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APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: JUN 2007

20 July 1964

THE HIGHER MILITARY COUNCIL OF TAE USSR

HR7 0- 14 (U)

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DD/I STAFF STUDY

CIA/RSS REFERENCE TITLE: CAESAR XXIV

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CAESAR XXIV

Off. Ser'. N o . 18

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THE HIGHER MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE USSR

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T h i s is a working p a p e r , t h e f i r s t i n a planned series OY r e p o r t s on S o v i e t m i l i t a r y policy-making.

W emphasize a t t h e o u t s e t t h e p a u c i t y of informae t i o n on t h e S o v i e t decision-making process--a l a c k of evidence t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s an important gap i n i n t e l l i s gence. It is hoped t h a t t h i s paper w i l l underscore tHe need for more information r e l a t i n g t o S o v i e t p o l i c y formulation.
W examine h e r e t h e Higher M i l i t a r y Council and e o f f e r t e n t a t i v e c o n c l u s i o n s about t h e u s e of t h i s i n s t i t u t i o n by Khrushchev and t h e m i l i t a r y f o r t h e i r v a r i o u s purposes.
A second s t u d y on m i l i t a r y decision-making w i l l d i s . c u s s t h e roles of i n d l u l d u a l presidium members and leading p a r t y , government and d i l i t a r y personnel in t h e policy-making p r o c e s s . A t h i r d s t u d y w i l l reexamine t h e r o l e of t h e m i l i t a r y ' s main p l a n n i n g i n s t i t u t i o n , t h e Generial S t a f f

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Although t h & s paper h a s n o t been c o o r d i n a t e d w i t h o t h e r o f f i c e s , t h e a u t h o r h a s b e n e f i t e d much from d f s c u s s i o n of t h e t o p i c w i t h colleagues in other o f f i c e s of t h e Agency. The a u t h o r a l o n e is r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e paper's conclusibns, , . The DDI/RS would welcome comment on t h i s paper, addressed t o Leonard Parkinsod, who wrote t h e p a p e r ,

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THE HIGHER MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE USSR

CONTENTS

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.............................. 1 PART ONE: THE COUNCIL TODAY .......................... 1. I n t r o d u c t i o n . . . ..................................... H i e r a r c h i c a l Status........... ......................1 2 4 Membership..... ..................................... Procedlllre. ..........................................6 Decision-Making Role ................................ Advisory Role............ ...........................7 8 The M i l i t a r y Influence....................... ......-10 . ghrushchev's U s e of M i l i t a r y Advice.. ............. .12
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.

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.......................................... 17 PART TWO: THE EVOLUTION O F THE COUNCIL.......... ....20 1934: The O r i g i n of t h e M i l i t a r y Council As C o n s u l t a t i v e Body.. ...................... 21 1937-1938: The M i l i t a r y Purge and S t a l i n ' s Assumption of D i r e c t Control of t h e M i l i t a r y Council.. ................22 1941: R o l e of M i l i t a r y Councils Assumed by S t a t e
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The Lower Level M i l i t a r y Councils..................l4 The C o u n c i l and t h e U.S. National S e c u r i t y Council.

Defense Committee and Stavka During World War 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1................2 1946: Establishment of a S i n g l e Main M i l i t a r y Council. 1950: Council System S t r i p p e d of Former Pwr..................3 oes..0...............0 1953-1957: Diminished R o l e of Council System Continues 1957-Present: Khrushchev R e v i t a l i z e s Council System....

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TIIX HIGIIJR MILITARY COUNCIL O F THE USSR

Sumrnarv and Conclusions

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The hi@hest-leMel body f o r m a l l y charged w i t h providi n g d e f e n s e recommendations t o t h e decision-making aQthori t y i n t h e S o v i e t Union is c a l l e d t h e "Higher M i l i t a r y Council1' (Vysshyy Voyenny Sovet*). T h i s body is shrouded i n s e c r e c y and is r a r e l y mentioned i n u n c l a s s i f i e d S o v i e t w r i t i n g s . However, by examining t h e occasionall u n c l a s s i f i e d r e f e r e n c e s t o m i l i t a r y decision-making1 een a w e TO 1 1 1 uminate t n e r o i l o w i n g reatures of the Higher M i l i t a r y Council :
(1) it is an i n s t i t u t i o n created and u s e d by Khrushchev t o maintain d i r e c t o p e r a t i o n a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o n t r o l over t h e e n t i r e S o v i e t m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h m e n t ;
(2) it provides t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l m i l i t a r y , who are not r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h e r u l i n g p a r t y presidium, w i t h d i r e c t access to Khrushchev and h i s "inner-presidium" m i l i t a r y team, and, hence, an o p p o r t u n i t y t o i n f l u e n c e d e c i s i o n s a t an e a r l y s t a g e i n t h e pblicy-making p r o c e s s ;

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(3) it is p r i m a r i l y a i ' c o n s u l t a t f v e body, *which deals with a w i d e range of s t r a t e g i c and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e quest i o n s , b u t a p p a r e n t l y has some decision-making a u t h o r i t y ( f o r example, "requirements" of an unknown kind are i s s u e d i n t h e name of t h e Council);

*The Higher M i l it a r y Council--"Vysshyy Voyenny Sovet"-was recorded i n t h e IRONBARK r e p o r t s as t h e Supreme M i l i t a r y Council. S o v i e t m i l i t a r y d i c t i o n a r i e s g e n e r a l l y g i v e t w o E n g l i s h meanings f o r "vysshyy;" t h e p r e f e r r e d one-and t h e second and t h e one u s e d i n t h i s study--is meaning ds "supreme." \

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(4) Khrushchev is not bound t o act on t h e recommendat i o n s of t h e m i l i t a r y members of t h e Council (some of whoxi r e p o r t e d l y opposed h i s 1960 t r o o p c u t p l a n ) , b u t on some matters he has r e p o r t e d l y followed t h e m i l i t a r y ' s advice o r y i e l d e d t o t h e i r p r e s s u r e (e.g., t h e 1961 resumption of n u c l e a r t e s t i n g ) ;

(5) t h e composition and f u n c t i o n of t h e Council s u g g e s t s t h a t it is one device u s e d by Khrushchev t o bypass t h e r u l i n g p a r t y presidium as a whole on c e r t a i n m i l i t a r y p o l i t i c a l matters. Khrushchev himself convokes t h e Counc i l , s e r v e s as its chairman, and dominates it. Depending on. t h e matter a t hand, p a r t i c i p a n t s in Council meetings have included presidium members who appear t o be Khsushchev's p r i n c i p a l m i l i t a r y a d v i s o r s (Bsezhnev, Mikoyan, and Kozlov are t h e o n l y ones s p e c i f i c a l l y i d e n t i f i e d in r e p o r t s on Council meetings), t h e p r i n c i p a l S o v i e t m i l i t a r y f i g u r e s (Mal inovsky, h i s deput ies , and o t h e r s e n i o r m i l it a r y o f f i c e r s and a d v i s o r s ) and high-level p a r t y and government i n d i v i d u a l s involved i n d e f e n s e - r e l a t e d m a t t e r s ;

(6) t h e Council's high-powered membership and l o f t y p o s i t i o n i n t h e S o v i e t h i e r a r c h i c a l scheme--the Council s t a n d s o u t s i d e and above t h e Defense Ministry--make it a unique i n s t i t u t i o n i n t h e Soviet system today;
( 7 ) n e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e Council has a n t e c e d e n t s i n t h e Soviet p a s t , and bears some f u n c t i o n a l s i m i l a r i t y (but remains d i s t i n c t i n b o t h usage and composition) t o t h e National S e c u r i t y Council of t h e United S t a t e s .

Stalin, too, established i n s t i t u t i o n s l i k e t h e Higher M i l i t a r y Council t o ensure h i s dominance in t h e realm of decision-making and p o l i c y execution. S t a l i n ' s r e t e n t i o n of t h e m i l i t a r y p o l i c y p r e r o g a t i v e i n t h e p o s t war y e a r s , however, d i d not depend upon t h e maintenance of an a c t i v e and powerful c o u n c i l system, which he gradua l l y c u r t a i l e d . Khrushchev, a f t e r Marshal Zhukov's fa1.1, r e v i t a l i z e d t h e e n t i r e c o u n c i l system and formed t h e Higher M i l i t a r y Council t o e n s u r e f o r himself t h e powers which S t a l i n had wielded i n t h e m i l i t a r y s p h e r e . B u t , u n l i k e S t a l i n ' s i n s t i t u t i o n s , Khsushchev's c o u n c i l system is more t h a n a r e p r e s s i v e device to r e t a i n p e r s o n a l dominance

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over t h e m i l i t a r y ; it: provides t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l s o l d i e r w i t h a h i g h - l e v e l lobbying forum t o recommend p o l i c y relating::: to t h e complex q u e s t i o n s of modern war t o t h e presidium decision-makers

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PART ONE:

TEE COUNCIL TODAY

Introduction
It h a s been characteristic of Khrushchev's s t y l e of r u l e , s i n c e he took f i r m hold of t h e helm of s t a t e i n 1957, t o place himself a t t h e head of t h e major p a r t y and government departments w h i l e methodically d i v i d i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s among h i s associates in order t o prevent any of them from a c q u i r i n g enough power--or a bureaucratic b a s i s f o r a c h i e v i n g power--to r i v a l h i s . N o t c o n t e n t w i t h h i s direct, personal c o n t r o l o v e r t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l p a r t y apparatus, t h e USSR Council of M i n i s t e r s , and t h e importa n t RSFSR Buro, Ehrushchev a l s o assumed personal c o n t r o l over t h e m i l i t a r y . I t is not s u r p r i s i n g t h e n t h a t h i s voice is t h e dominant one on m i l i t a r y q u e s t i o n s i n t h e r u l i n g presidium, and, w i t h rare e x c e p t i o n s , t h e o n l y p a r t y v o i c e heard on t h a t subject o u t s i d e t h e Kremlin walls. The m o s t important developments in m i l i t a r y doct r i n e and advanced weapons i n r e c e n t y e a r s have been att r i b u t e d t o h i s personal i n i t i a t i v e .

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To a s s u r e himself of a dominant role i n t h e m i l i t a r y decision-making process, Khrushchev assumed t w o key m i l i t a r y p o s t s which had a n t e c e d e n t s in S t a l i n ' s t i m e b u t which were created anew in a form more s u i t a b l e t o Khrushchev's p a r t i c u l a r circumstances and s t y l e of r u l e . Sometime a f t e r h i s showdown w i t h Marshal Zhukov, prob. a b l y in 1958, Khrushchev established (by a secret p a r t y decree, w e t h i n k ) a so-called Higher M i l i t a r y Council, c o n s i s t i n g of key m i l i t a r y and p a r t y personnel, t o s e r v e as h i s p e r s o n a l Advisory group on m a t t e r s r e l a t i n g to defense. Two or three y e a r s l a t e r , e v i d e n t l y , he a l s o donned t h e l o f t y t i t l e of Supreme High Commander. T h i s l a t t e r o f f i c e combined, in e f f e c t , t h e h i g h e s t p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t y and gave Khrushchev p e r s o n a l l y . powers and s t a t u r e comparable t o those of t h e P r e s i d e n t of t h e United S t a t e s , or t o those enjoyed by S t a l i n d u r i n g t h e Second World War.

