Politics in the Middle East Shaahid Hasan Jaffer

This 2000 word paper was written in 2011 for an assessment for a module entitled Politics in the Middle East in the third year of my Islamic Studies BA (Hons) at the Islamic College in London. It belongs to me and has been submitted to various plagiarism software so please do not use it in part/whole as part of graded work. It is for information purposes only. Feel free to contact me on shjiran@hotmail.com with feedback/comments.

The success of Hizbullah Since its formation in response to the Israeli invasion and subsequent occupation of Southern Lebanon in the early 1980s, Hizbullah has remained a force to be reckoned with in the Arab Israeli conflict. This paper will attempt to explore some of the reasons they have succeeded where many other resistance movements and even state armies have failed, and why their power and influence appears to be growing till today.

Since 1985, Hizbullah has effectively been the only Lebanese resistance, state-sanctioned or otherwise, waging war on the Israeli Defence Force (IDF). In June 2000, the organization achieved its biggest success to date, when the UN confirmed that Israeli forces had withdrawn completely from southern Lebanon. This helped to cement Hizbullahs position in the eyes of the general populace as the primary defenders of Lebanon against Israeli occupation. Its power and influence has increased exponentially, to the extent that former Israeli defence minister Moshe Arens wrote in Haaretz article in 2004 that a recent prisoner swap between Hizbullah and Israel was a second victory for the former. The first, he said, was when Ehud Barak decided to pull the IDF out of Southern Lebanon. Two victories in four years over one of the worlds most powerful armies speaks volumes for how Hizbullah had come to be regarded, even by its enemies.

The reason for Hizbullahs military success lies in its guerilla tactics, which rely heavily on Fourth Generation Warfare, a term defined by American analysts led by William S. Lind in 1989. It refers to a move back to uncontrolled, decentralized combat, with less emphasis on the armies of nation states and more on ideological networks using violence to further their aims. This type of warfare leads to a blurring of lines between civilians and fighters, and often leads to heavy civilian casualties. For example, during the 2006 conflict between Hizbullah and Israel, the former reported around 250 fighters dead and the latter 121. However, the Lebanon Higher Relief Council estimated that 1191 Lebanese civilians had died; and this played a part not only in turning a fair amount of international opinion against Israel, but also in providing further propoganda for Hizbullah.

It is almost impossible to defeat a guerilla organisation, regardless of the strength of the opposing army. The U.S.s infamous struggle against the Vietcong in Vietnam and the Soviet Unions humiliation by the Afghan Mujahideen provide but two examples of this.

This guerilla warfare is ideal for Hizbullahs backers; primarily Syria and Iran. Hizbullah allows Syria to maintain some influence in Lebanon, as well as the ability to strike at Israel through a proxy. Thus Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has provided more vocal and open support for the organisation than his late father and predecessor Hafez al-Assad. Al-Assad seems to use the group as a proxy; an alternative to a direct confrontation over the thorny issue of the Golan Heights. Love says that Hizbullah was elevated to the status of strategic partner by Bashar al-Assad.(2010, p.3). Hizbullahs loyalty to Syria was evident when the group organized a pro-Syrian march in opposition to the Cedar Revolution which occurred after the assassination of former Lebanese premier Rafik Hariri.

More important however, is Hizbullahs relationship with Iran. It was, of course, with Irans backing that Hizbullah was established. As part of Ayatullah Khomeinis attempt to export the Islamic revolution, Iranian Revolutionary Guards were sent to Lebanon to establish the organization and train its first batch of fighters. Iran thus was instrumental in the formation of Hizbullah, and according to an article in The Washington Post, even today supports the organization to the tune of $200 million a year.

