CANON 10

A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS, AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. A lawyer is, first and foremost, an officer of the court. A lawyers conduct before the court should be characterized by candor and fairness. The administration of justice would gravely suffer if lawyers do not act with complete candor and honesty before the courts. Hence, the burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. CLARITA J. SAMALA vs. ATTY. LUCIANO D. VALENCIA, A.C. No. 5439, January 22, 2007

Respondent failed to comply with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. It matters not that the trial court was not misled by respondent's submission of TCT No. 273020 in the name of Valdez, as shown by its decision dated January 8, 2002 dismissing the complaint for ejectment. What is decisive in this case is respondent's intent in trying to mislead the court by presenting TCT No. 273020 despite the fact that said title was already cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 275500, was already issued in the name of Alba. A lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice. As such, he should make himself more an exemplar for others to emulate. Accordingly, the Court finds respondent Atty. Luciano D. Valencia guilty of misconduct and violation of Canons 21, 10 and 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is suspended from the practice of law for three (3) years, effective immediately upon receipt of herein Resolution. Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will "do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court" and he shall "conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients." He should bear in0 mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion. The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his client's rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his client's cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth. (Young v. Batuegas, A.C. 5379, May 2003) CONRADO QUE vs. ATTY. ANASTACIO REVILLA, JR., A.C. No. 7054, December 4, 2009

The respondent took advantage of his position and the trust reposed in him by his clients (who are all squatters) to convince them to support, through their affidavits, his false claims on what allegedly transpired in the June 28, 2002 hearing. For these acts, we find the respondent liable under Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 the Code of Professional Responsibility for violating the lawyers duty to observe candor and fairness in his dealings with the court. This provision states: CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT

Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be misled by an artifice. Likewise, the respondent violated his duty as an attorney and his oath as a lawyer "never to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law." The respondent failed to remember that his duty as an officer of the court makes him an indispensable participant in the administration of justice, and that he is expected to act candidly, fairly and truthfully in his work. His duty as a lawyer obligates him not to conceal the truth from the court, or to mislead the court in any manner, no matter how demanding his duties to his clients may be. In case of conflict, his duties to his client yield to his duty to deal candidly with the court Wherefore, Anastacio Revilla, Jr. is found liable for professional misconduct for violations of the Lawyers Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and hold that the respondent should be DISBARRED from the practice of law. RUDECON MANAGEMENT CORPORATION and ATTY. RUDEGELIO D. TACORDA vs. ATTY. MANUEL N. CAMACHO, A.C. No. 6403, August 31, 2004

Rudecon Management Corporation and Atty. Rudegelio D. Tacorda filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a verified complaint for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law against Atty. Manuel N. Camacho for knowingly committing forum-shopping, in violation of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 in relation to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 7, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent filed his Answer to the instant complaint. He denies the allegations of complainant and contends that he is not guilty of forum shopping. He claims that the Answer in Intervention filed with Branch 78 in Civil Case No. Q-98-35326 and the Complaint filed with Branch 79 in Civil Case No. Q-9835444 do not involve the same issues and reliefs prayed for and that he did not resort to the filing of both actions in order to increase the chances of his client obtaining a favorable decision. The court agree with respondent that there was no intention on his part to mislead the court by concealing the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-98-35444 in Branch 79 when they filed the Motion for Intervention and Answer in Intervention in Civil Case No. Q-98-35326 in Branch 78. Indeed, the first paragraph of the said Answer in Intervention shows that respondent and his client called the trial courts attention with respect to the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-98-35444. Herein complainant, which is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-98-35326, does not dispute respondents allegation that the latter and his client attached to their Answer in Intervention a copy of their complaint in Civil Case No. Q-98-35444. In administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is clearly preponderant evidence and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. Moreover, an administrative case against a lawyer must show the dubious character of the act done as well as of the motivation thereof. In the present case, complainant failed to present clear and preponderant evidence to show that respondent willfully and deliberately resorted to falsehood and unlawful and dishonest conduct in violation of the standards of honesty as provided for by the Code of Professional Responsibility which would have warranted the imposition of administrative sanction against him. Wherefore, Resolution No. XVI-2004-43 dated February 27, 2004 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is set aside and the instant administrative case filed against Atty. Manuel N. Camacho is dismissed for lack of merit.

OLGA M. SAMSON vs. JUDGE VIRGILIO G. CABALLERO, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2138, August 5, 2009

This is an administrative complaint for dishonesty and falsification of a public document against respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30, Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija. In her complaint, complainant Olga M. Samson alleged that respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero should not have been appointed to the judiciary for lack of the constitutional qualifications of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence2, and for violating the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) which disqualifies from nomination any applicant for judgeship with a pending administrative case. According to the complainant, respondent, during his JBC interviews, deliberately concealed the fact that he had pending administrative charges against him. Since membership in the bar is an integral qualification for membership in the bench, the moral fitness of a judge also reflects his moral fitness as a lawyer. A judge who disobeys the basic rules of judicial conduct also violates his oath as a lawyer. In this particular case, respondents dishonest act was against the lawyers oath to "do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court." Respondents misconduct likewise constituted a contravention of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which strictly enjoins a lawyer from committing acts of deceit, otherwise, he may be suspended or disbarred. Thus: SEC. 270. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied) It cannot be denied that respondents dishonesty did not only affect the image of the judiciary, it also put his moral character in serious doubt and rendered him unfit to continue in the practice of law. Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of law. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those counted within its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. The first step towards the successful implementation of the Courts relentless drive to purge the judiciary of morally unfit members, officials and personnel necessitates the imposition of a rigid set of rules of conduct on judges. The Court is extraordinarily strict with judges because, being the visible representation of the law, they should set a good example to the bench, bar and students of the law. The standard of integrity imposed on them is and should be higher than that of the average person for it is their integrity that gives them the right to judge. Wherefore, we find respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, Cabanatuan City, guilty of dishonesty and falsification of an official document. He is ordered

dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Respondent is likewise disbarred for violation of Canons 1 and 11 and Rules 1.01 and 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. ISIDRA TING-DUMALI vs. ATTY. ROLANDO S. TORRES, A.C. No. 5161, April 14, 2004

