Husserl vs. Derrida Author(s): James M. Edie Reviewed work(s): Source: Human Studies, Vol. 13, No.

2 (1990), pp. 103-118 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009084 . Accessed: 30/04/2012 00:53
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Human Studies ? 1990 Kluwer

1990. 13: 103-118, Academic Publishers.

Printed

in the Netherlands.

Husserl

vs. Derrida

JAMESM. EDIE
Department of Philosophy, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60201

to observe It is striking (and somewhat that in the now very embarrassing) to the works of Jacques Derrida very little critical large literature devoted

attention has been paid to the strictly philosophical import of either his
or to the ultimate content of his own of other philosophers we have a great body of texts from students, ad? philosophy. Certainly and followers in this country, who almost of Derrida, mirers, particularly accept and then attempt to repeat in similar idioms the things uncritically interpretations that he has said or is interpreted as having meant. But serious philosophical comment is very from the side of analytical sparse, whether Anglo American have or from the side of phenomenology. Of course, we philosophy the very penetrating and criticism of his thought presented analysis by John Searle, but Searle is almost unique among analytical philosophers for to Derrida at all, unless, like Richard Rorty, paying any attention they have also already given up philosophy for a sociology of communication. The lack of critical interest phenomenologists greater and more is more detailed on the part of Husserlian as one would a expect puzzling, interest in his criticisms of Husserl, from them. that the more and mature Husserl disciplined in Derrida's thought in as much over in silence while are others who call in a more his general supposed achievements. sense to likely simply All too often what

But, here again, we find seem to pass his work scholars themselves rest content Derrida "continentalists" with glorifying

one first begins to read hopefully as a critical philosophical argument with

ends with the simple "the tradition," or some text is the notion of la Dijf?rance, In short, the number on Derrida that what other philosophers, or for purposes of illustration - just lacks taken and that both ends the argument and the conclusion who have written philosophers small. Therefore, the time would
Memorial Inc., Lecture, sponsored by the at Northwestern University,

paper.

of "continental" is extremely
the Aaron

philosophically
* This

Center Evanston,

as paper was presented for Advanced Research Illinois, October 1988.

Gurwitsch

in Phenomenology,

104
seem Husserl am assessment of what his critique of ripe for some kind of preliminary comes down to and of how it might be answered. Since I actually

of this memorial address in honor of Aron Gur taking the occasion to make witsch these remarks, I must approach Derrida from a philosophi? cal point of view and hold him to the rigorous demands which the spirit of Gurwitsch would in short, I have to put to his thought the properly require;

philosophical questions:What does itmean! Is it true?

and followers that his work have the impression admirers in order to squeeze out of it in a "counter-reading" of Husserl's text, began at what Husserl was trying to hide or hedge in. Derrida himself is always, his great respect for and least in his early works, very careful to emphasize to Husserl of the greatness and originality indebtedness and to acknowledge Derrida's thought, but there is no doubt that his intention was to seriously under? and to erect in their mine certain key doctrines of Husserl's phenomenology a method If one of deconstruction based on the notion of differance. place were to read only Derrida's followers and admirers, who have produced the his own prolific corpus now extant, concerning largest quantity of writing his one would as well deconstructed that he had thoroughly certainly come away with the conclusion not only the text of Husserl intentions but his philosophical at the heart of Husser and had revealed the innermost contradiction

to a "bad" classical the secret adherence lian phenomenology, namely as presence. All of Derrida's of Being concepts principal metaphysics at and result in, if not the suppression, center around this one discovery least the decentering of the subject, or the displacement of consciousness.

1. Consciousness/subjectivity since Now, all wonders, privilege consciousness of the Urtatsache, the wonder for Husserl, fact, the starting point, the origin, to attack the is to strike at the heart of Husserl gives to consciousness a complex in his matter and Derrida This is certainly was, discussion organized that consciousness or nonconsciousness. of Husserl has its con?

the fundamental

which

phenomenology. well and strategically nuanced, brilliant, was unaware never suggests that Husserl the absence of consciousness

trary, namely to deconstruct the sense which Husserl attempts never completely the subject. Derrida (1968:92) at least a "trace" of

the subject always when he first read his essay de philosophie, critics in the Soci?t? fran?aise never denied before them, that he had, unlike the Structuralists, Differance to say that in the of the subject. But what exactly does itmean the existence remains? last analysis only a trace of consciousness

