Some Cryptography Fundamentals

Message authentication code
S8CSE_Cryptography additionals 1

In cryptography, a message authentication code (often MAC) is a short piece of information used to authenticate a message. A MAC algorithm, sometimes called a keyed (cryptographic) hash function, accepts as input a secret key and an arbitrary-length message to be authenticated, and outputs a MAC (sometimes known as a tag). The MAC value protects both a message's data integrity as well as its authenticity, by allowing verifiers (who also possess the secret key) to detect any changes to the message content.
Security
While MAC functions are similar to cryptographic hash functions, they possess different security requirements. To be considered secure, a MAC function must resist existential forgery under chosen-plaintext attacks. This means that even if an attacker has access to an oracle which possesses the secret key and generates MACs for messages of the attacker's choosing, the attacker cannot guess the MAC for other messages without performing infeasible amounts of computation. MACs differ from digital signatures as MAC values are both generated and verified using the same secret key. This implies that the sender and receiver of a message must agree on the same key before initiating communications, as is the case with symmetric encryption. For the same reason, MACs do not provide the property of non-repudiation offered by signatures specifically in the case of a network-wide shared secret key: any user who can verify a MAC is also capable of generating MACs for other messages. In contrast, a digital signature is generated using the private key of a key pair, which is asymmetric encryption. Since this private key is only accessible to its holder, a digital signature proves that a document was signed by none other than that holder. Thus, digital signatures do offer non-repudiation.
Message integrity codes

The term message integrity code (MIC) is frequently substituted for the term MAC, especially in communications,[1] where the acronym MAC traditionally stands for Media Access Control. However, some authors[2] use MIC as a distinctly different term from a MAC; in their usage of the term the MIC operation does not use secret keys. This lack of security means that any MIC intended for use gauging message integrity should be encrypted or otherwise be protected against tampering. MIC algorithms are created such that a given message will always produce the same MIC assuming the same algorithm is used to generate both. Conversely, MAC algorithms are designed to produce matching MACs only if the same message, secret key and initialization vector are input to the same algorithm. MICs do not use secret keys and, when taken on their own, are therefore a much less reliable gauge of message integrity than MACs. Because MACs use secret keys, they do not necessarily need to be encrypted to provide the same level of assurance.
by Abhijith Marathakam
Implementation
MAC algorithms can be constructed from other cryptographic primitives, such as cryptographic hash functions (as in the case of HMAC) or from block cipher algorithms (OMAC, CBC-MAC and PMAC). However many of the fastest MAC algorithms such as UMAC and VMAC are constructed based on universal hashing.[3]
Standards
Various standards exist that define MAC algorithms. These include: FIPS PUB 113 Computer Data Authentication,[4] withdrawn in 2002,[5] defines an algorithm based on DES. ISO/IEC 9797-1 Mechanisms using a block cipher[6] ISO/IEC 9797-2 Mechanisms using a dedicated hash-function[7] ISO/IEC 9797-1 and -2 define generic models and algorithms that can be used with any block cipher or hash function, and a variety of different parameters. These models and parameters allow more specific algorithms to be defined by nominating the parameters. For example the FIPS PUB 113 algorithm is functionally equivalent to ISO/IEC 9797-1 MAC algorithm 1 with padding method 1 and a block cipher algorithm of DES.
Example
In this example, the sender of a message runs it through a MAC algorithm to produce a MAC data tag. The message and the MAC tag are then sent to the receiver. The receiver in turn runs the message portion of the transmission through the same MAC algorithm using the same key, producing a second MAC data tag. The receiver then compares the first MAC tag received in the transmission to the second generated MAC tag. If they are identical, the receiver can safely assume that the integrity of the message was not compromised, and the message was not altered or tampered with during transmission.
External links
RSA Laboratories entry on MACs [8] Ron Rivest lecture on MACs [9]
References
[1] IEEE 802.11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications (http:/ / standards. ieee. org/ getieee802/ download/ 802. 11-2007. pdf). (2007 revision). IEEE-SA. 12 June 2007. doi:10.1109/IEEESTD.2007.373646. . [2] Fred B Schneider, Hashes and Message Digests, Cornell University (http:/ / www. cs. cornell. edu/ courses/ cs513/ 2005fa/ NL20. hashing. html) [3] "VMAC: Message Authentication Code using Universal Hashing" (http:/ / www. fastcrypto. org/ vmac/ draft-krovetz-vmac-01. txt). CFRG Working Group (CFRG Working Group). . Retrieved 16 March 2010. [4] FIPS PUB 113 Computer Data Authentication (http:/ / www. itl. nist. gov/ fipspubs/ fip113. htm) [5] Federal Information Processing Standards Publications, Withdrawn FIPS Listed by Number (http:/ / www. itl. nist. gov/ fipspubs/ withdraw. htm) [6] ISO/IEC 9797-1 Information technology Security techniques Message Authentication Codes (MACs) Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher (http:/ / www. iso. org/ iso/ iso_catalogue/ catalogue_tc/ catalogue_detail. htm?csnumber=30656) [7] ISO/IEC 9797-2 Information technology Security techniques Message Authentication Codes (MACs) Part 2: Mechanisms using a dedicated hash-function (http:/ / www. iso. org/ iso/ iso_catalogue/ catalogue_tc/ catalogue_detail. htm?csnumber=31136) [8] http:/ / www. rsasecurity. com/ rsalabs/ node. asp?id=2177 [9] http:/ / web. mit. edu/ 6. 857/ OldStuff/ Fall97/ lectures/ lecture3. pdf
Article Sources and Contributors

Message authentication code Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=482740944 Contributors: Abatakar, Ablewisuk, AdjustShift, Andris, Benizi, Bobo192, Callwithme, Ceyockey, Ciphergoth, Connelly, Conny, CryptoDerk, Dachshund, Darkfight, David spector, Davidgothberg, Dimawik, DividedByNegativeZero, Dougher, Ed Brey, Edipo, Emufarmers, Gareth Jones, Giftlite, HamburgerRadio, Henning Makholm, Iridescent, Jesse Viviano, Jorge Stolfi, KnightRider, Kotepho, Linas, Loadmaster, Macabu, Mandarax, Manscher, Matb, Matt Crypto, Maurice Carbonaro, Merovingian, Messiah7, Michael Hardy, Mindmatrix, Mitch Ames, Nealmcb, Nroets, PabloCastellano, Pi.C.Noizecehx, Quarl, Qutezuce, Rasmus Faber, Robertgreer, RonaldDuncan, Schnolle, Sh00tr, Shiningfm, Signalhead, Smilerpt, TLange, TonyW, TreasuryTag, Twisp, Varuna, Verloc, Wonderstruck, Ww, Xvani, Y(J)S, 56 anonymous edits
Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors

Image:MAC.svg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:MAC.svg License: Public Domain Contributors: Twisp
License
Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported //creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/
MD5
MD5
MD5
General Designers First published Series Ronald Rivest April 1992 MD2, MD4, MD5, MD6 Detail Digest sizes Structure Rounds 128 bits MerkleDamgrd construction 4 [1]
Best public cryptanalysis A 2009 attack by Tao Xie and Dengguo Feng breaks MD5 collision resistance in 220.96 time. This attack runs in a few seconds on a regular [2] computer.
The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm is a widely used cryptographic hash function that produces a 128-bit (16-byte) hash value. Specified in RFC 1321, MD5 has been employed in a wide variety of security applications, and is also commonly used to check data integrity. MD5 was designed by Ron Rivest in 1991 to replace an earlier hash function, MD4. An MD5 hash is typically expressed as a 32-digit hexadecimal number. However, it has since been shown that MD5 is not collision resistant;[3] as such, MD5 is not suitable for applications like SSL certificates or digital signatures that rely on this property. In 1996, a flaw was found with the design of MD5, and while it was not a clearly fatal weakness, cryptographers began recommending the use of other algorithms, such as SHA-1which has since been found also to be vulnerable. In 2004, more serious flaws were discovered in MD5, making further use of the algorithm for security purposes questionablespecifically, a group of researchers described how to create a pair of files that share the same MD5 checksum.[4][5] Further advances were made in breaking MD5 in 2005, 2006, and 2007.[6] In December 2008, a group of researchers used this technique to fake SSL certificate validity.,[7][8] and US-CERT now says that MD5 "should be considered cryptographically broken and unsuitable for further use."[9] and most U.S. government applications now require the SHA-2 family of hash functions.[10]
History and cryptanalysis