Complainant Isidra Ting-Dumali charges respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres with presentation of false testimony; participation in, consent to, and failure to advise against, the forgery of complainants signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement; and gross misrepresentation in court for the purpose of profiting from such forgery, thereby violating his oath as a lawyer and the canons of legal and judicial ethics. In his Comment, the respondent denies the allegations of the complaint and asserts that he did not take advantage of his profession to deprive any of the co-heirs of his wife of the estate left by his parentsin-law. The records show that Felicisima and Miriam stated in the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated 11 November 1986 that they are the children of Julita Reynante and thus adjudicated only between them Lot No. 1586 to the exclusion of their other siblings. There was concealment of the fact that there were other compulsory heirs to the estate of the deceased. Significantly, the respondent is the brother-in-law of complainant. Being married to complainants sister, he knew of his wifes siblings. In fact, he declared that the complainant stayed with them while she was in the Philippines. Yet, the respondent presented that document to the Register of Deeds of General Trias, Cavite, to effect the transfer of the title of the lot in question in the name of his wife and his sister-in-law Miriam. Under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer owes candor, fairness, and good faith to the court. He shall "not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice." This Rule was clearly and openly violated by the respondent when he permitted Marcelina to falsely testify that she had no siblings aside from Felicisima and when he offered such testimony in the petition for reconstitution of the title involving Lot 1605. The respondent must have forgotten that as an attorney he is an officer of the court called upon to assist in the administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its cause. For this reason, any act on his part that obstructs and impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against him. Respondents acts or omissions reveal his moral flaws and doubtless bring intolerable dishonor to the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct for which he may be disbarred or suspended pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. In the determination of the imposable disciplinary sanction against an erring lawyer, we take into account the primary purpose of disciplinary proceedings, which is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable, and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. While the assessment of what sanction may be imposed is primarily addressed to our sound discretion, the sanction should neither be arbitrary or despotic, nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice. Rather, it should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the bar.

Thus, the supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. We will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for it. Verily, given the peculiar factual circumstances prevailing in this case, we find that respondents gross misconduct calls for the severance of his privilege to practice law for life, and we therefore adopt the penalty recommended by the Investigating Commissioner. In view of all the foregoing, we find respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the lawyers oath, as well as Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered disbarred from the practice of law, and his name is ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately. ARTURO L. SICAT vs. ATTY. GREGORIO E. ARIOLA, JR., A.C. No. 5864, April 15, 2005

Complainant Arturo L. Sicat, a Board Member of the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Rizal, charged respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, the Municipal Administrator of Cainta, Rizal, with violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility by committing fraud, deceit and falsehood in his dealings, particularly the notarization of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed by a one Juanito C. Benitez. According to complainant, respondent made it appear that Benitez executed the said document on January 4, 2001 when in fact the latter had already died on October 25, 2000. The records show that Benitez died on October 25, 2000. However, respondent notarized the SPA, purportedly bearing the signature of Benitez, on January 4, 2001 or more than two months after the latter's death. The notarial acknowledgement of respondent declared that Benitez "appeared before him and acknowledged that the instrument was his free and voluntary act." Clearly, respondent lied and intentionally perpetuated an untruthful statement. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routinary act.13 It converts a private document into a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution.14 Neither will respondent's defense that the SPA in question was superfluous and unnecessary, and prejudiced no one, exonerate him of accountability. His assertion of falsehood in a public document contravened one of the most cherished tenets of the legal profession and potentially cast suspicion on the truthfulness of every notarial act. As the Municipal Administrator of Cainta, he should have been aware of his great responsibility not only as a notary public but as a public officer as well. A public office is a public trust. Respondent should not have caused disservice to his constituents by consciously performing an act that would deceive them and the Municipality of Cainta. Without the fraudulent SPA, the erring parties in the construction project could not have encashed the check amounting to P3,700,000 and could not have foisted on the public a spurious contract all to the extreme prejudice of the very Municipality of which he was the Administrator. According to the COA Special Task Force: Almost all acts of falsification of public documents as enumerated in Article 171 in relation to Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code were evident in the transactions of the Municipality of Cainta with J.C. Benitez & Architects Technical Management for the consultancy services in the conduct of Detailed Feasibility Study and Detailed Engineering Design of the Proposed Construction of Cainta Municipal Medium Rise Low Cost Housing, in the contract amount of P11,000,000. The agent resorted to misrepresentation, manufacture or fabrication of fictitious document, untruthful narration of facts, misrepresentation, and counterfeiting or imitating signature for the purpose of creating a fraudulent contract. All these were tainted with deceit perpetrated against the government resulting to undue injury. The first and partial payment, in the amount of P3,700,000.00 was made in the absence of the required outputs. x x x

Wherefore, respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, Jr., is found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby disbarred from the practice of law. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered in the records of respondent, and brought to the immediate attention of the Ombudsman. WILFREDO T. GARCIA vs. ATTY. BENIAMINO A. LOPEZ, A.C. No. 6422, August 28, 2007