The Telegraph reported in 2006 that Iran, through its Martyrs Foundation, had begun to pay compensation to the families of Hizbullah fighters killed or wounded in the conflict with Israel. The same foundation covers all the medical expenses for wounded fighters, and contributes 70% to those of civilians injured in the conflict. (Harik 2005, p.83)

There is no doubt that the assistance, politically but more importantly financially, that Iran and Syria provide is vital to Hizbullahs success. However, this is not to say that the group does not have other channels from which to raise money. Donations from wealthy Lebanese expatriates funnel millions of dollars to the group every year. This hit the headlines in 2004 when a plane containing an estimated $2million in cash cashed en route from Benin to Beirut. The group is also helped by Zakat contributions (a 2.5% religious tax imposed by Islam), or through donations to the numerous collection boxes situated in shops banks, on street corners and in mosques all over Lebanon. (Jaber 1997 p.151). Hizbullah also has diverse business interests, from running Western Union offices (Levitt 2005 p.11) to manufacturing clothing. Allegedly, they are also involved in the illegal drug trade in South America and West Africa. (Love 2010 p.28)

However, what really sets Hizbullah apart from other resistance groups is how this money is spent. Hizbullah has successfully implemented Maoist tactics on guerilla warfare. Mao taught that guerilla warfare could not flourish if it separated itself from the sympathies and thus co-operation of the masses. Hizbullah have thus cleverly filled the vacuum created by ineffective state service to poorer areas by implementing a social programme; spending 50% of its 2007 budget on social services. (Love 2010 p.21) This programme is heavily concentrated on, but not exclusive to, poorer Shiite areas around the Hizbullah heartland of southern Lebanon. This money is used to provide a variety of social services; from rebuilding private property damaged by Israeli attacks free of charge, to establishing schools, hospitals and support agencies for widows and the disabled. (Norton 2000, p.35) By Lebanese law, these hospitals cannot be free of charge, but the fees they charge are only a quarter of those commanded by state-run facilities. (Jaber 1997, p.159). Harik notes that Hizbullah even provides garbage disposal services, removing 300 tonnes of waste a day from Southern Beirut (2005, p.83). Hussein Shami, Hizbullahs director of social services, claimed that Hizbullah provides the major source of water for dahiyeh [Southern Beirut] residents. (Harik 2005 p.85) Above all, Hizbullah has largely managed to avoid financial scandals, and is widely admired for its corruption-free politics. (Norton 2000, p.33)

Aware that the majority of Lebanon is Muslim, with the largest single denomination being Shiites (who make up an estimated 40% of the population), Hizbullah, and their public face, Secretary General Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah often play heavily on the religious aspect of their struggle, drawing parallels between the story of the third Shiite Imam and grandson of the Prophet, Husayn b. Ali, who was martyred by the second Ummayid Caliph Yazid b. Muawiyyah, and the present day struggle against Israel. Norton notes the significance of this evocation: Reference to the Israeli occupiers as Yazidis equates them to the oppressors of Imam Husayn and thereby invokes the living memory of his death and inspires courage in those who revere him (Norton 2000 p.25)

Nasrallah himself is pivotal to Hizbullahs success. The Shiite cleric has been involved with Hizbullah since 1982, and was appointed its leader ten years later, following the assassination of his predecessor, Sayyid Abbas alMusawi. His fiery yet eloquent speeches railing against Western intervention in the Arab world as well as perceived injustices perpetrated by Israel have struck a chord with Muslims the world over. It is interesting to note how he chooses to speak in the traditional Arabic dialect (Fusha) rather than the Arabic dialect specific to Lebanon, no doubt in an attempt to make his message understandable and accessible to as wide an audience as possible.

Nasrallah, and Hizbullah in general, also attempt to attract non-Shiite support for their cause. For example, the organizations stance on nonMuslims has softened in recent years. In its charter, it called on nonMuslims to embrace Islam as well as for the eventual establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon, but in 2004, Nasrallah told a reporter from The New York Review of Books:

We believe the requirement for an Islamic state is to have an overwhelming popular desire, and were not talking about fifty percent plus one, but a large majority. And this is not available in Lebanon and probably never will be.