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By t i r t u e of h i s p o s i t i o n of Supreme High Commander, Khrushchev gained u l t i m a t e o p e r a t i o n a l c o n t r o l over t h e Strategic Rocket Forces, and, presumably, t h e power t o react t o o r i n i t i a t e a n u l c e a r s t r i k e without t h e p r i o r approval of t h e o t h e r p a r t y leaders.* And by v i r t u e of h i s p o s i t i o n of Chairman of t h e Higher M i l i t a r y Council Khrushchev may bypass t h e P r e s i d i u m as a whole from t h e first stages of presumably any m i l i t a r y - p o l i t i c a l v e n t u r e .
W do not know whether Khrushchev. con$idessA.h%mself e f u l l y capable of making " f i n a l " m i l i t a r y d e c i s i o n s w i t h out p r i o r consultati'on w i t h l e a d i n g p a r t y and m i l i t a r y f i g u r e s . We do know t h a t he a c t i v e l y seeks o u t t h e adv i c e of others--presidium c o l l e a g u e s , government specialists and m i l i t a r y p r o f e s s i o n a l s i n t h e process of p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n , The p r i n c i p a l a d v i s o r y forum is t h e Higher M i l i t a r y Council. B u t t h e Council, as we: s h a l l demons t r a t e , t m n s c e n d s its a d v i s o r y r o l e and assumes some e x e c u t i v e and decision-making powers in its own r i g h t . Mor_pover, w h i l e Khrushchev u s e s t h e Council as an i n s t r u ment f o r e x e r c i s i n g h i s p e r s o n a l c o n t r o l o v e r t h e m i l i t a r y , t h e same organ p r o v i d e s t h e m i l i t a r y w i t h an opp o r t u n i t y t o b r i n g p r e s s u r e (by f o r c e of argumentation) d i r e c t l y t o bear on t h e p a r t y leadership f o r purposes of influencing policy decisions.
Hierarchical S t a t u s :

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The Higher M i l i t a r y Council; as d i s t i n c t from its predecessor i n s t i t u t i o n with a s i m i l a r name o r o t h e r

*For a s t u d y ' o n t h e s t r e a m l i n i n g of t h e s t r a t e g i c command machinery i n peacetime, see CAESAR X I of 3 J u l y 1962, V ''Soviet S t r a t e g i c Doctrine for t h e S k a r t of War," pp. 3539. Recently, Marshal Malinovsky, n o t i n g Khrushchev's e x c l u s i v e c o n t r o l of t h e SRF, s t a t e d i n RED STAR on 17 A p r i l 1964 t h a t l'on h i s i n i t i a t i v e , and under his d i r e c t leadership, a new t y p e of armed force--the s t r h g e g i c rocket troops-was created .'I (Our emphasis .)

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m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s , is n o t an o r g a n i c p a r t of t h e S o v i e t defense e s t a b l i s h m e n t . A t least s i n c e 1958, when it was probably r e - e s t a b l i s h e d and t a i l w e d t o s u i t Khrushchev's purposes, t h e Council has s t o o d o u t s i d e and above Ehe Ministry of Defense. The Council is, l i t e r a l l y , t h e meeti n g p l a c e of t h e supreme p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s h i p s . It seems t o be n e i t h e r a p r i m a r i l y governmental body nor a p a r t y body, but a mixed one.
The l o f t y hierarchical s t a t u s of t h e Higher M i l i t a r y Council w a s made p l a i n in one of t h e f e w r e f e r e n c e s t o t h a t body in t h e IBONBARK materials. An a r t i c l e in t h e a u t h o r i t a t i v e INFORMATION BULLETIN OF TEE ROCKET TROOPS, J u l y 1961, placed t h e Council between t h e p a r t y c e n t r a l committee and t h e M i n i s t e r of De&ense i n a h i e r a r c h i c a l 1 ist i n g *

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remarked i n one report t h a t is "attacneu t o " '(Russian n o t a v a i l a b l e ) t h e

Ministry of Defense.

T h i s c r y p t i c statement may l e a v e

t h e impression i n t h e minds of some readers t h a t t h e Counc i l is a "part of" t h e M i n i s t r y of Defense. We reject any such i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e renlajckand c i t e as evidence of t h e s u b o r d i n a t i o n of t h e m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s W t o t h e own Higher M i l it ary Council d e s c r i p t i o n s of t h e Cou ties, t h e l a t t e r o f t e n t r a n s c e n d i n g t h e competence of t h e off icer corps.

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*The p e r t i n e n t q u o t a t i o n reads as follows: "The eff o r t s of t h e commanding o f f i c e r and p a r t y and Komsomol o r g a n i z a t i o n s m u s t be directed toward t h e maintenance of a f i r m procedure, according t o r e g u l a t i o n s , f o r t h e strict f u l f i l l m e h t of t h e requirements of t h e C e n t r a l Committee of t h e CPSU, of t h e Main M i l i t a r y Council, of t h e Minister of Defense of t h e USSR and of t he Commanderin-Chief of Missile Troops f o r a r a d i c a l improvement In m i l i t a r y d i s c i p l i n e . " ( O u r emphasis .)

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Membership

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The e x t r a o r d i n a r y p o s i t i o n of t h e Council can be d. m a g s t e m from) its high explained by (and, i powered membership.

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escr ibed t h e Council as an "operational" and "very f l e x i k e " group of high-level p a r t y , government, and m i l i t a r y o f f i c i a l s u n d e r thp j u r i s d i c t i o n of Commander-in-Chief Khrushchev. In a d d i t i o n t o Khrushchev, who chairs t h e meetings of y c i v i l i a n members were Mikoyan and K residium m e m b e r s a t t e n d mee t h e Council d i d n o t d i s c l o s e t h e i r names. In addition, epending on t h e matter a t hand, memb e r s of t e cen r a committee, r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from t h e S t a t e Committees f o r E l e c t r o n i c s or Defense Technology, o r s c i e n t i s t s from t h e Academy of Sciences may be summoned t o a t t e n d C o u n c i l meetings.

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On t h e m i l i t a r y s i d e , according t o a l l commanders-in-chief of t h e v a r i o u s es or serv i c e are a u t o m a t i c a l l y m e m b e r s of t h e Council, and ' t h e Council may have a n attached advisory grow c o n s i s t i n g of o t h e r h i g h - r a n k i n g m i l i t a r y a d v i s o r s In a d d i t i o n ,

*According , Marshals Sokolovsky and Zhukov w e a.u A U C C . A d t o p l a y t h e p a r t of p r i n c i p a l m i l i t a r y a d v i s o r s attached t o t h e Council. A l a t e r r e p o r t s t a t e d t h a t Sokolovsky acc ment, b u t Zhukov had not y e t done so. corroborated t h i s r e p o r t . There were s t i o n s t h a t Zhukov was being considered f o r l r r e h a b i l i t a t i o n " probably i n e a r l y 1963, b u t t h i s has never materia lb e d . ( f o o t n o t e continued on page 5 )
*UT*YYU

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also related t h a t l e a d i n g m l l i z a r y men

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( f o o t n o t e continued from page 4) In addition t o t unc il s p r i n c ip a l m i l i t a r y advisoas 1 ief l y mentioned : t h e e x i s t e n c e of a "s attached .to t h e Minister of Defense and c o n s i s t i n g of " s e n i o r m a r s h a l s and generals." Marshal Meretskov w a s named as head of t h e group and Marshal Moskalenko and General Tulyenev were i d e n t i f i e d as members. Unfortunately, w e have no f u r t h e r information on t h e lvadvisory group f v While '*sen- ' i o r m a r s h a l s t p are members of t h e Inspector General Group which is headed by Moskalenko, t h e "special advisory group" of which Moskalenko is a member would, t h u s , app e a r t o be a separate body. Marshal Meretskov and General Tulyenev are c u r r e n t l y i d e n t i f i e d o n l y as " i n t h e Minist r y of Defense, '' and have n o t been i d e n t i f i e d as members of Moskalenko's Inspector General Group. If t h i s advis o r y group is i n fact d i s t i n c t from Moskalenko's organiz a t ion and is composed of " s e n i o r marshals and g e n e r a l s , '@ it may not be very d i s s i m i l a r from Voroshilov's 1934 M i l i t a r y Council and.Bulganings post-war M i l i t a r y C o u n c i l (both of which are examined i n Part Two).

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h e expressed t h e view t h a t Khrushchev's p o l i t i c a l power w a s s u c h t h a t he could be a member or head of any committee, c o u n c i l , or other o f f i c i a l body, a t any t i m e .

Procedure
e Council, as e x p l a i n e d is e n t i r e l y under K h r u s chev ' s domination and a t h i s d i s c r e t i o n . The Council holds r e g u l a r l y s c h e d u l e d meetings b u t a l s o meets f r e q u e n t l y whene v e r t h e need arises--a s t a t e m e n t c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a 1958 m i l i t a r y d i c t i o n a r y ' s d e f i n i t i o n of " M i l i t a r y Counc i l " as a "permanent, or t e m p o r a r i l y convoked c o n s u l t a t i v e organ attached t o t h e supreme s t a t e a u t h o r i t y . " Council s e s s i o n s do n o t require t h e assembling of a . quorum. A l l t h a t is n e c e s s a r y f o r a s e s s i o n of t h e Council is for Khrushchev t o meet w i t h s e v e r a l of h i s a d v i s o r s on m i l i t a r y q u e s t i o n s . ( W e do not know w h e t h e r a meeting of t h e Council c o u l d be h e l d i n t h e absence of its chairman, Khrushchev .)

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W have no information as t o whether o r n o t t h e e members of t h e Council have v o t i n g r i g h t s , t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t d e c i s i o n s are made a t meetings of t h e Council or i n its name.* The f l e x i b l e and v a r i e g a t e d membership of t h e Council, and t h e manner i n which its meetings are r e p o r t e d l y conducted, s u g g e s t t h a t t h e members do n o t c a s t a formal v o t e b u t seek t o persuade a s i n g l e a r b i t e r , Khrushchev, by force of argumentation.

....... ... .

From the l i t t l e evidence a t o u r d i s p o s a l , it wouild seem t h a t t h e b r e a d t h of defense-related q u e s t i o n s t a k e n . up at meetings of t h e Council is c o n s i d e r a b l e . The 1958 d i c t i o n a r y of m i l i t a r y t e r m s cited earlier s t a t e d t h a t

*Members of command l e v e l m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s do have v o t i n g r i g h t s . D e c i s i o n s a t t h i s l e v e l , however, p r i m a r i l y concern day-to-day a d m i n i s t r a t i v e chores.

- 6 ...-. ..... , ..

X E a L

..

aa organ Iffor t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,of importa n t problems concerning t h e p r e p a r a t i o n for and of war and m i l i t a r y m e a s u r e s . " Matters reported discussed a t o u n c u nave i n c l u d e d S U C h q i e s t i o n s as nuclear, t e s t i n g ; promotions and changes i n t o p command p o s i t i o n s i n t h e armed forces; f o r e i g n policy--notably t h e German q u e s t i o n ; m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y ; and t h e s t r u c t u r e and size of S o v i e t forces. The r a n g e of permissible q u e s t i o n s is probably l i m i t e d o n l y by ghrushchev's i n t e r e s t s .
t h e Council w a s
I

Dec is ion-Making R o l e

Although it is fundamentally a c o n s u l t a t i v e body a t t h e disposal of t h e supreme l e a d e r s h i p , t h e Council also performs more d i r e c t f u n c t i o n s i n t h e policy-maki n g process, For i n s t a n c e , some of t h e reports on t h e a c t i v i t i e s of t h e Council suggest t h a t Khrushchev occ a s i o n a l l y u s e s it as a f o r u m for t h e announcement of h i s p e r s o n a l decisions--such as changes i n t h e m i l i t a r y h i g h command--or for t h e p r e l i m i n a r y a i r i n g of proposals, p r i o r t o p r e s e n t i n g them t o t h e presidium or c e n t r a l committee f o r f i n a l approval. There is also some evidence which suggests t o u s t h a t c e r t a i n types of d e c i s i o n s are a c t u a l l y made a t meetings of t h e Council or c i r c u l a t e d i n p r i v a t e chann e l s i n t h e name of t h e Council. Thus, a r e f e r e n c e in
V C .