Complainant Atty. Wilfredo T. Garcia charged respondent Atty. Beniamino A. Lopez with violation of his oath as a member of the bar and officer of the court, and misrepresentation, amounting to perjury and prayed that respondent be suspended or disbarred. Complainant was the counsel of Sarmiento, the original applicant. Upon her death, the attorney-client relationship was terminated. However, complainant was retained as counsel by Gina Jarvia and Alfredo Ku. In filing an entry of appearance with motion of postponement in behalf of the "compulsory heirs of the late Angelita Sarmiento" when in truth he was merely representing some of the heirs but not all of them, respondent were guilty of misrepresentation which could have deceived the court. He had no authorization to represent all the heirs. He clearly violated his lawyer's oath that he will "do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court." Respondent failed to observe the foregoing rules. He made it appear that he was entering his appearance as counsel for all the heirs of Sarmiento which was highly unfair to complainant who had worked on the case from the very beginning (i.e. since 1996) and who had not been discharged as such. It is true that without the formal withdrawal of complainant as counsel of record, respondent would merely be considered as collaborating counsel. Nevertheless, by being less than candid about whom he was representing, respondent undeniably encroached upon the legal functions of complainant as the counsel of record. We cannot casually brush aside what respondent did. Even assuming that it was not a calculated deception, he was still remiss in his duty to his fellow lawyer and the court. He should have been more careful about his actuation since the court was relying on him in its task of ascertaining the truth. Wherefore, respondent Atty. Beniamino A. Lopez is hereby suspended from the practice of law for one (1) month for violating Canons 8 and 10, Rules 8.02 and 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is warned that the commission of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely. RENATO M. MALIGAY vs. ATTY. ANTONIO G. DORONILLA, JR., A.C. No. 6198, September 15, 2006

Maligaya filed a complaint against Atty. Doronilla which charged him with "misleading the court through misrepresentation of facts resulting [in] obstruction of justice". Complainant swore before the investigating commissioner that he had never entered into any agreement to withdraw his lawsuits. Atty. Doronilla, who took up the larger part of two hearings to present evidence and explain his side, admitted several times that there was, in fact, no such agreement. Later he explained in his memorandum that his main concern was "to settle the case amicably among comrades in arms without going to trial" and insisted that there was no proof of his having violated the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyer's oath. He pointed out, in addition, that his false statement (or, as he put it, his "alleged acts of falsity") had no effect on the continuance of the case and therefore caused no actual prejudice to complainant. By stating untruthfully in open court that complainant had agreed to withdraw his lawsuits, Atty. Doronilla breached these peremptory tenets of ethical conduct. Not only that, he violated the lawyer's

oath to "do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court," of which Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 are but restatements. His act infringed on every lawyer's duty to "never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law." The suspension referred to in the foregoing provision (Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court) means only suspension from the practice of law. For this reason, we disagree with the IBP's recommendation for Atty. Doronilla's suspension from the government military service. After all, the only purpose of this administrative case is to determine Atty. Doronilla's liability as a member of the legal profession, not his liability as a legal officer in the military service. Thus, it would be improper for us to order, as a penalty for his breach of legal ethics and the lawyer's oath, his suspension from employment in the Judge Advocate General's Service. Of course, suspension from employment as a military legal officer may well follow as a consequence of his suspension from the practice of law but that should not be reason for us to impose it as a penalty for his professional misconduct. We would be going beyond the purpose of this proceeding were we to do so. Therefore, we shall treat the IBP's recommendation as one for suspension from the practice of law. At any rate, we are not inclined to adopt the IBP's recommendation on the duration of Atty. Doronilla's suspension. We need to consider a few circumstances that mitigate his liability somewhat. First, we give him credit for exhibiting enough candor to admit, during the investigation, the falsity of the statement he had made in Judge Daway's courtroom. Second, the absence of material damage to complainant may also be considered as a mitigating circumstance. And finally, since this is Atty. Doronilla's first offense, he is entitled to some measure of forbearance. Nonetheless, his unrepentant attitude throughout the conduct of this administrative case tells us that a mere slap on the wrist is definitely not enough. Atty. Doronilla, it seems, needs time away from the practice of law to recognize his error and to purge himself of the misbegotten notion that an effort to compromise justifies the sacrifice of truthfulness in court. Wherefore, Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. is hereby suspended from the practice of law for two monthes. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar misconduct shall be dealt with more severely. ANTONIO CONLU vs. ATTY. IRENEO AREDONIA, JR., A.C. No. 4955, September 12, 2011

A complaint for disbarment with a prayer for damages was instituted by Antonio Conlu (Antonio) against Atty. Ireneo Aredonia, Jr. (Atty. Ireneo) on grounds of gross negligence and dereliction of sworn duty. Atty. Ireneo had doubtless been languid in the performance of his duty as Antonios counsel. He neglected, without reason, to file the appellants brief before the CA. He failed, in short, to exert his utmost ability and to give his full commitment to maintain and defend Antonios right. Antonio, by choosing Atty. Ireneo to represent him, relied upon and reposed his trust and confidence on the latter, as his counsel, to do whatsoever was legally necessary to protect Antonios interest, if not to secure a favorable judgment. Once they agree to take up the cause of a client, lawyers, regardless of the importance of the subject matter litigated or financial arrangements agreed upon, owe fidelity to such cause and should always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on them. And to add insult to injury, Atty. Ireneo appeared not to have taken any effort to personally apprise Antonio of the dismissal of the appeal, however personally embarrassing the cause for the dismissal might have been. As mentioned earlier, Antonio came to know about the outcome of his appeal only after his wife took the trouble of verifying the case status when she came to Manila. By then, all remedies had been lost.