MD5 is one in a series of message digest algorithms designed by Professor Ronald Rivest of MIT (Rivest, 1994). When analytic work indicated that MD5's predecessor MD4 was likely to be insecure, MD5 was designed in 1991 to be a secure replacement. (Weaknesses were indeed later found in MD4 by Hans Dobbertin.) In 1993, Den Boer and Bosselaers gave an early, although limited, result of finding a "pseudo-collision" of the MD5 compression function; that is, two different initialization vectors which produce an identical digest. In 1996, Dobbertin announced a collision of the compression function of MD5 (Dobbertin, 1996). While this was not an attack on the full MD5 hash function, it was close enough for cryptographers to recommend switching to a replacement, such as SHA-1 or RIPEMD-160. The size of the hash128 bitsis small enough to contemplate a birthday attack. MD5CRK was a distributed project started in March 2004 with the aim of demonstrating that MD5 is practically insecure by finding a collision using a birthday attack. by Abhijith Marathakam
MD5
MD5CRK ended shortly after 17 August 2004, when collisions for the full MD5 were announced by Xiaoyun Wang, Dengguo Feng, Xuejia Lai, and Hongbo Yu.[4][5][11] Their analytical attack was reported to take only one hour on an IBM p690 cluster. On 1 March 2005, Arjen Lenstra, Xiaoyun Wang, and Benne de Weger demonstrated[12] construction of two X.509 certificates with different public keys and the same MD5 hash, a demonstrably practical collision. The construction included private keys for both public keys. A few days later, Vlastimil Klima described[13] an improved algorithm, able to construct MD5 collisions in a few hours on a single notebook computer. On 18 March 2006, Klima published an algorithm[14] that can find a collision within one minute on a single notebook computer, using a method he calls tunneling. In 2009, the United States Cyber Command used an MD5 hash of their mission statement as a part of their official emblem.[15] On December 24, 2010, Tao Xie and Dengguo Feng announced the first published single-block MD5 collision (two 64-byte messages with the same MD5 hash given in Little endian notation).[16] Previous collision discoveries relied on multi-block attacks. For "security reasons", Xie and Feng did not disclose the new attack method. They have issued a challenge to the cryptographic community, offering a US$ 10,000 reward to the first finder of a different 64-byte collision before January 1, 2013. In 2011 an informational RFC was approved to update the security considerations in RFC 1321 (MD5) and RFC 2104 (HMAC-MD5). [17]
Security
The security of the MD5 hash function is severely compromised. A collision attack exists that can find collisions within seconds on a computer with a 2.6Ghz Pentium4 processor (complexity of 224.1).[18] Further, there is also a chosen-prefix collision attack that can produce a collision for two chosen arbitrarily different inputs within hours, using off-the-shelf computing hardware (complexity 239).[19] The ability to find collisions has been greatly aided by the use of off-the-shelf GPUs. On an NVIDIA GeForce 8400GS graphics processor, 1618 million hashes per second can be computed. An NVIDIA GeForce 8800 Ultra can calculate more than 200 million hashes per second.[20] These hash and collision attacks have been demonstrated in the public in various situations, including colliding document files[21][22] and digital certificates.[7]
Collision vulnerabilities
Further information: Collision attack In 1996, collisions were found in the compression function of MD5, and Hans Dobbertin wrote in the RSA Laboratories technical newsletter, "The presented attack does not yet threaten practical applications of MD5, but it comes rather close ... in the future MD5 should no longer be implemented...where a collision-resistant hash function is required."[23] In 2005, researchers were able to create pairs of PostScript documents[24] and X.509 certificates[25] with the same hash. Later that year, MD5's designer Ron Rivest wrote, "md5 and sha1 are both clearly broken (in terms of collision-resistance)."[26] On 30 December 2008, a group of researchers announced at the 25th Chaos Communication Congress how they had used MD5 collisions to create an intermediate certificate authority certificate which appeared to be legitimate when checked via its MD5 hash.[7] The researchers used a cluster of Sony Playstation 3s at the EPFL in Lausanne, Switzerland[27] to change a normal SSL certificate issued by RapidSSL into a working CA certificate for that issuer, which could then be used to create other certificates that would appear to be legitimate and issued by RapidSSL. VeriSign, the issuers of RapidSSL certificates, said they stopped issuing new certificates using MD5 as their by Abhijith Marathakam
MD5
checksum algorithm for RapidSSL once the vulnerability was announced.[28] Although Verisign declined to revoke existing certificates signed using MD5, their response was considered adequate by the authors of the exploit (Alexander Sotirov, Marc Stevens, Jacob Appelbaum, Arjen Lenstra, David Molnar, Dag Arne Osvik, and Benne de Weger).[7] Bruce Schneier wrote of the attack that "[w]e already knew that MD5 is a broken hash function" and that "no one should be using MD5 anymore."[29] The SSL researchers wrote, "Our desired impact is that Certification Authorities will stop using MD5 in issuing new certificates. We also hope that use of MD5 in other applications will be reconsidered as well."[7] MD5 uses the MerkleDamgrd construction, so if two prefixes with the same hash can be constructed, a common suffix can be added to both to make the collision more likely to be accepted as valid data by the application using it. Furthermore, current collision-finding techniques allow to specify an arbitrary prefix: an attacker can create two colliding files that both begin with the same content. All the attacker needs to generate two colliding files is a template file with a 128-byte block of data, aligned on a 64-byte boundary that can be changed freely by the collision-finding algorithm. An example MD5 collision, with the two messages differing in 6 bits, is: d131dd02c5e6eec4 55ad340609f4b302 d8823e3156348f5b e99f33420f577ee8 d131dd02c5e6eec4 55ad340609f4b302 d8823e3156348f5b e99f33420f577ee8 693d9a0698aff95c 83e488832571415a ae6dacd436c919c6 ce54b67080a80d1e 693d9a0698aff95c 83e4888325f1415a ae6dacd436c919c6 ce54b67080280d1e 2fcab58712467eab 085125e8f7cdc99f dd53e2b487da03fd c69821bcb6a88393 2fcab50712467eab 085125e8f7cdc99f dd53e23487da03fd c69821bcb6a88393 4004583eb8fb7f89 d91dbdf280373c5b 02396306d248cda0 96f9652b6ff72a70 4004583eb8fb7f89 d91dbd7280373c5b 02396306d248cda0 96f965ab6ff72a70
Both produce the MD5 hash 79054025255fb1a26e4bc422aef54eb4.[30]
Preimage vulnerability
In April 2009, a preimage attack against MD5 was published that breaks MD5's preimage resistance. This attack is only theoretical, with a computational complexity of 2123.4 for full preimage.[31][32]
Other vulnerabilities
A number of projects have published MD5 rainbow tables online, that can be used to reverse many MD5 hashes into strings that collide with the original input, usually for the purposes of password cracking. The use of MD5 in some websites' URLs means that search engines such as Google can also sometimes function as a limited tool for reverse lookup of MD5 hashes.[33] Both these techniques are rendered ineffective by the use of a sufficiently long salt.
Applications
MD5 digests have been widely used in the software world to provide some assurance that a transferred file has arrived intact. For example, file servers often provide a pre-computed MD5 (known as Md5sum) checksum for the files, so that a user can compare the checksum of the downloaded file to it. Unix-based operating systems include MD5 sum utilities in their distribution packages, whereas Windows users use third-party applications. Android ROMs also utilize this type of checksum. However, now that it is easy to generate MD5 collisions, it is possible for the person who created the file to create a second file with the same checksum, so this technique cannot protect against some forms of malicious tampering. Also, in some cases the checksum cannot be trusted (for example, if it was obtained over the same channel as the downloaded file), in which case MD5 can only provide error-checking functionality: it will recognize a corrupt or by Abhijith Marathakam
MD5
incomplete download, which becomes more likely when downloading larger files. MD5 was widely used to store passwords.[34][35] Sound uses of MD5 include UUID (also known as GUID) version 3 specified in RFC 4122, CRAM specified in RFC 2195, and the IETF NomCom lottery specified in RFC 3797. MD5 and other hash functions are also used in the field of electronic discovery, in order to provide a unique identifier for each document that is exchanged during the legal discovery process. This method can be used to replace the Bates stamp numbering system that has been used for decades during the exchange of paper documents.
Algorithm
MD5 processes a variable-length message into a fixed-length output of 128 bits. The input message is broken up into chunks of 512-bit blocks (sixteen 32-bit little endian integers); the message is padded so that its length is divisible by 512. The padding works as follows: first a single bit, 1, is appended to the end of the message. This is followed by as many zeros as are required to bring the length of the message up to 64 bits fewer than a multiple of 512. The remaining bits are filled up with a 64-bit big endian integer representing the length of the original message, in bits, modulo 264. The bytes in each 32-bit block are big endian, but the 32-bit blocks are arranged in little endian format. The main MD5 algorithm operates on a 128-bit state, divided into four 32-bit words, denoted A, B, C and D. These are initialized Figure 1. One MD5 operation. MD5 consists of 64 of these operations, grouped in to certain fixed constants. The main four rounds of 16 operations. F is a nonlinear function; one function is used in each algorithm then operates on each 512-bit round. Mi denotes a 32-bit block of the message input, and Ki denotes a 32-bit constant, different for each operation. denotes a left bit rotation by s places; s message block in turn, each block s varies for each operation. denotes addition modulo 232. modifying the state. The processing of a message block consists of four similar stages, termed rounds; each round is composed of 16 similar operations based on a non-linear function F, modular addition, and left rotation. Figure 1 illustrates one operation within a round. There are four possible functions F; a different one is used in each round:
denote the XOR, AND, OR and NOT operations respectively.
Pseudocode
The MD5 hash is calculated according to this algorithm: by Abhijith Marathakam
MD5
//Note: All variables are unsigned 32 bits and wrap modulo 2^32 when calculating var int[64] r, k //r specifies the per-round shift amounts r[ 0..15] := {7, 12, 17, 22, 7, 12, 17, 22, r[16..31] := {5, 9, 14, 20, 5, 9, 14, 20, r[32..47] := {4, 11, 16, 23, 4, 11, 16, 23, r[48..63] := {6, 10, 15, 21, 6, 10, 15, 21, //Use binary integer part of the sines for i from 0 to 63 k[i] := floor(abs(sin(i + 1)) (2 end for //(Or just use the following table): k[ 0.. 3] := { 0xd76aa478, 0xe8c7b756, k[ 4.. 7] := { 0xf57c0faf, 0x4787c62a, k[ 8..11] := { 0x698098d8, 0x8b44f7af, k[12..15] := { 0x6b901122, 0xfd987193, k[16..19] := { 0xf61e2562, 0xc040b340, k[20..23] := { 0xd62f105d, 0x02441453, k[24..27] := { 0x21e1cde6, 0xc33707d6, k[28..31] := { 0xa9e3e905, 0xfcefa3f8, k[32..35] := { 0xfffa3942, 0x8771f681, k[36..39] := { 0xa4beea44, 0x4bdecfa9, k[40..43] := { 0x289b7ec6, 0xeaa127fa, k[44..47] := { 0xd9d4d039, 0xe6db99e5, k[48..51] := { 0xf4292244, 0x432aff97, k[52..55] := { 0x655b59c3, 0x8f0ccc92, k[56..59] := { 0x6fa87e4f, 0xfe2ce6e0, k[60..63] := { 0xf7537e82, 0xbd3af235, //Initialize variables: var int h0 := 0x67452301 var int h1 := 0xefcdab89 var int h2 := 0x98badcfe var int h3 := 0x10325476 //Pre-processing: adding a single 1 bit append "1" bit to message /* Notice: the input bytes are considered as bit strings, where the first bit is the most significant bit of the byte.[36] In other words: the order of bits in a byte is BIG ENDIAN, but the order of bytes in a word is LITTLE ENDIAN */