........_.. . .. . , . . . .... ....z

o "requirements" of the Main M i l i t -Y o D e F s t r i c t l y f u l f i l l e d 1 *by commanders and p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n t h e armed forces i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e Council performs some p o l i c y f u n c t i o n s and issues d i r e c t i v e s i n t h e m i l i t a r y sphere. The Vequirementsl* are impossible t o d e f i n e because of a lack of evidence.
Wehave n o t t u r n e d up any r e f e r e n c e s t o s p e c i f i c documents i s s u e d in t h e name of t h e Higher M i l i t a r y Council.*
*There is evidence of i s s u a n c e s i n t h e name of lowerl e v e l m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s , b u t these i n s t i t u t i o n s are a species q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from t h e unique Higher M i l i t a r y Council.
- 7 -

==EL

t h a t "not e v e r y t h i n g depends on me; I work i n a collective.") Authozi'tbt i v e m i l i t a r y r e f e r e n c e s mention o n l y t h e "off icdal" decision-making bodies i n t h e p a r t y , and s t o p short ( a s might be expected) of mentioning Khrushchev's actual decision-making machinery.

4 '

, ._ ,
/.

..

Most n o t a b l e among t h e a t t e m p t s t o i n t e n t i o n a l l y obscure t h e Soviet p o l i c y process under Khrushchev are t w o r e c e n t a r t i c l e s by Marshal Malinovsky ( i n RED STAR) and Marshal Grechko ( i n IZVESTIYA) t h a t appeared on t h e occ a s i o n of Khrushchev's s e v e n t i e t h b i r t h d a y in A p r i l 1964. Both Marshals pontrayed t h e dominance o Khrushchev and f t h e p a r t y ( c e n t r a l committee and p r e s i d i u m ) , and portrayed t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l m i l i t a r y as t h e group which a d v i s e s and provides o t h e r forms of s u p p o r t i n t h e policy-making process. In a r a r e d e s c r i p t i o n of ''conferences" (soveshchanyy) of presidium members and l e a d i n g m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s , Marshal Grechko seemed t o be w r i t i n g about meetings of t h e HQher M i l i t a r y Council:

' ,

.. ....
.. . .

In t h e p a s t t e n y e a r s a l l these basic changes i n t h e s t r u c t u r e of o u r armed f o r c e s have taken place under t h e l e a d e r s h i p of t h e Leninist C e n t r a l Committee of o u r P a r t y and of N.S. Khrushchev p e r s o n a l l y . In these y e a r s , a t t h e i n i t i a t i v - e of N.S. Khrushchev, t h e Presidium of t h e CPSU Ce n t r a l Committee has held a series of conferences w i t h t he p a r t i c i p a t i o n of l e a d i n g m i l i t a r y f i g u r e s a t which t h e most imp o r t a n t problems r e l a t i n g t o t h e aeveloDment of each tvDe of armed force and -branch of troops have been c a r e f u l l y s t u d i e d . N.S. Khrushchev h a s most a c t i v e l y p a r t i c i pated i n t h e work of these confeiences and given proof of a profound and s p e c i f i c knowledge of m i l i t a r y matters. H e has been t h e i n i t i a t o r of many v a l u a b l e undertakings which have c o n s i d e r a b l y s t r e n g t h e n e d t h e defense c a p a b i l i t y of o u r s t a t e . I t w a s a t h i s prop o s a l t h a t t h e s t r a t e g i c rocket troops were c r e a t e d , which now form t h e backbone of t h e m i l i t a r y power of t h e S o v i e t Union and of t h e e n t ire s o c i a l ist camp. (Our emphasis. )
~

- 9 -

.. .

Grechko's r e f e r e n c e t o t h e "tea;year" l e n g t b of t h e conf e r e n c e s w i t h t h e "presidiumtt seems to be calculated t o f i t t h e p w t y theme of c o l l e c t i v i t y . He does not, of course, provide h i s readers w i t h t h e dates t h a t Khrushchev was a b l e (1) t o dominate t h e *tconferencesl' and t h u s maint a i n direct p e r s o n a l c o n t r o l mer t h e m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h ment, and subsequently (2) t o d e p r i v e h i s a s s o c i a t e s i n t h e r u l i n g presidium from a c q u i r i n g enough m i l i t a r y author6*yl;fto c h a l l e n g e h i s . Malinovskygs brief r e f e r e n c e t o d e c i s i o n making is even less s p e c i f i c t h a n Grechkogs. In t h e c o n t e x t of p r a i s i n g Khrushchev's leadership and s c o r i n g t h e " l i f e l e s s can0ns and dogmas widespread und e r S t a1i n , tt Mal inovsky wrote t h a t
. .

b e f o r e d e c i d i n g on any problem and adopti n g a practical d e c i s i o n on it, m e m b e r s of t h e p a r t y C e n t r a l Committee, m e m b e r s of t h e CPSU C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e P r e s i d u m , make a d e t a i l e d ' s t u d y of t h e s t a t e of a f f a i r s i n t h e Army and Navy, of t h e urgent problems i n consol i d a t i n g t h e country a s defense c a p a c i t y , of t h e urgent problems of m i l i t a r y development, and c o n s u l t leadi n g m i l i t a r y cadres. After t h i s a c o n c r e t e d e c i s i o n is reached
While redundant Malinovskyqs l a s t sentence emphar, sizes h i s p o i n t t h a t m i l i t a r y cadres are c o n s u l t e d on any problem before a "concrete d e c i s i o n " is reached. PRAVDA's v e r m f Mal inovsky' s a r t i c l e and a 17 A p r i l Moscow domestic s e r v i c e broldcast on the a r t i c l e deleted t h i s s e n t e n c e , as i f to p l a y down t h e policy-maker's dependence on t h e m i l i t a r y . (PRAVDA, f o r reasons unknown t o us, a l s o d e l e t e d Malinovsky's reference to Khrushchev a s "Supreme High Commander," and referred to Khrushchev simply as "comrade. '') The M i l it ary Influence

. . .....,

. ..(..

This b r i n g s us to a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e important i n d i r e c t o r informal role which t h e m i l i t a r y p l a y s i n t h e

10

-=a

. ..

formulation of @ o l i c y in t h e USSR. W f r e q u e n t l y see refe e r e n c e s in our i n t e l l i g e n c e p u b l i c a t i o n s t o t h e success o r f a i l u r e of t h e $ S o v i e t m i l i t a r y i n checking t h i s o r t h a t p o l i c y which ghrushchev h a s p u b l i c l y chappioned. B u t w e seldom, i f e v e r , see an e x p l a n a t i o n of how t h e m i l i t a r y manage t b make t h e i r i n f l u e n c e on p o l i c y f e l t . C l e a r l y , t h e q u e s t i o n I s n o t an e a s y one, e s p e c i a l l y Z n view of t h e f a c t s t h a t no p r o f e s s i o n a l m i l i t a r y man has s a t in t h e p a r t y p r e s i d i u m s i n c e 1957, and t h e m i l i t a r y r e p r e s e n t a t i o n In t h e p a r t y c e n t r a l committee c o n s t i t u t e s less t h a n teq. p e r c e n t of .the t o t a l membership of t h a t body.
The answer which w e o f f e r f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n is t h a t t h e Higher M i l i t a r y Council is t h e m i l i t a r y ' s p r i n c i p a l forum f o r applying p r e s s u r e on t h e supreme leadership t o

act on p o l i c y . The m i l i t a r y c h i e f t a i n s aome t o meetings of t h e Council as a d v i s o r s . B u t t h e l i n e between "advice" and special p l e a d i n g or lobbying is s l i g h t and e a s i l y t r a n s g r e s s e d . In t h e meetings of t h e Council, t h e m i l i t a r y are afforded direct access t o Khrushchev and o t h e r key presidium members and d i s c u s s w i t h them t h e most u r g e n t d e f e n s e - r e l a t e d problems of t h e day. Here t h e m i l i t a r y c h i e f s have an o p p o r t u n i t y , provided by t h e h i g h e s t l e v e l f o r u m t o which t h e y have access, t o b r i n g t h e i r viewpoints d i r e c t l y t o bear on p o l i c y makers a t an e a r l y stage hn t h e decision-making process .* While n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y mentioning t h e Higher M i l i t a r y Council as t h e "lobbying*t 'forum, Khrushchev himself ( a t a luncheon in New York as reported by TASS on 27 September 1960) commented on t h e i n f l u e n c e of t h e m i l i t a r y and weapon s p e c i a l i s t s on determining p o l i c y :
. . .
: .
..I

*The force component m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s , which w e d i s c u s s l a t e r , might provide a specialized a l t e r n a t i v e f o r u m 'for t h e branch commanders t o i n f l u e n c e , a t an e a r l y s t a g e i n p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n , i n d i v i d u a l c e n t r a l committee members who r e p o r t e d l y head secret m i l i t a r y s e c t i o n s w i t h i n t h e CC apparatus.
'

1 1

. .

/The
..
.-..

. . .. .

U.S. P r e s i d e n t 7 t o l d me t h a t he is o f t e n asked by the-military f o r money t o manufacture t h i s new t y p e of weapons or another. They t o l d him t h a t t h e Russians would o u t s t r i p them i n armaments u n l e s s he gave t h e m&ey. The P r e s i d e n t asked m e how t h i s w& done i n o u r country. I r e p l i e d t h a t approximately t h e same t h i n g happens. M i l i t a r y men and s c i e n t i s t s approach t h e government and ask f o r money t o manufacture new r o c k e t s . We g i v e . them money. S i x months later t h e same men come again and say: W have designed e better r o c k e t s , g i v e u s money f o r these rockets. W t e l l them: B u t r e c e n t l y e . w e allocated funds f o r new r o c k e t s . And t h e y r e p l y : Now w e have designed still better r o c k e t s , g i v e us money, otherwise t h e Americans w i l l o u t s t r i p u s . So w e have to a l l o c a t e money again.

. .

. . ..;...., .. .
%. , 8.

hot professional m i l it a r y , w a s their role i n t lear weapons t e s t i n g i n 1961 a f t e r a moratoeium of s e v e r a l years. Act h e matter w a s , d i s c u s s e d a t a meeting o cording er M i l i t a r y Council and t h e d e c i s i o n emanated from t h a t d i s c u s s i o n . The m i l i t a r y , it w a s reported, e x e r t e d pressure on Khrushchev ini3hBt meeti n g t o resume t e s t i n g i n 1961, by arguing convincingly t h a t "they could not be f u l l y prepared f o r w a r without t e s t i n g i n o r d e r t o know how d e l i v e r y v e h i c l e s would perform w i t h n u c l e a r warheads. I*

G=&2

Khrushchev's U s e of P r o f e s s i o n a l M i l i t a r y Advice Khrushchev (and h i s c l o s e a d v i s o r s i n t h e presidium) are, of c o u r s e , n o t bound t o act on t h e advice tendered by m e m b e r s of t h e Higher M i l i t a r y Council. Wrushchev has i n t h e past acted c o n t r a r y t o t h e judgment of v a r i o u s &embers of the p r o f e s s i o n a l m i l i t a r y leaders whose advice he had sought.

12

.. ,.. .. .,

A classic. . case i n p o i n t w a s t h e u n i l a t e r a l tro'opc u t p l a n announced by Khrushchev i n h i s Supreme S o v i e t speech on 1 4 January 1960. Khrushchev declared, ' w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e d e c i s i o n taken t o reduce S o v i e t forces by one-third, that '

. ... .. .. . .. ..

.. ... .. .

