was to begin on 15 June 1993. In the course of that operation, WEU deployed four ships and some six maritime patrol and early warning aircraft. A small WEU staff controlled one of the joint task groups while the other was detached to COMNAVSOUTH HQ in Naples. Some 74 000 challenges were issued, almost 6000 ships were inspected at sea, and more than 1400 were diverted and inspected in port. Six ships were caught while attempting to break the embargo. WEU Danube operation Following an extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers in Luxembourg on 5 April 1993, it was agreed that WEU Member States would provide assistance to Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania in their efforts to enforce the UN sanctions on the Danube. In June, the three riparian states accepted this offer, and agreed with WEU on the setting-up of a police and customs operation. Some 250 WEU personnel were involved when the operation was at its height. They manned a co-ordination and support centre and three control areas (Mohacs-Hungary; Calafat-Romania; Ruse-Bulgaria). Equipped with eight patrol boats and 48 vehicles, WEU personnel carried out 6748 inspection and monitoring operations that resulted in the discovery of 422 infringements. This operation was a practical example of concrete cooperation with the Associate Partners, within WEU, and of OSCE-WEU co-ordination, through the WEU Presidency delegation to the OSCE Sanctions Co-ordination Committee in Vienna. Following the Dayton Peace Agreements and the termination of the UN arms embargo, the Adriatic and Danube operations were wound up. Police contingent in Mostar

In October 1993, a few days before the Treaty on European Union came into force, the Ministers of the EC Member States requested WEU to examine the contribution WEU could make to the planned EU administration of the town of Mostar in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As a result of this request, WEU contributed a police contingent to the EU Administration of Mostar, established early in July 1994. The aim of the WEU police contingent was to assist the Bosnian and Croat parties in Mostar to set up a unified police force for the town. In May 1995, the Permanent Council accepted the offer of contributions to the WEU police force element from Austria, Finland and Sweden, which enabled it to reach its maximum strength of 182 personnel during the summer. The EU Administrations mandate ended in July 1996 and an EU Special Envoy was appointed until 31 December 1996. The WEU police contingent continued to assist him until he transferred his public order executive powers to the local authorities on 15 October 1996. Crisis Management Operations (1997-2001) Mission in Albania In May 1997, the WEU Council decided to send a Multinational Advisory Police Element to Albania, as part of the efforts undertaken in that country by the international community, notably the OSCE and the EU. The primary aim of MAPE was to provide advice and train instructors. A key part of MAPEs work was to provide advice to the Ministry of Public Order on restructuring the Albanian police. A new State Police Law was drawn up with MAPEs support and contained the foundations for building a democratic police to internationally accepted standards. Approximately 3000 police officers were trained in the Tirana Training Centre (Police Academy), in a second training centre in Durres and through field training programmes. On 2 February 1999, the WEU Council approved plans for an enhanced MAPE mission with a mandate until April 2000. This mission was conducted by WEU at the request of the EU on the basis of an Article J.4.2 decision, enabling among other things a major part of the costs to be met from the EU budget. MAPE enhanced its geographical coverage and increased its operational mobility. The mission expanded its training and advice to selected ministries, directorates and "low risk" police districts down to the operational unit level. MAPEs strength was approximately 143 by mid1999. WEUs mission played an important role during the Kosovo refugee crisis from April 1999 by supporting the Albanian police in their responsibilities for receiving, registering, supervising and escorting refugees. MAPE maintained constant contacts with the Ministry of Public Order. WEU assisted the Albanians in setting up their own joint crisis centre and a 24-hour MAPE presence was provided to support them in its operations and decisions. MAPE teams were dispatched to Kukes, near the Kosovo border, to assist the police directorate there, as well as to the police directorates in Tirana and Durres. The MAPE mission finally terminated on 31 May 2001. WEU Demining Assistance Mission in Croatia