It must be remembered that a retained counsel is expected to serve the client with competence and diligence. This duty includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsels care and giving the client sound legal advice, but also properly representing the client in court, attending scheduled hearings, preparing and filing required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so. The lawyer should not be sitting idly by and leave the rights of the client in a state of uncertainty. We cannot write finis to this case without delving into and addressing Atty. Ireneos defiant stance against the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of its resolution to file his comment on the basic complaint. After requesting and securing no less than three (3) extensions of time to file his comment, he simply closed, so to speak, communication lines. And when ordered to give an explanation through a show-cause directive for not complying, he asked for and was granted a 30-day extension. But the required comment never came. When the Court eventually directed the NBI to arrest him, he just left his last known address and could not be located. The Courts patience has been tested to the limit by what in hindsight amounts to a lawyers impudence and disrespectful bent. At the minimum, members of the legal fraternity owe courts of justice respect, courtesy and such other becoming conduct so essential in the promotion of orderly, impartial and speedy justice. What Atty. Ireneo has done was the exact opposite. What is clear to the Court by now is that Ireneo was determined all along not to submit a comment and, in the process, delay the resolution of the instant case. By asking several extensions of time to submit one, but without the intention to so submit, Ireneo has effectively trifled with the Courts processes, if not its liberality. This cannot be tolerated. It cannot be allowed to go unpunished, if the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice is to be maintained. And to be sure, Atty. Ireneo can neither defeat this Courts jurisdiction over him as a member of the bar nor evade administrative liability by the mere ruse of concealing his whereabouts Wherefore, respondent Atty. Ireneo Aredonia, Jr. is declared guilty of inexcusable negligence, attempting to mislead the appellate court, misuse of Court processes, and willful disobedience to lawful orders of the Court. He is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective upon his receipt of this Resolution, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. HON. MARIANO S. MACIAS vs. ATTY. ALANIXON A. SELDA, A.C. No. 6442, October 21, 2004

Judge Mariano S. Macias, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a Petition for Administrative Discipline against Atty. Alanixon A. Selda. Respondent Selda withdrew as counsel for one Norma T. Lim. He basically submitted as ground for his withdrawal that he could not cope up with the pace of the proceedings in view of his workload. In light of these representations, complainant granted the Motion and ordered respondent relieved of all his responsibilities as counsel for private protestee. However, respondent executed an affidavit disavowing his grounds for withdrawing as counsel for private protestee. He swore that he only filed the Motion on account of the pre-judgment of the case by complainant, who, on several occasions insinuated to him that his client would lose in the protest. He stated that he was convinced that chaos would result if his client was unseated, and withdrawal from the case was his best recourse. On the basis of respondents affidavit, his former client and private protestee in subject election protest case, moved for the inhibition of complainant. Complainant granted the motion for his inhibition

if only to disabuse any doubt on his impartiality. But, eventually this Court set aside complainants inhibition after finding no strong and valid reason therefor, and directed him to continue hearing the case and to resolve it with reasonable dispatch. Deploring the act of respondent as "serious deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct as a lawyer and in utter violation of the lawyers oath," complainant requested the IBP to investigate the matter and recommend to the Court an appropriate penalty against respondent. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline required respondent to answer. He failed. Hence, the court affirms the findings of the IBP on the culpability of respondent. All members of the legal profession made a solemn oath to, inter alia, "do no falsehood" and "conduct [themselves] as [lawyers] according to the best of [their] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [their] clients." These particular fundamental principles are reflected in the Code of Professional. When respondent executed his affidavit retracting his reason for withdrawing as counsel for Norma T. Lim, he acknowledged, under oath, his misrepresentation. He misled the court in clear violation of his oath as lawyer and failed to abide by the Code of Professional Responsibility. Candor towards the courts is a cardinal requirement of the practicing lawyer. In fact, this obligation to the bench for candor and honesty takes precedence. Thus, saying one thing in his Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for Private Protestee and another in his subsequent affidavit is a transgression of this imperative which necessitates appropriate punishment. The appropriate penalty to be imposed on an errant attorney involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the facts of the case. The circumstances in this case demand that respondent be imposed suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year. This serves the purpose of protecting the interest of the court, the legal profession and the public. For indeed, "if respect for the courts and for judicial process is gone or steadily weakened, no law can save us as a society." In view whereof, the February 27, 2004 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors in CBD Case No. 02-921 is affirmed with the modification that respondent Atty. Alanixon A. Selda is suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year, to commence upon receipt of this Decision. He is further sternly warned that a repetition of a similar offense will call for a more severe consequence. EDISON G. CHENG vs. ATTY. ALEXANDER M. AGRAVANTE, A.C. No. 6183, March 23, 2004

Respondent Atty. Alexander M. Agravante served as counsel for The Rogemson Co., Inc. (hereinafter, Rogemson) in a case filed against it before the National Labor Relations Commissions (NLRC) Regional Arbitration Branch No. XI in Davao City by its former employee, a certain Beaver Martin B. Barril. Labor Arbiter Newton R. Sancho, then, rendered a decision in favor of the complainant, and ordered Rogemson to pay Barril separation pay and backwages. A copy of said decision was received by respondents law office on September 8, 1998. However, respondent filed a Memorandum of Appeal with the NLRC only on September 22, 1998 Thereafter, complainants terminated the services of Atty. Agravante. Through their new lawyers, complainants wrote Atty. Agravante, demanding that they be compensated for the pecuniary damages they had suffered as a result of his negligence.2