W have s t u d i e d t h i s q u e s t i o n in d e t a i l from e e v e r y angle, consulted w i t h t h e m i l i t a r y and t h e g e n e r a l s t a f f , and u n h e s i t a t i n g l y r e p l y : Our defense w i l l be f u l l y s u f f i c i e n t , and we have r e a l i s t i c a l l y t a k e n e v e r y t h i n g i n t o account. (Our emphasis.)
Khrushchev implied t h a t t h e o p i n i o n given by t h e " m i l i t a r y and t h e g e n e r a l staff" w a s one of suppo-rt for t h e m e a s u r e . B u t it has s i n c e been r e v e a l e d t h a t t h e second and t h i r d r a n k i n g m i l i t a r y leaders--the .Chief of t h e Warsaw Pakt ' f o r c 6 s a n d - t h e , ChSef df t h e General 'Staff-had opposed' mrus h c h e v ' s scheme. confirming our own inference, reporte m e of d e c i s i o n on t h e t r o o p c u t i s s u e , Marshal Sokolovsky, t h e n t h e Chief of t h e General S t a f f , protested t o Khrushchev t h a t , as a r e s u l t of Khrushchev's budgetary c u t s , he could not m a i n t a i n t h e S o v i e t forces a t t h e l e v e l which would be n e c e s s a r y t o defeat t h e great numbers a v a i l a b l e t o t h e enemy. ) Overriding t h e o p p o s i t i o n of Marshals Sokolovsky and Konev ( t h e n Warsaw P a c t c h i e f ) , Khrushchev 'pushed., h i s t r o o p c u t program through and replaced t h e r e c a l c i t r a n t o f f i c e r s w i t h some he t h o u g h t t o be more amenable in t h e t o p army posts.*

.. ,.. ....

For example, = r e c e n t l y recalled t h a t "when Marshal Grechko s t r o n g o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e p a r t i a l demobilization p l a n s s e v e r a l y e a r s ago, Khrushchev threw h i m o u t of t h e m e e t i n g and Grechko went on an extended l e a v e . Grechko was subsequently restored t o g r a c e , of course."

*Other s e n i o r m i l i t a r y a d v i s o r s also were opposed t o t h e t r o o p t c u t p l a n b u t were e v i d e n t 1 not as adamant as

Konev and Sokolovsky.

.-'

13

.i

. .

The Lower M i l i t a r y Councils

*,
I

There are, of course, other Inems used' by t h e m i l i t a r y t o e x p r e s s t h e i r viewpoints, t h e most n o t a b l e being t h e l a r g e body of d o c t r i n a l w r i t i n g s , both c l a s s i f i e d and open. And there is evidence s u g g e s t i n g t h a t there may be forums other t h a n t h e Higher M i l i t a r y Council u s e d by t h e m i l i t a r y t o convey t h e i r views d i r e c t l y t o highl e v e l p o l i c y makers.
O t h e r s u c h a d i v s o r y c e n t e r s may be found i n ' t h e m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s on t h e l e v e l s of t h e major f i e l d commands and f o r c e component h e a d q u a r t e r s .

',..

: : :

t h e group o f ' f o r c e s ; m i l i t a r y d i s t r i c t , army, PVO d i s -

'Command Level M i l i t a r y Counci1s:include t h o s e a t

t r i c t , f l e e t and f l o t i l l a l e v e l . They g e n e r a l l y consist of a t l e a s t three formal members: (1) t h e commander (or commander-in-chief) of t h e command, (2) h i s deputy or s t a f f c h i e f , and (3) t h e chief of t h e Main P o l i t i c a l Administration ( t h e t o p p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e r i n t h e m i l i t a r y s u b d i v i s i o n . ) Members have r e p o r t e d l y included other senior officers of t h e m i l i t a r y s u b d i v i s i o n , ass ' i s t a n t s t o t h e MPA c h i e f , and, s i g n i f i c a n t l y , l e a d i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of local p a r t y organs.* In a d d i t i o n t o p r o f e s s i o n a l m i l i t a r y and p a r t y members, c i v i l i a n s engaged

* A 20 November 1963 S o v i e t m i l i t a r y pamphlet e n t i t l e d llPolit i c a l Organs and P a r t y O r g a n i z a t i o n s of t h e S o v i e t A r m y and Navy," by Col. Gen. Kalashnik, s t a t e s t h a t "it is known t h a t a l l first secretaries of c e n t r a l committees of CLmmunist p a r t i e s i n union republics, first secretaries of k r a y committees, and many first secretaries of oblast p a r t y committees are members of m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s of m i l i t a r y d i s t r i c t s , f l e e t s , and PVO districts.91 The SMALL SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA (1958), i n d i s c u s s i n g t h e m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l on d i s t r i c t , f l e e t and army l e v e l , s t a t e s t h a t " t h e c o u n c i l carries o u t its work i n close c o n t a c t w i t h t h e local p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n .

14

.......... , . . ..

._.. . ~.

=E =L

i n e s s e n t i a l m i l i t a r y ,support a c t i v i t i e s i n t h e l o c a l e have been reported as having a t t e n d e d meetings of! m i l i t a r y district councils. ' . The command m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s .have powerful admini s t r a t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n a d d i t i o n t o s e r v i n g as c o n s u l t a t i v e organs f o r t h e commander. According t o a S o v i e t Defense M i n i s t r y book, FOUNDATIONS OF SOVIET ,MILITARY LAW (1962), m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s tvpossess< e r i g h t th guaranteed by law t o examine and decide a l l important matters i n t r o o p l i f e and a c t i v i t i e s . " (Our emphasis.) The r a n g e of decis ion-making powers is b r o a d l y described i n S o v i e t m i l i t a r y a r t i c l e s as i n c l u d i n g " m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l p r e p a r a t i o n , a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and m o b i l i z a t i o n a l work and t r a i n i n g of troops. It Decisions::ht t h i s level-which appear t o f a l l i n t o t h e r o u t i n e day-to-day c a t e g o r y , i n c o n t r a s t t o t h e Higher M i l i t a r y C o u n c i l ' s broader scope--are r e p o r t e d l y subject t o a m a j o r i t y v o t e by t h e members of t h e command l e v e l m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s . Accordi n g t o a pamphlet by Larkov and F i l i p p o v , e n t i t l e d "OneMan Command i n t h e S o v i e t Armed Forces and Methods of F u r t h e r Consolidation" (Moscow 1960),
t h e r e s o l u t i o n s of m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s are passed by a m a j o r i t y v o t e a f t e r d i s c u s - , s i o n of each q u e s t i o n on t h e basis of b m i n e s s - l i k e c r i t i c i s m and are brought i n t o e f f e c t by order of t h e c o m a n d e r , (commander-in-chief)

. . .. .. . . . ., .....'.'."
"

.... .... .. . ......

Thus t h e v o t i n g r i g h t r e p r e s e n t s a s i g n i f i c a n t check by t h e p a r t y on t h e l o c a l commander's freedom of:.maneuver..*

*That t h e m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s c o n t i n u e t o act as a l i m i t a t i o n on t h e commander's freedom of maneuver is made clear i n a 5 June 1964 RED STAR a r t i c l e by General Kurochkin. Evincing s e n s i t i v i t y on t h i s p o i n t , Kurochkin a t t e m p t s t o r e b u t t h e views he s a y s he o c c a s i o n a l l y f i n d s '*in o u r m i l i t a r y - p o l i t i c a l literature.. . t h a t in t h e S o v i e t Armed F o r c e s there i s . n o ' f u l l ' one-man command, s i n c e there are c o l l e c t i v e l e a d i n g organs, t h e m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s . Kurochkin makes t h e weak argument t h a t m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s do n o t annul t h e p r i n c i p l e of one-man command s i n c e ' ( f o o t n o t e continued on page 16)
It

-'15

...

The command-level m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s , as i n d i c a t e d in open press items, are s u b o r d i n a t e d t o b o t h t h e Defense M i n i s t r y and t h e c e n t r a l committee. They are under t h e Defense M i n i s t r y i n t h a t (1) t h e chairman of t h e l o c a l m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l , t h e commander, is s u b o r d i n a t e to t h e Defense XinisteF;, and (2) t h e m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l ' s resolut i o n s are executed by t h e order t t h e , commander. A t - t h e d same t i m e , t h e m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s are r e s p o n s i b l e t o t h e p a r t y ' s c e n t r a l committee in t h a t t h e Main P o l i t i c a l Administrat i o n (an independent c e n t r a l committee department) places l e a d i n g o f f i c i a l s on t h e c o u n c i l s as v o t i n g members. Force Component M i l i t a r y Councils appeared f o r t h e first t i m e in t h e m i l i t a r y press within a year after t h e
f a l l of Zhukov. Since t h e n , u n f o r t u n a t e l y , o n l y a s m a l l amount of information r e g a r d i n g membership and f u n c t i o n s of t h e f i v e M i l i t a r y Councils has been uncovered from both open and c l a s s i f i e d m i l i t a r y sources.

The composition of t h e f i v e c o u n c i l s a t t h i s l e v e l h a s not been r e v e a l e d i n a v a i l a b l e material. B u t i f t h e composition of force component c o u n c i l s c o n s i s t e n t l y f o l lows t h e Navy's p a t t e r n (and t h e announced p e r s o n n e l i n t h e M i l i t a r y Councils of t h e A i r Defense and S t r a t e g i c Rocket Forces l e n d s s u p p o r t t o t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y ) , t h e m a n b e r s h i p would c o n s i s t of (1) t h e Commanders-in-Chief of t h e force components, who head t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e Councils (Strategic Rocket Forces, Krylov; Navy,. Gorehkov; A i r Defense Forces, Sudets; A r m y A i r Force, V e r s h i n i n ; Ground Forces, Chuykov); (2) t h e i r d e p u t i e s and s t a f f chiefs; and (3) high-ranking Main P o l i t i c a l A d m i n i s t r a t ion officers (Deputy C h i e f s of t h e MPA are known t o b%.members of t h e ' Navy and A i r Defense Councils .)

. ............:. ..

......,... . .

( f o o t n o t e continued from page 15) (1) t h e d i s c u s s i o n of major problems i n t h e c o u n c i l s "only h e l p s t h e commander t o avoid errors and t o f e e l more convinced of t h e c o r r e c t n e s s of t h e d e c i s i o n made, and (2) t h e d e c i s i o n s of t h e m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l are p u t i n t o practice by t h e commander.

"

-, ,

16

-seuz.

. . ...
. ,

..

The f u n c t i o n s of t h e f o r c e component c o u n c i l s , asr e f l e c t e d in t h e m i l i t a r y p r e s s , s e e m t o p a r a l l e l t h e , . d u t i e s of t h e command l e v e l m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s .(discussed above). And t h e membership of t h e t w o t y p e s of c o u e c i l s appears t o f o l l o w t h e same p a t t e r n (i.e., t h e commander, h i s s t a f f c h i e f , and a high-ranking W A o f f i c e r ) But. w e do n o t know how r i g i d l y t h i s p a r a l l e l is. followed.. For example, w e know t h a t l e a d i n g l o c a l . p a r t y represent a t i v e s are m e m b e r s of t h e command l e v e l . m i l i t a r y counc i l s , b u t w e do n o t know whether s e n i o r c e n t r a l committee members are r e p r e s e n t e d in f o r c e component' m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s . And w e do not know whether t h e members of . f o r c e component c o u n c i l s have v o t i n g r i g h t s s i m i l a r t o t h e majority-vote p r i n c i p l e of t h e commanli l e v e l m i l i - . t a r y councils.

The Council and t h e U.S. National S e c u r i t y Council

Although it is a unique i n s t i t u t i o n i n S o v i e t s o c i e t y , t h e Higher M i l i t a r y Council, t o t h e degree t h a t its advi-

sory f u n c t i o n s are known t o us, seems t o bear some resemblance t o t h e us. National S e c u r i t y Council. In both cases, t h e chief of s t a t e has u l t i m a t e decision-making a u t h o r i t y on s t r a t e g i c m i l i t a r y i s s u e s . And in both cases, t h e d u t i e s of t h e two Counaila are t o assist tibe chief of s t a t e in t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of and p r e p a r a t i o n for n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y matters. A comparison of t h e "off i c i a l l y ' * defined g e n e r a l t a s k s of t h e two c o u n c i l s a l s o shows a c e r t a i n s i m i l a r i t y :
... '..*I- . .. , . . , . ..
I

._. \._ ....... ............%.. .. , . ..