//Pre-processing: padding with zeroes append "0" bits until message length in bits 448 (mod 512) append length mod (2 pow 64) to message /* bit (not byte) length of unpadded message as 64-bit little-endian integer */
7, 12, 17, 22, 7, 12, 17, 22} 5, 9, 14, 20, 5, 9, 14, 20} 4, 11, 16, 23, 4, 11, 16, 23} 6, 10, 15, 21, 6, 10, 15, 21}
of integers (Radians) as constants: pow 32))
0x242070db, 0xa8304613, 0xffff5bb1, 0xa679438e, 0x265e5a51, 0xd8a1e681, 0xf4d50d87, 0x676f02d9, 0x6d9d6122, 0xf6bb4b60, 0xd4ef3085, 0x1fa27cf8, 0xab9423a7, 0xffeff47d, 0xa3014314, 0x2ad7d2bb,
0xc1bdceee 0xfd469501 0x895cd7be 0x49b40821 0xe9b6c7aa 0xe7d3fbc8 0x455a14ed 0x8d2a4c8a 0xfde5380c 0xbebfbc70 0x04881d05 0xc4ac5665 0xfc93a039 0x85845dd1 0x4e0811a1 0xeb86d391
} } } } } } } } } } } } } } } }
MD5
//Process the message in successive 512-bit chunks: for each 512-bit chunk of message break chunk into sixteen 32-bit little-endian words w[j], 0 j 15 //Initialize hash value for this chunk: var int a := h0 var int b := h1 var int c := h2 var int d := h3 //Main loop: for i from 0 to 63 if 0 i 15 then f := (b and c) or ((not b) and d) g := i else if 16 i 31 f := (d and b) or ((not d) and c) g := (5i + 1) mod 16 else if 32 i 47 f := b xor c xor d g := (3i + 5) mod 16 else if 48 i 63 f := c xor (b or (not d)) g := (7i) mod 16 temp := d d := c c := b b := b + leftrotate((a + f + k[i] + w[g]) , r[i]) a := temp end for //Add this chunk's hash to result so far: h0 := h0 + a h1 := h1 + b h2 := h2 + c h3 := h3 + d end for
var char digest[16] := h0 append h1 append h2 append h3 //(expressed as little-endian)
//leftrotate function definition leftrotate (x, c) return (x << c) binary or (x >> (32-c)); Note: Instead of the formulation from the original RFC 1321 shown, the following may be used for improved efficiency (useful if assembly language is being used - otherwise, the compiler will generally optimize the above code. Since each computation is dependent on another in these formulations, this is often slower than the above method where the nand/and can be parallelised): (0 i 15): f := d xor (b and (c xor d)) (16 i 31): f := c xor (d and (b xor c))
MD5
MD5 hashes
The 128-bit (16-byte) MD5 hashes (also termed message digests) are typically represented as a sequence of 32 hexadecimal digits. The following demonstrates a 43-byte ASCII input and the corresponding MD5 hash: MD5("The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog") = 9e107d9d372bb6826bd81d3542a419d6 Even a small change in the message will (with overwhelming probability) result in a mostly different hash, due to the avalanche effect. For example, adding a period to the end of the sentence: MD5("The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog.") = e4d909c290d0fb1ca068ffaddf22cbd0 The hash of the zero-length string is: MD5("") = d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e The MD5 algorithm is specified for messages consisting of any number of bits; it is not limited to multiples of eight bits (octets, bytes) as shown in the examples above. Some MD5 implementations such as md5sum might be limited to octets, or they might not support streaming for messages of an initially undetermined length.
Notes
[1] RFC 1321, section 3.4, "Step 4. Process Message in 16-Word Blocks", page 5. [2] Tao Xie and Dengguo Feng (30 May 2009). How To Find Weak Input Differences For MD5 Collision Attacks (http:/ / eprint. iacr. org/ 2009/ 223. pdf). . [3] Xiaoyun Wang and Hongbo Yu. "How to Break MD5 and Other Hash Functions" (http:/ / merlot. usc. edu/ csac-f06/ papers/ Wang05a. pdf). . Retrieved 2009-12-21. [4] Xiaoyun Wang, Dengguo ,k.,m.,m, HAVAL-128 and RIPEMD], Cryptology ePrint Archive Report 2004/199, 16 August 2004, revised 17 August 2004. Retrieved July 27, 2008. [5] J. Black, M. Cochran, T. Highland: A Study of the MD5 Attacks: Insights and Improvements (http:/ / www. cs. colorado. edu/ ~jrblack/ papers/ md5e-full. pdf), March 3, 2006. Retrieved July 27, 2008. [6] Marc Stevens, Arjen Lenstra, Benne de Weger: Vulnerability of software integrity and code signing applications to chosen-prefix collisions for MD5 (http:/ / www. win. tue. nl/ hashclash/ SoftIntCodeSign/ ), Nov 30, 2007. Retrieved Jul 27, 2008. [7] Sotirov, Alexander; Marc Stevens, Jacob Appelbaum, Arjen Lenstra, David Molnar, Dag Arne Osvik, Benne de Weger (2008-12-30). "MD5 considered harmful today" (http:/ / www. win. tue. nl/ hashclash/ rogue-ca/ ). . Retrieved 2008-12-30. Announced (http:/ / events. ccc. de/ congress/ 2008/ Fahrplan/ events/ 3023. en. html) at the 25th Chaos Communication Congress. [8] Stray, Jonathan (2008-12-30). "Web browser flaw could put e-commerce security at risk" (http:/ / news. cnet. com/ 8301-1009_3-10129693-83. html). CNET.com. . Retrieved 2009-02-24. [9] "US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#836068" (http:/ / www. kb. cert. org/ vuls/ id/ 836068). Kb.cert.org. . Retrieved 2010-08-09. [10] "NIST.gov - Computer Security Division - Computer Security Resource Center" (http:/ / csrc. nist. gov/ groups/ ST/ hash/ policy. html). Csrc.nist.gov. . Retrieved 2010-08-09. [11] Philip Hawkes and Michael Paddon and Gregory G. Rose: Musings on the Wang et al. MD5 Collision (http:/ / eprint. iacr. org/ 2004/ 264), 13 Oct 2004. Retrieved July 27, 2008. [12] Arjen Lenstra, Xiaoyun Wang, Benne de Weger: Colliding X.509 Certificates (http:/ / eprint. iacr. org/ 2005/ 067), Cryptology ePrint Archive Report 2005/067, 1 March 2005, revised 6 May 2005. Retrieved July 27, 2008. [13] Vlastimil Klima: Finding MD5 Collisions a Toy For a Notebook (http:/ / eprint. iacr. org/ 2005/ 075), Cryptology ePrint Archive Report 2005/075, 5 March 2005, revised 8 March 2005. Retrieved July 27, 2008. [14] Vlastimil Klima: Tunnels in Hash Functions: MD5 Collisions Within a Minute (http:/ / eprint. iacr. org/ 2006/ 105), Cryptology ePrint Archive Report 2006/105, 18 March 2006, revised 17 April 2006. Retrieved July 27, 2008. [15] "Code Cracked! Cyber Command Logo Mystery Solved" (http:/ / www. wired. com/ dangerroom/ 2010/ 07/ code-cracked-cyber-command-logos-mystery-solved/ ). USCYBERCOM. Wired News. 2010-07-08. . Retrieved 2011-07-29. [16] Tao Xie, Dengguo Feng (2010). "Construct MD5 Collisions Using Just A Single Block Of Message" (http:/ / eprint. iacr. org/ 2010/ 643) (PDF). . Retrieved 2011-07-28. [17] RFC 6151, Updated Security Considerations for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms
MD5
[18] M.M.J. Stevens (June 2007). On Collisions for MD5 (http:/ / www. win. tue. nl/ hashclash/ On Collisions for MD5 - M. M. J. Stevens. pdf). . "[...] we are able to find collisions for MD5 in about 224.1 compressions for recommended IHV's which takes approx. 6 seconds on a 2.6GHz Pentium 4." [19] Marc Stevens, Arjen Lenstra, Benne de Weger (2009-06-16). Chosen-prefix Collisions for MD5 and Applications (https:/ / documents. epfl. ch/ users/ l/ le/ lenstra/ public/ papers/ lat. pdf). . [20] "New GPU MD5 cracker cracks more than 200 million hashes per second.." (http:/ / bvernoux. free. fr/ md5/ index. php). . [21] Magnus Daum, Stefan Lucks. "Hash Collisions (The Poisoned Message Attack)" (http:/ / th. informatik. uni-mannheim. de/ People/ lucks/ HashCollisions/ ). Eurocrypt 2005 rump session. . [22] Max Gebhardt, Georg Illies, Werner Schindler. A Note on the Practical Value of Single Hash Collisions for Special File Formats (http:/ / csrc. nist. gov/ groups/ ST/ hash/ documents/ Illies_NIST_05. pdf). . [23] Dobbertin, Hans (Summer 1996), "The Status of MD5 After a Recent Attack" (ftp:/ / ftp. rsasecurity. com/ pub/ cryptobytes/ crypto2n2. pdf) (pdf), RSA Laboratories CryptoBytes 2 (2): 1, , retrieved 2010-08-10, "The presented attack does not yet threaten practical applications of MD5, but it comes rather close. ....[sic] in the future MD5 should no longer be implemented...[sic] where a collision-resistant hash function is required." [24] "Schneier on Security: More MD5 Collisions" (http:/ / www. schneier. com/ blog/ archives/ 2005/ 06/ more_md5_collis. html). Schneier.com. . Retrieved 2010-08-09. [25] "Colliding X.509 Certificates" (http:/ / www. win. tue. nl/ ~bdeweger/ CollidingCertificates/ ). Win.tue.nl. . Retrieved 2010-08-09. [26] "[Python-Dev] hashlib - faster md5/sha, adds sha256/512 support" (http:/ / mail. python. org/ pipermail/ python-dev/ 2005-December/ 058850. html). Mail.python.org. . Retrieved 2010-08-09. [27] "Researchers Use PlayStation Cluster to Forge a Web Skeleton Key" (http:/ / blog. wired. com/ 27bstroke6/ 2008/ 12/ berlin. html). Wired. 2008-12-31. . Retrieved 2008-12-31. [28] Callan, Tim (2008-12-31). "This morning's MD5 attack - resolved" (https:/ / blogs. verisign. com/ ssl-blog/ 2008/ 12/ on_md5_vulnerabilities_and_mit. php). Verisign. . Retrieved 2008-12-31. [29] Forging SSL Certificates (http:/ / www. schneier. com/ blog/ archives/ 2008/ 12/ forging_ssl_cer. html) [30] Eric Rescorla (2004-08-17). "A real MD5 collision" (http:/ / www. rtfm. com/ movabletype/ archives/ 2004_08. html#001055). Educated Guesswork (blog). . [31] Yu Sasaki, Kazumaro Aoki (2009-04-16). Finding Preimages in Full MD5 Faster Than Exhaustive Search (http:/ / www. springerlink. com/ content/ d7pm142n58853467/ ). Springer Berlin Heidelberg. . [32] Ming Mao and Shaohui Chen and Jin Xu (2009). "Construction of the Initial Structure for Preimage Attack of MD5" (http:/ / doi. ieeecomputersociety. org/ 10. 1109/ CIS. 2009. 214). International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Security (IEEE Computer Society) 1: 442445. doi:10.1109/CIS.2009.214. ISBN978-0-7695-3931-7. . [33] Steven J. Murdoch: Google as a password cracker (http:/ / www. lightbluetouchpaper. org/ 2007/ 11/ 16/ google-as-a-password-cracker/ ), Light Blue Touchpaper Blog Archive, Nov 16, 2007. Retrieved July 27, 2008. [34] FreeBSD Handbook, Security - DES, Blowfish, MD5, and Crypt (http:/ / www. freebsd. org/ doc/ en/ books/ handbook/ crypt. html) [35] Solaris 10 policy.conf(4) man page (http:/ / docs. sun. com/ app/ docs/ doc/ 816-5174/ policy. conf-4?l=en& a=view) [36] RFC 1321, section 2, "Terminology and Notation", Page 2.
References
Berson, Thomas A. (1992). "Differential Cryptanalysis Mod 232 with Applications to MD5". EUROCRYPT. pp.7180. ISBN 3-540-56413-6. Bert den Boer; Antoon Bosselaers (1993). Collisions for the Compression Function of MD5. Berlin; London: Springer. pp.293304. ISBN3-540-57600-2. Hans Dobbertin, Cryptanalysis of MD5 compress. Announcement on Internet, May 1996. "CiteSeerX" (http:// citeseer.ist.psu.edu/dobbertin96cryptanalysis.html). Citeseer.ist.psu.edu. Retrieved 2010-08-09. Dobbertin, Hans (1996). "The Status of MD5 After a Recent Attack" (ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/ cryptobytes/crypto2n2.pdf). CryptoBytes 2 (2). Xiaoyun Wang; Hongbo Yu (2005). "How to Break MD5 and Other Hash Functions" (http://www.infosec.sdu. edu.cn/uploadfile/papers/How to Break MD5 and Other Hash Functions.pdf). EUROCRYPT. ISBN 3-540-25910-4.
MD5
External links
RFC 1321 The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm RFC 6151 Updated Security Considerations for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms W3C recommendation on MD5 (http://www.w3.org/TR/1998/REC-DSig-label/MD5-1_0) REXX MD5 test suite (http://purl.net/xyzzy/src/md5.cmd) covers MD5 examples in various RFCs (incl. errata)