When it appeared that Atty. Agravante had no intention of responding to their letter, Edison G. Cheng, General Manager of Rogemson, filed an affidavit-complaint with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. Agravante tells a different story. He neither admitted nor denied receiving the decision of the Labor Arbiter, instead, he alleges that he was out of town on said date and only returned to his office on September 10, 1998. Upon arriving at the office, his secretary handed to him all the correspondence addressed to him, including the envelope containing the Labor Arbiters decision. He alleges that there were several markings on this particular envelope, one of which was the date "September 10, 1998," and he allegedly assumed that this was the date of receipt by his office. He then informed Abelgas of the result of the case and the period within which to file a Memorandum of Appeal. The instruction for Rogemson to proceed with the appeal came a full six (6) days later. He offered the services of his law office for procuring the appeal bond, but he was informed that Rogemson would take care of it. He alleges that Rogemson furnished them with the bond only in the morning of September 22, 1998, although the bond documents were notarized on September 21, 1998. Before lawyers are admitted to the bar, they must first solemnly swear to do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court. This oath, to which all lawyers subscribe in solemn agreement to dedicate themselves to the pursuit of justice, is not a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law to be forgotten afterwards, nor is it mere words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that every lawyer must uphold and keep inviolable at all times. This duty is expressed in general terms in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Agravante lied when he said he received the Labor Arbiters decision on September 10, 1998 in order to make it appear that his Memorandum of Appeal was filed on time. It cannot be stressed enough how important it is for a lawyer as an officer of the court to observe honesty at all times, especially before the courts. A lawyer must be a disciple of truth, and Agravante has clearly failed to live up to this duty. In this case, respondents filing of the Memorandum of Appeal four (4) days after the deadline proves that his efforts fell short of the diligence required of a lawyer. His failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribed period constitutes negligence and malpractice proscribed by the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provide that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Agravantes insistence that it was not his place to file an appeal without express instructions from his client to do so is not persuasive. He could easily withdraw the appeal if his client should later decide not to pursue the same. Furthermore, the belated filing of the Memorandum of Appeal cannot in any way mitigate respondents liability; on the contrary, it shows ignorance on his part. As a lawyer, he ought to know that his Memorandum of Appeal, having been filed beyond the reglementary period, would surely be struck down for late filing. In sum, respondent utterly failed to perform his duties and responsibilities faithfully and well as to protect the rights and interests of his client. Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Alexander M. Agravante is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year and is fined in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos

(P10,000.00). He is sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. EDGAR O. PEREA vs. ATTY. RUBEN ALMADRO, A.C. No. 5246, March 20, 2003

This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Edgar O. Perea against Atty. Ruben Almadro for gross neglect of his duties as lawyer of herein complainant. Respondent was his counsel before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 99) where he (complainant Perea) is being charged with the crime of Frustrated Homicide. RTC issued an order granting Atty. Almadros motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence within ten (10) days from said date. All the while, complainant thought that respondent filed said demurrer and the case against him dismissed. It was only sometime in 1999 that complainant learned that Atty. Almadro failed to file any demurrer. The trial court ordered the herein complainant to present evidence in his defense. Later, a warrant was issued for his arrest prompting him to surrender to the court and post bail. Complainant suffered financially and emotionally due to respondents neglect of his duties. Respondent has not attended any of his hearings which led complainant to plead with respondent to withdraw formally as his counsel so he could hire another lawyer. Because of Atty. Almadros neglect, complainant is now facing the loss of his freedom and livelihood. Respondent filed three motions for extension of time to file comment. The Court resolved to grant the said motions with a warning that no further extensions shall be granted. Respondent, through the law firm Sua and Alambra, filed a Manifestation and Motion that respondent has not yet received a copy of the complaint hence it asked the Court to order the complainant to furnish them a copy. Respondent through said law firm submitted an Answer to the complaint, contending that: two days after the RTC granted the manifestation of defense to file motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence, he had finished the draft of the motion and the accompanying pleading which he stored in a magnetic computer diskette intended for editing prior to its submission in court; a few days before the deadline, herein respondent tried to retrieve the draft from the diskette but said drafts were nowhere to be found despite efforts to retrieve them; this led him to believe that the drafts must have been finalized and the edited versions accordingly filed since it is his practice to expunge from the diskette drafts that were already finalized and acted upon; meanwhile, the presiding judge of the RTC retired, as a consequence, actions on pending cases were held in abeyance; moreover, communications with the herein complainant had become rarer; thereafter, towards the end of 1997 up to the next five months of 1998, respondent was preoccupied with the congressional elections in Biliran where he ran and subsequently lost; then he was offered a position at the Philippine Stock Exchange as head of the Compliance and Surveillance Division which he accepted; his time and attention was spent in the performance of his demanding job at the PSE as well as in the preparation of his testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee in connection with the "BW" scam; anent the case of herein complainant, he offered on several occasions to withdraw as one of the defense counsel of the complainant even to the extent of offering to return his acceptance fee which the latter however refused;6 it is not true that complainant pleaded with respondent to withdraw as his counsel, the truth being that it was complainant who refused to let go of respondent as his counsel; also, while he is a counsel of complainant in the criminal case before the RTC, he was merely a collaborating counsel, the lead counsel being Atty. Solomon Villanueva; finally, he was actually mulling over the possible procedural steps to take with regard to complainants case when he received instead, a copy of the present complaint It is plain from the records that respondent lawyer failed to submit a demurrer to evidence for which he had earlier asked permission from the trial court and which his client, herein complainant was relying on. More than that, he failed to contact his client and to apprise the latter about the developments

of the case leaving complainant completely surprised and without any protection when years later, he received summons from the trial court asking him to present evidence in his defense and, not long after, the trial court issued a warrant for his arrest. Respondents negligence is compounded by his attempt to have this tribunal believe the story of how his draft, stored in a magnetic diskette, mysteriously disappeared and how the absence of such file in his diskette led him to believe that the same was already filed in court. In his Answer, he even tried to depict himself as a conscientious lawyer by stating that he was actually mulling on the procedural steps he would undertake regarding complainants case when instead he received a copy of this complaint for disbarment. Such story, as observed by the IBP, is not only outrageous but is contemptuous as it makes a mockery of the Court. Respondent would have this Court believe a very preposterous story of how his draft disappeared, all the time avoiding the simple fact that he failed to submit the necessary pleading before the trial court. Such behavior cannot be countenanced and deserves stern penalty therefor. The act of the IBP in requiring Atty. Kenton Sua and Atty. Alan Alambra to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court for deliberate falsehood and misrepresentation in the preparation of the Answer for herein respondent is appropriate. Records reveal that both Attys. Sua and Alambra have filed their joint Explanation. Wherefore, finding respondent Atty. Ruben Almadro guilty of serious neglect of his duties as a lawyer and of open disrespect for the court and the authority it represents, as embodied in Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year and fined in the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos, with a warning that any or similar acts of dishonesty would be dealt with more severely. Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved. A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of paper, language or argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved. If not faithfully or exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of the court may lose their proper and correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers and the public who may thereby be misled. ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS and POTENCIANO L. GALANIDA, G.R. No. 144412. November 18, 20030