National S e c u r i t y Council
j e c t i v e s , commitments, and r i s k s of t h e United States in r e l a t i o n t o its ac$ual and pot e n t i a l m i l it a r y power, in ' t h e i n t e r e s t of n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , for t h e purpose of making recommendat ions t o t h e P r e s i d e n t ,
T h e d u t i e s of t h e Council are t o assess and appraise t h e ob-

USSR M i l i t a r y Council
"A permanent, or t e m p o r a r i l y convoked, c o n s u l t a t i v e organ attached t o t h e s u p r e m e s t a t e a u t h o r i t y f o r t h e considerat i o n of important problems concerning t h e p r e p a r a t i o n f o r and waging of war:and m i l i t a r y m e a s u r e s .? (Short D i c t i o n a r y of O p e r a t i o n a l ,

.. ,

17

..:. . ...,. , . . , . , . .., .

...... .,,. , ..

....
,.

. .

and t o c o n s i d e r p o l i c i e s on matters of,aommon i n t e r e s t t o t h e departments and agencies of t h e Government conceraed w i t h t h e n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , and t o makelrecommendat i o n s t o t h e P r e s i d e n t '' ( A c t i v i t i e s of t h e National S e c u r i t y Council, United States Government Organizat i o n Manual 1963-64, pp. 56-

T a c t i c a l and General M i l i t a r y TBrmS, M i l i t a r y Publ i s h i n g House of t h e Ministry of Defense USSR, 1958,. p. 7 0 . )

,

57)

While t h e advisory f u n c t i o n s are a p p a r e n t l y somewhat s i m i l a r , t h e p a r a l l e l breaks down r e g a r d i n g t h e c u r r e n t ' usage and composition of t h e two i n s t i t u t i o n s . Regarding usage, t h e NSC which m e t somewhat r e g u l a r l y i n t h e 1950's is, as a r e s u l t of d i f f e r e n t s t y l e s of l e a d e r s h i p , only o c c a s i o n a l l y called together today. Wrushchev, while usipg t h e Higher M i l i t a r y Council a s an advisory body, may not r e l y upon it f o r c o n s u l t a t i o n concerning a s e n s i t i v e p o l i t i c a l - m i l i t a r y matter (e.g.l d u r i n g t h e 1962 Cuban m i s s i l e crisis, Khrushchev r e p o r t e d l y relied upon a f e w experienced p r e s d d m members*--not on a formal c o n s u l t a t i v e body--for related a d v i c e ) . Regarding composition, t h e c i v i l i a n U1.s. Secretary of Defense (an NSC member) appears t o w i e l d more decision-making power t h a n h i s S o v i e t counterp a r t , t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l m i l i t a r y Defense Minister. In add i t i o n w e have found no Higher M i l i t a r y Council l i n k w i t h t h e S o v i e t Foreign M i n i s t r y (which seems t o p l a y a minor policy-making r o l e ) , and t h u s a comparison w i t h t h e U.S. S e c r e t a r y of State (an NSC m e m b e r ) cannot be drawn.

*****

*The p a r t i c i p a t i o n of t h e presidium and o t h e r high-level p a r t y , s t a t e and m i l i t a r y i n d i v i d u a l s in m i l i t a r y p o l i c y formulation w i l l be t h e s u b j e c t of our second s t u d y on d e c i s i o n making.

18

While t h e Higher M i l i t a r y Council bears some comparison w i t h t h e National S e c u r i t y Council, w e f e e l t h a t t h e former m u s t be examined w i t h i n t h e S o v i e t system In o r d e r t o draw its present-day m i s s i o n i n t o s h a r p e r f o c u s . Thus we have searched o u t t h e h i g h l i g h t s of t h e c o u n c i l system over t h e l a s t t h i r t y y e a r s and p r e s e n t o w f i n d i n g s i n t h e f o l l o w i n g p a r t i n an a t t e m p t to increase o u r unders t a n d i n g of t h e p r o c e s s e s of m i l i t a r y c o n s u l t a t i o n a n d . . p o l i c y recornendat Ion i n t h e S o v i e t Union.
I .

.... . ..

19

PART TWO:

THE EVOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL

In t h i s p o r t i o n of t h e s t u d y , w e s h a l l t r y t o p l a c e t h e Higher M i l i t a r y Council i n h i s t o r i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e . The m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s y s t e m , i n brief o u t l i n e , has evolved i n t h e f o l l o w i n g way:

.. ,... ...,.. .. ., . .I.

(1) a M i l i t a r y Council under t h e Defense Commissar was formed i n 1934 as a high-level c o n s u l t a t i v e organ and was subsequently a b o l i s h e d , presumably between t h e end of 1937 and t h e beginning of World War 11;
(2) i n 1937, s u b o r d i n a t e m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s were created and given a d m i n i s t r a t i v e f u n c t i o n s (a role d i r e c t l y related t o t h e m i l i t a r y purge) as w e l l as adv i s o r y roles;

(3) i n 1938, S t a l i n e s t a b l i s h e d t w o Main M i l i t a r y Councils ('lG1avnyy Voyenny Sovet") to r u n t h e Army and Navy;
(4) t h e powers of t h e t w o Main M i l i t a r y Councils were assumed by t h e State Defense Committee and Stavka a d u r i n g World W r 11, and lower-level m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s were subordinated t o t h e Stavka;
... .....
..

...

.. ,....... - . .. . ,..,...

(5) d h o r t l y a f t e r t h e war, 8 s i n g l e a h l a i n M i l i t a r y Council (presumably combining t h e r o l e of the t w o 1938 Main M i l i t a r y Councils) and a M i l i t a r y Cou'rrcil under t h e Defense Minister (somewhat similar t o t h a t formed i n 1934) were recreated;
(6) a f t e r t h e 1950 m i l i t a r y r e o r g a n i z a t i o n , r e f e r ences t o S t a l i n ' s postwar Main M i l i t a r y Council disappeared f r o m view and t h e command-level m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s a p p a r e n t l y were s t r i p p e d of t h e i r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d u t i e s ;

(7) i n t h e 1953-1957 " c o l l e c t i v e p a r t y l e a d e r s h i p " p e r i o d , t h e high-level m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l was Ignored and t h e work of Eower l e v e l m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s w a s (according t o a n t i-Zhukov a r t i c l e s ) c u r t a i l e d ;

- 2 0 - '

.. . . .

...

. (8) f i n a l l y , w i t h t h e f a l l of Zhukov and t h e cons o l i d a t i o n of supreme power by Khrushchev, lower-level m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s were r e v i t a l i z e d w i t h a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and c o n s u l t a t i v e t a k k s ; f o r c e component m i l i t a r y counc i l s were introduced; and a Higher M i l i t a r y Council w a s formed t o accommodate Khrushchev's s t y l e of r u l e . 1934: The O r i g i n of t h e M i l i t a r y Council As A C o n s u l t a t i v e Body

The o r i g i n s of t h e Higher M i l i t a r y d o u n c i l may be traced back t o a June 1934 decree of t h e p a r t y ' s c e n t r a l e x e c u t i v e committee which f o r m a l l y abloa1shedLBhe Revolut ionary M i l i t a r y Council (Bewoensovet) and e s t a b l i s h e d t h e more c e n t r a l i z e d People's Commissariat of Defense.* The decree also s e t up a '*Military Council" under t h e new People's Commissariat of Defense, i n t h e capacity of a " c o n s u l t a t i v e organ.1c T h i s organ, w e t h i n k , was a protot y p e of t h e p r e s e n t "Higher M i l i t a r y Council .'I
U n l i k e t h e p r e s e n t Higher M i l it ary Counc 3.1, however, (1) t h e earlier v e r s i o n was subordinated t o t h e Commiss a r i a t of Defense, of which it was an o r g a n i c p a r t ; and (2) t h e membership of t h e e a r l i e r v e r s i o n was l i m i t e d to
1

..

*The Revvoensovet (RVS) w a s t h e governing body of t h e M i l i t a r y Commissariat from t h e e a r l y days of t h e CivtP1 War-, 'and t h e RVS possessed u l t i m a t e e x e c u t i v e and administ r a t i v e c o n t r o l over t h e S o v i e t armed f o r c e s . The RVS as t h e "nerve c e n t e r " of t h e command w a s composed of m i l i t a r y men acceptable to t h e c e n t r a l committee and w a s d i r e c t l y s u b o r d i n a t e t o t h i s body. The 1934 reorganieat i o n which abolished t h e RVS w a s aimed, first, a t s t r e n g t h e n i n g S t a l i n ' s c o n t r o l over t h e S o v i e t m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h ment, and, second, a t promoting t h e more e f f i c i e n t cont r o l of t h e m i l i t a r y over t h e o p e r a t i o n a l , admiknistrative and t e c h n i c a l a s p e c t s of t h e q u e s t i o n s w i t h which t h e y were involved. (See Erickson's THE SOVIET HIGH COMblAND,

London, 1962, Chapter Seven).

21

..

t h e o f f i c i a l head of t h e m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h m e n t , t h e Commissar of Defense, and h i s d e p u t i e s . * Thus; t h e M i l i t a r y Council of t h e l a t e ' t h i r t i e s m e t and worked under the1 command of Voroshilov ( t h e Peapike's Commissar for Defense); appoihtments t o t h e Council were made by t h e Sovnarkom (Council of People's Commissars) on Voroshilov's recommendation; and t h e Council ' s d e c i s i o n s and recommendations were put i n t o e f f e c t by Voroshilov who r e p o r t e d d i r e c t l y to Stalin.
.

. . . . . .. . . . ..

1937-1938:

The M i l i t a r y Purge and S t a l i n ' s Assumption of Direct Control of t he M i l i t a r y Council

-_

'-1

While Voroshilov's 1934 M i l i t a r y Council was com: pQsed e x c l u s i v e l y of m i l i t a r y . petsqnnel (ar6gnd- 8a membetg) , s e n i o r . p a r t y o f f i c i a l s a p p a r e n t l y had d i r e c t access t o t h e . m i n u t e s of t h e s e s s i o n s . And when p a r t y o f f i c i a l s ! o c c a s i o n a l l y attended meetings of t h e Council, t h e y dominated it.
.I

The C o u n c i l was J i i c t u a l l y decimated by t h e m i l i t a r y purge of 1937-1938. From 1 t o 4 June of 1937, an e x t r a o r d i n a r y s e s s i o n of t h e Council was held i n which t h e head of t h e NKVD, Pezhov, s u b m i t t e d a r e p o r t on an alleged "counter-revolutionary and t r e a s o n a b l e o r g a n i z a t i o n " i n t h e Red Army. Within 18 months of Yezhov's announcement, 75 of t h e 80 m e m b e r s of t h e Council were purged, accordi n g to S o v i e t s o u r c e s . As a r e s h l t of t h e purge, t h e r o l e of t h e M i l i t a r y Council w a s g r a d u a l l y decreased and it was a b o l i s h e d , evddently l a t e i n 1938 or not long afterwards

In t h e meantime, S t a l i n made t w o p r i n c i p a l moves w i t h t h e aim of t i g h t e n i n g p o l i c i a l c o n t r o l s over t h e army, a t t h e expense of t h e a u t h o r i t y and p r e s t i g e of

TSKOE m A T I V N O E PRAVO, Moscow, 1950. p. 239.