He, rather, and gave to consciousness renounces the subject since to his and he responded remains

105
is one of his earlier of this particular notion his deconstruction Though ones he has one of the more and therefore deconstructions disciplined proffered, it does seem to get into almost immediate difficulty. He

(1973:88-89) writes:
What like to draw attention to is that the for-itself of ultimately in its dative dimension determined (fiir-sich) traditionally self-presence or prereflexive as phenomenological whether reflexive self-giving, as primordial in the form of arises in the role of supplement substitution, "in the place of (f?r etwas), that is, as we have seen, in the very opera? in general. The for-itself would be in-the-place-of tion of significance instead of itself. The strange structure of the supple? itself: put for-itself a possibility ment appears here: by delayed that to reaction, produces which it is said to be added on. we would

Now,

to account for the is this really sufficient apart from its truth value, of being conscious of objects in the world and of our experience centrality of ourselves? Or of the centrality of this consciousness for all of ex? cannot be adequately The expression "for-itself perience? by explained it a meaning from the dative case in the parts of speech derived giving we learn in studying surface grammatical structures. The ancients,

which

like Aristotle and themedievals (to be very brief), distinguished transitive

actions were those which by noting that "immanent" the subject and remained in the subject as perfections of "proceeded as acts of cognition as of first intentions, the subject," such (whether i.e., directed toward the having of objects in the world or as second intentions, and immanent actions from acts as objects) or acts of i.e., such as taking oneself or one's own conscious on this basis by the high volition. The theory of intentionality developed scholastics of the 13th and 14th centuries went into such subtleties and minute that contemporary has perhaps philosophy rightly idealists who invented the terminol? them, but the German forgotten to the same himself alludes belonged ogy to which Derrida essentially "scholastic" tradition. When Kant distinguished the being of consciousness about from distinctions

in itself (an-sich-sein) or less and named it with the more being term of "being for itself we have technical (aus-sich-und-f?r-sich-seir?) our contemporary between distinction essentially phenomenological being for-itself and being-in-itself, or "experiencing being" as opposed to "experienced being." Now there are many

difficulties

consciousness, concerning other things which Derrida as obvious as this one, simply and as imposing tions, when they become cannot be denied. It will not do to say things like it is neither active nor terms could solve voice, as if such grammatical passive but of the middle

the experiencing concerning subject, the transcendental ego, and many concerning rightly has qualms about. But certain distinc?

106
the locution "middle voice" can take on meaning by or a middle only in terms of an opposition place between the active and the passive, in a sys? just as to say that an element tem appears and functions differently when isolated from that system than it does within the totality of the system or when it is placed in a different the question, since definition analytical are truths which Derrida These system altogether. very well knows but in seems (or feigns) to forget or gloss over. his rhetorical flights sometimes the many of course, difficulties associated Phenomenology, recognizes with posited its thesis as of the centrality of consciousness in which consciousness is for the possibility condition of any the absolutely necessary the objectivity of the ego itself. For whatsoever, objectivity including the subject is the zero-point of a system of coordinates, the phenomenology, center of all experience, which around the world of objects is necessary arraigned as in an indefinite takes horizon. phenomenology them. these up But clearly there are difficulties, and manner in a disciplined in order to answer

when he says that "all phenomenol? (1) As Derrida himself recognizes, there is the matter of the perspec is a phenomenology of perception," ogy of consciousness. tival or situated character Consciousness always has a point of view point of view in the world in a always sides at once, and it is from this is its point of view on the world is inserted that objects can be perceived. Consciousness only It is, in any case, and by embodiment. both by perception from all "place" and therefore can never experience anything or without or or from every possible emphasis, point of view, which is always a Vorwissen know more as well about as a Mitwissen in of

exhaustively. Perception such wise that we always perception particular room is than what

any particular object already to us in any and directly is immediately presented in Husserl's of perception instance. Clearly, phenomenology are given is left for the absences which together with what is always appresented confers certainly and than presented) and the the facticity its freedom and its absolute or to completely

(much more primarily presented of consciousness the embodiment

on consciousness limit both which positionality either to dominate any particular object in the world ability coincide with itself. All of this was well known to Husserl. (2) There experience is also of the theme of of other egos, as at the same intersubjectivity, other beings

in our given primarily are who experienced

the world and therefore as time experiencing ("appresented") as other beings who "drain the world us as we objectify them, objectifying of my own the absolute dominion away from us" so to speak and prevent self. Husserl, who sought a "middle way" between individual experiencing "realism" accounting and idealism with "idealism" faulted always for the real finitude of the plurality of subjects. not adequately