This is a petition for review assailing the Decision of 27 April 2000 and the Resolution of 8 August 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51451. The Court of Appeals upheld the Decision of 18 September 1998 and the Resolution of 24 December 1998 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. V-000180-98. The NLRC modified the Decision dated 23 December 1997 of Labor Arbiter Dominador A. Almirante (Labor Arbiter) in NLRC Case No. RAB VII-05-0545-94 holding that Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank) illegally dismissed Potenciano L. Galanida (Galanida). The NLRC awarded Galanida separation pay, backwages, moral and exemplary damages, and other amounts totaling P1,264,933.33.

Private respondent Potenciano Galanida was hired by petitioner Allied Banking Corporation on 11 January 1978 and rose from accountant-book(k)eeper to assistant manager in 1991. His appointment was covered by a Notice of Personnel Action which provides as one of the conditions of employment the provision on petitioners right to transfer employees. Subsequently, petitioner bank informed private respondent that he was to report to the Tagbilaran City Branch effective 23 May 1994. Private respondent refused. After several hearings, the Labor Arbiter held that Allied Bank had abused its management prerogative in ordering the transfer of Galanida to its Bacolod and Tagbilaran branches. In ruling that Galanidas refusal to transfer did not amount to insubordination, the Labor Arbiter misquoted this Courts decision in Dosch v. NLRC thus: As a general rule, the right to transfer or reassign an employee is recognized as an employers exclusive right and the prerogative of management (Abbott Laboratories vs. NLRC, 154 SCRA 713 [1987]). The exercise of this right, is not however, absolute. It has certain limitations. Thus, in Helmut Dosch vs. NLRC, et al. 123 SCRA 296 (1983), the Supreme Court, ruled: While it may be true that the right to transfer or reassign an employee is an employers exclusive right and the prerogative of management, such right is not absolute. The right of an employer to freely select or discharge his employee is limited by the paramount police power xxx for the relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual but impressed with public interest. xxx And neither capital nor labor shall act oppressively against each other. Refusal to obey a transfer order cannot be considered insubordination where employee cited reason for said refusal, such (sic) as that of being away from the family. (Underscoring supplied by the Labor Arbiter) The Labor Arbiter reasoned that Galanidas transfer was inconvenient and prejudicial because Galanida would have to incur additional expenses for board, lodging and travel. On the other hand, the Labor Arbiter held that Allied Bank failed to show any business urgency that would justify the transfer. The Labor Arbiter order respondent Allied Banking Corporation to pay complainant the aggregate total amount of Three Hundred Twenty Four Thousand Pesos in their ruling. The NLRC concluded that Allied Bank dismissed Galanida in bad faith, tantamount to an unfair labor practice as the dismissal undermined Galanidas right to security of tenure and equal protection of the laws. Hence, the decision of the Labor Arbiter is modified by increasing the award of separation pay and granting in addition thereto backwages, moral and exemplary damages. The Court of Appeals held that Galanidas refusal to comply with the transfer orders did not warrant his dismissal. The appellate court ruled that the transfer from a regional office to the smaller Bacolod or Tagbilaran branches was effectively a demotion. The appellate court agreed that Allied Bank did not afford Galanida procedural due process because there was no hearing and no notice of termination. The memorandum prepared by Atty. Durano and, worse, the assailed Decision of the Labor Arbiter, both misquoted the Supreme Courts ruling in Dosch v. NLRC. The Court held in Dosch:

We cannot agree to Northwests submission that petitioner was guilty of disobedience and insubordination which respondent Commission sustained. The only piece of evidence on which Northwest bases the charge of contumacious refusal is petitioners letter dated August 28, 1975 to R.C. Jenkins wherein petitioner acknowledged receipt of the formers memorandum dated August 18, 1975, appreciated his promotion to Director of International Sales but at the same time regretted that at this time for personal reasons and reasons of my family, I am unable to accept the transfer from the Philippines and thereafter expressed his preference to remain in his position, saying: I would, therefore, prefer to remain in my position of Manager-Philippines until such time that my services in that capacity are no longer required by Northwest Airlines. From this evidence, We cannot discern even the slightest hint of defiance, much less imply insubordination on the part of petitioner. The phrase [r]efusal to obey a transfer order cannot be considered insubordination where employee cited reason for said refusal, such as that of being away from the family does not appear anywhere in the Dosch decision. Galanidas counsel lifted the erroneous phrase from one of the italicized lines in the syllabus of Dosch found in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA). The syllabus of cases in official or unofficial reports of Supreme Court decisions or resolutions is not the work of the Court, nor does it state this Courts decision. The syllabus is simply the work of the reporter who gives his understanding of the decision. The reporter writes the syllabus for the convenience of lawyers in reading the reports. A syllabus is not a part of the courts decision. A counsel should not cite a syllabus in place of the carefully considered text in the decision of the Court. In the present case, Labor Arbiter Almirante and Atty. Durano began by quoting from Dosch, but substituted a portion of the decision with a headnote from the SCRA syllabus, which they even underscored. In short, they deliberately made the quote from the SCRA syllabus appear as the words of the Supreme Court. We admonish them for what is at the least patent carelessness, if not an outright attempt to mislead the parties and the courts taking cognizance of this case. Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision or authority. It is the duty of all officers of the court to cite the rulings and decisions of the Supreme Court accurately. Wherefore, the Decision of 27 April 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51451 upholding the Decision of 18 September 1998 of the NLRC in NLRC Case No. V-000180-98 is affirmed. Labor Arbiter Dominador A. Almirante and Atty. Loreto M. Durano are admonished to be more careful in citing the decisions of the Supreme Court in the future. NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO vs. ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT C. FLORIDO, A.C. No. 5624, January 20, 2004