In the leadup to the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, Shaykh Nabil Qaouk (leader of the resistance forces), Nasrallah, and other delegates from Hizbullah, held meetings with Christian clerics to inform them that this was a national victory, not a sectarian one. Nasrallah had been attempting to paint Hizbullah victories as belonging to all of Lebanon as early as 1996, when in an interview with the Christian Lebanese Broadcasting Company (LBC), he said:

The resistance is our right as much as it is yours. It is our duty and your duty. We are fighting on behalf of a people, a nation and a government.

Gestures and statements such as these have contributed to an upsurge in support for the organization outside of its traditional support base in recent years. In April 2005, a Zogby poll asking whether Hizbullah should be disarmed found that only 18% of Maronites and 3% of Sunnis agreed unconditionally (contrasted with 0% of Shiites).1 This concerted outreach effort and the broadened support it entails has no doubt contributed to Hizbullahs success in recent years. A movement cannot rely on only 40% of the population of its home country, especially if that number consists of the weakest and poorest of society.

An essential part of any resistance movement is propaganda and the ensuing battle for hearts and minds. Hizbullah has striven to win support with its weekly newspaper, Al-Ahad, its radio station, Al-Nour, and its television station, Al-Manar, famous for showing tapes of fighters in action. Since 1996, Al-Manar, aware that its signal can be picked up in Israel, has even begun to broadcast in Hebrew. (Harik 2005, p.161)

Zogby International/ Information International/ The Arab American Institute. Methodology: Interviews with 600 adults in Lebanon. N.B. The figures were somewhat higher when the same question was posed with conditions attached, e.g. if peace exists, or if Hizballah agrees.

Ultimately however, any movement which refuses to move into the mainstream political arena will find itself sidelined and marginalized. Thus, in 1992, Hizbullah fielded candidates in the Lebanese parliamentary elections for the first time. In 2005, Hizbullah won 14 seats in a parliament of 128, and a Hizbullah-Amal coalition won all 23 seats in Southern Lebanon. In January 2011, whilst Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri was in Washington meeting U.S. President Barack Obama, The March 8 Alliance, of which Hizbullah is a key member, became the ruling coalition and successfully nominated Najib Mikati as the new Prime Minister, causing the collapse of Hariris government. Effectively, Hizbullah, still shy of the thirtieth anniversary of its creation, had become kingmakers in one of the most strategically important countries in the most volatile region in the world.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Arens, M. (2004) Hizbullah 2, Israel 0, Haaretz, February 16, 2004. Coughlin, C. (2006) Teheran fund pays war compensation to Hizbollah families, The Daily Telegraph, 4 August 2006. Available from: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1525593/Teheran-fund-payswar-compensation-to-Hizbollah-families.html [Accessed 14 April 2011] Deeb, L (2006) An enchanted modern: Gender and public piety in Shii Lebanon, Princeton University Press, New Jersey Harik, J.P. (2005) Hezbollah: The changing face of terrorism, I.B. Tauris, London Jaber, H. (1997) Hezbollah: Born with a vengeance, Columbia University Press, New York Levitt, M. (2005) Hezbollah: Financing terror through criminal enterprise (testimony given to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate), available from: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/html/pdf/hezbollah-testimony05252005.pdf [accessed 14 April 2011] Love, J.B. (2010) Hezbollah: Social services as a source of power, JSOU Report 10-5, available from: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2010/1006_jsoureport-10-5.pdf [accessed 14 April 2011] Shatz, A. (2004) In search of Hezbollah, The New York Review of Books, March 31 2004. Available from: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2004/apr/29/in-search-ofhezbollah/?pagination=false [Accessed 14 April 2011]

Norton, R.A. (2000) Hizballah and the Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon. Journal of Palestine Studies (p.22-35)

Wilson, S. (2004) Lebanese wary of a Rising Hezbollah, The Washington Post, December 24, 2004

No author (undated): Hizbullah charter. Available from: http://www.standwithus.com/pdfs/flyers/hezbollah_program.pdf [accessed 14 April 2011]