107
of conscious? (3) And there is, above all, the problem of the temporality ness which Husserl had always before him. We must remember that Husserl not only from his own meticulous his phenomenological method developed but also, at least in part, under the and continually renewed investigations to of reading the Principles of William stimulus James, of Psychology which "now" uses he several times refers of consciousness the term "moment" in the Logical James calls the Investigations. the "pulse" of consciousness, Husserl most usually but in either case they did not mean (Augenblick),

a purely instantaneous, sense. instant in the ancient Aristotelian "punctual," James speaks of the specious present and Husserl the proten emphasizes of consciousness sive and retensive character of the present moment which to an object and/or to itself is always a duration in its presence (not unlike the dur?e of Bergson). course Husserl's the Derrida of of recognizes development Inner-time in which the structures Consciousness of of Phenomenology are very carefully and thematized, but he seems to investigated temporality believe that in the Logical Husserl had a more naive, even Investigations to a Aristotelian of time as a "punctual" notion in time similar point without dimensions, duration, point in space without purely to be borne out by the fact that This does not seem to me diaphanous. Husserl's in the Logical is that of consciousness Investigations conception geometrical of "anonymous operating a transcendental consciousness), in the world an (that is a non-egological intentionality," not only objects condition of experiencing time but also of experiencing the ego itself (since, as

through he tells us throughout the first edition of this work, he could find no "ego" in or behind consciousness). This is no doubt a very difficult question but it is certain that the manner in which correct intentions Derrida manner even

is not the poses it in Chapter 5 of Speech and Phenomena one wishes to remain fair to Husserl's of proceding if in his earliest work.

2. The First Investigation: Husserl's

In his criticism task. He with considers himself exactly of Husserl, which

theory of signs
and admirers take to be quite

his disciples

general and quite definitive, Derrida in effect gives himself a very limited
limits himself references Husserl's who where a few to parts of the First Investigation, exclusively to relevant passages in some later works. He never as a whole, nor does he claim to. phenomenology almost and most problems out to his readers honestly pointed and what difficulties lay they might

In his treatment of the First Investigation he is greatly helped by Husserl

continually the crucial

108
bring of exceptional "Problems the phenomena which find their place under the headings difficulty "to mean" and "meaning" Or again: "The figures (bedeuten) (Bedeutung)." us ... must be adopted with of speech which here thrust themselves upon on just caution these ..."(Derrida, 1973:119-120). By concentrating up. continually beset which of we must this concede are the most Derrida critical moments in the own have to Investigation, and the problems capitalizes which Husserl on Husserl's felt would Husserl cautions us:

difficulties,

development critical self awareness be worked over

to come. He himself of phenomenologists by generations us more than one edition, as we know, of the Logical gave Investigations.1 So my first point here is that while we must, and are forced to recognize the brilliance, the ingenuity, the force, and the cohesion of Derrida's and to take serious account of the critical of the First Investigation, reading a to point out that he gave himself points that he brings up, it is not wrong momentous and the somewhat his ambitions easy assignment considering claims He for the consequences begins by only of his success. antimetaphysical and the "degenerate" on unwarranted based an was out that Husserl pointing to excise to the extent that he wanted of that could

was the past which in no way be brought back to present postulates and the being present of the being of meaning By accepting experience. as ideality, i.e., as the possible act in the repetition of a productive meaning in in the self-presence of transcendental life, Husserl himself, living present, hides his own Derrida what he now calls "first philosophy," asserts, metaphysics theoretical metaphysical and uncriticized presuppositions. Derrida (1973:6) writes:

philosopher outmoded

... contested seems to us tormented from within, by its phenomenology own descriptions and of the constitu? of temporalization of the movement At the heart of what ties together these two tion of intersubjectivity. non we an irreducible moments of description decisive recognize a non a constituting as having and with it a nonlife, value, presence an ineradicable or nonself of the living present, presence belonging nonprimordiality. Derrida does not mention, In his analysis of the First Investigation though no doubt he presumes, his logical and linguistic that Husserl throughout is concerned only with what linguists call natural languages investigations and not at all with can be made up the mathematized to take their place. formal Therefore languages which he begins with the total in which is actually language or artificial

situation and cognitive is com? for a vast array of purposes among which as very many found after him, that But Husserl munication. finds, linguists function of is not the only or even the logically communication primary linguistic unanalyzed used and practically language. There is a teleological purpose hidden in language (and Derrida