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Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors

Image:lll.png Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Lll.png License: Public Domain Contributors: Matt Crypto Image:Boxplus.png Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Boxplus.png License: Public Domain Contributors: Grafite, JMCC1, Maksim Image:MD5.svg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:MD5.svg License: Creative Commons Attribution-Sharealike 3.0,2.5,2.0,1.0 Contributors: Surachit
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Secure Electronic Transaction

Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) was a standard protocol for securing credit card transactions over insecure networks, specifically, the Internet. SET was not itself a payment system, but rather a set of security protocols and formats that enable users to employ the existing credit card payment infrastructure on an open network in a secure fashion. However, it failed to gain traction. VISA now promotes the 3-D Secure scheme.
History and development

SET was developed by SETco, led by VISA and MasterCard (and involving other companies such as GTE, IBM, Microsoft, Netscape, RSA, Safelayer --formerly SET Projects-- and VeriSign) starting in 1996. SET was based on X.509 certificates with several extensions. The first version was finalised in May 1997 and a pilot test was announced in July 1998. SET allowed parties to cryptographically identify themselves to each other and exchange information securely. SET used a blinding algorithm that, in effect, would have let merchants substitute a certificate for a user's credit-card number. If SET were used, the merchant itself would never have had to know the credit-card numbers being sent from the buyer, which would have provided verified good payment but protected customers and credit companies from fraud. SET was intended to become the de facto standard of payment method on the Internet between the merchants, the buyers, and the credit-card companies. Despite heavy publicity, it failed to win market share. Reasons for this include: Network effect - need to install client software (an e-wallet). Cost and complexity for merchants to offer support and comparatively low cost and simplicity of the existing SSL based alternative. Client-side certificate distribution logistics.
Key features
To meet the business requirements, SET incorporates the following features: Confidentiality of information Integrity of data Cardholder account authentication Merchant authentication
Participants
A SET system includes the following participants: Cardholder Merchant Issuer Acquirer Payment gateway Certification authority
Transaction
The sequence of events required for a transaction are as follows: 1. The customer obtains a credit card account with a bank that supports electronic payment and SET 2. The customer receives a X.509v3 digital certificate signed by the bank. 3. Merchants have their own certificates 4. The customer places an order 5. The merchant sends a copy of its certificate so that the customer can verify that it's a valid store 6. The order and payment are sent 7. The merchant requests payment authorization 8. The merchant confirms the order 9. The merchant ships the goods or provides the service to the customer 10. The merchant requests payment
Dual signature
An important innovation introduced in SET is the dual signature. The purpose of the dual signature is the same as the standard electronic signature: to guarantee the authentication and integrity of data. It links two messages that are intended for two different recipients. In this case, the customer wants to send the order information (OI) to the merchant and the payment information (PI) to the bank. The merchant does not need to know the customer's credit card number, and the bank does not need to know the details of the customer's order. The link is needed so that the customer can prove that the payment is intended for this order. The message digest (MD) of the OI and the PI are independently calculated by the customer. The dual signature is the encrypted MD (with the customer's secret key) of the concatenated MD's of PI and OI. The dual signature is sent to both the merchant and the bank. The protocol arranges for the merchant to see the MD of the PI without seeing the PI itself, and the bank sees the MD of the OI but not the OI itself. The dual signature can be verified using the MD of the OI or PI. It doesn't require the OI or PI itself. Its MD does not reveal the content of the OI or PI, and thus privacy is preserved.

Secure Electronic Transaction Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=431183512 Contributors: Alansohn, Argilo, Axel.fois, Becheung, David Gerard, Deville, Grimey109, Ignacioerrico, Jarjoura, Juanpdp, Luismgarcia, MainFrame, Matt Crypto, MuffledThud, RJaguar3, SWAdair, Sbisolo, Shadowjams, Sietse Snel, SkyWalker, SouthernNights, Tad Lincoln, Tcncv, Urdna, Vicky Ng, WMXX, Wk muriithi, Yun-Yammka, Zollerriia, 67 anonymous edits
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Transport Layer Security

Transport Layer Security (TLS) and its predecessor, Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), are cryptographic protocols that provide communication security over the Internet.[1] TLS and SSL encrypt the segments of network connections at the Transport Layer, using asymmetric cryptography for key exchange, symmetric encryption for privacy, and message authentication codes for message integrity. Several versions of the protocols are in widespread use in applications such as web browsing, electronic mail, Internet faxing, instant messaging and voice-over-IP (VoIP). TLS is an IETF standards track protocol, last updated in RFC 5246, and is based on the earlier SSL specifications developed by Netscape Communications.[2]
Description
The TLS protocol allows client-server applications to communicate across a network in a way designed to prevent eavesdropping and tampering. Since most protocols can be used either with or without TLS (or SSL) it is necessary to indicate to the server whether the client is making a TLS connection or not. There are two main ways of achieving this, one option is to use a different port number for TLS connections (for example port 443 for HTTPS). The other is to use the regular port number and have the client request that the server switch the connection to TLS using a protocol specific mechanism (for example STARTTLS for mail and news protocols). Once the client and server have decided to use TLS they negotiate a stateful connection by using a handshaking procedure.[3] During this handshake, the client and server agree on various parameters used to establish the connection's security. The handshake begins when a client connects to a TLS-enabled server requesting a secure connection and presents a list of supported cipher suites (ciphers and hash functions). From this list, the server picks the strongest cipher and hash function that it also supports and notifies the client of the decision. The server sends back its identification in the form of a digital certificate. The certificate usually contains the server name, the trusted certificate authority (CA) and the server's public encryption key. The client may contact the server that issued the certificate (the trusted CA as above) and confirm the validity of the certificate before proceeding. In order to generate the session keys used for the secure connection, the client encrypts a random number with the server's public key and sends the result to the server. Only the server should be able to decrypt it, with its private key. From the random number, both parties generate key material for encryption and decryption. This concludes the handshake and begins the secured connection, which is encrypted and decrypted with the key material until the connection closes. If any one of the above steps fails, the TLS handshake fails and the connection is not created.
History and development

Secure Network Programming API
Early research efforts toward transport layer security included the Secure Network Programming (SNP) application programming interface (API), which in 1993 explored the approach of having a secure transport layer API closely resembling Berkeley sockets, to facilitate retrofitting preexisting network applications with security measures.[4]
SSL 1.0, 2.0 and 3.0