This is an administrative complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido and his eventual removal from the Roll of Attorneys for allegedly violating his oath as a lawyer by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious and bogus Court of Appeals Resolution/Order. Natasha V. Heysuwan-Florido averred that she is the legitimate spouse of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido, but that they are estranged and living separately from each other. They have two children namely, Kamille Nicole H. Florido, five years old, and James Benedict H. Florido, Jr., three years old both of whom are in complainants custody. Complainant filed a case for the annulment of her marriage. Meanwhile, there is another case related to the complaint for annulment of marriage which is pending before the Court of Appeals.

Respondent went to complainants residence in Tanjay City, Negros Oriental and demanded that the custody of their two minor children be surrendered to him. He showed complainant a photocopy of an alleged Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals which supposedly granted his motion for temporary child custody. Complainant called up her lawyer but the latter informed her that he had not received any motion for temporary child custody filed by respondent. Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the alleged resolution of the Court of Appeals, but respondent failed to give it to her. Complainant then examined the resolution closely and noted that it bore two dates: November 12, 2001 and November 29, 2001. Sensing something amiss, she refused to give custody of their children to respondent. Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint alleging that respondent violated his attorneys oath by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious Court of Appeals Resolution in and outside a court of law. Furthermore, respondent abused and misused the privileged granted to him by the Supreme Court to practice law in the country. Respondent claims that he acted in good faith in invoking the Court of Appeals Resolution which he honestly believed to be authentic. The court ruled that candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted could easily be imagined. Even with due recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in the defense of a clients cause, it must never be at the expense of the truth Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive language in his pleadings in describing complainant and her relatives. A lawyers language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. The lawyers arguments whether written or oral should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and should be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentlemen to another. By calling complainant, a sly manipulator of truth as well as a vindictive congenital prevaricator, hardly measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer. Respondents actions erode the public perception of the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct and the sanctions for such malfeasance is prescribed by Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Wherefore, in view of all the foregoing, Atty. James Benedict C. Florido is suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years. Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. The rules of procedure are intended to facilitate the delivery of justice to those to whom it is due without unnecessary expense and waste of time for truly justice delayed is justice denied. PABLO R. OLIVARES and/or OLIVARES REALTY CORPORATION vs. ATTY. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR., A.C. No. 6323, April 13, 2007

This is a complaint1 for disbarment and suspension against respondent Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr. by Pablo R. Olivares and/or Olivares Realty Corporation.

Olivares alleged that respondents client, Sarah Divina Morales Al-Rasheed, repeatedly sued him for violations of the lease contract which they executed over a commercial apartment in Olivares Building in Paraaque. Respondent, on the other hand, asserts that he was only performing his legal obligation as a lawyer to protect and prosecute the interests of his client. He denied that he was forum shopping as his client, in her certificate of non-forum shopping, disclosed the two previous cases involving the same cause of action which had been filed and dismissed. Respondent further claims he could not refuse his clients request to file a new case because Al-Rasheed was the "oppressed party" in the transaction. All lawyers must bear in mind that their oaths are neither mere words nor an empty formality. When they take their oath as lawyers, they dedicate their lives to the pursuit of justice. They accept the sacred trust to uphold the laws of the land. As the first Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility states, "[a] lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes." Moreover, according to the lawyers oath they took, lawyers should "not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same." With all this in mind, respondent should have refrained from filing the second complaint against Olivares. He ought to have known that the previous dismissal was with prejudice since it had the effect of adjudication on the merits. There was no excuse not to know this elementary principle of procedural law. A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. A lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and justice. Lawyers have the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Filing multiple actions constitutes an abuse of the Courts processes. It constitutes improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade justice. Those who file multiple or repetitive actions subject themselves to disciplinary action for incompetence or willful violation of their duties as attorneys to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such actions that appear to be just and consistent with truth and honor. Everything considered, this Court finds that a reprimand is insufficient and rules instead that CBDs recommendation for a six-month suspension from the practice of law to be more commensurate to the violation committed. However, in view of respondents death on September 27, 2006,30 the penalty can no longer be imposed on him. This development has, in effect, rendered this disciplinary case moot and academic. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. ATTY. DANIEL B. LIANGCO, December 13, 2011