109
will emphasize writing for reasons of his own, us which have their own

validity but should not be exaggerated to the extent they have been) and this
purpose writing otherwise language is the linguistic certainly assists purpose of enabling us as linguists well know in which the possibility of - to analyze what would thoughts. This ability of experience, is logically whether prior to

perceptual the fact of more

and perhaps unanalyzable be unanalyzed to analyze the dumb thought of preverbal or otherwise, is certainly a function which or less successful of our use of communication.2

the central theme of Husserl's language our ability to determine and to the sameness of meanings is that of analysis - as - are idealities repeatable and therefore explain how it is that meanings In his discussion

distinguishable from the "real" events of the individual psychic

lives

same life. The of ordinary of a speaker or hearer) (whether everyday sentence can be uttered on tone e by one person or on tone d by another but sense in either case. Very will have the same intended great physical can take place in the utterances of the phonetic sounds them? variations we be intended and repeated. Whenever and yet the same meaning real but speak of the same sign we are not, therefore, referring to something are not real entities; only our to something in themselves "ideal." Meanings selves can be said to be real, in the sense that our ideal meanings are ongoing, same events. The historical datable, psychic experiences can be had again and again by multiple consciousnesses object-of-thought ever repeat their exact experiences but no two consciousnesses twice. Every experience of in is subject to the law of the irreversible temporality of existence at each moment that consciousness of its development is in a new state of expectation, and different of position, of maturity, but of existence, it can always again and again intend the same meanings. real being such wise Derrida Husserl makes the crucial distinction (which are words and orchestrates) between which emphasizes signs or expressions are only and signs which indications and, (Anzeichen), to himself, to the foundation unbeknownst contributed of thereby greatly in a natural language, or and linguistics. A word contemporary phonology discussion also Husserl calls Now in his

an "expression" is a sign that has its (Ausdruck), for so long as it can hold its place in the lexicon of a meaning (Bedeutung) the correlation between the physical given natural language. No doubt or written mark), is only arbitrarily (the acoustic aspect of the expression what paired with the meaning and only that meaning But but in that historical in this way refers language this word can have to a selfsame and repeatable

identity characterized by its ideality.

there are many is always things in any given linguistic string, which of words, each with its ideal meaning, which convey composed something other and something more than what the words themselves strictly mean.

110
in a general way, Husserl refers to as "indication" since these are only indicated and not meant matters the signs that convey them, by there being no intrinsic or necessary between the sign and what connection This is what, at this instance while in this instance. Suppose I am speaking it conveys to you, over and above the meaning of my words and sen? here I convey such as that I am elated or that I facts about myself, tences, certain psychic am depressed or that I am tired or that I would like to get on with it or that I or suppose a low opinion of deconstructionism, to you that I convey such as the fact that Imay have a deep voice or information merely physical a squeaky voice or that I may have a cold or be otherwise in physically have some distress or that I am speaking as though I had just received a promo? In any of these cases these tion and a check from the Illinois State Lottery. acts of speaking and conveyed be indicated that would by my things a purely associative I am using would with the words connection through that I of the words the expression of the meaning as opposed to "significant calls "indicating signs"

have

to do with nothing am using. These Husserl

signs."

Now if Imight be permitted a slight digression here itwould be only to

to the Moscow in the years School that belonged linguists as we know well and 1917 were particularly acquainted, of Roman from the writings Jakobson, with Husserl's Logical Investiga? on "Expression and with his First Investigation tions and most particularly before they came to learn the same lesson independently Meaning." Long that the learned it from Husserl: from Saussure, namely, they had already state that the between 1913 a unique value and a unique status among and the signifier, the signified though signs that a sign never erased, is constituted link in such wise by an indissoluble is This its meaning. of this kind must always have and must always mean it from all other kinds of signs. Of course contemporary what distinguishes a science only a little over fifty years old, owes many more linguistics, It was not only the First but lessons than this one to Husserl's inspiration. words languages in that the distinction of natural have between also the Fourth Investigation of perception, logical and theoretical philosophical, "On the Logic of Parts and Wholes" psychology place even only with To for an historical in outline to allude as the inspired many early linguists, just its main received Gestalt psychology particularly which the Third Investigation, 1974). But this is not the (Holenstein, nor do we really have time to repeat, are able We of the First Investigation. support from of Husserl of the others who to them are already familiar in this manner.