The SSL protocol was originally developed by Netscape.[5] Version 1.0 was never publicly released; version 2.0 was released in February 1995 but "contained a number of security flaws which ultimately led to the design of SSL version 3.0".[6] SSL version 3.0, released in 1996, was a complete redesign of the protocol produced by Paul Kocher working with Netscape engineers Phil Karlton and Alan Freier. Newer versions of SSL/TLS are based on SSL 3.0. The 1996 draft of SSL 3.0 was published by IETF as a historic document in RFC 6101.
TLS 1.0
TLS 1.0 was first defined in RFC 2246 in January 1999 as an upgrade to SSL Version 3.0. As stated in the RFC, "the differences between this protocol and SSL 3.0 are not dramatic, but they are significant enough that TLS 1.0 and SSL 3.0 do not interoperate." TLS 1.0 does include a means by which a TLS implementation can downgrade the connection to SSL 3.0, thus weakening security. On September 23, 2011 researchers Thai Duong and Juliano Rizzo demonstrated a "proof of concept" called BEAST (Browser Exploit Against SSL/TLS) using a Java Applet to violate same origin policy constraints, for a long-known Cipher block chaining (CBC) vulnerability in TLS 1.0.[7][8] Practical exploits had not been previously demonstrated for this vulnerability, which was originally discovered by Phillip Rogaway[9] in 2002. Mozilla updated the development versions of their NSS libraries to mitigate BEAST-like attacks. NSS is used by Mozilla Firefox and Google Chrome to implement SSL. Some web servers that have a broken implementation of the SSL specification may stop working as a result.[10] Microsoft released Security Bulletin MS12-006 on January 10, 2012, which fixed the BEAST vulnerability by changing the way that the Windows Secure Channel (SChannel) component transmits encrypted network packets.[11] As a work-around, the BEAST attack can also be prevented by removing all CBC ciphers from one's list of allowed ciphersleaving only the RC4 cipher, which is still widely supported on most websites.[12][13] Users of Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2 can enable use of TLS 1.1 and 1.2, but this work-around will fail if it is not supported by the other end of the connection and will result in a fall-back to TLS 1.0.
TLS 1.1
TLS 1.1 was defined in RFC 4346 in April 2006.[14] It is an update from TLS version 1.0. Significant differences in this version include: Added protection against Cipher block chaining (CBC) attacks. The implicit Initialization Vector (IV) was replaced with an explicit IV. Change in handling of padding errors. Support for IANA registration of parameters.
TLS 1.2
TLS 1.2 was defined in RFC 5246 in August 2008. It is based on the earlier TLS 1.1 specification. Major differences include: The MD5-SHA-1 combination in the pseudorandom function (PRF) was replaced with SHA-256, with an option to use cipher-suite specified PRFs. The MD5-SHA-1 combination in the Finished message hash was replaced with SHA-256, with an option to use cipher-suite specific hash algorithms. However the size of the hash in the finished message is still truncated to 96-bits. The MD5-SHA-1 combination in the digitally-signed element was replaced with a single hash negotiated during handshake, defaults to SHA-1. Enhancement in the client's and server's ability to specify which hash and signature algorithms they will accept. Expansion of support for authenticated encryption ciphers, used mainly for Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and CCM mode of Advanced Encryption Standard encryption. TLS Extensions definition and Advanced Encryption Standard CipherSuites were added. TLS 1.2 was further refined in RFC 6176 in March 2011 redacting its backward compatibility with SSL such that TLS sessions will never negotiate the use of Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) version 2.0.
Applications
In applications design, TLS is usually implemented on top of any of the Transport Layer protocols, encapsulating the application-specific protocols such as HTTP, FTP, SMTP, NNTP and XMPP. Historically it has been used primarily with reliable transport protocols such as the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). However, it has also been implemented with datagram-oriented transport protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) and the Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP), usage which has been standardized independently using the term Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS). A prominent use of TLS is for securing World Wide Web traffic carried by HTTP to form HTTPS. Notable applications are electronic commerce and asset management. Increasingly, the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) is also protected by TLS. These applications use public key certificates to verify the identity of endpoints. TLS can also be used to tunnel an entire network stack to create a VPN, as is the case with OpenVPN. Many vendors now marry TLS's encryption and authentication capabilities with authorization. There has also been substantial development since the late 1990s in creating client technology outside of the browser to enable support for client/server applications. When compared against traditional IPsec VPN technologies, TLS has some inherent advantages in firewall and NAT traversal that make it easier to administer for large remote-access populations. TLS is also a standard method to protect Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) application signaling. TLS can be used to provide authentication and encryption of the SIP signaling associated with VoIP and other SIP-based applications.
Security
TLS has a variety of security measures: Protection against a downgrade of the protocol to a previous (less secure) version or a weaker cipher suite. Numbering subsequent Application records with a sequence number and using this sequence number in the message authentication codes (MACs). Using a message digest enhanced with a key (so only a key-holder can check the MAC). The HMAC construction used by most TLS cipher suites is specified in RFC 2104 (SSL 3.0 used a different hash-based MAC). The message that ends the handshake ("Finished") sends a hash of all the exchanged handshake messages seen by both parties.
The pseudorandom function splits the input data in half and processes each one with a different hashing algorithm (MD5 and SHA-1), then XORs them together to create the MAC. This provides protection even if one of these algorithms is found to be vulnerable. TLS only. SSL 3.0 improved upon SSL 2.0 by adding SHA-1 based ciphers and support for certificate authentication. From a security standpoint, SSL 3.0 should be considered less desirable than TLS 1.0. The SSL 3.0 cipher suites have a weaker key derivation process; half of the master key that is established is fully dependent on the MD5 hash function, which is not resistant to collisions and is, therefore, not considered secure. Under TLS 1.0, the master key that is established depends on both MD5 and SHA-1 so its derivation process is not currently considered weak. It is for this reason that SSL 3.0 implementations cannot be validated under FIPS 140-2.[15] A vulnerability of the renegotiation procedure was discovered in August 2009 that can lead to plaintext injection attacks against SSL 3.0 and all current versions of TLS. For example, it allows an attacker who can hijack an https connection to splice their own requests into the beginning of the conversation the client has with the web server. The attacker can't actually decrypt the client-server communication, so it is different from a typical man-in-the-middle attack. A short-term fix is for web servers to stop allowing renegotiation, which typically will not require other changes unless client certificate authentication is used. To fix the vulnerability, a renegotiation indication extension was proposed for TLS. It will require the client and server to include and verify information about previous handshakes in any renegotiation handshakes.[16] This extension has become a proposed standard and has been assigned the number RFC 5746. The RFC has been implemented in recent OpenSSL[17] and other libraries.[18][19] There are some attacks against the implementation rather than the protocol itself:[20] In the earlier implementations, some CAs[21] did not explicitly set basicConstraints CA=FALSE for leaf nodes. As a result, these leaf nodes could sign rogue certificates. In addition, some early software (including IE6 and Konqueror) did not check this field altogether. This can be exploited for man-in-the-middle attack on all potential SSL connections. Some implementations (including older versions of Microsoft Cryptographic API, Network Security Services and GnuTLS) stop reading any characters that follow the null character in the name field of the certificate, which can be exploited to fool the client into reading the certificate as if it were one that came from the authentic site, e.g. paypal.com\0.badguy.com would be mistaken as the site of paypal.com rather than badguy.com. Browsers implemented SSL/TLS protocol version fallback mechanisms for compatibility reasons. The protection offered by the SSL/TLS protocols against a downgrade to a previous version by an active MITM attack can be rendered useless by such mechanisms.[22] SSL 2.0 is flawed in a variety of ways: Identical cryptographic keys are used for message authentication and encryption. SSL 2.0 has a weak MAC construction that uses the MD5 hash function with a secret prefix, making it vulnerable to length extension attacks. SSL 2.0 does not have any protection for the handshake, meaning a man-in-the-middle downgrade attack can go undetected. SSL 2.0 uses the TCP connection close to indicate the end of data. This means that truncation attacks are possible: the attacker simply forges a TCP FIN, leaving the recipient unaware of an illegitimate end of data message (SSL 3.0 fixes this problem by having an explicit closure alert). SSL 2.0 assumes a single service and a fixed domain certificate, which clashes with the standard feature of virtual hosting in Web servers. This means that most websites are practically impaired from using SSL. SSL 2.0 is disabled by default in Internet Explorer 7,[23] Mozilla Firefox 2, Mozilla Firefox 3, Mozilla Firefox 4[24] Opera and Safari. After it sends a TLS ClientHello, if Mozilla Firefox finds that the server is unable to complete the handshake, it will attempt to fall back to using SSL 3.0 with an SSL 3.0 ClientHello in SSL 2.0 format to maximize the likelihood of successfully handshaking with older servers.[25] Support for SSL 2.0 (and weak 40-bit and 56-bit ciphers) has been removed completely from Opera as of version 9.5.[26] by Abhijith Marathakam
Modifications to the original protocols, like False Start (adopted and enabled by Google Chrome[27]) or Snap Start, have been reported to introduce limited TLS protocol version rollback attacks[28] or to allow modifications to the cipher suite list sent by the client to the server (an attacker may be able influence the cipher suite selection in an attempt to downgrade the cipher suite strength, to use either a weaker symmetric encryption algorithm or a weaker key exchange[29]).
TLS handshake in detail