22

==a

t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l o f f i c e r c o r p s . F i r s t l y , i n May 1937, s u b o r d i n a t e m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s , composed of a commander and two o t h e r members, were introduced i n t o t h e m i l i t a r y d i s t r i c t s , f l e e t s and grmies. I n eachcbf these commands, t h e new m i l i t a r y council, according t o t h e book MILITARY STRATEGY, was made t h e "highest organ of a d m i n i s t r a t ion. I t had "complete r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " both f o r t h e m o r a l e - p o l i t i c a l c o n d i t i o n of t h e t r o o p s and f o r t h e i r "constant combat and mobilization preparedness." The fact t h a t a p o l i t i c a l commissar was made a m e m b e r of each c o u n c i l gave h i m t h e power t o i n t e r v e n e in t h e c o n t r o l and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of t h e major o p e r a t i o n a l commands. Thus, on t h e major command l e v e l , S t a l i n w a s able t o annul t h e p r i n c i p l e of u n i t y of command t h a t had been i n f o r c e s i n c e 1924 in t h e . s p h e r e s of combat, s u p p l y and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Later i n 1937, S t a l i n f o r m a l l y abolished t h e one-man command system and r e s t o r e d t h e e q u a l i t y of t h e commissars w i t h commanding personnel on a l l l e v e l s i n t h e armed f o r c e s . Secondly, in 1938, S t a l i n set u p h i s own s m a l l , advis o r y groups of p a r t y and m i l i t q y men l o y a l t o h i m s e l f , and nominally r e s p o n s i b l e t o t h e p a r t y c e n t r a l committee, t o supervise t h e running of t h e Red Army and Navy. These groups were o f f i c i a l l y called " t h e Main M i l i t a r y Council 61 t h e Red Army and t h e Main M i l i t a r y Council of t h e Navy." (LARGE SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA, November 1951, In terms of t h e i r s t a t u r e , a u t h o r i t y , and p. 486). f u n c t i o n s , , t h e s e c o u n c i l s more c l o s e l y resembled t h e present-day Higher M i l i t a r y Council t h a n d i d t h e M i l i t a r y Council which had been set up under t h e Defense Commissar i n 1934.

...

....... ... .
... .

The Army's M a i n M k l i t a r y Council c o n s i s t e d on a s t a f f of e l e v e n members; Voroshilov was Chairman of t h e group, which included S t a l i n himself, Blyukher, Budenny, Mekhlis, Shaposhnikov, and Shchadenko. The A r m y ' s Main M i l i t a r y Council bore some s i m i l a r i t y t o t h e Stavka of t h e Supreme High Command of World War 11, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n its practice of sending members t o m i l i t a r y " f r o n t . " (A case i n p o i n t is Blyukher's command i n t h e Lake Khasan o p e r a t i o n s of July-Bugust 1938). Longer-range w a r planning, probably with a high degree of c o o r d i n a t i o n With t h e Defense Committee (Komitet Oborony) of t h e p o l i t b u r o ,

23

5KREr.''

was also an a c t i v i t y of t h e Main M i l i t a r y Councils in t h e

period preceding World W a r 11.
..... ..

.'.I

.
I.

...

., .... ... . .
,

. .. . ...

The Navy's Main M i l i t a r y Council was under t h e chairmanship of p o l i t b u r o m e m b e r Zhdanov--but in r e a l i t y , both c o u n c i l s were under t h e c o n t r o l of S t a l i n t o whom Zhdanov and Voroshilov r e p o r t e d . The Main M i l i t a r y Councils took over a l l t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e f u n c t i o n s of t h e d e b i l i t a t e d M i l i t a r y Council (also under. Voroshilov) which is s a i d to have continued t o f u n c t i o n as a c o n s u l t a t i v e organ until it was e v e n t u a l l y abolished. -( ENCYCLOPEIDA, November, 1951, p. 486) The second e d i t i o n of MILITARY STRATEGY expanded on
t h e o r i g i n a l i n r e l a t i n g t h a t "the Main M i l i t a r y Councils examined t h e basic problems of t h e s t r u c t u r e pf t h e Army and Navy, and directed a l l of t h e i r a c t i v i t y i n t o t h e thorough p r e p a r a t i o n of t h e Army and Navy for t h e impending war." As an example, both v e r s i o n s of t h e book t o l d of an A p r i l 1940 meeting of t h e Army's Main M i l i t a r y Counc i l in which t h e " l e s s o n s of t h e war w i t h Finland" were

..discussed and a decree introduced on r e o r g a n i z i n g "many a d m i n i s t r a t ions of t h e People ps C o d s s a r i a t for Defense. (one of t h e important a d m i n i s t r a t i v e changes s p e c i f i c a l l y mentioned involved t h e r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e S o v i e t a i r defense d i r e c t o r a t e i n t o a main d i r e c t o r a t e .)
I t may be of i n t e r e s t t o n o t e t h a t S o v i e t h i s t o r i c a l accounts of t h e failure of S o v i e t defense p o l i c y on t h e eve of World War I1 blame S t a l i n p e r s o n a l l y (and t o a much lesser degree Marshals Timoshenko and Zhukov), b u t nowhere t o our knowledge c r i t i c i z e t h e m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l system. In t h e c u r r e n t h i s t o r i c a l fare, S t a l i n is accused of having ignored t h e p r i n c i p l e s of c o l l e c t i v e leadership-i .e. , by i m p l i c a t i o n , he ignored h i s m i l it a r y advisors--

24

3EML

and of having drawn thel.wrong conclusions f o r t h e strategic p r e p a r a t i o n of t h e country.* 1941: Role of M i l i t a r y Councils Assumed by S t a t e Defense Committee and S t avka During World W ar I1

. ..

The USSR was a t w a r o n l y a week or so when a r a d i c a l r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e m i l i t a r y , t h e government, and t h e . p a r t y w a s undertaken. On 30 June 1941, S t a l i n e s t a b l i s h e d t h e S t a t e Defense Committee (Gosudarstvennyy Komitet Oborony: OKO) as t h e "highest agency of command f o r t h e c o u n t r y and armed forces." In t h e GKO, government and p a r t y

*The Commander-in-Chief of t h e Strategic Rocket Forces, Marshal Krylov, d e l i v e r e d such a commentary earlier t h i s year: "It m u s t be a d m i t t e d t h a t under t h e c o n d i t i o n s of S t a1 in ' 6 p e r s o n a l i t y c u l t , t h e p o t e n t i a l it ies of t h e count r y and its armed f o r c e s w e r e not f u l l y e x p l o i t e d f o r e x e c u t i n g a c r u s h i n g r e p u l s e t o s u c h a s t r o n g and-dangerous enemy as t h e German f a s c i s t a g g r e s s o r s i n 1941. Conc e n t r a t i n g great power i n h i s own hands and m i s u s i n g t h e

'

.. . . .

............. .. .....-..... . . . .. .

. . . .. ..

c o n f i d e n c e ' o f t h e p a r t y and people, S t a l i n u n i l a t e r a l l y decided on t h e most important s t a t e problems and g r o s s l y ignored Lenin's p r i n c i p l e s of c o l l e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p . . The reprisals a g a i n s t a great number of o u t s t a n d i n g m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s who were f a i t h f u l and l o y a l commanders t o t h e p a r t y c o n s t i t u t e d one of t h e most s e r i o u s consequences of h i s a c t t v l t y . Before t h e outbreak of t h e war S t a l i n was f a m i l i a r w i t h data on t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n and deployment of German fascist d i v i s i o n s on t h e Western borders of t h e USSR. B u t 'he,:considerdd',this,..onlyprovocation. a As a r e s u l t , t h e country and t h e army found themselves in a d i f f i c u l t p o s i t i o n in t h e i n i t i a l period of t h e w a r . I t w a s only t h e u n f l i n c h i n g w i l l of t h e p a r t y and t h e courage of t h e S o v i e t people which made it p o s s i b l e t o s u r v i v e t h a t p e r i o d , t o e f f e c t a breakthrough, and t o win v i c t o r y . " (IZVESTIYA i n t e r v i e w , on t h e occasion of Armgd Forces Day, 23 February 1964.)

- 25 3GR&L

I
I
I

...._..... .. . ..

f u n c t i o n s were fused.* The GK0.almost overnight became t h e c e n t e r of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and o p e r a t i o n a l command over governmental, m i l i t a r y and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e organs i n t h e S o v i e t Union.** Presided over by S t a l i n , t h e GKO c o n s i s t e d of f i v e t o e i g h t p o l i t b u r o members, i n c l u d i n g o r i g i n a l l y , Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov, and Beria. Later, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, and Voznesensky j o i n e d t h e group, and i n 1944 Bulganin r e p l a c e d Voroshilov.
The i n d i v i d u a l m e m b e r s of t h e GKO were given d i r e c t r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r t h e p r i n c i p a l branches of t h e count r y ' s war materiel production-Molotov f o r t a n k s , Beria f o r armaments and munitions, Malenkov f o r a i r c r a f t , and Mikoyan f o r food and f u e l . (Mikoyan is t h e only former S t a t e Defense Committee m e m b e r s t i l l a c t i v e i n S o v i e t p o l i t i c a l l i f e and, as w e have a l r e a d y pointed o u t , he

*The f u s i o n w a s a l s o p e r s o n i f i e d by S t a l i n , who, d u r i n g t h e war, assumed t h e p o s t s of leader of t h e p a r t y , head of t h e government, Chairman of t h e S t a t e Defense Committee, Chairman of t h e Stavka, People's Commissar of Defense and Supreme Commander-in-Chief

**The "possible"' f u t u r e w a r t i m e o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e Sov i e t s t r a t e g i c leadership, according to. both 1962 and 1963 e d i t i o n s of t h e Defense M i n i s t r y ' s book MILITARY STRATEGY, would be delegated t h e same powers t h e State Defense Committee held d u r i n g World War 11. This organi. z a t i o n , a "higher agency of commandt1 (vysshiy organ rukovodstva), would be under t h e leadersh5p of t h e first s e c r e t a r y of t h e CPSU c e n t r a l committee and head of government, "to whom t h e f u n c t i o n s of Supreme Commander-inC h i e f of a l l t h e A r m e d Forces1' may be assigned. Addit i o n a l l y , t h e Defense M i n i s t r y books suggest t h a t t h e W a r s a w Pact P o l i t i c a l C o n s u l t a t i v e Committee would act as a high p o l i t i c a l organ f o r t h e c o o r d i n a t i o n Of t h e S a t e l l i t e and S o v i e t f o r c e s . The leadership of j o i n t o p e r a t i o n s would be s u p p l i e d by t h e S o v i e t Supreme High Command, i n which t h e supreme commands of t h e s a t e l l i t e armies would be r e p r e s e n t e d .

26

3EcE+

...

r e p o r t e d l y a t t e n d s meetings of t h e present-day Higher M i l it a r y Council. )

I.. .. .. ..

. ..:

. .

While t h e GKO w a s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r d i r e c t i n g and coo r d i n a t i n g t h e o v e r a l l w a r e f f o r t , another agency, t h e headquarters o r Stavka of t h e Supreme High Command, w a s charged w i t h t h e day-to-day p r e s e c u t i o n of t h e war and w i t h developing t h e o v e r a l l s t r a t e g i c p l a n s f o r t h e m i l i t a r y f o r c e s . Created by t h e GKO a s a s o r t of j o i n t chiefs of s t a f f , t h e Stavka c o n s i s t e d of between twelve and f o u r t e e n t o p m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s who advised S t a1i n , chairman of t h e Stavka and t h e Supreme Commander-in-Chief. In a d d i t i o n t o Zhukov, t h e e f f e c t i v e m i l i t a r y head of t h e Stavka d u r i n g most of its e x i s t e n c e , other chief m e m b e r s were Marshals Vasilevsky, Budenny, Timoshenko, Voronov, and Shaposhnikov. D i r e c t l y s u b o r d i n a t e t o t h e Stavka was t h e General S t a f f ( t h e Chief of which a l s o s a t on t h e Stavka) which acted a s a s o u r c e of planning and data on o r d e r of b a t t l e . Unfortunately, w e do n o t have information on t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e t w o Main M i l i t a r y Councils d u r i n g t h e w a r . W would deduce from t h e above accounts, however, e t h a t t h e y were d i s s o l v e d soon after t h e w a r began and t h e i r f u n c t i o n s were t a k e n over by t h e GKO and Stavka. In any case, w e have never enoountered r e f e r e n c e s t o t h e e x i s t e n c e of these c o u n c i l s d u r i n g t h e w a r . (The older M i l i t a r y Council i n t h e Defense Commissariat had e v i d e n t l y been abolished by t h e time H i t l e r launched o p e r a t i o n Barbarossa. )

......