disquisition, form, the contents to them for the students the attention

them and to direct

can mean at least three something say that an expressive sign expresses acts (with meaning-fulfilling things: (1) itmay refer to the meaning-giving or itmay refer to the "contents" of these acts, i.e., acts if they are given), (2)

Ill theirmeanings, or (3) itmay refer to the objectivity meant by themeaning

and expressed Sometimes criticism we tions. When in the real or fictive world. by it, i.e., the object of reference in reading what Jacques Derrida is setting up as a serious learn something instructive about Husserl's real inten? very

for instance about the contamination which is always writing a in actually to one another between really produced speaking expressing accom? and the indicative function of language that necessarily meaning a content that expression indicates forever it, he notices panies always hidden from intuition, that is, from the lived experience of another, and he

(1973:22) writes:
... we have to ferret out the unshaken in a language purity of expression without in a speech as monologue, in the completely communication, muted voice of the "solitary mental life" (im einsamen Seelenleben). By a strange paradox, meaning would isolate the concentrated purity of its ex-pressiveness just at that moment when the relation to a certain outside is suspended. Only to a certain outside, because this reduction does not a relation but rather reveals, within to an eliminate, pure expression the intending of an objective stands face which object, namely, ideality, to face with the Bedeutungsintention. the meaning-intention, What we the of "idealism" and "realism," Beyond opposition and "objectivism," etc., transcendental "subjectivism" phenomenological answers to the necessity idealism of describing the objectivity of the ... from a ... which and the presence of the present is object standpoint beyond Of course and to an outside in general. essence.

just called a paradox is in fact only the phenomenological project in its

not a simple inside but rather the intimate possibility of a relation to a

we would have hoped for more sober language here, but as in other places, Derrida gives us some insight into Husserl's mind - to many such an extent that, in reading his criticism and "refutations" of Husserl I once reminded a passage have been more than of from St. Augustine's dialogue On The Teacher where he shows that it is not the subjective intentions of the teacher which are necessarily to the (indicative) conveyed student but the objective force of the argument he is expounding. the case of a bright student reading the destructive poses Augustine of the atheistic Epicureans:

criticisms

someone who is a follower of the For example, and thinks the Epicureans soul is mortal sets forth the arguments as expounded for its immortality wiser men. If one who is able to comprehend* by spiritual things hears the truth, whereas the speaker him, he judges that the other is expressing does not know whether are true or not, but thinks them his arguments as teaching what he does not utterly false. Is he, then to be considered

know? (On the Teacher, 13,41)

112
3. Differance The sense which notions both of Differance and "Trace" which Derrida are in a

develops

a generalization of the insights of Gestalt (with psychology us most and Merleau-Ponty Gurwitsch have since made long In the area of the phenomenol? of Saussure. familiar) and of the linguistics

for instance, we never see objects or quasi-objects (such ogy of perception, as sense-data) as purely positive of the whole bits of reality independent structure. No object as such is ever wholly present, but only as perceptual containing presented he says, its own differentiations from what is absent. If there is a in a system. What is present, object at all it is only as an element structure." Ul? referential in a generalized is only "a function to subvert the entire attempt timately he goes so far as to paradoxically that "there never of perception by concluding understanding philosophical was any perception." as Husserl would want it, is not comprehended, situation perceptual ... And contrary to what intuitions or presentations phenomenology by us has tried to make of perception is always phenomenology which to what our desire cannot fail to be tempted into believe, contrary to the assurance the thing itself always escapes. Contrary believing, Husserl gives us ... "the look" cannot "abide" (Derrida, 1973:104). The or the organization of phonemic structure of figure-ground oppositional sounds and phonetic writing into patterns governed by laws of phonology, one and perhaps syntax, which give us the rules for opposing morphology, structure to the to extend this oppositional to another, allow Derrida sign in general. It is not only signs structure of consciousness entire intentional The which are, in the words of Saussure, diacritical, itself. The intentional object but consciousness and oppositional, negative, to always can be identified, the extent that it can be identified, only by what is not intended. If we, for color, it is only insofar instance, call an object "red," or "blue," or whatever to rule to all of the other as this particular quality is opposable according color adjectives which we would recognize more. lesson to Husserl who took the in our natural languages as

possibly taking its place. A color is just its opposition to black and yellow
and purple should be and so on and nothing addressing

