Targeted Killings AC Torrey Barber Limit the debate to terrorists since most literature on the topic is specific to terrorism

and we should focus on that literature base. The value is MORALITY as based on the value premise of the resolution since it specifically targets a question of moral permissibility. The standard is UTILITARIANISM. Maximizing utility allows us to understand that using targeted killing is a morally permissible foreign policy tool.

Moral rights and wrongs are based on consequences proves util is best
Conrad D. Johnson, 'The Authority of the Moral Agent', Journal of Philosophy 82, No 8 (August 1985), pp. 391 If we follow the usual deontological conception, there are also well-known difficulties. If it is simply wrong to kill the innocent, the wrongness must in some way be connected to the consequences. That an innocent person is killed must be a consequence that has some important bearing on the wrongness of the action; else why be so concerned about the killing of an innocent? Further, if it is wrong in certain cases for the agent to weigh the consequences in deciding whether to kill or to break a promise, it is hard to deny that this has some connection to the consequences. Following one line of thought, it is consequentialist considerations of mistrust that stand behind such restrictions on what the agent may take into account. AND

Respecting the equal moral worth of all individuals requires consequentialism.

David Cummiskey, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Bates College. Kantian Consequentialism. 1996. FURTHERS According to Kant, the objective end of moral action is the existence of rational beings. Respect for rational beings requires that in deciding what to do, one must give appropriate practical consideration to the unconditional value of rational beings and to the conditional value of happiness. Since agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale, the most natural interpretation of the demand that one give equal respect to all rational beings leads to a consequentialist normative theory. We have seen that there is no sound Kantian reason for abandoning this natural consequentialist interpretation. In particular, a consequentialist interpretation does not require sacrifices that a Kantian ought to consider unreasonable, and it does not involve doing evil so that good may come of it. It simply requires an uncompromising commitment to the equal value and equal claims of all rational beings and a recognition that in the moral consideration of conduct, one's own subjective concerns do not have overriding importance.

AND Life is the end toward which all purposeful action is directed.
Douglas Den Uyl and Douglas Rasmussen, Prof.s Philosophy Bellarmine and St. Johns, 1981, Reading Nozick, p. 244-245 Why should this be the standard for moral evaluation? Why must this be the ultimate moral value? Why not "death" or "the greatest happiness for the greatest number"? Man's life must be the standard for judging moral value because this is the end toward which all goal-directed action (in this case purposive action) is directed, and we have already shown why goal-directed behavior depends on life. Indeed, one cannot make a choice without implicitly choosing life as the end. If the affirmative proves that the use of targeted killings is morally permissible you affirm. I CONTEND that the use of targeted killings is a morally permissible foreign policy tool.

Targeted killings are far better than the alternatives.

Jonathan Ulrich, received his J.D. from the University of Virginia School of Law in 2005, and his A.B., cum laude, from Princeton University in 2002. He works as an associate in the International Arbitration Group of White & Case, LLP, in Washington, D.C., The Gloves Were Never On: Defining the President's Authority to Order Targeted Killing in the War Against Terrorism 2005 The foregoing examination of the basic requirements of the law of armed conflict reveals, in the words of one commentator, that "targeted killing is the most natural application of the principles of jus in bello in wars against terror." n112 The practice of assassination, even when justified by the exigencies and laws of war, is not often viewed as a morally defensible use of force. And yet, the comparatively widespread acceptance of the higher combatant deaths and collateral damage associated with conventional conflict is more at odds with the basic jus in bello precept of limited war: The moral legitimacy of targeted killing becomes even clearer when compared to the alternative means of fighting terror that is, the massive invasion of the community that shelters and supports the terrorists in an attempt to catch or kill the terrorists and destroy their [*1054] infrastructure... Hence, targeted killing is the preferable method not only because, on a utilitarian calculation, it saves lives - a very weighty moral consideration - but also because it is more commensurate with a fundamental condition of justified self-defense, namely, that those killed are responsible for the threat posed. n113 Targeted killing preserves not only the lives of civilians caught up in the conflict by combatants who often refuse to fight in the open, but also those of the troops who must engage these terrorists. n114 By directing the use of force at only those individuals who threaten U.S. soldiers and civilians, targeted killing more efficiently destroys the terrorists' ability to wage war and inflict terror, while ensuring that collateral damage is kept to a minimum. This is the very essence of limited war as prescribed by jus in bello.

AND

Targeted killings should be morally preferred they kill much less than other methods of war
Daniel Statman, Department of Philosophy, University of Haifa, The Morality of Assassination: A reply to Gross, Political Studies (2003) vol. 51. pp. 775-779, Ebsco Third, while assassination does involve some moral risk, it also has a chance of achieving better results from a moral point of view. Think of a battle in a conventional war against an enemy unit. Assume it can be won either by bombing the unit from the air, killing 200 soldiers, or by having its headquarters targeted by an intelligent missile, killing most of the commanders of the unit say, 25 officers. If both tactics could achieve the same result, then surely the second tactic should be morally preferred. Similarly, if Bin Laden and 30 of his close partners had been targeted, that would have been far better than killing thousands of people and causing enormous damage in Afghanistan, in a war whose contribution to the cessation of world terror is far from clear. AND

TKs cripple terrorist organizations

Daniel L. Byman, Professor at Georgetown University and Research Director of the Saban Center at Brookings Institution, The Targeted Killings Debate, Expert Roundup, Council on Foreign Relations, June 8, 2011, http://www.cfr.org/international-peace-and-security/targetedkillings-debate/p25230 Killing terrorist leaders and key lieutenants not only brings justice to our enemies, but can devastate the group in question. Killing a leader like bin Laden removes a charismatic yet pragmatic leader--one who succeeded in transforming a small group into a household name and proved time and again he could attract recruits and funding. His replacement, be it Ayman alZawahiri or another senior al-Qaeda figure, may prove less charismatic and less able to unify this fissiparous movement. Some existing affiliates and cells may split off, and the core might be eclipsed by rivals. Less dramatic, but no less important, is a campaign against lieutenants and bomb-makers, passport-forgers, travel-facilitators, and others whose skills cannot easily be replaced--essentially what the United States has been doing since the end of the Bush administration in Pakistan through drone strikes. When these individuals are hit, and hit again, it is possible to exhaust the terrorist group's bench. During the Second Intifada, Israel found that initial strikes against Palestinian cell leaders and bomb-makers had only a limited impact on the terrorist groups it faced, as eager replacements quickly took over. Eventually, however, there was a bottom to the barrel and less skilled, less motivated people took over. An often-neglected impact of killing terrorist leaders is on what they and their group do not do. When a campaign against lieutenants is in full-gear, they must spend much of their time in hiding or moving from place to place. Communicating by phone becomes risky, and the circle of trust shrinks, making meetings or large-scale training harder to pull off. The hunt for spies within can become all-

consuming. In the end, leaders are less able to lead, and the group's cohesion and strategic direction suffer. Thus, you affirm.