On t h e other hand, t h e m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s of t h e d i s t r i c t s , f l e e t s and a r m i e s t h a t had been set up in 1987, played a key r o l e d u r i n g t h e war. According t o t h e LARGE SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA e n t r y of 1951, t h e y continued t o maint a i n "complete m i l i t a r y and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a u t h o r i t y in t h e f r o n t o r army zone of o p e r a t i o n s , " although t h e y were s t r i c t l y subordinated t o t h e Stavka. The m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s of f r o n t s ( t h e w a r t i m e e q u i v a l e n t of m i l i t a r y d i s t r i c t s ) were headed by t h e m i l i t a r y f r o n t commander and were manned by s e n i o r p a r t y personnel--the m o s t celeb r a t e d of whom was Khrushchev--who insured t i g h t p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l over major o p e r a t i o n a l commands throughout t h e

27

.. .

war. (On lower-levels of command, t h e p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l system underwent s e v e r a l changes. The p o l i t i c a l commis- , sar system, which had been abolished after t h e F i n n i s h debacle, w a s restored f o l l o w i n g t h e d i s a s t r o u s first days of t h e war w i t h Germany, b u t again gave way t o t h e s y s t e m of one-man command when t h e m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n improved i n October 1942.)
..

Union, where h i s t o r i c a l w r i t i n g is still made t o s e r v e t h e purposes of t h e c u r r e n t p a r t y leadership o r t o a i r t h e grievances of d i s s e n t e r s from c u r r e n t or proposed policies. Thus p r i n c i p a l C r e d i t f o r t h e planning of the s u c c e s s f u l S t a l i n g r a d o p e r a t i o n i n t h e f a l l of 1942 has a l t e r n a t e l y passed from S t a l i n t o t h e Stavka (notably Zhukov), t o t h e f r o n t command--where Khrushchev served as a m e m b e r of t h e m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l . By our own account of t h e mach5nery of m i l i t a r y p o l i c y formulation d u r i n g t h e war, there seems t o have evolved ( a f t e r a n i n i t i a l period of d e s p e r a t e i n n o v a t u n ) an e f f i c i e n t "Stavkaf r o n t t t e s y s t e m , c o n s i s t i n g of an exchange of combat i n t e l l i g e n c e between t h e f r o n t s and S t a l i n ' s Stavka and t h e t r a n s m i s s i o n of d i r e c t i v e s from t h e "Supreme Higb' Command" t o t h e f i e l d commanders. The Stavka/General S t a f f d i r e c t i v e s * provided t h e g e n e r a l concept of o p e r a t i o n s determined t h e f o r c e s t o be committed and c o n c e n t r a t e d i n Its execution, and set t h e date f o r commencing t h e o p e r a t ion. Front cormpanders enjoyed. some l a t i t u d e i n applying their own s p e c i f i c requirements f o r t h e e x e c u t i o n
........... .. . .. . .n . .. ..... ,. ,...., .

The methods of s t r a t e g i c command and c o n t r o l d u r i n g t h e w a r and t h e i r r e l a t i o n t o p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n have s i n c e become a p o l i t i c a l l y charged i s s u e w i t h i n t h e S o v i e t

. ". ,
...>..:.

*In making v i t a l d e c i s i o n s , t h e Stavka a p p a r e n t l y r e l i e d h e a v i l y on f o r e i g n i n t e l l i g e n c e sources as w e l l as on t h e t a c t i c a l information s u p p l i e d from t h e S o v i e t f r o n t s See Erickson, TEE SOVIET HIGH COMMAND, f o r an e x c e l l e n t descript i o n of t h e r o l e of espionage n e t s on m i l i t a r y p o l i c y making--specif i c a l l g t h e v i t a l d e c i s i o n s based on r e p o r t s from Sorge in Japan, Rote Kapelle in Germany, and Rossler i n Switzerland (pp. 637-639).

... .. .

28

of t h e Stavka o r d e r , but r i g i d adherence t o t h e f r o n t d i r e c t i v e was t h e keynote of o p e r a t i o n s a t t h e army l e v e l and below. In a d d i t i o n t o Stavka d i r e c t i v e s , i n d i v i d u a l members of t h e Supreme High Command were f r e q u e n t l y s e n t t o t h e area of o p e r a t i o n s (Zhukov t o S t a l i n g r a d f o r an example) , and f r o n t commanders and t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s were f r e q u e n t l y summoned t o t h e Stavka.
. . .
......,,, ... .... .. . . .:..i5-.; '.. .. '. . ..
1

1946:

E s t a b l i s h m e n t Of A S i n g l e Main M i l i t a r y Council

With t h e end of t h e w a r , S t a l i n abolished t h e S t a t e Defense Committee (September 1945) and t h e Stavka ( i n . 1946). He a l s o r e l i n q u i s h e d h i s own t i t l e of Supreme High Commander, according t o o f f i c i a l S o v i e t h i s t o r i e s , b u t remained t h e o f f i c i a l as w e l l as actual head of t h e m i l i t a r y establishment u n t i l March 1947, when he gave up t h e p o s t of Minister of t h e Armed Forces t o a p o l i t i c a l marshal; Bulganin. Again, lamentably, w e have h a r d l y any information on t h e m i l i t a r y adGisory bodies i n t h e e a r l y postwar period. One S o v i e t source, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE USSR (19461, s t a t e s without e l a b o r a t i o n :
' 1

To t h e c e n t r a l organs of t h e m i l i t a r y adm i n i s t r a t i o n belong: t h e Main M i l i t a r y Council n l a v n y y Voyenyy Sovet7, t h e Mini s t r y of-the; Armed Forces of The USSR, and t h e M i l i t a r y Council-a consultative organ of t h e M i n i s t e r of Armed Forces of t h e USSR.
While we have found no information s t a t i n g t h a t t h e two Main M i l i t a r y Coucnils formed in 1938 were e v e r f o r m a l l y abolished, w e are l e d t o conclude t h a t a new s i n g l e Main M i l i t a r y Council, combining t h e r o l e s of t h o s e set up i n 1938, was formed by S t a l i n in February 1946, when t h e Navy and Defense Commissariats were merged. (fa March 1946, t h e u n i f i e d defense commissariat w a s named t h e Mini s t r y of t h e Armed Forces 09 . t h e U S S R . ) The ADMINISTRATIVE L W BOOK of 1946, while f a i l i n g t o supply information A

29

M i l i t a r y Council under t h e M i n i s t r y of Defense has n o t been d i s c u s s e d b u t presumably it included a t leas uerense Minis er (who probably r e p o r t e d d i q e c t l y t o S t a l i n ) , t h e deputy d e f e n s e ministers, and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e General S t a f f .
1950:

on t h e f u n c t i o n s and membership of t h e new Main M i z i t a r y Council, r e v e a l e d t h e s u p r a m i l i t a r y s t a t u s of t h a t organ by l i s t i n g it b e f o r e t h e Defense Minfstry. (Our n e x t e x p l i c i t r e f e r e n c e t o t h e Main M i l i t a r y Council, some 15 y e a r s l a t e r i n -the J u l y , 1961, a1 t n e c;ouncii se M i n i s t r y in ' a h i e r a r c h i c a l l i s t i n g I , of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e agencies.) The membership of t h e

Council System S t r i p p e d of Former Powers

..... .. .. ..., .

The Main M i l i t a r y Council n o t e d i n 1946 w a s ignored i n o f f i c i a l S o v i e t p u b l i c a t i o n s f o l l o w i n g t h e February 1950 r e o r g a n i z a t i o n ( i n which t h e USSR M i n i s t r y of t h e Armed Forces was renamed @'War M i n i s t r y of t h e USSR" and t h e c o n t r o l of t h e Naval Forces w a s c o n c e n t r a t e d i n t h e "Ministry of t h e Navy of t h e USSR"). W have found no e evidence t o i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e 1950 r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e Soviet m i l i t a r y establishment i n t o t h e t w o ministries involved t h e r e - e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t w o Main M i l i t a r y Counc i l s f o r - t h e t w o m i l i t a r y m i n i s t r i e s (as i n 1938). It is p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e post-war Main M i l i t a r y Council w a s aboltthhed a t t h a t time. Some twenty months a f t e r t h e 1950 r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e d e f e n s e e s t a b l i s h m e n t , t h e LARGE SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA ignored t h e Main M i l i t a r y Counc i l b u t spoke of a " M i l i t a r y Council''-which w a s similar t o t h e post-war a d v i s o r y organ under t h e Defense M i n i s t e r : The M i l i t a r y Council is a c o l l e g i a l , usu a l l y c o n s u l t a t i v e , organ under t h e war Minister f i h o is t h e 7 commander of a l l Armed ForEes of t h e s t ate: S t a l i n may n o t have f e l t compelled t o make much use of h i s post-war Main M i l i t a r y Council in t h e f i r s t p l a c e . The Main M i l i t a r y Council, l i k e so many of h i s formal

30

....

...., . ., . .. .. . . . ..

o r g a n i z a t i o n s , may not have been a b o l i s h e d and may have continued t o e x i s t as a paper o r g a n i z a t i o n which seldom met. ( I n t h e e a r l y postwar p e r i o d , for'example, S t a l i n c a l l e d only i r r e g u l a r meetings of t h e p o l i t b u r o . ) And i n view of t h e g e n e r a l s t a g n a t i o n i n Soviet m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e i n t h a t p e r i o d , it would appear t h a t S t a l i n r u l e d over t h e armed f o r c e s w i t h a heavy hand and a deaf ear t o h i s g e n e r a l s and m a r s h a l s u n t i l h i s d e a t h i n 1953. (Marshal Grechko r e c e n t l y declared--in IZVESTIYA on 17 A p r i l 1964--that S t a l i n adopted i n c o r r e c t posit i o n s on o r g a n i z a t i o n a l problems while "remaining a t t h e head of t h e armed f o r c e s a f t e r k h e w a r . " )

'

In a d d i t ion, t h e 1950 r e o r g a n i z a t i o n a p p a r e n t l y s t r i p p e d t h e command-level m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s of t h e powers which t h e y had wielded d u r i n g and immediately a f t e r t h e w a r . The change i n power and s t a t u s from t h e m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l t o t h e la: a1 commander is s t r i k i n g l y e v i d e n t i n a comparison of t h e 1946 Evtikhiev-Vlasov book, ADMINISTRATIVE L W USSR w i t h t h e 1950 Eutikhiev-VlasovA Studeniken book, SOVIET ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: 1946 Admintstrative Law USSR
S ta tu s

1950 Soviet Administrative Law*

.. .. . . .. .... .... ...

.

....