But is all this correct? First of all it seems highly doubtful thatDerrida
this particular up

matter both logically in great detail in the Third Investigation on the "The
of perception, and in his own phenomenology Logic of Parts and Wholes," in Ideas, and elsewhere.3 two points, relying on other recent commen? like to make Here I would sense made by common a remark of the most elementary tators. The first is John Searle. Derrida has asked us to throw out "logocentrism" because of

113
on "phonocentrism," its dependence and because to "phallocentrism." A lot more follows leading folklore, aware, slipping as all who but have of read his fighting mistakes the danger of its consequence in this improbable imitators are well begin from

from

texts and those of his

into elementary

is that one may logocentrism in logic. Let me quote directly

Searle (1983:74ff.):
The correct claim that the elements as of the language only function elements because of the differences have from one another is they into the false claim converted that the elements "consist of (Culler, on" (Derrida) the traces of these other elements. 1983) or are "constituted "There are only, everywhere, and traces of traces." But the differences to the first, nor does it follow second thesis is not equivalent from it. From the fact that the elements the way that they do because of function their relations to other elements, it simply does not follow that "nothing, nor within neither among the elements ever the system, is anywhere or absent. There are and differences simply present only, everywhere, traces of traces." ... The system of differences to does nothing whatever undermine the distinction between presence and absence; on the contrary the system of differences a system of presences is precisely and ab?
sences.

The

second

brief

remark will

Wittgenstein's unwarranted

Philosophical generalizations

pas de hors texte," "every etc. anything but writing,"

the basis of a quotation from to many of the and is applicable Investigations to which Derrida is prone such as that: "// n'y a is a mis-reading," "there never has been reading be made

on

"If it is possible, Wittgenstein for someone to make a false move writes, in some game, then it might be possible to make nothing for everybody but false moves in every game." - Thus we are under a temptation to misunderstand the logic of the use of our words. are sometimes Orders not obeyed. But what would it be like if no ever obeyed? orders were The concept 'order' would lost its have purpose The (Wittgenstein, 1958:110e).

be true if every reading were a mis-reading or if every a mis-perceiving. a very and highly We would be giving perception sense to the word "misread." And, if I say that after multiple metaphysical of a house that I have never really seen it at all, because it partial viewings were be seen as a whole, from every side at once, without perspectives, and is therefore in reality only my fiction, what kind of metaphysical are we entering?4 wonderland can never

same would

114
4. Metaphysics to concede It is necessary in his analyses that Husserl use the language sometimes of ancient metaphysics, as those at which of consciousness does

at such particularly he is making the real distinction between body and points use of the ancient word to designate soul. Husserl's "soul" sometimes to designate the embodied and sometimes consciousness, consciousness, can be a metaphysical to designate sometimes individual subjectivity what to one who does not look beyond the terms he is using to to say. The same is, no doubt, true also of his he actually means or Leben as those describ? use of the word "life" in such phrases extensive embarrassment ing the intentional ende sieben orientation of human reality towards The the world elements as a in (life-experiencing-the-world).

Welterfahr

Husserl's terminology which delighted a life-world theorist like JohnWild

that the ancients had a very But let us remember the Derridians. horrify anima the distinction between hard time making (the animating principle) as we the notions, conflated and sometimes and animus (consciousness) and does not conflate the distinction has no trouble making know. Husserl does use a metaphysical the meanings, terminology though he sometimes later on discard. Nevertheless that a more vigilant phenomenology might or Heidegger's we must closure" ask what Derrida's "metaphysical or even the not yet completed "deconstruction of metaphysics" "destruction comes down to. He does not Derrida of metaphysics" actually by proposed and we know that he say that this has already been accomplished, always on teaching the texts of classical philosophy like everybody else, while goes for the final closure to take place. waiting to come, the movement of that schema the present and for sometime over the language of metaphysics from be capable of working only inside that language. No doubt from a certain sphere of problems within, to grasp what shall have has always this work begun. We already is announced the closure of metaphysics inside language when happens (Derrida, 1973:51-52). For will In attempting reassured to overcome metaphysics he happily announces himself to be

the disciple of Heidegger though if we read the fine print we are not fully
He Heidegger. has better than anyone Heidegger but then goes on to say (1973:26): about [Heidegger] often as that for instance, says such things, in certain texts else escaped metaphysics "This does not mean, of course, that one them afterwards." And in another place he writes

escapes it is already apparent that, while we appeal to Heideg (1973:74): "Perhaps like to raise the in decisive motifs especially places, we would gerian ... not sometimes raise the whether thought does Heidegger's question as the metaphysics All this seems to come same questions of presence."