The TLS protocol exchanges records, which encapsulate the data to be exchanged. Each record can be compressed, padded, appended with a message authentication code (MAC), or encrypted, all depending on the state of the connection. Each record has a content type field that specifies the record, a length field and a TLS version field. When the connection starts, the record encapsulates another protocol the handshake messaging protocol which has content type 22. Simple TLS handshake A simple connection example follows, illustrating a handshake where the server (but not the client) is authenticated by its certificate: 1. Negotiation phase: A client sends a ClientHello message specifying the highest TLS protocol version it supports, a random number, a list of suggested CipherSuites and suggested compression methods. If the client is attempting to perform a resumed handshake, it may send a session ID. The server responds with a ServerHello message, containing the chosen protocol version, a random number, CipherSuite and compression method from the choices offered by the client. To confirm or allow resumed handshakes the server may send a session ID. The chosen protocol version should be the highest that both the client and server support. For example, if the client supports TLS1.1 and the server supports TLS1.2, TLS1.1 should be selected; SSL 3.0 should not be selected. The server sends its Certificate message (depending on the selected cipher suite, this may be omitted by the server).[30] The server sends a ServerHelloDone message, indicating it is done with handshake negotiation. The client responds with a ClientKeyExchange message, which may contain a PreMasterSecret, public key, or nothing. (Again, this depends on the selected cipher.) This PreMasterSecret is encrypted using the public key of the server certificate. The client and server then use the random numbers and PreMasterSecret to compute a common secret, called the "master secret". All other key data for this connection is derived from this master secret (and the client- and server-generated random values), which is passed through a carefully designed pseudorandom function. 2. The client now sends a ChangeCipherSpec record, essentially telling the server, "Everything I tell you from now on will be authenticated (and encrypted if encryption parameters were present in the server certificate)." The ChangeCipherSpec is itself a record-level protocol with content type of 20. Finally, the client sends an authenticated and encrypted Finished message, containing a hash and MAC over the previous handshake messages. The server will attempt to decrypt the client's Finished message and verify the hash and MAC. If the decryption or verification fails, the handshake is considered to have failed and the connection should be torn down. 3. Finally, the server sends a ChangeCipherSpec, telling the client, "Everything I tell you from now on will be authenticated (and encrypted, if encryption was negotiated)." The server sends its authenticated and encrypted Finished message. The client performs the same decryption and verification. by Abhijith Marathakam
4. Application phase: at this point, the "handshake" is complete and the application protocol is enabled, with content type of 23. Application messages exchanged between client and server will also be authenticated and optionally encrypted exactly like in their Finished message. Otherwise, the content type will return 25 and the client will not authenticate. Client-authenticated TLS handshake The following full example shows a client being authenticated (in addition to the server like above) via TLS using certificates exchanged between both peers. 1. Negotiation Phase: A client sends a ClientHello message specifying the highest TLS protocol version it supports, a random number, a list of suggested cipher suites and compression methods. The server responds with a ServerHello message, containing the chosen protocol version, a random number, cipher suite and compression method from the choices offered by the client. The server may also send a session id as part of the message to perform a resumed handshake. The server sends its Certificate message (depending on the selected cipher suite, this may be omitted by the server).[30] The server requests a certificate from the client, so that the connection can be mutually authenticated, using a CertificateRequest message. The server sends a ServerHelloDone message, indicating it is done with handshake negotiation. The client responds with a Certificate message, which contains the client's certificate. The client sends a ClientKeyExchange message, which may contain a PreMasterSecret, public key, or nothing. (Again, this depends on the selected cipher.) This PreMasterSecret is encrypted using the public key of the server certificate. The client sends a CertificateVerify message, which is a signature over the previous handshake messages using the client's certificate's private key. This signature can be verified by using the client's certificate's public key. This lets the server know that the client has access to the private key of the certificate and thus owns the certificate. The client and server then use the random numbers and PreMasterSecret to compute a common secret, called the "master secret". All other key data for this connection is derived from this master secret (and the client- and server-generated random values), which is passed through a carefully designed pseudorandom function. 2. The client now sends a ChangeCipherSpec record, essentially telling the server, "Everything I tell you from now on will be authenticated (and encrypted if encryption was negotiated)." The ChangeCipherSpec is itself a record-level protocol and has type 20 and not 22. Finally, the client sends an encrypted Finished message, containing a hash and MAC over the previous handshake messages. The server will attempt to decrypt the client's Finished message and verify the hash and MAC. If the decryption or verification fails, the handshake is considered to have failed and the connection should be torn down. 3. Finally, the server sends a ChangeCipherSpec, telling the client, "Everything I tell you from now on will be authenticated (and encrypted if encryption was negotiated)." The server sends its own encrypted Finished message. The client performs the same decryption and verification. 4. Application phase: at this point, the "handshake" is complete and the application protocol is enabled, with content type of 23. Application messages exchanged between client and server will also be encrypted exactly like in their Finished message. The application will never again return TLS encryption information without a type 32 apology.
Transport Layer Security Resumed TLS handshake
Public key operations (e.g., RSA) are relatively expensive in terms of computational power. TLS provides a secure shortcut in the handshake mechanism to avoid these operations. In an ordinary full handshake, the server sends a session id as part of the ServerHello message. The client associates this session id with the server's IP address and TCP port, so that when the client connects again to that server, it can use the session id to shortcut the handshake. In the server, the session id maps to the cryptographic parameters previously negotiated, specifically the "master secret". Both sides must have the same "master secret" or the resumed handshake will fail (this prevents an eavesdropper from using a session id). The random data in the ClientHello and ServerHello messages virtually guarantee that the generated connection keys will be different than in the previous connection. In the RFCs, this type of handshake is called an abbreviated handshake. It is also described in the literature as a restart handshake. 1. Negotiation phase: A client sends a ClientHello message specifying the highest TLS protocol version it supports, a random number, a list of suggested cipher suites and compression methods. Included in the message is the session id from the previous TLS connection. The server responds with a ServerHello message, containing the chosen protocol version, a random number, cipher suite and compression method from the choices offered by the client. If the server recognizes the session id sent by the client, it responds with the same session id. The client uses this to recognize that a resumed handshake is being performed. If the server does not recognize the session id sent by the client, it sends a different value for its session id. This tells the client that a resumed handshake will not be performed. At this point, both the client and server have the "master secret" and random data to generate the key data to be used for this connection. 2. The client now sends a ChangeCipherSpec record, essentially telling the server, "Everything I tell you from now on will be encrypted." The ChangeCipherSpec is itself a record-level protocol and has type 20 and not 22. Finally, the client sends an encrypted Finished message, containing a hash and MAC over the previous handshake messages. The server will attempt to decrypt the client's Finished message and verify the hash and MAC. If the decryption or verification fails, the handshake is considered to have failed and the connection should be torn down. 3. Finally, the server sends a ChangeCipherSpec, telling the client, "Everything I tell you from now on will be encrypted." The server sends its own encrypted Finished message. The client performs the same decryption and verification. 4. Application phase: at this point, the "handshake" is complete and the application protocol is enabled, with content type of 23. Application messages exchanged between client and server will also be encrypted exactly like in their Finished message. Apart from the performance benefit, resumed sessions can also be used for single sign-on as it is guaranteed that both the original session as well as any resumed session originate from the same client. This is of particular importance for the FTP over TLS/SSL protocol which would otherwise suffer from a man in the middle attack in which an attacker could intercept the contents of the secondary data connections.[31]
TLS record protocol

This is the general format of all TLS records.
+ Byte 0 Bytes 1..4 Bytes 5..(m-1) Bytes m..(p-1) Bytes p..(q-1) Byte +0 Content type Byte +1 Byte +2 Byte +3
Version (Major)
Length
(Minor) (bits 15..8) (bits 7..0) Protocol message(s)
MAC (optional)
Padding (block ciphers only)
Content type This field identifies the Record Layer Protocol Type contained in this Record.
Content types
Hex Dec 0x14 20 0x15 21 0x16 22 0x17 23 Type ChangeCipherSpec Alert Handshake Application
Version This field identifies the major and minor version of TLS for the contained message. For a ClientHello message, this need not be the highest version supported by the client.
Versions
Major Minor Version Type Version Version 3 3 3 3 0 1 2 3 SSL 3.0 TLS 1.0 TLS 1.1 TLS 1.2
Length The length of Protocol message(s), not to exceed 214 bytes (16 KiB). Protocol message(s) One or more messages identified by the Protocol field. Note that this field may be encrypted depending on the state of the connection. MAC and Padding
A message authentication code computed over the Protocol message, with additional key material included. Note that this field may be encrypted, or not included entirely, depending on the state of the connection. No MAC or Padding can be present at end of TLS records before all cipher algorithms and parameters have been negotiated and handshaked and then confirmed by sending a CipherStateChange record (see below) for signalling that these parameters will take effect in all further records sent by the same peer.
Handshake protocol
Most messages exchanged during the setup of the TLS session are based on this record, unless an error or warning occurs and needs to be signalled by an Alert protocol record (see below), or the encryption mode of the session is modified by another record (see ChangeCipherSpec protocol below).
+ Byte 0 Bytes 1..4 Bytes 5..8 Bytes 9..(n-1) Byte +0 22 Byte +1 Byte +2 Byte +3
Version (Major) Message type (Minor)
Length (bits 15..8) (bits 7..0)
Handshake message data length (bits 23..16) (bits 15..8) (bits 7..0)
Handshake message data
Bytes Message type n..(n+3) Bytes (n+4)..
Handshake message data length (bits 23..16) (bits 15..8) (bits 7..0)
Handshake message data
Message type This field identifies the Handshake message type.

Message Types Code 0 1 2 11 12 13 14 15 16 20 Description HelloRequest ClientHello ServerHello Certificate ServerKeyExchange CertificateRequest ServerHelloDone CertificateVerify ClientKeyExchange Finished
Handshake message data length This is a 3-byte field indicating the length of the handshake data, not including the header. Note that multiple Handshake messages may be combined within one record. by Abhijith Marathakam
Alert protocol
This record should normally not be sent during normal handshaking or application exchanges. However, this message can be sent at any time during the handshake and up to the closure of the session. If this is used to signal a fatal error, the session will be closed immediately after sending this record, so this record is used to give a reason for this closure. If the alert level is flagged as a warning, the remote can decide to close the session if it decides that the session is not reliable enough for its needs (before doing so, the remote may also send its own signal).
+ Byte 0 Bytes 1..4 Bytes 5..6 Bytes 7..(p-1) Bytes p..(q-1) Byte +0 21 Byte +1 Byte +2 Byte +3
Version (Major) Level (Minor) Description 0
Length 2
MAC (optional)
Level This field identifies the level of alert. If the level is fatal, the sender should close the session immediately. Otherwise, the recipient may decide to terminate the session itself, by sending its own fatal alert and closing the session itself immediately after sending it. The use of Alert records is optional, however if it is missing before the session closure, the session may be resumed automatically (with its handshakes). Normal closure of a session after termination of the transported application should preferably be alerted with at least the Close notify Alert type (with a simple warning level) to prevent such automatic resume of a new session. Signalling explicitly the normal closure of a secure session before effectively closing its transport layer is useful to prevent or detect attacks (like attempts to truncate the securely transported data, if it intrinsically does not have a predetermined length or duration that the recipient of the secured data may expect).
Alert level types

Code Level type 1 2 warning fatal Connection state connection or security may be unstable. connection or security may be compromised, or an unrecoverable error has occurred.
Description This field identifies which type of alert is being sent.
Alert description types