"The m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l of a m i l i t a r y d i s t r i c t (army, f l e e t ) is t h e h i g h e s t . r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of m i l i t a r y power i n t h e d i s t r i c t (army, f l e e t ) . I t is subordinated d i r e c t l y t o t h e M i n i s t r y of Armed Forces of t h e USSR. A l l m i l i t a r y u n i t s and m i l i t a r y i n s t i t u t i o n s which are l o c a t e d on t h e t e r r i t o r y of a d i s t r i c t ( f r o n t , army) are s u b o r d i n a t e d t o t h e m i l i t a r y council. It c o n S i s t s of t h e commander of t h e d i s t r i c t t r o o p s (he is also t h e chairman) and two members. u

"The commander of a m i l i t a r y district ( f l e e t , f l o t i l l a , group of forces) is t h e h i g h e s t a u t h o r i t y of a l l t h e t r o o p s , m i l i t a r y i n s t i t u t i o n s and m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g e s t ab1ishments on t h e t e r r i t o r y of a d i s trict (fleet, f l o t i l l a , group of f o r c e s ) and is subordinated d i r e c t l y t o t h e War M i n i s t r y of t h e USSR (Ministry of t h e Navy of t h e USSR)

."

*The 1950 work ignored t h e m i l i t a r y council s y s t e m . a l together.

31

. .

Powers
has complete r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for t h e p o l i t ical-morale c o n d i t i o n and c o n s t a n t b a t t l e

"The m i l it a r y c o u n c i l

.,

... . - . ..
..

and m o b i l i z a t i o n preparedness of t h e m i l i t a r y i n s t i t u t i o n s which are l o c a t e d i n t h e d i s t r i c t . I t is e n t r u s t e d w i t h t h e l e a d e r s h i p of combat p o l i t i c a l preparedness of t h e t r o o p s of a d i s t r i c t (army, f l e e t ) ; t r a i n i n g and s e l e c t i o n of cadres of command p o l it ical and l e a d i n g s t a f f s of a d i s t r i c t P s u n i t s and i n s t i t u t i o n s ; t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n preparedness of t h e troops of a d i s t r i c t , t h e communicationi. routes and means of c o n t a c t on t h e d i s trict's t e r r i t o r y ; the traini n g of a l l personnel i n t h e selfless s p i r i t of d e d i c a t i o n t o t h e homeland and S o v i e t a u t h o r i t y , i n t h e merciless s p i r i t of s t r u g g l e w i t h t h e p e o p l e ' s enemies, w i t h s p i e s , s a b o t e u r s , wreckers. The d i s t r i c t m i l it ary c b u n c i l is charged w i t h e n s u r i n g t h e u n i t s and i n s t i t u t i o n s w i t h a l l types of t e c h n i c a l and material s u p p l i e s , s a n i t a r y and v e t e r i n a r y p r o v i s i o n s , d e f e n s i v e and nondefensive c o n s t r u c t i o n on t h e t e r r i t o r y of a d i s t r i c t . The m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l of a d i s t r i c t t a k e s an a c t i v e p a r t i n t h e work of c i v i c organization r e g a r d i n g t h e s t r e n g t h e n i n g of t h e r e a r areas and

"The commander of t h e t r o o p s of d i s t r i c t ( f l e e t , f l o t i l l a , group of f o r c e s ) has complete r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the political-morale c o n d i t i o n and c o n s t a n t b a t t l e and m o b i l i z a t i o n preparedness of t h e m i l i t a r y u n i t s and i n s t it u t ions which are located i n t h e d i s t r i c t . He is e n t r u s t e d with t h e l e a d e r s h i p of b a t t l e and p o l i t i c a l preparedness of t h e t r o o p s of a d i s t r i c t , t r a i n i n g and s e l e c t i o n of cadres o d i s t r i c t u n i t s f and i n s t i t u t i o n s ; t h e mobiliz a t i o n preparedness of t h e t r o o p s of a d i s t r i c t , t h e communication r o u t e s and means of c o n t a c t on t h e t e r r i t o r y of a d i s t r i c t ; t h e t r a i n i n g of a l l personnel i n t h e selfless s p i r i t of d e d i c a t i o n t o t h e homeland and S o v i e t a u t h o r i t y , in a merciless s p i r i t of s t r u g g l e w i t h t h e people's enemies, w i t h s p i e s , s a b o t e u r s , wreckers. The commander of t h e t r o o p s of a d i s t r i c t ( f l e e t , f l o t i l l a , group of f o r c e s ) is charged w i t h e n s u r i n g t h e u n i t s and i n s t i t u t i o n s a l l types of t e c h n i c a l and material s u p p l i e s , s a n i t a r y and v e t e r i n a r y p r o v i s i o n s , d e f e n s i v e and noddefensive c o n s t r u c t i o n s on t h e . t e r r i t o r y of a

32

.. .

...,....... . .. .. .

f u l f i l l i n g other work which is d i r e c t e d toward s t r e n g t h ening t h e defensive capabili t i e s of t h e USSR." (p. 152)
..

.'..'.\', . . . .,. ... .

"

. . . . ..
.

. ...

d i s t r i c t . He takes an a c t i v e p a r t i n t h e work of c i v i c o r g a n i z a t i o n s regarding t h e strengtheni n g of t h e rear a r e a s and i n f u l f i l l i n g o t h e r work which is d i r e c t e d toward s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e def e n s i v e cap ab il it d e s of t h e USSR." (p. 240)

S t r i p p e d of t h e i r postwar s t a t u s and powers, t h e commandl e v e l m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s n e v e r t h e l e s s continued t o e x i s t after t h e 1950 r e o r g a n i z a t i o n . '*In peacetime, ** t h e 1951 LARGE .SOVIET ENCYCM)PEDIA's e n t r y went, *'in t h e S o v i e t Army t h e m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l is preserved a s a c o n s u l t a t i v e organ under t h e d i s t r i c t commanders. I*
1953-1957:

Diminished Role of Council System Continues

From t h e death of S t a l i n , t o t h e f a l l of Marshal Zhukov t h e m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l system was, as in earlier postwar days, r a r e l y mentioned. The near s i l e n c e regardi n g command-level m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s is probably most c l e a r l y explained by t h e 2 November 1957 CPSU CC r e s o l u t i o n , and follow-up comment, which charged Zhukov w i t h p u r s u i n g **a o l i c y of c u r t a i l i n g t h e work o f . . . m i l i t a r y p councils.
... .. ...

S o v i e t comment subsequent t o t h e Zhukov indictment has suggested t h a t d u r i n g t h i s period t h e lower-level m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s diil not r e g a i n t h e i r w a r t i m e powers of "cornplete m i l i t a r y and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a u t h o r i t y , *' b u t rather

continued t o s e r v e o n l y as advisory bodies. A 1960 Defense M i n i s t r y pamphlet, "One-Man Command i n t h e S o v i e t Armed Forces and Methods of FurthEr Consol i d a t ion, a f t e r scori n g Zhukov's a l l e g e d p u r s u i t of m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s h i p as having been "void of checks and c o n t m l s , '' s t a t e d :
.Our p a r t y h a s e n e r g e t i c a l l y rejected a l l attempts to e l i m i n a t e m i l i t a r y

33

,. .

c o u n c i l s or t o reduce t h e i r . r u l e t o cons u l t d t i v e organs without any r i g h t s a t all.

The membership of t h e command-level m i l i t a r c o u n c i l s a t t h i s t i m e has n o t been made c l e a r B u t on t h e b a s i s of S o v i e t press a r t 1 Zhukov p e r i o d , we would s u r m i s e t h a t t h e composition of t h e c o u n c i l s was stacked i n f a v o r of t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l m i l i t a r y . For not u n t i l a f t e r Zhukov's d i s m i s s a l were C h i e f s of t h e P o l i t i c a l D i r e c t o r a t e s i d e n t i f i e d as members of M i l i t a r y Councils a t t h e m i l i t a r y - d i s t r i c t and group-of -f orces level-:* This new i d e n t i f i c a t i o n suggests t h a t t h e t o p p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e r in t h e area had not been a member of t h e m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l d u r i n g a t least t h e l a t t e r p a r t of t h e * ' c o l l e c t i v e leadership" period.

... .

. . . ..

In t h e absence of S o v i e t r e f e r e n c e s t o any highl e v e l m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d , t h e advisory and p o l i c y planning t a s k s appear to have f a l l e n wgthin t h e e x c l u s i v e domain of t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l m i l i t a r y chiefs and t h e General S t a f f . In s u p p o r t of t h 3 s i n f e r e n c e , some post-Zhukov press items i n d i c a t e t h a t during Zhukov's a d m i n i s t r a t i o n armed forces members were denied d i r e c t For example, r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t o t h e decision-makers. Marshal Moskalenko wrote i n a n a r t i c l e in RED STAR on 3 November 1957 t h a t a s a r e s u l t of Zhukov's "rude trampli n g of L e n i n i s t p r i n c i p l e s " of d i r e c t i n g t h e armed forces, " t h e s i t u a t i o n reached t h e p o i n t where Communists were a c t u a l l y not p e r m i t t e d t o address t h e c e n t r a l committee of t h e p a r t y , t o express t h e i r p r o p o s a l s and
i d e a s .Iv
.,. ..... . . . . .

...

*The first i de n t i f i c a t i o n of a "member of t h e M i l i t a r y Council and Chief of t h e P o l i t i c a l D i r e c t o r a t e " occurred on 30 October 1957, when L t . Gen. N. Id. Aleksandrov of t h e Kiev M i l i t a r y D i s t r i c t was so described. Since t h e n t h i s d e s i g n a t i o n has been given t o !the t o p p o l i t i c a l officers i n t h e o t h e r m i l i t a r y d i s t r i c t s .
1

34.-

:-

1957

- Present:

Khrushchev R e v i t a l i z e s Council System

......... ..
..

Within a year after t h e f a l l of Zhukov, three s i g n i e f i c a n t developments (which w d i s c u s s e d i n P a r t One of t h i s study) were brought about i n t h e m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l system of t h e S o v i e t Union.* The first involved Khrushchev's c r e a t i o n of t h e Higher M i l i t a r y C o u n c i l , first d e f i n e d i n a 1958 m i l i t a r y d i c t i o n a r y (cited earlier) r e a s o n s xor m r u s h c h e v ' s r e a t ion oo u n c f il , w e f e e l , were (1) h i s f e l t need toe e n s u r e h i s assumption of direct o p e r a t i o n a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o n k r o l o v e r t h e e n t i r e S o v i e t m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h m e n t , and (2) h i s desire t o have a high-level c o n s u l t a t i v e body on defense matters a t h i s Immediate d i s p o s a l . An effect of t h i s development, if n o t another aim, w a s t o provide i n d i v i d u a l p r o f e s s i o n a l m i l i t a r y leaders w i t h a forum for d i r e c t access t o t h e u l t i m a t e policy-makers.
. w o t h e r changes i n t h e c o u n c i l system occurred T o a t about t h e same time, and probably for t h e same p u r poses. One involved t h e c r e a t i o n of an unprecedented type of c o u n c i l - - m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l s a t t h e f o r c e c ~ r n ~ . - ~ - ' ~ t : ponent l e v e l (ground forces, navy, a n t i - a i r defense, etc.)--which began to be mentioned in t h e press i n 1958. Another change, made apparent d i r e c t l y after t h e f a l l of Zhukov, involved t h e r e v i t a l i z a t i o n of t h e major operat i o n a l command l e v e l m i l it ary c o u n c i l s which were given greater adminis*rat i v e powers i n a d d i t ion t o t h e i r former consultative role.

..
2.Y.'

..t

.... .. . . ,.

*The changes in 1 9 5 f-58 i n t h e c o u n c i l system may be l e g a l l y based i n a document s p o r a d i c a l l y cited in t h e S o v i e t press e n t i t l e d "Regulations on M i l i t a r y C o u n c i l s ' ' o r t h e " S t a t u t e on M i l i t a r y Councils" which w a s i s s u e d , sometime between t h e November 1957 indictment of Zhukov and t h e end of 1958. The document, u n f o r t u n a t e l y , remains unpublished and c u r r e n t l y u n a v a i l a b l e .

35

3mWL