115
down congratulating Heidegger in metaphysics is entrapped except think about it I am not so sure about thee!" It seems rejection that we must, of the "bad," "classical" to me to Derrida by saying in effect: "The whole for thee and me, but now that I ask what Derrida's own

world

in conclusion,

of Husserl and all previous metaphysics comes down to.What is the conclusion? What logocentric philosophy really is the net gain of his "closure?" What, in short, is the result?

When we look at the highly imaginative andmetaphorical vocabulary he

uses wonder to express his deconstructions how he can have erected we may almost begin to of metaphysics of the main pillars of his attack on on Husserl's supposed inability to see where his one was

Husserl's

phenomenology own metaphorical vocabulary as well how the whole wonder metaphysics, the fact that Western not bear critical tells us that words

Western will

to him. We almost begin misleading or the history of of his "White Mythology," seems to be based, as does Heidegger's at times, on is built up on a metaphorical base which metaphysics are we to make of his own writings? He

scrutiny. What

different way (Derrida in Miller, 1980:521).5

are not atoms, but points of economic stations condensation, necessary the way for a large number more of marks, for somewhat along effervescent Then crucibles. their effects not only turn back on them? selves through a sort of closed self-excitation, in they spread themselves a chain over the theoretical and practical whole of a text, each time in a

In his paper on Differance he insists that Differance on the very next page he concept," though call the word provisionally it really is a word course, concept knows considering distinct sufficiently about

"is neither refers to

a word "what

nor a I will

or concept of differance in its new spelling." Of a concept, perhaps a somewhat and it is vague the manner in which it has been and is being used, but from others and Derrida certainly of natural languages to know that he and use of words and concepts even if he

enough has no control over the creation was their first historical source. In discussing Derrida's or even

to be distinguished the development

attitude towards metaphysics and the history of in uncovering his own metaphysics metaphysics, (which seems to a highly baroque form of absolute be idealism) we must always recall that he (and we) are always permitted to use the language and the arguments even of the "old" metaphysics so long as we do so "under erasure" (sous invented the style of writing that would cross out words, rature). Heidegger for being, in his printed texts, so that he could continue to use particularly the same old words while to be saying something that had never claiming been said before and that nobody had ever understood before and that could ever completely understand. Derrida has made it perhaps nobody else

116
an artform. time what But we must it means still ask ourselves a vocabulary commonsensically "under erasure," from and what time to it all

to use

comes to. eventually I am afraid that all this is not very reassuring whom have about the same reaction to Derrida's those of Heraclitus. sheet whether on just what destructive But

to any philosopher, most of as Aristotle did to writings

it is, no doubt, too early to draw up a final balance to the history of metaphysics, Derrida's contribution

or constructive, may be. I will, therefore, conclude with two points made by two of the most perceptive critics among the younger on Derrida, of commentators generation though I will, no doubt, be condens? tolerate and may be accentuat? their thought far beyond what they would ing ing aspects of it they did not wish to emphasize. The first is taken from Irene Harvey's magisterial "structure" and a concept of differance, to have any is not supposed express intentions, which is not work, Derrida and the

Economy of Differance inwhich her last chapter is devoted to outlining the

to be a concept supposed to structure. She shows that, contrary does have structure: the concept of differance

Derrida's

of she writes, differance itself, as the nonrepresentable principle of repetition itself repeats. It (a) allows for the possibility representation, and in turn (b) itself repeats as a form in all its various effects (Harvey, In short,

1986:203).6
a grand admission. of sameness, of the notion Ideality, in short of the Kantian of repeatability, Idea, the very point on teleology, to the early Derrida) Husserl had based his metaphysics which (according as presence, reintroduced has been of being by Derrida though in a very in front of it. hidden form and with an opaque shield of verbiage This is indeed second My who has been commentator from another younger point comes for years to come to grips with the strengths and the trying in David Wood, weaknesses of Derrida's thought and its presuppositions. comes to the conclusion that there is ultimately his latest essay on Derrida, and final behind point, cludes: Derrida's a formal followed when it can be rigorously point reasoning, the door which leaves dimension transcendental by to

philosophy (and even metaphysics)

"There is no other place to go."

open. For, as Wood

(1988:69) con?