Code 0 10 20 Description Close notify Unexpected message Bad record MAC Level types warning/fatal fatal fatal Possibly a bad SSL implementation, or payload has been tampered with e.g. FTP firewall rule on FTPS server. TLS only, reserved TLS only Note
21 22 30 40 41 42 43
Decryption failed Record overflow Decompression failure Handshake failure No certificate Bad certificate Unsupported certificate
fatal fatal fatal fatal
warning/fatal SSL 3.0 only, reserved warning/fatal warning/fatal E.g. certificate has only Server authentication usage enabled and is presented as a client certificate warning/fatal warning/fatal Check server certificate expire also check no certificate in the chain presented has expired warning/fatal fatal fatal TLS only
44 45
Certificate revoked Certificate expired
46 47 48
Certificate unknown Illegal parameter Unknown CA (Certificate authority) Access denied
49
fatal
TLS only - E.g. no client certificate has been presented (TLS: Blank certificate message or SSLv3: No Certificate alert), but server is configured to require one. TLS only
50 51 60 70 71 80 90 100 110 111 112
Decode error Decrypt error Export restriction Protocol version Insufficient security Internal error User cancelled No renegotiation Unsupported extension Certificate unobtainable Unrecognized name
fatal
warning/fatal TLS only fatal fatal fatal fatal fatal warning warning warning warning TLS only, reserved TLS only TLS only TLS only TLS only TLS only TLS only TLS only TLS only; client's Server Name Indicator specified a hostname not supported by the server TLS only TLS only TLS only
113 114 115
Bad certificate status response Bad certificate hash value Unknown PSK identity (used in TLS-PSK and TLS-SRP)
fatal fatal fatal
ChangeCipherSpec protocol
+ Byte 0 Bytes 1..4 Byte +0 20 Byte +1 Byte +2 Byte +3
Version (Major) (Minor) 0
Length 1
Byte CCS protocol type 5
CCS protocol type Currently only 1.
Application protocol
+ Byte 0 Bytes 1..4 Bytes 5..(m-1) Bytes m..(p-1) Bytes p..(q-1) Byte +0 Byte +1 23 Byte +2 Byte +3
Version
Length
(Major) (Minor) (bits 15..8) (bits 7..0) Application data
MAC (optional)
Length Length of Application data (excluding the protocol header and including the MAC and padding trailers) MAC 20 bytes for the SHA-1-based HMAC, 16 bytes for the MD5-based HMAC. Padding Variable length ; last byte contains the padding length.
Support for name-based virtual servers

From the application protocol point of view, TLS belongs to a lower layer, although the TCP/IP model is too coarse to show it. This means that the TLS handshake is usually (except in the STARTTLS case) performed before the application protocol can start. The name-based virtual server feature being provided by the application layer, all co-hosted virtual servers share the same certificate because the server has to select and send a certificate immediately after the ClientHello message. This is a big problem in hosting environments because it means either sharing the same certificate among all customers or using a different IP address for each of them. There are two known workarounds provided by X.509: If all virtual servers belong to the same domain, a wildcard certificate can be used. Besides the loose host name selection that might be a problem or not, there is no common agreement about how to match wildcard certificates. Different rules are applied depending on the application protocol or software used.[32] by Abhijith Marathakam
Add every virtual host name in the subjectAltName extension. The major problem being that the certificate needs to be reissued whenever a new virtual server is added. In order to provide the server name, RFC 4366 Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions allow clients to include a Server Name Indication extension (SNI) in the extended ClientHello message. This extension hints the server immediately which name the client wishes to connect to, so the server can select the appropriate certificate to send to the client.
Implementations
SSL and TLS have been widely implemented in several free and open source software projects. Programmers may use the PolarSSL, CyaSSL, OpenSSL, NSS, or GnuTLS libraries for SSL/TLS functionality. Microsoft Windows includes an implementation of SSL and TLS as part of its Secure Channel package. Delphi programmers may use a library called Indy. Comparison of TLS Implementations provides a brief comparison of features of different implementations.
Browser implementations
All the most recent web browsers support TLS: Apple's Safari supports TLS, but its not officially specified which version.[33] On operating systems (Safari uses the TLS implementation of the underlying OS) like Mac OS X 10.5.8, Mac OS X 10.6.6, Windows XP, Windows Vista or Windows 7, Safari 5 has been reported to support TLS 1.0.[34] Mozilla Firefox, versions 2 and above, support TLS 1.0.[35] As of January 2012 Firefox does not support TLS 1.1 or 1.2.[36] Microsoft Internet Explorer always uses the TLS implementation of the underlying Microsoft Windows Operating System, a service called SChannel Security Service Provider. Internet Explorer 8 in Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2 supports TLS 1.2. Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2 use the same code (Microsoft Windows Version 6.1 (build 7600)) similar to how Windows Vista SP1 uses the same code as Windows 2008 Server.[37] As of Presto 2.2, featured in Opera 10, Opera supports TLS 1.2.[38] Google's Chrome browser supports TLS 1.0, but not TLS 1.1 or 1.2.[39]
Standards
The current approved version of TLS is version 1.2, which is specified in: RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2. The current standard replaces these former versions, which are now considered obsolete: RFC 2246: The TLS Protocol Version 1.0. RFC 4346: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1. as well as the never standardized SSL 3.0: RFC 6101: The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) Protocol Version 3.0. Other RFCs subsequently extended TLS. Extensions to TLS 1.0 include: RFC 2595: Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP. Specifies an extension to the IMAP, POP3 and ACAP services that allow the server and client to use transport-layer security to provide private, authenticated communication over the Internet. RFC 2712: Addition of Kerberos Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS). The 40-bit cipher suites defined in this memo appear only for the purpose of documenting the fact that those cipher suite codes have
already been assigned. RFC 2817: Upgrading to TLS Within HTTP/1.1, explains how to use the Upgrade mechanism in HTTP/1.1 to initiate Transport Layer Security (TLS) over an existing TCP connection. This allows unsecured and secured HTTP traffic to share the same well known port (in this case, http: at 80 rather than https: at 443). RFC 2818: HTTP Over TLS, distinguishes secured traffic from insecure traffic by the use of a different 'server port'. RFC 3207: SMTP Service Extension for Secure SMTP over Transport Layer Security. Specifies an extension to the SMTP service that allows an SMTP server and client to use transport-layer security to provide private, authenticated communication over the Internet. RFC 3268: AES Ciphersuites for TLS. Adds Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cipher suites to the previously existing symmetric ciphers. RFC 3546: Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions, adds a mechanism for negotiating protocol extensions during session initialisation and defines some extensions. Made obsolete by RFC 4366. RFC 3749: Transport Layer Security Protocol Compression Methods, specifies the framework for compression methods and the DEFLATE compression method. RFC 3943: Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Compression Using Lempel-Ziv-Stac (LZS). RFC 4132: Addition of Camellia Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS).
RFC 4162: Addition of SEED Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS). RFC 4217: Securing FTP with TLS. RFC 4279: Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS), adds three sets of new cipher suites for the TLS protocol to support authentication based on pre-shared keys. Extensions to TLS 1.1 include: RFC 4347: Datagram Transport Layer Security specifies a TLS variant that works over datagram protocols (such as UDP). RFC 4366: Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions describes both a set of specific extensions and a generic extension mechanism. RFC 4492: Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS). RFC 4507: Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without Server-Side State. RFC 4680: TLS Handshake Message for Supplemental Data. RFC 4681: TLS User Mapping Extension. RFC 4785: Pre-Shared Key (PSK) Ciphersuites with NULL Encryption for Transport Layer Security (TLS). RFC 5054: Using the Secure Remote Password (SRP) Protocol for TLS Authentication. Defines the TLS-SRP ciphersuites. RFC 5081: Using OpenPGP Keys for Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authentication, obsoleted by RFC 6091. Extensions to TLS 1.2 include: RFC 5746: Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication Extension. RFC 5878: Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authorization Extensions. RFC 6091: Using OpenPGP Keys for Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authentication. RFC 6176: Prohibiting Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) Version 2.0. RFC 6209: Addition of the ARIA Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS).
References and footnotes