At the request of the EU on the basis of Article J.4.2 of the Treaty on European Union, WEU implemented a joint action in the field of mine clearance. Within the framework of the WEU Demining Assistance Mission to Croatia (WEUDAM), which began operations on 10 May 1999, WEU provided advice, technical expertise and training support to the Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC) in the areas of programme management, planning and project development, geographic information systems, and level II surveys. Sweden acted as lead nation for this nine-strong mission. The mission was funded by the EU. The WEUDAM mission terminated on 30 November 2001. General security surveillance mission in Kosovo In response to a request from the European Union based on Article J.4.2 of the Treaty on European Union, in November 1998 the WEU Satellite Centre embarked on a mission of "general security surveillance" of the Kosovo region. The initial focus of the general security surveillance mission was to gather information for the EU as well as the NATO and OSCE missions on the state of implementation of the Belgrade agreements dated 15 and 16 October as well as on the situation of refugees and displaced persons and the related infrastructure. The mission of general security surveillance was conducted in close co-ordination with the WEU Military Staff, which provided additional information for each of the Satellite Centre reports transmitted to the EU, NATO and OSCE. With the changed situation in Kosovo, with KFOR troops and other representatives of the international community on the ground, the Satellite Centre concentrated its work from July 1999 on the finalisation of a geographic information system (GIS) on Kosovo. The GIS was a digital map of the entire Kosovo region with visualisation and analysis tools and could be used to assist in several aspects of reconstruction work (including demining) in Kosovo. In July 1999, this system was also made available to the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).

Common Foreign and Security Policy

INTRODUCTION One of the main purposes of the inter-Governmental Conference which led to the signature of the draft Amsterdam Treaty was to make common foreign and security policy (CFSP) more effective and to equip the Union better for its role in international politics. The reform seemed particularly urgent after the disintegration of former Yugoslavia. The tragic course of events there made it clear that the Union needed to be able to act to avert disaster and not merely react after the event. The Yugoslav crisis also threw into relief the weakness of uncoordinated Member State reactions. The Amsterdam Treaty aims to overcome contradictions between the particularly ambitious objectives of the CFSP and the means available to the Union for achieving those objectives, which did not live up to expectations or provide adequately for the matters at stake. BACKGROUND Throughout the successive stages of the construction of a European Community, the issues of political union, common foreign policy and common defence policy have regularly been put on the agenda by a series of policy proposals. In 1950, the Plven plan (named after the French Prime Minister) was to create an integrated European army under joint command. This plan was the subject of negotiation between Member States of the European Coal and Steel Community from 1950 to 1952, and led to the signature of the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community. (EDC). The corollary of the EDC was a political project, presented in 1953, for creating a federal or confederative structure. The "European Political Community" would have created a two-house Parliamentary assembly, a European executive Council, a Council of Ministers and a Court of Justice. The political Community was to have very wide powers and responsibilities and was, in the long run, to absorb the ECSC and the EDC. However, it never came to fruition, since it was rejected by the French National Assembly on 30 August 1954. In the early sixties, tough negotiations were conducted on the basis of the two Fouchet plans presented one after the other in France, calling for closer political cooperation, a Union of States and common foreign and defence policies. A Committee established to draft specific proposals produced difficult, but nevertheless ambitious, compromises such as setting up an independent Secretariat and the introduction of qualified majority decisions on certain issues as