Notes 1. There are six Investigations, but there is no reason why there might not be many more, just as there are three volumes of Ideas, which is also an incom? and so on. plete project, just as there are five (or six) Cartesian Meditations, to Derrida's usual language very few of Husserl's books are written Contrary with "authority," or fully finished as points of "origin" for future generations.

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One of the most beautiful exceptions is, of course, The Formal and Transcen? dental Logic which he wrote in a state of great exaltation in the period of a few months time (while the others took months and years of laborious effort) and which, unlike most of his other investigations, does have a beginning, a middle and an end, though we know from his later Experience and Judgment that he considered even this important work to still need further revision and critical
reworking.

2. Derrida makes much of his "strategy" to replace the phoneme by the grapheme as the most important and primary element of language and to elevate writing above speaking. As he says: "there never has been anything but writing, there have never been anything but supplements, substitutive significations which could only come forth in a chain of differential references, the 'real' superven? ing, and being added only while taking on meaning from a trace and from an invocation of the supplement, etc." To which he has added the oft-repeated trans. slogan: "// n'y a pas de hors texte." (Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, 1974], pp. 158-159.) Since it is a part of his Gayatri Spivak [Johns Hopkins, "strategy" or one of his "strategies" to privilege the side which has always been the underdog in Western and since he thinks Western philosophy, have given the primacy to speaking over writing, he greatly philosophers the necessity and importance of the grapheme as having always emphasizes already been potentially there in language, even prior to speech. This is the primordial or archi-writing which is present even before writing and which rules even speaking. It seems to me that, having decided on this "strategy," Derrida does not do much with it.He greatly emphasizes the fact, for instance, that in his own heavily announced neologism "differance" there is no distinction between the sounding of this word in speech whether it is written with an a or with an e, but surely this is true only for French phonology since, in English, there would be a strong tendency to pronounce "difference" (with an e) differently from "differance" (with an a). Much more importantly, we could understand his preoccupation with writing if it were used to make the linguistic point that unless and until a phonological system and other systems of language) can be written down and analyzed in that way their subunder stood laws and structures (just like kinship structures!) go unobserved. But Derrida is not interested in scientific linguistics. 3. It seems to me worth noting that when Derrida first read his paper on to the Soci?t? fran?aise de Philosophie even the Marxist critic, Differance Lucien Goldmann took him to task for his feigned naivit? in attacking on this point: "Derrida knows as well as anyone that since the phenomenology of form, innumerable experiments have shown that, even for the psychology most elementary forms of perception, one does not perceive elements but relations and structures." From: Derrida and Differance (1968:92). 4. I am indebted for these remarks tomy discussions with Professor Carl A. Rapp and also to his remarkable paper on literary criticism entitled "The of Deconstruction." Metaphysics 5. I am also indebted to Professor Carl A. Rapp for his reference to this discus?
sion.

6. The

of the logical and metaphysical discussion importance of Husserl's concept of "teleology" goes far beyond the scope of this essay. A much better and a much more sure guide through this literature than Derrida would be: Andr? de Murait (1974).

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References Culler, C. (1983). On deconstruction: Theory and criticism after structuralism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. In D. Wood of differance. and R. Derrida, J. (1968). The original discussion Bemasconi and differance. Evanston: Northwestern (Eds.) (1988), Derrida University Press. Derrida, J. (1973). Speech and phenomena and other essays on Husserl's theory of signs, trans. D.B. Allison. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Indiana Harvey, I.E. (1986). Derrida and the economy of differance. Bloomington: University Press. Holenstein, E. (1974). Introduction in Roman Jakobson's approach to language, trans. C. Schelbert. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Miller, J.H. (1980). Stevens' rock and criticism as cure. In M. Philipson and P. Gudel (Eds.), Aesthetics today. New York: New American Library. trans. G.L. Breckon. Evanston: Murait, A. de. (1974). The idea of phenomenology, Northwestern University Press. Searle, J. (1983). The World turned upside down. New York Review of Books, 27
October.

Wood, D. (1988). Differance Bemasconi (Eds.), Derrida

Press.

and the problem of strategy. In D. Wood and R. and differance. Evanston: Northwestern University investigations. New York: Macmillan.

Wittgenstein,

L. (1958). Philosophical