This is an administrative Complaint for Disbarment filed by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) against respondent Atty. Daniel B. Liangco for INEXCUSABLE IGNORANCE OF THE LAW in violation of Canons 1 and 10, Rule 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility wherein respondent acted upon the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga, without the mandatory notice to Gozun (Complainant in A. M. No. MTJ-97-1136) who would be affected by the action. The records show that respondent, upon receipt of the Petition, had it docketed in his court, designated Gozun as respondent in the case title, and quickly disposed of the matter by issuing a Resolution all on the same day that the Petition was filed without notice and hearing. Respondent

admitted that, to his mind, he was merely rendering a legal opinion at the local governments behest, which he gladly and expeditiously obliged. Without denying this fact in his Comment, he admitted that he had erred in acting upon the Petition, but emphasized that his actions were not attended by malice or bad faith. Unfortunately, the Sanguniang Bayan, relying on the Resolution respondent issued, caused the demolition of the house of Gozun and his family, who were thus ejected from the property they had been occupying for decades. In effect, Gozun was deprived of his property without due process. As a member of the bar and former judge, respondent is expected to be well-versed in the Rules of Procedure. This expectation is imposed upon members of the legal profession, because membership in the bar is in the category of a mandate for public service of the highest order. Lawyers are oath-bound servants of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which they have sworn to be fearless crusaders. As judge of a first-level court, respondent is expected to know that he has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for declaratory relief. Moreover, he is presumed to know that in his capacity as judge, he cannot render a legal opinion in the absence of a justiciable question. Displaying an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he in effect erodes the publics confidence in the competence of our courts. Moreover, he demonstrates his ignorance of the power and responsibility that attach to the processes and issuances of a judge, and that he as a member of the bar should know. Under Canon 10, Rule 10.03, respondent as lawyer is mandated to observe the Rules of Procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. In this case, however, the opposite happened. Respondent recklessly used the powers of the court to inflict injustice. A judge who disobeys the basic rules of judicial conduct also violates the lawyers oath. Wherefore, this Court resolves to DISBAR Atty. Daniel B. Liangco ANTONIO B. RAMOS and MA. REGINA PAZ R. DE DIOS vs. ATTY. ALEJANDRO JOSE C. PALLUGNA, A.C. No. 5908, October 25, 2004

The instant disbarment case arose when Antonio B. Ramos and Ma. Regina Paz R. De Dios charged Atty. Alejandro Jose C. Pallugna with gross misconduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer relative to Civil Case No. 2002-264 The respondent was the counsel of the plaintiff in the said case then pending with the Regional Trial Court, Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 24. The main issue raised in the complaint was the ownership and control of Vineyard Piano Bar and Restaurant. In an Order dated October 18, 2002, the trial court denied the plaintiffs prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. The Court of Appeals issued the following Resolution, to wit: without necessarily giving due course to the petition for certiorari, the Court orders private respondents to comment (not move to dismiss) within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner may reply within five (5) days from receipt of the Comment (Sec. 6, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). Hence, In a Verified Complaint the complainants alleged as follows: By whatever stretch of his imagination and evidently prompted by ill-motive, and with the use of the Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals, Atty. Pallugna filed a Motion to Restore Possession with Motion to Appoint a New Sheriff. It is very clear that the Motion to Restore Possession is a misplaced

attempt to deceive the Court as to the correct import and interpretation of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals Atty. Alejandro Jose C. Pallugna, in a letter dated November 14, 2002, addressed to THE CITY POLICE DIRECTOR, Philippine National Police, Cagayan de Oro City, with whom he was in cahoots with as reported by Sheriff Estenzon of RTC 20, requested from the latter police assistance for the implementation of what he maliciously termed as a "TRO" allegedly issued by the Court of Appeals The respondent vehemently denied the allegation. According to the respondent I did not perform any act of sheer misconduct nor of conduct that could discredit the legal profession or in any way have I violated my oath of office as a lawyer as I performed my duty within the bounds of law. When the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals was implemented, two Sheriffs of the Office of the Regional Trial Court, namely: Sheriff IV Reynaldo Cuyong and Sheriff IV Jaime Banaag, implemented the TRO. Attached hereto is their Sheriffs Report to the Court of Appeals and marked as Annex "2" hereof. In the implementation of the TRO, the sheriffs were afraid that harm will befall them in the hands of the rouge men of herein complainants. To avert any injury to the sheriffs, I formally requested for police escorts from the City Police Director. The police personnel acted in preservation of the peace and the sheriffs merely did their jobs. Hence, there was nothing irregular, immoral, abusive, oppressive, or wanting in legality that I did as a lawyer. If complainants may find extraordinary zeal and dedication in my work, then they should be grounds to commend me and not to disbar me; The IBP Commissioner ruled that the respondent violated Canon 10, Rule 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which the court adopts. Indeed, while a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the expense of truth and the administration of justice. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer has the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and is enjoined from unduly delaying a case by impeding execution of a judgment or by misusing court processes. While lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their clients right, they should not forget that they are, first and foremost, officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Their office does not permit violation of the law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. A lawyers responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. They advance the honor of their profession and the best interests of their clients when they render service or give advice that meets the strictest principles of moral law. Candor in all their dealings is the very essence of a practitioners honorable membership in the legal profession. Lawyers are required to act with the highest standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the conduct of their litigation and their relations with their clients, the opposing parties, the other counsels and the courts. They are bound by their oath to speak the truth and to conduct themselves according to the best of their knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity to the courts and their clients. Indeed, the respondents actuations render him administratively liable for failing to observe the candor, fairness and honesty required of him as a member of the bar. It was his duty to inform the appellate court, as well as his client, of the factual developments in the case, and otherwise to bring the case to an end if the court thereafter determines that the issues had thereby been rendered moot and academic. The appellate court could then have devoted its efforts to the study and adjudication of meritorious controversies pending decision. The respondents bad faith is evident, as he applied for a restraining order in the Court of Appeals when he very well knew that the orders of the trial court which

were sought be enjoined had already been implemented. The respondents insistence that he was merely "assisting in the implementation of the Order of the Higher Court" deserves scant consideration. The penalty of suspension is imposed to punish the lawyer or to set an example or a warning for the other members of the bar. In the present case, we find that for his actuations, the respondent should be suspended for three (3) months from the practice of law. Wherefore, respondent Atty. Alejandro Jose C. Pallugna is hereby found guilty of violating Canon 10 and Rule 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is suspended from the practice of law for a period of Three (3) Months from receipt of this Decision. He is sternly warned that future similar transgressions shall be dealt with more severely.