a long-term goal. Unfortunately agreement could not be reached on the proposals of the Fouchet Committee and negotiations between the Member States foundered in 1962. In response to calls by Heads of State and Government for a study of possible ways of moving forward on the political level, the "Davignon report" was presented in 1970 at the Luxembourg Summit. This was the starting point for European Political Cooperation (EPC), launched informally in 1970 before being formally enshrined in the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987. The main feature of EPC was consultation among the Member States on foreign policy issues. Three years later, the Copenhagen Summit presented a report on how EPC was working. Subsequently, meetings of Foreign Ministers and the Political Committee (made up of national political directors) were held more frequently. At the same time, a group of "European correspondents" was set up to monitor EPC in each Member State. Political cooperation was also assisted by access to COREU, the new telex network linking the Member States. The establishment of the European Council in 1974 contributed to better coordination of EPC because of the role it gave to Heads of State and Government in defining the general orientation of Community policy. From that point the role of the Presidency and the publicity given to the work of the EPC reinforced each other through official Community statements of position. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Islamic revolution in Iran brought home to the Member States the growing impotence of the European Community on the international scene. Determined to strengthen EPC, in 1981 they adopted the London Report which required prior consultation by Member States of each other and the European Commission on all foreign policy matters affecting all Member States. In 1982, prompted by the same concern to affirm the international position of the Community, the Genscher-Colombo initiative proposed a draft "European Act" and led, in 1983, to the Stuttgart "Solemn Declaration on European Union". In 1985 the Dooge Committee Report, drawn up in preparation for the inter-Governmental Conference which was to lead to the Single European Act, contained a number of proposals concerning foreign policy, in particular for greater concertation of policy on matters concerning security, and for cooperation in the armaments sector. It also called for the creation of a permanent Secretariat. In the end, the provisions introduced by the Single European Act did not go as far as the Dooge Committee proposals, but they did establish an institutional basis for EPC, the group of European correspondents and a Secretariat working under the direct authority of the Presidency. The objectives of EPC were also extended to all foreign policy issues of general interest.

The intergovernmental conference on political union led to the inclusion in the EU Treaty of a specific Title on a common foreign and security policy (CFSP). With the Treaty's entry into force in 1993, the CFSP replaced EPC and a separate inter-Governmental pillar was created in the Community structure. This expressed the will of the Union to assert its identity on the international scene. TITLE V OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION Common foreign and security policy (CFSP) is governed by the provisions of Title V of the Treaty on European Union. The CFSP is also addressed in Article 2 (ex Article B) of the Common Provisions, which states that one of the objectives of the Union is to "assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence". The CFSP was introduced as the result of a desire to equip the Union better for the many challenges facing it at international level, by providing it with new means of taking action in areas of foreign relations other than the traditional Community ones (mainly trade policy and development cooperation). Title V constitutes a separate pillar of the European Union, since the way it operates and its inter-Governmental nature distinguish it from the traditional pillars of the Community, such as the single market and trade policy. This difference is most striking in the decision-making procedures, which require Member State consensus, whereas in traditional Community areas a majority vote suffices. Other differences are the less important roles played by the Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice in matters falling under Title V. The backgrounding of these institutions under the CFSP is in stark contrast with their powers and responsibilities in traditional spheres of Community competence. To achieve harmony and avoid contradictions between these two types of activity (Community and inter-Governmental), Article 3 (ex Article C) provides that: "The Union shall ensure (...) the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring such consistency. The shall assure the implementation of these policies, each in accordance with its respective powers." Nevertheless, in the first years after its introduction, Member States' joint action under Title V did not work as satisfactorily as they might have hoped. It was against this relatively unsatisfactory background that the negotiations at the 1996 inter-Governmental Conference

aimed to introduce in the new Treaty the institutional reforms needed to make the CFSP effective. PROGRESS UNDER THE TREATY OF AMSTERDAM First and foremost, the CFSP's capacity for action has been reinforced through the introduction of more coherent instruments and more efficient decision-making. It is now possible to adopt measures by a qualified majority vote, with the dual safeguards of "constructive abstention" and the possibility of referring a decision to the European Council if a member state resorts to a veto. The Commission, for its part, is also more involved both on the representative side and in implementation. Common strategies The Amsterdam Treaty has added a new foreign policy instrument to the existing ones (joint action and common position), namely common strategies. The European Council, the body that defines the principles and general guidelines of the CFSP, now has the right to define, by consensus, common strategies in areas where the Member States have important interests in common. The objectives, duration, and means to be made available by the Union and Member States for such common strategies must be specified. The Council is responsible for implementing common strategies through joint actions and common positions adopted by a qualified majority. It also recommends common strategies to the European Council. Decision-making The general rule remains that CFSP decisions always require a unanimous vote in their favour. However, Member States can exercise "constructive abstention", i.e. an abstention which does not block the adoption of the decision. If they qualify their abstention by a formal declaration, they are not obliged to apply the decision; but they must accept, in a spirit of solidarity, that the decision commits the Union as a whole and must agree to abstain from any action that might conflict with the Union's action under that decision. This mechanism does not apply if the Member States abstaining in this way account for more than one third of Council votes weighted in accordance with the Treaty. The amended Title V of the EU Treaty does, however, allow for adoption by a qualified majority in two cases:

 for decisions applying a common strategy defined by the

European Council;

for any decisions implementing a joint action or common

position already adopted by the Council. There is a safeguard clause enabling member states to block majority voting for important reasons of national policy. In such cases, when the Member State concerned has stated its reasons, the Council may decide by a qualified majority to refer the matter to the European Council for a unanimous decision by heads of state and government. The High Representative for the CFSP The new Article 26 (ex Article J.16) of the EU Treaty introduces a new post intended to give the CFSP a higher profile and make it more coherent: The Secretary-General of the Council has been assigned the role of High Representative for the CFSP. He is responsible for assisting the Council in CFSP-related matters by contributing to the formulation, preparation, and implementation of decisions. At the request of the Presidency he acts on behalf of the Council in conducting political dialogue with third parties. Because of this new role, the Secretary-General's administrative tasks have been transferred to the deputy Secretary-General. It does not, however, stop the Council appointing special representatives with mandates covering specific political issues whenever it sees fit, as has already been done in the case of former Yugoslavia. As regards the logistics of the new position, the High Representative is supported by a policy planning and early warning unit set up in the General Secretariat of the Council and placed under his responsibility. The policy planning and early warning unit The coherence of common foreign and security policy depends how Member States react to international developments. Past experience has shown that if reactions are uncoordinated, the position of the European Union and its Member States on the international scene is weakened. Joint analysis of international issues and their impact, and pooling of information should help the Union produce effective reactions to international developments. With this in mind, it was agreed in a declaration annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam to set up a policy planning and early warning unit in the General Secretariat of the Council under the authority of the High Representative for the CFSP. Comprising specialists drawn from the

General Secretariat, the member states, the Commission and the Western European Union (WEU), its tasks include:

monitoring and analysing developments in areas relevant

to the CFSP;

providing assessments of the Union's foreign and security

policy interests and identifying areas on which the CFSP could focus in future;

providing timely assessments and early warning of

events, potential political crises and situations that might have significant repercussions on the CFSP;

producing, at the request of either the Council or the

Presidency, or on its own initiative, reasoned policy option papers for the Council. The "Petersberg tasks", security and the Western European Union The "Petersberg tasks" have been incorporated into Title V of the EU Treaty. This is a crucial step forward at a time when there has been a resurgence of local conflicts posing a real threat to European security (for example, former Yugoslavia), even though the risk of large-scale conflicts has fallen significantly compared to the Cold War period. The "Petersberg tasks" represent a very fitting response by the Union, embodying as they do the Member States' shared determination to safeguard European security through operations such as humanitarian and peace-making missions. On the security front, the new Article 17 (ex Article J.7) of the EU Treaty also opens up prospects for two new developments, although neither seems imminent:

common defence; and the integration of the Western European Union (WEU)
into the European Union. Specifically, the new text states that the CFSP covers all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to common defence, should the European Council so decide. Similarly, as regards rapprochement of the EU and the WEU, provision is made for the Union fostering closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possible integration of the WEU into the European Union, should the European Council so decide. Financing of CFSP operational expenditure

Under the EU Treaty, CFSP operations were financed either from the Community budget or by the Member States, applying a scale to be decided case by case. This system gave rise to some criticism, particularly from the Commission, because of its complexity and inefficiency. The Treaty of Amsterdam has addressed the problem, providing for expenditure on CFSP operations to be financed from the Community budget. The only exceptions are operations with military or defence implications, or if the Council unanimously decides otherwise. In this case, Member States that abstain and issue a formal declaration are not obliged to contribute to the financing of the operation. Where expenditure is charged to the Member States, the cost is divided according to gross national product, unless the Council unanimously decides otherwise.