[1] T. Dierks, E. Rescorla (August 2008). "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol, Version 1.2" (http:/ / tools. ietf. org/ html/ rfc5246). . [2] A. Freier, P. Karlton, P. Kocher (August 2011). "The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) Protocol Version 3.0" (http:/ / tools. ietf. org/ html/ rfc6101). . [3] " SSL/TLS in Detail (http:/ / technet. microsoft. com/ en-us/ library/ cc785811. aspx)". Microsoft TechNet. Updated July 31, 2003. [4] Thomas Y. C. Woo, Raghuram Bindignavle, Shaowen Su and Simon S. Lam, SNP: An interface for secure network programming Proceedings USENIX Summer Technical Conference, June 1994 [5] "THE SSL PROTOCOL" (http:/ / web. archive. org/ web/ 19970614020952/ http:/ / home. netscape. com/ newsref/ std/ SSL. html). Netscape Corporation. 2007. Archived from the original (http:/ / home. netscape. com/ newsref/ std/ SSL. html) on 14 June 1997. . [6] Rescorla 2001 [7] Dan Goodin (2011-09-19). "Hackers break SSL encryption used by millions of sites" (http:/ / www. theregister. co. uk/ 2011/ 09/ 19/ beast_exploits_paypal_ssl/ ). . [8] "Y Combinator comments on the issue" (http:/ / news. ycombinator. com/ item?id=3015498). 2011-09-20. . [9] "Security of CBC Ciphersuites in SSL/TLS" (http:/ / www. openssl. org/ ~bodo/ tls-cbc. txt). 2004-05-20. . [10] Brian Smith (2011-09-30). "(CVE-2011-3389) Rizzo/Duong chosen plaintext attack (BEAST) on SSL/TLS 1.0 (facilitated by websockets -76)" (https:/ / bugzilla. mozilla. org/ show_bug. cgi?id=665814). . [11] "Vulnerability in SSL/TLS Could Allow Information Disclosure (2643584)" (http:/ / technet. microsoft. com/ en-us/ security/ bulletin/ ms12-006). 2012-01-10. . [12] "Safest ciphers to use with the BEAST? (TLS 1.0 exploit)" (http:/ / serverfault. com/ questions/ 315042/ ). 2011-09-24. . [13] "First solutions for SSL/TLS vulnerability" (http:/ / www. h-online. com/ security/ news/ item/ First-solutions-for-SSL-TLS-vulnerability-1349813. html). 2011-09-26. . [14] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla (April 2006). "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1, RFC 4346" (http:/ / tools. ietf. org/ html/ rfc5246#ref-TLS1. 1). . [15] National Institute of Standards and Technology (December 2010). "Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program" (http:/ / csrc. nist. gov/ groups/ STM/ cmvp/ documents/ fips140-2/ FIPS1402IG. pdf). . [16] Eric Rescorla (2009-11-05). "Understanding the TLS Renegotiation Attack" (http:/ / www. educatedguesswork. org/ 2009/ 11/ understanding_the_tls_renegoti. html). Educated Guesswork. . Retrieved 2009-11-27. [17] "SSL_CTX_set_options SECURE_RENEGOTIATION" (http:/ / www. openssl. org/ docs/ ssl/ SSL_CTX_set_options. html#SECURE_RENEGOTIATION). OpenSSL Docs. 2010-02-25. . Retrieved 2010-11-18. [18] "GnuTLS 2.10.0 released" (http:/ / article. gmane. org/ gmane. network. gnutls. general/ 2046). GnuTLS release notes. 2010-06-25. . Retrieved 2011-07-24. [19] "NSS 3.12.6 release notes" (https:/ / developer. mozilla. org/ NSS_3. 12. 6_release_notes). NSS release notes. 2010-03-03. . Retrieved 2011-07-24. [20] Various (2002-08-10). "IE SSL Vulnerability" (http:/ / www. mail-archive. com/ bugtraq@securityfocus. com/ msg08807. html). Educated Guesswork. . Retrieved 2010-11-17. [21] "Defeating SSL" (https:/ / www. blackhat. com/ presentations/ bh-dc-09/ Marlinspike/ BlackHat-DC-09-Marlinspike-Defeating-SSL. pdf). . [22] Adrian, Dimcev. "SSL/TLS version rollbacks and browsers" (http:/ / www. carbonwind. net/ blog/ post/ Random-SSLTLS-101SSLTLS-version-rollbacks-and-browsers. aspx). Random SSL/TLS 101. . Retrieved 9 March 2011. [23] Lawrence, Eric (2005-10-22). "IEBlog : Upcoming HTTPS Improvements in Internet Explorer 7 Beta 2" (http:/ / blogs. msdn. com/ ie/ archive/ 2005/ 10/ 22/ 483795. aspx). MSDN Blogs. . Retrieved 2007-11-25. [24] "Bugzilla@Mozilla Bug 236933 - Disable SSL2 and other weak ciphers" (https:/ / bugzilla. mozilla. org/ show_bug. cgi?id=236933). Mozilla Corporation. . Retrieved 2007-11-25. [25] "Firefox still sends SSLv2 handshake even though the protocol is disabled" (https:/ / bugzilla. mozilla. org/ show_bug. cgi?id=454759). 2008-09-11. . [26] Pettersen, Yngve (2007-04-30). "10 years of SSL in Opera Implementer's notes" (http:/ / my. opera. com/ yngve/ blog/ 2007/ 04/ 30/ 10-years-of-ssl-in-opera). Opera Software. . Retrieved 2007-11-25. [27] Wolfgang, Gruener. "False Start: Google Proposes Faster Web, Chrome Supports It Already" (http:/ / www. conceivablytech. com/ 3299/ products/ false-start-google-proposes-faster-web-chrome-supports-it-already). . Retrieved 9 March 2011. [28] Brian, Smith. "Limited rollback attacks in False Start and Snap Start" (http:/ / www. ietf. org/ mail-archive/ web/ tls/ current/ msg06933. html). . Retrieved 9 March 2011. [29] Adrian, Dimcev. "False Start" (http:/ / www. carbonwind. net/ blog/ post/ Random-SSLTLS-101-False-Start. aspx). Random SSL/TLS 101. . Retrieved 9 March 2011. [30] These certificates are currently X.509, but there is also a draft specifying the use of OpenPGP based certificates. [31] vsftpd-2.1.0 released (http:/ / scarybeastsecurity. blogspot. com/ 2009/ 02/ vsftpd-210-released. html) Using TLS session resume for FTPS data connection authentication. Retrieved on 2009-04-28. [32] Named-based SSL virtual hosts: how to tackle the problem (https:/ / www. switch. ch/ pki/ meetings/ 2007-01/ namebased_ssl_virtualhosts. pdf), SWITCH. [33] Apple (2009-06-10). "Features" (http:/ / www. apple. com/ safari/ features. html). . Retrieved 2009-06-10.
[34] Adrian, Dimcev. "Common browsers/libraries/servers and the associated cipher suites implemented" (http:/ / www. carbonwind. net/ TLS_Cipher_Suites_Project/ tls_ssl_cipher_suites_annex_a1_main. docx). TLS Cipher Suites Project. . [35] Mozilla (2008-08-06/). "Security in Firefox 2" (https:/ / developer. mozilla. org/ en/ Security_in_Firefox_2). . Retrieved 2009-03-31. [36] "Bug 480514 - Implement support for TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246)" (https:/ / bugzilla. mozilla. org/ show_bug. cgi?id=480514). 2010-03-17. . Retrieved 2010-04-04. [37] Microsoft (2009-02-27). "MS-TLSP Appendix A" (http:/ / msdn. microsoft. com/ en-us/ library/ dd208005(PROT. 13). aspx). . Retrieved 2009-03-19. [38] Yngve Nyster Pettersen (2009-02-25). "New in Opera Presto 2.2: TLS 1.2 Support" (http:/ / my. opera. com/ core/ blog/ 2009/ 02/ 25/ new-in-opera-presto-2-2-tls-1-2-support). . Retrieved 2009-02-25. [39] Chromium Project (2011-07-25). "No TLS 1.2 (SHA-2) Support" (http:/ / code. google. com/ p/ chromium/ issues/ detail?id=90392). . Retrieved 2011-09-21.
Further reading
Wagner, David; Schneier, Bruce (November 1996). "Analysis of the SSL 3.0 Protocol" (http://www.schneier. com/paper-ssl.pdf). The Second USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce Proceedings. USENIX Press. Eric Rescorla (2001). SSL and TLS: Designing and Building Secure Systems. United States: Addison-Wesley Pub Co. ISBN0-201-61598-3. Joshua Davies (2011). Implementing SSL/TLS Using Cryptography and PKI. New York: Wiley. ISBN978-0-470-92041-1. Stephen A. Thomas (2000). SSL and TLS essentials securing the Web. New York: Wiley. ISBN0-471-38354-6. Bard, Gregory (2006). "A Challenging But Feasible Blockwise-Adaptive Chosen-Plaintext Attack On Ssl" (http:/ /eprint.iacr.org/2006/136). International Association for Cryptologic Research (136). Retrieved 2011-09-23. Canvel, Brice. "Password Interception in a SSL/TLS Channel" (http://lasecwww.epfl.ch/memo/memo_ssl. shtml). Retrieved 2007-04-20. IETF Multiple Authors. "RFC of change for TLS Renegotiation" (http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5746). Retrieved 2009-12-11. Creating VPNs with IPsec and SSL/TLS (http://www.linuxjournal.com/article/9916) Linux Journal article by Rami Rosen
External links
SSL 2 specification (http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/ssl/draft02.html) (published 1994) Early drafts of SSL 3.0 specification (http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-freier-ssl-version3-00) (published 1995) The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) Protocol Version 3.0 (2011) (http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6101) The IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) TLS Workgroup (http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/tls-charter. html) SSL tutorial (http://www2.rad.com/networks/2001/ssl/index.htm) ECMAScript Secure Transform (Web 2 Secure Transform Method) (http://www.semnanweb.com/ ecmast-ecmascript-secure-transform/) OWASP: Transport Layer Protection Cheat Sheet (http://www.owasp.org/index. php?title=Transport_Layer_Protection_Cheat_Sheet) A talk on SSL/TLS that tries to explain things in terms that people might understand. (http://computing.ece.vt. edu/~jkh/Understanding_SSL_TLS.pdf) SSL: Foundation for Web Security (http://www.cisco.com/web/about/ac123/ac147/archived_issues/ipj_1-1/ ssl.html)
This article is based on material taken from the Free On-line Dictionary of Computing prior to 1 November 2008 and incorporated under the "relicensing" terms of the GFDL, version 1.3 or later.

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Message authentication code

Message authentication code

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History and cryptanalysis

Both produce the MD5 hash 79054025255fb1a26e4bc422aef54eb4.[30]

denote the XOR, AND, OR and NOT operations respectively.

of integers (Radians) as constants: pow 32))

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Secure Electronic Transaction

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Transport Layer Security

Transport Layer Security

Transport Layer Security

History and development

SSL 1.0, 2.0 and 3.0

Transport Layer Security

Transport Layer Security

Transport Layer Security

TLS handshake in detail

Transport Layer Security

Transport Layer Security Resumed TLS handshake

Transport Layer Security

TLS record protocol

(Minor) (bits 15..8) (bits 7..0) Protocol message(s)

Padding (block ciphers only)

Transport Layer Security

Version (Major) Message type (Minor)

Length (bits 15..8) (bits 7..0)

Handshake message data

Bytes Message type n..(n+3) Bytes (n+4)..

Handshake message data

Message type This field identifies the Handshake message type.

Transport Layer Security

Version (Major) Level (Minor) Description 0

Padding (block ciphers only)

Alert level types

Description This field identifies which type of alert is being sent.

Transport Layer Security

Alert description types

fatal fatal fatal fatal

Certificate revoked Certificate expired

Certificate unknown Illegal parameter Unknown CA (Certificate authority) Access denied

50 51 60 70 71 80 90 100 110 111 112

113 114 115

fatal fatal fatal

Transport Layer Security

Version (Major) (Minor) 0

Byte CCS protocol type 5

CCS protocol type Currently only 1.

(Major) (Minor) (bits 15..8) (bits 7..0) Application data

Padding (block ciphers only)

Support for name-based virtual servers

Transport Layer Security